



# SWEDEN

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Statement by Sweden on behalf of Austria, Mexico and Sweden for the special time on nuclear disarmament at the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Introduction of working paper on reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons

Geneva, 30 April 2003

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Mr. Chairman,

At the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the nuclear weapons states committed themselves to "further reductions of non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process". This was undoubtedly a major achievement. For the first time ever these weapons were addressed in a consensus document. In this session of the preparatory committee, at last year's session as well as this year's, a large number of delegations have spoken about the importance of pursuing this issue. Austria, Mexico and Sweden would like to add our contribution by tabling the working paper "Reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons" at this session.

Mr. Chairman,

There are several numbers of rationals behind this working paper.

First, non-strategic nuclear weapons are a global concern, but due to the lack of transparency, general knowledge about these weapons is limited. The estimate numbers, depending on definitions, range between 7,000 and 20,000.

Second, tactical nuclear weapons are an integral part of the global nuclear disarmament agenda. It is a part of the "unequivocal undertaking" to achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons which the nuclear weapons states committed themselves to at the 2000 Review Conference. It is part of the 9<sup>th</sup> of the 13 practical steps towards this goal.

Third, non-strategic nuclear weapons pose great threats. Their portability, proximity to areas of conflict and high probability of pre-delegation in case of military conflict increase the risk of proliferation and of early, pre-emptive, unauthorized or accidental use. They can be more easily and frequently transported than strategic nuclear weapons. They could be appealing to terrorists due to their relatively small size and sometimes less sophisticated safety and security devices.

Fourth, there are deeply worrying signs that some countries are planning to develop new types of low-yield non-strategic nuclear weapons and to use them as so-called "battlefield weapons" against for example hardened and deeply buried targets. This development is surprising – also from a military standpoint - since highly sophisticated conventional weapons are being developed for the same purposes. This development would also go against many of the commitments made in 2000 – the unequivocal undertaking, the principle of irreversibility and the diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security doctrines. It could also threaten one of the corner-stones of the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime, namely the Comprehensive

Test-Ban Treaty since the development of new weapons probably would require the resumption of nuclear testing.

Fifth, non-strategic nuclear weapons is increasingly seen by some countries as a counter to conventional forces – especially if countries lack the resources to advance and modernize their conventional weapons' systems. There is a real danger that the distinction between conventional weapons and non-strategic nuclear weapons is being erased, and, thus, that the threshold against the use of nuclear weapons is being lowered.

Last but not least, non-strategic nuclear weapons have traditionally been neglected in arms control negotiations. The only specific framework for these weapons is the 1991/92 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives or Declarations between the United States and the Soviet Union/Russian Federation. These declarations are not legally binding, but rather political commitments, which means that there is no mechanism in them for exchange of information or for the verification of compliance. Both sides have postponed the completion of elimination.

What can be done about this? With regards to the possible development of new tactical nuclear weapons and possible new rationales for their use, we would like to make a strong appeal to all delegations to make sure that these plans remain plans only – for the safety of the world and for the integrity of the NPT regime. With regards to a concrete way forward, we would like delegations to consider the following:

First, the framework of the 1991/92 presidential declarations could be strengthened through the reaffirmation by the United States and the Russian Federation of their continued commitment to the regime, and with the codification into a legally binding instrument, ensuring the principles of irreversibility, transparency and verification. Such a framework could be used to help the Russian Federation acquire resources to implement the remaining part of its commitments. And it could be used for further agreed upon reductions between the two countries.

Second, confidence-building measures, including increased transparency, could be developed among the nuclear weapons states that possess these weapons. Measures could include the exchange of data on holdings and status, safety provisions, types of weapons, yields, ranges of their designated delivery systems, distribution by region, and weapons elimination.

Third, further reduction of the operational status of these weapons so as to reduce the risks of pre-emptive or accidental use. Accountability measures could be developed to this end, for example the removal of the weapons to secure storage with no movement

outside the storage without prior notification, including a commitment to a ceiling in the number of weapons deployed.

Fourth, special security and physical protection measures for transport and storage could be enhanced. Guarantees for the safety of these weapons, their components and related materials could be given by the nuclear-weapons states.

Fifth, certain types of non-strategic nuclear weapons could, as a first step, be prohibited and eliminated including those that already have been removed from the arsenals of some nuclear weapons states. A ban could be suitable for nuclear mines, nuclear artillery shells, grenades, short-range ballistic missiles, nuclear anti-aircraft, and anti-missile weapons. Transparency mechanisms for the verification of the elimination of these weapons could be developed.

Mr. Chairman,

It is our hope that our working paper will stimulate discussion among delegations on the important issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons in itself, and also on ways to move this issue forward both within the current review process of the NPT with a view to make recommendations to the 2005 NPT Review Conference, and elsewhere in other fora.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.