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## **REPORT ON NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT POLICIES RELATED TO WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, ARMS CONTROL ISSUES**

**Translations of government policy documents, speeches, parliamentary questions and answers;**

**PENN reports; some Belgian and German documents**

**Jan 2001 - November 2002**

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**Documents Netherlands government and parliament; official speeches, PENN  
Reports on developments Jan 2001 - Nov 2002  
(including some German and Belgian documents)**

**PENN/NI Report**

**4 February 2001**

Please find below and attached a translation of part of a note sent to the Dutch parliament on 17 January by the Minister of Foreign Affairs van Aartsen. It is also written on behalf of the Minister of Defence, and is a response to earlier pressure on the minister by members of the foreign affairs committee concerning the Dutch position at NATO on the para 32 process. In fact the minister promised a meeting on this para 32 process/NATO nuclear policy to take place before the NATO ministerials in December. (see my earlier report on the September foreign affairs committee meeting, which discussed the NPT review conference). The meeting will now take place on 21 February: this note will be part of the proceedings.

Re the content, note the following:

- some of the time references are wrong, which confirms that the note was originally written last year
- Holland still supports the basic tenet of NATO nuclear policy: note the explicit reference to it in the second paragraph under 'results'
- The minister claims credit for some of the input in the para 32 process (third paragraph)
- The specific policy results re the public, ngo's are concerned with partial transparency on readiness and security measures.. Note the continued secrecy on locations etc;
- Note that the minister acknowledges that the Volkel squadrons are DCA: this is one step closer to admitting tacnukes are stored there
- Re Russia : essentially exchange of information on tacnukes, CSBM with an eye on possible negotiations. The Dutch government wants further negotiated reductions
- On reductions. Note especially the specific reference to a permanent presence of tacnukes under 'nuclear transparency'
- Finally, note the support for the NPT final document

**Comments**

The most important point is the contradiction in NATO nuclear policy which we noted earlier in relation to the NPT process and NAG resolution. The para 32 report confirmed this contradiction which means that there is at least some internal difference of opinion within NATO. Along which lines is of course the interesting factor. Certainly it would seem useful to continue to encourage the NATO five to carry out the promises made in the para 32 report. This can be most usefully done by encouraging public debate on the contradiction, both within and outside the parliaments of these five (and elsewhere if possible). Note however that the NMD/TMD debate will increasingly overshadow this discussion unless we make the link somewhere.

Finally, on Araxos question: only one Greek public source saying that tacnukes have been withdrawn: MUNSS squadron website for Araxos still calling for new personnel the coming months. Written questions have been asked in the Dutch parliament on this, as soon as I get answers I will translate and post them.

Karel Koster

.....

.....  
Furthermore, on 14 December the so-called paragraph 32 process on options for confidence building measures, verification, non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament was completed. The results of this process are laid down in the attached report which has been published by the North Atlantic Council. You are informed about this in the second half of this letter.

.....  
Results paragraph 32 process

Partially in response to the request made by the standing House Committee on Foreign Affairs for the NATO document in which the consequences of the so-called paragraph 32 process are laid down, I have the honour of sending you herewith the document as it was published by the Ministerial North Atlantic Council on 14 December 2000. De ministers directed the North Atlantic Council in permanent session to implement the recommendations of the report with all due speed. Furthermore, NATO will naturally continue to review its policy in relation to the development of international security policy.

Also on behalf of the Minister of Defence I can inform the committee as follows on the course and the current results of the paragraph 32 process. The process was the consequence of paragraph 32 of the communique of the NATO Summit in Washington, where the Alliance decided, in the light of general strategic developments and the decreased salience of nuclear weapons, to consider options for confidence building measures, verification, non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament. Since the Strategic Concept also adopted during the Summit formed the basis for the discussion, the document contains no changes in Alliance nuclear policy. The Netherlands, too, attaches importance to the basic assumptions of NATO nuclear policy.

Partially on the basis of Dutch proposals the Ministerial North Atlantic Council of December 1999 initiated discussions on content in the various NATO fora, like the High Level Group (HLG), the Senior Defense Group on Proliferation (DGP) and the Senior Political-Military Group on Proliferation (SGP). As I also informed you in my letter of 27 March 2000 on the Review Conference on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) the Netherlands played an active role in this process, in order to make a success of this exercise, within the limits of existing NATO strategy. Besides the introduction of various proposals in the different fora of the Alliance, I wrote a letter to my NATO colleagues on 17 October in which I emphasised that it is important that NATO and the allies seize this process to demonstrate that the Alliance is prepared to play an active role in the area of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. In the different fora serious and constructive consultations on these subjects have taken place this year. The process has resulted in reports and advice to the Ministerial North Atlantic Council of 14 December, which has become part of the document before you.

Arms Control and Security

The promotion of arms control and disarmament forms an integral part of the security policy of the Alliance, as it is expressed in the NATO Strategic Concept adopted during last year's Washington Summit. The report therefore begins with a description of the international developments of the last decade in connection with weapons of mass destruction, missiles and conventional weapons. The way in which the Alliance during this period attempted, by

contributing to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, to attain its goals on security policy, are also covered.

After this a description is given of the results of the debate between the allies on options for confidence and security building measures, verification, non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament, regarding both nuclear and conventional arms.

### Nuclear Weapons

The most important results of this process in the area of nuclear weapons can be divided into the following categories:

- 1) Confidence building measures vis a vis Russia
- 2) Nuclear transparency
- 3) Non-proliferation/disarmament

#### Ad 1) Confidence building measures vis a vis Russia

NATO wants to pursue four specific confidence and security building measures regarding nuclear weapons: with Russia:

- Improving and strengthening the dialogue on nuclear forces
- Information exchange regarding the readiness of nuclear forces
- Information exchange on security measures and safety aspects concerning nuclear weapons
- Information exchange about sub-strategic nuclear weapons

In this light and within the framework of possible arms control agreements the Netherlands also attaches importance to the exchange of information about locations and numbers of nuclear weapons in Europe and organising mutual visits to storage locations, taking into account the security of the Allies and NATO policy. Russia disposes over a relatively large arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons. Such mutual measures can encourage the atmosphere of openness and trust between Russia and NATO. They are also, in the opinion of the government, important in pursuing further reductions in the number of sub-strategic nuclear weapons within the framework of bilateral arms control agreements and can in future represent the first step towards verification measures.

#### Ad 2) Nuclear transparency

NATO will, more actively than it did before, disseminate and explain information on nuclear policy in relation to international organisations, non-governmental organisations and its own public. In this, the following elements will be given special attention:

- the drastic reductions in the number of alliance nuclear weapons which have taken place during the last decade, while good grounds remain for a permanent, but strongly reduced presence of sub-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe;
- the role of NATO(-countries) in promoting non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament;
- the reduced role of nuclear weapons in the current security climate.

For important reasons of military-operational security NATO cannot meet the desire for more openness on numbers and locations of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. In this the current NATO information policy ('neither confirm nor deny') remains the same. NATO will be more open regarding other aspects of nuclear policy, like the strongly reduced readiness of the NATO 'dual-capable aircraft' (DCA), among others, and the far-reaching security measures regarding the weapons and their storage. The Netherlands, by the way, does not make a secret

of its nuclear task, and the fact that the two DCA squadrons based on Volkel have been given this mission.

### Ad 3 Non-proliferation/disarmament

NATO allies will continue their active involvement in the negotiations about and the implementation of treaties concerning non-proliferation and disarmament. More concretely this means:

- support for the NPT and the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament agenda, as it was agreed on in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference
- support for consultation in the area of arms control questions in space
- dialogue with partners (besides the Russian Federation and the Ukraine also with the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Mediterranean partners);
- contacts with other international fora on the subject of non-proliferation and disarmament, to encourage the debate in the Alliance on these subjects.

(EXCERPT ENDS)

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**Statements by Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs van Aartsen and Defence de Grave in response to comments and questions put to him by parliamentarians on NMD and NATO nuclear policy  
Special meeting of Permanent Committee on Foreign Affairs  
21 February 2001**

(unofficial transcription and translation by PENN-Netherlands: these are a selection of interesting quotes. The official report of the meeting will only become available around mid-April)

#### MINISTER VAN AARTSEN ON NMD

"As for NMD, one could talk about this extensively but perhaps I may deal with it briefly because of the limited time available. Messrs. Koenders, Van Bommel and Van den Doel have talked about it. I think it is correct to say that the worries there were about the US continuing on its way, that these worries have been removed during the last few months. Hopefully this will also become clear during the meeting we are having at the end of February and in any case this can be verified from our side in the talks we are having on the other side in the course of March."

(EDITOR'S NOTE: the minister is probably referring to talks on the other side of the Atlantic)

"The first question is, and that is an analytical way of looking at the problem..... is there indeed a threat. I believe Mr. Koenders said that the real threats to security are indeed increasing. This analysis is being made. Not (just) the degree to which certain parts of Europe, Russia, the Russian Federation, the US, Asia, Africa are also under a certain degree of threat. The threat is essentially broader."

(...)

"And fortunately, I consider it positive that the US government is prepared and a few weeks ago actually stated that it will take the time for this. It is logical to consider what point we have actually reached technically. A few comments about this have been made this morning. For the Netherlands, we too make



this analysis, this is in the first instance, the first priority in the framework of (security) is non-proliferation. Non-proliferation and arms control. Quite rightly we also have a certain reputation in this, we have shown our concern about this, , we have described this in parliament and this line should be continued."

(...)

"Then there is the theme of taking defensive measures, this is TMD, but that is a matter for the minister of defence. And in part we are of course already participating in this. This also connects with thoughts and ideas but I have no further information on this. And precisely one of the thoughts which we have put on the agenda in the PDR (EDITOR - ?) process is thinking about TMD together with the Russian Federation (....) The other theme entails ensuring that strategic stability is not disturbed and a third point, I think an important point, ...that we should not be thinking in the direction of a unilateral abrogation of the ABM treaty. There is no need for this either, there have been adjustments of the ABM Treaty in earlier stages."

(...)

"It is important that the introduction of NMD does not take place at the price of the international arms control regime, because that would be a wrong signal."

MINISTER VAN AARTSEN, LATER, IN RESPONSE TO FURTHER COMMENTS

"Mr. Koenders referred to different positions in Europe. I think that these have not all yet crystallised. I think that the position being taken by the Dutch government is shared by a number of EU member states."

(...)

MINISTER VAN AARTSEN ON PARAGRAPH 32, NATO POLICY

"Yes, the Dutch position has been that, together with some countries we have waged a kind of lonely battle on this and I maintain what I stated in the letter...we are reasonably satisfied because there have been outcomes in a number of areas."

(...)

...in general one can say that we did not get as far as the House would perhaps have wanted us too, not as far as we ourselves would have wanted, as we had the debate on judicially binding negative security assurances before..."

" As for the last: we are part of an alliance which possesses nuclear weapons, this is part of NATO's strategic concept and this therefore means that Holland must play a role in this.....You will see that the NPT final document is referred to in the paragraph 32 report en this means that in all the negotiating fora which we have on this in the coming years, that the aim remains the abolition of nuclear weapons."

MINISTER DE GRAVE OF DEFENCE ON GREECE:

"There is no question of a change in Greek policy..."

(EDITOR: this probably refers to the press reports of the removal of tacnukes from Araxos air base)

(ENDS)

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**27857 No. 1**

## Missile Defence

Dear Mr Chairman,

In response to the request from the Permanent Foreign Affairs Committee for additional information on the Dutch government's stance on American plans with respect to Missile Defence, we have the honour of presenting you with the following statement, further to previous letters to the House on the subject of Missile Defence of August 30 2000 (26800 V. no. 122) and of April 17 2001 (27400 V. no. 68) and with reference also to the answers of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to questions put by member of parliament Van den Doel of July 14 2000 (Appendix to Proceedings no. 1562, Parliamentary year 1999–2000).

(.....)

The Netherlands' stance

### Development of strategic thinking in the US

As the outcome of the American strategic policy review is not yet known, a considered response to it is of course not feasible at this juncture. It is understandable as such and expedient for a newly elected government to base its own policy on a thorough analysis of the situation. At the same time, in light of the special role of the US in the global political arena, a strategic policy review is of significance to the rest of the world, irrespective of whether one is an ally, a "strategic competitor" or a "risk country". It is therefore gratifying that the US is taking great pains to consult with the Allies, Russia and China.

The government endorses the analysis that the threat to security today differs from that of the Cold War. As the letter to The House of May 20 1998 on the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and the Netherlands Armed Forces (26051, no. 1) already stated, "the massive nuclear threat that characterised the Cold War has faded. The threat has since become more diffuse and is no longer confined to inter–state combat. The farther the proliferation of technologies and expertise proceeds, the more numerous will be the alignments, and even individuals, capable of launching an assault, even on Netherlands territory".

An armed conflict, let alone a nuclear war, between NATO and Russia is a more distant prospect than ever. This point has already been underlined in the most recent NATO Strategic Concept. The threats of the coming years are many, and the growing capability of some risk countries in the area of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction is among their number. The extent to which the presence of this capability will also represent a real threat depends in part on the intentions and credibility of the proliferator in question and on the probability that its capability will be deployed. Speaking generally, however, additional capability in the area of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction can be said to compel reflection, including reflection about a defensive reaction. However the response to this threat ought to cover a broader spectrum, extending to embrace non–proliferation / arms control, defensive systems and the political resolution of conflicts.

The government believes that as far as possible the goal should be to establish

multilateral rather than unilateral responses to the problem of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. The first priority in this respect is to strengthen and further develop the international system of non-proliferation and arms control and disarmament.

Missile defence is an integral part of that response (a subject given further consideration below), but the introduction of MD systems to combat intercontinental ballistic missiles must not be undertaken at the expense of strategic stability between the nuclear states or of the international structure of non-proliferation and arms control. The central criterion for the government is whether the introduction of MD systems leads to greater or less security. This implies, in the government's opinion, that the development and introduction by the US of a - limited - missile defence capability against intercontinental missiles must not detract from international strategic stability, including the system of non-proliferation and arms control. The government therefore calls upon the US, as did the Minister of Foreign Affairs in meetings of the ministerial NAC and similarly the Prime Minister during the most recent NATO mini-summit meeting on June 13, not to proceed with unilateral abandonment of the Antiballistic Missile Treaty. The ABM treaty is not sacred and could be amended or replaced in mutual consultation between the US and Russia, but unilateral measures by the US could lead to undesirable retaliatory measures that would represent an express threat to stability (potential renewed arms race, proliferation).

As Your House has already been informed by letter of April 17 last (27400 V, no. 68), the Minister of Foreign Affairs - during his recent visit to Washington and on other occasions - has stressed in this connection that it is of great importance to proceed with intensive consultations with Moscow; the government has the firm impression that president Putin is willing to hold serious talks with Washington. The message being conveyed to Russia, as expressed earlier by Germany and other countries, is that it is also in Russia's interest to keep a grip on the process by agreeing with the US on an amendment to the ABM treaty, or on a new treaty to replace it. The basic premise for the government in that context is that stability must rest to the greatest possible degree on mutual agreement and a nuclear deterrent potential at the lowest possible level. For this to be credible it is essential that results should emerge in the form of both a further reduction of nuclear weapons and verifiable agreements. Arms control based on unilateral measures is inherently unstable, and verification is deficient. Nor has experience gained with the mutual unilateral reduction of US and Russian tactical nuclear weapons in Europe been constructive. The large-scale reductions on the part of NATO in the nineteen-nineties elicited no real response from Russia (numbers are not clear, because no verification has taken place). It must not be forgotten that although relations in Europe have greatly improved, there are still large numbers of nuclear weapons on the Russian side, both strategic and tactical. These weapons are a strategic reality that cannot be disclaimed, and whose presence represents a real security problem. This underlines the importance of verifiable reduction agreements between the Russian Federation and the US.

A selective approach to multilateral arms control treaties and non-proliferation regimes carries the risk of undermining this collective security system and can lead to destabilisation and greater proliferation. The Netherlands is not blind to the flaws embedded in these regimes, but takes the stance that these do not conclusively rob

the regimes of their legitimacy. On the contrary, treaties and international agreements on arms control and non-proliferation should be strengthened and at the same time reviewed in terms of their mutual coherence. While the existing treaties and arms export regimes may not provide a watertight guarantee, they form an indispensable element of the response to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles; more than that: they are the first priority when seeking a response to such proliferation. The Netherlands is by tradition extremely active in this area, witness inter alia our contribution to the various non-proliferation negotiations, with as current high point the role of Ambassador Ramaker in the realisation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, our hosting of the OPCW and our chairmanship of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), from which has emerged a draft Code of Conduct with respect to the non-proliferation of ballistic missiles.

In the context of strengthening the system of international non-proliferation regimes the government also urges the US to persist with its active support of international exertions on arms control and non-proliferation. In particular the American government should be called upon to seek ratification by the Senate of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and to support an effective Protocol for the Biological Weapons Treaty. At the same time the government calls countries such as Russia, India, Pakistan and Iran to account with respect to their non-proliferation commitments and urges them to help further augment the international non-proliferation and arms control system.

Another element of the response to the security threat is the active pursuit of political solutions for the differences and disputes that underlie the efforts of countries to procure or to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. By way of example we can cite recent efforts to improve relations with and to gain access to the Korean peninsula, an endeavour in which the EU also regards itself as having a role to play - as became clear during the recent visit of the EU triumvirate to North Korea.

Role for missile defence systems and potential cooperation in this area

Defensive systems also have a part to play in the response, in the view of the Netherlands. From the Dutch viewpoint the reference here is to TMD. The government believes there is insufficient reason at this juncture to undertake the – extremely large – investments required for the development of a strategic missile defence system for the European Allies, that is to say a capability to combat potential assault with long-range ballistic missiles by “states of concern”. In light of Dutch endeavours in the context of NATO (DCI) and the European Union the financial resources are also unlikely to be available for a Dutch contribution to the development of strategic missile defence systems.

However NATO territory and countries involved in regional conflicts are already under threat from tactical ballistic missiles. That means that efforts must unquestionably be directed towards a further build-up of defence capability against tactical ballistic missiles, which in the event of a regional conflict would provide protection to deployed forces and specific targets and population centres in crisis areas against missiles in the operational theatre in question. There is already agreement within the Alliance on the need for such capability. The European Allies, including the Netherlands, can therefore direct their efforts for the time being

towards the development and procurement of TMD systems such as the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) of the Royal Netherlands Air Force and possibly of systems on board Royal Netherlands Navy air defence command frigates.

Because missile technology is being increasingly disseminated, the threat to security will have to be closely monitored as it develops. This means too that the European Allies must be amenable to cooperating more closely with the US (and with Russia) in seeking answers in the area of missile defence.

In that context the dialogue with Russia within the framework of NATO (in the Permanent Joint Council) on the security threat, proliferation, TMD, sub-strategic nuclear weapons and other issues is worth special attention. Although formally the PJC dialogue is quite unconnected with the American-Russian talks on the ABM treaty, there is undoubtedly a political link between the two. Russia perhaps regards the talks in the PJC as a potential forum for convincing the European Allies of the error of the American plans, while for the NATO countries on the other hand they offer the possibility of partnering Russian in endeavouring to arrive at the best achievable joint analysis of the threat, and of reviewing the opportunities for potential partnership in subsidiary areas. Seen from that perspective, the Russian proposals for TMD cooperation ought therefore to be reconsidered in the first instance. Russia will also have to be called to account for the fact that its own nuclear cooperation with countries like Iran and India is aggravating the risk of proliferation. Allusion should also be made in such overtures to more recent non-proliferation initiatives such as the Non-proliferation and Disarmament Co-operation Initiative (relating to cleaning up the remnants of the Cold War).

To recapitulate, the stance of the government is as follows, subject to the annotation that this represents only a preliminary stance, in view of the fact that no concrete conclusions have yet been reached in the US on a great many points:

1. The threats of the years ahead are numerous and the growing capability of some risk countries in the area of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destructions is a component factor. NATO in its entirety should take good account of this.
2. The future reaction to these developments should not be confined to military resources, but should in the first instance comprise political, diplomatic and economic resources.
3. The maintenance and further development of the entire edifice of international non-proliferation and arms control agreements are core elements of such an approach. It is important that the US continues actively to support and help develop this edifice, in the interests among other things of effective verification of reductions and limits. A selective approach on the part of the US could undermine this system.
4. The envisaged defence against strategic missiles from risk countries must not be allowed to detract from the strategic stability between the main nuclear states or from multilateral arms control. The Netherlands therefore urges the new administration to maintain its efforts in pursuit of agreement with Russia on the amendment or replacement of the ABM treaty - that is to say, no unilateral American abandonment of the treaty - as well as a dialogue with China.
5. The obvious solution is to amend the ABM treaty or to draw up a new treaty in its place such as to allow the siting of MD in a limited configuration, but not that of a

more extensive system that would undermine the strategic equilibrium between the US and Russia. As far as China is concerned there still remains a real risk of MD impairing the strategic relationship with that country.

6. In the context of the Alliance the government will continue to contribute in future to the development of TMD systems. For the time being there is no reason, nor are the financial resources available, for a Dutch contribution to the development of strategic missile defence systems for Europe.

7. Building up a broad dialogue on security with Russia is a contributory element to maintaining stability in Europe. The dialogue and any cooperation with Russia on TMD within the framework of NATO play a significant role in this context, but so too does consultation on concerns about Russia's nuclear cooperation with countries like Iran and India.

8. The government therefore welcomes the importance the American government is prepared to place on consultation and partnership with the Allies and other countries, including Russia. The Netherlands will take an active part in consultations within NATO on missile defence and a new cooperative relationship with Russia. The government will persist with its exertions on the above lines in the coming period within the framework of NATO as well as bilaterally and in the multilateral non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament fora.

THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
J.J. van Aartsen

THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE  
F.H.G. de Grave

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**PENN/NI report on nuclear weapons storage vault upgrades 24 July 2001**

Dear Friends,

please find attached the first set of professional translations (by Bothof, who also do EU work) on nuclear weapons related issues of the NATO 5 plus project. It was made possible by a grant from the Ploughshares Foundation.

This first distribution are two sets of questions put to the Dutch government (and its answers) concerning the upgrading of WS3 nuclear storage vaults at Volkel air base in the south of Holland. (based on information obtained by Hans Kristensen of Nautilus).

I would like you to look at this set of questions very carefully, especially in your own language and perhaps comparing it to a second language you know. Please inform me of any mistakes in translation. I am deliberately putting this question to you all, in the hope that many of you respond. Secondly: please send me similar material from your own country in one of the languages used, with a brief English language description of the content. I am looking for official documents only, parliamentary or government, covering nuclear weapons issues. Your cooperation is important, because it saves us searching websites.

This material will be distributed widely the coming months, with as priority the NATO five countries. .

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Much obliged

Karel Koster

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**1287 Questions put by the MP Harrewijn (GroenLinks) to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence concerning the upgrading of systems for the storage of nuclear weapons (submitted on 23 April 2001).**

1.  
Has the government seen the article "VS wil tot 2018 kernwapens in Kleine Brogel" (US wants to maintain its nuclear arsenal in Kleine Brogel until 2018?) (De Morgen, 12 April 2001)
2.  
Can the government confirm that the Weapons Storage and Security System, which is used for the storage of B61 type nuclear weapons, needs to be upgraded on a number of European bases in order to maintain the system to 2018?
3.  
Is the government aware of plans to implement upgrades of this kind at any of the Dutch air force bases? If so, which ones?
4.  
If such upgrades are planned, what will be the involvement of the Dutch armed forces and of the Dutch government?

Replies by Minister de Grave (Defence), also on behalf of the Minister of Foreign Affairs (received on 5 June 2001)

1.  
Yes
2.  
The government is not aware of any plans or proposals by the US authorities to amend the presence of US nuclear weapons on European soil or to restrict this presence in time. NATO's Strategic Concept, which was revised in 1999, stresses that the presence of these weapons in Europe and the nuclear weapons strategies of our European allies will remain vital political and military elements in our transatlantic alliance.  
The storage facilities for US nuclear weapons in Europe are regularly upgraded to meet the most stringent safety requirements. There are only a few such facilities. The weapons are safely stored in underground vaults.
- 3  
In accordance with NATO security policy, the government cannot issue any statements about the precise number of these storage facilities or their locations.
- 4  
The government maintains that as long as US nuclear weapons are located in Europe in the interests of our defence security, NATO has a duty to store and manage these weapons as safely as possible, and this includes any necessary modernisations. The storage and management of US nuclear weapons in Europe is financed by NATO. The Netherlands makes a proportional contribution to this fund.

House of representatives of the States General

2  
2000-2001 Session, annexe to the parliamentary papers  
KVR 13795

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**PENN Report 10 Aug 2001**

Please note the speech made by the Dutch premier Kok on 13 June at the special North Atlantic Council in Brussels. The second half contains a fairly clear rejection of US unilateral measures, even specific opposition to a unilateral abrogation of the ABM treaty. Note also the emphasis on international agreements on non-proliferation and arms control and the specific reference to both Russia and China. Any comments?

Karel Koster

At the special  
meeting of the  
North Atlantic Council  
NATO HQ,  
Brussels  
13 June 2001Speech

by Mr. Willem Kok, Prime Minister of The Netherlands  
Mr Secretary General,

I am very grateful for the initiative to have this meeting on the occasion  
of president Bush's first visit to Europe. And I thank the Secretary  
General for his introduction.

NATO is daily proving its indispensable role in Euro-Atlantic security.  
In the Balkans we are handling two major crisis management operations. On  
top of that we are actively involved in the prevention of new crises.  
Unfortunately, developments in Macedonia and Bosnia give us cause for  
concern.

In Macedonia a sustainable solution is necessary, including the  
demobilisation of extremist Albanian groups. KFOR co-operates closely with  
the Macedonian government. Effective border control is crucial. SFOR's  
role in securing peace and stability in Bosnia-Herzegovina remains  
essential.

Major reductions in SFOR's military presence or unilateral decisions to do  
so therefore have to be ruled out. In the words of Secretary Powell: 'we  
went in together, we go out together'. I can only underline that statement.  
The practical, effective cooperation between NATO and the EU in crisis  
management operations in the Balkans at present bodes well for our future  
co-operation, reinforcing each other's efforts. An effective European  
Security and Defense Policy is good for Europe and good for NATO. We are  
on the right track with ESDP.

In a few days time, in Gothenburg, the European Council will agree on the  
next steps to be taken. NATO remains our first choice for crisis  
management operations in and around Europe. But it is important to have a  
second instrument available if NATO cannot or will not act. Of course we  
will make maximal use of the strength and solidarity of the Alliance.  
Europe's wish to take its own responsibility in certain circumstances will  
not go at the expense of NATO. For Europe to be credible and the Alliance  
to remain vital, we need to do more on military capabilities. Our military  
contributions must keep pace with the ambitions we formulate both in NATO  
and in the EU. Governments have to live up to this task.

Mr Secretary General,

Our security agenda includes the need to give adequate answers to severe  
threats posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and  
their means of delivery. The primary method to prevent and combat these  
threats are international agreements on non-proliferation and arms  
control. These should include the international code of conduct against  
ballistic missile proliferation, the CTBT and an effective Biological  
Weapons Verification Protocol.

On the response to the new threats, including a discussion on Missile  
Defense, close and serious consultations among the Allies, but also with  
Russia and China, are very much needed. Our goal must be and remain to  
achieve more stability and more security - not less. It is my firm  
conviction that a unilateral abrogation of the ABM-treaty by the US would  
not be the right approach. This does not mean of course that it could not  
be adjusted or replaced by a new treaty, in mutual agreement.

The continuing relevance of our Alliance is clearly illustrated by the



wish of a large number of countries to join NATO. We want to remain in line with our open door policy, taking into account that a structured preparation of decisions to be taken at the Prague Summit - where we hope and expect to launch a next enlargement round - is needed. I suggest we start the concrete discussion on the basis of the relevant criteria for NATO enlargement at the beginning of next year already. We could task the NAC to draw up a report in December including proposals on how to structure our debate.

Mr Secretary General,

For the Netherlands the Transatlantic link as embedded in NATO remains as essential as ever. In facing the new challenges we share the same values, interests and goals. Experience has clearly proved that where we have the political will to act together we are successful. This provides us with a solid basis to face the challenges of the future with confidence.

Thank you.

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**PENN note 31 August 2001**

The Netherlands parliamentary session of the foreign affairs and defence committees to discuss a government note on Missile defence and transatlantic relations (among others) which you have all received in English translation by now, has been put off to 12 September. Next week I will be distributing a detailed briefing to the parliamentarians involved. The Labour Party spokesman has also invited me and a few others to advise him on these issues. From those of you who are best informed I would appreciate receiving the following information:

- What is the exact status of the HR 2514 legislation in the US Congress (regarding having the allies pay for missile defence provided for them by the US)?
- What is the most recent position of the UK , Danish, Belgian, German , Canadian , Norwegian, Italian French and Japanese government on missile defence? (official quotes and sources please)
- Up to date state of affairs re CTBT conference in New York
- ABM treaty news
- any official moves in any NATO legislature you know of regarding Missile Defence (meetings, resolutions, government notes, committee reports)

Please note carefully: I am looking for the more unusual type of source: official documents, newspaper articles which could have been missed in the usual network distribution etc and of course your own tactical information.

Much obliged

Karel Koster  
PENN Netherlands

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**28 000 V Adoption of the Income and Expenditure Budget  
of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (V) for the Year 2002  
Sept 2001**

**EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM No. 2**

[...]

## Combating the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

A comprehensive solution is being offered to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their transmission equipment presenting an increased threat to safety, which includes the further enhancement of the international standardisation framework and instruments against proliferation of such weapons.

As far as American plans for installing a missile defence system are concerned, NATO shall further discuss how implementation could take place leading to a positive effect on the allied defence system without adversely affecting the international strategic stability. Other important considerations are the relationship with Russia and the consequences for the worldwide non-proliferation and disarmament regime.

The Dutch government continues to aim to make progress in the development of an international standardisation framework for combating the proliferation of missile technology and missiles that may be used for transmitting weapons of mass destruction.

During its chairmanship of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 1999–2000, the Netherlands gave the initial impetus to a design for a code of conduct, Dutch House of Commons, 2001–2002, 28 000 Chapter V, No. 2 44. It is hoped that further steps shall be made towards multilateralisation of this international code of conduct in September 2001, during the MTCR plenary meeting in Ottawa. The aim is to hold a closing conference in 2002 at which the code of conduct shall be signed by MTCR member states and any other countries wanting to join the regime.

The area of missile defence covers another part of the solution being offered, but the introduction of a defence system against intercontinental ballistic missiles should not be at the expense of the strategic stability between the nuclear states or the international non-proliferation and arms control regime.

The NATO territory and countries involved in regional conflict are already under threat from tactical ballistic missiles, which is why the Netherlands endeavours to further construct a defence capacity against them.

As missile technology is already increasingly expanding, the development of the treaty shall need to be followed very closely. In that context, the dialogue with Russia within the NATO framework (in the Permanent Joint Council) merits particular attention: topics for discussion such as the overall threat, proliferation, theatre missile defence (TMD) and sub-strategic nuclear weapons are envisaged.

On the topic of nuclear weapons, the Dutch efforts continue to be focussed on the integral implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPV in Dutch), both in respect of the actual non-proliferation aspect and the promotion of continued nuclear disarmament. This policy not only takes shape in the NPV framework, but also in various other forums such as the First Commission of the General Meeting of the UN, the Geneva Disarmament Conference, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the EU and NATO and also the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

The first conference of the preparatory meeting for the NPV Testing Conference, as planned for 2005, shall take place in 2002. The Dutch government shall endeavour to set up proper implementation reporting procedures and to achieve clear agreements on the further implementation of the plan of action from the previous testing conference as held in 2000. The Dutch government shall also endeavour to bring about the coming into force of the nuclear stop treaty, in due time for the NPV testing conference to be held in 2005, and the beginning of negotiations as to a treaty to stop the production of nuclear fuel. Within NATO the Netherlands have endeavoured to bring about the implementation of the “Section 32 Report” in respect of the contribution NATO could make to confidence inspiring measures, verification, non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament, in view of the decreased role of nuclear weapons.

The Netherlands primarily wants to draw the attention to a dialogue with Russia to discuss sub-strategic nuclear weapons. This dialogue should still take shape in 2001. Furthermore, the Netherlands shall continue to promote within NATO, that attention should be focussed on the consequences for the alliance of the increased threat caused by the spread of weapons of mass destruction and their transmission equipment. The Netherlands shall continue to be involved in bilateral and multilateral projects to support the destruction of chemical and nuclear weapons as well as other components of the Russian (military) nuclear infrastructure. Dutch House of Commons, 2001–2002, 28 000 Chapter V, No. 2 45

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## **The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction**

The dangers stemming from the continued proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons are on the increase. High-risk countries such as North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Libya are involved in programmes for such weapons – often with the support from other countries. They also develop, with varying success, ballistic missiles with increased ranges. Fact of the matter is that short and middle range missiles, with ranges of up to 500 and 5,500km respectively, are posing a growing threat; southern parts of NATO territory are now within reach of such missiles. In the long term some countries may well be capable of developing missiles with a very large range (over 5,500km). Particularly Iran is likely, based on the considerable support from other countries, to possess weapons of mass destruction in the next ten years, including a more or less rudimentary nuclear weapon, as well as missiles that will be able to reach large parts of the NATO territory.

This is why initiatives to combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology are becoming more and more important. The same applies to defence strategies using military instruments against such weapons. The American government is currently considering the changes to be made to their defence policy. It is a fact that the Bush government is aiming to develop a system over the next few years, to protect American territory against incoming missiles from high-risk countries.

According to the United States, safety is no longer based on the mutually assured power of deterrence, as was the case during the Cold War, but on a combination of offensive and defensive systems yet to be developed.

The United States have said to be prepared to consult their NATO allies on the implementation of missile defence systems. An allied analysis of the motives and capacities of high-risk countries should, if possible, lead to a joint solution to the increased risks. The instruments to be used in this context shall not only be military, but, more particularly, political, diplomatic and economic in nature.

According to Dutch opinion, there is no urgent security problem that would justify extremely large investments from the European allies in a defence system against incoming long range missiles from high-risk countries. Moreover, investments into such strategic missile defence strategies would be at the expense of other plans such as strengthening the European crisis control capacities in the framework of the DCI and the “Headline Goal”. Furthermore, the Netherlands is of the opinion that the defence systems against missiles as envisaged by the United States, should not be to the detriment of the strategic stability between the main nuclear weapons states, nor of the international arms control and non-proliferation system.

An important point of focus for Europe is the further development of a tactical defence capacity, with the aim of protecting military units and potential targets, such as populated areas and infrastructures, against medium range missiles at times of regional conflict in the operational zones in question. The acquisition and further development of such “Theatre Missile Defence” (TMD) systems should provide the European allies with the necessary possibilities for collaboration with the United States. The Netherlands plays a pioneering role in the area of TMD in Europe, due to the improvement of the Patriot Air Defence System (Pac-3). Furthermore, the Dutch Ministry for Defence are conducting a study with Germany, into the deployment of TMD systems on board the latest LCF frigates.

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### **House of Representatives of the States General 2**

Parliamentary Session 2001–2002

**Annexe to the Proceedings**

**Questions put by members of the House, and the reply provided by the government.**

**518**

Questions from member **Koenders** (PvdA) to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on *the intention of the US to withdraw unilaterally from the ABM treaty*. (Submitted 18 December 2001)

1

Were you informed by the American government of its intention to withdraw unilaterally from the ABM treaty or did signals of this intention only reach you through the media?

2

Do you not find it strange, to say the least, especially in view of developments since 11 September, that the United States appears to show little interest in the position taken by, for example, its European allies in relation to unilateral withdrawal from the treaty and its NMD plans? How do you explain this attitude in the light of more equal transatlantic relations?

3

How have the Netherlands and the European Union, before and after 11 September, presented their views on the American position, and do you get the impression that this has had any effect?

4

Do you believe that the expression of doubts and objections may turn out to have been inadequate if the United States perseveres with unilateralism in the sphere of international weapons control regimes?

5

Do you see a role for the NATO member states in the discussion about the intention to withdraw from the ABM treaty and the need to arrive at verifiable weapons control agreements and a cooperative framework for a new security system?

6

What are the consequences for the NATO/Russia relationship?

7

Can you answer these questions before Thursday 20 December 2001 with an eye to the General Consultation on transatlantic relations to be held on that day?

## Reply

Reply by Minister **Van Aartsen** (Foreign Affairs). (Received 21 January 2002)

1

On 13 December 2001, President Bush sent a letter to the Prime Minister to inform him of the American withdrawal from the ABM treaty.

2, 3 and 4

The government takes the view that a new security relationship is appropriate in the light of the changing nature of relations with Russia. The government's position has always been that an American/Russian compromise on the ABM treaty should be sought as part of the discussion on a new strategic framework, in order to minimise the potential destabilising consequences of unilateral action. I have personally put this view to Secretary of State Powell on a number of occasions, bilaterally and at NATO meetings. Other allies and EU partners have actively made a similar position known to the US government. In its communications with Russia too, this government has consistently urged the need for an agreement with the US on the future of the ABM treaty.

The fact that the US announced it would have to withdraw from the ABM treaty unilaterally after intensive talks with Russia had demonstrated the impossibility of reaching agreement on modifying the treaty does not mean that the US has little interest in its allies' position. At many of its consultative meetings, bilaterally and at NATO, the US has informed its allies of progress in American thinking on the issues. At these meetings the allies, in turn, have been able to put forward their views on the introduction of Missile Defence and its effects on strategic relationships. In their responses to US withdrawal from the ABM treaty, most of the allies have expressed the hope that the US and Russia would soon negotiate agreements on a new strategic framework.

Intensive discussions with Russia on a new strategic framework are continuing, with consultation covering missile defence (including possible cooperation in this area between the US and Russia), reductions in the number of strategic nuclear warheads and their verification, transparency, confidence-building measures and non-proliferation. In the context of plans by both the US and Russia to drastically reduce their stocks of strategic nuclear warheads, which the government naturally applauds, the Netherlands and other allies have continually pressed for steps to be taken that may help to increase the irreversibility and verifiability of such reductions. The fact that verification procedures are now being discussed appears to be partly due to the position taken by the allies. The government is hopeful that future discussions between the US and Russia on the strategic framework will produce positive results.

5 and 6

President Bush formally withdrew from the ABM treaty on 13 December 2001. This withdrawal, according to the provisions of the treaty, comes into effect 6 months from that date. Agreements between Russia and the US on strategic reductions and their verification are, in the first instance, a bilateral matter. NATO consultation does offer the allies the opportunity to present their views on the subject to the US. The NATO member states will also be able to contribute to consolidation of the US and NATO's renewed relationship with Russia. At its meeting on 7 December 2001, the North Atlantic Council Ministerial ordered the development of new, effective mechanisms for consultation, cooperation, joint decision-making and coordinated or joint action. A similar, new NATO-Russia Council is due to come into effect before the NATO Council Ministerial Meeting in Reykjavik in

May 2002. The Netherlands will actively support the development in NATO of a relationship with Russia that contributes to stability and security in Europe. Cooperation issues include the fight against terrorism, non-proliferation, export control, weapons control, openness in arms policy, confidence-building measures and missile defence. In his response to the American withdrawal from the ABM treaty, President Putin said that although the decision was a mistake, he did not believe it posed a threat to Russia. He said that the US and Russia must keep up the pace of work on a new weapons control regime. Against this background, the American withdrawal from the ABM treaty will probably not affect NATO/Russia relations.

7

No longer applicable.

House of Representatives, Parliamentary Session 2001–2002, Annexe

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## House of Representatives of the States General 2

Parliamentary Session 2001–2002

Annexe to the Proceedings

Questions put by members of the House, and the reply provided by the government.

568

Questions from member **Van Bommel** (SP) to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on *possible resumption of nuclear tests by the US*. (Submitted 15 January 2002)

1

Is it true that the Bush administration wants the option of being able to resume nuclear tests?<sup>1</sup> Is it true that the American government intends to carry out these tests at the Nevada test site within two years? If so, what is your opinion on these developments?

2

Do you agree that the testing of nuclear weapons would send the wrong message to countries like India, Pakistan and China – that is to say, to continue with the development of their nuclear arsenals and to persist in their refusal to sign the test ban treaty? Can you explain your answer?

3

What is the aim of these nuclear tests and how does it relate to the results of the sub-critical tests that have been continually carried out since underground testing ended?

4

Are you prepared to put pressure on the Bush administration to finally sign the test ban treaty and abandon the idea of nuclear tests?

5

Are you also prepared to take initiatives in the United Nations and the European Union to further these aims?

<sup>1</sup> 'Washington Post' 8 January 2002, 'Parool' 8 and 9 January 2002.

## Reply

Reply by Minister **Van Aartsen** (Foreign Affairs). (Received 29 January 2002)

1

The Nuclear Posture Review (the review of American nuclear policy) recently presented to Congress and the Bush administration's comments on the review maintain the 1992 moratorium on nuclear tests, although the option of resuming nuclear testing in the future is explicitly kept open. This position only differs with American government policy to date to the extent that Washington wants to reduce the time needed to prepare for testing from two years to one year. However, the US has said that it has no plans to resume nuclear tests.

2

An end to the moratorium on nuclear tests would do considerable damage to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. It would reduce pressure on India, Pakistan and China to stop nuclear tests and further development of their nuclear arsenals. There would also be less chance of these countries signing and/or ratifying the test ban treaty.

3

The so-called 'Stockpile Stewardship Program' tests are conducted on nuclear weapons to assess the safety and reliability of existing nuclear arsenals. Computer simulations and laboratory tests, including sub-critical tests, enable the US to guarantee the safety and reliability of nuclear weapons without resorting to nuclear tests as defined in the test ban treaty. When the test ban treaty was signed in 1996, Washington stated that it wished to keep open the nuclear test option in case the test programme was at some time in the future no longer able to guarantee the safety and reliability of nuclear weapons. The US says, however, that it has no plans to resume nuclear testing.

4 and 5

The CTBT is a regular subject of discussion with the US at a bilateral, European, UN and NATO level.

In the months preceding the November 2001 conference in New York the EU urged the US on a number of occasions to ratify the treaty and participate in the conference, both of which would help to bring a fully operative CTBT a step closer. On the Netherlands' initiative the conference was held in New York for the very purpose of drawing the nuclear test ban treaty more emphatically to Washington's attention. Unfortunately, the US did not attend.

At this conference I once more emphasised the importance of the test ban treaty coming into force and called on the US to ratify the treaty as soon as possible. The Netherlands will continue to pursue this aim at every opportunity and in cooperation with its European partners where appropriate.

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## FIRST STEP TOWARDS ACQUISITION OF JSF BY NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT

Memo by Karel Koster, PENN Netherlands , 24 Jan 2002

Barring some unpredictable turn of events the Dutch cabinet is set to take the first step towards acquisition of the US-built JSF rather than the European-built Eurofighter and Rafale, as a replacement of the F-16. This will tie Netherlands defence and industrial policies to US interests, away from European ones. As happened in 1975 with the Starfighter, it is entirely likely that the other countries making large-scale use of the F-16 (Norway, Belgium, Denmark) will follow in the Netherlands footsteps, thus creating a considerable US-oriented vector inside European security policy. The slim chances of developing an independent European foreign and security policy will therefore be further weakened, as this requires an independent military-industrial base.

Various disclosures by a number of papers, notably the NRC Handelsblad last Saturday 19 jan2002), have shown that behind the scenes manoeuvring by the ministry of defence (led by the Atlanticist foreign minister de Grave) has effectively initiated the JSF acquisition process, before parliament had a chance to make a considered decision. Furthermore, other disclosures have shown that no serious consideration was given to the competing aircraft. Close ties between the Dutch and US air forces have played an obvious role in this.

The only strongly dissenting force in the government (a coalition of three parties, including the social democrats PvdA, centrist liberals D66 and right-wing liberals-VVD) appears to have been the ministry of finance (also run by a VVD minister) who was not prepared to fully or largely pre-finance Dutch participation in the research and development stage of the JSF. Lockheed Martin, for its part, has been putting extreme pressure on the Dutch government by demanding a quick decision (on the grounds that this would greatly reduce the eventual per-unit price) , thus undermining a parliamentary process in which these questions would have been brought to the fore. Yesterday, further intensive lobbying by Dutch aerospace industry officials aiming at participation in the US building program, the decisive stage was reached. Apparently the industry offered to take a larger share of the financial pre-production burden (400 million of the 800 million Euro), thus satisfying the finance minister. Weak protests by a leading social democrat parliamentarian are already being swallowed. (the only realistic option would have been to delay the decision until after national elections, 15 May; undoubtedly this was also the reason for the pro-JSF lobby, including the US ambassador, to redouble its efforts). The cabinet is set to make a pro-JSF decision on Friday 25 January.

The value of the entire Dutch order will be E 6.000 million.

A delegation of the Dutch Parliament's foreign affairs committee (Lower House) is visiting Washington DC next week: it is likely that the JSF project will be on the agenda.

The fait accompli will have the following consequences:

- Increased transatlantic ties between US and Dutch aerospace/electronics industry
- Participation by Dutch industry in the production of JSF for a number of countries, which

would override Dutch arms export legislation (this happened before with respect to F-16 production for Pakistan)

- Continued close military cooperation between the US and Dutch air forces, and more difficulties in interfacing with European air forces deploying the other two types
- Foreclosing a debate on the need for manned aircraft, or indeed on Dutch security policy which does not necessarily need manned combat aircraft for its most likely future missions. In any case, the proper public debate is not taking place

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## **PENN/NI report 11 February 2002**

### **F-16 replacement**

The Dutch cabinet decided last Friday, after weeks of internal debate, to participate in the pre-development costs of the F-16. This decision still has to go through parliament. In this light it is significant that doubts by two government ministers of the Labour Party (Pronk) and D66 (Brinkhorst, van Boxtel) are still being leaked to the press (there are three parties in the coalition: the third - VVD - appears to be solidly pro-JSF. Apparently these ministers have had their disapproval officially noted in the cabinet minutes. The most important reason is the open commitment to a project of which the costs may spiral out of control. (prime minister Kok has stated that a commitment to the pre-development automatically implies purchase of the JSF. The second reason is the clear turn away from any development towards a relatively independent European aerospace industry branch (in which the French would play a pivotal role). The Rafale lobby appears to have been neutralised, but there is still a parliamentary session to come, before the elections. Present European disaffection with the US on a number of issues (Middle East, human rights, NATO) may well play a role in the further debate.

Karel Koster

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## **House of Representatives of the States General 2**

Parliamentary Session 2001–2002

Annexe to the Proceedings

Questions put by members of the House, and the reply provided by the government.

868

Questions from member Koenders (PvdA) to the Minister for Foreign Affairs about **transatlantic relations**. (Submitted 21 February 2002)

1

What is your response to the article by Commissioner Patten in the 'Financial Times' of 15 February in which he expresses concern about the 'unilateralist instinct' of the US and in that context describes the use of projection of military might as 'profoundly misguided'?<sup>1</sup>

2

Do you share this analysis and do you agree that this article is in no way prompted by anti-Americanism but by concern for the development of a broad agenda with respect to the importance of international cooperation? If you do, which specific proposals have you put forward or supported in recent discussions to arrive at a common European agenda and what was the content of those proposals?

3

What exactly is the Netherlands' policy on the use of the term 'axis of evil' and what policy proposals do you support when it comes to European policy on Iraq, Iran and North Korea. Is there a European consensus at all on these crucial dossiers? If not, why not?

4

Can you give a detailed response to what Secretary of State Powell has said about the options with regard to Iraq?<sup>2</sup> What policy line should the EU take in this matter? Under what international law, military/strategic and/or political conditions do you consider a military option in Iraq justified? What is your assessment of the inspections policy and its effectiveness?

5

Do you still maintain your earlier position that President Bush's 'State of the Union' speech should be seen as essentially intended for domestic consumption, with rhetoric as a key feature?<sup>3</sup> Which European ministers support your view on this? What contribution will you be making to this discussion?

6

What is your assessment of the analyses at the Wehrkunde conference in Munich in relation to NATO,

whereby the political function seems to win out over a military-operational one? In this context, what position do you take with regard, on the one hand, to the reinforcement of NATO that is required and, on the other, by extension, to NATO expansion; and what position will you be taking during the forthcoming visit by Prime Minister Nastase?

7

What initiatives do you believe are important to strengthening transatlantic relations with concrete European initiatives at this point? How can the European defence-identity policy and security policy be given a fresh stimulus?

<sup>1</sup> 'Financial Times', 15 February 2002.

<sup>2</sup> 'Volkskrant' et al., 14 February 2002

<sup>3</sup> General Consultation dated 17 February 2002.

## Reply

Reply by Minister Van Aartsen (Foreign Affairs). (Received 21 March 2002)

1 and 2

In the article referred to in the 'Financial Times', Commissioner Patten mentions the fear that the success of the campaign in Afghanistan possibly strengthens the instinct in the US that the use of military force is the only basis for security, that the US can only rely on itself, and that allies can be useful but the US is strong enough to act independently. Commissioner Patten says he hopes those instincts do not gain the upper hand, because they would be profoundly misguided. The lesson of 11 September, Commissioner Patten says, is that we do, in fact, need both American leadership and international cooperation – and on an unprecedented scale. I wholeheartedly agree with the latter. But I do not share the apparent fear that the US will only trust in itself from now on. The US will use those instruments it considers effective: international bodies, bilateral channels or ad hoc structures such as the coalition that has been formed. This is pre-eminently a business-like approach and in no way precludes a multilateral approach. In the fight against terrorism the US is making use of a range of instruments that includes, besides coalition-building, the use of military force. The care with which the anti-Taliban coalition was built shows just how much the US needs allies in that fight and how much the US is conscious of the fact. This is not a matter of strict unilateralism: no country, however big and powerful, can pursue an effective international policy without investing in relationships with others. In that respect, there are no indications, either, that the US will be relying only on itself and its own military power in the fight against terrorism. In his commemorative speech on 11 March this year, President Bush stressed again the need for international diplomatic, financial and military cooperation. The Dutch government also believes that the fight against international terrorism demands a broad agenda that, for the time being, also includes a military component, and is urging that approach in all the relevant forums (EU, UN, NATO, etc.). The Netherlands will also continue to push for a broad transatlantic dialogue – in NATO, in talks between the EU and US, and bilaterally – and an effective multilateral approach to international terrorism.

3 and 4

As already indicated in my letter of 6 February 2002 to the House, the government is of the view that a critical attitude towards the three countries in question is justified, even though there are differences between the three. The term 'axis of evil' is not a term used by the Dutch government or the European Union, but it is important for the EU to have a clear, unanimous point of view on its approach to weapons of mass destruction. The Netherlands advocates an intensive dialogue between the EU and the US aimed at answering the question 'what is the most effective policy with regard to these countries'. The Dutch government believes that a combination of pressure and dialogue is the right way to move these countries towards a change of policy. North Korea has a considerable stockpile of missiles and is a significant source of the proliferation of missiles, missile parts and missile technology. The missile programmes of other high-risk countries are to a large extent based on this source. It is assumed that North Korea has a large stockpile of chemical weapons and the ingredients for nuclear weapons. The international community is trying to persuade North Korea to allow IAEA inspections again and to end missile proliferation and its own ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction programme. The US and North Korea have had an Agreed Framework since 1994, whereby North Korea refrains from



further development of a heavy-water nuclear reactor in exchange for the supply of oil and the construction of two light-water reactors for civil use (these pose less of a proliferation problem). Bodies involved in implementing the Agreed Framework include the Korean Energy Development Organisation (KEDO), in which the EU also participates. Last year the American government evaluated its policy on North Korea. The US puts a heavy emphasis on verification of current and future agreements. It has repeatedly reaffirmed its support for the policy of South Korean overtures to North Korea, most recently during President Bush's visit to Seoul. The US is always ready to enter into dialogue with North Korea. The EU and EU countries have also held discussions with North Korea, at which President Kim Jung-Il has said that North Korea will maintain its own moratorium on missile testing, but for economic reasons cannot halt the export of missiles and missile technology. There is a consensus in the EU about the fact that the door must be kept open by means of a critical dialogue, with a particular focus on non-proliferation and human rights. The EU role must also support the South Korean 'sunshine policy'. South Korea has said repeatedly that contact between the EU and North Korea is important to achieving the basic principle of this policy: rapprochement between North and South Korea. In the relationship with Iran, the Iranian attitude to proliferation issues, terrorism, human rights and the Israel-Palestine conflict is of particular concern. Although the conservative forces in Iran are still strong, the reformist government led by President Khatami (twice elected by a large majority) does offer the possibility of a gradual extension of bilateral and EU relations with Iran and a comprehensive dialogue on the problems referred to above. In the EU the Council is currently discussing the draft negotiation guidelines for a Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Iran. The Netherlands sees an agreement of this kind not only as an economic instrument but would like to secure a place in it for the political dimension of relations with Iran as well. The General Council has also decided to evaluate relations with Iran as a whole before its approval of the mandate gives the green light to negotiations. Secretary of State Powell's statements give a clear picture of US policy on Iraq. The US demands, in the first instance, Baghdad's unconditional admittance of weapons inspectors. Washington would seek active support from the international community to increase pressure on Baghdad. The US is not, however, prepared to negotiate with Baghdad on the modalities of weapons inspection. Washington will also be seeking changes to the UN sanctions regime at the end of May this year when the Security Council meets to discuss sanctions. Although the US advocates a hard line on Iraq, no definitive decisions have yet been taken and all options – political, diplomatic and military – remain explicitly open. Powell has also put a heavy stress on consultation with its allies. A US solo effort is not a foregone conclusion. Like the US, the European Union is striving for implementation of all UN Security Council resolutions (especially 1284 and 1382), aimed at complete dismantling of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction capability. This would involve the resumption of an intensive inspection regime with unconditional, immediate and unlimited access by the UNMOVIC weapons inspectors. As long as Baghdad refuses to permit this, the EU is also unwilling to enter into dialogue. In mid-2001 the EU expressed its support for British/American proposals to adapt the sanctions in such a way that trade with Iraq could be liberalised while at the same time tightening controls on the export of military equipment to the country. Finally, the EU and its member states are trying to ease the adverse effects of the sanctions on the Iraqi people by providing humanitarian assistance and supplies under the terms of the UN's Oil-for-Food programme. Iraq has now indicated its willingness to talk about admission of UNMOVIC inspectors. An initial discussion between the UN Secretary General and an Iraqi delegation was held on 7 March this year. This meeting was mainly taken up with identifying topics for discussion. Iraq has not placed any conditions on the holding of a second meeting. It is not yet clear whether Iraq will then want to talk about admitting inspectors. If no meaningful results on this issue are achieved reasonably soon, the international community will have to consider its next steps. National and international opinion on the question of what these steps might involve is still being clarified, partly because of the associated military/strategic and political aspects.

5

President Bush's 'State of the Union' address could count on widespread support among the American people and in Congress. As far as its language is concerned, the 'State of the Union' was a continuation of the appeals in the US after 11 September for the people to unite in the fight against terrorism, the defence of American standards and values, and the recovery of the economy. This is the sense in which, I believe, the words used by President Bush should be interpreted. Reactions to President Bush's speech were many and varied. French President Chirac recently said that France and the US were on exactly

the same wavelength in the fight against terrorism. I completely concur with this. I repeat once again that for any sensible discussion to take place it is essential to concentrate on the substance rather than the rhetoric.

6

Following the terrorist attacks on 11 September the Alliance immediately committed itself to the fight against terrorism by invoking Article 5. This was an important underscoring of transatlantic solidarity which was very much appreciated in the US. NATO then made a concrete military contribution to the fight against international terrorism in a number of areas (including AWACS aircraft in the US and naval vessels in the Mediterranean). In view of the need for a very broadly based coalition that included a large number of non-NATO countries, the Alliance as such was not the framework within which the coalition took shape. This does not detract from the fact that many NATO countries, including the Netherlands, are making a substantial contribution to both 'Enduring Freedom' and ISAF. The campaign against terrorism has various objectives and is expected to last for years. NATO being called on in the future to take on (part of) the fight cannot be ruled out either. What all this means, therefore, is that NATO is definitely not set to become an increasingly political organisation at the expense of its military dimension. That would be a strange conclusion to draw too, in the light of the fact that around 60,000 military personnel are currently taking part in NATO crisis management operations in the Balkans. NATO will have to adapt to the new situation after 11/9. In the opinion of the Dutch government and other NATO member states, consideration needs to be given to the question of the extent to which capabilities and structures need to be changed in the light of asymmetrical threats. The NATO Summit in Prague in November will therefore be more than just an 'expansion' summit. In addition to the question of which countries will be invited to join NATO, the main focus will be on the subject of adapting NATO in the light of the fight against terrorism. Discussion on this has already begun and the Netherlands made a number of pertinent suggestions at the NATO Ministerial Meeting in December 2001. These relate to such things as the consolidation of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Centre, to which the addition of a special 'audit unit' and NBC-related database was proposed. Another proposal made at NATO was that we define our defensive capability shortcomings in relation to terrorist operations and set ourselves targets for NATO planning on the issue. Finally, it was suggested that the training of military units that may be deployed in the event of NBC attacks should be coordinated and improved. These and other proposals are now being developed and discussed. In the months ahead there will be further intensive discussion on reformulation of the current 'Defence Capabilities Initiative' for the upgrading of NATO's capabilities (more focus on communication, intelligence, smart weapons, etc.), the improvement of response options in the face of the threat from weapons of mass destruction, possible changes to the command structure and more outreach activities focused on specific regions. Another subject to which NATO is paying a good deal of attention is its relationship with the Russian Federation. Building on the decision at the NATO Ministerial Meeting last December to set up new, effective mechanisms for consultation, cooperation, joint decision-making and coordinated/joint action, a considerable amount of effort has recently been put into developing these mechanisms. As to the subjects that may be discussed by the new NATO-Russia Council, these are currently expected to include combating terrorism, crisis management, non-proliferation, weapons control and confidence-building measures, theatre missile defence, search and rescue at sea, military-to-military contacts and civil emergency. It will therefore cover military as well as political issues. The aim is to reach agreement on form and content at the next NATO Ministerial Meeting in May. In the government's view, the new NATO-Russia Council will provide an excellent opportunity in a number of areas to strengthen cooperation with the Russian Federation in a structural and sustainable way. The more successful this is, the more that security in Europe will be reinforced. With respect to NATO expansion, I refer to my letter of 19 December 2001, particularly to the NATO viewpoint expressed in it that, until the NATO Ministerial Meeting in Reykjavik in May, attention will be focused on progress made by the aspirant countries in the 'Membership Action Plan'. Over the next two months the Netherlands will therefore not make any public statements on specific countries or give any undertakings to specific countries. The same line was taken during Prime Minister Nastase's visit on 26 and 27 February this year, while still expressing our understanding of the political, psychological and strategic considerations on which Romanian aspirations are based and the effort that Romania is making.

7

For the European Security and Defence Policy (EVDB), recent developments mean a reaffirmation of the basic principles that the Dutch government formulated right at the beginning of the EVDB process. These include more and, above all, better, rapidly deployable European capabilities, guaranteed close cooperation between the EU and NATO, and the opportunity for non-EU European NATO allies to be involved. The European countries will have to work more seriously on strengthening the relevant capabilities. There is a close connection here with NATO's 'Defence Capabilities Initiative'. The path the Netherlands has chosen – closer cooperation with partners on specific projects – is worthy of imitation. The European countries will have to make more effort militarily, whether within the framework of NATO or that of the European Union. This is one of the most important ways of maintaining the transatlantic link in the longer term. The Netherlands is also working to find a suitable way of bringing about cooperation between the EU and NATO. Following Turkey's initial blockade in NATO arising out of a desire to see a better arrangement for Turkey's participation in EU-led operations, now Greece is being obstructive because of a belief that the compromise reached with Turkey goes too far. Dutch efforts are aimed at finding a solution in the near future.

House of Representatives, Parliamentary Session 2001–2002, Annexe

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## REPORT BASED ON PRESS RELEASE 'ARGOS' INVESTIGATIVE RADIO PROGRAM ON **CONFLICT NATO** Karel Koster 23 February 2002

In a program broadcast on Dutch radio on Friday 22 February 2002, Prof. Rob de Wijk, a national security expert and NATO insider, revealed that there is a serious conflict taking place inside NATO. The conflict came to a head at an informal meeting of NATO ambassadors in Brussels on 18 January, when Senator Lugar described the NATO alliance as "irrelevant" unless it adapted itself to fight the war against terrorism. De Wijk was present at the meeting.

Lugar:

"The Alliance invoked article 5 for the first time in its history in response to September 11. But, NATO itself has only played a limited, largely political and symbolic role in the war against terrorism."

"Rightly or wrongly, the legacy of Kosovo has reinforced the concern that NATO is not up to the job of fighting a modern war." ([www.senate.gov/~lugar/011702.html](http://www.senate.gov/~lugar/011702.html))

Lugar stated at the beginning of his speech that he had coordinated its contents with President Bush. De Wijk, who has been involved in policy making for 20 years, stated that the 18 January meeting concluded that there was absolutely no European vision on how to maintain NATO's relevancy. The language used at the conference was unusually hard and undiplomatic, according to De Wijk. He also concluded that the US government has decided to bring this confrontation into the open, because a conference report on the 18 January meeting was being distributed by US information officers (it reached him on 21 Feb). He therefore did not feel himself bound to secrecy.

On 20 January the Netherlands government presented a non-paper to the NATO Permanent Council in which an attempt was made to bridge the differences between the European NATO members and the US government.

In reaction to this the Dutch parliamentarians Jan Hoekema and Bert Koenders (foreign affairs spokesmen for D66 and the Labour Party, two of the governing coalition parties) have labelled questions on the nature of the non-paper. They also asked about the NATO plans to cut back the funding of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Centre, reported in the Wall Street Journal Europe (24 January 2002)

According to other sources a meeting of the NATO Council on 15 February concluded that the public confrontation between the US and its European allies should stop.

On 19 February Solana, the EU foreign affairs coordinator, called publicly for a constructive dialogue between the US and the European Union.

A key issue in the background is the preparations by the US for a war against Iraq. 4000 US troops are involved in exercises in Kuwait. Intriguingly, a German NBC unit was also involved in those exercises, and has probably been joined by a Czech NBC unit.

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House of Representatives of the States General 2  
Parliamentary Session 2001–2002 Annexe to the Proceedings  
Questions put by members of the House, and the reply provided by the government.  
917

Questions from member **Hoekema** (D66) to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on **the American ‘nuclear promise’**. (Submitted 27 February 2002)

1  
Have you seen reports<sup>1</sup> that the American government has dissociated itself from the policy that has applied since 1978 of not deploying nuclear weapons against countries that do not themselves have these weapons (the so-called ‘negative security guarantees’), which was first proclaimed as a policy at the First General Meeting of the United Nations on Disarmament (SAVVN) in 1978 by Secretary of State Vance?

2  
If these reports are true, what is your opinion of them? Have there been consultation on the matter in the NATO Alliance or bilaterally? What will you be doing about it with the allies?

<sup>1</sup> GPD 23 February: Statements by Under Secretary of State John Bolton, according to the ‘Washington Times’.

## Reply

Reply by Minister **Van Aartsen** (Foreign Affairs). (Received 27 March 2002)

1  
Yes.

2  
The American Department of State has denied that the United States has changed its policy on the so-called ‘negative security guarantees’. Since there is no changed policy, I see no reason within the Alliance to initiate discussion on it. ‘Negative security guarantees’ are unilateral restrictions on the deployment of nuclear weapons imposed by the nuclear powers themselves. In the case of nuclear-free zones these guarantees are included as treaty provisions. The unilateral guarantees were most recently ratified by the nuclear powers in Security Council Resolution 984 (1995). Information on ‘negative security guarantees’ and their interpretation by the United States government, including the fact that it has not ruled out, under certain circumstances, consideration of the deployment of nuclear weapons if an enemy uses other weapons of mass destruction, is provided in my letter of 6 September 1999<sup>1</sup> (25 819 and 26 348, no. 8, Parliamentary Session 1998–1999) and elsewhere, and in the reply to questions put by member Hoekema<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Parliamentary Papers 25 819, 26 438 no. 8, Parliamentary Session 1998–1999.

<sup>2</sup> Annexe to the Proceedings no. 1229, Parliamentary Session 1999–2000.

House of Representatives, Parliamentary Session 2001–2002, Annexe 1927

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## **PENN/NI report : Further report on transatlantic relations**

Karel Koster 1 March 2002

The investigative radio programme Argos today broadcast further information on the near-rift which has developed in NATO. The programme quoted from the report made by the US information officer Diana Zeleny of the 18 January meeting, which was described in last week’s Argos broadcast. (covered by my previous report). The following are the key points revealed by the programme:

- Senator Lugar made the same points inside the meeting as he published in the text which can be found on his website
- The Dutch ministry of foreign affairs denies that there has been a conflict in NATO

- The quote read out by Rob de Wijk in last week's programme was repeated. That is, if NATO does not change, it will become irrelevant; the Europeans appear to have responded by stating that the US chose not to use the help offered after 11 September and are not consulting them.

Three Dutch parliamentarians took part in the programme:

- Ab Harrewijn (Green Left defence spokesman): he regarded the conflict as extremely serious: it indicated a re-nationalisation of defence policies

- Jan Hoekema (D66 foreign affairs spokesman, governing party) regarded these developments as serious, but not fundamentally so. He saw NATO becoming a facilitary organisation, providing some capacity for US operations by those member states willing to cooperate. He saw nothing strange in the leadership role played by the US but was worried by the lack of political consultations.

- Mr. Dirk Jan Blauw, defence spokesman of the VVD (the conservative liberals, one of the governing parties) also did not regard the conflict as fundamental: after all, Senator Lugar had given a number of options. He also regarded a leadership role by the US as normal.

According to other sources there is some unease in NATO circles at the Dutch publicity surrounding the NATO debate.

Provisional evaluation

The original source of this particular controversy lies in the Lugar presentation at the NATO meeting and the non-paper presented by the Dutch government in reaction to the US declarations. This event should be seen in the context of the public statements on both sides of the Atlantic. The internal nature of the debate of course carries more weight and has probably been deliberately leaked by the US (through de Wijk, who could do so because of the US report delivered to him: it had no 'secret' classification) to increase public pressure on the NATO states. The question is whether the choices presented by Lugar are also the options being presented by the US as policy alternatives and whether the Dutch non-paper is a desperate attempt to maintain some kind of bridge between the Bush administration and the continental NATO. Another more likely possibility is that the Bush administration has already decided to ignore the NATO as such and simply patch together ad hoc coalitions when necessary. This would fit in with the strategy of coalition building used so far: the US decides what has to be done and then finds allies to cooperate with, within or outside NATO. It would then also state that it is prepared to carry out operations alone. The 'soft' NATO can then serve as a kind of cleaning up service to maintain the peace and do development aid after the US military operation is completed.

## **PRESS RELEASE ARGOS MARCH 1, 2002**

**Dutch radio programme 'Argos' makes report public of secret nato meeting**

**"US message to permanent representatives was clear: if NATO is not radically altered to meet new threats and challenges, it could become irrelevant and lose American support"**

**The Dutch investigative radio programme Argos (VPRO, radio 1, March 1) today made public the report of a secret informal meeting of the permanent representatives to NATO, held on January 18, 2002 in Genval near Brussels. The radio programme reported last week already about the meeting and investigated this issue together with the German newspaper Hamburger Abendblatt. Yesterday Argos obtained a copy of the report, written by Diane Zeleny, U.S. Information Officer, NATO Country Relations, OIPS.**

**These are the most important passages of the report:**

## **Conference Report: U.S. Mission to NATO Security Policy Workshop**

*NATO and the new strategic environment: meeting the challenge*

*Genval, January 18, 2002*

In addition to permreps attendees includes security experts and officials from NATO countries. Panelists included U.S. Senator Richard Lugar, Ambassador Richard Haass of the U.S. State Department, (...) Dr. Dominique Moisi, of IFRI in Paris, Dr. Horst Teltschik, Chairman of Wehrkunde (...), Professor Ron de Wijk of the Clingendael Institute in the Netherlands.

### **Key findings:**

1. U.S. message to permreps was clear: if NATO is not radically altered to meet new threats and challenges, it could become irrelevant and lose American support.(...)
2. European message, while not unanimous, was also clear: we want some respect in Washington and less condescension. We offered help and you did not accept. We aren't convinced that if we spend more, do more, we will have more of say in the game. (...)
3. Transatlantic trust and confidence is frayed.  
(...)
6. U.S. policymakers wonder if NATO has lost its rationale, lost its monopoly with the advent of ESDP. (...)  
(...)
8. There is a strong consensus that there has been re-nationalization of European security interests since 9/11.  
(...)
11. NATO will be more a la carte – a lego box from which to choose the assets required for the job at hand.  
(...)

Moisi commenced with an ironic statement on the new threat to NATO: Don Rumsfeld. In 1966, the greatest threat to NATO was de Gaulle and now it is the US Defense Secretary. Moisi had no further surprises in store, and sounded surprisingly like Vedrine (...) Moisi ended as ironically as he began: "I'm pro-NATO, but if the US isn't what can I do?"

(...)

Richard Haass, Director of State Department's Policy Planning department (...) asked if NATO has lost its rationale? NATO (...) must play a role outside of Europe. European capabilities and political will needs to strengthen significantly. (...) If capabilities don't evolve, NATO will be talking shop only.  
(...)

### **Perm rep commentary:**

(...)

- Is it true that if we do more we will have more of a say in the game? (...)

### **Conclusion:**

Clearly a very strong and consistent message from U.S. speakers, both official and non-official, executive as well as legislative branches of government. NATO needs to reform significantly, or face probable irrelevance. U.S. has undergone a dramatic change in thinking since September 11<sup>th</sup>. Focus is now squarely on threats posed by terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. (...) No clear European consensus on how to get NATO ready for the next 50 years.

Diane Zeleny

U.S. Information Officer

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19 March 2002-03-21 REF: DVB/VD-45/02

Answer by Mr. Van Aartsen, minister of foreign affairs to questions put to him by the members of parliament Koenders (Labour Party) and Hoekema on the **adjustments to NATO (dd 21 February 2002)**

Question 1

Is it true that Secretary General Robertson is considering the disbandment of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Centre as a cost-cutting measure? (1) If so, what is the position of the Netherlands government on this?

ANSWER: There are no plans for disbanding the centre in connection with cost cutting. In the light of the current debate in NATO on possible adjustments, in order to be better prepared for terrorist threats, the great majority of the allies, as well as Secretary General Robertson, agrees that the centre should be strengthened further. That is also the position of the Netherlands government. The Netherlands has also made some concrete suggestions on this (see also the report on the NATO ministerials, letter 19 Dec 2001)

Question 2:

Was decision taken during the Permanent Council of 31 January to undertake a “...broad discussion on the need to adjust the alliance to the new situation after the events of 11 September 2001 ?” (2) Did the Dutch government table a non-paper? What is the position of the Netherlands government in this debate? Can the document be made available to the House?

Answer

On 15 Feb (not on 31 January 2002) the NATO ambassadors held a brainstorming session on the new role of NATO, in the light of the preparation of the Prague Summit. No conclusions were drawn after the end of the informal session. No Netherlands ‘non-paper’ was tabled. The Dutch permanent representative, Ambassador Patijn, did however distribute the Dutch talking points after the conclusion of the meeting. These have been appended for your information.

NAC BRAINSTORMING SESSION FEBRUARY 15, 2002

NETHERLANDS’ SPEAKING NOTES

NATO’s New Roles

· September 11, the possibility of a fundamentally new relationship with Russia and the prospect of a substantial enlargement have rearranged NATO’s political agenda.

Some fundamentals, however, remain unchanged and must be preserved and strengthened in ‘Prague’:

1. NATO embodies strategic security link between US and Europe. Given commonality of fundamental political objectives and interests (democracy, rule of law, human rights, market oriented liberal international trading system) ‘Prague’ must reflect the will on both sides of the ocean that this link remains a key element in our respective security policies and that NATO will remain the central forum for consultations on issues that affect their security interests;

2. Military cooperation in NATO (common defence planning, standardisation/ integration, common military structures) plays key role in security and defence policies of European nations:

- the Alliance provides European allies a solid international political basis for planning and implementing their defence efforts

aimed at providing collective security and defence, protecting common rather than national interests;

- NATO's standardization and integration policies have provided European nations a solid technical base for cooperation in the field of defence;
- next to US NATO is the only entity that can plan, organise, execute and sustain major crisis management operations. Preserving and improving this capability is a precondition for European Governments to participate and share risks in major international crisis management operations;
- the future membership and/or partnership offers former communist states in Central and Eastern Europe the perspective of joining the transatlantic security link, thus providing clear and effective direction in their search for internal and external stability during their long and difficult transitions. 'Prague' should unambiguously restate and reconfirm NATO's essential role in giving direction to security and defence policies of European nations and in preserving for the future an effective military partnership between the US and Europe.

· On the way to Prague, apart from the enlargement issue, NATO has to formulate new policies and instruments for dealing with the threat of terrorism. I want to elaborate on four issues:

1. In formulating its policies for combating terrorism NATO must develop both a philosophy and the practical means for cooperation and a division of labour with other international organisations. Combating terrorism requires a wide ranging effort going way beyond military cooperation. Relations between NATO and EU will be pivotal. In the run up to Prague we must assure that not only the Berlin+ cooperative agenda is implemented. We also have to reach political understanding that enables NATO and EU to consult and to cooperate practically to draw full benefit of each others strengths and achievements.
2. With a view both to the struggle against terrorism and to their regional security concerns NATO has to add new and tangible dimensions to our cooperation with partners in the Mediterranean, the Caucasus and Central Asia. We should move from general discussions to more regionally focussed discussions in PfP and EAPC, where relevant underpinned with practical cooperation programs.
3. Refocussing NATO's activities to better combat terrorism implies the willingness of all allies to rethink the way we do business under DCI, defence planning, NATO infrastructure and -defence support. We need to improve on our political flexibility if we want to agree on new priorities and new procedures. This organisation has to change with its new challenges and its growing membership. We need unorthodox thinking. To give one example: perhaps the European Capabilities Action Plan will deliver what DCI has been less able to do. A less technocratic and more political approach may work better. Secondly, to review and adapt defence planning, infrastructure and defence support cooperation has been notoriously difficult in the past. Also here we need to come forward with quite unorthodox solutions. The European Allies will have to organize their efforts so as to create synergy between increasing resources, increasing efficiency through cooperation and increasing cost-effectiveness.
4. NATO should seriously look at possibilities to become more



directly involved and more operational in dealing with the threat of weapons of mass destruction. In my letter of December 13, 2001, I put forward some practical proposals to develop WMDC into a broader based centre of excellence and to explore the establishment of NATO assets in the field of consequence management. I suggest you give these serious consideration.

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- 1 Wall Street Journal Europe, January 24, 2002: 'In a confidential memo to member states, Lord Robertson listed programs that might have to be cut for lack of sufficient funding. Among them was the Weapons of Mass Destruction center and NATO's office in Ukraine - both hallmark projects for NATO in the 1990's backed by the US(...).'
- 2 Atlantic News nr3357, 1 February 2002, p.2. Zie voorts: Toespraak Senator Lugar van 19 januari voor de jaarvergadering van de US-NATO missions. [www.senate.gov/lugar/011702.html](http://www.senate.gov/lugar/011702.html).

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**PENN memo** 19 March 2002

In view of the NATO connection of the NPR (see below), I would appreciate any other information on this you may be able to give me. The def-foreign affairs committee meeting in the Dutch parliament (on transatlantic relations, missile defence etc) planned for this week has been put off (again) to next week.

(with thanks to Otfried Nassauer)

Karel

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**Nuclear Posture Review [Excerpts]**

Submitted to Congress on 31 December 2001.

**8 January 2002**

**Nuclear Posture Review Report**

**"Dual-capable aircraft and nuclear weapons in support of NATO.** DoD will not seek any change to the current posture in FY02 but will review both issues to assess whether any modifications to the current posture are appropriate to adapt to the changing threat environment. A plan is already underway to conduct a NATO review of U.S. and allied dual capable aircraft in Europe and to present recommendations to Ministers in summer of 2002. Dual capable aircraft and deployed weapons are important to the continued viability of NATO's nuclear deterrent strategy and any changes need to be discussed within the alliance." (p. 44)

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**27 857 Missile Defence**

No. 2 Letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defence

To the President of the House of Representatives of the States General

The Hague, 25 March 2002

We are pleased to provide this response to the request from the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs of 25 January 2002. Continuing on from the letters on Missile Defence of 30 August 2000 (26 800 V, no. 122), 17 April 2001 (27 400 V, no. 68) and 5 July 2001 (27 857, no. 1), it gives further information on American plans for Missile Defence and its relationship to the ABM treaty.

**Introduction**

In our letter of 5 July 2001 we explained to you at some length the basic principles of the strategic review of American security policy that President Bush decided to initiate shortly after taking office. The review has three main elements: a new deterrence concept, the review of the nuclear forces structure (Nuclear Posture Review) and the development of defence systems against missiles from high-risk countries. Whereas these key elements were still only identifiable in broad outline in July, more detail is now available. This letter looks at

those developments and at the new strategic framework for relations with Russia. The US sees the terrorist attacks of 11 September as a confirmation of the basic principles of its strategic review. The new American security policy is based first and foremost on the notion of an inherently unsafe world, in which its deterrence relationship with Russia is no longer the central focus, and the threat from high-risk countries with weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles has increased. President Bush has said from the start that the US must protect itself against these high-risk countries. In his 'State of the Union' speech on 29 January 2002, he again left no-one in any doubt about the US position on this. As a consequence, the US remains determined to establish a defence system against missiles from high-risk countries (missile defence). Since 11 September 2001 the American government has also pointed out that some of these countries actively support terrorism. The terrorist threat is a major reason for the US attaching more importance than ever to combating the spread of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems – its aim being to prevent terrorist organisations ever having access to such weapons. The US therefore advocates a tightening of export controls, with the appropriate international regimes playing a significant role. It is also exerting more pressure on countries to fulfil their obligations under the terms of the Biological Weapons Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Treaty and the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This applies particularly to high-risk countries suspected of lending support to terrorist organisations. The US is calling on these countries to end their clandestine weapons programmes.

(.....)

**Conclusion**

The government shares the US view that the continuing spread of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems to high-risk countries poses a growing threat. The possibility that terrorist organisations are also trying to acquire these types of weapons is all the more disturbing after the terror attacks in the US on 11 September 2001. The continuing spread of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems demands, in the first instance, an effective non-proliferation policy. The increased US emphasis on the importance of compliance with non-proliferation treaties, especially by high-risk countries, is therefore justified. At the same time, the government still believes that arms control and non-proliferation are best served by the broadest possible multilateral approach. One of the aims the Netherlands is relentlessly pursuing is the establishment of the first politically binding international instrument for countering the spread of ballistic missiles, the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC), which you were informed of in the letter dated 26 October 2001 (21 531, no. 5). The Netherlands is also active on other non-proliferation fronts, and increasingly from the perspective of preventing terrorism with weapons of mass destruction.

As to the government's view on the unilateral withdrawal from the ABM treaty by the US, this was covered in the government's reply to questions put by member Bert Koenders (Annexe to the Proceedings, Parliamentary Session 2001– 2002, 518). The Netherlands continues to be active in the area of missile defence systems for the protection of deployed military units (Theatre Missile Defence, TMD). NATO is waiting for the results of two studies on its possible future need for missile defence systems before making any further decisions. Discussions with Russia on TMD are also held regularly in the Permanent Joint Council. A subject currently being considered is a programme of activities designed to investigate in more detail the options for TMD cooperation. The government welcomes the intention expressed by the US and Russia to reduce considerably their stockpiles of strategic nuclear weapons. These reductions are in line with the aim of reducing dependence on nuclear weapons and fulfilling the obligations imposed by Article 6 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The government is still of the opinion that they need to be laid down in a legally binding document that provides for verification and includes provisions guaranteeing the irreversibility of such reductions. The government hopes that the US and Russia will be able in this way to shape their new strategic relationship. The government will also be pressing for this bilaterally and in the NATO talks. In spite of the announced reduction in the quantity of strategic nuclear weapons on the Russian side, the large number of Russian non-strategic weapons continues to be a cause for concern. The government still believes that, in the context of a strategic framework, these weapons also need to be considered. The NATO-Russia talks on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) also offer the opportunity to put these concerns on the agenda. As you know, these talks arose out of the discussion within the alliance (concluded in December 2000) in response to paragraph 32 of the Washington Summit Declaration (see the letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of 17 January 2001, 26 348, no. 4). Against this background the government is proposing to hold a NATO-Russia seminar on nuclear arms security and storage this spring. Finally, it should be noted that on 8 October 2001 the government sought advice from the Advisory Council on International Issues on the matters referred to above. The Council's advice is expected this spring.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs,  
J.J. van Aartsen  
The Minister of Defence,  
F.H.G. de Grave

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### **No. 3 Letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs**

To the President of the House of Representatives of the States General  
The Hague, 27 March 2002

In response to the request from the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, contained in the letter of 13 March 2002<sup>1</sup>, to give ‘an assessment of the recently leaked reports on American planning for possible nuclear attacks, which would lower the nuclear threshold, and to examine the risks of such a policy’, I have the honour, on behalf also of the Minister of Defence, to report as follows.

On 25 March 2002 we sent your House a letter in which we examined the American strategic review (Parliamentary Paper 27 857, no. 2). This also included a detailed study of the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), the review of the nuclear forces structure. In relation to the reports that have appeared in the press in recent weeks we are able to advise the following as a supplement to the information provided in our earlier letter.

The American government established the NPR at the request of Congress. The NPR is included in a classified document submitted to the American Congress in January 2002. This government does not have access to the classified document in question. The substance of our letter of 25 March 2002 was based on the US government’s public announcements about the NPR and the information it provided to NATO.

On the basis of the information available to us, we described how the US has developed a draft for a new ‘triad’ to guarantee the credibility of its deterrence policy in a world characterised by new uncertainties. The NPR is first and foremost about deterrence. The report makes no mention of targets or pre-emptive strikes. The NPR contains no plans or guidelines for the operational deployment of nuclear weapons. The American authorities have also underscored this in their response to the recent press reports.

<sup>1</sup> See annexe.

House of Representatives, Parliamentary Session 2001–2002, 27 857, no. 3

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### **27 857 Missile Defence**

### **27 925 Combating international terrorism**

No. 4 report on a general consultation

Adopted 16 April 2002

On 28 March 2002 the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Standing Committee on Defence consulted with Foreign Affairs Minister Jozias van Aartsen and Defence Minister Frank de Grave.

(.....)

#### **The reply by the ministers**

The **Minister for Foreign Affairs** did not share the members’ view that the Americans have now embraced unilateralism. On the contrary, in all his contacts with the American administration he sees a willingness to operate with *and* consult with allies. What should be borne in mind, though, is that the attacks in America on 11 September came as a shock and that this is having an effect on policy. The US realises more than ever that the threat has changed

and that an answer to that changed threat has to be found in a different strategic concept. The American government has not, however, neglected to seek out allies in its fight against terrorism. Europe should respond to that position by making an unequivocal investment in the transatlantic relationship. This is the very point on which the American side has some concerns. They relate to NATO’s headline goals and the transformation of defence capabilities in some NATO member states. From their side, the Americans need signs from the EU that it is prepared to make the necessary effort in support of the alliance. At the same time, Washington does appreciate the policy of the ‘purple cabinets’ on this point. The minister also denied that the Netherlands tends not to be critical when it should be. Comments have been directed at the Americans on their unilateral withdrawal from the ABM treaty, the non-ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, and their restrictive measures on steel imports. The Netherlands is critical when criticism is warranted, but must also declare its support when there is reason to do so.

The minister also maintained that the US nuclear concept has not changed. He believes that members wrongly see reports that do not come directly from the American government as an interpretation of the policy. The NPR, however, is not a schedule. It is a broad, conceptual analysis initiated by the administration at the request of Congress. It has not changed the nuclear doctrine, and the threshold for

the use of nuclear weapons has not been lowered. The aim is, in fact, to raise the nuclear threshold. The development of weapons capable of destroying bunkers deep underground is certainly on the agenda, but the aim here is to reinforce the arsenal's deterrent effect. So the US is not intending to move away from the test moratorium either. The US and the Russian Federation are now holding intensive talks about a legally binding instrument to regulate the proposed reductions of strategic arsenals, including verification based on START I. They are also discussing the promotion of transparency, the implementation of confidence-building measures, cooperation on Missile Defence, and non-proliferation. This consultative process therefore contradicts the assumption that these powers are intent on starting an arms race and would endeavour to build their stocks of missiles with multiple nuclear warheads. The new threat to the US has underscored the importance of the MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime). One of the major themes of the MTCR is the adoption of an ICOC (International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation). The ICOC would be the first step towards reducing the risk of the spread of missiles. Its success will depend very much on the level of support it attracts. The Netherlands has been very active on this front. It is trying, in the EU and bilaterally as well, to maintain the commitment of the parties that was clearly in evidence at the Paris conference in February. Iran's presence at the conference was extremely significant.

Reports have appeared in the press that may indicate that the problems the OPCW (Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons) is experiencing could have something to do with the organisation's policy towards Iraq. But the OPCW does not have a mandate to carry out inspections on its own account in Iraq. There is some concern, though, about the OPCW's financial situation and management culture. A solution will be sought at the meeting of treaty partners in April. The minister stressed the importance of a quick solution to the question of weapons inspections in Iraq. The Secretary-General of the UN is in contact with the Iraqi government and will be holding further talks with government representatives in April. This meeting will not include negotiations on implementation of Resolution 1284, but the resolution will be elucidated. The ultimate aim of negotiations will be the unconditional implementation of this resolution. Negotiating the implementation of Resolution 1284 is, however, only one aspect of American policy towards Iraq. The other aspect concerns the goods that Iraq is allowed to import. Naturally, the termination of the current mechanism for controlling the importation of goods into Iraq would require its replacement by an agreed list of goods to be controlled. The hope is that agreement on this will be reached in May. The outcome will depend largely on the negotiations held by the permanent members of the Security Council, especially the dialogue between the US and the Russian Federation. Military action is therefore not on the agenda. On the contrary, the US wishes to invest in consultation. In response to an interjection by Mr Harry van Bommel the minister said he stood by his view that the fight against terrorism should not be confused with the question of weapons inspections in Iraq. He did not believe, however, that it would be wise to set any limit on those inspections at the moment, because that could have an adverse effect. The minister also pointed out that a mandate could be agreed for discussions on unexploded devices in former war zones under the terms of the conventional weapons treaty chaired by the Netherlands. Worldwide, the number of landmine victims is falling. The Netherlands is actively working to address the problem of small arms. The minister would inform the House of the result of the Pretoria conference. Finally, in response to interjections by Mr Jan Dirk Blaauw and Mr Bert Koenders, the minister said he would provide the House with a written account of the government's view on the future of NATO.

The **Minister of Defence** added that the TMD project, whereby short and medium-range defence missiles would be deployed on ships, cannot currently be put into effect because the costs are too high. The American administration claims that the project's underlying objectives are still valid. The US is keen to discuss the question of how those objectives might now best be achieved. NATO is coordinating its policy on this point. The US will define its position in mid-May. The House can then be provided with more specific information. The minister will inform the House in writing of any changes to the new air defence and command frigates to be built. The minister also said that there is a clear distinction between MD and TMD. TMD is about protecting

military units in the context, for example, of a peace mission. The scope of MD would extend to protection against the threat of long-range missiles from high-risk countries. MD plans, which therefore relate to space defence, do not form part of Dutch defence plans. There has been no change in Dutch policy as far as the use of cluster weapons is concerned. In conclusion, the minister also underlined the importance of transatlantic cooperation. He pointed out that both sides need to signal their willingness to invest in the relationship. In his view it was true to say that the US could pursue a broader security policy, for example by linking it to development cooperation. He was surprised, however, by the fact that there are members who reproach the US for its unilateralism while at the same time pressing for an end to NATO membership. Those whose aim is to withdraw from membership are the very ones who could be reproached for unilateralism.

Chairman of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Mr Jaap de Hoop Scheffer  
Chairman of the Standing Committee on Defence, Mr Gerrit Valk  
Clerk of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, T.J.E. van Toor

**House of Representatives, Parliamentary Session 2001–2002, 27 857 and 27 925, no. 4**

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House of Representatives of the States General 2

Parliamentary Session 2001-2002

28 000 V **Adoption of the budget** for revenue and expenditure of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (V) for the year 2002

**no. 59 Letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs**

To the President of the House of Representatives of the States General  
The Hague, 16 April 2002

At the General Consultation of 28 March 2002 on transatlantic relations and arms control, member Blaauw requested a memorandum setting out the government's position on the future of NATO. A reaction was also sought to the opinions expressed by Senator Lugar in a speech on 18 January 2002 (see: [www.senate.gov/-lugar/011702.html](http://www.senate.gov/-lugar/011702.html)). I am pleased, on behalf also of the Minister of Defence, to respond to the member's request.

In doing so, I will concentrate on the agenda for the NATO Summit in Prague in November, since discussion on the future of NATO in the months ahead will occur mainly in the context of preparations for the summit.

NATO's current responsibilities are set out in the Strategic Concept adopted in 1999. None of these responsibilities are any less relevant now than they were then. NATO forms the foundation for a stable security structure in Europe and is also the most important forum for the transatlantic security debate and, as such, is essential to Europe and the US alike. The Alliance is proving its military value through its successful peace operations in the Balkans, in which almost 60,000 military personnel are currently taking part. The Alliance also projects stability through intensive cooperation with partners and its ongoing process of expansion. It is now working with Russia on a more far-reaching form of cooperation; one that will not affect NATO's own freedom to act. If sufficient progress is made in these discussions, a special NATO-Russia Summit will probably be held in late May to seal the agreements. The fight against terrorism is a new challenge. As I said in my speech on 5 April on the occasion of the celebration of the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Atlantic Committee, the summit in Prague will have to focus on NATO's role in combating terrorism and the changes needed to facilitate that role. In recent years the Alliance has continually adapted to developments in the security area and will have to do so again in this respect.

A large number of practical proposals are currently being discussed which are designed to enable NATO to offer better protection against terrorist attacks and their effects (consequence management), especially those in which weapons of mass destruction are used. The Netherlands started off discussion on this last December in the form of concrete proposals that are now being discussed and developed. They include:

- closer cooperation between the intelligence services;
- consolidation of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Centre;
- strengthening the capacity to protect the civil population in the event of an attack with weapons of mass destruction, and
- comparison of the measures taken in different NATO countries after 11 September, so that best practices can be shared.

Proposals put forward by other countries include a response unit for cases of biological (terrorist) attack, a rapidly deployable diagnostic and forensic laboratory, and joint training on combating the effects of biological and chemical attacks. Agreement on a (hopefully large) number of these proposals could be reached in the months ahead.

In addition to these specific measures, the upgrading of the NATO countries' military capabilities in general is also to be discussed. The Defence Capabilities Initiative process has resulted in improved capability in some instances, but certainly not all. The outcome of the Prague Summit must be a more targeted list of shortcomings, better prioritisation and, if possible, greater commitment from all the allies to actually achieving the objectives within a set period. The European countries in particular will have to tackle their military capability deficiencies in both the NATO and EU arenas. More can and must be done, through closer cooperation, more emphasis on modules, pooling and task specialisation, and, in some cases, higher defence budgets. The US in turn must commit itself to greater defence technology transfer.

The DCI at the NATO level and the European Capabilities Action Plan at the EU level are two sides of the same coin and reinforce one another. The Netherlands has taken the lead in the EU by launching the European Capabilities Action Plan. This must likewise produce some initial results in short order.

Another focus of attention is internal change in NATO itself, partly in the light of anticipated NATO expansion. The NATO command structure will need to be looked at critically again, as will defence planning methodology, in order to attract greater political attention. The internal organisational structure of NATO headquarters will need to be further modified. The starting point here is that NATO is increasing both its political decisiveness and its military strike capability.

As far as Senator Lugar's ideas are concerned, I agree with his analysis that Americans and Europeans are both vulnerable to terrorist attacks, including those involving the use of weapons of mass destruction.

The threat of terrorist attacks on the US and Europe is certainly not over. The fight against terrorism will be a long one. The task is to keep the most dangerous technologies out of the hands of the world's most dangerous people – largely because the terrorists are, as he rightly says, beyond deterrence. In that light I regard Senator Lugar's appeal for a broadening of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program as an attractive idea. It is transparently clear that more money and energy will need to be put into countering the proliferation of nuclear, biological, chemical and radiological weapons now and in the future. In this context, the Nunn-Lugar program in the countries of the former Soviet Union performs a very useful function and in principle the idea of broadening this deserves every support. NATO, and more specifically the enhanced WMD Centre, can play an important role in this.

Another point, which was also raised by Senator Lugar, concerns NATO's geographical reach. The Washington Treaty does not wholly exclude action outside the Euro-Atlantic area. Article 5 of the treaty relates to "the restoration and maintenance of security in the North Atlantic area" in the event of aggression, but does not limit the action required to achieve this. In view of the fact that the threat of terrorism would most likely come from outside the Euro-Atlantic area, it does not make sense to impose geographical restrictions either – quite the reverse. So I agree with Senator Lugar that "old distinctions between 'in' and 'out' of area have become utterly meaningless".

I also agree completely with Lugar's objections to the theory propounded by some that there would be a defined division of tasks between the US, which would take on the major conflicts outside Europe, and Europe, which would concentrate on the smaller conflicts within Europe. This is based, as Lugar rightly says, on the mistaken assumption that the US has only minor interests in Europe and that Europeans have few interests in the rest of the world. Both have global – and often identical – interests and should as far as possible act in unison to be effective. The fact that Europe lags behind in terms of capability, as he correctly states, is no reason to turn NATO into a purely political organisation, but is, in fact, a further reason for addressing those shortcomings.

To summarise: the agenda from now until Prague is ambitious. Where originally it was only expected to be an 'expansion summit', the events of 11 September have added the changes to NATO needed in the light of the new threats and, following on from this, much more focus on its approach to its military shortcomings. The government's efforts will be fully and energetically aimed at helping to ensure that NATO takes up the new challenges, since this is essential to our security.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs,  
J.J. van Aartsen

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PENN/NI report 16 April 2002

## Netherlands government about to fall

The Dutch government is about to fall: all the expectations are that Prime minister Kok will be going to Queen Beatrix this afternoon to tender his resignation. The formal reasons will be given in a statement to parliament this afternoon, but the ostensible reason is the presentation last week on 10 April of the so-called NIOD report on the fall of the Srebrenica enclave in 1995. The enclave had been declared a protected zone by the UN and was supposed to be protected by a Dutch battalion under UN command. Reportedly, 7000 Bosnian Muslim men are still missing, a substantial part of them were slaughtered by parts of the Bosnian Serb army which took the enclave.

The issue has continuously played a role in Dutch politics since then, because of the responsibility of the Dutch soldiers for the population of the enclave. Because most of the parliamentary parties were responsible for the decision to send the troops (in 1993) they have not been in a great hurry to investigate the precise course of events in 1995 and the possibility that those murdered could have been saved if the Dutch cabinet had ordered the UN contingent had offered more than token resistance to the Bosnian Serb army under General Mladic. In fact the call for a parliamentary investigation was deflected by the decision to order the NIOD, a research bureau which used to specialise in the Second world war, to investigate the entire affair. The report was published last week and caused an uproar in the media which has banished all other matters to the background. The key political point is that we will be having elections on 15 May and the election recess will start at the end of next week. The cabinet's fall was initiated by the left-wing minister Pronk, who openly disagreed with the conclusions of the NIOD report, which absolved the 1995 cabinet from direct blame for the massacre. Premier Kok and Pronk were ministers in that cabinet. Because of Pronk's manoeuvres it has become impossible to beat a safe retreat for the cabinet as a whole, hence its impending very probable fall.

An interesting side-effect(?) is that the vote for Dutch participation in the JSF development programme which should have taken place this afternoon has been put off. This does not necessarily mean that the cabinet decision to participate will not go through anyway, but there will be trouble if parliament does not support the decision. In the Dutch political system it is customary that the cabinet, once it has resigned, may only carry out existing policies, but not implement new ones.

Karel Koster

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### **OPCW - position of director**

Unofficial translation of response by Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs Michel to oral questions put to him by Peter Vanhoutte, parliamentarian of Agalev (Flemish Greens) on 17 april 2002, regarding OPCW and the position of director Bustani (translation Karel Koster)

#### Question

What position will our country take at the conference? Is our country prepared to defend the position of Bustani without reservations? Will our country also attempt to persuade the EU to take a common position?

What steps will our country undertake if Mr. Bustani is nevertheless removed from his position?

#### Answers

1. Right from the start Belgium has argued for a common EU position.
2. The EU strongly regrets the serious crisis in which the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) finds itself.; this is threatening to undermine the main objective of the OPCW, namely the total destruction of chemical weapons and its verification.
3. The EU would preferably have avoided a confrontation about this during the last session of the Executive Council of the OPCW (March 2002).
4. The EU also wishes to avoid a new confrontation during the upcoming special

General Conference and is prepared to support an honourable solution for the crisis, in which a new management team for the OPCW could be appointed as quickly as possible.

5. The EU is of the opinion that Mr. Bustani should step down in order to save the OPCW.

6. The EU is at this moment involved in agreeing on its voting behaviour. Already it is clear that a broad majority in the EU will call on Mr. Bustani's resignation during the coming General Assembly. It is also obvious that a large majority of other OPCW member states, regardless of their being from the North or the South, want this resignation. One can therefore conclude that there is such a loss of confidence in Mr. Bustani within the OPCW that there is no other solution except his resignation.

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**PENN/NI report Netherlands political situation - murder Fortuyn**

6 May 2002

Pim Fortuyn, the populist Dutch politician who had been expected to gain around 20 seats in the 150 seat parliament in the upcoming national elections (15 May) has been murdered, probably assassinated. He was shot at around 1800 local time when he came out of a radio interview in a studio in Hilversum, the media centre of Holland. It is at present unclear whether this was a politically motivated deed or a spontaneous one. It is almost certainly connected to the very high-profile media campaign surrounding Pim Fortuyn, who was widely expected to cause a far-reaching upset in the Dutch political system next week.

The consequences of this event for the election campaign are unclear. It is possible that his electoral list (consisting largely of unknowns) will nevertheless continue to participate in the campaign. However, Fortuyn himself was a unique populist politician. It will be impossible to find a substitute with comparable charisma. The death of Fortuyn marks a turning point in Dutch politics: to my knowledge no politician has been assassinated in the Netherlands since the Spanish king ordered the prince of Orange, father of the nation, killed in the 16th century. The question is how the potential Fortuyn voters will react. Possibly they will simply not vote: it seems very unlikely that they will transfer their votes to any other party. Fortuyn symbolised a far-reaching dissatisfaction with the Dutch political establishment, partially because of the increasing problems in the collective sector (health, education, public transport and safety) as well as increasing disaffection with the migrant community. In local elections in Rotterdam Fortuyn has already achieved a stunning victory earlier this year by taking votes from the social democrats (Labour Party) in that city.

The fact that there is now no symbol for the new right-wing populist European politics in Holland, is bound to have negative consequences for the political climate in Holland ie the shift to the right will in some way be translated into official or unofficial politics. It is fair to describe the political establishment and opinion makers in Holland as being thoroughly shocked this evening.

Karel Koster

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**PENN Netherlands report on political situation 15 May 2002**

The definitive prognosis of the Dutch elections have just come through. The results run more or less parallel to the polls held the last few days. You will recall that Pim Fortuyn, the leader of the right-populist Pim Fortuyn List was assassinated last week. The PLF campaign nevertheless continued and may have gained extra votes as a result of the massive collective outpouring of grief by his supporters at the funeral last Friday.

This is the provisional composition (there will be some minor shifts as the definitive results come in) of the next 150 seat Dutch Lower House (the present distribution of seats is in brackets):

Christian Democrats CDA: 43 (29)



Lijst Pim Fortuyn: 26 (0)  
Labour Party : 23 (45)  
Liberal conservatives (VVD): 23 (38)  
Green Left (GL): 10 (11)  
Socialist Party (SP): 9 (5)  
Centrist Liberals (D66): 8 (14)  
Christian Union (CU): 4 (5)  
Christian Reformed (SGP): 2 (3)  
Leefbaar Nederland (LN): 2 (0)

The purple coalition which has already formally left office (the present government is a caretaker cabinet) consisted of PvdA, VVD and D66.

GreenLeft are the Greens, SP the radical socialists, LN progressive populists who threw out Pim Fortuyn in February because of remarks regarding muslim immigrants. CU are progressive christians, SGP more right wing christians and CDA is of course the traditional kingmaker of Dutch politics. The purple cabinet of the last 8 years shut them out, but they have come back in with a bang. They will now resume their powerful key position in Dutch politics.

Tomorrow 16 May the formal process of forming a coalition cabinet will start. The most likely result is centrist - right-wing combination: CDA - VVD - LPF although a progressive coalition is theoretically possible: CDA - PvdA - GL - D66. However, a 4- party coalition is considered too unstable, because the CDA would not like to govern with three progressive parties. About half of the CDA voters would support a progressive combination. A minority cabinet based on less than 75 seats is possible too, but would depend on various combinations of the excluded parties for its existence - very unstable too.

On the other hand, LPF without its leader is considered to be a very inexperienced group of people, with few experienced politicians. The most prominent in my eyes is Jansen van Raaij, a former Christian Democrat who lobbied for the US aerospace industry during the Reagan star wars plans. He can be regarded as an Atlanticist. Before he was killed Fortuyn was also visited by a Lockheed Martin delegation in connection with the JSF plans. (see my earlier postings).

The foremost question on everybody's mind is how fast a cabinet can be formed. Traditionally this takes 2 or 3 months of negotiations. This time round it might go a lot faster.

On foreign and security issues the expected right-wing cabinet will probably have the following positions:

- Atlanticist, pro Nato (CDA does have a European wing but this will probably be overshadowed)
- pro JSF
- EU go slow policy on expansion
- no problem with tacnukes on Dutch soil
- extra defence expenditure as demanded by the USA will be a problem
- internal issues (migrants, education, public safety, health, housing, transportation) will easily overshadow foreign and security issues. A war against Iraq may have further internal repercussions on the migrant issue.
- Missile Defence participation go slow because of costs

This development would seem to run parallel with those which have already taken place elsewhere in Europe. The overall effect will tend to encourage a process of turning inwards which will interact dangerously with the migrant issue and the war on terrorism.

I will keep you informed on further developments.

Karel Koster

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PENN report: **Netherlands chooses JSF as replacement F-16** 6 June 2002

As expected, the new Dutch parliament on 4 June rejected a last attempt by the progressive parties to stop Dutch participation in the American Joint Strike Fighter project by introducing

an amendment to the defence budget which would have prevented money from being allocated to the JSF development program. The changed composition of parliament, which is now overwhelmingly right-wing/populist made the decision possible. Participation in the research and development phase almost certainly commits the Dutch air force to buying the JSF from Lockheed Martin (with far-reaching operational implications). Other European countries, probably Norway and Denmark will now probably follow suit. The decision can be regarded as a shift back towards an Atlantic policy closely tied to US foreign policy. This can be described as a serious setback for the development of a European defence industry, which is a necessary basis for an independent European foreign and security policy.

This should also be seen in the context of the Galileo decision (independent European satellite navigation system project approved by the EU governments) and the US proposal in NATO to develop a rapid reaction capability. This last is clearly meant to head off the development of a European rapid reaction force, which is anyway stagnating.

Present developments partially undermine the possibility of developing an independent European course.

A key question in all this is: who is going to pay the bills? The US wants Europe to increase its defence spending and restructure its armed forces for compatibility with US forces in its overseas operations. However, there are extremely strong pressures against further increases in defence spending in Europe, war or terrorism or not, since there are huge competing budget demands in 'public order' and typically 'soft' sectors like health and education. It is especially these issues combined with the immigration policies which have formed the basis of the new right wing populist parties in Europe.

Somebody is going to get caught between a rock and a hard place....

Karel Koster

PENN Netherlands

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PENN/NI report on **Netherlands - US relations** 10 June 2002

You might be interested to know that there has been a fairly active reaction in Holland to the passing of the ASPA (American Servicemen's Protection Act) in the US Senate last Friday. Representatives of most parliamentary parties expressed anger and dismay at the legislation, although the reaction is somewhat premature as the law still has to go through a combined Senate and House meeting (and may therefore be amended). The news of this legislation was carried on page 1 of the Volkskrant as one of the leads, the bottom of p1 of the NRC Handelsblad and p 5 of Utrechts Nieuwsblad, an important regional daily. All the reports mentioned the parliamentary (Lower House) disquiet. Quoted were the following:

Verhagen (Christian Democrats): " ... legitimacy is being given to other countries in opposing the the ICC..."

Terpstra (VVD - right wing liberals) "...absurd legislation which should be opposed with support from the EU allies..."

Janssen van Raaij (Lijst Pim Fortuyn): "... have they gone crazy? We are not Panama, which they simply invaded."

The above three parties will form the next Dutch cabinet.

The opposition Green Left demanded a rapid parliamentary debate with minister of foreign affairs van Aartsen (still part of the present caretaker cabinet).

None of the parliamentarians thought it likely that the US would actually invoke the law. A NATO spokesperson interviewed by NRC Handelsblad stated that the matter is none of NATO's business, as it concerns US legislation.

Former minister of foreign affairs van den Broek wrote an oped in today's NRC Handelsblad calling for open rejection of the US legislation.

Comment

Although these reactions are perhaps a bit premature it is interesting that ASPA is being opposed by most of the Dutch parliament: the US exemption for its own personnel in possible war crimes indictments is viewed as completely unacceptable. This logic could easily be applied to all the other US unilateralist steps.

Naturally all this opposition can rapidly turn out to be mostly hot air, especially if it is not reflected across Europe.

Karel Koster  
PENN-Netherlands

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28 000 X Adoption of the budget for revenue  
and expenditure of the Ministry of Defence  
(X) for the year 2002

**No. 31 Letter from the Minister of Defence**

To the President of the House of Representatives of the States General  
The Hague, 21 June 2002

The spring meetings of the NATO ministers of defence were held in Brussels on 6 and 7 July 2002. In this letter I report on the key points of those meetings. I also present you with the communiqués from the North Atlantic Council for Ministers of Defence (NAC (D)), the Defence Planning Committee (DPC), the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), as well as statements on the strengthening of military capabilities and the Balkans, and from the meetings of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) and the NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC).

(.....)

**The Nuclear Planning Group**

At the Nuclear Planning Group meeting there was a reminder that NATO's sub-strategic nuclear armament has been reduced by 85% since 1991 and is being maintained at a minimum level to promote continued peace and stability. In this context, the NATO ministers have given indications of a further change to these defence forces, which consist of fighter planes that, in addition to their conventional role, are also charged with the NATO nuclear task (dual capable aircraft). The change is seen as both possible, thanks to further improvement in the strategic security situation, and necessary in view of the sharp increase in operational load imposed by conventional crisis management roles. Against this background the Dutch contribution to the NATO nuclear task can be reduced from two squadrons to one. This is a military-operational measure with no financial or staffing consequences for the Dutch air force. However, the Netherlands will still meet the requirements of the NATO nuclear task. There is no change to the NATO nuclear arms policy as such.

**NATO-Russia**

This was the first time the ministers of defence had come together in the context of the new NATO-Russia Council (NRC). All the ministers stressed the importance of the new cooperative relationship. Russian minister Igor Ivanov said that it contributed to European security and stability. Its success will depend on the political will to give real substance to the partnership. Secretary-General Robertson said that the recently opened NATO Military Liaison Mission in Moscow could help to bring about a qualitative improvement in relations between NATO and Russia. The NRC ambassadors will translate into concrete projects the cooperative links that develop in areas such as non-proliferation, NBC threats, terrorism, training and exercises, arms control and defence reforms. It was within this framework, at the inaugural meeting of the NATO-Russia Council in Pratica di Mare (Italy) on 28 May 2002, that the Netherlands offered to organise a new seminar on nuclear security.

**NATO-Ukraine**

Secretary-General Robertson supported the Ukraine's efforts to radically reorganise its armed forces. There are still many obstacles to achieving interoperability with the alliance defence structures. Ukrainian Minister of Defence Volodymyr Schkidchenko emphasised that the NATO cooperation activities would be instrumental in the success of the reform process in areas such as defence planning, English language skills, cooperation between military academies, and democratic control of the armed forces. He indicated that the Ukraine was seeking further integration into Euro-Atlantic structures, including, in due course, NATO membership.

The Minister of Defence,  
F. H. G. de Grave

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28 600 V Adoption of the budget statement of the  
Ministry for Foreign Affairs (V) for the year 2003

Sept 2002

No. 2 explanatory memorandum

(.....)

POLICY AGENDA 2003

A. GENERAL AND ACCENTS FOR 2003

(.....)

**ACCENTS**

(....)

In 2003 preparations for the Netherlands' chairmanship of the EU (second half of 2004) will also be in full swing. It is, however, still too early to say which areas this chairmanship will choose to accent. NATO is preparing for the NATO Summit in November 2002. Work is being done, for example, on better coordination of capabilities and existing command structures to enable a complementary approach to be taken – by NATO *and* the EU – to new threats. The NATO and EU expansion processes are intended to consolidate peace and stability in Europe after the fall of the Wall in 1989. NATO expansion must not lead to new lines of division in Europe. The Netherlands will make out a case for giving real substance to the NATO-Russia Council. Under the umbrella of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), work is being done to build a European rapid intervention capability. This policy, which the Netherlands advocates and promotes, focuses on those situations in which NATO does not take action and in which the European Union recognises an interest. The institutional EU structures that make this possible are now in place. It is now largely a question of the actual realisation of the Headline Goals (development of the required military capability and police cooperation). In this area, the Netherlands will continue to stress complementarity with NATO. Finalisation of the cooperation modalities between the EU and NATO clears the way for an enhanced EU role.

(.....)

Controlling the security risks posed by increasing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems has acquired a new urgency. The risks come from both state and non-state players, or a combination of the two. Weapons of mass destruction are a security problem and are terrorism-sensitive. The Netherlands will pay particular attention to reinforcing multilateral non-proliferation regimes, more effective export controls and the destruction in Russia of proliferation-sensitive materials. With respect to Iraq, the aim must be for the country to comply fully with all disarmament conditions, as set out in UN resolutions, and especially as these relate to the admission of UN weapons inspectors and the conduct of weapons inspections.

(....)

Combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

The present multilateral system for the prevention of proliferation and the promotion of arms control and disarmament must be strengthened. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems presents an increasing security risk. If certain terrorist groups were to manage to acquire nuclear, biological, chemical or radiological resources, they would probably not be afraid to actually use them. The proliferation of such weapons to particular countries is also a growing cause for concern. The UN is working towards finalising negotiations on the treaty against nuclear terrorism. The Cabinet's non-proliferation policy will, in the first instance, be given shape within the framework of the EU/CFSP. The Cabinet is also endeavouring to promote an active stance on the part of both the EU and NATO towards the prevention of Nuclear, Biological, Chemical and Radiological (NBCR) terrorism. National measures, such as strengthening export controls, are also important. With respect to nuclear weapons, the Netherlands continues to work towards integrated implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This policy is not only being developed in the context of the NPT, but also in various other forums such as the First Committee of the General Assembly of the UN, the Geneva Disarmament Conference, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. In 2003 the second meeting of the preparatory committee for the NPT testing conference planned for 2005 will be held. Here, the Cabinet will devote itself to developing a good implementation report and for the formulation of clear agreements on further implementation of the action programme produced by the last testing conference in 2000. The government is also relentlessly pursuing the introduction of the Test Ban Treaty and a start to negotiations on a treaty to halt the production of fuel for nuclear weapons. In NATO the Netherlands is also working to initiate a dialogue with Russia on confidence-building measures relating to nuclear arms.

> Desired results:

- + reinforcement of the current multilateral system for the prevention of proliferation and the promotion of arms control and disarmament;
- + continuing integrated implementation of the NPT;
- + dialogue with Russia on confidence-building measures relating to nuclear arms;
- + continuing support, through bilateral and multilateral projects, of the destruction of chemical weapons and nuclear arms and other parts of the Russian (military) nuclear infrastructure;

- + further tightening of the Australia group's guidelines on export control of chemical and biological weapons;
- + the widest possible acceptance of the code of conduct against ballistic missile proliferation (ICOC) that was developed under the Netherlands' chairmanship as part of the Missile Technology Control Regime;

House of Representatives, Parliamentary Session 2002–2003, 28 600 Chapter V, No. 2 63

- + universality of the Chemical Weapons Treaty and a more effective implementation of all its components;
- + the best possible fulfilment of the role of host country for the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW);

This will include an increased focus on improving the financial health of the OPCW.

- + a new initiative for the addition of a verification protocol to the treaty on biological weapons.

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### **German governing coalition (SPD/Greens) security policy document Oct 2002**

<http://www.spd.de/servlet/PB/show/1023294/Koalitionsvertrag.pdf>

Chapter on Security Policy and Arms Control:

IX. FAIR GLOBALISATION – GERMANY WITHIN EUROPE AND THE WORLD

Foreign and Defence Policy

(...)

Transatlantic relations

Next to European integration, a close relationship with the USA – Germany's most important non-European partner – is the second pillar on which the freedom and democracy of Germany is founded. Friendly relations with the USA are based on shared values and common interests. This remains an indispensable constant of German foreign policy. The deepening of German-US and Euro-US relationships is a crucial goal within our policy.

Freedom and security – on which the Atlantic partners speak with one voice – are indispensable prerequisites for a peaceful civilian society. With this in mind, the German government is supporting a policy which assumes responsibility and promotes civil and democratic societies throughout the world.

NATO and NATO eastern enlargement

The coalition partners regard the Atlantic alliance as an essential tool for the stability and security of Europe, as well as for ensuring lasting peace in Europe. Cooperation with the United States of America, guaranteed by the alliance, remains one of the preconditions for security on the continent. The German government will do what it can to ensure that NATO consistently continues to make the necessary adjustment to the changed defence policy environment and preserves its significance for European security. The German government is pursuing the goal of being able to invite as many countries as possible, by consensus, to take up membership of the alliance, at the forthcoming NATO summit in Prague.

Russia/Eastern Europe

We want to utilise the expansion of the European Union and NATO to intensify cooperation with our neighbours to the east.

Within the European Union, the Atlantic Alliance and the G8 countries, we are working towards the construction of a lasting and sustainable defence partnership with Russia.

At the same time, we want to support political, economic and social cooperation, which contributes to the success of democratic, constitutional and social reforms.

We want to continue to develop relations with an independent Ukraine based on shared values, to support reform policy, to promote the development of the civilian society and, in so doing, to give democracy a firmer foothold.

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**PENN/NI memo 23 October 2002 NI voting NAC resolution**

Dear friends, colleagues,

I learned from the foreign ministry here in Holland this afternoon that a Dutch (and presumably a NATO) abstention on the two NAC resolutions (which will be voted on at the UN First Committee on Friday or perhaps Monday) are likely. Primary deciding factor seems to be US intention to vote against (my interpretation). Presumably other NATO countries will follow. Information on this last would be much appreciated

Karel Koster

PENN/NI

PS: Dutch national elections now definitely scheduled for 22 January 2003, (not December as was first surmised). This means that a substantial part of the budget plans which had already been launched in September will probably pass through the "lame-duck parliament", guided by the caretaker cabinet. I would expect existing foreign policy priorities to remain the same the coming months. It will be interesting to see whether the support of US unilateralism will become a campaign issue. There is no doubt that most parties would prefer to ignore this, but they may not be able to prevent a national debate from starting, especially if there is a war going on come election time.

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**PENN/NI memo 14 November 2002 Fischer speech in German parliament**

Dear friends, colleagues

please find attached the German original and translation of an important speech by the German minister of foreign affairs Joschka Fischer, on 29 October in the German parliament. I would especially like to encourage the non-European readers to study this document carefully. It gives an extremely good idea of the European critique of American policies, especially regarding the war on terrorism vis a vis the war on Iraq. It also defines the key foreign policy issues of the coming years.

Your reactions are of great interest to me

Karel Koster

PENN/NI

This translation was made possible by a grant from the Ploughshares foundation

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**Bundestag speech by Joschka Fischer,  
Foreign, Security and Development Policy  
29. October 2002**

Vice-President Susanne Kastner:

No other requests to speak have been received.

We now come to issues concerning Europe, Foreign and Security Policy, Development Policy and Human Rights.

The Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, Joseph Fischer, has the floor.

Joseph Fischer, Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs:

Madam Vice-President, Ladies and Gentlemen,

When we talk about the future of foreign and security policies here today, we are dealing, to my mind, with one of the most formidable challenges we will have to face over the next four years. Based on the continuity of German foreign and security policy, we are dealing, on the one hand, with perpetuating the broad lines on which the foreign policy of our country is based; on the other

hand, we have to confront new challenges and, above all, new threats.

Allow me, at the start of my address, to emphasise the following. It is a constitutional imperative for German foreign and security policy that its broad outlines be carried through. This entails merging our country into the European integration process – which will, in fact, face huge challenges in the next two years – committing ourselves to the transatlantic union, and fostering our relationship with the United States of America and our special relationship with Israel, which is rooted in our historical and moral responsibility for our past. These are the three fundamental lines that not only determine German foreign and security policy, but also our areas of involvement.

At the same time, since 11 September last year, we are having to cope with a situation which is a new strategic threat to our safety, namely international terrorism. First and foremost, I would like to draw your attention to the fact that this threat will not disappear of its own accord. This threat needs to be answered with strong and, where necessary, even military, police and secret service action, because terrorism cannot be defeated with words alone. This is especially true of the new totalitarianism, which is the Islamic terrorism of a certain Osama Bin Laden, who has embraced mass murder and death for the purpose of his programme. This will have to be fought and defeated.

Coincidentally, we can recognise that this danger contains four elements. If these are brought together, it will, in fact, represent a strategic threat we must not underestimate. I would like to exemplify this by referring to the Pakistan/India conflict, which makes this strategic threat very clear.

The conflict surrounding Kashmir is an example of the future threat to security. Here we find the element of religious conflict. In European religious and political history this occurred during the 16th century, the century of religious wars. There is also the element of nationalistic confrontation between neighbours, an element from the 19th and early 20th centuries. We find the element of nuclear proliferation and weapons of mass destruction, elements belonging to the middle of the 20th century. Finally, characteristic of the beginning of the 21st century, we have the element of global terrorism.

This is the new challenge we have to deal with. In this context, I have mentioned the Indian/Pakistani conflict. That trail leads directly to a regional conflict which has not been settled since India and Pakistan came into being, namely the conflict surrounding Kashmir.

This not only poses the question of how to respond to this terrorist danger in the large neighbouring region between the Atlantic and the Pacific – the Arab-Islamic world – but at the same time also presents an answer. The answer must contain three elements.

Firstly: Terrorism must be actively fought with the necessary tools of power. However, in most instances, these tools of power are not of a military nature, but rather a matter for the police and secret services, based on information activities which, by definition, require international co-operation.

Secondly: Regional conflicts must be resolved, because they carry a seed of great danger – escalation. A political solution to regional conflicts is the decisive factor in killing that seed before it can germinate.

Thirdly: In general, these are young societies. We cannot engage them in abstract dialogue alone, but must also offer a cultural and moral answer, as well as an economic and political perspective. We must react to a global security threat with a global security solution. In my view, dialogue means not only exchanging friendly phrases, but rather getting to the point: How is it possible to reconcile the Convention on Human Rights with Sharia Law? This question brings us to the heart of the problem.

(Applause from BÜNDNIS 90 (Alliance 90)/DIE GRÜNEN (the Green Party) and the SPD (the Socialist Party))

If all this is true and these are the dangers; if it is therefore true that the status quo was shattered to such a degree on September 11 that we can no longer live with it; if it is true that resolving regional conflicts is an essential factor; and if it is true that we must prevent weapons of mass destruction from falling

into the hands of terrorists, then – and this is at variance with opinion in the USA – I have to ask myself (to phrase it very diplomatically), whether prioritising Iraq is plausible. I have drawn very different conclusions.

(Applause from BÜNDNIS 90 (Alliance 90)/DIE GRÜNEN (the Green Party) and the SPD (the Socialist Party))

This is my great concern, which, incidentally, I did not convey to the American side for the first time during our national election campaign, but had already done so during my first visit after September 11, which is to say on September 19. It is not my opinion, nor do I believe – this has to be said openly among partners – that this prioritisation with regard to the generally acknowledged threat scenario is the right one. This is the decisive factor.

(Dr Wolfgang Gerhardt [FDP (Free Democratic Party)]: No!)

- Yes, it IS the main question.

(Dr Wolfgang Gerhardt [FDP (Free Democratic Party)]: With a UN mandate!)

- Don't use the UN as an excuse, however important it may be. But we must be careful that our good intentions do not produce the wrong outcomes, which would only serve to further increase the danger of terrorism.

(Applause from BÜNDNIS 90 (Alliance 90)/DIE GRÜNEN (the Green Party) and the SPD (the Socialist Party))

We are dealing with a dangerous region, which I am not certain, colleague Gerhardt, the majority of the American Congress or the American people are really prepared – even though the USA has the necessary means to intervene there – to persevere with for years, maybe even decades, in order to build a new nation after the present regime has fallen. I dare not imagine the consequences that would result in this region if the USA were not prepared to remain there for the duration. These are our reasons. Tomorrow we will once again be talking about this with our American partners.

Our understanding of partnership is that when there are differences, these are openly addressed among freely elected, democratic governments. This has nothing to do with walking to Canossa. We have a different idea of what alliance means.

(Applause from BÜNDNIS 90 (Alliance 90)/DIE GRÜNEN (the Green Party) and the SPD (the Socialist Party))

The second great challenge we have to meet is Europe. Expansion is becoming a reality. Although certain aspects of the last summit meeting are open to criticism, it is still a fact that the door was definitely opened. This means that in Copenhagen the decision will be taken to admit ten new members. This is a historical step, which not only this federal government has worked towards, but also the preceding one, especially the then Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, who is no longer a member of the House, but whom I would like to mention again because of the enduring merit this has earned him. We lose absolutely nothing by preserving this continuity.

For me, the most important thing is that a historical step, unparalleled in recent history, will be taken towards uniting Europe. If the fundamental consensus was to create a Europe where nationalism no longer has a chance, then the step that will now be taken in Copenhagen is a rational one.

(Applause from BÜNDNIS 90 (Alliance 90)/DIE GRÜNEN (the Green Party) and the SPD (the Socialist Party) and from Dr Angela Merkel, MP [CDU/CSU (Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union)])



However, it will be essential to reconstruct an EU of 25 or more. This reconstruction will be carried out by means of a constitutional covenant. This constitutional covenant arose out of an initiative of this government. All I can say to this is that the outline proposal put forward yesterday by Giscard is really deserving of thorough discussion and should be judged without prejudice. Let's be honest, who would have imagined two years ago, that today we would not only be on the brink of an expansion by 10 member states, but that, at the same time, the first rough draft of a European Constitution would be on the table? – None of you. And I don't mean this in a party-political sense, Mrs Merkel. It was demanded. But we did it.

(Applause from BÜNDNIS 90 (Alliance 90)/DIE GRÜNEN (the Green Party) and the SPD (the Socialist Party) – Dr Friedbert Pflüger [CDU/CSU (Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union)]: You didn't even want the Covenant!)

I didn't want the Covenant?

(Dr Friedbert Pflüger [CDU/CSU]: No, Parliament forced you into agreeing to the Covenant!)

So, you think I didn't want the Covenant. As I recall, citizen Fischer gave a speech at Humboldt University that led to the Covenant.

(Dr Friedbert Pflüger [CDU/CSU]: Later, yes!)

This initiative has been taken by the federal government. I am only too happy to argue with you, but not about things that are self-evident.

(Applause from BÜNDNIS 90 (Alliance 90)/DIE GRÜNEN (the Green Party) and the SPD (the Socialist Party))

We need this reconstruction of Europe. I do not wish to go into detail, but for us – the Chancellor mentioned this in his speech today – it is absolutely imperative: the institutional triangle – the Commission, the European Parliament and Council – must be balanced when it comes to future developments – and they must come. What we don't want is a return to inter-governmentalisation. To us this clearly means that we want a strengthening of the Commission and a clear division of responsibilities between the national and integrated levels. In this context, we also want a stronger European Parliament. This is the foundation of our work, against which other proposals will be measured.

(Applause from BÜNDNIS 90 (Alliance 90)/DIE GRÜNEN (the Green Party) and the SPD (the Socialist Party))

However, it is absolutely essential to achieve a German-French consensus in this respect. If it is achieved – and we are working on that, as was evident at the last meeting of the European Council – then this European future will, in fact, be constructed, and not by excluding, but by including, the other member states.

(Applause from BÜNDNIS 90 (Alliance 90)/DIE GRÜNEN (the Green Party) and the SPD (the Socialist Party))

Ladies and gentlemen, with reference to recent events, please allow me to pose a question about Russia and the Chechen Republic. Anyone who believes he knows of a simple solution is wrong. I can only issue a warning against questioning the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation. I am not assuming that anyone would; however, we are dealing with a separatist movement here.

I don't have to explain what a further disintegration of the Russian Federation would mean in terms of violence and instability. On the other hand, however, Russia is moving towards democracy. The Chechen people are Russian citizens and have human rights. A democracy must respect those human rights. As far as I am concerned, this is the decisive factor.

(Applause from BÜNDNIS 90 (Alliance 90)/DIE GRÜNEN (the Green Party) and the SPD (the Socialist Party) as well as the members of the CDU/CSU (Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union) and the FDP (Free Democratic Party))

However, I must warn against the Chechen terrorists – I have received certain information, some of which is also known to one or two colleagues – who are also abusing human rights in the most abominable way. However, if Russia is a state with democratic rule, then it must also ensure that the principles of democratic rule are supported, especially with respect to innocent civilians and the citizens of the Russian Federation in the Chechen Republic. This places us in a difficult position. On the one hand, Russia is our partner and that partnership must be further developed. On the other hand, Russia must be persuaded that, even under the most difficult circumstances, democracies are bound to their principles and the rule of law. This is what determines our relationship with the Chechen Republic and with Russian political policy on the Chechen Republic respectively.

In this regard, I can only appeal once more to those who are responsible in Russia to finally initiate a political solution.

(Applause from BÜNDNIS 90 (Alliance 90)/DIE GRÜNEN (the Green Party) and the SPD (the Socialist Party) as well as Dr Angela Merkel, MP [CDU/CSU (Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union)])

Those who are aware of the history of the Caucasus and the Chechen Republic know that, in the final analysis, violence offers no solution. On the contrary, it will only lead to more bloodbaths. This is why a political solution is essential.

In this context, allow me to mention one more issue. Turkey is right next door to this crisis region and to the region I spoke of earlier. It would be wrong to assume – and those who appreciate our position know it would be wrong – that, as convinced Europeans, we should for reasons of goodwill – and this is why I am addressing this issue, Mr. Schäuble, please understand every word the way it is intended – open the door at this point in time. The decisions taken in Helsinki were not taken for reasons of goodwill. When I am in the United States – and I would be pleased if others would do the same – I always mention this, to ensure that our American counterparts are under no misapprehension.

The costs must also be considered. The recently agreed German-French compromise on agricultural policy shows that everything comes at a price, which I have also pointed out to our American partners. This is most important.

(Dr Wolfgang Schäuble [CDU/CSU]: Have you also noticed that?)

On the one hand, there are demands that the German-French engine must run – I ask you what it must, for example, have cost Helmut Kohl to keep this engine running – and on the other hand, you are now asking me, 'Have you also noticed that?'. This is opposition tactics; however, the decision is yours.

(Applause from BÜNDNIS 90 (Alliance 90)/DIE GRÜNEN (the Green Party) and the SPD (the Socialist Party) - Michael Glos [CDU/CSU (Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union)]: Stop this now! You're just acting out up there!)

The next point is this. As far as Turkey is concerned, there is a possible controversy, but not regarding the question of whether we should arrive at a goodwill decision in favour of the USA. We are under no obligation to do that. We are dependable partners in Operation Enduring Freedom in the fight against

terror. We agree with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council regarding Iraq. We do not agree with the evaluation of military action. We differ in this regard, and are not prepared to participate in any military action.

However, Turkish membership of the EU is a totally different question. I am reversing the question to the EU: Mr Schäuble, you know as well as I do, that if the door to Turkish membership of the EU is closed, you are also closing the door on the first civil powers and innovators since Kemal Ataturk, because the modernisation of Turkey means orientation towards Europe. We know that Turkey is a difficult partner, and that it does not yet conform with the Copenhagen criteria. I am not even sure whether, on the day Turkey does conform to these criteria, it will be prepared to relinquish its sovereignty, as required for full integration into the European Union. However, I am sure of one thing. If we were to do what you want, the nationalists and Islamic die-hards would be rubbing their hands with glee. This would put an end to modernisation. I am absolutely certain of this. This, and nothing else, determines our position and that of the Chancellor.

(Applause from BÜNDNIS 90 (Alliance 90)/DIE GRÜNEN (the Green Party) and the SPD (the Socialist Party) - Michael Glos [CDU/CSU (Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union)]: That's not true!)

I am not denying – and neither is anyone else – that the question of Turkish partnership is difficult. However, the problem with Turkey will not be solved by ignoring it, or by facile answers. Because, if my analysis of the strategic threat to Europe and our country by Islamic terrorists is correct, the following question arises: Can a lay, i.e. secular, modernisation of Turkey, as one of the largest Islamic countries, be brought about based on democracy and rule of law? This question is far more important than the many discussions currently being held on the military options of another country. For if it were possible to modernise Turkey, it would entail answering the question of the strategic safety of the entire region.

(Applause from BÜNDNIS 90 (Alliance 90)/DIE GRÜNEN (the Green Party) and the SPD (the Socialist Party))

This is the foreign and security policy for which the present federal government stands. I can assure you of one thing: based on the existing continuities, we will confront these new challenges and ensure that Germany make its contribution to the unification of Europe and to a changing and strengthened Atlantic union.

Thank you.

(Applause from BÜNDNIS 90 (Alliance 90)/DIE GRÜNEN (the Green Party) and the SPD (the Socialist Party))

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**PENN/NI report on Netherlands position on Missile Defence**

15 Nov 2002

please find the English version of a Dutch report on Missile Defence written at the request of the Netherlands government on this website.

[www.aiv-advies.nl](http://www.aiv-advies.nl)

It was written by the Advisory Counsel on International Relations (the AIV), a government financed thinktank.

The government reacted to this study, which was presented to the government in September, in a letter to parliament on 1 Nov. In that letter the ministers of defence and foreign affairs of the caretaker cabinet describe government policy, especially regarding TMD. In view of the upcoming NATO summit the following paragraph is relevant:

(from 27 857 nr 5, 1 Nov 2002)

paragraph:

"This summer the debate within NATO was intensified by the US offer to

provide MD capabilities for the allies. Hence missile defence will be discussed at the Prague Summit. A decision will be taken on the further discussion. Entirely in line with the AIV report the Netherlands will argue that this should not just concern 'capabilities', but also the concept as such, in which political and strategic factors should also be considered. At the same time the Netherlands takes a constructive position regarding the proposal for a follow-up to the technical TMD study mentioned above, so that the technical and operational aspects of a possible territorial defence of the European NATO area against ballistic missiles can be researched and taken along in the considerations. The activities (though initially consisting of just making an inventory) of the ad hoc TMD working Group (TMD AHWG) which was inaugurated on 31 July as a working group of the NATO Russia Council, is being taken along in this assessment. "

There is a great deal more in the letter, especially on the relation between TMD and MD: I hope to summarise this later

See also this week's Jane's Defence Weekly 13112002, p5 French Turnaround on NATO missile defence

Karel Koster

PENN-NI

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**PENN/NI report on Defence and Foreign Affairs budgets: questions and answers**

16 Nov 2002

Dear friends, colleagues

please find attached a selection of the parliamentary written questions asked by Dutch parliamentarians about the defence and foreign affairs budgets. The issues I chose include MD, NATO summit, nuclear tasks, terrorism, WMD, nuclear disarmament, European foreign and security policy. Note the narrow interpretation of art 6 of the NPT in a response concerning the foreign affairs budget (q 111).

As always, I would welcome similar documents from your own parliaments.

Karel Koster

PENN/NI

This translation was made possible by a grant from the Ploughshares foundation

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**Adoption of the budget statement of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (V) for the year 2003**

**No. 7**

**Report consisting of a list of questions and answers; Adopted 25 October 2002**

The Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs<sup>1</sup>, charged with the preparatory research for this bill, has the honour to present a report in the form of a list of questions together with the answers provided by the government.

The Chairman of the Committee,

De Haan

The Secretary of the Committee,

Van Oort

18.

*Is the attempt to induce countries to become members of the International Court of Justice and thereby offer the government support still a current concern?*

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Answer

The aim of having states become party to the International Court of Justice and thereby offer support is still a current concern. It is essential for the Court's credibility to emphasise its universal character the world over.

The Netherlands will even be intensifying its activities on this front. This will include helping states and NGOs to organise seminars and conferences aimed at encouraging the implementation and/or ratification process. This support will take the form of financial contributions or the provision of technical assistance in implementing treaty obligations in national legislation.

**20.**

*What examples can the government give of joint complicity by state and non-state players in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction?*

Answer

There are as yet no concrete examples of such joint complicity by state and non-state players in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, but it would, of course, be highly undesirable for such weapons to fall into the hands of terrorist groups.

**22.**

*To what extent do oil interests play a part in the policy that significant countries are pursuing with respect to Central Asia and the Caucasus region?*

Answer

Oil interests in and around the Caspian Sea are a major factor in deciding the policy of important players, both neighbouring countries (Russia, Iran, Turkey and China) and other countries with oil companies operating in the region (including the US, United Kingdom, France, Italy and the Netherlands). This applies to policy on current and potential transit countries as well as oil and gas-producing countries. But this policy is certainly not directed exclusively at promoting oil companies' and suppliers' commercial interests; it also promotes stable development towards a democratic rule of law and market economy and encourages the attempt to find solutions to intractable conflicts in and between the countries concerned.

**23.**

*What is the government's view on transatlantic relations? Will the government include reference to the position of the United States in the areas of environment, trade policy and the international rule of law?*

Answer

The Dutch government attaches great importance to the maintenance and reinforcement of the relationship between Europe and the United States in a world that faces significant cross-border problems. We must therefore make use of our communality of values, traditions and interests without

denying our differences or seeing discussion of them as ‘off limits’.

The government believes that the US and Europe are natural partners when it comes to tackling the challenges we find ourselves facing at the transatlantic and global level. It is in the interests of the Netherlands and Europe as well as the US that we act in tandem when tackling those challenges. In doing so, optimum use must be made of our various international links, such as the UN, NATO and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OVSE) and the dialogue and cooperation between the EU and the US. This view is shared by the American government, as evidenced by the stress placed on international cooperation in the recently published ‘National Security Strategy’.

In many areas, practical cooperation since 11 September 2001 has been broadened and deepened, and in other areas has been developing at a rapid pace. For this cooperation to bear fruit, it is important to continue emphasising our communality. There is more that binds us than what sometimes appears to keep us apart. At the same time, the government will not neglect, in bilateral and transatlantic consultation, to bring any of its concerns to the attention of the American government should there be reason to do so.

On environmental issues, the EU and the US are working together closely as part of the ‘New Transatlantic Agenda’. The Netherlands is still unhappy about the refusal by the Americans to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. The Netherlands’ main effort now will be directed at keeping the US involved in the political process, including the negotiations on further measures post-2012 – i.e after the Kyoto Protocol term expires (see also the answer to question 98). Meanwhile, the US has put other measures in place, mostly of a bilateral nature, to counter climate change. The US continues to be involved in other multilateral environment treaties, including the UN climate treaty, the Montreal Protocol and CITES. Environmental considerations will also be part of American negotiations on free trade treaties.

The EU and the US are the world’s two biggest economies, together accounting for fifty per cent of global GDP and forty per cent of world trade. Against this background it is inevitable that trade disputes will arise. These disputes only affect a small percentage of transatlantic trade. There have always been trade problems and there always will be, without them necessarily having immediate adverse repercussions on relations as a whole. The government, like the European Commission and the US, is working towards managing and solving these disputes. Efforts in this direction include measures to provide mutual ‘early warning’ systems and discussion of problems in the appropriate forums (particularly the WTO; see also the answer to question 19).

The US and Europe, with their common history and traditions, were in at the birth of the present system of world order and rule of law. The Dutch government believes that opportunities to strengthen cooperation must be sought, based on a joint analysis of the challenges within transatlantic and international structures. This also means Europe and the US respecting the international rule of law and continuing to make good use of multilateral structures.

24.

*How does the government view the international fight against terrorism? What steps will be taken in*

*the short and longer term to further reduce the danger of terrorist attacks? Will the government also include reference to the situation in Afghanistan?*

Answer

Since the attacks of 11 September 2001 many measures against terrorism have been taken nationally and internationally on both the prevention and counter-terrorism fronts. The National Action Plan on Terrorism and Security contains a comprehensive set of measures that the Netherlands has taken at the national level. The Netherlands has twice reported on these measures to the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) set up under UN Security Council Resolution 1373.

NATO is discussing proposals to enable the alliance to defend and protect itself faster and more effectively against terrorist attacks. A great many measures against terrorism have also been put in place at the European level. The progress made in implementing these measures is regularly discussed in the Council.

This does not mean, however, that policy in this area is in any sense 'finalised'. The recent attacks on the French oil tanker 'Limbourg' and in Bali clearly show that ongoing efforts are essential. The Netherlands will press in the EU for a thorough evaluation of the measures taken so far. Where necessary, additional measures must be implemented – to secure the safety of shipping, for example. The Netherlands will soon be assessing whether additional measures are required to combat terrorism within its borders (see also the answer to question 74).

The fight against terrorism is also assuming greater importance in the foreign and security policy of the European Union. Combating terrorism, including the possibility of providing assistance, is an issue increasingly addressed in agreements and political dialogue.

With the overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the Afghan Interim Government led by President Karzai now in office, Afghanistan is no longer a suitable base for international terrorism in general and al-Qaeda in particular. But operations against al-Qaeda in Afghanistan as part of Operation Enduring Freedom are still continuing. In Afghanistan the Afghan government and the international community are working closely together to rebuild the country. The Dutch government is contributing to this effort by providing financial resources for development cooperation projects and maintaining military personnel in ISAF, who may soon be playing a leading role along with Germany. The Netherlands believes that the sustainable reconstruction of Afghanistan will help to promote regional stability and the fight against terrorism.

100.

*What information does the government have on a possible link between the Iraqi regime and al-Qaeda now and in the past? What connections were identified as a result of the attack on the World Trade Centre in 1993?*

Answer

Since the attacks of 11 September 2001 there has been further intensification of cooperation between the intelligence and security services. At present, however, the government has no indications of any

relationship between the Iraqi regime and al-Qaeda, now or in the past. Even the recent arrest in the Netherlands of the radical Islamist mullah Krekar provided no such indications.

As far as the connection between al-Qaeda and the perpetrators of the attack on the World Trade Centre in 1993 is concerned, the government would point out that Ramzi Yousouf, one of the main suspects in the case, who is currently in detention in the United States, can be related to al-Qaeda.

**111.**

*Does the government believe that nuclear and conventional weapons disarmament should apply not only to the Russian Federation but to the United States as well? Will the government explain its position on this?*

Answer

In the government's opinion, reduction of nuclear and other weapons is a matter that concerns not only the Russian Federation and the United States, but also the other three recognised nuclear powers: China, France and the United Kingdom. In Article 6 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) these countries have pledged themselves to take effective measures to promote nuclear disarmament in the context of a treaty aimed at total disarmament under strict and effective international controls. Naturally, the large number of Russian tactical nuclear weapons involved is a specific point of concern for this government.

**112. and 113.**

Question 112

*What is the situation with respect to the development of the American anti-missile shield? What contacts does the Netherlands have with the United States in this area?*

**Question 113**

*What is the current situation in the Joint Foreign and Security Policy (GBVB) forum with respect to the United States' unilateral withdrawal from the ABM treaty and its ensuing plans to build a missile shield? On what points do the EU member states agree or disagree in relation to this American proposal?*

Answer

As well as bilateral contacts with the US at various levels, important talks on this subject are being held in NATO. Although the US is gradually proceeding with the development of a Missile Defence system, many important decisions on its final architecture have not yet been taken. Meanwhile, the US has offered its allies the option of being involved in the development of a defence system of this kind. At the government's request, the Advisory Council on International Issues recently made recommendations which were published in a report entitled 'A closer look at the American plans for missile defence – the pros and cons of building invulnerability'. The questions posed above will be addressed in detail in the letter containing the government's response to these recommendations, which is to be tabled in the House shortly.

In the Joint Foreign and Security Policy (GBVB) forum the American withdrawal from the ABM treaty and its associated plans for missile defence is not a specific topic of discussion.



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**Adoption of the budget statement of the Ministry of Defence for the year 2003**  
**Report consisting of a list of questions and answers**

1. *The budget states that the Standard Missile 2 Block IVA programme was implemented as part of the American 'Navy Area Missile Program', which was closed down at the end of 2001. Does this mean the Standard Missile programme has also been discontinued?*

155. *Why has the United States stopped development of Standard Missile 2 Block IV A?*

*Does this mean the Netherlands is going on alone?*

The 'Standard Missile' programme has many types of missile, one of which is the 'SM2 block IV A'. The 'Area Air Defence' weapon, the 'SM2 block III', intended for air defence and command frigates (LCFs), is in production. The first series of 24 'SM2 block III' missiles will be delivered to the Dutch Navy in 2002. The United States has halted development of the 'SM2 block IV A' (with a 'Theatre Missile Defence' [TMD] capability in addition to traditional air defence capabilities) on the basis of national planning criteria. All the same, the United States is conducting further research into ways of satisfying the need for maritime TMD, which would involve other variants of the Standard missile. The basic US position on this includes continuing cooperation with its international partners, including the Netherlands.

2. *As subsequent studies by the American government's research agency, the General Accounting Office, have shown, the Patriot PAC III failed in its interception role during the Gulf War of 1990-1991. Is the weapons system now more reliable?*

The Patriot was designed as an anti-aircraft defence system. At the end of the 1980s the system was also seen to have potential for defence against tactical ballistic missiles, but required extensive technical modifications for the purpose. When the Gulf War broke out in 1991 these changes had not yet been implemented and the effectiveness of the Patriot against tactical ballistic missiles was therefore not optimal. During the conflict the development and introduction of a modified version (the Pac 2) was accelerated, as a result of which the effectiveness of the weapons system was significantly improved. The Pac 3 version developed since 1996 is the most advanced, with much-improved targeting precision, range and accuracy. This enables, for example, tactical ballistic missiles carrying weapons of mass destruction to be intercepted at great altitude, which can limit the intended ground effects of weapons of mass destruction.

3.

*Has the Dutch contribution to the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) nuclear task now been reduced from two squadrons to one (28 000 X, No. 31)? What implications will this have or has this had on the number of F16s? What is the deployment status of the squadron that is no longer being deployed for the NATO nuclear task? Why has this had no consequences for the Dutch Air Force? What tasks have the personnel taken on?*

4. *How many defence personnel are engaged in activities directly related to implementation of the NATO nuclear task?*

NATO's sub-strategic nuclear armament has been reduced by 85% since 1991 and is being maintained at a minimum level to promote continued peace and stability in Europe. NATO has given indications of a further change to these nuclear forces, which consist of fighter planes that, in addition to their conventional role, are also charged with the NATO nuclear task ('dual capable aircraft'). This change is made possible by further improvement in the strategic security situation. A change is also necessary because of the sharp increase in operational load on pilots imposed by conventional crisis management tasks. Against this background the Dutch contribution to the NATO nuclear task has been reduced from two squadrons to one. The squadron that has been withdrawn from the nuclear task cannot be disbanded because it is still playing its conventional role. Despite this change, the Netherlands still meets the NATO nuclear task requirements.

On the subject of the number of personnel engaged in activities directly related to the NATO nuclear task, the Ministry of Defence has no comment. This is confidential information.

*54. What is the situation with regard to development of the National Missile Defence programme?*

The former 'National Missile Defence' programme has been succeeded in the United States by the present 'Missile Defence Programme'. The Netherlands is not a participant in this. The development and introduction of a defence system against ballistic missiles takes time. For the most part, the American MD system currently being developed is still only at the drawing board stage. There is therefore still ample opportunity for discussion with the United States and the other allies.

*61. What does the government mean when it states that 'carrying out peace operations outside the treaty area and the campaign against terrorism have further blurred the distinction between Article 5 and non-Article 5 operations'?*

In the past, action outside the NATO treaty area has been limited to crisis management and peace operations, also known as 'non-Article 5 operations'. The attacks of 11 September 2001 and the international fight against terrorism have shown, however, that action under Article 5 need not continue to be limited to the NATO treaty area.

*64. NATO is described as 'the cornerstone of Dutch security policy'. In view of the latest developments concerning the Balkans and the International Court of Justice, does the government believe that more attention should be paid to an independent European defence system (defence and security policy, operational deployment and the defence industry) so that Europe is less dependent on the United States?*

NATO embodies the transatlantic alliance and guarantees collective defence. The indispensability of this alliance came to light when the obligation to assist was invoked following the attacks of 11 September 2001. NATO's operations in the Balkans ensure stability and peace. The alliance is adapting to a constantly changing security situation. At the Prague Summit, NATO will decide on expanding to include new member states. This will enhance stability on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. This is not therefore a matter of a relationship of dependency in a negative sense. The further development of the European Security and Defence Policy, in which the Netherlands plays a definite role, is in no way in conflict with the role of NATO or the United States in Dutch security policy. If the Netherlands wishes to continue to be a useful partner to the United States in the future, it will have to make a greater military contribution by helping to strengthen European military capabilities.

*65. What new policy proposals are there with regard to the fight against terrorism?*

On the basis of recommendations contained in the report of the Task Force on Defence and Terrorism (27 925 No. 40, 18 January 2002), a distinction was made early this year between measures that could be implemented in the short term and measures that could be put into effect over the longer term. You have been regularly informed of the short-term measures – including the strengthening of the operational intelligence capability of the chief of defence staff, the reinforcement of the capabilities of the Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD), the Military Police Corps and the special assistance unit of

the Marine Corps, as well as the concrete NBC initiatives (including the establishment of a defence-forces-wide NBC centre of expertise and school, and the establishment of a stand-by NBC company) – by letter, in progress reports on the Action Plan on Combating Terrorism and Security (27 925 No. 40) and during General Consultations (most recently on 2 October 2002). On the latter occasion the government's policy proposals with regard to the Action Plan were explained in more detail.

The longer-term measures should be seen in the context of international developments. In the EU the European Council at Seville (June 2002) in its Declaration on combating terrorism placed the emphasis on strengthening intelligence cooperation and on the coordination of available military and civil capabilities to protect the civilian population. In NATO last year, on the Netherlands' initiative, the alliance's role in combating terrorism was closely scrutinised; the outcome will be put into effect at the Prague Summit this November. You will be informed about this separately.

*68. Have the cuts to the Organisation for Applied Scientific Research (TNO) budget that were announced in the Defence Budget for 2002 been reconsidered as a result of the events of 11 September 2001? What will be the relationship between, on the one hand, the new institutions to be set up for information gathering and information distribution on NBC weapons and, on the other hand, the TNO? What financial consequences do the developments concerned have for the TNO budget?*

The cuts to the TNO budget that were announced in the budget for 2002 have indeed been reconsidered as a result of the events of 11 September 2001. Scientific research and development is vital to the development of military resources to combat terrorism. You were informed of this on 18 January 2002 by means of the report produced by the 'Defence and Terrorism' task force (appendix to 27 925 No. 40). One of the short-term measures taken is the intensification of several scientific research and development programmes that have become more important in the light of the terrorist threat, including passive defence against NBC weapons.

There is no formal relationship between the defence-forces-wide NBC centre of expertise and the TNO, other than the general relationship between Defence and the TNO in the context of information support. It is, in fact, conceivable that the Joint NBC centre of expertise would engage the TNO to provide advice on NBC matters. Conversely, the Joint NBC centre of expertise will advise Defence on prioritising the various NBC scientific research and development programmes conducted by the TNO and other bodies. Within that framework, staff at the NBC centre will supervise research projects in which the TNO is involved.

*69. Will the NBC company to be established be primarily deployed within the Netherlands' borders? If it will, why can it not then be made up of immediately deployable reservists? If this capability is intended for peace operations, in what way will a contribution be made to NBC protection in the Netherlands?*

The intention is to deploy the NBC defence company in all sorts of operations and in fulfilment of national tasks. The company will consist of a number of modules. The parts of this capability that are not deployed in operations will be available for national deployment (safety net structure).

*76. What is the NATO member states' opinion of the Bush Doctrine? Is it a subject of discussion in NATO? If it is, then in what way is it discussed? To what extent is the concept of a preventive attack discussed?*

The new American national security strategy (also known as the 'Bush Doctrine') provides an answer to the threats which the United States sees itself facing following the events of 11 September 2001. This American security strategy is more than just a strictly political/military doctrine. It also covers areas such as trade and development cooperation. Much of what the document says about NATO is already being discussed within the alliance.

In the current American security strategy the concept of a pre-emptive strike is based on the threats that have come to light since 11 September 2001. The concept as such is not a subject of discussion in NATO, but the fight against terrorism is an important priority and the new security threats are seen as an urgent issue. In its security strategy the American government argues that NATO must adapt to the new security developments. On the subject of a pre-emptive strike, the present security strategy exhibits a certain degree of continuity with the security strategy published in 1999 by the then American government. In this connection it should be noted that the government, at the request of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, will soon be presenting its view of the American security doctrine to the House.

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**PENN/NI report 18 Nov 2002 - NATO Summit**

Dear friends, colleagues

Please find attached a further note summarising and quoting from three further Netherlands documents sent by the minister of foreign affairs to parliament the last few days. Note especially the statement referring to the reaffirmation of the 1997 statement on the non-deployment of nuclear weapons in the new NATO member states in document C.

Correction

A close reader pointed out a vital error in 27857, nr 5, 1 Nov 2002, sent to you on 17 nov 2002:

In the first section "The analysis" ,last sentence, a "not" is missing, viz:  
"However, in the opinion of the government this does \*not\* change the fact that from a military-strategic point of view..."

Karel Koster  
PENN/NI

.....  
**NOTES AND QUOTES FROM NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS  
RELATED TO THE NATO SUMMIT**

(translation is my own - Karel Koster 18 Nov 2002

**A**

The Dutch commitment for the NATO summit in Prague

**DVB/VD-198/02**

**12 nov 2002**

(.....)

Core goal

“The most important goal of the NATO summit in Prague as far as the Netherlands is concerned is a reaffirmation at the highest levels of the transatlantic ties. At the same time the NATO summit should give a clear signal that the Alliance is capable of meeting new threats, like international terrorism and the threat of weapons of mass destruction. The strengthening of military capabilities will therefore be a central theme during the NATO summit. A decision will also be made at the NATO summit about the general outlines of the reorganization of the NATO command structure.”

(the note then gives a list of the Netherlands' involvement in the Prague Capability



(...)

“ In the debate about the concept of immediate threat the question as to the political and judicial conditions which have to be met by a concrete military action. An attempt could be made to give a more detailed description of the reason for such actions, the proportionality and the justification. The question of how misuse can be prevented should be explicitly taken into account in this framework. That discussion should take place in both bilateral as the relevant fora, like NATO and the UN. “

(mentions that the gap between US and European forces could be a growing problem in NATO-K)

4. NATO

(NATO response force, decisions at the summit-K)

5. Non-military aspects of security

(Description of the way the US security document handles this. Criticizes lack of political will US to make special effort development aid-K)

6. Regional and bilateral policy

7. Summary and evaluation

(repeats description of the US security strategy and its aims-K)

“A debate should take place on the concept of immediate threat, where the question as to the political and judicial conditions under which a pre-emptive act is undertaken should play a central role. This should in particular deal with the reasons for such actions, precisely to prevent misuse of the concept. Ultimately such actions must comply with all of international law concerning the use of violence.”

(...)

“A final remark: it is clear that the different players in Washington are emphasizing different aspects. For that reason too, it is important for the Europeans, as good friends and loyal allies of the US, to interact constructively with the US debate.“

.....  
.....

**C.**  
**Government position on NATO enlargement**  
**DVB/VD212/02**  
**12 Nov 2002**

(general and uncritical description of the enlargement plans. -K)

“The existing agreements as formulated in the Founding Act agreed on by the US and Russian in 1997, will remain valid. These include: NATO has no intention, plan or reason to station nuclear weapons on the territory of the new NATO member states and that no storage facilities will be built in the new NATO member states. “

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