BIJLAGE I: STRATEGISCHE KERNWAPENS EN ANTI-RAKETSCHILD

• NATO Parliamentary Assembly – Committee Resolution 309 on Missile Defence and Arms Control (09.10.2001)
• NATO Parliamentary Assembly – Committee Resolution 313 on Safeguarding the Nuclear Complex in Russia and other Newly Independent States (09.10.2001)
• Office of the Press Secretary - President Bush and President Putin Talk to Crawford Students (exc.)
• Office of the Press Secretary - New Relationship Between the U.S. and Russia; Joint Statement by President George W. Bush And President Vladimir V. Putin on a New Relationship Between the United States and Russia (14.11.2001)
• Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Moscow – Generals Go into Opposition to the Kremlin (13.11.2001)
• Moscow Times – Top Brass: No Strategic Concessions to the U.S. (03.12.2001)
• US Department of Defense – Missile Intercept Test Successful (03.12.2001)
• Washington Post - Missile Defense Test's Value Questioned (02.12.2001)
• Defense Week - “Missile-Defense Satellites’ Cost Balloons To $23 Billion” (19.11.2001)
• Arms Control Today - The Unruly Hedge: Cold War Thinking at the Crawford Summit (Dec 2001)
• Reuters – China Fumes over US Missile Test (04.12.2001)
• BASIC press release – New report on Trident, UK and USA (05.12.2001)
• Washington Times – Inside the Ring (07.12.2001) (exc.)
• Congressional Quarterly Weekly – House-Passed Bill Boosts Pentagon Funds for Heavy Weapons, More Agile Forces (01.12.2001) (exc.)
• Council for a Livable World – Senate Appropriations Committee Votes to Cut Non-Proliferation Funds (04.12.2001)
• RFE/RL – Russia’s Nuclear Arsenal Large, Aging (09.11.2001)
• Middle Powers Initiative - Statement on Bush-Putin Nuclear Arms Reductions Plans (27.11.2001)
• Union of Concerned Scientists Working Paper - An Assessment of the Intercept Test Program of the Ground-Based Midcourse National Missile Defense System (30.11.2001)
• New York Times – U.S. and Russia to Complete Talks on Arms (11.12.2001)
• Jane’s Defence Weekly – Bush, Putin Agree to Cut Nuclear Stocks (21.11.2001)
• International Herald Tribune – US to Withdraw from ABM Treaty (12.12.2001)

Parliamentary Assembly

Committee Resolution 309 on Missile Defence and Arms Control

Presented by the Defence and Security Committee, Ottawa, 9 October 2001

The Assembly,

1. Recognising that the issue of strategic missile defence has led to differences of opinion that may strain the unity of the North Atlantic Alliance;
2. Aware that the proliferation of technology for ballistic missiles and for nuclear, biological and chemical weapons poses new threats to Alliance members and other friendly nations throughout the world;
3. Recalling that Article 6 of the Washington Treaty states that NATO's guarantee of collective defence extends to both Europe and North America;
4. Realising that each Alliance member must take all necessary steps to defend its territory, citizens and armed forces;
5. Recognising that the adversarial relationships that characterised the Cold War no longer serve the security interests of the Alliance or Russia;
6. Reaffirming its support for continued reductions in nuclear weapons, including the possibility that the United States may dramatically reduce the size of its nuclear arsenal;
7. Supporting the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) between the United States and Russia, which has contributed greatly to international security through a binding, verifiable arms control regime that has built mutual trust and confidence;
8. Recognising that a new strategic framework that replaces the concept of mutual assured destruction with a more co-operative approach to security and arms control should govern the relationship between the United States and Russia;
9. Fearing that strategic missile defences could lead other states to increase their strategic missile arsenals so as to overcome those defences, leading to a nuclear arms race;
10. URGES the member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
    1. to work towards further reductions in nuclear weapons through either a formal treaty regime or informal co-ordinated and co-operative reductions;
    2. to discourage other states from increasing their nuclear arsenals;
    3. to strengthen efforts, such as the Missile Technology Control Regime, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and Chemical Weapons Convention, which are intended to halt the proliferation of ballistic missiles and nuclear, biological and chemical weapons;
    4. to establish an effective verification and compliance regime for the Biological Weapons Convention that would effectively deter countries seeking to develop biological weapons;
    5. to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures;
    6. to implement the Defence Capabilities Initiative, addressing in particular the concerns that have been expressed about shortcomings in defence against nuclear, biological and chemical weapons;
    7. to strengthen co-operation with one another, with members of the Partnership for Peace, and with other friendly countries in protecting civilian populations against attacks involving nuclear, biological and chemical weapons;
    8. to continue support for the Alliance's Theatre Missile Defence programme.

NATO Parliamentary Assemblee

Committee Resolution 313 on Safeguarding the Nuclear Complex in Russia and other Newly Independent States presented by the Science and Technology Committee

Ottawa, 9 October 2001

The Assembly,

1. Conscious that reducing the global nuclear stockpile and maintaining its security has been one of the most challenging undertakings of the post-Cold War period;
2. Recognising that arms control and co-operative security agreements between the United States and the Newly Independent States (NIS) have substantially reduced an enormous arsenal and, in particular, helped deactivate more than 5,000 nuclear warheads so far;
3. Aware that, despite considerable efforts, mainly by the United States and Russia, much remains to be done to protect, secure and dispose of weapons and weapons-usable material in the countries of the former Soviet Union;
4. Concerned that Russia, because of its economic situation, cannot afford to protect adequately some of the sites where weapons-grade fissile material and weapons technologies are located, or improve the security of other military and civilian nuclear installations;
5. Convinced that the possible theft or diversion of nuclear materials or other weapons technologies from the NIS, by either state or non-state actors, is the most pressing proliferation threat to the Alliance;
6. Worried that terrorists or states of concern taking advantage of the poor security conditions at some sites might illegally acquire nuclear material or other weapons technologies;
7. URGES member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
   1. to devise a set of enhanced responses to face these urgent security challenges in co-operation with Russia and all the allied countries equally concerned by the threats;
   2. to assist Russia in identifying, tagging and sealing all its warheads as part of a reliable accounting system, as well as upgrading the protection measures of the 123 nuclear weapon storages selected by the Russian government;
   3. to consolidate Russian and other NIS fissile material at fewer sites and implement both the 1993 Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Agreement and the 1997 Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement;
   4. to help Russia eliminate up to 100 tons of plutonium by the best technical means available;
   5. to help Russia and other NIS strengthen the existing programmes to improve nuclear installations personnel social conditions and reliability;
   6. to launch additional initiatives and finance existing programmes to help Russia dismantle out of service nuclear submarines (especially SSNs) and improve spent naval fuel storage facilities and protection measures;
   7. to strongly urge Russians to prohibit the sale of nuclear submarines and related technologies to foreign countries;
   8. to discourage the Russian President and State Duma from putting into effect the scheme for importing and eventually reprocessing 20,000 tons of spent nuclear fuel;
   9. to encourage the United States and Russia to reaffirm in a joint statement their commitment to the 1991-92 informal regime on tactical nuclear weapons or to sign an agreement to that effect;
   10. to discourage the Bush Administration from reducing the total budget for Defense Nuclear Non-proliferation and other important co-operative security programmes in 2002;
   11. to encourage European NATO Allies and the European Union to step up their diplomatic, financial and technical contribution to securing fissile material, combating illicit traffic, assisting scientists and technical personnel;
   12. to improve international sharing of intelligence regarding nuclear material smuggling and terrorist groups interested in weapons of mass destruction.

President Bush and President Putin Talk to Crawford Students

Remarks by President Bush And President Putin to Russian Exchange Students And Students of Crawford High School
Crawford High School
Crawford, Texas

For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
November 15, 2001

President Bush: […] We've got a lot to do together. We've had great discussions in Washington, as well as here in Texas. We're both pledging to reduce the amount of nuclear weapons, offensive weapons, we have in order to make the world more secure. We're talking about ways to cooperate in anti-terrorism and anti-proliferation.
[…]
I, after long consultations with people inside our government, I announced that our government was going to reduce our nuclear arsenal to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads over the next decade. That's a tangible accomplishment. I shared that information with President Putin. He, too, is going to make a declaration at some point in time.
In other words, this particular summit has made us closer because we've agreed on some concrete steps, as well, specific things we can do together. We're working on counter-proliferation, which is an incredibly important issue, to make sure that arms and potential weapons of mass destruction do not end up in the hands of people who will be totally irresponsible, people that hate either one of our nations.
[…]

Q You say that we've reached an agreement to declare to reduce our nuclear weapons. In reducing our nuclear weapons, are we talking about de-alerting them and taking them off of alert status? Or are we actually talking about taking apart the warheads and destroying the weapon?
President Bush: We are talking about reducing and destroying the number of warheads to get down to specific levels, from significant higher levels today to significantly lower levels tomorrow. And, as well, most of our weapons are de-alerted. They're not on alert. However, it doesn't take them long to fire up, if we need them. Our mission is to make sure we never need them on each other. We need to get beyond the notion that in order to keep the peace, we've got to destroy each other. That's an old way of thinking. Now we're working together to figure out ways to address the new threats of the 21st century.

New Relationship Between the U.S. and Russia

[…]For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
November 14, 2001

Joint Statement by President George W. Bush And President Vladimir V. Putin on a New Relationship Between the United States and Russia

Our countries are embarked on a new relationship for the 21st century, founded on a commitment to the values of democracy, the free market, and the rule of law. The United States and Russia have overcome the legacy of the Cold War. Neither country regards the other as an enemy or threat. Aware of our responsibility to contribute to international security, we are determined to work together, and with other nations and international organizations, including the United Nations, to promote security, economic well-being, and a peaceful, prosperous, free world.
We affirm our determination to meet the threats to peace in the 21st century. Among these threats are terrorism, the new horror of which was vividly demonstrated by the evil crimes of September 11, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, militant nationalism, ethnic and religious intolerance, and regional instability. These threats endanger the security of both countries and the world at large. Dealing with these challenges calls for the creation of a new strategic framework to ensure the mutual security of the United States and Russia, and the world community.
We have agreed that the current levels of our nuclear forces do not reflect the strategic realities of today. Therefore, we have confirmed our respective commitments to implement substantial reductions in strategic offensive weapons. On strategic defenses and the ABM Treaty, we have agreed, in light of the changing global security environment, to continue consultations within the broad framework of the new strategic relationship. On nonproliferation matters, we reaffirm our mutual commitment to the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions, and endorse efforts to strengthen the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Both sides agree that urgent attention must continue to be given to improving the physical protection and accounting of nuclear materials of all possessor states, and preventing illicit nuclear trafficking.

[…]Generals go into opposition to the Kremlin

Defence Minister Sergey Ivanov is losing control of the armed forces, all hope is pinned on the President

Vadim Solovyev
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Moscow, 13 November 2001

In literally the last few hours before his departure for the USA, President Vladimir Putin deemed it necessary to hold a lengthy meeting behind closed doors with the top Russian military leadership. And there were serious, not to say critical, reasons for doing so. The more closely Moscow cooperates with the US administration, the sharper the reaction to these actions in the "Trans-Arbat Military District" [allusion to Defence Ministry headquarters on Moscow's Arbat Square].
And the configuration of the political alignment in this district itself has also changed. Disagreements with the Kremlin have been developing for a long time, but the mechanism of political leadership of the armed forces had stopped them coming to the surface. (..)
Putin placed at the head of the Defence Ministry the civilian Sergey Ivanov, former head of the Russian Federation Security Council. However, with the start of the antiterrorist war a military man came to the fore - Chief of the General Staff Anatoliy Kvashnin. He was the one who would report to the Kremlin on the course of combat operations, make predictions about the situation and prepare recommendations. And Kvashnin did all this very competently. As for Sergey Ivanov, he did not shine in this kind of knowledge. Indeed, at first he even used to make military-political statements that were "inappropriate to the moment" (for which, apparently, he was scolded by the Kremlin bosses).
Now career military men believe they are capable of exerting even a strictly political influence on the president and his entourage. There are at least three key issues on which the military want to influence the country's leadership - strategic parity with the USA, geopolitical Alignment in Central Asia and the Middle East and the social position of servicemen. (..)
From the geopolitical viewpoint, there is also a growing disagreement within the Defence Ministry with the way in which the Kremlin is structuring its participation in the antiterrorist coalition. To put it in agitprop style, the boot of the American soldier is trampling the recently- Soviet soil of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. That is absolutely at odds with the philosophy of the rulers of the "Trans-Arbat District". And the reason is clear - throughout their professional lives they have trained to destroy that very enemy. That was why in many of them the New York events of 11 September caused undisguised glee. The presence of the Pentagon in the former Soviet republics with Russia's consent is only intensifying these sentiments. Furthermore, the Americans seem to be achieving in Afghanistan something that the Russian military failed to do in 10 years of war. And many of those who are high up in our military now received a career boost thanks to the ill-fated Afghan war of 1979-89.
(..)
The president's military policy with regard to his own armed forces is also not inspiring. Almost two years of Vladimir Putin's presidency have brought nothing new either as regards re-equipping the army and navy or as regards the impoverished status of military men. The promised pay raise, the increase planned in two stages, for the beginning and the middle of next year, has itself proved ephemeral. Foreboding that the military will be let down yet again is instilled by the rather sluggish situation on the world oil market - the lower the prices, the fewer illusions among officers and generals that the Kremlin will keep its word. (..)
And then last Saturday [10 November] an appeal from "generals and admirals of the Soviet armed forces and the Russian army to the Russian president, State Duma deputies, government members and governors (presidents) of the regions of the Russian Federation" was published in a radical left newspaper. "Reforms of death" - that is how the authors describe the current changes in Russia, including the military-political reforms. "This is a lie and deception of the people" - that is how the armed forces reforms are described. The solution to the crisis is seen in restoring power to the people and dealing in the cruellest way with the former and present leaders of the state.
Here there is a slogan: "The people must decide their own fate", and a definition of the goal: "The people must have returned to them not only their stolen wealth but the social gains that they had secured under Soviet power." Incidentally, this is a call for the violent revision of everything that has taken shape in the Russian state in the past decade.
(..)
In addition it is reliably known that all the high-ranking signatories are in close contact with the General Staff and the attribution in the heading "Appeal of general and admirals...of the Russian Army" certainly does not indicate that they are retirees. No, the retirees are speaking in the name of serving generals and admirals, acting in this case as the mouthpiece of offices at the General Staff. The retirees have said what is on the minds of serving personnel. (..)

Top Brass: No Strategic Concessions to the U.S.

Moscow Times
December 3, 2001
By Richard Balmforth, Reuters

A senior member of the military, in tough remarks that dimmed the afterglow of a cordial U.S.-Russia summit, has ruled out any concessions to Washington on strategic weapons and missile defense.
Colonel-General Yury Baluyevsky, first deputy head of the General Staff, also said Friday that although Washington had not violated the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty by missile defense tests, there were signs that it was close to doing so. "From the Russian side, there are no concessions. There have been none and there will not be any on the question of anti-missile defense and strategic arms," Baluyevsky told reporters.
Baluyevsky was also cool on the subject of a new relationship with the NATO military alliance, saying everything that had taken place up to now in NATO-Russia relations had been "a simple waste of time."
They were the first comments by Russian military top brass since the Texas summit last month between President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President George W. Bush that, while being warm-spirited, failed to reach agreement on the thorny issue of U.S. missile defense plans.
Baluyevsky, while shrugging off the effects on Russia's security of Washington breaking out of the ABM Treaty, said it seemed likely that this would happen sooner or later. He said Russia did not believe that Washington was yet in violation. But he added: "Certain elements indicate that Washington is close to breaking the clauses of the treaty."
It was not clear if he was referring to the U.S. military's planned test over the Pacific on Sunday night as part of its plans to develop a controversial missile defense shield. In the test, a projectile fired from Kwajalein island was to try to destroy a dummy warhead launched from a California air force base.
Washington said Thursday that the test itself would not amount to a violation of the treaty. Bush, at the summit, announced plans to cut U.S. strategic offensive weapons to between 1,700 and 2,200. Russia has said it is ready to cut the number of its strategic warheads to 1,500.
But Baluyevsky said Washington had still not indicated what mechanism would regulate the cuts in the U.S. strategic stockpile and whether the warheads would be destroyed.
"It is not clear how this process will be monitored. A single handshake does not solve problems like that," he said.
Baluyevsky was lukewarm about possible stronger ties with the NATO military alliance that Putin and NATO Secretary-General George Robertson discussed in Moscow a week ago. Putin told Robertson that Russia was ready to develop relations with NATO but did not seek to join the alliance or have a veto over its activities.
"We are ready for widening cooperation with NATO but on the condition that we preserve our national security interests," Baluyevsky said.
*The Foreign Ministry on Friday welcomed a vote by the United Nations in favor of maintaining the ABM Treaty, saying it was evidence of "growing support in the world for this treaty and a striving not to allow its destruction," The Associated Press reported. The UN General Assembly on Thursday voted 84-4 with 61 abstentions in favor of keeping the treaty.

Missile Intercept Test Successful

United States Department of Defense
News Release No. 613-01
3 December 2001

The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) announced today it has successfully completed a test involving a planned intercept of an intercontinental ballistic missile target. The test took place over the central Pacific Ocean. A modified Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) target vehicle was launched from Vandenberg AFB, Calif., at 9:59 p.m. EST, and a prototype interceptor was launched approximately 20 minutes later and 4,800 miles away from the Ronald Reagan Missile Site Kwajalein Atoll in the Republic of the Marshall Islands. The intercept took place approximately 10 minutes after the interceptor was launched, at an altitude in excess of 140 miles above the earth, and during the midcourse phase of the target warhead's flight. This was the third successful intercept for the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) Segment, formerly known as National Missile Defense.
The test successfully demonstrated exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV) flight performance and "hit to kill" technology to intercept and destroy a long-range ballistic missile target. In addition to the EKV locating, tracking, and intercepting the target resulting in its destruction using only the body-to-body impact, this test also demonstrated the ability of system elements to work together as an integrated system. The test involved the successful integrated operation of space and ground-based sensors and radars, as well as the Battle Management, Command Control and Communications (BMC3) function to detect the launch of the target missile, cue an early warning radar to provide more detailed target location data; and integration of a prototype X-Band radar (based at Kwajalein) to provide precise target data to the EKV, which received the target updates from the In-Flight Interceptor Communications Systems (IFICS) at Kwajalein.
The EKV separated from its rocket booster more than 1,400 miles from the target warhead. After separation, it used its on-board infrared and visual sensors, augmented with the X-Band radar data provided by BMC3 via the In-flight Interceptor Communications System, to locate and track the target. Sensors aboard the EKV also successfully selected the target instead of a large balloon, which functioned as a decoy. Only system-generated data was used for the intercept after the EKV separated from its booster rocket. A C-band transponder aboard the target warhead did not provide any tracking or targeting information to the interceptor after the interceptor was launched.
Tonight's test is a major step in our aggressive test program, and is the third successful intercept in five attempts.
[…]

Missile Defense Test's Value Questioned

Stormy Calif. Weather Delays Fifth Trial

By Bradley Graham
Washington Post Staff Writer
Sunday, December 2, 2001; Page A06

Cloud cover, lightning and high winds over California forced the postponement last night of a fifth test of a prototype national missile defense system amid fresh argument over the value of the tightly scripted experiment in determining the weapon's feasibility.
A Pentagon official said a range safety rule requiring continued visual tracking of a missile in flight, as well as concern about static interference arising from the stormy weather, prevented the launch of a target missile. The test was rescheduled for tonight, but with more poor weather expected, the official said that a further delay was likely.
The test is due to follow the same scenario used in the past four trials. The target missile will be launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base northwest of Los Angeles and will arc across the Pacific, releasing both a mock warhead and a single balloon decoy. Twenty minutes later, an interceptor missile is supposed to blast off from Kwajalein Atoll in the central Pacific about 4,500 miles away. Once in space, a "kill vehicle" -- a 120-pound, 5-foot-tall device resembling a telescope with a jet pack -- is to separate from its booster and home in on the imitation 5 1/2-foot-tall warhead.
If all goes according to plan, the kill vehicle will ram into the warhead about 140 miles over the Pacific, demonstrating a concept that defense officials have dubbed "hit to kill."
With a record of two hits and two misses in four previous intercept attempts, the Pentagon is avoiding any major changes in the target, interceptor or test course that might add risk this time. A new critique by the Union of Concerned Scientists released on Friday called attention to the lack of operational realism in the test, citing a continued heavy reliance on surrogates and artificial elements. But Pentagon officials defended the simplified measures as part of a step-by-step approach that is normal in the early development of a complex weapons system.
Lt. Gen. Ronald Kadish, director of the Pentagon's Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), told reporters on Friday that a hit would give him confidence enough to move on to more complicated and realistic test scenarios, including the use of more and different decoys. A miss, depending on the cause, could stir renewed questions about the Bush administration's ambitious development plan, which many Democratic lawmakers, scientists and arms control advocates regard as unworkable, unaffordable and unnecessary.
The land-based interceptor system is only one of several technological approaches that the Bush administration is pursuing in a broadened program of experimentation. Others involve sea-based interceptors, airborne lasers and space-based weapons. But the land-based interceptor design has received the most funding and attention, having been accelerated by the Clinton administration in 1999.
In its 28-page critique, the Union of Concerned Scientists said artificial test conditions such as the use of a single decoy mean that the results will reveal little about the proposed system's ability to operate under real combat conditions.
The report noted that the booster used to launch the kill vehicle travels at only a third of the speed intended for the actual weapon, whose new and faster booster is more than a year behind schedule.
Additionally, it said that each of the mock warheads used in the tests has carried a transponder and that the transponder data have been designed to provide the initial guidance to the interceptor for when to launch and where to fly. Pentagon officials have said that the transponder is necessary to compensate for the lack of a high-precision X-band radar in the proper location in the testing range. And they have said that data from the transponder have not factored in the final homing of the kill vehicle. But the report of the scientists' group said the transponder has served to get the kill vehicle to a location in space that has minimized the amount of maneuvering it has had to do.
The report also observed that all the tests -- including the planned fifth one -- essentially have been the same, with no change in the trajectories of the missiles, the target complex, the time of day of the launches and the intended intercept point.
"We find that the current test program is still in its infancy, and that the United States remains years away from having enough information to make an informed decision on the deployment of even a limited nationwide missile defense system," the report concluded. "Hit-to-kill has been demonstrated, but not under conditions that are operationally relevant."
Kadish himself emphasized several times on Friday that the purpose of these initial tests was not to prove the system's ability to operate under real-life conditions but to identify weaknesses and acquire confidence in the approach. "We are testing to learn; we are not testing as pass-fail for some operational reason," he said. "There seems to be confusion on this every time I discuss these types of tests."
Kadish said that artificialities are inherent in much developmental testing but that the plan is to eliminate them in the missile defense program over time. To this end, the administration has proposed such changes as launching interceptors from Alaska and using ship-based tracking radars.
But some of these moves, as well as plans to test other kinds of antimissile technologies, threaten to bring the United States into conflict with the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which bans some kinds of experimentation as well as the deployment of a nationwide missile defense. President Bush has declared his desire to set the treaty aside, but he and Russian President Vladimir Putin, who is intent on preserving the treaty in some form, were unable to work out their differences during meetings last month.
To avoid a confrontation over the treaty, the administration decided to forgo the use of a ship-based Aegis radar and a land-based radar planned for the latest test.“

Missile-Defense Satellites’ Cost Balloons To $23 Billion”

by Nathan Hodge and John M. Donnelly
Defense Week, November 19, 2001.

A constellation of missile-tracking satellites that is key to President Bush’s missile-defense plans will cost at least $23 billion—not $10 billion as estimated just last year, a House panel says. At issue is the
proposed network of two dozen Space-Based Infrared System-Low satellites, or SBIRS Low.
In other words, the satellites, designed to track ballistic missiles in mid-flight, will cost more than half the amount the Pentagon says the entire ground-based National Missile Defense system of interceptors, radars and computers will cost to build and maintain over 20 years. The military says the NMD system’s "life-cycle cost" is $43 billion. The surprisingly high SBIRS-Low cost estimate has not previously been disclosed. The figure represents the projected effect of the Pentagon and contractors repeatedly underestimating the program’s cost and complexity.
SBIRS Low is the latest in a line of troubled attempts to construct a set of missile-tracking satellites. SBIRS Low would follow a missile from the end of its boost phase to re-entry, providing defensive interceptors with crucial details about where the missile is headed.
In a new draft report accompanying the fiscal 2002 defense appropriations bill, the House Appropriations Committee said the number of lines of software code estimated to support the satellites has grown from 900,000 to 3 million. In addition, the projections of satellite weight have gone "through the roof," the panel said, without specifying how much because the data is proprietary.
Significantly, the panel said, even the $23 billion estimate, which includes the cost of maintaining the satellites, "does not capture the full breadth of risks to be faced by the program. The true program costs could be significantly higher."

Funding cut

SBIRS Low, the committee remarked, posed the risk of a potential "rush to failure." The committee turned down the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization’s $385 million request for the program and recommended taking SBIRS low off the acquisition track altogether.
The panel said ground-based radars would provide a more cost-effective alternative. Instead of cutting all funding for SBIRS. Low, the committee provided a $250 million line item for "satellite sensor technology."
Separately, the committee eliminated the Air Force’s $93.7 million request for the SBIRS High program, a higher-altitude set of satellites that would provide the initial tocsin when a missile is launched.
The committee’s report said SBIRS High faces "serious hardware and software design problems" that have increased costs by a half a billion dollars. The committee would not fund any hardware procurement, but it did provide $30 million to the research and development account for SBIRS High. It was unclear at press time when the House would take up the defense spending bill, but it is expected to occur before Thanksgiving. The Senate appropriators have not yet passed their version of the bill.

Northrop responds

Lockheed Martin is the prime contractor on SBIRS High. Teams led by TRW and Spectrum Astro, respectively, are vying for SBIRS Low work. Against the backdrop of the House committee setback, Northrop Grumman, a partner on both satellite programs, is forging ahead to sell the programs.
At a briefing last Tuesday, Carl Fischer, vice president and general manager of Northrop Grumman’s newly formed Space Systems Division, touted its capabilities in space and missile-defense systems. He stressed that there are "good new stories" associated with the SBIRS Low program.
Fischer said Northrop Grumman had refocused its space-based capabilities for three new missions: homeland security, counter-terrorism and low-intensity conflict.
"We’re well positioned to satisfy all of these missions, because of our sensors and because of the [ground-based] processing we do," he said.
Northrop Grumman has partnered with Lockheed Martin for the development, delivery, operation and maintenance of the ground segment hardware and software of SBIRS High, and Northrop would provide the payload. Fischer urged the trade press to look at the benchmarks that he says SBIRS High
has achieved, as well as the new capabilities Northrop Grumman had acquired through its acquisition of Aerojet General’s Electronics and Information Systems group, where he previously worked.
Responding to questions about cost overruns and schedule setbacks on the SBIRS programs, Fischer acknowledged that there have been delays, "and we’re disquieted about that." However, Fischer said, "I think it’s important for all of us to recognize our great success on the program."
For instance, SBIRS High met 19 parameters for operational requirements, as well as 16 parameters for payload performance, he said. "The payloads work; they work well," Fischer said.
In addition, Fischer looked to cast doubt on suggestions that ground-based radar might provide a more cost-effective alternative to SBIRS Low. "As good as ground based radars are, they have physical limitations," he said.

Positives

Separately, the Lexington Institute, a think tank based in Arlington, Va., dismissed criticism that SBIRS Low had become too risky because of growth in cost, weight and complexity.
"None of these reasons is valid," Lexington said. "Changes in system complexity and the weight and cost of the satellite are within acceptable boundaries or reflect improvements demanded by the government."
Fischer said SBIRS Low is compatible with command and control aircraft such as AWACS, JSTARS and UAVs in theater. "The exciting thing," he said, "is that many of those systems are in the Northrop Grumman portfolio of products."
That compatibility, he suggested, will help in the integration of U.S. missile defense systems. When matched with better ground processing, programs such as SBIRS Low will cut the time it takes to get information off of a sensor platform and deliver it in a useful form to the military consumer, Fischer said.
"What we’re talking about as a particular strength of the Northrop Grumman is ... helping to craft a robust missile defense system, not only for homeland defense, but for theater missile defense," he said. Northrop Grumman has a part in both teams working to win the contract for SBIRS Low. It has partnered with Spectrum Astro on mission sensors design and ground segment design and integration for SBIRS Low.

The Unruly Hedge: Cold War Thinking at the Crawford Summit

Hans M. Kristensen
Arms Control Today, December 2001

President George W. Bush’s announcement on November 13 that the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal will be reduced to 1,700-2,200 deployed warheads over the next 10 years raises important questions about the need for transparency of nuclear arsenals in the 21st century. No sooner had Bush said that the cuts involved “reducing and destroying the number of warheads to get down to specific levels” than national security adviser Condoleezza Rice corrected the record: “I believe that what the president was referring to is [that] we will not have these warheads near the places at which they could be deployed. In other words, they will truly not be deployable warheads. In that sense, their capability will not be accessible to the United States.”1
This glitch in the Bush administration’s first attempt to outline its new nuclear policy is no insignificant matter. It comes only a few weeks before Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld is expected to announce the results of a review of nuclear forces and policy, and it indicates that the Bush administration will continue what is known as the “hedge,” a reserve of thousands of nuclear warheads permitted by arms control treaties that mandated the destruction of launchers but not warheads. The hedge is not included in the future “operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads” referred to by Bush, but it nonetheless makes up an increasing portion of the total stockpile.
This article presents new information about the hedge that has recently been declassified and released under the Freedom of Information Act. Newly available documents demonstrate that the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), which is responsible for U.S. nuclear forces, repeatedly warned during the 1990s that increased transparency of the nuclear arms reduction process was more important after START II than new cuts, suggesting that Bush’s inclusion of only operationally deployed strategic warheads in the new round of cuts is unwise because it will contribute to the hedge and therefore the opacity of U.S. forces.
Although the details of Bush’s cuts will not become known until Rumsfeld completes the Nuclear Posture Review in December, the size of the remaining force also suggests that the reductions largely follow already established force structure analysis conducted by STRATCOM back in the early to mid-1990s. This means that President Bush’s “new strategic framework” is based on the old strategic assumptions about the triad, credible deterrence, and counterforce targeting that guided Cold War nuclear policy.

Origins of the Hedge

The hedge of thousands of active and inactive nuclear weapons that the United States maintains outside arms control agreements and public scrutiny was conceived in the late 1980s and formally approved by the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review. All of the warheads in the hedge, which are maintained at various levels of readiness, are retired warheads from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Treaty and the 1991 START I accord, which required destruction of delivery vehicles (bombers and missiles) but not warheads.
The hedge—composed of an “active reserve” and an “inactive reserve”—has grown substantially as START I has been implemented, and it continues to grow as the United States makes other changes to its nuclear force posture. For example, the United States currently deploys 18 Trident nuclear submarines, each of which carries 24 Trident I or Trident II missiles with eight warheads per missile, for a total of 3,456 warheads. The Navy has finally begun to implement the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review by reducing the number of submarines to 14, and it plans to decrease the number of warheads per missile to five to stay below the START II limit of 1,700 SLBM warheads. Most of the surplus warheads will not be destroyed but rather will be moved to the hedge.
The warheads in the hedge are designed to serve several purposes. Some are designated as replacements for warheads destroyed each year in routine reliability and safety tests. More are intended to safeguard against catastrophic failure of operationally deployed weapons. For example, one force structure study published by Strategic Air Command in September 1991 described three ways that a leg of the U.S. nuclear triad could fail: a communications failure could force U.S. ICBMs to “ride out” a full attack; a breakthrough could make the ocean transparent to satellites, thus rendering submarines and their missiles vulnerable; or a design flaw in the Minuteman III or Trident II missiles or their associated warheads could render the systems inoperable.2 In any of these cases, reserve warheads from the hedge would be used to replace defective warheads or to compensate for the loss of a delivery system by increasing loadings on other launch platforms.
Most warheads in the hedge, however, are intended to provide the capability to increase the size of the operational arsenal quickly by “reconstituting” or “uploading” retired warheads onto nuclear missiles and bombers in case Russia returns to a hostile regime or some other threatening nuclear power appears on the horizon. Central to this concern has been the “breakout” potential that U.S. nuclear planners say Russia has because of its large warhead production capacity, which probably exceeds 1,000 warheads per year.3 The United States halted warhead production in 1992 (although small-scale reproduction was started in 1999) and has since determined that the service life of its modern warheads can be safely extended to maintain a reliable and enduring arsenal. Russian warheads, in contrast, were designed for a shorter life with less capability for extension, requiring a larger ongoing production capacity. Therefore, as Russia evolved from “the Evil Empire” to a partner and as arms control treaties dramatically reduced the size of deployed strategic nuclear forces, the United States saw the hedge as a prudent precaution against a dangerous and uncertain future.
However, no sooner had the Nuclear Posture Review endorsed the hedge than its contradiction with other U.S. policy goals became apparent. Following talks in 1994, President Bill Clinton and President Boris Yeltsin agreed in May 1995 to negotiate agreements aimed at increasing the “transparency and irreversibility” of nuclear arms reductions, a step that likely would entail subjecting each side’s nondeployed arsenals to international scrutiny and mandating that nondeployed warheads be destroyed so that a rapid reconstitution of nuclear forces would no longer be possible.4
This decision was made for several reasons. Partly it was due to concerns over the safety of Russian nuclear weapons and fissile material. The United States was anxious to learn what happened to the thousands of nuclear warheads Russia removed from operational status and to prevent dismantled nuclear weapons or fissile materials from being stolen or bought by “rogue” states, such as Iran, or terrorist organizations. The commitment to transparency and irreversibility was also prompted by increasing international pressure on the two superpowers to do more to fulfill their disarmament obligations under Article VI of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Clinton and Yeltsin issued their statement only two days before the end of the critical NPT review and extension conference in New York, where the nuclear powers were eager to assemble enough support for the indefinite extension of the treaty.
However, at the same time as he was working to open Russia’s nuclear infrastructure to greater scrutiny, President Clinton had also issued Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 37, a secret document that established four “first principles” to guide arms control efforts for nuclear reductions beyond START II: deterrence, stability, equivalence, and the hedge.5 Thus, despite the public pledge to pursue “transparency and irreversibility” in nuclear arms reductions, PDD-37 also endorsed a reserve of unaccountable nuclear warheads that could preserve the U.S. ability to reverse its nuclear arms reductions quickly.
This contradiction in U.S. policy was magnified when PDD-37 reached STRATCOM, where commander-in-chief Admiral Henry D. Chiles directed the Policy and Doctrine Branch to prepare a paper that outlined STRATCOM’s position on post-START II arms control. The resulting white paper was approved by the Strategy and Policy Division on September 16, 1996, and used the four “first principles” in PDD-37 to formulate five objectives for U.S. arms control efforts after START II:

• Protect U.S. strategic nuclear delivery vehicle force structure. There are currently no new platforms planned, so it’s important to retain as many of the existing ones as possible.
• Retain U.S. warheads at a level consistent with war-fighting needs. Deterrence
• Minimize the impact of those Russian systems, [deleted], that pose the greatest threat to U.S. interests. Deterrence, Stability
• Reduce and eliminate U.S. and Russian non-deployed warheads and fissile materials. Equivalence, Stability
• Address non-strategic nuclear forces as part of the overall effort to stem the proliferation threat. [deleted]. Equivalence, Stability6

The STRATCOM white paper assumed that “warhead elimination must be the centerpiece of post-START II arms control, and should come before further force structure reductions occur,” and the fourth objective called for reducing and eliminating nondeployed warheads. At the same time, however, the first objective emphasized the importance of retaining as many of the existing “delivery platforms” as possible to “ensure adequate hedge capability.” The reason for this inconsistency was that, as a nuclear war-fighting command, STRATCOM not surprisingly viewed the arms control process as a means of achieving strategic advantages. Cold War or not, STRATCOM’s foremost concern was to ensure that the United States would triumph in a nuclear clash. To that end, the hedge served to safeguard U.S. nuclear superiority, while transparency and warhead elimination helped bring Russian weapons under greater control.
Thus, throughout the early and mid-1990s, the U.S. government and military faced a conflict between the desire to lower the overall number of nuclear weapons and improve relations with Russia while maintaining some sort of insurance against potential future challenges.
Today, the role of the hedge in protecting U.S. security by insuring against a vast Russian nuclear rearmament is less important, both because of a warming in U.S.-Russian relations and because of a contraction of Russia’s arsenal. Although Russia’s current inventory of unaccountable warheads is even larger than that of the United States, its arsenal is likely to shrink dramatically over the next decade. Of an estimated 20,000-25,000 nuclear warheads,7 some 9,000 are considered operational (5,600 strategic and 3,500 tactical),8 with approximately 13,500 warheads awaiting dismantlement. Unless significant numbers of Russian warheads are refurbished, remanufactured, and returned to operational forces, the stockpile may shrink to as few as 1,000 strategic and several hundred tactical warheads9 within the next 10 years.
With a Russian “breakout” becoming less likely, and concern that rogue states or terrorists could acquire warheads or fissile material increasing, a large reserve of unaccountable U.S. warheads is a growing liability to national security. If a large proportion of the U.S. arsenal remains opaque, it will be extraordinarily difficult to convince Russia to open its stockpile to inspection, especially in the absence of a more formal arms reduction agreement. U.S. interests would then be threatened as thousands of Russian warheads are removed from service to storage facilities whose security may have been weakened over the last decade by Russia’s poor economy. The result could be a failure to bring Russian unaccountable nuclear warheads and fissile material under control.
President Bush’s initiative to reduce only operational strategic nuclear forces will move thousands of U.S. warheads into the unaccountable hedge categories, and it completely ignores the proportionally increasing number of nonstrategic nuclear warheads. This perpetuates a dangerous transformation of the U.S. stockpile. Before START I, about 5 percent of the total stockpile was in the inactive category, but the current trend is that deployed (accountable) strategic warheads are a shrinking fraction of the stockpile. Present plans for the START II stockpile could increase that ratio to a 1:1 ratio, with the reserve constituting as large a stockpile as the deployed stockpile.10 Over the next 10 years, this trend could transform the composition of the U.S. nuclear stockpile to a predominantly clandestine posture, in which less than a quarter of all warheads are accountable.
Rather than bringing greater transparency to the nuclear arms reduction process when it is most needed, President Bush’s apparent continued endorsement of the hedge decreases transparency, undercutting incentives that Russia would have for disclosing the status of its thousands of non-operational tactical nuclear warheads.
The Bush administration’s aversion to a new formal nuclear-reductions agreement and its focus on operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads is also inconsistent with STRATCOM advice. In the past few years, STRATCOM—a strong proponent of a hedge force and of maintaining a nuclear war-fighting advantage over Russia, as indicated above—has repeatedly and publicly emphasized the importance of greater transparency and irreversibility of nuclear arms reductions. In connection with his nomination as commander-in-chief of STRATCOM, Vice Admiral Richard W. Mies stated in a written response to the Senate Armed Services Committee in June 1998:

Further reductions in strategic delivery systems beyond START III should be complimented by more comprehensive considerations of increased stockpile transparency, greater accountability and transparency of non-strategic/tactical nuclear warheads, limitations on production infrastructures, third party nuclear weapon stockpiles, the impact on our allies, and the implications of deploying strategic defensive systems. [With fewer weapons, these issues] become more complex and sensitive. Whereas at existing START I/II levels our deterrent forces are relatively less sensitive to “cheating.”

Even after President Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive 4 in early 2001,11 which ordered a review of U.S. nuclear offensive and defensive postures, STRATCOM continued to stress the need for transparency. Admiral James Ellis, the current head of STRATCOM, told the Senate Armed Services Committee in September that, as reductions to low levels are implemented, “issues such as disparity in non-strategic nuclear forces, transparency, irreversibility, production capacity, aggregate warhead inventories, and verifiability become more complex and more sensitive.”
Whether the upcoming Nuclear Posture Review reflects STRATCOM’s appeal will be apparent when the results are announced before the end of the year. So far, however, Bush’s cuts appear to favor protection of the hedge over greater transparency and irreversibility of nuclear arms reductions.

Conclusions

The Crawford summit promised a new era in U.S.-Russian relations, but with respect to nuclear policy issues it fell far short of expectations. Rather than moving toward a true “new strategic framework” that takes arms control beyond the Cold War paradigm, President Bush seems to be regressing to an early 1990s mentality that requires the United States to prepare for possible Russian rearmament, even as the president proclaims America’s new and growing friendship with Russia.
Indeed, even the size of the president’s proposed reductions ring of Cold War conflict. In the early 1990s, STRATCOM analysis established a “preferred force structure” that protected a triad of modern and flexible nuclear forces in a “stable nucleus,” while gradually reducing excess operational weapons. The analysis was the basis for START II, the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review, and the START III framework, which called for a 2,000-2,500 warhead level. This same thinking seems to be underlying Bush’s policy. Bush says that the goal continues to be to maintain a credible deterrent, but a continued deployment of about 2,000 warheads indicates that STRATCOM will adhere to the same concepts of triad, counterforce targeting, and flexible response as it did a decade ago. “I can guarantee you,” former STRATCOM commander-in-chief General Eugene Habiger said during an interview in 1998, that “our analysis and assessment will be based on an analysis of the threat, if you will, potential for threat, and not just on ‘well, 1,500 or 2,000 looks about right.’”12
Bush’s cut of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 1,700-2,200 is not deep enough or different enough to indicate a shift in nuclear policy of the magnitude that he alluded to in his May 2001 speech at the National Defense University. His announcement provoked a tepid response from President Vladimir Putin, who issued only a vague promise that Russia would “try to respond in kind.” The summit simply reaffirmed how deeply rooted in Cold War nuclear planning the United States continues to be.
Bush’s pledge indicates that, despite its frequent criticism of arms control, the Bush administration has not moved beyond the most significant shortcoming of treaties: the fact that they have counted only operational strategic warheads while ignoring reserve warheads and non-strategic weapons. This means that thousands of non-operational nuclear warheads placed in reserve and thousands of tactical nuclear weapons continue to be unaccounted for by the arms reduction process. If Bush wants to move nuclear arms control out of the Cold War, he must end the distinction between operational and non-operational warheads and seek ceilings on total warheads.
The hedge is a dangerous signal of intent that connotes deceit in our relations with Russia. There seems to be no better way to undermine the very trust that President Bush has said should be the basis for a new U.S.-Russian strategic relationship than to keep thousands of nuclear warheads hidden in secret bunkers in case it turns out that Russia needs to be destroyed after all. If Bush wants to transform our strategic relations with Russia, he must make the entire stockpile accountable.
President Bush could have used the November summit with Putin to increase the transparency and irreversibility of the nuclear arms reduction process. Instead he seems to have taken a step back from the START III framework and complicated efforts to reduce the currency of nuclear weapons in the U.S.-Russian relationship. There now rests a great responsibility with the forthcoming Nuclear Posture Review to create clarity and transparency on the nuclear posture.

Sources: Hans M. Kristensen and Joshua Handler, “Appendix 6A: Tables of Nuclear Forces, 2001,” in SIPRI Yearbook 2001: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); Joshua Handler, “The September 1991 PNIs and the Elimination, Storing and Security Aspects of TNWs,” Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University, revised September 24, 2001; Robert S. Norris and William M. Arkin, “NRDC Nuclear Notebook: U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile, July 1998,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 1998; William M. Arkin, Robert Norris, and Joshua Handler, “Taking Stock: Worldwide Nuclear Deployments 1998,” Natural Resources Defense Council, March 1998; Thomas B. Cochran, “U.S. Inventories of Nuclear Weapons and Weapon-Usable Fissile Material,” Natural Resources Defense Council, revised September 26, 1995.

NOTES
Support for research used in this article was provided by the Ploughshares Fund and John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.
Editor’s note: Many of the documents referenced in this article can be found on the Nautilus Institute’s Web site, www.nautilus.org. Direct links can be found in the Web version of this article at www. armscontrol.org.
1. Bush quote: The White House, “President Bush and President Putin Talk to Crawford Students,” November 15, 2001. Rice quote: “Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Dr. Condoleezza Rice on Visit of President Putin,” U.S. Newswire, November 15, 2001.
2. U.S. Strategic Air Command/XP, n.t. [“The Phoenix Study”], September 11, 1991, p. 32. Available on the Internet at http://www.nautilus.org/nukestrat/USA/Force/phoenix.html
3. Department of Defense, Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, “Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Nuclear Deterrence,” October 1998, p. 48. Available on the Internet at http://www.nautilus.org/nukestrat/USA/advisory/dsb98.pdf
4. The White House, “Joint Statement on the Transparency and Irreversibility of the Process of Reducing Nuclear Weapons,” May 10, 1995.
5. U.S. Strategic Command, “White Paper: Post-START II Arms Control,” September 18, 1996, pp. 1, 2.
6. Bulleted points are a direct quotation from the “White Paper: Post-START II Arms Control,” pp. 1, 2. Underlining in original.
7. U.S. Strategic Command, “Statement of General Eugene, United States Air Force, Commander in Chief, United States Strategic Command, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee,” March 13, 1997, p. 3. The Defense Department reported in January 2001 that the Russian nuclear stockpile “was estimated [in December 2000] to be well under 25,000 warheads, a reduction of over 11,000 warheads since eliminations began in 1992.” Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, January 2001, p. 55.
8. Hans M. Kristensen and Joshua Handler, “Appendix 6A: Tables of Nuclear Forces, 2001,” in SIPRI Yearbook 2001: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 466. Available on the Internet at http://projects.sipri.se/nuclear/06A.pdf
9. William M. Arkin, Robert Norris, and Joshua Handler, “Taking Stock: Worldwide Nuclear Deployments 1998,” Natural Resources Defense Council, March 1998, pp. 2, 13, 27.
10. “Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Nuclear Deterrence,” p. 48.
11. Federation of American Scientists, “National Security Presidential Directives [NSPD] George W. Bush Administration,” http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/index.html
12. General Eugene E. Habiger, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Strategic Command, interview with Defense Writer’s Group, Washington, D.C., March 31, 1998.

Hans M. Kristensen is a senior program officer with the Nautilus Institute in Berkeley, California. He is a contributor to the SIPRI Yearbook and co-author of the “NRDC Nuclear Notebook” in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

China Fumes Over U.S. Missile Test

Reuters, Dec. 4, 2001

BEIJING - China said on Tuesday it remained staunchly opposed to plans by Washington to develop a national missile defense system after the United States tested its controversial missile defense shield.
“Our position on missile defense is very clear and consistent: we are opposed to the United States building a missile defense system,” Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue told a news conference.
“Instead we believe that relevant sides should, through sincere and serious dialogues, seek a solution that does not compromise any side's security interests, nor harm international efforts at arms-control and disarmament,” she said.
The United States said it took a major step forward in testing its controversial missile defense shield on Monday by shooting down a dummy warhead on an intercontinental ballistic missile over the Pacific Ocean.
Chinese officials have discussed U.S. missile defense plans with their U.S. counterparts but the two sides do not see eye to eye.
Both Russia and China oppose U.S. plans to develop a missile shield, saying it would violate the 1972 Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty and could trigger a new arms race.
The test is part of President Bush's goal of building a limited shield to protect against ballistic missiles from ''rogue'' nations such as North Korea, Iran and Iraq.
U.S. officials say the current missile defense tests do not violate the ABM treaty between the United States and the former Soviet Union. That treaty forbids the United States or Russia from developing a national missile defense.
But Bush and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld have vowed to move beyond that pact if Moscow and Washington cannot reach agreement on updating it.
Despite agreeing to new and deep cuts in offensive nuclear missiles by both countries, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Bush failed to agree on the anti-missile program at a summit in Texas last month, but said discussions would continue.

BASIC Press Release
5 December 2001

New Report Highlights Danger to UK of Increased US Nuclear Aggression

As the US Government undertakes a radical reappraisal of the size, composition and role of its nuclear arsenal, a major new report examines the implications for Britain’s own nuclear deterrent.
BASIC’s new report, “Secrecy and Dependence: The UK Trident System in the 21st Century”, examines the close links between UK and US nuclear development and policies. The Bush administration’s desire for a more versatile nuclear capability, and Washington’s deep opposition to international arms control, raise serious questions about existing UK Government commitments to nuclear non-proliferation. Exploring these conflicting currents, the report highlights key nuclear weapons policy questions that will need to be addressed during Labour’s second term.
Behind Washington’s recently announced reductions in its nuclear weapons – slashing its massive 6,000-warhead arsenal down to almost 2,000 in the next ten years – are plans for further nuclear weapons development. Efforts are mounting to create a new nuclear warhead, a low-yield “mini-nuke” that would provide the United States with the capability to use nuclear weapons in regional conflicts. This new weapon would complement the Bush administration’s increasing interest in using US nuclear force to counter chemical and biological weapons aggressors. Mark Bromley, BASIC Analyst, said: “With steps to develop a smaller, more usable nuclear arsenal, US policy threatens to escalate the arms race and turn Bush’s pledged reductions into worthless promises.”
The UK nuclear weapons programme is intertwined on many levels with that of the United States. If Washington adopts a more aggressive nuclear posture, London may be forced to follow suit, with damaging consequences for international attempts to control the spread of nuclear weapons. However, “Secrecy and Dependence” urges Tony Blair to introduce and encourage wider multilateral disarmament talks amongst the nuclear powers, and become a true leader in global nuclear disarmament. Such a move would reinforce Britain’s long-standing commitment to arms control agreements and help to stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Dr Ian Davis, BASIC’s Director, remarked: “The emergence of a new, more aggressive US nuclear posture and the collapse of multilateral arms control agreements raise serious questions about UK nuclear weapons policy. The time is right for an open and honest debate about the future role of the UK Trident system and continued wisdom of our secretive and dependent nuclear relationship with the United States.”

Inside the Ring

Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough
Washington Times
7 December 2001

[…]

Chinese nuclear 'event'

U.S. intelligence agencies have detected new efforts by China on strategic nuclear weapons. The latest evidence comes in intelligence reports that China conducted a nuclear weapons-related experiment at the remote Lop Nur test facility in western Xinjiang province.
The latest nuclear weapons test was an "event" last month that produced no detectable nuclear yield or blast, officials said. It followed several similar tests that were reported in classified intelligence reports in July.
The Chinese conducted three nuclear weapons-related tests at Lop Nur in June and July. Preparations were spotted by U.S. intelligence imagery.
The tests are part of China's aggressive strategic nuclear weapons buildup that includes two new road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles, the DF-31 and the DF-41, and a new class of ballistic missile submarines outfitted with JL-2 missiles — a naval version of the DF-31

[…]

Congressional Quarterly Weekly
December 1, 2001
Pg. 2856

House-Passed Bill Boosts Pentagon Funds For Heavy Weapons, More Agile Forces

By Pat Towell, CQ Staff

Loath to say no to the Pentagon, especially in the midst of a war, the House version of the defense appropriations bill fills nearly everything on the military´s wish list - from weapons designed to counter a long-ago Soviet threat to equipment for an unconventional fight in Afghanistan.
The House passed the $317.5 billion bill (HR 3338), which provides for the Pentagon´s fiscal 2002 expenses, by a vote of 406-20 on Nov. 28. The Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommittee is scheduled to act on its version of the measure the week of Dec. 3. (Vote 458, p. 2866)
More than a decade after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld has called for transforming the military from a Cold War force into something lighter and more agile.
Yet Rumsfeld sought, and Congress agreed, to continue building weapons for traditional warfare, such as the 40-ton Crusader mobile cannon at a cost of $23 million each.
The defense bill would provide the $448 million requested to continue developing the Crusader, which should be operational by 2008. Army officials, who want 480 cannons at a cost of $11 billion, insist that the new gun is necessary because the current one lacks the range of enemy artillery.
To be sure, the bill includes several congressional add-ons that would bolster the military´s ability to fight the type of conflict it currently is waging in Afghanistan. The House Appropriations Committee, which marked up the bill Oct. 24, allocated hundreds of millions of dollars to strengthen air warfare capabilities.
Some of that money would be used to improve the military´s ability to strike distant targets by allowing long-range stealth bombers to drop precision-guided "smart" bombs on more targets during a single mission. The rest would provide commanders with more information about the enemy by modernizing the Air Force´s aging fleet of long-range surveillance planes and complementing it with remotely piloted drone aircraft, or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).
Overall, the bill´s adjustments to President Bush´s budget request were at the margins. The House panel proposed few of the large cuts in major weapons programs that could pay for transformation plans.
"Sometimes it is very difficult to separate the boys from the toys," Defense Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman Jerry Lewis, R-Calif., said in an interview Nov. 28.

Hard to Let Go

Lewis reflects Washington´s ambivalence about sacrificing programs with strong constituencies to pay for new types of weapons. On the one hand, he routinely adds tens of millions of dollars to the annual spending bills for bases and research projects in his district, such as the $7.4 million added to the House bill to upgrade the electrical system at a Marine Corps supply base in Barstow, Calif.
On the other hand, Lewis has been a vigorous promoter of transforming technologies, such as UAVs, and has warned that the services will have to shelve some traditional weapons to pay for change.
Lewis pointed out that even Rumsfeld found it harder than anticipated to make the services give up proven weapons to try novel war-fighting approaches.
"We rarely see the department - never an individual branch - or even Congress kill a program," Lewis said.
The House version of the fiscal 2002 bill trimmed Bush´s request of $319.4 billion. (CQ Weekly, p. 2559)
The $1.9 billion reduction reflected the committee´s diversion of more funds than Bush requested to the military construction appropriations bill (HR 2904 - PL 107-64) and to the energy and water appropriations bill (HR 2311 - PL 107-66), which funds defense-related projects in the Energy Department. (CQ Weekly, pp. 2488, 2616)
The Appropriations Committee attached a $20 billion emergency supplemental to the bill to pay the recovery costs from the terrorist attacks, beef up homeland security and fund military operations in Afghanistan. (Story, p. 2837; box, p. 2858)
Although floor action on HR 3338 consumed the House during most of the session Nov. 28, nearly all the debate focused on the portion of the bill providing supplemental funds.
An amendment by Bob Filner, D-Calif., that would have required the government to pay the difference in salaries for federal employees called to active duty as members of the National Guard or reserves, was ruled out of order for violating the House rule barring legislation on an appropriations bill. Filner appealed the ruling, but it was upheld by a vote of 275-141. (Vote 456, p. 2864)

Anti-Missile Defense

The bill would cut $441 million from Bush´s $8.3 billion request to develop and field anti-missile defenses. The legislation would provide the $3.2 billion requested to continue developing a ground-based system begun by the Clinton administration. It would protect U.S. territory against a small number of missiles, such as ones that North Korea or other hostile states might launch. A total of $786 million would be provided for facilities in Alaska and elsewhere in the Pacific to test the system and, possibly, to provide a rudimentary defense against a North Korean missile.
Arms control advocates, however, warn that some of the proposed Alaskan facilities would violate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Their uphill battle against that part of Bush´s program was abandoned after the terrorist attacks. Bush insists the treaty must give way to an anti-missile defense, but he said he would prefer to work out an agreement with Russia. (CQ Weekly, p. 2656)
The bill would make several specific cuts in Bush´s anti-missile request, targeting projects strongly supported by conservatives who want to jettison the ABM Treaty. For example, it would provide only $70 million of the $190 million requested to develop a laser-armed anti-missile
satellite.
It also would cut $96 million from the $596 million requested for a long-range anti-missile system based on the Navy´s Aegis cruisers. Since 1995, many conservatives have argued that this program could be fielded more quickly than the land-based system begun by President Bill Clinton.
But the Appropriations Committee deleted funds for missiles intended to be used in that type of hurried deployment. The bill also would force the Pentagon to overhaul development of a fleet of satellites carrying infrared telescopes to detect attacking missiles and help steer intercepting rockets. Arguing that the program, designated SBIRS-Low, was plagued with delays, technical shortcomings and cost overruns, the Appropriations Committee eliminated the $385 million requested for this program. Instead, the bill would provide $325 million to explore alternative detection technologies.
The administration, in a Nov. 28 statement, said it strongly opposes the missile defense cuts.

[…]

Council for a Livable World
4 December 2001

Senate Appropriations Committee Votes to Cut Non-Proliferation Funds

The Senate Appropriations Committee unanimously approved today a version of the fiscal 2002 Defense Appropriations Bill cutting $46 million from the Nunn-Lugar program, initiated in 1991 to assist Russia in dismantling the former Soviet nuclear weapons complex.
The Bush administration had requested $403 million for the program, already $40 million less than fiscal 2001 funding levels. The additional cuts, if they stand, would bring the total 2002 funding for Nunn-Lugar down to $357 million.
The bill will next be voted on by the full Senate, and then go through a House-Senate conference before a final version is sent to the President for signature.
"The cuts to Nunn-Lugar are unconscionable," said Steve LaMontagne of Council for a Livable World Education Fund.
During his campaign, President Bush pledged to "increase substantially" U.S. nonproliferation assistance to Russia. More recently, Bush met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Crawford, Texas where the two leaders again promised to make nonproliferation a top priority in the U.S.-Russian relationship.

RFE / RL
9 November 2001

Russia's Nuclear Arsenal Large, Aging

Officials at the Moscow Center for the Study of the Problems of Disarmament told Interfax on 8 November that Russia has 6,094 nuclear weapons, of which 3,444 are on ICBMs, 2,024 are on submarines, and 626 are on bombers. The majority of the rockets have a predicted useful life lasting until 2010, the strategic bombers have an expected use until 2020, but many of the land-based rockets will be beyond their projected lifetimes by 2005, the center's officials said.

Source: RFE / RL, 9 November 2001
Provided by: RANSAC, Nuclear News, 15 November 2001, Web: www.ransac.org

Middle Powers Initiative
November 27, 2001

Statement on Bush-Putin Nuclear Arms Reductions Plans

At the Bush-Putin Summit, held November 13-15, 2001, President Bush announced plans to unilaterally reduce the US strategic nuclear arsenal from approximately 7,000 nuclear weapons to between 2,200 and 1,700 over a ten-year period. President Putin announced that Russia would make similar reductions. No announcement was made with regard to the large inventories of tactical nuclear weapons in the arsenal of each country.
In general, these announcements were treated by the media throughout the world as a major step forward. The Japan Times, for example, stated in a November 16th editorial, “The world took a giant step toward disarmament this week when U.S. President George W. Bush and his Russian counterpart, President Vladimir Putin, agreed to slash their nuclear arsenals.”
While any cuts in nuclear arsenals are certainly steps in the right direction and we support the positive relationship between the two presidents, we are concerned that these announced arms cuts reflect neither the urgency nor comprehensiveness required to meet the standards set forth in the 13 Practical Steps of the 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, or to prevent nuclear accidents from occurring or nuclear weapons from falling into the hands of terrorists. Above all, what was required was a recognition that nuclear weapons do not bring security, and nuclear deterrence is irrelevant to the current world crisis.
President Putin had previously offered reductions to 1,500 strategic nuclear weapons or even lower in START III negotiations. Putin aides had let it be known that this number could go down to 1,000 or possibly lower. The US plan, therefore, did not even go to a level previously proposed by the Russians. Under the current Bush-Putin plan, there will still be enough strategic nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the two countries at the end of ten years to destroy civilization and life as we know it.
The proposed new warhead numbers contradict President Bush’s claim that Russia is no longer an enemy, and suggest that this new proposal is a rationalization and modernization of nuclear deterrence rather than a serious move towards meeting the legal obligations of the two countries to eliminate nuclear arsenals. Overall, the proposed cuts reflect an intention of the two countries to continue to rely upon their nuclear arsenals for security for the foreseeable future.
While the earlier Russian proposals did not specify a timeframe, ten years lacks a sense of urgency, particularly in the context that more than ten years have already passed since the end of the Cold War. The two countries had initially agreed in the START II Treaty to reduce their arsenals to 3,500 strategic nuclear weapons each by January 1, 2003. This date was set back to December 31, 2007 by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin. Now Presidents Bush and Putin plan to take an additional four years to lower the arsenals to 2,200 to 1,700 strategic nuclear weapons.
Unilateral cuts are not bolstered by binding agreements. What is unilaterally cut may later be unilaterally reversed. This is not in keeping with the principle of irreversibility set forth by the parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Under the current plan, it is likely that the plutonium pits of the weapons will be retained by each country for potential future use should a decision be made to re-arm.
Unilateral cuts also tend to undermine the importance of international law by circumventing the process of reaching multinational agreements. US and Russian leadership is needed in bolstering multinational arms control efforts, such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Entry-into-Force Conference, which the US recently boycotted.
President Putin indicated that he would prefer that any agreement between the two countries on nuclear arms reductions be put in writing. We agree that this would be preferable in that the disarmament process would be strengthened by the inclusion of provisions ensuring irreversibility, transparency and verification.
The two presidents failed to address the alert status of their nuclear arsenals. Presently each country has some 2,250 strategic nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert, ready to be fired on a few minutes’ notice. This state of high alert makes no sense more than ten years after the end of the Cold War. It increases the possibility of an accidental nuclear war such as almost occurred in January 1995 when a US-Norwegian satellite launch was initially mistaken by the Russians as an attack on their country. It would be prudent for the two countries to eliminate their policies of launch-on warning to reduce the danger of launching to an accidental or unauthorized attack.
The two presidents also failed to address tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons. These are the weapons most likely to be used in a war and are also the most likely to fall into the hands of terrorists. Not to address this issue leaves open the possibility that either country might be tempted to cross the nuclear threshold and use tactical nuclear weapons, at a time when all countries should be working to delegitimize them and thereby help prevent further proliferation.
President Bush had hoped to reach an agreement with President Putin to amend the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty to allow for testing of sea-based, air-based and space-based missile defense systems. President Putin, however, held firm on the importance of maintaining this treaty as “a cornerstone of strategic stability.”
President Putin’s view of this treaty is in keeping with that of the international community as reflected in the Final Document of the 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, which called for “preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons.”
We would suggest that Presidents Bush and Putin revisit nuclear disarmament issues in a broader framework when they next meet in Moscow in March 2002. Specifically, we recommend the following:

1. In preparation for their Moscow meeting, they make a thorough review of the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty with particular emphasis on the 13 Practical Steps set forth therein.
2. Strategic arms reductions be approached with a far greater sense of urgency, and that this urgency be communicated to the public by the two presidents.
3. Strategic arms reductions be set forth in a START III Treaty with provisions for verification, transparency and irreversibility.
4. The alert status of nuclear arsenals and launch policies be placed on the agenda with the goals of taking all nuclear weapons off of high alert status and ending launch-on-warning policies.
5. Tactical nuclear weapons be placed on the agenda with the goal of eliminating these weapons altogether.
6. The ABM Treaty be maintained and reaffirmed as “a cornerstone of strategic stability.”
7. An inventory be established and maintained of all nuclear weapons and fissile materials globally, beginning with accountings of all US and Russian nuclear weapons and materials.
8. The above inventory be used to strengthen safeguard and disposal procedures to prevent nuclear weapons and fissile materials from falling into unauthorized hands.
9. The two presidents give their support to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and its ratification by all states needed for its entry into force.
10. The two presidents give leadership to convening a multilateral conference for realizing the “unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear- weapons States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals.”

Union of Concerned Scientists Working Paper

An Assessment of the Intercept Test Program of the Ground-Based Midcourse National Missile Defense System

Lisbeth Gronlund, David Wright, and Stephen Young
30 November 2001

In this working paper we examine the first four intercept tests of the ground-based midcourse national missile defense system being developed by the United States, as well as plans for the fifth test. We pay particular attention to the controversial role that the C-band beacon on the warhead played in the recent tests.
The most basic of all the functions that the missile defense system must perform is "hit-to-kill" -- the kill vehicle must be able to maneuver to intercept the mock warhead at high closing speeds. But while the past intercept tests have demonstrated hit-to-kill, they have not done so under conditions that are operationally realistic.
We find that the current test program is still in its infancy, and that the United States remains years away from having enough information to make an informed decision on the deployment of even a limited nationwide missile defense system.
Following the previous intercept test in July 2001, which was successful, some missile defense supporters argued that this test demonstrated that the technology was ready to be deployed. It is therefore important to put the current test program in the proper context by describing its limitations and artificialities. While these limitations may be appropriate for a program at this early stage of development, they mean that the tests say little about the ability of the system to operate under realistic conditions.
All four of the previous intercept tests have been essentially repeats of one another, but with additional components included in the later tests. In each case, the trajectories of the target missile and of the interceptor missile were the same, the target complex deployed was the same, the intercept point was the same, and the test took place at the same time of day. The upcoming test will be a repeat of the previous one.
One of the key tasks that a defense system will have to perform is to distinguish the warhead from decoys and other objects. The tests have included a balloon decoy as well as a mock warhead, and the system has been credited with successfully discriminating the warhead. However, the physical appearances of the objects used in the tests have been very different from one another as measured by the various defense sensors. Moreover, in all cases, the defense has been given a priori information about the expected appearance of the different objects in advance of the test, an advantage the United States is unlikely to have in a real attack. Thus, the intercept tests reveal very little about the discrimination capabilities of the system.
As a result, it is clear that the tests to date and the upcoming test are mainly focused on the "endgame" of the full intercept process-on whether the kill vehicle can successfully home on a target that it can readily identify (or has been identified for it).
But an examination of the tests shows that even this goal has not been met. Hit-to-kill has been demonstrated, but not under conditions that are operationally relevant.
One of the most relevant parameters for exo-atmospheric hit-to-kill is the closing speed between the kill vehicle and the target. Despite this, the intercepts have all occurred at closing speeds that are much lower -- by up to a factor of two-than would be expected for an operational system. This artificiality is compounded by a second one: based on data sent by the C-band beacon or GPS receiver on the mock warhead, the kill vehicles have been launched on a trajectory that is headed essentially straight at the mock warhead. As a result, the kill vehicle does not have to maneuver much to home on the mock warhead and intercept it. In a real attack, the kill vehicle might need to maneuver far more to home on the target, especially if the defense radars had not succeeded in discriminating the warhead from the other objects.
The primary reason for the artificially low closing speeds is that all these tests have used a two-stage surrogate booster in place of the planned three-stage booster for the interceptor. The development of the booster has fallen behind schedule, and is not expected to be ready for use in the intercept tests until at least a year from now. However, it is not clear why BMDO has chosen to use a two-stage surrogate booster rather than a faster three-stage booster. A three-stage booster is used to launch the mock warhead in the tests.
In addition to using a three-stage booster to launch the kill vehicle, the Bush administration should take several other steps to make the test program more realistic and its results more meaningful. These include testing against more realistic decoys and other countermeasures, conducting tests in which the defense does not have full a priori knowledge about the test conditions, and testing under a much wider range of conditions. All of these measures can be implemented within the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which permits the ground-based midcourse system to be fully tested.
The report concludes by considering the planned test program, in which 20 more intercept tests are scheduled by the end of 2006, for a total of 24 development tests. Even if this ambitious schedule can be met, operational testing would not begin until 2007. Because initial operational testing would need to be concluded prior to making a well-informed deployment decision, the United States will not be in a position to make a deployment decision about the ground-based midcourse system until 2008 at the earliest.

New York Times December 11, 2001
by PATRICK E. TYLER

U.S. and Russia to Complete Talks on an Arms Control Pact

MOSCOW, Dec. 10 - Russia and the United States said today that they had agreed to complete negotiations on a new strategic arms control accord that could codify a significant reduction in offensive weapons - to about 2,000 weapons each - even if they do not reach agreement on missile defenses.
After meeting with President Vladimir V. Putin, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell said for the first time that the accord might take the form of a treaty, something the Bush administration has resisted in its quest to act unilaterally in structuring the American nuclear arsenal for the future.
Secretary Powell and the Russian foreign minister, Igor S. Ivanov, said at a Kremlin news conference that they were under instructions from both presidents to prepare the arms control accord and have it ready for signing when President Bush makes a state visit to Moscow in the middle of next year.
Both Secretary Powell and Mr. Ivanov agreed, by contrast, that they had made no progress on the thorny issue of missile defenses as the United States continues to press forward with plans for a series of tests next spring that would violate the terms of the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty.
The envisioned accord on reducing nuclear arms would include significant provisions borrowed from the Start I and Start II treaties to ensure that each side was informed of the capabilities and deployments of the other side's nuclear forces, Secretary Powell said.
“Both of our presidents have charged us to finish this work as soon as possible,” Secretary Powell said, “and find ways to formalize this agreement at lower levels of strategic offensive numbers and to try to get the work concluded in time” for a Moscow summit.
“Both of us recognize the need for there to be a codification of the new levels, and we will be discussing the form that will take,”he added. “It might be the form of a treaty or some other way of codifying it.”
Mr. Ivanov echoed those remarks, saying, “There is an understanding expressed by both sides that these reductions need to be imported into some treaty formulation and here in the negotiations, we will decide which form it will take.”
Last month, after Mr. Putin and Mr. Bush met in Crawford, Tex., Condoleezza Rice, the national security adviser, said pointedly that while the Russians had spoken of the need for a treaty, the American side had not.
Secretary Powell's remarks today suggested that a treaty might be necessary if any new accord that set limits on the size of the nuclear arsenals was to extend beyond the term in office of both leaders.
The announcement today appeared to affirm that Mr. Bush and Mr. Putin have moved well beyond the testy oratory that characterized the opening months of the Bush administration.
Moreover, Mr. Bush appears to have modified his initial approach to arms control after developing a personal relationship with Mr. Putin, a relationship that has been bolstered by cooperation with the Russians after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.
In the meetings in Moscow today, Secretary Powell said he expected to receive a detailed description from the Russians of strategic arms reductions Moscow was willing to make. The United States has said it will reduce its arsenal of about 6,000 warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200.
Mr. Putin has spoken of his desire to go as low as 1,500 warheads, which would save Moscow from having to make major investments in new strategic missiles to replace the Soviet-era multiple-warhead rockets reaching the end of their service life in the next decade.
A State Department official said that the Russians did not provide a numerical breakdown on how they planned to reduce their offensive nuclear forces today.
“Maybe they are still editing the draft," the official said, adding, "It is up to them to announce it when they want to but I don't think we have any concern about that.” The administration knows, he said, that the numbers are going to be in the ballpark of the American reductions.
A State Department official traveling with Secretary Powell said the agreement on reductions in offensive weapons could go forward despite the deadlock over missile defenses.
The official indicated that Russian officials wanted the United States to engage in detailed discussions on each level of missile-defense testing, something that Washington fears would amount to giving Moscow a veto over tests if the Kremlin deems a particular test would violate, even nullify, the ABM treaty.
“We have always been willing to explain our testing program,” the State Department official said, adding, “That is different than giving them approval for any particular test.”
Mr. Ivanov said today that Russia “has never put any prerequisites or conditions with regard to the ABM treaty,” which he said still represented “the key element of the whole treaty system of providing strategic stability in the world.”
The Russian view that the ABM treaty is the cornerstone of strategic arms control is largely shared by Washington's allies in Europe.
While in Moscow, Secretary Powell also met with leaders of the Russian Parliament, whose members wanted to know whether the intensification of Russian-American relations during the antiterror campaign in Afghanistan would disappear after the United States achieved its objectives.
An American official who was present quoted Secretary Powell as replying that "what happened on Sept. 11 didn't start something, it accelerated" an improvement in relations that “President Bush wants to make permanent.”
In his talks with Mr. Ivanov, Secretary Powell raised the sensitive issue of Russia's arms sales to Iran and Moscow's assistance in building the first nuclear power station in Iran at Bushehr.
The State Department official said Washington acknowledged Russia's right to make certain conventional arms sales to Iran, but was concerned about sales of sophisticated weaponry and nuclear assistance that might advance Iran's secret efforts to build nuclear weapons.
“Our problem is that the legitimate nuclear programs have been used as a cover for a whole lot of other transfers and training that we think is dangerous in a country that we see is trying to develop nuclear weapons,” the American official said.