BIJLAGE III: NAVO NUCLEAR BELEID
TACTISCHE KERNWAPENS
Lijst met
vragen en antwoorden naar aanleiding van vaststelling van de begroting
van de uitgaven en de ontvangsten van het Ministerie van Buitenlandse
zaken (V) voor het jaar 2002, nr. 12
100
Welke Nederlandse initiatieven worden opgenomen met betrekking tot een
dialoog met Rusland over substrategische wapensystemen?
Met verwijzing naar de laatste twee brieven aangaand
ede situatie in het Midden Oosten (kamerstuk nummer 23 432 nr 40 en 41)
en het Algemeen Overleg met de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken hierover
op 5 september jl. geldt dat de aanbevelingen van het Mitchell-rapport
nog altijd uitgangspunt vormen van de inspanningen van de internationale
gemeenschap om te helpen de geweldspiraal te doorbreken en de partijen
tot serieuze vredesonderhandelingen te bewegen. De Nederlandse o\inspanningen
die velerlei vormen aannemen van bilaterale acties tot interventies in
EU-kader en andere multilaterale organen, maken derhalve onderdeel uit
van een gemeenschappelijke inzet.
Lijst met vragen en antwoorden over de Militaire Inlichtingen
Dienst naar aanleiding van de vaststelling van de begroting van de uitgaven
en de ontvangsten van het Ministerie van Defensie (X) voor het jaar 2002,
28 000 X, nr. 3
30
Is er iets bekend van Russische plannen om een nieuwe generatie tactische
wapens te ontwikkelen?
Op het gebied van de nieuwe generatie tactische kernwapens
valt op dit moment niets te melden.
Vaststelling
van de begroting van de uitgaven en de ontvangsten van het Ministerie
van Defensie (X) voor het jaar 2002, 28 000 X, Nr. 19
Brief van de Minister van Defensie
Aan de Voorzitter van de Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal
Den Haag, 9 november 2001
Tijdens de behandeling van de defensiebegroting voor
het jaar 2002 heeft het lid Van Bommel (SP) een motie ingediend die de
regering oproept de gemeente Uden ten behoeve van het rampenbestrijdingsplan
van die gemeente alle relevante gegevens over de mogelijke aanwezigheid
van kernwapens op de luchtmachtbasis Volkel te verstrekken (28 000 X,
nr. 14).
In mijn reactie heb ik toegezegd hierover contact op te nemen met mijn
collega van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksaangelegenheden en u hierover
mede namens mijn collega nader in te lichten. Uit overleg met het ministerie
van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksaangelegenheden is gebleken dat vertegenwoordigers
van dat ministerie op 30 oktober jl. inmiddels uitvoerig over bovengenoemd
onderwerp hebben gesproken met de burgemeester en de brandweercommandant
van de gemeente Uden. De burgemeester en de brandweercommandant is erop
gewezen dat zij bij het opstellen van hun rampenbestrijdingsplan gebruik
kunnen maken van het «Nationaal Plan Kernongevallenbestrijding»
(1989) en de «Leidraad Kernongevallenbestrijding», die per
circulaire van 23 juni 1993 is verzonden aan gemeentelijke en provinciale
besturen en tevens een paragraaf bevat met richtlijnen voor het omgaan
met militaire nucleaire ongevallen. Voorts heeft de commandant van de
luchtmachtbasis Volkel de gemeente in 1997 aanvullende gegevens ter beschikking
gesteld ten behoeve van het rampenbestrijdingsplan voor deze basis. Op
dit ogenblik wordt, onder leiding van het ministerie van VROM, het «Nationaal
Plan Kernongevallenbestrijding» bovendien geactualiseerd, waarbij
tevens aandacht wordt besteed aan de mogelijkheid van nucleaire (luchtvaart)ongevallen
en de interactie tussen civiele en militaire autoriteiten.
Aangezien op de luchtmachtbasis Volkel geplaatste F-16 «dual capable»
jachtvliegtuigen van de Koninklijke luchtmacht zijn belast met de kernwapentaak,
zullen de omliggende gemeenten in hun rampenbestrijdingsplannen hoe dan
ook rekening moeten houden met militaire nucleaire ongevallen. Daarvoor
beschikt de lokale overheid al over voldoende gegevens. Dit staat los
van het antwoord op de vraag of er inderdaad kernwapens liggen opgeslagen.
Daarover kunnen, zoals bekend, geen mededelingen worden gedaan op grond
van het vigerende Navo-voorlichtingsbeleid.
In zijn gesprek met vertegenwoordigers van het ministerie van Binnenlandse
Zaken en Koninkrijksaangelegenheden heeft de burgemeester van Uden zijn
tevredenheid uitgesproken over de hem verstrekte informatie, de daarbij
gemaakte afspraken en de verdere stappen die de regering neemt ten aanzien
van het «Nationaal Plan Kernongevallenbestrijding». De door
het lid Van Bommel ingediende motie is daardoor naar mijn oordeel overbodig
geworden.
De Minister van Defensie,
F. H. G. de Grave
Final
Communiqué Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council 6
December 2001
Press release (excerpt): M-NAC-2(2001)158
15.
We reaffirm that the Alliance must have the capability to defend appropriately
and effectively against the threats that the proliferation of Weapons
of Mass Destruction and their means of delivery can pose. Our response
should be consistent with the indivisibility of Allied security. We will
continue to work together to adapt the Alliances comprehensive strategy
to meet these challenges, adopting an appropriate mix of political and
defence efforts. In this context, the Alliances policy of support
for arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation will continue to play
a major role in the achievement of the Alliances security objectives.
The Alliance stresses the importance of abiding by and strengthening existing
multilateral non-proliferation and export control regimes and international
arms control and disarmament accords. We will continue to actively contribute
to the development of agreements and measures in this field and pursue
further arms reductions, transparency and confidence-building. We reaffirm
our determination to contribute to the implementation of the conclusions
of the 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference and will work towards
a successful outcome of the upcoming review. We also support ongoing efforts
to achieve an International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile
Proliferation before the end of 2002. Non-proliferation, arms control
and disarmament along with deterrence and defence play an essential role
in enhancing security against these new threats and challenges. In this
context, the role that missile defence could play is being actively considered
as we continue our consultations with the United States on this issue.
In this regard, we welcome continued work at NATO on theatre missile defence.
Uncovered Nukes: A fact
sheet on tactical nuclear weapons
ISSUE BRIEF Volume 5, Number 19, November 30, 2001
By Alistair Millar and Brian Alexander, Fourth Freedom
Forum, Washington DC
The November summit between President Bush and his
Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin yielded a highly anticipated announcement
on reductions in operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to
a level between 1,700 and 2,200. Reductions in strategic nuclear weapons
are a welcome, much needed step in what President Bush has called, "moving
beyond the Cold War." However, these reductions are unlikely to include
between 4,000 and 15,000 tactical nuclear weapons, mainly in the Russian
arsenal.
Tactical nuclear weapons have never been the subject of a formal arms
control effort, despite that these 'uncovered nukes' pose dangers equal
to or above those of strategic nukes. US and Russian Presidential initiative
undertaken in 1991 and 1992 have yielded some reductions, but have not
done enough to address the dangers posed by these weapons.
Unless the United States and Russia make stronger commitments to address
tactical nuclear weapons, cold war-era nuclear dangers will remain a present
and growing threat to international peace and security. Efforts by the
United States and Russia could serve as the basis for broader, multilateral
initiatives on these weapons.
Unique Dangers
'Tactical nuclear weapons' (TNWs) include a broad
array of atomic explosive devices, ranging from so-called nuclear landmines
and nuclear artillery shells to air-dropped or missile launched nuclear
warheads. TNW yields range from relatively low (0.1 kiloton (KT)) to higher
than the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (10-15 KT, upwards to
1 megaton). Even a very low-yield atomic blast would create highly damaging
effects, above and beyond what a conventional explosion of the same size
could produce. Furthermore, because TNWs are often smaller in size, and
because of the manner which they are safeguarded and deployed, TNW are
more susceptible to theft and unauthorized or accidental use. Misuse of
a TNW would cause unprecedented destruction, and potentially lead to a
broader nuclear exchange.
The TNW arsenal of the United States is estimated to be numbered at 1,670
warheads. These are stored mainly at facilities in the US mainland, but
150-200 US TNW are deployed across eight bases in Europe. Estimating the
Russian arsenal is more complicated. There are numerous conflicting accounts,
and serious doubt about whether the Russians themselves even know the
total number of TNW they have. The most recent estimate of the Russian
TNW arsenal is around 3,590 deployed weapons, but when estimates of warheads
stored or slated for dismantlement are taken into account, these estimates
grow to as high as 15,000. Without greater international attention toward
controlling these arsenals, these weapons, or their components, could
fall into the hands of nuclear aspirant states or non-state actors such
as terror networks.
TNW and the War on Terror
The rise of international terrorism presents a particularly
grave and compelling reason to develop an international regime to monitor
and control, the presence of TNWs. Because they may be relatively small
and portable -particularly but not exclusively in the case of so-called
"suitcase" bombs or atomic demolition munitions-TNWs are easier
to transport and more vulnerable to theft than other nuclear weapons.
The Russian TNW arsenal poses particular problems. Concerns about the
theft of Russian nuclear weapons or material or the contracting out of
nuclear expertise have been paramount since the end of the cold war. Exacerbating
these worries is the possibility of unemployed or underpaid nuclear technicians,
the fallout of a crumbling Russian economy, who may be tempted to illegally
sell nuclear matter to terrorist groups and renegade states. Poorly guarded
borders and sloppy customs procedures add to this problem.
In the hands of nuclear terrorists, tactical nuclear weapons could wreak
havoc and destruction far-surpassing anything witnessed in New York on
September 11. The initial damage could claim tens of thousands of lives
and destroy many square miles of property. The area and its surroundings
would be rendered uninhabitable by nuclear contamination lasting decades.
After-effects of radiation exposure would manifest themselves in victims
across a broad geographic area for years and years to come. At this ground
zero, there would be no bucket-brigades, no reasonable talk of rebuilding.
Intelligence experts note that terrorist organizations already have attempted
to acquire these weapons. Osama bin Laden claims to possess nuclear weapons,
and has threatened to use them against the United States. Although claims
of Al Qaeda's possession nuclear weapons are unconfirmed, President Bush,
has warned that "They are seeking chemical, biological and nuclear
weapons. The possibility of terror organizations acquiring TNW or any
nuclear materials remains a very real possibility. This underscores the
importance of international efforts to control and reduce this class of
weapon through a successful initiative on TNWs.
Beware the Nuclear Option in the War on Terror
The U.S. response to the terror attacks on New York
and Washington has led to many calls for the use of tactical nuclear weapons
against terrorist bases, or the countries that may harbor them. Use of
such weapons in the battle against terrorist groups is a bad idea. It
would weaken efforts to control these weapons while simultaneously setting
a dangerous precedent for their use by state and nonstate actors. Additionally,
any use of such weapons would immediately challenge the maintenance of
a successful international coalition against terrorists, and threaten
contamination of civilians within the target state and neighboring states.
Time for Controls & Reduction, Not Use or Development
Existing tactical nuclear arsenals, in addition to
dangers of leakage into the wrong hands, also undermine nonproliferation
efforts supported by the United States, Russia and the other more than
180 signers of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Worse, in the United
States and Russia there are discussions in the United States and Russia
about developing new classes of these weapons. Such development would
smack up against the intentions of NPT and give strong incentive for other
nations to develop their own arsenals.
As Presidents Bush and Putin appear on the threshold of unprecedented
progress in strategic nuclear reductions, to truly achieve nuclear security
in the post-cold war era, they must address tactical nuclear weapons.
This includes not only remnant arsenals from the Soviet Union, but also
calls in the United States and Russia for the possible development of
new classes of these weapons.
Paradoxically, the war on terrorism provides an opportunity to greatly
improve long-term prospects for international peace. The US and Russia
have begun a new level of cooperation and dialogue. Europe and the United
States have never been closer. US sanctions against Pakistan have been
dropped. Even China's support appears greater than in the past.
President Bush has supported his nuclear reduction proposal by claiming
"It's a new day." Indeed, as September 11 has demonstrated,
it's a new world. Responding to this new world requires attending to not
only the threats that linger from the past, but addressing those that
face us now and in the immediate future. Tactical nuclear weapons reductions
and controls are an essential element of meeting this challenge.
What Should Be Done Now
With these concerns about the dangers of TNW in mind,
along with the climate of cooperation that has emerged, particularly in
light of the war on terror, the United States and Russia are encouraged
to do the following to address the dangers of TNW:
- Build upon the START (Strategic Arms Reductions
Treaty) process. The START framework can serve as a basis to ensure
control with adequate verification and monitoring. As it appears cooperation
between the Untied States and Russia is improving, particularly in the
wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, it would make sense
in the context of START III and current discussions to address TNWs.
- Go beyond unilateral and bilateral approaches
to ensure stability and third-party participation of other nations.
There is a need for mechanisms, such as the Cooperative Threat Reduction,
(Nunn-Lugar) intiative, that would enable the United States, Russia,
and partner nations to implement common decisions. Adding the effective
involvement of an official representative from one or more international
organizations to relevant fora, such as NATO's Permanent Joint Council,
would help to assure more stability and accountability, and provide
a sustainable element that could better withstand difficulties in bilateral
relations;
- Withdraw tactical nuclear weapons from Europe
to address longstanding Russian security concerns, particularly as NATO
continues to expand eastward, in exchange for a pledge from Moscow that
it will share data on the status and location of its TNW arsenal, and
download and significantly reduce its forward deployed tactical nuclear
weapons;
- Proceed with TNW disarmament by category in a
step-by-step approach. It would be worth pursuing a global limit on
specific types of weapons, if done in conjunction with a prohibition
on the development and deployment of all redesigned or new models of
tactical nuclear weapons.
For an in-depth account of the dangers of tactical
nuclear weapons, and steps which can be taken to address them, see the
new report by the Fourth Freedom Forum, "Uncovered Nukes: Tactical
Nuclear Weapons and the Challenge of Arms Control", available at
www.fourthfreedom.org.
The Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers is a non-partisan alliance of
14 of the nations leading nuclear arms control non-proliferation
organizations working for a practical, step-by-step program to reduce
the dangers of weapons of mass destruction.
** The views and analysis in this paper do not necessarily
reflect those of every member of the Coalition.
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