|
BIJLAGE IV: INTERNATIONALE VERDRAGEN EN
DE VERENIGDE NATIES
Non-Proliferatie Verdrag
28 000 V Vaststelling van
de begroting van de uitgaven en de ontvangsten van het Ministerie van
Buitenlandse Zaken (V) voor het jaar 2002
Nr. 2 MEMORIE VAN TOELICHTING
[…]
Het tegengaan van proliferatie van massavernietigingswapens
[…]
In 2002 vindt de eerste bijeenkomst plaats van de voorbereidende vergadering
van de voor 2005 geplande NPV-toetsingsconferentie. De regering zal zich
daarbij inzetten voor een goede uitvoeringsrapportage en voor de totstandkoming
van duidelijke afspraken over de verdere uitvoering van het actieprogramma
van de vorige toetsingsconferentie in 2000. Voorts streeft de regering
naar de inwerkingtreding van het kernstopverdrag, tijdig voor de NPV-toetsingsconferentie
in 2005, en naar een begin van onderhandelingen over een verdrag ter stopzetting
van de productie van splijtstoffen voor kernwapens.
[…]
 
UN News Centre
New York, 11 November 2001
Opening remarks of Kofi Annan to the Conference on
Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty (CTBT)
Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,
Thank you all for coming to this Conference, which I have convened at
the request of a majority of the 84 States that have already ratified
the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
If anyone thinks that that Treaty, or this Conference, have been overshadowed
or marginalized by the events of 11 September and their aftermath, I hope
they will think again.
Those events should have made it clear to everyone that we cannot afford
further proliferation of nuclear weapons. Nor can we afford to lose momentum
in efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons from the world's arsenals. We
must do everything we can to reduce the risk of such weapons falling into
the hands of terrorists.
This Treaty is a crucial element in the non-proliferation regime. The
longer we delay its entry into force, the greater the risk that nuclear
testing will resume -- and that in turn would make non-proliferation much
harder to sustain.
As you know, the Treaty names 44 States whose ratification is required
for it to enter into force. Thirty-one of those have ratified it so far.
The main purpose of this Conference is to find ways of encouraging the
remaining States to sign and ratify the Treaty, in particular those 13
needed for it to enter into force.
Why should this be so difficult?
Many of those States have for years voiced their support for global nuclear
disarmament.
Many of them are States which themselves worked long and hard to conclude
the Treaty.
Now it is within their power to bring it into force.
I implore them to do so, and I urge all of you to focus on finding arguments,
and taking steps, that will allay the doubts still felt in those States.
Dear friends,
We have a precious but fleeting opportunity to render
this troubled world a safer place, free of the threat of nuclear weapons.
We must not let it pass.
Thank you very much.
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
Conference on Facilitating
the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
2nd Meeting (PM)
DC/2817 11 November 2001
Nuclear-weapon use by terrorists, ‘chain of setbacks’
in disarmament among issues highlighted in Test-Ban-Treaty conference
[…]
Statements
JOSCHKA FISCHER, Minister for Foreign Affairs of
Germany, said that 11 September had dramatically altered the basis of
security policy. Resolute action by the international community was required
to fight terrorism, as were political responses to crises, conflicts and
threats. That was particularly true for efforts to counter the unforeseeable
dangers presented by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Prior to 11 September, the momentum of efforts towards global disarmament,
arms control and non-proliferation seemed to have been lost. The CTBT
must enter into force as soon as possible, because of its practical value
and the vital political signal it would send.
The international community had emerged from the cold war to face a new,
equally dangerous challenge, he said. Part of the response to that challenge
must be a new impetus for disarmament and arms control. It was particularly
important to: avoid new, mainly regional arms races; maintain and enhance
the system of disarmament and non-proliferation treaties; and more effectively
contain the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to State and
non-State actors. The announcement by the President of the United States
that his country would dramatically reduce its nuclear arsenal sent an
important signal concerning the disarmament obligations of the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The ongoing talks between
the United States and the Russian Federation would result in agreements
to drastically reduce their nuclear potential, thereby advancing global
stability and disarmament.
The proliferation of biological and chemical weapons also raised concerns,
he said. The Biological Weapons Convention was a weak point in the international
non-proliferation framework, so priority task of the fifth Review Conference
should be to strengthen the agreement. Consultations there should concentrate
on verification, transparency and practical cooperation. The Chemical
Weapons Convention now faced the challenge of eliminating large Soviet-era
stockpiles. Germany had already spent 25 million euros on those efforts
and was willing to contribute further.
Multilateral treaties did not, he said, solve all problems, but global
non-proliferation could only be successful if all members of the community
of nations were involved. Germany appealed to all States of the group
of 44, whose ratifications were necessary for the CTBT to entry into force,
to ratify now, so that a legally binding framework could replace unilateral
test moratoria. He called on India, Pakistan and the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea to sign and ratify the Treaty promptly, thereby showing
the world that they were serious about international peace and security.
Two nuclear-weapon States, the United States and China, should ratify
the CTBT and help it achieve universality.
[…]
JACK STRAW, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of
the United Kingdom, said that some 44 per cent of United Nations Member
States had signed and ratified the CTBT. Nearly three quarters of the
annex 2 countries were among them, including the Russian Federation, whose
ratification since the last Article XIV Conference was most welcome. The
Conference was taking place in circumstances that were different from
those when the event was first envisaged. The events of 11 September had
cast a long shadow, not just over New York City, but over the whole world,
and had given non-proliferation efforts -- and the Conference, in particular
-- added significance. It showed the unpalatable truth that there were
individuals for whom mass destruction held no horrors. All had an overriding
interest to ensure that weapons of mass destruction did not fall into
the hands of terrorists. The best way to do that was to stem the proliferation
of those weapons in the first place.
On a more optimistic note, however, 11 September marked a rare moment
in world history when the whole world was galvanized to action, he said.
Old cold- war adversaries had emerged as allies in every aspect of the
coalition against terrorism -- military, humanitarian, political and diplomatic.
The emerging consensus must go deeper still. There was now a real chance
to establish a balance of trust. Peace was the best form of security.
He underlined the United Kingdom's commitment to multilateral non-proliferation
regimes and to the Treaty. The cessation of all nuclear explosions would
constitute an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.
For that reason, he added, the CTBT was one of the practical steps noted
under the article VI section of the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review
Conference. The United Kingdom strongly supported that Document, which
called for early entry into force of the test-ban Treaty and a moratorium
on nuclear explosions. He welcomed the fact that several countries, which
had not felt able to ratify the Treaty, were maintaining moratoria on
nuclear explosions.
The United Kingdom had shown its commitment to the Treaty and had not
tested since 1992, he continued. While all countries had the obligation
to work towards universalizing the CTBT, it was a complex task. The work
of the Preparatory Commission and the Provisional Technical Secretariat
were vital to carrying out the necessary practical steps. An international
monitoring system (IMS) was needed to verify the Treaty by detecting nuclear
explosions anywhere in the world. The United Kingdom continued to support
the development of the verification regime. Budgetary commitments to enable
the work to continue must also be met. Most importantly, efforts to bring
the Treaty into force must be stepped up. He urged all States that had
not yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty.
[…]
JOZIAS J. VAN AARTSEN, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands,
said the terrible events of 11 September had made clear that all would
have to work hard to make the world a safer place. The possibility that
terrorists or States that supported them would seek to acquire weapons
of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, could not be excluded.
To prevent them from doing so, effective non-proliferation had acquired
even greater urgency. A well-functioning test-ban Treaty was a key element
in stemming nuclear proliferation. The CTBT constituted a true milestone
on the long and arduous road to put the ‘nuclear genie’ in the
bottle. The norm the Treaty was establishing against testing would only
be fully effective if it entered into force, which was why all States
needed to sign and ratify the CTBT, nuclear-weapon States, in particular.
He called upon China and the United States to ratify the Treaty.
While the twentieth century had been an age of unprecedented advancement,
it had also been an age of conflict and threat on a scale never before
seen, he said. Building on the NPT, tremendous progress had been made
towards the elimination of the most destructive weapons. The existing
nuclear arsenals of the two major nuclear Powers had been substantially
reduced. The process should continue, eventually involving all nuclear-weapon
States. A web of interlocking treaties on nuclear restraint had gradually
been created. The CTBT was an integral part of that web. The test ban
brought closer a key notion of the NPT -- the vision of a nuclear-weapon-free
world. Without it, the entire fabric of global arms control and non-proliferation
would unravel.
The CTBT was a high-tech treaty on global arms control, he said, equipped
with the means to ensure effective verification. An IMS was being put
in place. Once completed, the system would, in fact, extend well beyond
the detection capabilities thought possible by the negotiators of the
Treaty. It would also detect nuclear-test explosions carried out by would-be
proliferators who thought they could escape the non-proliferation regime
by staying outside the CTBT. Once it entered into force, the international
community would have a credible tool to act against proliferators. The
Treaty was also equipped with clear enforcement rules -- any violator
could expect sanctions.
While all nuclear-weapon States were now observing a moratorium on nuclear
tests, that was not enough, he said. A legally binding prohibition on
testing was needed. He regretted that two years after the conclusion of
the CTBT, India and Pakistan had conducted a series of underground nuclear-test
explosions. Both countries had declared their intention to adhere to the
Treaty. Now was the time to do so. He called upon all other States that
had not done so to sign and/or ratify the Treaty at an early date. The
States whose ratification was necessary for the Treaty's entry into force
had a special responsibility. Resumed testing would revive the urge to
refine nuclear weapons and feed a new arms race. It would also encourage
would-be proliferators to pursue the nuclear option. Finally, it would
increase the risk of nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands.
[…]
JAN PETERSEN, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Norway, associated himself
with the statement made on behalf of the European Union. He said that
close international cooperation and a multilateral approach to non-proliferation
and disarmament were essential to reducing the threats posed by weapons
of mass destruction and the terrorist threat to international peace and
security. There was already framework to build on, consisting of multilateral
and bilateral arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation regimes.
A fresh effort was needed to achieve universal membership on key existing
treaties, like the NPT and the CTBT.
The CTBT represented four decades of hard work and dedication to banning
all nuclear tests, he continued. Ensuring the Treaty’s universality
and early entry into force were essential to broader efforts to reduce
and eliminate all nuclear weapon, and must be given the highest priority.
He appealed to all countries that had not yet sign and ratified the Treaty
to do so without delay. He commended the lead taken by France, Russian
Federation and the United Kingdom, as nuclear-weapon States.
Further sustained efforts were need to complete the verification system
of the Treaty, he said. It was necessary to ensure the full funding and
operation of the system in accordance with the requirements set forth
in the Treaty. Norway would continue its dedication to that work and called
for cooperation from all States, ratifiers and signatories, to complete
the verification system. Though self-imposed test moratoria were welcome,
unilateral measures could not take the place of legally binding and fully
verifiable agreements through the signing of international agreements.
In order to succeed in developing regional and global security arrangements,
all States should be bound to the norms established by the international
disarmament and non-proliferation regimes. The early entry into force
of the CTBT and its effective implementation were essential to international
trust, stability and peace.
[…]
RENATO R. MARTINO, Observer for the Holy See, was convinced that it was
time to end all nuclear-weapon testing for all time and supported all
efforts to ensure the entry into force of the CTBT. The Holy See had signed
the CTBT in 1996 and ratified it in July 2001. Nuclear weapons were incompatible
with the peace the Holy See sought for the twenty-first century, he said.
The banning of all tests and the further development of disarmament and
non-proliferation were closely linked and must be achieved as soon as
possible, under effective international controls. He appealed to States
whose ratifications were necessary for the Treaty to enter into force
to do so. The CTBTO had done a tremendous job in giving the world community
confidence that the CTBT would have positive results. The continued success
of the NPT required the entry into force of the CTBT. If the world was
to end the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, then the development
of those weapons must be stopped.
A weakened NPT and inoperable CTBT would force the world to wander through
a dangerous morass of tensions and recriminations, he continued. The security
of all States and people of the world would be severely jeopardized. It
was, therefore, the solemn duty of all States to work actively for peace.
In the wake of the damnable acts of 11 September and the violence that
continues to plague the world, the Conference should be used to renew
the common desire for an enduring peace.
Washington Post
By Colum Lynch Special to The Washington Post
Monday, November 12, 2001; Page A06
U.S. Boycotts Nuclear Test Ban Meeting
Some Delegates at U.N. Session Upset at Latest Snub
of Pact Bush Won't Back
UNITED NATIONS, Nov. 11 -- The Bush administration
today boycotted a U.N. conference convened by Secretary General Kofi Annan
to encourage states to ratify a global treaty banning nuclear weapons
tests.
The decision to sidestep the three-day event represents the latest demonstration
of U.S. opposition to the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which has
been signed by 161 countries, including the United States, and ratified
by 85.
President Bush has made it clear that he will never submit the treaty
to the U.S. Senate for ratification. But some delegates were miffed that
the United States had chosen to snub many of its closest allies at a time
that it is seeking to build a coalition to fight terrorism.
The decision brought an end to weeks of internal debate in the Bush administration
over the wisdom of accepting an invitation to attend the conference as
an observer. "We're not attending," a senior State Department
official said today. "This is a meeting for ratifying states and
we've made it clear we're not going to ratify."
The State Department had initially favored sending a low-level delegation
to avoid a diplomatic confrontation. But the Pentagon hoped that a U.S.
boycott would contribute to hastening the death of the nuclear pact.
The nuclear accord has long been a target of U.S. conservatives. In 1999,
the Republican-controlled Senate voted 51-48 to reject a bid by President
Bill Clinton to ratify the pact. Bush and his advisers have argued that
the treaty is impossible to verify and that it may need to test weapons
to ensure the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear arsenal.
Russia, which has ratified the treaty, warned that the resumption of atomic
tests could restart the nuclear arms race. Igor Sergeev, a special assistant
to President Vladimir Putin, proposed today that the United States consider
new negotiations aimed at improving the ability to verify treaty violations.
Wolfgang Hoffmann, the Mexican chairman of the conference, said that he
expected other countries to follow Russia's lead. "This will obviously
be a road down which many delegations will want to go in order to accommodate
one very important signatory."
Annan told delegates at the opening session this morning that the Sept.
11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington underscored the urgency
of limiting the scope of the world's handful of nuclear weapons programs.
"We have a precious but fleeting opportunity to render this troubled
world a safer place, free of the threat of nuclear weapons," he said.
"We must not let it pass."
Although the treaty has widespread support, its prospects for becoming
law remain dim. The pact can only go into force after it is ratified by
all 44 countries which have the capacity to develop nuclear weapons. Thirteen
of those nations, including the United States, China, India, Pakistan,
North Korea and Israel, have yet to ratify the pact. Washington and New
Dehli, which violated an informal international moratorium on nuclear
tests in 1998, have insisted they will never allow the treaty to become
law.
But Hoffmann said that he was still hopeful that the United States would
one day ratify the pact. "I don't think there is unanimity within
the U.S. administration on these issues," he said. "I think
that if you keep up the pressure on the United States they will come around."
Conference on Facilitating
the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
(New York, 2001)
Final Declaration
- Fully conscious of the responsibilities which
we assumed by signing the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, pursuant
to article XIV of that Treaty, and recalling the Final Declaration adopted
by the Conference, held in Vienna, from 6 to 8 October 1999, we the
ratifiers, together with the States Signatories, met in New York from
11 to 13 November 2001 to promote the entry into force of the Treaty
at the earliest possible date. We welcomed the presence of representatives
of non-signatory States, international organizations and non-governmental
organizations.
- We reaffirmed our strong determination to enhance
international peace and security throughout the world and stressed the
importance of a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable
comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty as a major instrument in the field
of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects. We
reiterated that the cessation of all nuclear-weapon test explosions
and all other nuclear explosions, by constraining the development and
qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development
of advanced new types of nuclear weapons, constitutes an effective measure
of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects and
thus a meaningful step in the realization of a systematic process to
achieve nuclear disarmament. We therefore renewed our commitment to
work for universal ratification of the Treaty, and its early entry into
force as provided for in article XIV.
- We reviewed the overall progress made since the
opening for signature of the Treaty and, in particular, the progress
made after the Conference held in Vienna from 6 to 8 October 1999. We
noted with appreciation the overwhelming support for the Treaty that
has been expressed: the United Nations General Assembly and other multilateral
organs have called for signatures and ratifications of the Treaty as
soon as possible and have urged all States to remain seized of the issue
at the highest political level. We highlighted the importance of the
Treaty and its entry into force for the practical steps for systematic
and progressive efforts towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation,
which were identified in 2000 at international forums dealing with nuclear
disarmament and non-proliferation. We believe that the cessation of
all nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions will
contribute to the accomplishment of those efforts.
- In accordance with the provisions of article XIV
of the Treaty, we examined the extent to which the requirement set out
in paragraph 1 had been met and decided by consensus what measures consistent
with international law may be undertaken to accelerate the ratification
process in order to facilitate the early entry into force of the Treaty.
- Since the Treaty was adopted by the United Nations
General Assembly and opened for signature five years ago, progress has
been made in the ratification process. As of today, 162 States have
signed and 87 States have deposited their instruments of ratification,
an increase of over 70 per cent compared with the number of ratifications
at the time of the Conference held in 1999. Of the 44 States listed
in Annex 2 to the Treaty whose ratification is required for the entry
into force of the Treaty, 41 have signed, and of these, 31 have also
ratified the Treaty. A list of those States is provided in the appendix.
Progress in ratification has been sustained. We welcomed this as evidence
of the strong determination of States not to carry out any nuclear-weapon
test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent
any such nuclear explosion at any place under their jurisdiction or
control.
- Despite the progress made and our strong support
for the Treaty, we noted with concern that it has not entered into force
five years after its opening for signature. We therefore stressed our
determination to strengthen efforts aimed at promoting its entry into
force at the earliest possible date in accordance with the provisions
of the Treaty.
- After the opening for signature of the CTBT,
nuclear explosions were carried out. The countries concerned subsequently
declared that they would not conduct further nuclear explosions and
indicated their willingness not to delay the entry into force of the
Treaty.
- In the light of the CTBT and bearing in mind
its purpose and objectives, we affirm that the conduct of nuclear-weapon
test explosions or any other nuclear explosion constitutes a serious
threat to global efforts towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.
- We call upon all States to maintain a moratorium
on nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions and
underline the importance of signature and ratification of the Treaty.
- We noted with satisfaction the report of the Executive
Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty Organization (CTBTO) to the Conference on progress made by the
Preparatory Commission and its Provisional Technical Secretariat since
November 1996 in fulfilment of the requirement to take all necessary
measures to ensure the effective establishment of the future CTBTO.
- In this connection, we welcomed the momentum
which has been developed by the Preparatory Commission and its Provisional
Technical Secretariat across the Major Programmes of the Commission,
as identified by the Executive Secretary in his report. We also welcomed
the progress in building the global infrastructure for Treaty verification,
including the International Monitoring System, with a view to ensuring
that the verification regime shall be capable of meeting the verification
requirements of the Treaty at entry into force. We further welcomed
the conclusion of a significant number of related agreements and arrangements
with States and with international organizations.
- Convinced of the importance of achieving universal
adherence to the Treaty, welcoming the ratifications of all the States
that have done so since the 1999 Conference, and stressing in particular
the steps required to achieve its early entry into force, as provided
for in article XIV of the Treaty, we:
- Call upon all States that have not yet signed the Treaty to sign
and ratify it as soon as possible and to refrain from acts which
would defeat its object and purpose in the meanwhile;
- Call upon all States that have signed but not yet ratified the
Treaty, in particular those whose ratification is needed for its
entry into force, to accelerate their ratification processes with
a view to early successful conclusion;
- Recall the fact that two States out of three whose ratifications
are needed for the Treaty’s entry into force but which have
not yet signed it have expressed their willingness not to delay
the entry into force of the Treaty, and call upon them to sign and
ratify it as soon as possible;
- Note the fact that one State out of three whose ratifications
are needed for the Treaty’s entry into force but which have
not yet signed it has not expressed its intention towards the Treaty,
and call upon this State to sign and ratify it as soon as possible
so as to facilitate the entry into force of the Treaty;
- Note the ratification by three nuclear-weapon States and call
upon the remaining two to accelerate their ratification processes
with a view to early successful conclusion;
- In pursuit of the early entry into force of the Treaty, undertake
ourselves to use all avenues open to us in conformity with international
law, to encourage further signature and ratification of the Treaty;
and urge all States to sustain the momentum generated by this Conference
by continuing to remain seized of the issue at the highest political
level;
- Agree that ratifying States will select one of their number to
promote cooperation to facilitate the early entry into force of
the Treaty, through informal consultations with all interested countries;
and encourage bilateral, regional and multilateral initiatives aimed
at promoting further signatures and ratification;
- Urge all States to share legal and technical information and advice
in order to facilitate the processes of signature, ratification
and implementation by the States concerned, and upon their request.
We encourage the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty Organization and the Secretary-General of the United Nations
to continue supporting actively these efforts consistent with their
respective mandates;
- Call upon the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty Organization to continue its international cooperation activities
to promote understanding of the Treaty, including by demonstrating
the benefits of the application of verification technologies for
peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty,
in order to further encourage signature and ratification of the
Treaty;
- Reiterate the appeal to all relevant sectors of civil society
to raise awareness of and support for the objectives of the Treaty,
as well as its early entry into force as provided for in article
XIV of the Treaty.
- We reaffirm our commitment to the Treaty’s
basic obligations and our undertaking to refrain from acts which would
defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty pending its entry into force.
- We remain steadfast in our commitment to pursue
the efforts to ensure that the Treaty’s verification regime shall
be capable of meeting the verification requirements of the Treaty at
entry into force, in accordance with the provisions of article IV of
the Treaty. In this context, we will continue to provide the support
required to enable the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization to complete its tasks in the most
efficient and cost-effective way.
- The Conference addressed the issue of possible
future conferences, expressed the determination of its participants
to continue working towards entry into force of the Treaty and took
note of the provisions contained in paragraph 3 of article XIV of the
Treaty.
First Committee – United
Nations General Assembly
Extracts
from September Sessions of the 56th United Nations General Assembly as
it relates to Items under the 1st Committee Agenda
Statement by Ambassador Richard Ryan, Permanent Representative
of Ireland to the United Nations – 24 September 2001:
“[…] International peace and security is indivisible and, because
of this, we share the unease with the Secretary-General regards the current
uncertainties in the existing bilateral and multilateral arms control
agreements. Surely, recent events strengthen rather than diminish the
need for renewed commitment to multilateral negotiations towards legally
binding, irreversible and verifiable disarmament agreements across the
range of immensely destructive weapons in existence today.”
Extracts from
Special Debate on “Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism”
as it relates to Items under the 1st Committee Agenda
Statement by Ambassador Pierre Schori, Permanent
Representative of Sweden to the United Nations – 3 October 2001:
“[…] The tragedy of 11 September has highlighted the need for
intensified efforts at preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and their delivery vehicles. Sweden agrees with the statement
by the Secretary General to the IAEA General Conference a fortnight ago,
that progress in the areas of nuclear non-proliferation is now more important
than ever. Biological, chemical or nuclear weapons must not fall into
the hands of terrorists. The international community must shoulder its
responsibility and find ways to strengthen and ensure compliance with
the Biological and Toxin Weapons Conventions, ensure the effective implementation
of the Chemical Weapons Convention and reinforce the nuclear non-proliferation
regime.”
…
THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS
Statement by: H.E. MR Dirk Jan Van Den Berg, Permanent Representative
of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the United Nations - 1 October 2001
"… The perspective of terrorists obtaining b, however, is even
more terrifying and yet not imaginary. We must therefore multiply our
efforts in the field of non-proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical
weapons. The Netherlands is therefore committed to the early conclusion
of a convention for the suppression of nuclear terrorist acts. We must
ensure that the key treaties relating to weapons of mass destruction are
implemented to the full. Mechanisms for control, surveillance and inspection
as for instance established in the case of the OPCW, are indispensable
elements to ensure non-proliferation."
General
Assembly General Debate: Disarmament and Security References
The 56th General Assembly General Debate was held from
November 10 - 16, 2001 at UN Headquarters in New York City. Below are
selected quotes from the speeches made by Heads of State and Foreign Ministers.
Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs
of Belgium, President of the Council of the European Union, Mr. Louis
Michel
More than ever, disarmament and non proliferation form the cornerstones
of any peace and security structure and must therefore be subject to binding
multilateral norms. It is against this background that we wish to strengthen
non proliferation regimes, promote the rapid entry into force of the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention. We must also combat the proliferation of ballistic missiles
and the illicit trade in light weapons and continue to work for the complete
elimination of antipersonnel mines.
…
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic
of Germany Joschka Fischer
The insidious anthrax attacks since I I September show that the threat
from weapons of mass destruction in terrorist hands, which yesterday seemed
abstract, is today a real and deadly danger. The community of states must
do everything in its power to counter it with a new push for nonproliferation
and global disarmament.
The dangers of dissemination to non-state groups and of regional arms
races require new answers and effective, internationally enforceable criminal
sanctions. In the nuclear field, the commitment contained in the Non-Proliferation
Treaty to complete nuclear disarmament remains crucial. All states are
called upon to participate in the negotiation of an international code
of conduct on ballistic missile proliferation.
…
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, H.E. Ms Anna
Lindh
We must join forces for multilateral disarmament. A world free from weapons
of mass destruction would be a much safer world. Multilateral agreements
contribute to security for the individual. It has produced impressive
results - chemical and biological weapons have been totally banned. Still,
however, many challenges remain. Three years ago, Sweden helped launch
the New Agenda Coalition - a group of states concerned with the lack of
progress in nuclear disarmament, sharing a vision of a nuclear-weapons-free
world. In our case, the initiative was rooted in the firm belief that
both global and national security depends on multilateral frameworks and
platforms.
Last year, the 187 States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty adopted
by consensus a road map towards nuclear disarmament. Based on the unequivocal
undertaking by the nuclear-weapon-states to fully eliminate their nuclear
arsenals, an action plan in twelve steps was agreed. This promising outcome
was confirmed by the General Assembly. All States parties have pledged
to achieve a nuclear-weapons-free world under strict and effective international
control. I strongly urge the four states remaining outside the Treaty,
to sign and ratify it.
We have a number of important instruments to prevent testing, banning
production of weapons material, and for improving verification. The Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, a Fissile Material Cut off Treaty and the Additional
Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards agreement pave the way for the twin objectives
of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Clearly it is now time to
concentrate on their implementation.
The US plans for a strategic missile defence system risk having a negative
impact on disarmament, non-proliferation and the whole NPT process. The
ongoing consultations are welcome, but the outcome is still uncertain.
We strongly believe that new threats of proliferation require a multilateral
response, built on the already existing safety net.
Deep cuts in strategic and tactical nuclear arsenals
are long overdue, and should be accompanied by effective mechanisms of
verification and irreversibility. Such treaty agreements can never be
replaced by unilateral declaration.
Weapons of mass destruction remain a threat to mankind.
Terrorists must not be given the opportunity to threaten us with these
weapons. Now is the time to reinforce efforts to contain proliferation.
1st Committee, October
29, 2001
Statement by H.E. Mr. Chris C. Sanders, Disarmament
Ambassador Head of the Netherlands Delegation to the First Committee.
"The desirability of transparency applies as
much to weapons of mass destruction as it does to conventional weapons.
Multilateral treaties related to weapons o f mass destruction are there,
there will be more, and these treaties provide for their own mechanisms
to ensure transparency in Weapons of Mass Destruction.
We are encouraged by the constructive dialogue that
we have developed with those countries that are not yet in a position
to participate in the UN Register and who can not yet give their support
to this resolution. We will continue to work with them, and let me once
again assure you that the Netherlands continues to work actively to promote
greater transparency in the field of Weapons of Mass Destruction."
UN First Committee
Bulletin
By Jenni Rissanen
ACRONYM - UK
26 October 2001
[…]
Mexico had also planned to table a new resolution on tactical (sub-strategic)
nuclear weapons (TNW). This year marks the tenth anniversary of the unilateral
initiatives on TNW by the United States and Russia. (The United Nations
Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) recently arranged a seminar
to commemorate these initiatives as well as to discuss the need for further
steps) However, Mexico reportedly came under pressure from the United
States and Russia not to introduce the draft. Although some other delegations
had also interest in the topic and possibly a resolution as well, Mexico
decided after consultations with the interested parties not to proceed
but to speak on TNW instead. Delivering a joint statement on behalf of
the New Agenda initiative (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand,
South Africa and Sweden) on Wednesday, October 24, Mexico expressed deep
"concern that the total number of [tactical] nuclear weapons…still
amounts to thousands" and argued that it was "essential to preserve
and to build upon the 1991/1992" initiatives. The New Agenda specifically
called for further reductions, confidence-building measures (CBM) and
"concrete agreed measures" to reduce the operational status
on TNW. A joint statement from Finland and Sweden had addressed the issue
on the previous day. Testifying to the growing interest in TNW, the Netherlands
was also expected to address the subject, joined by Norway and Canada
and possibly other NATO countries. However, it is understood that these
states came under pressure from the United States and decided to withdraw
their statement.
[…]
United Nations
A/C.1/56/L.1/Rev.1
General and complete disarmament: preservation of and
compliance with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile
Systems
Stemming: aangenomen met 82 stemmen voor, 5 tegen
(Albanië, Benin, Israël, Micronesië, Verenigde Staten)
en 62 onthoudingen (Andorra, Argentinië, Australië, Bahamas,
Bahrein, Bangladesh, België, Bolivia, Brazilië, Bulgarije, Canada,
Chili, Denemarken, Dominicaanse Republiek, Duitsland, Estland, Filippijnen,
Finland, Frankrijk, Georgië, Ghana, Grenada, Griekenland, Guatamala,
Hongarije, Ijsland, Italië, Japan, Joegoslavië, Letland, Liechtenstein,
Litouwen, Luxemburg, Macedonië, Malta, Marokko, Mauritius, Monaco,
Kroatië, Nederland, Nieuw-Zeeland, Nicaragua, Noorwegen, Oekraïne,
Oostenrijk, Paraguay, Peru, Polen, Portugal, Roemenië, Samoa, San
Marino, Slovenië, Slowakije, Spanje, Tsjechië, Trinidad &
Tobago, Turkije, Uruguay, Verenigd Koninkrijk, Zuid-Korea, Zweden)
United Nations A/C.l/56/L.35/Rev.1
General Assembly
1 November 2001
Fifty-sixth session
First Committee
Agenda item 74
General and complete disarmament
Japan: revised draft resolution
A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons
The General Assembly,
[…]
- Reaffirms the importance of achieving the universality
of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and calls
upon States not parties to the Treaty to accede to it as non-nuclear-weapon
States without delay and without conditions;
- Also reaffirms the importance for all States
parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to
fulfil their obligations under the Treaty;
- Stresses the central importance of the following
practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement
article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and paragraphs 3 and 4(c)
of the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation
and disarmament of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty:
- The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without
delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutinonal
processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-ban-Treaty as well as a moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test
explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force
of that Treaty;
- The establishment of an ad hoc committee in the Conference on
Disarmament as early as possible during its 2002 session to negotiate
a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively
verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance
with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate
contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament
and non-proliferation objectives, with a view to its conclusion
within five years and, pending its entry into force, a moratorium
on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons;
- The establishment of an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate
to deal with nuclear disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament
as early as possible during its 2002 session in the Context of establishing
a programme of work;
- The inclusion of the principle of irreversibility to apply to
nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and
reduction measures;
- An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States, as agreed
in the 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, to accomplish
the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear
disarmament, to which all States parties to the Non-Proliferation
Treaty are committed under article VI of the Treaty;
- Deep reductions by the Russian Federation and the United States
of America in their strategic offensive arsenals, while placing
great importance on the existing multilateral treaties, with a view
to maintaining and strengthening strategic stability and international
security;
- Steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament
in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the
principle of undiminished security for all:
- Further efforts by all the nuclear-weapon States to continue
to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally;
- Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard
to their nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation
of agreements pursuant to article VI of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty and as voluntary confidence-building measures to support
further progress on nuclear disarmament;
- The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based
on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear
arms reduction and disarmament process;
- Concrete agreed measures to reduce further the operational
status of nuclear weapons systems;
- A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies
to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and
to facilitate the process of their total elimination;
- The engagement, as soon as appropriate, of all nuclear-weapon
Sates in the process leading to the total elimination of their
nuclear weapons;
- Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States
in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under
effective international control;
- Recognizes that the realization of a world free
of nuclear weapons will require further steps, including deeper reductions
in nuclear weapons, by all the nuclear-weapon States in the process
of working towards achieving their elimination;
- Invites the nuclear-weapon States to keep the
States Members of the United Nations duly informed of the progress or
efforts made towards nuclear disarmament;
- Emphasizes the importance of a successful Review
Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
in 2005 as the first Preparatory Committee is convened in 2002;
- Welcomes the ongoing efforts in the dismantlement
of nuclear weapons, notes the importance of the safe and effective management
of the resultant fissile materials and calls for arrangements by all
the nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, the fissile
material designated by each of them as no longer required for military
purposes under the International Atomic Energy Agency or other relevant
international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such
material for peaceful purposes in order to ensure that such material
remains permanently outside military programmes;
- Stresses the importance of further development
of the verification capabilities, including International Atomic Energy
Agency safeguards, that will be required to provide assurance of compliance
with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance
of a nuclear-weapon-free world;
- Calls upon all States to redouble their efforts
to prevent and curb the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of
mass destruction, including their means of delivery, confirming and
strengthening, if necessary, their policies not to transfer equipment,
materials or technology that could contribute to the proliferation of
those weapons;
- Also calls upon all States to maintain the highest
possible standards of security, safe custody, effective control and
physical protection of all materials that could contribute to the proliferation
of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in order, inter alia,
to prevent those materials from falling into the hands of terrorists;
- Welcomes the adoption and stresses the importance
of resolution GC(45)/RES/13 adopted at the International Atomic Energy
Agency General Conference, which recommends that the Director General
of the International Atomic Energy Agency, its Borad of Governors and
member States continue to consider implementing the elements of the
plan of action outlined in resolution GC(44)/RES/19, adopted on 22 September
2000 at the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency,
to promote and facilitate the conclusion and entry into force of safeguards
agreements and additional protocols, and calls for the early and full
implementation of that resolution;
- Encourages the constructive role played by civil
society in promoting nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.
Stemming: aangenomen met 139 stemmen voor, 3 tegen
(India, Micronesië en Verenigde Staten) en 19 onthoudingen (Bhutan,
Brazilië, Burma, China, Cuba, Egypte, Ierland, Iran, Israël,
Mauritius, Mexico, Nieuw-Zeeland, Noord-Korea, Pakistan, Russische Federatie,
San Marino, Wit-Rusland, Zuid-Afrika, Zweden)
United Nations A/C.1/56/L.45
General and complete disarmament: follow-up to the
advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality
of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons
Stemming over operationale paragraaf 1: aangenomen
met 153 stemmen voor, 4 tegen (Frankrijk, Israël, Russische Federatie,
Verenigde Staten) en 2 onthoudingen (Micronesië, Verenigd Koninkrijk).
Stemming over gehele resolutie: aangenomen met 111 stemmen voor, 29 tegen
(Albanië, Andorra, België, Bulgarije, Denemarken, Frankrijk,
Griekenland, Hongarije, IJsland, Israël, Italië, Letland, Litouwen,
Luxemburg, Monaco, Nederland, Noorwegen, Polen, Portugal, Roemenië,
Russische Federatie, Slovenië, Slowakije, Spanje, Tsjechië,
Turkije, Verenigd Koninkrijk, Verenigde Staten) en 21 onthoudingen (Armenië,
Australië, Azerbeidzjan, Bosnië-Herzegovina, Canada, Cyprus,
Estland, Finland, Georgië, Japan, Joegoslavië, Kazakstan, Kroatië,
Liechtenstein, Macedonië, Micronesië, Moldavië, Oostenrijk,
Turkmenistan, Wit-Rusland, Zuid-Korea)
Conference on Disarmament
Annual Session Ends
In Shadow of Attacks in US
By Jenni Rissanen
Disarmament Diplomacy, September 2001
Introduction
The Conference on Disarmament (CD) concluded its
2001 session on September 13 in unusual and sombre circumstances, hearing
numerous interventions condemning the September 11 terrorist attacks in
the United States and expressing deep sympathy with the victims. The CD's
failure to adopt a work programme and commence disarmament negotiations
was overshadowed by the atrocities in New York and Washington. Since negotiating
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Conference has now spent
six years mired in a state of virtual stalemate. This year, however, it
did at least begin to appoint three special coordinators to begin discussions
on updating its agenda, improving its working methods and expanding its
membership. The CD has recommended that these discussions continue next
year.
CD Concludes Work for 2001
Some thirty countries addressed the Conference's
888th plenary on September 13, all vehemently condemning the terrorist
attacks and expressing shock and sorrow over the immense loss of life.
Some delegations argued that the events served as a wake-up call to the
CD to get back to the serious work of making a contribution to world peace
and security.
Many of the statements emphasized that the attacks were directed not only
against the United States but the whole of humanity. CD members pledged
their support in fighting terrorism and bringing the people responsible
for the atrocities to justice. A number of countries also stressed the
importance of multilateral cooperation in combating terrorism and argued
that the CD had a role to play in this fight. Russia condemned the "barbaric
acts" and pointed out - probably in reference to the activities of
the rebels in Chechnya - that it had "repeatedly" appealed for
international cooperation in combating terrorism.1
Japan said the incidents reminded the world of the importance of cooperation,
asserting that effective prevention of such outrages could only be achieved
through joint efforts. The work of the CD was "not irrelevant"
in this context. Japan felt the Conference had to overcome its differences
and get down to work early next year. This would be the "best way...to
pay respect to the victims of the recent incident".2
It agreed with Australia and New Zealand, who held that the attacks "underscore[d]
the opportunities we have missed by not proceeding on the basis of what
we all know to best achievable way forward, namely the Amorim package".
The Amorim proposal, put forward in August 2000 by the then CD President,
Ambassador Celso Amorim of Brazil, sets out the basis of a programme of
work addressing a range of issues including negotiation of a treaty banning
the production of fissile material (fissban).3
Those who stood so steadfastly against this programme, Australia and New
Zealand argued, must surely question "the wisdom of that posture".
The two states further said it would be "unconscionable" for
the Conference to return next year and not get down to work "with
a sense of urgency".4 Switzerland was
of the same opinion, arguing that the CD should "be inspired by those
events" and "draw fresh breath" so that "something
positive [could] come out of these tragic" incidents.5
The CD adopted its yearly report to the UN General Assembly during this
final plenary. CD President, Ambassador Roberto Betancourt Ruales of Ecuador,
made his final remarks before closing the session, stating that efforts
henceforth should be focussed "at a higher political level if we
are to endeavour to bring the [CD] out of its state of paralysis".
He noted that all members "clearly aspire to the attainment of peace
and security", but added that these goals were "being moved
further away...by disturbing phenomena in the strategic panorama and by
the escalation of violence and terror, which has reached an unprecedented
level". He believed the recent attacks on the United States would
lead the Conference to "reflect on the need for the [CD] to establish,
as soon as possible, more effective measures to ensure international peace
and security, thus banishing the spectre of nuclear annihilation".6
[…]
Conclusion
With the exception of a brief period in 1998 when
the CD established an ad hoc committee on fissban, the Conference has
now been effectively unemployed for six long years. In the current context
of general turmoil and uncertainty for multilateral arms control and disarmament
efforts, it seems likely that further barren sessions may lie ahead. As
a result, there is talk - although no one has said this openly - of cutbacks
in CD delegations, including possible withdrawals of disarmament ambassadors,
until a more promising era dawns. Such a downgrading would no doubt provide
evidence of the CD's malaise and undermine the CD, although perhaps not
any more than the current deplorable situation. This malaise, however,
is symptomatic of a deeper illness, the causes of which can neither be
located nor cured at Geneva.
CD Dates for 2002
January 21 to March 29; May 13 to June 28; July 29
to September 13.
Notes and References
- Anatoly Antonov, Minister Plenipotentiary and Deputy
Head of Delegation of Russia to the CD, September 13, 2001. CD/PV.888.
- Seicchiro Noburo, Ambassador of Japan to the CD,
September 13, 2001. CD/PV.888.
- The Amorim proposal (CD/1624, August 24, 2000) recommends
the establishment of four ad hoc committees: one each to "deal
with" nuclear disarmament and PAROS, one to negotiate a ban on
the production of fissile materials, based on a specific mandate agreed
in 1995, and one, with a broader mandate, to negotiate on negative security
assurances (NSA). In addition, it proposes the establishment of special
co-ordinators on anti-personnel mines, transparency in armaments, and
the review of the CD's agenda, the expansion of its membership and its
effective and improved functioning. Amorim attached a draft presidential
declaration to this proposal stressing that the CD is a disarmament
negotiating forum and that the above mandates should be viewed in that
light, and further noting that the CD continues "to be influenced
by and responsive to developments in the international strategic scene
which affect the security interests of its individual members."
- Lesley Luck, Ambassador of Australia to the CD, September
13, 2001. CD/PV.888.
- Christian Faessler, Ambassador of Switzerland to
the CD, September 13, 2001. CD/PV.888.
- Roberto Betancourt Ruales, Ambassador of Ecuador
and CD President, September 13, 2001. CD/PV.888.
[…]
Jenni Rissanen is the Acronym Institute's Analyst attending
the CD in Geneva.
Code of Conduct Against Ballistic
Missile Proliferation
Draft International
Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation
MTCR/HEL/PL/00/CHAIR/01
Helsinki, 10-13 October 2000
Subscribing states agree to respect and implement
the following principles, commitments and other measures in all national
and collective activities relating to rockets and rocket systems.
- Principles:
- Recognition by subscribing states of the increasing security challenges
caused by the ongoing proliferation of ballistic missile systems
capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction and of the need
to prevent and curb such proliferation through international endeavours,
including through this International Code of Conduct against Ballistic
Missile Proliferation;
- Recognition by subscribing states of the importance of strengthening,
and gaining wider adherence to, existing disarmament and non-proliferation
regimes;
- Recognition by subscribing states that adherence to, and full
compliance with, disarmament and non-proliferation norms build confidence
as to the peaceful intentions of states;
- Recognition by subscribing states that participation in this International
Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation is voluntary
and open to all states and that this Code of Conduct will complement
and strengthen existing national, bilateral, regional and multilateral
security arrangements and disarmament and non-proliferation regimes;
- Recognition by subscribing states that all countries alike must
be able to continue to reap the benefits of the utilisation of space
for peaceful purposes in ways that do not contribute to the proliferation
of ballistic missile systems capable of delivering weapons of mass
destruction;
- Recognition by subscribing states that space launch vehicle programmes
should not be used to conceal ballistic missile programmes, considering
that there are similarities between both types of programmes in
terms of technology, facilities and expertise;
- Recognition by subscribing states of the necessity of appropriate
transparency measures on ballistic missile programmes and space
launch vehicle programmes in order to increase confidence and to
promote non-proliferation of ballistic missiles and ballistic missile
technology;
- Confirmation by subscribing states of their commitment to the
United Nations Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of All
States taking into Particular Account the Needs of Developing Countries,
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly (resolution 51/122
of December 13, 1996).
- Commitments:
- Commitment by subscribing states to ratify:
- the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,
- the 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage
Caused by Space Objects, and
- the 1974 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into
Outer Space;
- Commitment by subscribing states to curb the proliferation of
ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction,
and to undertake measures to prevent such proliferation, both at
a global and regional level through multilateral, bilateral and
national endeavours;
- Commitment by subscribing states to exercise maximum possible
restraint in the development, testing and deployment of ballistic
missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, including,
where possible, to reduce national holdings of such missiles, in
the interest of global and regional peace and security;
- Commitment by subscribing states to exercise the necessary vigilance
in the consideration of assistance to space launch vehicle programmes
in any other country so as to prevent contributing to delivery systems
for weapons of mass destruction, considering that such programmes
may be used to conceal ballistic missile programmes;
- Commitment by subscribing states not to support any ballistic
missile programme in countries which might be developing or acquiring
weapons of mass destruction in a way incompatible with the norms
established by the disarmament and non-proliferation treaties.
- c) Incentives:
- Consideration by subscribing states to provide on a voluntary
and case-by-case basis, incentives to subscribing states who choose
to eliminate their existing ballistic missile and/or space launch
vehicle programmes, as appropriate, and who commit to forgo such
programmes in the future.
- Confidence Building Measures:
- Agreement by subscribing states to implement transparency measures
as follows, with an appropriate and sufficient degree of detail,
to increase confidence and to promote non-proliferation of ballistic
missiles:
- With respect to ballistic missile programmes, to:
- make an annual declaration providing an outline of their
ballistic missile policies. Examples of openness in such
declarations might be relevant informtion on ballistic missile
systems and land (test-) launch sites;
- provide annual information on the number and generic class
of ballistic missiles launched during the preceding year,
as declared in conformity with the pre-launch notification
mechanism referred to hereunder in tiret (iii).
- With respect to expendable space launch vehicles, and consistent
with commercial and economic confidentiality principles, to:
- make an annual declaration providing an outline of their
space launch vehicle policies and land (test-) launch sites;
- provide annual information on the number and generic class
of space launch vehicles launched during the preceding year,
as declared in conformity with the pre-launch notification
mechanism referred to hereunder, in tiret (iii);
- consider, on a voluntary basis (including on the degree
of access permitted), inviting international observers to
their land (test-) launch sites.
- With respect to their ballistic missile and space launch vehicle
programmes, to:
- exchange pre-launch notifications on their ballistic missile
and space launch vehicle launches and test flights.
These notifications should include information as the generic
class of the ballistic missile or space launch vehicle,
the planned launch notification window, the launch area,
and the planned direction.
Implementation of the above confidence building measures
will have no bearing on the question of legitimacy of the
rocket programmes concerned in respect of the obligations
and norms deriving from the disarmament and non-proliferation
treaties, and of the principles and commitments set out
in this code.
- Organisational Aspects:
- Agreement by subscribing states to:
- hold regular meetings, annually or as need be, to define,
review and further develop the workings of the International
Code of Conduct;
- establish a mechanism for the exchange of notifications and
other information in the framework of the International Code
of Conduct;
- establish an appropriate mechanism for the voluntary resolution
of questions arising from national declarations, and/or questions
pertaining to space launch vehicle and ballistic missile activity.
|