BIJLAGE IV: INTERNATIONALE VERDRAGEN EN DE VERENIGDE NATIES


Non-Proliferatie Verdrag

28 000 V Vaststelling van de begroting van de uitgaven en de ontvangsten van het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (V) voor het jaar 2002

Nr. 2 MEMORIE VAN TOELICHTING

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Het tegengaan van proliferatie van massavernietigingswapens

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In 2002 vindt de eerste bijeenkomst plaats van de voorbereidende vergadering van de voor 2005 geplande NPV-toetsingsconferentie. De regering zal zich daarbij inzetten voor een goede uitvoeringsrapportage en voor de totstandkoming van duidelijke afspraken over de verdere uitvoering van het actieprogramma van de vorige toetsingsconferentie in 2000. Voorts streeft de regering naar de inwerkingtreding van het kernstopverdrag, tijdig voor de NPV-toetsingsconferentie in 2005, en naar een begin van onderhandelingen over een verdrag ter stopzetting van de productie van splijtstoffen voor kernwapens.
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UN News Centre
New York, 11 November 2001

Opening remarks of Kofi Annan to the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)

Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,
Thank you all for coming to this Conference, which I have convened at the request of a majority of the 84 States that have already ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
If anyone thinks that that Treaty, or this Conference, have been overshadowed or marginalized by the events of 11 September and their aftermath, I hope they will think again.
Those events should have made it clear to everyone that we cannot afford further proliferation of nuclear weapons. Nor can we afford to lose momentum in efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons from the world's arsenals. We must do everything we can to reduce the risk of such weapons falling into the hands of terrorists.
This Treaty is a crucial element in the non-proliferation regime. The longer we delay its entry into force, the greater the risk that nuclear testing will resume -- and that in turn would make non-proliferation much harder to sustain.
As you know, the Treaty names 44 States whose ratification is required for it to enter into force. Thirty-one of those have ratified it so far. The main purpose of this Conference is to find ways of encouraging the remaining States to sign and ratify the Treaty, in particular those 13 needed for it to enter into force.
Why should this be so difficult?
Many of those States have for years voiced their support for global nuclear disarmament.
Many of them are States which themselves worked long and hard to conclude the Treaty.
Now it is within their power to bring it into force.
I implore them to do so, and I urge all of you to focus on finding arguments, and taking steps, that will allay the doubts still felt in those States.
Dear friends,

We have a precious but fleeting opportunity to render this troubled world a safer place, free of the threat of nuclear weapons. We must not let it pass.
Thank you very much.


Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)

Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
2nd Meeting (PM)
DC/2817 11 November 2001

Nuclear-weapon use by terrorists, ‘chain of setbacks’ in disarmament among issues highlighted in Test-Ban-Treaty conference

[…]

Statements

JOSCHKA FISCHER, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany, said that 11 September had dramatically altered the basis of security policy. Resolute action by the international community was required to fight terrorism, as were political responses to crises, conflicts and threats. That was particularly true for efforts to counter the unforeseeable dangers presented by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Prior to 11 September, the momentum of efforts towards global disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation seemed to have been lost. The CTBT must enter into force as soon as possible, because of its practical value and the vital political signal it would send.
The international community had emerged from the cold war to face a new, equally dangerous challenge, he said. Part of the response to that challenge must be a new impetus for disarmament and arms control. It was particularly important to: avoid new, mainly regional arms races; maintain and enhance the system of disarmament and non-proliferation treaties; and more effectively contain the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to State and non-State actors. The announcement by the President of the United States that his country would dramatically reduce its nuclear arsenal sent an important signal concerning the disarmament obligations of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The ongoing talks between the United States and the Russian Federation would result in agreements to drastically reduce their nuclear potential, thereby advancing global stability and disarmament.
The proliferation of biological and chemical weapons also raised concerns, he said. The Biological Weapons Convention was a weak point in the international non-proliferation framework, so priority task of the fifth Review Conference should be to strengthen the agreement. Consultations there should concentrate on verification, transparency and practical cooperation. The Chemical Weapons Convention now faced the challenge of eliminating large Soviet-era stockpiles. Germany had already spent 25 million euros on those efforts and was willing to contribute further.
Multilateral treaties did not, he said, solve all problems, but global non-proliferation could only be successful if all members of the community of nations were involved. Germany appealed to all States of the group of 44, whose ratifications were necessary for the CTBT to entry into force, to ratify now, so that a legally binding framework could replace unilateral test moratoria. He called on India, Pakistan and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to sign and ratify the Treaty promptly, thereby showing the world that they were serious about international peace and security. Two nuclear-weapon States, the United States and China, should ratify the CTBT and help it achieve universality.
[…]
JACK STRAW, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, said that some 44 per cent of United Nations Member States had signed and ratified the CTBT. Nearly three quarters of the annex 2 countries were among them, including the Russian Federation, whose ratification since the last Article XIV Conference was most welcome. The Conference was taking place in circumstances that were different from those when the event was first envisaged. The events of 11 September had cast a long shadow, not just over New York City, but over the whole world, and had given non-proliferation efforts -- and the Conference, in particular -- added significance. It showed the unpalatable truth that there were individuals for whom mass destruction held no horrors. All had an overriding interest to ensure that weapons of mass destruction did not fall into the hands of terrorists. The best way to do that was to stem the proliferation of those weapons in the first place.
On a more optimistic note, however, 11 September marked a rare moment in world history when the whole world was galvanized to action, he said. Old cold- war adversaries had emerged as allies in every aspect of the coalition against terrorism -- military, humanitarian, political and diplomatic. The emerging consensus must go deeper still. There was now a real chance to establish a balance of trust. Peace was the best form of security. He underlined the United Kingdom's commitment to multilateral non-proliferation regimes and to the Treaty. The cessation of all nuclear explosions would constitute an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.
For that reason, he added, the CTBT was one of the practical steps noted under the article VI section of the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. The United Kingdom strongly supported that Document, which called for early entry into force of the test-ban Treaty and a moratorium on nuclear explosions. He welcomed the fact that several countries, which had not felt able to ratify the Treaty, were maintaining moratoria on nuclear explosions.
The United Kingdom had shown its commitment to the Treaty and had not tested since 1992, he continued. While all countries had the obligation to work towards universalizing the CTBT, it was a complex task. The work of the Preparatory Commission and the Provisional Technical Secretariat were vital to carrying out the necessary practical steps. An international monitoring system (IMS) was needed to verify the Treaty by detecting nuclear explosions anywhere in the world. The United Kingdom continued to support the development of the verification regime. Budgetary commitments to enable the work to continue must also be met. Most importantly, efforts to bring the Treaty into force must be stepped up. He urged all States that had not yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty.
[…]
JOZIAS J. VAN AARTSEN, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, said the terrible events of 11 September had made clear that all would have to work hard to make the world a safer place. The possibility that terrorists or States that supported them would seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, could not be excluded. To prevent them from doing so, effective non-proliferation had acquired even greater urgency. A well-functioning test-ban Treaty was a key element in stemming nuclear proliferation. The CTBT constituted a true milestone on the long and arduous road to put the ‘nuclear genie’ in the bottle. The norm the Treaty was establishing against testing would only be fully effective if it entered into force, which was why all States needed to sign and ratify the CTBT, nuclear-weapon States, in particular. He called upon China and the United States to ratify the Treaty.
While the twentieth century had been an age of unprecedented advancement, it had also been an age of conflict and threat on a scale never before seen, he said. Building on the NPT, tremendous progress had been made towards the elimination of the most destructive weapons. The existing nuclear arsenals of the two major nuclear Powers had been substantially reduced. The process should continue, eventually involving all nuclear-weapon States. A web of interlocking treaties on nuclear restraint had gradually been created. The CTBT was an integral part of that web. The test ban brought closer a key notion of the NPT -- the vision of a nuclear-weapon-free world. Without it, the entire fabric of global arms control and non-proliferation would unravel.
The CTBT was a high-tech treaty on global arms control, he said, equipped with the means to ensure effective verification. An IMS was being put in place. Once completed, the system would, in fact, extend well beyond the detection capabilities thought possible by the negotiators of the Treaty. It would also detect nuclear-test explosions carried out by would-be proliferators who thought they could escape the non-proliferation regime by staying outside the CTBT. Once it entered into force, the international community would have a credible tool to act against proliferators. The Treaty was also equipped with clear enforcement rules -- any violator could expect sanctions.
While all nuclear-weapon States were now observing a moratorium on nuclear tests, that was not enough, he said. A legally binding prohibition on testing was needed. He regretted that two years after the conclusion of the CTBT, India and Pakistan had conducted a series of underground nuclear-test explosions. Both countries had declared their intention to adhere to the Treaty. Now was the time to do so. He called upon all other States that had not done so to sign and/or ratify the Treaty at an early date. The States whose ratification was necessary for the Treaty's entry into force had a special responsibility. Resumed testing would revive the urge to refine nuclear weapons and feed a new arms race. It would also encourage would-be proliferators to pursue the nuclear option. Finally, it would increase the risk of nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands.
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JAN PETERSEN, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Norway, associated himself with the statement made on behalf of the European Union. He said that close international cooperation and a multilateral approach to non-proliferation and disarmament were essential to reducing the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction and the terrorist threat to international peace and security. There was already framework to build on, consisting of multilateral and bilateral arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation regimes. A fresh effort was needed to achieve universal membership on key existing treaties, like the NPT and the CTBT.
The CTBT represented four decades of hard work and dedication to banning all nuclear tests, he continued. Ensuring the Treaty’s universality and early entry into force were essential to broader efforts to reduce and eliminate all nuclear weapon, and must be given the highest priority. He appealed to all countries that had not yet sign and ratified the Treaty to do so without delay. He commended the lead taken by France, Russian Federation and the United Kingdom, as nuclear-weapon States.
Further sustained efforts were need to complete the verification system of the Treaty, he said. It was necessary to ensure the full funding and operation of the system in accordance with the requirements set forth in the Treaty. Norway would continue its dedication to that work and called for cooperation from all States, ratifiers and signatories, to complete the verification system. Though self-imposed test moratoria were welcome, unilateral measures could not take the place of legally binding and fully verifiable agreements through the signing of international agreements. In order to succeed in developing regional and global security arrangements, all States should be bound to the norms established by the international disarmament and non-proliferation regimes. The early entry into force of the CTBT and its effective implementation were essential to international trust, stability and peace.
[…]
RENATO R. MARTINO, Observer for the Holy See, was convinced that it was time to end all nuclear-weapon testing for all time and supported all efforts to ensure the entry into force of the CTBT. The Holy See had signed the CTBT in 1996 and ratified it in July 2001. Nuclear weapons were incompatible with the peace the Holy See sought for the twenty-first century, he said. The banning of all tests and the further development of disarmament and non-proliferation were closely linked and must be achieved as soon as possible, under effective international controls. He appealed to States whose ratifications were necessary for the Treaty to enter into force to do so. The CTBTO had done a tremendous job in giving the world community confidence that the CTBT would have positive results. The continued success of the NPT required the entry into force of the CTBT. If the world was to end the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, then the development of those weapons must be stopped.
A weakened NPT and inoperable CTBT would force the world to wander through a dangerous morass of tensions and recriminations, he continued. The security of all States and people of the world would be severely jeopardized. It was, therefore, the solemn duty of all States to work actively for peace. In the wake of the damnable acts of 11 September and the violence that continues to plague the world, the Conference should be used to renew the common desire for an enduring peace.


Washington Post
By Colum Lynch Special to The Washington Post
Monday, November 12, 2001; Page A06

U.S. Boycotts Nuclear Test Ban Meeting

Some Delegates at U.N. Session Upset at Latest Snub of Pact Bush Won't Back

UNITED NATIONS, Nov. 11 -- The Bush administration today boycotted a U.N. conference convened by Secretary General Kofi Annan to encourage states to ratify a global treaty banning nuclear weapons tests.
The decision to sidestep the three-day event represents the latest demonstration of U.S. opposition to the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which has been signed by 161 countries, including the United States, and ratified by 85.
President Bush has made it clear that he will never submit the treaty to the U.S. Senate for ratification. But some delegates were miffed that the United States had chosen to snub many of its closest allies at a time that it is seeking to build a coalition to fight terrorism.
The decision brought an end to weeks of internal debate in the Bush administration over the wisdom of accepting an invitation to attend the conference as an observer. "We're not attending," a senior State Department official said today. "This is a meeting for ratifying states and we've made it clear we're not going to ratify."
The State Department had initially favored sending a low-level delegation to avoid a diplomatic confrontation. But the Pentagon hoped that a U.S. boycott would contribute to hastening the death of the nuclear pact.
The nuclear accord has long been a target of U.S. conservatives. In 1999, the Republican-controlled Senate voted 51-48 to reject a bid by President Bill Clinton to ratify the pact. Bush and his advisers have argued that the treaty is impossible to verify and that it may need to test weapons to ensure the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear arsenal.
Russia, which has ratified the treaty, warned that the resumption of atomic tests could restart the nuclear arms race. Igor Sergeev, a special assistant to President Vladimir Putin, proposed today that the United States consider new negotiations aimed at improving the ability to verify treaty violations.
Wolfgang Hoffmann, the Mexican chairman of the conference, said that he expected other countries to follow Russia's lead. "This will obviously be a road down which many delegations will want to go in order to accommodate one very important signatory."
Annan told delegates at the opening session this morning that the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington underscored the urgency of limiting the scope of the world's handful of nuclear weapons programs. "We have a precious but fleeting opportunity to render this troubled world a safer place, free of the threat of nuclear weapons," he said. "We must not let it pass."
Although the treaty has widespread support, its prospects for becoming law remain dim. The pact can only go into force after it is ratified by all 44 countries which have the capacity to develop nuclear weapons. Thirteen of those nations, including the United States, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel, have yet to ratify the pact. Washington and New Dehli, which violated an informal international moratorium on nuclear tests in 1998, have insisted they will never allow the treaty to become law.
But Hoffmann said that he was still hopeful that the United States would one day ratify the pact. "I don't think there is unanimity within the U.S. administration on these issues," he said. "I think that if you keep up the pressure on the United States they will come around."


Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

(New York, 2001)

Final Declaration

  1. Fully conscious of the responsibilities which we assumed by signing the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, pursuant to article XIV of that Treaty, and recalling the Final Declaration adopted by the Conference, held in Vienna, from 6 to 8 October 1999, we the ratifiers, together with the States Signatories, met in New York from 11 to 13 November 2001 to promote the entry into force of the Treaty at the earliest possible date. We welcomed the presence of representatives of non-signatory States, international organizations and non-governmental organizations.
  2. We reaffirmed our strong determination to enhance international peace and security throughout the world and stressed the importance of a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty as a major instrument in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects. We reiterated that the cessation of all nuclear-weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosions, by constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons, constitutes an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects and thus a meaningful step in the realization of a systematic process to achieve nuclear disarmament. We therefore renewed our commitment to work for universal ratification of the Treaty, and its early entry into force as provided for in article XIV.
  3. We reviewed the overall progress made since the opening for signature of the Treaty and, in particular, the progress made after the Conference held in Vienna from 6 to 8 October 1999. We noted with appreciation the overwhelming support for the Treaty that has been expressed: the United Nations General Assembly and other multilateral organs have called for signatures and ratifications of the Treaty as soon as possible and have urged all States to remain seized of the issue at the highest political level. We highlighted the importance of the Treaty and its entry into force for the practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, which were identified in 2000 at international forums dealing with nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. We believe that the cessation of all nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions will contribute to the accomplishment of those efforts.
  4. In accordance with the provisions of article XIV of the Treaty, we examined the extent to which the requirement set out in paragraph 1 had been met and decided by consensus what measures consistent with international law may be undertaken to accelerate the ratification process in order to facilitate the early entry into force of the Treaty.
  5. Since the Treaty was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly and opened for signature five years ago, progress has been made in the ratification process. As of today, 162 States have signed and 87 States have deposited their instruments of ratification, an increase of over 70 per cent compared with the number of ratifications at the time of the Conference held in 1999. Of the 44 States listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty whose ratification is required for the entry into force of the Treaty, 41 have signed, and of these, 31 have also ratified the Treaty. A list of those States is provided in the appendix. Progress in ratification has been sustained. We welcomed this as evidence of the strong determination of States not to carry out any nuclear-weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under their jurisdiction or control.
  6. Despite the progress made and our strong support for the Treaty, we noted with concern that it has not entered into force five years after its opening for signature. We therefore stressed our determination to strengthen efforts aimed at promoting its entry into force at the earliest possible date in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty.
  7. After the opening for signature of the CTBT, nuclear explosions were carried out. The countries concerned subsequently declared that they would not conduct further nuclear explosions and indicated their willingness not to delay the entry into force of the Treaty.
  8. In the light of the CTBT and bearing in mind its purpose and objectives, we affirm that the conduct of nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosion constitutes a serious threat to global efforts towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.
  9. We call upon all States to maintain a moratorium on nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions and underline the importance of signature and ratification of the Treaty.
  10. We noted with satisfaction the report of the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) to the Conference on progress made by the Preparatory Commission and its Provisional Technical Secretariat since November 1996 in fulfilment of the requirement to take all necessary measures to ensure the effective establishment of the future CTBTO.
  11. In this connection, we welcomed the momentum which has been developed by the Preparatory Commission and its Provisional Technical Secretariat across the Major Programmes of the Commission, as identified by the Executive Secretary in his report. We also welcomed the progress in building the global infrastructure for Treaty verification, including the International Monitoring System, with a view to ensuring that the verification regime shall be capable of meeting the verification requirements of the Treaty at entry into force. We further welcomed the conclusion of a significant number of related agreements and arrangements with States and with international organizations.
  12. Convinced of the importance of achieving universal adherence to the Treaty, welcoming the ratifications of all the States that have done so since the 1999 Conference, and stressing in particular the steps required to achieve its early entry into force, as provided for in article XIV of the Treaty, we:
    1. Call upon all States that have not yet signed the Treaty to sign and ratify it as soon as possible and to refrain from acts which would defeat its object and purpose in the meanwhile;
    2. Call upon all States that have signed but not yet ratified the Treaty, in particular those whose ratification is needed for its entry into force, to accelerate their ratification processes with a view to early successful conclusion;
    3. Recall the fact that two States out of three whose ratifications are needed for the Treaty’s entry into force but which have not yet signed it have expressed their willingness not to delay the entry into force of the Treaty, and call upon them to sign and ratify it as soon as possible;
    4. Note the fact that one State out of three whose ratifications are needed for the Treaty’s entry into force but which have not yet signed it has not expressed its intention towards the Treaty, and call upon this State to sign and ratify it as soon as possible so as to facilitate the entry into force of the Treaty;
    5. Note the ratification by three nuclear-weapon States and call upon the remaining two to accelerate their ratification processes with a view to early successful conclusion;
    6. In pursuit of the early entry into force of the Treaty, undertake ourselves to use all avenues open to us in conformity with international law, to encourage further signature and ratification of the Treaty; and urge all States to sustain the momentum generated by this Conference by continuing to remain seized of the issue at the highest political level;
    7. Agree that ratifying States will select one of their number to promote cooperation to facilitate the early entry into force of the Treaty, through informal consultations with all interested countries; and encourage bilateral, regional and multilateral initiatives aimed at promoting further signatures and ratification;
    8. Urge all States to share legal and technical information and advice in order to facilitate the processes of signature, ratification and implementation by the States concerned, and upon their request. We encourage the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization and the Secretary-General of the United Nations to continue supporting actively these efforts consistent with their respective mandates;
    9. Call upon the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization to continue its international cooperation activities to promote understanding of the Treaty, including by demonstrating the benefits of the application of verification technologies for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty, in order to further encourage signature and ratification of the Treaty;
    10. Reiterate the appeal to all relevant sectors of civil society to raise awareness of and support for the objectives of the Treaty, as well as its early entry into force as provided for in article XIV of the Treaty.
  13. We reaffirm our commitment to the Treaty’s basic obligations and our undertaking to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty pending its entry into force.
  14. We remain steadfast in our commitment to pursue the efforts to ensure that the Treaty’s verification regime shall be capable of meeting the verification requirements of the Treaty at entry into force, in accordance with the provisions of article IV of the Treaty. In this context, we will continue to provide the support required to enable the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization to complete its tasks in the most efficient and cost-effective way.
  15. The Conference addressed the issue of possible future conferences, expressed the determination of its participants to continue working towards entry into force of the Treaty and took note of the provisions contained in paragraph 3 of article XIV of the Treaty.

First Committee – United Nations General Assembly

Extracts from September Sessions of the 56th United Nations General Assembly as it relates to Items under the 1st Committee Agenda

Statement by Ambassador Richard Ryan, Permanent Representative of Ireland to the United Nations – 24 September 2001:
“[…] International peace and security is indivisible and, because of this, we share the unease with the Secretary-General regards the current uncertainties in the existing bilateral and multilateral arms control agreements. Surely, recent events strengthen rather than diminish the need for renewed commitment to multilateral negotiations towards legally binding, irreversible and verifiable disarmament agreements across the range of immensely destructive weapons in existence today.”


Extracts from Special Debate on “Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism” as it relates to Items under the 1st Committee Agenda

Statement by Ambassador Pierre Schori, Permanent Representative of Sweden to the United Nations – 3 October 2001:
“[…] The tragedy of 11 September has highlighted the need for intensified efforts at preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles. Sweden agrees with the statement by the Secretary General to the IAEA General Conference a fortnight ago, that progress in the areas of nuclear non-proliferation is now more important than ever. Biological, chemical or nuclear weapons must not fall into the hands of terrorists. The international community must shoulder its responsibility and find ways to strengthen and ensure compliance with the Biological and Toxin Weapons Conventions, ensure the effective implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and reinforce the nuclear non-proliferation regime.”

THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS
Statement by: H.E. MR Dirk Jan Van Den Berg, Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the United Nations - 1 October 2001
"… The perspective of terrorists obtaining b, however, is even more terrifying and yet not imaginary. We must therefore multiply our efforts in the field of non-proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The Netherlands is therefore committed to the early conclusion of a convention for the suppression of nuclear terrorist acts. We must ensure that the key treaties relating to weapons of mass destruction are implemented to the full. Mechanisms for control, surveillance and inspection as for instance established in the case of the OPCW, are indispensable elements to ensure non-proliferation."


General Assembly General Debate: Disarmament and Security References

The 56th General Assembly General Debate was held from November 10 - 16, 2001 at UN Headquarters in New York City. Below are selected quotes from the speeches made by Heads of State and Foreign Ministers.

Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Belgium, President of the Council of the European Union, Mr. Louis Michel
More than ever, disarmament and non proliferation form the cornerstones of any peace and security structure and must therefore be subject to binding multilateral norms. It is against this background that we wish to strengthen non proliferation regimes, promote the rapid entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. We must also combat the proliferation of ballistic missiles and the illicit trade in light weapons and continue to work for the complete elimination of antipersonnel mines.

Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany Joschka Fischer
The insidious anthrax attacks since I I September show that the threat from weapons of mass destruction in terrorist hands, which yesterday seemed abstract, is today a real and deadly danger. The community of states must do everything in its power to counter it with a new push for nonproliferation and global disarmament.
The dangers of dissemination to non-state groups and of regional arms races require new answers and effective, internationally enforceable criminal sanctions. In the nuclear field, the commitment contained in the Non-Proliferation Treaty to complete nuclear disarmament remains crucial. All states are called upon to participate in the negotiation of an international code of conduct on ballistic missile proliferation.

Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, H.E. Ms Anna Lindh
We must join forces for multilateral disarmament. A world free from weapons of mass destruction would be a much safer world. Multilateral agreements contribute to security for the individual. It has produced impressive results - chemical and biological weapons have been totally banned. Still, however, many challenges remain. Three years ago, Sweden helped launch the New Agenda Coalition - a group of states concerned with the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament, sharing a vision of a nuclear-weapons-free world. In our case, the initiative was rooted in the firm belief that both global and national security depends on multilateral frameworks and platforms.
Last year, the 187 States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty adopted by consensus a road map towards nuclear disarmament. Based on the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon-states to fully eliminate their nuclear arsenals, an action plan in twelve steps was agreed. This promising outcome was confirmed by the General Assembly. All States parties have pledged to achieve a nuclear-weapons-free world under strict and effective international control. I strongly urge the four states remaining outside the Treaty, to sign and ratify it.
We have a number of important instruments to prevent testing, banning production of weapons material, and for improving verification. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, a Fissile Material Cut off Treaty and the Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards agreement pave the way for the twin objectives of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Clearly it is now time to concentrate on their implementation.
The US plans for a strategic missile defence system risk having a negative impact on disarmament, non-proliferation and the whole NPT process. The ongoing consultations are welcome, but the outcome is still uncertain. We strongly believe that new threats of proliferation require a multilateral response, built on the already existing safety net.

Deep cuts in strategic and tactical nuclear arsenals are long overdue, and should be accompanied by effective mechanisms of verification and irreversibility. Such treaty agreements can never be replaced by unilateral declaration.

Weapons of mass destruction remain a threat to mankind. Terrorists must not be given the opportunity to threaten us with these weapons. Now is the time to reinforce efforts to contain proliferation.


1st Committee, October 29, 2001

Statement by H.E. Mr. Chris C. Sanders, Disarmament Ambassador Head of the Netherlands Delegation to the First Committee.

"The desirability of transparency applies as much to weapons of mass destruction as it does to conventional weapons. Multilateral treaties related to weapons o f mass destruction are there, there will be more, and these treaties provide for their own mechanisms to ensure transparency in Weapons of Mass Destruction.

We are encouraged by the constructive dialogue that we have developed with those countries that are not yet in a position to participate in the UN Register and who can not yet give their support to this resolution. We will continue to work with them, and let me once again assure you that the Netherlands continues to work actively to promote greater transparency in the field of Weapons of Mass Destruction."


UN First Committee Bulletin

By Jenni Rissanen
ACRONYM - UK
26 October 2001

[…]
Mexico had also planned to table a new resolution on tactical (sub-strategic) nuclear weapons (TNW). This year marks the tenth anniversary of the unilateral initiatives on TNW by the United States and Russia. (The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) recently arranged a seminar to commemorate these initiatives as well as to discuss the need for further steps) However, Mexico reportedly came under pressure from the United States and Russia not to introduce the draft. Although some other delegations had also interest in the topic and possibly a resolution as well, Mexico decided after consultations with the interested parties not to proceed but to speak on TNW instead. Delivering a joint statement on behalf of the New Agenda initiative (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden) on Wednesday, October 24, Mexico expressed deep "concern that the total number of [tactical] nuclear weapons…still amounts to thousands" and argued that it was "essential to preserve and to build upon the 1991/1992" initiatives. The New Agenda specifically called for further reductions, confidence-building measures (CBM) and "concrete agreed measures" to reduce the operational status on TNW. A joint statement from Finland and Sweden had addressed the issue on the previous day. Testifying to the growing interest in TNW, the Netherlands was also expected to address the subject, joined by Norway and Canada and possibly other NATO countries. However, it is understood that these states came under pressure from the United States and decided to withdraw their statement.

[…]


United Nations A/C.1/56/L.1/Rev.1

General and complete disarmament: preservation of and compliance with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems

Stemming: aangenomen met 82 stemmen voor, 5 tegen (Albanië, Benin, Israël, Micronesië, Verenigde Staten) en 62 onthoudingen (Andorra, Argentinië, Australië, Bahamas, Bahrein, Bangladesh, België, Bolivia, Brazilië, Bulgarije, Canada, Chili, Denemarken, Dominicaanse Republiek, Duitsland, Estland, Filippijnen, Finland, Frankrijk, Georgië, Ghana, Grenada, Griekenland, Guatamala, Hongarije, Ijsland, Italië, Japan, Joegoslavië, Letland, Liechtenstein, Litouwen, Luxemburg, Macedonië, Malta, Marokko, Mauritius, Monaco, Kroatië, Nederland, Nieuw-Zeeland, Nicaragua, Noorwegen, Oekraïne, Oostenrijk, Paraguay, Peru, Polen, Portugal, Roemenië, Samoa, San Marino, Slovenië, Slowakije, Spanje, Tsjechië, Trinidad & Tobago, Turkije, Uruguay, Verenigd Koninkrijk, Zuid-Korea, Zweden)


United Nations A/C.l/56/L.35/Rev.1
General Assembly
1 November 2001
Fifty-sixth session
First Committee
Agenda item 74

General and complete disarmament
Japan: revised draft resolution

A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons

The General Assembly,

[…]

  1. Reaffirms the importance of achieving the universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and calls upon States not parties to the Treaty to accede to it as non-nuclear-weapon States without delay and without conditions;
  2. Also reaffirms the importance for all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to fulfil their obligations under the Treaty;
  3. Stresses the central importance of the following practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and paragraphs 3 and 4(c) of the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty:
    1. The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutinonal processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-ban-Treaty as well as a moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that Treaty;
    2. The establishment of an ad hoc committee in the Conference on Disarmament as early as possible during its 2002 session to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives, with a view to its conclusion within five years and, pending its entry into force, a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons;
    3. The establishment of an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament as early as possible during its 2002 session in the Context of establishing a programme of work;
    4. The inclusion of the principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures;
    5. An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States, as agreed in the 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty are committed under article VI of the Treaty;
    6. Deep reductions by the Russian Federation and the United States of America in their strategic offensive arsenals, while placing great importance on the existing multilateral treaties, with a view to maintaining and strengthening strategic stability and international security;
    7. Steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all:
      1. Further efforts by all the nuclear-weapon States to continue to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally;
      2. Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to their nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and as voluntary confidence-building measures to support further progress on nuclear disarmament;
      3. The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process;
      4. Concrete agreed measures to reduce further the operational status of nuclear weapons systems;
      5. A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination;
      6. The engagement, as soon as appropriate, of all nuclear-weapon Sates in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons;
    8. Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control;
  4. Recognizes that the realization of a world free of nuclear weapons will require further steps, including deeper reductions in nuclear weapons, by all the nuclear-weapon States in the process of working towards achieving their elimination;
  5. Invites the nuclear-weapon States to keep the States Members of the United Nations duly informed of the progress or efforts made towards nuclear disarmament;
  6. Emphasizes the importance of a successful Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 2005 as the first Preparatory Committee is convened in 2002;
  7. Welcomes the ongoing efforts in the dismantlement of nuclear weapons, notes the importance of the safe and effective management of the resultant fissile materials and calls for arrangements by all the nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, the fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under the International Atomic Energy Agency or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes in order to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes;
  8. Stresses the importance of further development of the verification capabilities, including International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world;
  9. Calls upon all States to redouble their efforts to prevent and curb the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery, confirming and strengthening, if necessary, their policies not to transfer equipment, materials or technology that could contribute to the proliferation of those weapons;
  10. Also calls upon all States to maintain the highest possible standards of security, safe custody, effective control and physical protection of all materials that could contribute to the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in order, inter alia, to prevent those materials from falling into the hands of terrorists;
  11. Welcomes the adoption and stresses the importance of resolution GC(45)/RES/13 adopted at the International Atomic Energy Agency General Conference, which recommends that the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, its Borad of Governors and member States continue to consider implementing the elements of the plan of action outlined in resolution GC(44)/RES/19, adopted on 22 September 2000 at the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, to promote and facilitate the conclusion and entry into force of safeguards agreements and additional protocols, and calls for the early and full implementation of that resolution;
  12. Encourages the constructive role played by civil society in promoting nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

Stemming: aangenomen met 139 stemmen voor, 3 tegen (India, Micronesië en Verenigde Staten) en 19 onthoudingen (Bhutan, Brazilië, Burma, China, Cuba, Egypte, Ierland, Iran, Israël, Mauritius, Mexico, Nieuw-Zeeland, Noord-Korea, Pakistan, Russische Federatie, San Marino, Wit-Rusland, Zuid-Afrika, Zweden)


United Nations A/C.1/56/L.45

General and complete disarmament: follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons

Stemming over operationale paragraaf 1: aangenomen met 153 stemmen voor, 4 tegen (Frankrijk, Israël, Russische Federatie, Verenigde Staten) en 2 onthoudingen (Micronesië, Verenigd Koninkrijk).
Stemming over gehele resolutie: aangenomen met 111 stemmen voor, 29 tegen (Albanië, Andorra, België, Bulgarije, Denemarken, Frankrijk, Griekenland, Hongarije, IJsland, Israël, Italië, Letland, Litouwen, Luxemburg, Monaco, Nederland, Noorwegen, Polen, Portugal, Roemenië, Russische Federatie, Slovenië, Slowakije, Spanje, Tsjechië, Turkije, Verenigd Koninkrijk, Verenigde Staten) en 21 onthoudingen (Armenië, Australië, Azerbeidzjan, Bosnië-Herzegovina, Canada, Cyprus, Estland, Finland, Georgië, Japan, Joegoslavië, Kazakstan, Kroatië, Liechtenstein, Macedonië, Micronesië, Moldavië, Oostenrijk, Turkmenistan, Wit-Rusland, Zuid-Korea)


Conference on Disarmament

Annual Session Ends In Shadow of Attacks in US

By Jenni Rissanen
Disarmament Diplomacy, September 2001

Introduction

The Conference on Disarmament (CD) concluded its 2001 session on September 13 in unusual and sombre circumstances, hearing numerous interventions condemning the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States and expressing deep sympathy with the victims. The CD's failure to adopt a work programme and commence disarmament negotiations was overshadowed by the atrocities in New York and Washington. Since negotiating the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Conference has now spent six years mired in a state of virtual stalemate. This year, however, it did at least begin to appoint three special coordinators to begin discussions on updating its agenda, improving its working methods and expanding its membership. The CD has recommended that these discussions continue next year.

CD Concludes Work for 2001

Some thirty countries addressed the Conference's 888th plenary on September 13, all vehemently condemning the terrorist attacks and expressing shock and sorrow over the immense loss of life. Some delegations argued that the events served as a wake-up call to the CD to get back to the serious work of making a contribution to world peace and security.
Many of the statements emphasized that the attacks were directed not only against the United States but the whole of humanity. CD members pledged their support in fighting terrorism and bringing the people responsible for the atrocities to justice. A number of countries also stressed the importance of multilateral cooperation in combating terrorism and argued that the CD had a role to play in this fight. Russia condemned the "barbaric acts" and pointed out - probably in reference to the activities of the rebels in Chechnya - that it had "repeatedly" appealed for international cooperation in combating terrorism.1 Japan said the incidents reminded the world of the importance of cooperation, asserting that effective prevention of such outrages could only be achieved through joint efforts. The work of the CD was "not irrelevant" in this context. Japan felt the Conference had to overcome its differences and get down to work early next year. This would be the "best way...to pay respect to the victims of the recent incident".2 It agreed with Australia and New Zealand, who held that the attacks "underscore[d] the opportunities we have missed by not proceeding on the basis of what we all know to best achievable way forward, namely the Amorim package". The Amorim proposal, put forward in August 2000 by the then CD President, Ambassador Celso Amorim of Brazil, sets out the basis of a programme of work addressing a range of issues including negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material (fissban).3 Those who stood so steadfastly against this programme, Australia and New Zealand argued, must surely question "the wisdom of that posture". The two states further said it would be "unconscionable" for the Conference to return next year and not get down to work "with a sense of urgency".4 Switzerland was of the same opinion, arguing that the CD should "be inspired by those events" and "draw fresh breath" so that "something positive [could] come out of these tragic" incidents.5
The CD adopted its yearly report to the UN General Assembly during this final plenary. CD President, Ambassador Roberto Betancourt Ruales of Ecuador, made his final remarks before closing the session, stating that efforts henceforth should be focussed "at a higher political level if we are to endeavour to bring the [CD] out of its state of paralysis". He noted that all members "clearly aspire to the attainment of peace and security", but added that these goals were "being moved further away...by disturbing phenomena in the strategic panorama and by the escalation of violence and terror, which has reached an unprecedented level". He believed the recent attacks on the United States would lead the Conference to "reflect on the need for the [CD] to establish, as soon as possible, more effective measures to ensure international peace and security, thus banishing the spectre of nuclear annihilation".6

[…]

Conclusion

With the exception of a brief period in 1998 when the CD established an ad hoc committee on fissban, the Conference has now been effectively unemployed for six long years. In the current context of general turmoil and uncertainty for multilateral arms control and disarmament efforts, it seems likely that further barren sessions may lie ahead. As a result, there is talk - although no one has said this openly - of cutbacks in CD delegations, including possible withdrawals of disarmament ambassadors, until a more promising era dawns. Such a downgrading would no doubt provide evidence of the CD's malaise and undermine the CD, although perhaps not any more than the current deplorable situation. This malaise, however, is symptomatic of a deeper illness, the causes of which can neither be located nor cured at Geneva.

CD Dates for 2002

January 21 to March 29; May 13 to June 28; July 29 to September 13.

Notes and References

  1. Anatoly Antonov, Minister Plenipotentiary and Deputy Head of Delegation of Russia to the CD, September 13, 2001. CD/PV.888.
  2. Seicchiro Noburo, Ambassador of Japan to the CD, September 13, 2001. CD/PV.888.
  3. The Amorim proposal (CD/1624, August 24, 2000) recommends the establishment of four ad hoc committees: one each to "deal with" nuclear disarmament and PAROS, one to negotiate a ban on the production of fissile materials, based on a specific mandate agreed in 1995, and one, with a broader mandate, to negotiate on negative security assurances (NSA). In addition, it proposes the establishment of special co-ordinators on anti-personnel mines, transparency in armaments, and the review of the CD's agenda, the expansion of its membership and its effective and improved functioning. Amorim attached a draft presidential declaration to this proposal stressing that the CD is a disarmament negotiating forum and that the above mandates should be viewed in that light, and further noting that the CD continues "to be influenced by and responsive to developments in the international strategic scene which affect the security interests of its individual members."
  4. Lesley Luck, Ambassador of Australia to the CD, September 13, 2001. CD/PV.888.
  5. Christian Faessler, Ambassador of Switzerland to the CD, September 13, 2001. CD/PV.888.
  6. Roberto Betancourt Ruales, Ambassador of Ecuador and CD President, September 13, 2001. CD/PV.888.

[…]

Jenni Rissanen is the Acronym Institute's Analyst attending the CD in Geneva.


Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation

Draft International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation

MTCR/HEL/PL/00/CHAIR/01
Helsinki, 10-13 October 2000

Subscribing states agree to respect and implement the following principles, commitments and other measures in all national and collective activities relating to rockets and rocket systems.

  1. Principles:
    1. Recognition by subscribing states of the increasing security challenges caused by the ongoing proliferation of ballistic missile systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction and of the need to prevent and curb such proliferation through international endeavours, including through this International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation;
    2. Recognition by subscribing states of the importance of strengthening, and gaining wider adherence to, existing disarmament and non-proliferation regimes;
    3. Recognition by subscribing states that adherence to, and full compliance with, disarmament and non-proliferation norms build confidence as to the peaceful intentions of states;
    4. Recognition by subscribing states that participation in this International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation is voluntary and open to all states and that this Code of Conduct will complement and strengthen existing national, bilateral, regional and multilateral security arrangements and disarmament and non-proliferation regimes;
    5. Recognition by subscribing states that all countries alike must be able to continue to reap the benefits of the utilisation of space for peaceful purposes in ways that do not contribute to the proliferation of ballistic missile systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction;
    6. Recognition by subscribing states that space launch vehicle programmes should not be used to conceal ballistic missile programmes, considering that there are similarities between both types of programmes in terms of technology, facilities and expertise;
    7. Recognition by subscribing states of the necessity of appropriate transparency measures on ballistic missile programmes and space launch vehicle programmes in order to increase confidence and to promote non-proliferation of ballistic missiles and ballistic missile technology;
    8. Confirmation by subscribing states of their commitment to the United Nations Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of All States taking into Particular Account the Needs of Developing Countries, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly (resolution 51/122 of December 13, 1996).
  2. Commitments:
    1. Commitment by subscribing states to ratify:
      • the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,
      • the 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, and
      • the 1974 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space;
    2. Commitment by subscribing states to curb the proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, and to undertake measures to prevent such proliferation, both at a global and regional level through multilateral, bilateral and national endeavours;
    3. Commitment by subscribing states to exercise maximum possible restraint in the development, testing and deployment of ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, including, where possible, to reduce national holdings of such missiles, in the interest of global and regional peace and security;
    4. Commitment by subscribing states to exercise the necessary vigilance in the consideration of assistance to space launch vehicle programmes in any other country so as to prevent contributing to delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction, considering that such programmes may be used to conceal ballistic missile programmes;
    5. Commitment by subscribing states not to support any ballistic missile programme in countries which might be developing or acquiring weapons of mass destruction in a way incompatible with the norms established by the disarmament and non-proliferation treaties.
  3. c) Incentives:
    1. Consideration by subscribing states to provide on a voluntary and case-by-case basis, incentives to subscribing states who choose to eliminate their existing ballistic missile and/or space launch vehicle programmes, as appropriate, and who commit to forgo such programmes in the future.
  4. Confidence Building Measures:
    1. Agreement by subscribing states to implement transparency measures as follows, with an appropriate and sufficient degree of detail, to increase confidence and to promote non-proliferation of ballistic missiles:
      1. With respect to ballistic missile programmes, to:
        • make an annual declaration providing an outline of their ballistic missile policies. Examples of openness in such declarations might be relevant informtion on ballistic missile systems and land (test-) launch sites;
        • provide annual information on the number and generic class of ballistic missiles launched during the preceding year, as declared in conformity with the pre-launch notification mechanism referred to hereunder in tiret (iii).
      2. With respect to expendable space launch vehicles, and consistent with commercial and economic confidentiality principles, to:
        • make an annual declaration providing an outline of their space launch vehicle policies and land (test-) launch sites;
        • provide annual information on the number and generic class of space launch vehicles launched during the preceding year, as declared in conformity with the pre-launch notification mechanism referred to hereunder, in tiret (iii);
        • consider, on a voluntary basis (including on the degree of access permitted), inviting international observers to their land (test-) launch sites.
      3. With respect to their ballistic missile and space launch vehicle programmes, to:
        • exchange pre-launch notifications on their ballistic missile and space launch vehicle launches and test flights.
          These notifications should include information as the generic class of the ballistic missile or space launch vehicle, the planned launch notification window, the launch area, and the planned direction.
          Implementation of the above confidence building measures will have no bearing on the question of legitimacy of the rocket programmes concerned in respect of the obligations and norms deriving from the disarmament and non-proliferation treaties, and of the principles and commitments set out in this code.
  5. Organisational Aspects:
    1. Agreement by subscribing states to:
      • hold regular meetings, annually or as need be, to define, review and further develop the workings of the International Code of Conduct;
      • establish a mechanism for the exchange of notifications and other information in the framework of the International Code of Conduct;
      • establish an appropriate mechanism for the voluntary resolution of questions arising from national declarations, and/or questions pertaining to space launch vehicle and ballistic missile activity.