



NEW AGENDA COALITION – RESOLUTIE

First Committee United Nations General Assembly

Towards a Nuclear-Weapon Free World: Accelerating the Implementation of Nuclear Disarmament Commitments

Draft Resolution for UNGA First Committee

NAC - New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, and Sweden) – 8 October 2004

The General Assembly,

(pp1) Recalling its resolution 58/51 of 8 December 2003, and mindful of the upcoming 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

(pp2) Expressing its grave concern at the danger to humanity posed by the possibility that nuclear weapons could be used and at the lack of implementation of binding obligations and agreed steps toward nuclear disarmament and reaffirming that nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing processes requiring urgent irreversible progress on both fronts,

(pp 3) Recalling the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, in accordance with commitments under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and noting that the ultimate objective of the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

1. *Calls upon* all States to fully comply with commitments made to nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation and not to act in any way that may be detrimental to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation or that may lead to a new nuclear arms race;
2. *Calls upon* all States to spare no efforts to achieve universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty;
3. *Calls upon* all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to accelerate the implementation of the practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament agreed at the 2000 Review Conference;
4. *Also calls upon* the nuclear-weapon States to take further steps to reduce their non-strategic nuclear arsenals, and not to develop new types of nuclear weapons in accordance with their commitment to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in their security policies;
5. *Agrees* to urgently strengthen efforts towards both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation through the resumption in the Conference on Disarmament of negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the special coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein taking into account both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives, as well as the completion and implementation of arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place fissile material no longer required for military purposes under international verification;
6. *Calls for* the establishment of an appropriate subsidiary body in the Conference on Disarmament to deal with nuclear disarmament;
7. *Underlines* the imperative of the principles of irreversibility and transparency for all nuclear disarmament measures, and the need to develop further adequate and efficient verification capabilities;

8. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its sixtieth session an item entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon free world: Accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments", and to review the implementation of the present resolution at that session.

Stemming

Kernwapenstaten

China	voor	Israël	tegen	Verenigd Koninkrijk	tegen
Frankrijk	tegen	Pakistan	voor	Verenigde Staten	tegen
India	onthouding	Rusland	onthouding		

NAVO

België	voor	IJsland	onthouding	Roemenië	onthouding
Bulgarije	onthouding	Italië	onthouding	Slovenië	onthouding
Canada	voor	Letland	tegen	Slowakije	onthouding
Denemarken	onthouding	Litouwen	voor	Spanje	onthouding
Duitsland	voor	Luxemburg	voor	Tsjechië	onthouding
Estland	onthouding	Nederland	voor	Turkije	voor
Griekenland	onthouding	Noorwegen	voor		
Hongarije	onthouding	Polen	onthouding		

EU

Cyprus	voor	Ierland	voor	Oostenrijk	voor
Finland	voor	Malta	voor	Zweden	voor

Overig

Australië	onthouding	Japan	voor	Zuid-Korea	voor
Indonesië	voor	Noord-Korea	onthouding		
Iran	voor	Syrië	voor		

Stemverklaring Frankrijk (mede namens Verenigd Koninkrijk en Verenigde Staten)

Mr. Chairman,

I take the floor on behalf of the United Kingdom, the United States of America and France to explain our vote against resolution L.22 'Towards a nuclear weapons free world a new agenda: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments'.

This resolution has been tabled over a number of years and contains important elements that we support. However, when the resolution was tabled last year, we were sorry to find that the text contained many elements that did not command consensus and were not acceptable to the United Kingdom, the United States of America and France.

We noted that this year text takes a more pragmatic approach. Nevertheless, certain elements are not acceptable to us. The new title of the resolution does not reflect the progress which is being made towards nuclear disarmament. The content of the resolution does not take due account of full range of obligations of all of us towards nuclear non proliferation and disarmament.

As we stated in our explanation of vote on this resolution last year, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and France remain fully committed to meeting our obligations under article VI of the nuclear non proliferation Treaty. We have taken significant measures on nuclear disarmament ourselves and support nuclear weapons reductions worldwide. Unfortunately, this resolution does not take sufficient account of the progress that has been made in this regard. Although last year resolution had mentioned the Moscow Treaty, this is not the case this year. This despite the fact that the Treaty commits the United States and Russia to reduce their nuclear arsenals by several thousand warheads over the next decade.

Mr. Chairman,

Our nuclear disarmament and non proliferation commitments remain steadfast and rooted in the NPT. As we turn our attention to the forthcoming review conference here in New York in the Spring, we hope that ongoing dialogue

among state parties will help ensure that progress will follow previous review conferences and lead to the further strengthening of this cornerstone of the global non proliferation and disarmament regime.

Thank you Mr. Chairman

AMERIKAANSE KERNWAPENS IN EUROPA

Bulletin of Atomic Scientists

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U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, 1954-2004

by Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen - November/December 2004

More than a decade after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, only the United States continues to deploy land-based nuclear weapons outside its borders. Defense and NATO officials have yet to outline the purpose or the targets of the weapons, but new documents obtained under the Freedom of Information Act and other sources shed some light on the composition of still-deployed nuclear weapons, as well as the reductions that have taken place.

After reviewing both new and old evidence we have concluded that there are more than three times as many bombs in Europe as was previously thought. We estimate that approximately 480 bombs are housed at eight bases in six European nations. Three types of bombs are deployed: B61-3, B61-4, and B61-10.

The United States first deployed nuclear weapons to Europe in September 1954, when it delivered gravity bombs to bases in Britain. During the next decade, weapons went to Germany, Italy, France, Turkey, Netherlands, Greece, and Belgium. In total, the United States deployed 24 different weapons systems to Europe. Germany hosted the most diverse force--21 of the 24 systems. In 1971 the number of U.S. nuclear warheads based in Europe peaked at approximately 7,300. By the late 1970s, this number had dropped to about 6,000. After the United States withdrew several obsolete systems in the 1980s and the Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) systems as a result of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the level declined to about 4,000.

A historic event took place on September 27, 1991 when President George H. W. Bush announced the withdrawal of all U.S. tactical ground-launched and naval tactical nuclear weapons worldwide. The withdrawal included tactical weapons based in Europe, and all nuclear artillery shells, short-range missile warheads, and naval nuclear depth bombs. What remained were about 1,400 gravity bombs in seven European countries. As the Soviet Union dissolved and hundreds of targets were removed from war plans, the United States cut the number of bombs for U.S. and NATO nuclear-capable aircraft to 700. In 1994, as a result of a Nuclear Posture Review, President Bill Clinton further cut this number to 480.

In the mid-1990s rumors circulated about further cuts in the number of U.S. bombs in Europe, but a re-examination of available evidence indicates that additional cuts were not made. Instead, the Defense Department changed alert levels and consolidated some deployed weapons, moving them to main operating bases. In one of his last acts as president, in November 2000 Bill Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-74, which authorized 480 nuclear bombs to remain deployed in Europe. To the best of our knowledge, this level has stayed constant throughout President George W. Bush's first term

(see "[U.S. B61 Bombs in Europe, 2004](#)").

The WS3 program

One way to track European deployments is by closely following the Weapon Storage and Security System (WS3) program, the method by which B61 nuclear bombs are stored in underground vaults inside aircraft shelters. A 1976 Sandia National Laboratories study to determine the best way to safeguard U.S. Air Force nuclear weapons deployed abroad led to the establishment of the WS3 program. Air force officials eventually decided to store the weapons in sturdy vaults that would descend beneath the floor of specially built hardened hangars.

Officials originally envisioned building WS3 systems at all foreign bases where U.S. Air Force nuclear weapons were deployed. In 1986, plans called for a total of 437 vaults, with a maximum capacity of 1,748 weapons, to be built at 26 locations in nine countries, including South Korea. Air force documents specify that up to four weapons can be housed in each vault.

Two vaults were to be built at each of the six bases where GLCMs were to be deployed, and it is possible that spare warheads were to be stored in the vaults. The signing of the INF Treaty in 1987 obviated the need for these vaults, and they were never built.

The United States later built vaults for British bombs at two bases in Europe--10 at the Royal Air Force (RAF) base in Brüggen, Germany, and 24 at the base in Marham, Britain. The RAF later ended its nuclear mission, retired its WE177 bombs, and deactivated the vaults. As a result of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the INF Treaty, and

other factors, the air force scaled back considerably the number of vaults to be built as part of the WS3 program. Excluding British bases, the air force built 215 vaults at 13 sites in seven countries. With the completion of the vaults at Incirlik Airbase, in Turkey, in April 1998, the WS3 program was capable of accommodating up to 860 weapons. Since 1995, the Defense Department has closed one base containing 11 vaults and removed nuclear weapons from three other bases, leaving 23 vaults presumably in caretaker status. Greece has also ended its nuclear role in NATO, adding six vaults to the list in caretaker status.

Burden sharing unravelling?

European countries have long contributed to NATO's common defense by "burden sharing," which has included allowing U.S. nuclear weapons to be based within their borders.

At first, eight nations agreed to host U.S. nuclear weapons, but France's withdrawal from NATO's integrated military command left seven. As the public debate about European deployments raged during the 1970s and 1980s, there were occasional murmurings that the United States would completely remove its weapons from one country or another. Fearing a domino effect, the United States typically squelched dissent and pressured its allies to uphold their original agreements even after the main rationale for the deployments had changed.

This trend has shown signs of changing. Twenty B61 bombs were airlifted out of Araxos Airbase in the spring of 2001, and the U.S. custodial unit, the 731st Munitions Support Squadron, was stood down on June 20, 2001, ending more than 40 years of U.S. nuclear weapons deployment to Greece. With no fanfare or apparent dispute, Greece gave up its last nuclear responsibility.

The reasons for the Greek withdrawal are unknown. Greece may have decided that continuing to fund the nuclear mission, with no clear danger to the East, was not worth the cost. There are some indications that other allies may follow suit. The United States withdrew nuclear weapons from some bases in Germany, Italy, and Turkey in the mid-1990s, but instead of removing the weapons from those countries, they were consolidated to larger bases where the weapons are earmarked for use by the host nation.

U.S. B61 bombs in Europe, 2004

Location	Delivery aircraft	WS3 storage vaults			Number			
		No.	Capacity	Completed	U.S.	Host	Total	
Belgium	Kleine Brogel Airbase	Belgian F-16A/B	11	44	April 1992	0	20	20
Germany	Büchel Airbase	German PA-200 Tornados	11	44	Aug. 1990	0	20	20
	Memmingen Airbase		11	44	Oct. 1990	0	0	0
	Nörvenich Airbase	Tornados	11	44	June 1991	0	0	0
	Ramstein Airbase	US F-16C/D	55	220	Jan. 1992	90	40*	130
Greece	Araxos Airbase	Greek A-7	6	24	Sept. 1997	0	0	0
Italy	Aviano Airbase	US F-16C/D	18	72	Jan. 1996	50	0	50
	Ghedi Torre Airbase	Italian PA-200 Tornados	11	44	Jan. 1997	0	40	40
Netherlands	Volkel Airbase	Dutch F-16A/B	11	44	Sept. 1991	0	20	20
Turkey	Akinci Airbase	Turkish F-16	6	24	Oct. 1997	0	0	0
	Balikesir Airbase		6	24	Sept. 1997	0	0	0
	Incirlik Airbase	US F-16C/D	25	100	April 1998	50	40	90
Britain	RAF Lakenheath	US F-15E	33	132	Nov. 1994	110	0	110
Total			215	860		300	180**	480**

Notes: Memmingen Airbase is closed. Nörvenich, Araxos, Akinci, and Balikesir airbases are in caretaker status. One vault at Ramstein is a training vault. *Half of these weapons may have been returned to the United States after Memmingen closed in 2003. **These totals assume that the 20 bombs from Araxos have been moved to Ramstein or possibly Aviano. Alternatively, the weapons may have been returned to the United States.