

MASSAVERNIGINGSWAPENS IN HET MIDDEN-OOSTEN (1)

Egypte, Israël, Syrië

PENN – NL Facts and Reports Nr. 11

Juli 2002

Werkgroep Eurobom

PENN-Nederland

MASSAVERNIETIGINGSWAPENS IN HET
MIDDEN-OOSTEN (1)


Juli 2002

**PENN, het Project voor Europese Nucleaire
Non-proliferatie**, is opgezet om:

- * officiële discussies over de toekomst van kernwapens in Europa nauwgezet te volgen en deze te verhelderen;
- * analyses van en commentaren op deze ontwikkelingen te publiceren;
- * verdere maatregelen voor kernontwapening in Europa en substantiële Europese bijdragen aan kernwapenbeheersing, ontwapening en non-proliferatie te stimuleren;
- * te ijveren voor de volledige naleving van het Non-Proliferatieverdrag door de NAVO, de Europese Unie, en haar leden;
- * politieke belemmeringen op te werpen tegen ontwikkelingen die zouden kunnen leiden tot een Europese Unie met kernwapens;
- * te bevorderen dat de Europese Unie en al haar leden uiteindelijk niet-nucleaire leden van het NPV worden.

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Deze publikatie is mogelijk gemaakt door de
W. Alton Jones Foundation



Werkgroep Eurobom

PENN/Netherlands MPI/Netherlands

FACTS AND REPORTS

Juli 2002 – No. 11

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INLEIDING EN COMMENTAAR

Dit is eigenlijk de tweede F&R van onze 'regionale brandhaarden' reeks. Het leek de redactie zinvol om korte dossiers aan te leggen van de landen die de capaciteit bezitten om massavernietigingswapens te maken, of ze aan het ontwikkelen zijn, op basis van publiekelijk beschikbare informatie. Daarbij beperken we ons niet tot de door President Bush aangewezen landen, de zogenaamde 'boevenstaten'. We zullen ook de stand van zaken beschrijven in de landen die meestal als westerse bondgenoten worden gezien. Bij alle door ons besproken landen zullen we bekijken wat er bekend is van de Nederlandse betrokkenheid, zowel diplomatiek als economisch. Daarbij heeft de wapenhandel onze belangstelling, zeker als er een verband gelegd kan worden met massavernietigingswapens. In volgende afleveringen komen Iran, Irak en Saoudie Arabie, evenals Japan, Taiwan, Noord en Zuid-Korea aan bod.

In dit nummer van Facts & Reports, de elfde in de reeks, wordt de aanwezigheid van massavernietigingswapens in Israël, Syrië en Egypte bekeken. De atoombewapening van Israël, die ook over vliegtuigen en raketten beschikt om kernkoppen naar hun doel te brengen, is onomstreden. Egypte beschikt in ieder geval over een chemische wapencapaciteit, die in het verleden in Jemen ook gebruikt is. Recentere berichten in het Duitse blad 'Die Welt' als zou Egypte verdergaande stappen hebben genomen naar nucleaire bewapening vallen niet te controleren, maar zulke stappen lijken een logische reactie op de Israëlische kernwapens.

Wel zeker zijn de uitgebreide wapenleveranties vanuit Nederland aan Israël, waarbij een duidelijke keuze wordt gemaakt voor ondersteuning van deze kernwapenstaat. De lijst van leveranties spreekt voor zichzelf.

Commentaar

De 'niet-erkende' kernbewapening van Israël heeft in het Midden-Oosten vergaand gevolgen. Met name Egypte heeft vele malen geprobeerd de kernbewapening van Israël internationaal aan de orde te stellen. Deze is ook vele malen onderwerp geweest van resoluties van de Algemene Vergadering van de Verenigde Naties, maar deze bleven zonder gevolgen, omdat de belangrijkste bondgenoot van Israël, de VS, hier geen enkel steun aan gaf. Gezien de algemene gespannen situatie in het Midden Oosten lijkt het waarschijnlijk dat een wapenwedloop met massavernietigingswapens vroeg of laat uitmondt in oorlog. Een nieuwe oorlog met Irak zou bijvoorbeeld rampzalige gevolgen kunnen hebben. Om die reden is het wenselijk om te streven naar een wapen embargo voor de hele regio. Nederland zou kunnen beginnen met het intrekken van haar militaire steun voor Israël. Verder bieden de pleidooien van Egypte voor een zone vrij van alle massavernietigingswapens in ieder geval een ingang om de regio veiliger te maken.

MIDDEN-OOSTEN

Center for Defense Information (CDI)

Iran, Israel and nuclear weapons in the Middle East

Washington - 14 februari 2002

[...]

Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East

The Persian Gulf and the Middle East, though nominally separate geographic identities, are linked fundamentally as one broad political-military region. The dynamics of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and Israel's relative military superiority, invariably affect the thinking of all the Arab/Persian communities in the region. Even without Israel, there are inter-Arab and regional rivalries that provide impetus for proliferation. The Iran-Iraq war was a powerful formative experience for both these countries and their concept of national security and deterrence. Likewise, Israel's long history of conflict with its neighbors, its innate sense of vulnerability, and the hostility it faces from the Gulf States will drive its own elusive search for security.

Israel's nuclear weapons are an outgrowth of its sense of being besieged and the corresponding doctrine that arises from this psychology. Israeli military strategy has long focused on preemptive conventional capabilities and the ability to carry the battle away from Israeli territory and its population centers. Given the delays inherent in mobilizing a largely reservist Army, the country relies heavily upon its Air Force to stem the tide of battle and supply breathing room. Thus, as the analyst Geoffrey Kemp notes, any threat that undermines the superiority of the air force also calls into question the Israeli concept of deterrence. Arab advances in missile technology, air defenses, and chemical weapons seem to offer just such a threat. Thus, nuclear weapons are seen as a hedge against conventional attack as well as a deterrent against weapons of mass destruction.

Israel's nuclear weapons program dates back to the late 1950s and the construction of the nuclear facility at Dimona, in the Negev. Here, with French and later South African assistance, the Israelis embarked upon a nuclear weapons program that, according to U.S. Intelligence estimates, is thought to have yielded between 75 and 130 devices. Some reports indicate that Israel instituted a nuclear alert during the 1973 Yom Kippur War and again in 1991 during the Gulf conflict. Information about the Israeli weapons program is somewhat conjectural. The Israeli government does not admit to possessing nuclear weapons and is not a member of the NPT. Dimona remains a closed site not subject to international inspections or safeguards. There exists no official mention of how nuclear weapons fit into Israeli strategic thinking, and their role in the Israeli Defense Force's doctrine is therefore a matter of guesswork.

The states arrayed against Israel hold that it is their right to develop nuclear weapons as a deterrent to the Israeli arsenal. They believe that Washington maintains a double standard by ignoring Israel's acquisition of weapons of mass destruction while opposing the transfer of even peaceful nuclear technologies to others. Both Iraq and Iran have sought a nuclear capability as a strategic equalizer. In the case of Iraq, however, nuclear weapons serve an ambition greater than that of a relative deterrent. Saddam's search for regional hegemony meant that he must both overcome Iran's strategic superiority and stake a claim to leadership of the Arab world. In Saddam's eyes, weapons of mass destruction in general, and nuclear weapons specifically, serve both purposes. They counter Iran's strategic depth and demographic superiority. They are also seen to threaten and confront Israel. Thus they play to broader inter-Arab themes.

Israel is understandably averse to seeing its nuclear advantage eroded. Indeed, as its strike on the Osiraq reactor in Iraq in 1981 demonstrated, Israel is ready to maintain a nuclear monopoly in the region through the use of force. That the world was a safer place following the destruction of the Iraqi reactor is undoubted. And it is noteworthy that Iraq possessed a relatively advanced military program despite its membership in the NPT. However, in the long run, the tactical success of the air raid may prove to be counterproductive. It certainly underscored the Arab belief that their defenses could only be marginally effective against Israel in the absence of a credible nuclear deterrent. Additionally, Arab governments reacted with a mixture of indignation and suspicion at Israel's de facto claim to a monopoly. Applying the logic of the East-West balance of power persuaded some in the region of the stability that nuclear proliferation might impart. This logic may be dubious, but it nevertheless provides a powerful incentive for countries seeking a nuclear weapons capability. These dynamics tend to reinforce themselves. Iraq's weapons programs may have been intended to confront Israel, but it was the Iranians who suffered from Saddam's obsession with chemical weapons as the world, including the United States, looked on in silence during their eight-year war. This instilled in Tehran the

powerful lesson that it must be responsible for its own defense. U.S. acquiescence to the Israeli nuclear program further erodes Tehran's faith in the equal application of international arms regimes. They hesitate to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) despite their own doubts as to the utility of these weapons. Iranian attempts to hedge against perceived threats, couched as they often are in incendiary rhetoric aimed at Israel, simply reinforces Iran's image as a proliferator.

Iran has posited the creation of a weapons of mass destruction-free zone in the Middle East, but this approach is disingenuous. The idea links Israel's nuclear weapons capability to an *eventual* political settlement that Iran actively opposes. Such a strategy seeks to place the burden of proof on Israel's intention to forgo its nuclear deterrent. Tel Aviv will not address the nuclear question without a *prior*, far-reaching political settlement and several years of confidence building measures. Thus the mechanics for a regional nuclear arms race are, for the time being, locked into place.

The Israeli nuclear arsenal will continue to drive Iranian and Iraqi WMD acquisition efforts for the foreseeable future. In turn, these ambitions are likely to underscore Israel's sense of vulnerability. Furthermore, the perception that nuclear weapons connote independence, equality, and prestige will likely survive any regime change in Baghdad, further perpetuating proliferation in the region as a whole. Strategies of containment and technology denial may slow the process, but they offer no permanent solutions.

Beginning the long process of integrating Iran fully into the world community as a responsible member could provide a keystone upon which to build a broader settlement. Rejection of Israel and the United States are not necessarily popular or static characteristics of traditional Iranian foreign policy. Ironically, there exists in Iran a far greater popular consensus for engagement than seems to exist in either United States or Israel. Engaging Iran has its share of pitfalls. But talk of an "axis of evil" or bombing the Bushehr reactor sites can only retard progress along the path towards controlling nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.

*By Michael Donovan
CDI Research Analyst*

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Verenigde Naties

Resolutie over een kernwapenvrije zone in het Midden Oosten

A/C.1/56/L.5

17 October 2001

United Nations General Assembly

Fifty-sixth session

First Committee

Agenda item 71

Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East

Egypt: draft resolution

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 3263 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3474 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/71 of 10 December 1976, 32/82 of 12 December 1977, 33/64 of 14 December 1978, 34/77 of 11 December 1979, 35/147 of 12 December 1980, 36/87 A and B of 9 December 1981, 37/75 of 9 December 1982, 38/64 of 15 December 1983, 39/54 of 12 December 1984, 40/82 of 12 December 1985, 41/48 of 3 December 1986, 42/28 of 30 November 1987, 43/65 of 7 December 1988, 44/108 of 15 December 1989, 45/52 of 4 December 1990, 46/30 of 6 December 1991, 47/48 of 9 December 1992, 48/71 of 16 December 1993, 49/71 of 15 December 1994, 50/66 of 12 December 1995, 51/41 of 10 December 1996, 52/34 of 9 December 1997, 53/74 of 4 December 1998, 54/51 of 1 December 1999 and 55/30 of 20 November 2000 on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Recalling also the recommendations for the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East consistent with paragraphs 60 to 63, and in particular paragraph 63 (d) of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,

Emphasizing the basic provisions of the above-mentioned resolutions, which call upon all parties directly concerned to consider taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East and, pending and during the establishment of such a zone, to declare solemnly that they will refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices and from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory by any third party, to agree to place their nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and to declare their support for the establishment of the zone and to deposit such declarations with the Security Council for consideration, as appropriate,

Reaffirming the inalienable right of all States to acquire and develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,

Emphasizing the need for appropriate measures on the question of the prohibition of military attacks on nuclear facilities,

Bearing in mind the consensus reached by the General Assembly since its thirty-fifth session that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would greatly enhance international peace and security,

Desirous of building on that consensus so that substantial progress can be made towards establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East,

Welcoming all initiatives leading to general and complete disarmament, including in the region of the Middle East, and in particular on the establishment therein of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons,

Noting the peace negotiations in the Middle East, which should be of a comprehensive nature and represent an appropriate framework for the peaceful settlement of contentious issues in the region,

Recognizing the importance of credible regional security, including the establishment of a mutually verifiable nuclear-weapon-free zone,

Emphasizing the essential role of the United Nations in the establishment of a mutually verifiable nuclear-weapon-free zone,

Having examined the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of General Assembly resolution 55/30,

1. *Urges* all parties directly concerned to consider seriously taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, and, as a means of promoting this objective, invites the countries concerned to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

2. *Calls upon* all countries of the region that have not done so, pending the establishment of the zone, to agree to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;

3. *Takes note* of resolution GC(45)RES/18, adopted on 21 September 2001 by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency at its forty-fifth regular session, concerning the application of Agency safeguards in the Middle East;

4. *Notes* the importance of the ongoing bilateral Middle East peace negotiations and the activities of the multilateral Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security in promoting mutual confidence and security in the Middle East, including the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone;

5. *Invites* all countries of the region, pending the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, to declare their support for establishing such a zone, consistent with paragraph 63 (d) of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,¹ and to deposit those declarations with the Security Council;

6. *Also invites* those countries, pending the establishment of the zone, not to develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or permit the stationing on their territories, or territories under their control, of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices;
7. *Invites* the nuclear-weapon States and all other States to render their assistance in the establishment of the zone and at the same time to refrain from any action that runs counter to both the letter and the spirit of the present resolution;
8. *Takes note* of the report of the Secretary-General;²
9. *Invites* all parties to consider the appropriate means that may contribute towards the goal of general and complete disarmament and the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the region of the Middle East;
10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to pursue consultations with the States of the region and other concerned States, in accordance with paragraph 7 of resolution 46/30 and taking into account the evolving situation in the region, and to seek from those States their views on the measures outlined in chapters III and IV of the study annexed to his report of 10 October 1990 or other relevant measures, in order to move towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East;
11. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its fifty-seventh session a report on the implementation of the present resolution;
12. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-seventh session the item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East".

Aangenomen zonder stemming op 30 oktober 2001 (First Committee) en op 29 november 2001 (Algemene Vergadering).

Verenigde Naties

Resolutie over het risico van nucleaire proliferatie in het Midden-Oosten

A/C.1/56/L.25

18 October 2001

United Nations General Assembly

Fifty-sixth session

First Committee

Agenda item 77

The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East

Egypt: draft resolution (on behalf of States Members of the UN that are members of the League of Arab Nations)

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind its relevant resolutions,

Taking note of the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the latest of which is resolution GC(45)RES/18, adopted on 21 September 2001,

Cognizant that the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region of the Middle East would pose a serious threat to international peace and security,

Mindful of the immediate need for placing all nuclear facilities in the region of the Middle East under full-scope safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency,

Recalling the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 11 May 1995, in which the Conference urged universal adherence to the Treaty as an urgent priority and called upon all States not yet parties to the Treaty to accede to it at the earliest date, particularly those States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities,

Recognizing with satisfaction that, in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Conference undertook to make determined efforts towards the achievement of the goal of universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and called upon those remaining States not parties to the Treaty to accede to it, thereby accepting an

international legally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices and to accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all their nuclear activities, and underlined the necessity of universal adherence to the Treaty and of strict compliance by all parties with their obligations under the Treaty,

Recalling the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 11 May 1995, in which the Conference noted with concern the continued existence in the Middle East of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, reaffirmed the importance of the early realization of universal adherence to the Treaty and called upon all States in the Middle East that had not yet done so, without exception, to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible and to place all their nuclear facilities under full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards,

Noting that Israel remains the only State in the Middle East that has not yet become party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Concerned about the threats posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons to the security and stability of the Middle East region,

Stressing the importance of taking confidence-building measures, in particular the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, in order to enhance peace and security in the region and to consolidate the global non-proliferation regime,

Emphasizing the need for all parties directly concerned to consider seriously taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and, as a means of promoting this objective, inviting the countries concerned to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and pending the establishment of the zone, to agree to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.

Noting that one hundred and sixty-one States have signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, including a number of States in the region,

1. *Welcomes* the conclusions on the Middle East of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;
2. *Reaffirms* the importance of Israel's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East;
3. *Calls upon* that State to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons without further delay and not to develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons, and to renounce possession of nuclear weapons, and to place all its unsafeguarded nuclear facilities under full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards as an important confidence-building measure among all States of the region and as a step towards enhancing peace and security;
4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its fifty-seventh session on the implementation of the present resolution;
5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-seventh session the item entitled "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East".

Aangenomen met 139 stemmen voor, 3 tegen (Israel, Micronesië, Verenigde Staten) en 7 onthoudingen van stemming (Australië, Canada, Ethiopië, India, Kameroen, Marshall Eilanden, Ruanda) op 2 november (First Committee) en met 153 stemmen voor, 3 tegen (Israel, Micronesië, Verenigde Staten) en 6 onthoudingen van stemming (Australië, Canada, Ethiopië, India, Tongo, Trinidad-Tobago) op 29 november (Algemene Vergadering).

PrepCom van het NPV (New York – april 2002)

Factual Summary

By chairman Henrik Salander (Sweden)

18 April 2002

[...] On the issue of universality, States parties reaffirmed the importance of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and recognized that the resolution remains valid until its goals and objectives are achieved. The resolution is an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Conference and of the basis on which the NPT was indefinitely extended without a vote in 1995. States parties

reiterated their support for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction. States parties noted that all States of the region of the Middle East, with the exception of Israel, are States parties to the NPT. States Parties called upon Israel to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible and to place its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards. Some States parties affirmed the importance of establishing a mechanism within the NPT review process to promote the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. [...]

**Statement by H.E. Ambassador Mahmoud Mubarak
Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs For Multilateral Relations
Head of the Delegation of the Arab Republic of Egypt
9 April 2002**

[...] The Final Document of the 2000 Review conference reaffirmed that the Middle East Resolution adopted by the 1995 Review Conference constitutes an integral part of the results of the 1995 Conference and of the basis on which the Treaty was indefinitely extended in 1995. It also reaffirmed that the Resolution remains valid until its goals and objectives are achieved. The same Document explicitly emphasized the importance of Israel's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under the comprehensive IAEA safeguards. Thus it is incumbent upon the States party to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, to take all the steps necessary to urge Israel to adhere to the Treaty and to place all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA safeguards. This is all the more urgent since all states of the Middle East have acceded to the Treaty, with the exception of Israel, which continues to place obstacles before the efforts made to render the region free from nuclear weapons. [...]

**Statement by H.E. Mr. Makmur Widodo
Permanent Representative of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations, on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
8 April 2002**

[...] We reiterate our support for the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and to this end, we reaffirm the need for the speedy establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in accordance with the relevant General Assembly resolutions adopted by consensus and Security Council resolutions 487 (1981) and 687 (1991). We call upon all parties concerned to take urgent and practical steps towards the establishment of such a zone and, pending its establishment to call on Israel, the only country in the region that has not joined the NPT, nor declared its intention to do so, to renounce possession of nuclear weapons, to accede to the NPT without delay, to place promptly all its nuclear facilities under IAEA Safeguards and to conduct its nuclear related activities in conformity with the non-proliferation regime. We recall that the 2000 Review Conference reaffirmed the importance of Israel's accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA Safeguards, in realizing the goal of the universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East. [...]

**Statement by the Acting Head of the United Kingdom Delegation, Ambassador Peter Jenkins.
9 April 2002**

[...] We call upon [...] Israel, to resolve international concerns about its nuclear status by acceding to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. [...]

EGYPTE

KERNWAPENS

Federation of American Scientists

(www.fas.org/nuke/guide/egypt/nuke/index.html)

Nuclear Weapons Program

The Egyptian nuclear program was launched in 1954. Egypt acquired its first nuclear reactor from the Soviet Union in 1961. The two megawatt reactor was opened by President Gamal Abdel-Nasser at Inchass, in the Nile Delta. But the Egyptian nuclear ambition was discarded following the 1967 defeat at the hands of Israel. As a result, Egypt lost many of its nuclear experts who had to travel abroad to seek work opportunities. Some emigrated to Canada and others joined the Iraqi nuclear program. Evidently Egypt has decided to concentrate on increasing conventional forces, and chemical and biological weapons, rather than developing nuclear weapons.

At the same time, however, serious work on developing nuclear potential designated for use in power engineering, agriculture, medicine, biotechnology, and genetics continues. Industrial incorporation of four explored uranium deposits is planned, including the extraction and enrichment of uranium for subsequent use as fuel for atomic power plants.

In the mid-1970s the US promised to provide Egypt with eight nuclear power plants and the necessary cooperation agreements were signed. In the late 1970s, the US unilaterally revised the bilateral agreements and introduced new conditions that were unacceptable to the Egyptian government. As a result, the decision was taken to ratify the NPT, with one goal in mind – the implementation of a nuclear power program. Before his assassination in 1981, President Anwar Sadat announced plans to build two nuclear power stations along the Mediterranean coast. These plans, though, were subsequently shelved. There are [poorly attested] reports that Egypt is planning a Chinese-made power reactor, variously assessed at between 300 MW and 600 MW, that could have the capacity to produce material for the production of as many as four nuclear warheads a month. Egypt is believed to be seeking joint nuclear weapons research with Syria and Saudi Arabia to defray costs and allow Egypt to continue its conventional military buildup.

In early 1992, a deal was made for Argentina to deliver one more reactor with a capacity of 22 megawatts to Egypt. The contract signed in 1991 for the delivery to Egypt of a Russian MGD-20 cyclotron accelerator remains in force. Since 1990 Egypt has been a member of the Arab Power Engineering Organization uniting 11 countries. A number of Egyptian scientific projects are being carried out under the aegis of the IAEA. There are bilateral agreements in the area of the peaceful use of atomic energy with Germany, the United States, Russia, India, China, and Argentina. There are, moreover, agreements with Great Britain and India to provide assistance in training national cadres for scientific research and work on the country's atomic enterprises.

Egypt has subscribed to the Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Since 1974, Egypt has taken the initiative of proposing to render the Middle East nuclear-weapons free zone, calling all countries in the region without exception to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In April 1990, Egypt took the initiative to render the Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction. The 1991 Madrid Peace Conference established a multinational mechanism to work on making the Middle East a nuclear weapon-free zone. This mechanism, however, stalled three years ago as a result of the Israeli position. Egypt hosted in April 1996 the conference for signing the declaration on rendering Africa a nuclear-weapons free zone.

Sources and Resources

- Egypt The Nuclear Potential of Individual Countries Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons Problems of Extension Appendix 2 *Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service* 6 April 1995
- Egypt's True Defense Expenditures - 2.7 or 14 Billion Dollars? Shawn Pine *Ariel Center for Policy Research* -- a 300MW Chinese made reactor currently being built will be able to produce 4 nuclear warheads a month

Geheimdienst: Kairo will Atombomben bauen

Ägypten soll dabei sein, mit Hilfe Chinas Uran anzureichern und Langstreckenraketen zu kaufen

Von Jacques Schuster

22 juni 2002

Berlin - Ägypten ist dabei, auf der Sinai-Halbinsel Uran zu schürfen, mit chinesischer Hilfe anzureichern und Langstreckenraketen zu erwerben. Zu diesem Schluss kommen westliche Geheimdienstkreise, die der WELT Informationen über Kairos Bestrebungen zugespielt haben, massiv aufzurüsten und sich mit ABC-Waffen zu versorgen. Die ägyptische Regierung bestreitet jegliche Absicht, an einem nuklearen Militärprojekt zu arbeiten. Auch die internationale Atombehörde in Wien gibt auf Nachfragen an, von etwaigen Waffenentwicklungen in Ägypten nichts zu wissen.

Dennoch verdichten sich die Hinweise, dass Kairo seine Bemühungen verstärkt, Uran zu erwerben und derart anzureichern, dass es künftig möglich würde, Atomwaffen herzustellen. Ein Indiz dafür ist die Unterzeichnung eines ägyptisch-chinesischen Abkommens über die Zusammenarbeit bei der friedlichen Nutzung der Atomenergie. Dieser Vertrag wurde bei dem letzten Besuch Präsident Hosni Mubaraks in Peking vom 23. bis 26. Januar dieses Jahres unterzeichnet. Das Abkommen, das weit gehend geheim gehalten wurde, sieht laut Geheimdienstinformationen genaue Vorkehrungen für die Zusammenarbeit bei Forschung und Entwicklung, bei Ortung und Nutzung von Uranvorkommen vor. Ein zentraler Bestandteil des Abkommens ist die chinesische Hilfe beim Abbau natürlicher Uranvorkommen auf der Sinai-Halbinsel. Der aus ägyptischer Sicht wichtigste Bereich des Vertrages mit China aber stellt die Kooperation bei der Erforschung der Produktion von Uranhexafluorid (UF₆) dar, das bei der Anreicherung von Uran in Zentrifugen verwendet wird. Diese Art der Urananreicherung wurde zuerst 1940 beim so genannten Manhattan-Projekt der Amerikaner zum Bau einer Atombombe entwickelt. In den letzten Jahren versuchten auch der Iran und der Irak, auf diese Weise Uran anzureichern.

Folgt man den Aussagen aus Geheimdienstkreisen, bemüht sich Ägypten außerdem, in verschiedenen afrikanischen Staaten den Kauf von Uran auszuloten. Dabei wird immer wieder der Niger als einer der potentiellen Handelspartner genannt. Außerdem gibt es Anzeichen dafür, so die geheimdienstlichen Quellen, dass Kairo bereits natürliches Uran erworben hat. Bedeutung kommt in diesem Zusammenhang einer Information aus China zu. Nach dieser Quelle soll sich Peking im Juli 2001 geweigert haben, ein ägyptisches Frachtschiff in seine Hoheitsgewässer zu lassen. Der Frachter sei in hohem Maße verstrahlt gewesen, hieß es. Was die Langstreckenraketen anbelangt, steht Kairo seit Ende der neunziger Jahre im Verdacht, mit Nordkorea zusammenzuarbeiten. Immer wieder gab es Meldungen über ägyptische Versuche, nordkoreanische No-Dong-Raketen zu erwerben, die bis zu 1300 Kilometern reichen können. Zwar scheint es, dass das ägyptische Verteidigungsministerium den Kauf dieser Raketen derzeit verschoben hat. Geheimdienstkreise aber glauben, dass Kairo die Transaktion nur mit Rücksichtnahme auf die gegenwärtige amerikanische Politik gegenüber Nordkorea hinauszögert. Ein Anlass für diese Spekulation sind die Kenntnisse westlicher Geheimdienste über den massiven Ankauf von Lastwagen des Typs MAZ-547, den Ägypten in Nordkorea, Weißrussland und der Ukraine tätigt. Lastwagen dieser Klasse werden häufig als Abschussrampe für Raketen im Allgemeinen, für die No-Dong-Rakete im Besonderen verwendet. Geheimdienstexperten fürchten, Kairo bereite alles für den Erwerb dieser Raketen vor, um den Handel bei passender Gelegenheit zu tätigen. Als günstiger Zeitpunkt für den Kauf wird der Beginn der amerikanischen Offensive gegen den Irak genannt. Washington wäre in diesen Wochen mit anderen Dinge beschäftigt, folglich abgelenkt, heißt es.

Die ägyptische Regierung dementiert all diese Nachrichten. Dennoch betont Mubarak seit langem, dass eine zur Abschreckung fähige ägyptische Militärmacht für das Gleichgewicht im Nahen Osten unerlässlich sei. Was damit gemeint sein könnte, erklären seine Berater. Die Experten des amerikanischen "Wisconsin Project" zur Überwachung von Nuklearwaffen, etwa berichten in ihrem Risikoreport über Ägypten, dass hochrangige ägyptische Offizielle immer wieder darauf hinweisen, wie notwendig eigene Atomwaffen vor dem Hintergrund der israelischen Nuklearkapazitäten seien. Dazu passt auch ein Meinungsbeitrag Mustafa Al Baqis in der ägyptischen Tageszeitung "Al-Ahram" vom 21. Mai dieses Jahres. In diesem Artikel beklagt der enge Vertraute des Präsidenten das Versäumnis Kairos, keine Atomwaffen erworben zu haben. Al Baqi fordert die Regierung auf, ihre bisherige Haltung zu überdenken und sich Nuklearwaffen zu besorgen. Geschieht dies, wird sich die Lage im Nahen Osten wohl weiter verschärfen.

Chronologie der Aufrüstung

1961 Mit sowjetischer Hilfe beginnt Kairo den Bau eines Forschungsreaktors

1972 Die Sowjetunion liefert Frog-7-Missiles

1981 Kairo unterzeichnet den Atomwaffensperrvertrag

1986 Ägyptens Regierung erhält Zugriff auf das nordkoreanische Scud-B-Raketenprogramm

1988 wird ein ägyptischer Offizier beim Schmuggel von Carbon in Baltimore erwischt, das für die Kernspaltung notwendig ist

1989 Ägypten beharrt auf seinem Recht, chemische Waffen zu besitzen

1996 Amerikanischer Geheimdienst entdeckt sieben Schiffsladungen von nordkoreanischen Scud-C-Raketen, die nach Ägypten transportiert werden sollten

1998 Präsident Mubarak erklärt, sein Land werde sich Atomwaffen besorgen, falls es nötig sei

Die Welt

Ägypten rüstet in allen Bereichen systematisch auf

Milliarden für Panzer, Kampffjets und Scud-Raketen. Nur ein Bruchteil der Militärausgaben wird im Haushalt veröffentlicht

Von Evangelos Antonaros

22 juni 2002

Athen - Trotz Rückschlägen im Wirtschaftsbereich betreibt Ägypten seit Jahren ein besonders ehrgeiziges und äußerst aufwendiges Rüstungsprogramm. Nach dem ölreichen Saudi-Arabien gilt das arme Ägypten als der weltweit zweitwichtigste Kunde für Waffensysteme jeder Art. Die im Staatshaushalt enthaltenen Rüstungsausgaben nehmen seit 1990 unaufhaltsam zu. Sie dürften allerdings nur einen Bruchteil der tatsächlich für Anschaffungen im Verteidigungsbereich vorgesehenen Staatsausgaben ausmachen. Beträge in Milliardenhöhe - davon gehen westliche und israelische Militärexperten aus - werden als streng gehütetes Staatsgeheimnis behandelt und daher nirgendwo erwähnt.

Die jährlich etwa 1,3 Milliarden Dollar US-Militärhilfe reichen zur Finanzierung nur eines kleinen Teils der ägyptischen Anschaffungen aus. Zu fast 80 Prozent wird sie von der Luftwaffe in Anspruch genommen. Die seit Anfang der achtziger Jahre mit mehreren Fünf-Jahres-Programmen systematisch vorangetriebene Modernisierung der Streitkräfte und die Umstellung des Arsenal von bis dahin erstrangig russischen auf westliche Waffensysteme wird mit eigenen Geldmitteln und mit zinsgünstigen Krediten, oft gar auch mit Subventionen der reichen Golfstaaten vorangetrieben. Ebenfalls wird seit gut zehn Jahren die Produktion eigener Waffensysteme gefördert, um die Abhängigkeit von westlichen Lieferungen einzudämmen und die daraus resultierenden Kosten in Grenzen zu halten.

Durch eigene Waffenproduktionen, die durch zahlreiche bilaterale Kooperationsabkommen mit über 30 Staaten abgesichert sind, will sich Ägypten ebenfalls Kontrollen westlicher Inspektoren entziehen. So weigert sich Kairo seit Jahren beharrlich, die Herstellung eigener Massenvernichtungswaffen zuzugeben, obwohl der damalige Präsident Sadat bereits 1970 behauptet hatte, dass Ägypten "tiefgekühlte biologische Waffen" besitze, die es im Ernstfall gegen Israels Bevölkerung einsetzen könnte. Solche Waffen hatte Ägypten schon 1963 beim jemenitischen Bürgerkrieg eingesetzt. Ebenfalls lässt sich Ägypten bei seiner Atomwaffenstrategie nicht in die Karten schauen mit der Behauptung, allen Ländern in der Region stehe das Recht zu, "für die eigene Sicherheit zu sorgen", solange Israel Nuklearwaffen besitze und dem Nichtverbreitungsabkommen nicht beitrete.

Bei westlichen Experten stand Ägypten Ende der neunziger Jahre im Verdacht, eine enge Kooperation im Nuklearbereich mit Nordkorea anzustreben. Auch mit Russland wird eine engere Zusammenarbeit im Bereich der Raketentechnologie angestrebt. Unklar ist zurzeit, welche Reichweite die bereits im Besitz der ägyptischen Streitkräfte befindlichen Raketen besitzen. Anders als die USA, die ihren wichtigen arabischen Partner möglicherweise aus strategischen Gründen nicht öffentlich an den Pranger stellen wollen, behauptet Israel, dass Kairo im Stillen ein Raketenprogramm betreibe, das bereits eine "akute Gefahr" für Israels Sicherheit darstelle. Zahlreiche Scud-C-Raketen mit einer Reichweite von 500 Kilometern sollen nach israelischen Angaben mit chemischen und biologischen Sprengköpfen bestückt sein.

Oft ist es in der Vergangenheit zu Verstimmungen zwischen Washington und Kairo gekommen, weil Ägypten verschiedene unter amerikanische Verbote fallende so genannte Dual-Use-Komponenten an die Nordkoreaner geliefert haben soll. Trotzdem wird die Modernisierung der ägyptischen Streitkräfte mit amerikanischer Hilfe

zünftig vorangetrieben. Das geschieht vor allem im Bereich der Luftwaffe, wo von den etwa 550 ägyptischen Kampfflugzeugen etwa die Hälfte westlicher Herkunft sein soll. Bei 190 von ihnen handelt es sich sogar um moderne Jets vom Typ F 16. Ebenfalls ist die Kampfhubschrauberflotte mit bis zu 36 Apache-Helikoptern modernisiert worden.

Parallel dazu betreibt Kairo die Ausstattung seiner Landstreitkräfte (zurzeit zwölf Divisionen) mit modernen Panzern und gepanzerten Mannschaftsfahrzeugen. Seit dem Golfkrieg produziert Ägypten im Rahmen einer Kooperation mit den USA unter dem Programm "Factory 200" den amerikanischen M1A1-Panzer.

Die Welt

Araber brauchen Atomwaffen für ein strategisches Gleichgewicht

DIE WELT dokumentiert Auszüge eines Artikels der ägyptischen Tageszeitung "Al Ahram" vom 21. Mai 2002

22 juni 2002

Der Autor, Mustafa Al Baqi, war Büroleiter des ägyptischen Staatspräsidenten Husni Mubarak und ständiger Vertreter seines Landes bei der Internationalen Atombehörde in Wien. Noch heute gilt er als enger Berater des Präsidenten. In seinem Beitrag setzt sich Al Baqi mit der Frage auseinander, ob die Araber eine atomare Rüstung brauchen?

. . . Die sich . . . aufdrängende Frage ist: Ist es sinnvoll für die Araber, Atomwaffen zu besitzen? Nicht, um sie einzusetzen, wohl aber, um eine Politik der Abschreckung und des Gleichgewichts zu Israel zu schaffen? Ein atomares Gleichgewicht realisierten zum Beispiel Staaten wie Pakistan und Indien nur, weil sie dem Atomwaffensperrvertrag nicht beitraten - wir schon. Und die letzten Wochen zeigten, dass diese Balance Indien und Pakistan vom Krieg abhielt. Dabei darf nicht vergessen werden: Israel trat dem atomaren Klub recht früh bei, als es die Anlage "Dimona" erbaute. Ziel war, Furcht unter den Arabern zu erregen und benachbarte Staaten abzuschrecken - die eigene Sicherheit aufrechtzuerhalten und die Nachbarn in Unruhe zu stürzen.

Wie oft bedrängte ich während der Sitzungen der Internationalen Atombehörde meinen israelischen Kollegen, dass sein Land dem Sperrvertrag beitrete. Er verwies wiederum immer auf die "pakistanische" oder die "iranische Gefahr". So behielt sich Israel immer das atomare Vorrecht auf Kosten seiner Nachbarn vor, ohne sich um Verständigung und Frieden in der Region zu bemühen. Atomare Gehversuche des Irak zerstörte Israel 1991 ebenso, wie es im Konflikt zwischen Pakistan und Indien mit letzterem militärisch und strategisch kooperierte. . . .

Angesichts des arabisch-israelischen Konflikts obliegt es nun den Arabern, nach anderen Mitteln der Auseinandersetzung zu suchen. Mit ihnen meine ich nicht nur militärische, sondern: Professionalisierung der Bildung, Stärkung des Kulturlebens und Hochtechnologien - damit modernisiert sich ein Staat, um Herausforderungen zu begegnen. Auch der durch Israel: Nähern wir uns dem Nachbarn beim technologischen Fortschritt an und öffnen wir unsere Wirtschaft, so erhält die Region jenes strategische Gleichgewicht, welches Frieden bringt. Auch wird so jeder davon abgehalten, sich in ein militärisches Abenteuer zu stürzen. Gegenseitiger Respekt ist vonnöten. Der wird ebenfalls realisiert, wenn in den arabischen Ländern die Teilnahme am politischen Leben verbreitert wird, wenn der Pfad der Demokratisierung und der Verfassungsreformen weitergegangen wird.

Vergessen wir dabei, dass Israel sich stets mit seiner Demokratie brüstet, aber in erster Linie ein rassistischer Staat ist? Einige Politiker Israels weisen unermüdlich auf die fehlende Demokratie und die gefesselten Freiheiten bei den Arabern hin. Allerdings: Ist Israel nicht diese entsetzliche Macht, die sich nicht an internationale Beschlüsse hält und in ihrer Aggressivität die Rechte anderer nicht respektiert? Dieser Staat ist außerhalb von Gesetzen und Ethik - und schämt sich dafür nicht. . . .

Im Oktoberkrieg 1973 hätte Israel beinahe begrenzte Atomwaffen gegen ägyptische Panzer eingesetzt. Erinnern wir uns: Vor zehn Jahren beschloss der israelische Staat, jedes arabische Land zu bestrafen, welches Atomwaffen herstellt. Die Araber verfügen über genügend Geld, um die atomaren Grundstoffe zu kaufen. Wir haben auch die nötigen Experten, allein in Ägypten gibt es mehr als zehn, die als Inspektoren in der Internationalen Atombehörde arbeiten. Dieser steht ein angesehener ägyptischer Diplomat vor.

Vor alledem aber wäre hierzu politischer Wille zu einem Atomprogramm über Jahre hinweg notwendig. Dies darf kein Wille zur Aggression oder gar zur Bedrohung anderer sein; wohl aber einer zur Schaffung eines strategischen Gleichgewichts in der Region, welches die Rechte schützt und die Heiligtümer bewahrt.

Wir dürfen keine träumende Gesellschaft sein und auch keine elendige. Wir sollten allerdings den Umständen ihr wahres Gewicht beimessen und sie richtig beurteilen. Wir haben die Grundlagen, uns in eine Lage zu versetzen, die viel besser als die jetzige wäre. Vorausgesetzt, die Absichten sind aufrichtig, die Gefühle lautern und die Vernunft steht über allem.

Übersetzung aus dem Arabischen von Jan Rübél

Die Welt

Chinesische Firmen sind den USA wegen Waffenexporten ein Dorn im Auge

Die USA gaben bekannt, dass sie am 9. Mai erneut Sanktionen gegen chinesische Staatsunternehmen und eine dubiose Rolle spielende Geschäftsleute beschlossen haben

Von Johnny Erling

22 juni 2002

Peking - Für das Dementi brauchte das Pekinger Außenministerium einen Tag Zeit: Es stimme, dass Peking und Kairo im Januar eine Zusammenarbeit zur friedlichen Nutzung der Kernenergie unterzeichnet haben. Die Frage, ob die Atommacht China dabei Ägypten hilft, Uran in solchen Mengen zu schürfen, produzieren und anzureichern, wie es zum Herstellen von Atomwaffen nötig ist, stelle sich nicht: "In der Frage von Nuklearexporten befolgt China strikt drei Prinzipien: dass ihre Nutzung zu friedlichen Zwecken garantiert wird; dass eine Garantieüberwachung durch die internationale Atomenergiebehörde akzeptiert wird; dass ohne Genehmigung der chinesischen Seite die Nuklearexporte an keinen dritten Staat weitergegeben werden."

Doch es geht nicht nur um Prinzipien der Exportkontrolle, sondern darum, wozu das Know-how verwendet werden kann. Auch die konkreten Fragen nach der Verwicklung chinesischer Firmen bei der Weiterverbreitung (Proliferation) von nicht nuklearen Massenvernichtungswaffen beantwortet Peking am liebsten nur prinzipiell.

Vergangenen Monat gaben die USA bekannt, dass sie am 9. Mai erneut Sanktionen gegen chinesische Staatsunternehmen und eine dubiose Rolle spielende Geschäftsleute beschlossen hatten. Sie seien in Exporte von Raketenteilen und Chemikalien an den Iran verwickelt. Das Außenministerium protestierte.

Von den 14 Beschuldigten, die vom State Department auf seine schwarze Liste gesetzt wurden und damit von Geschäften mit den USA verbannt sind, kamen aber acht aus China. Darunter seien, so die "Washington Times", Unternehmen wie China North Industries (Norinco) und China Shipbuilding Trading oder Unternehmen des Maschinenbaus und der Luftfahrt. Sie sollen an den Iran Komponenten für neu entwickelte Antischiff-Raketen geliefert haben, die auf verbesserten einst auch von China gekauften Silkworm-Raketen beruhen. Chemieausrüstern wie Liyang Chemical Equipment oder Zibo Equipment wurde vorgeworfen, Produkte zu liefern, die der Iran beim Bau von Chemiewaffen nutzen konnte.

Es war das dritte Mal, dass die USA seit Herbst chinesische Firmen wegen Weitergabe von Massenvernichtungswaffen mit Sanktionen belegen. Das Außenministerium bestritt alle Vorwürfe und verlangte nach Nachweisen. Am 1. September hatten die USA die China Metallurgical Equipment Corporation beschuldigt, Technologie für Pakistans Raketen, die nuklear bestückt werden können, zugeliefert zu haben. Am 11. Januar wurden zwei Firmen wegen Lieferungen für Irans Chemie- und biologische Waffen auf den Index gesetzt.

Die neuen Fälle schüren einen schon schwelenden Konflikt. Im August 2001 hatten republikanische Senatoren Präsident Bush zu mehr Druck auf China aufgefordert. Peking hätte in der Vergangenheit sechs Mal Versprechungen gebrochen, keine Raketentechnologien zu exportieren, dann aber doch Pakistan, Syrien und Nordkorea beim Aufbau seiner Raketenprogramme unterstützt.

Westliche Diplomaten erinnerten an die Warnung von US-Botschafter Clark T. Randt beim Februarbesuch von US-Präsident George Bush in Peking. Für die USA, so der Botschafter, sei die Proliferationsfrage zum Kardinalproblem des USA/China-Verhältnisses geworden. Sie komme noch vor Streitfragen wie Menschenrechte, Religion, Tibet oder Pekings Haltung zur MD-Raketenabwehr.

Für die USA wird eine nachprüfbare Unterbindung chinesischer Exporte von Massenvernichtungswaffen immer wichtiger. Drei der bisherigen vier Hauptnutznieder chinesischer Lieferungen, der Irak, der Iran und Nordkorea bilden für Bush die "Achse des Bösen". Hinzu kommen Raketenlieferungen an Pakistan, die partiell offenbar auch in Afghanistan landen. US-Truppen haben dort gerade Raketen chinesischen Ursprungs entdeckt.

China lässt sich Zeit, amerikanische Wünsche zu erfüllen, zumal die USA derzeit Taiwan aufrüsten. Besuche Pekinger Politiker im Nahen und Mittleren Osten haben sich gehäuft. Das von Ölimporten abhängige China

muss bereits mit gut 80 Millionen Tonnen ein Drittel seines Bedarfs einführen und kauft Öl vorwiegend im Nahen Osten. Es hat dort eigene Interessen.

Ha'aretz

German newspaper: Egypt is trying to obtain nuclear weapons

By Ha'aretz Service
22 juni 2002

Western intelligence agencies have reached the conclusion that Egypt is taking steps to obtain nuclear weapons, the German daily *Die Welt* reported Saturday. According to the report, Egypt intends to mine natural uranium in the Sinai Peninsula and enrich it to weapons' grade material with the help of Chinese technology. The material would then be used on long-range missiles.

The paper also said that Egypt had in the past few years considered obtaining enriched uranium from several African countries.

Die Welt stressed that Egypt has denied the existence of any military nuclear project, and that the International Atomic Energy Agency, located in Vienna, confirmed that it has no information on nuclear developments in Egypt. The paper claimed that despite the denial, there have been increased hints that Cairo was stepping up its attempts to attain and enrich uranium, so as to be able to produce nuclear weapons in the future.

On January 23, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak set out for an official trip to China. During the visit the two countries signed an agreement on cooperation. Most of the details of the agreement have remained confidential, although security sources believe that the agreement between the two countries regards cooperation on matters of research, development, use of uranium sources, and especially "Chinese aid for mining natural uranium in the Sinai Peninsula."

Die Welt

Israels Medien diskutieren WELT-Bericht über Ägypten

Mit großer Aufmerksamkeit hat Israels Medienwelt die Nachricht von einem ägyptischen Entwicklungsprojekt für Nuklearwaffen aufgenommen

25 juni 2002

Tel Aviv - Der Radiosender "Kol Israel" zitierte am Wochenende mehrfach die WELT, die diese Meldung veröffentlicht hatte - die großen Zeitungen folgten.

Die Zeitung "Ma'ariv" kommentierte die Nachricht auf einer ganzen Seite unter der Rubrik "Kampf gegen Terror". Darin befragte Experten äußerten Zweifel. Der "Vater der israelischen Atombombe", Yuval Neeman, verwies auf eigene Versuche in den siebziger Jahren, Uranvorkommen auf der damals von Israel besetzten Halbinsel Sinai auszunutzen. "Israelische Wissenschaftler haben diese Möglichkeit untersucht. Die Schwierigkeit bestand in der Gewinnung des reinen Urans, das dort stark mit andern Rohstoffen vermischt ist."

Gerald Steinberg vom Begin-Center für Strategische Studien zweifelt ebenfalls an der Meldung. Er spricht aber auch von der "ägyptischen Obsession" mit nuklearen Angelegenheiten: "Vor allem, da die Armeeführung mit ansehen muss, wie der Irak und der Iran in diesem Bereich vorwärts kommen."

Die angesehene Tageszeitung "Ha'aretz" griff die Meldung auf ihrer Frontseite auf. Sie verweist auf das ägyptische Dementi. Die Zeitung befragte Shai Feldman, Leiter des Jaffee-Center für Strategische Studien. Schon vor zehn Jahren verwies er in einem Buch auf die Schürfung von natürlichen Uranvorkommen in Ägypten. "Darin allein besteht noch keine Nukleargefahr. Sie ist auch nicht bei der Atombehörde in Wien meldepflichtig." Die "Schlüsselfrage" ist laut Feldman die Anreicherung des geschürften Urans. Die Antwort hänge von der chinesischen Bereitschaft ab, dabei zu helfen. Feldman glaubt an die chinesische Rücksichtnahme auf US-Vorbehalte gegen die Weiterverbreitung von Nuklear-Know-how.

Auch "Ha'aretz" registriert die in der WELT aufgereihten Indizien. "Israelische Experten erkennen eine Debatte zwischen der Führung um Präsident Husni Mubarak und anderen über die Notwendigkeit, die erworbenen No-Dong-Raketen auch mit Atomsprengköpfen auszurüsten." In Israel herrscht der Eindruck vor, Ägypten werde nicht vom Atomwaffensperrvertrag zurücktreten - zumindest "nicht in naher Zukunft". NJ

Die Welt

Ägypten schon im Besitz von Langstreckenraketen?

Kairo soll bereits über 24 No-Dong-Raketen verfügen. WELT-Bericht über Atomwaffenprogramm von Regierung nicht dementiert

Von Evangelos Antonaros
27 juni 2002

Athen - Ägypten ist allen anderslautenden Beteuerungen gegenüber den USA zum Trotz höchstwahrscheinlich jetzt schon im Besitz von nordkoreanischen Mittelstreckenraketen vom Typ No-Dong. Nur wenige Tage nachdem DIE WELT über Bemühungen Kairos im Atomwaffenbereich in Zusammenarbeit mit China berichtet hatte, behauptete der gewöhnlich sehr zuverlässige Informationdienst Middle East News Line (MENL) unter Berufung auf US-Geheimdienstquellen, dass 24 Raketen dieser Art bereits in Ägypten eingetroffen seien. Der amerikanische Geheimdienst CIA habe bereits einen entsprechenden Bericht angefertigt und dem Weißen Haus und dem US-Kongress vorgelegt. Danach sollen 24 No-Dong-Raketen (Reichweite bis zu 1300 Kilometer) seit der ersten Jahreshälfte 2001 irgendwo in Ägypten gelagert sein. Nach Ansicht von Experten sollen sie sich im Landesosten, also in relativer Nähe zur Grenze mit Israel, untergebracht sein.

Ursprünglich sollen die Raketen ohne die benötigten Triebwerke geliefert worden sein. Aber unlängst soll über Libyen auch die Lieferung von schätzungsweise 50 Triebwerken erfolgt sein. Rüstungsexperten im Nahen Osten gehen davon aus, dass das Raketengeschäft der Ägypter mit Nordkorea über die libysche Schiene abgewickelt wird, um den Westen, und insbesondere die USA, in die Irre zu führen. Kairo, das jährlich eine US-Militärhilfe in Höhe von 1,3 Milliarden Dollar bezieht, hat nämlich von Anfang beteuert, einen Kauf weder der nordkoreanischen Raketen noch deren Triebwerke anzustreben. Dazu ein Experte gegenüber MENL: "Alle im Westen, die dieses Geschäft bremsen wollten, haben nun eine schallende Ohrfeige ins Gesicht bekommen."

Zu den Berichten hüllt sich die ägyptische Regierung weiterhin in Schweigen - eine von Kairo übrigens beliebte Taktik. Auch ein klares Dementi eines ägyptischen Atomwaffenprogramms vor dem Hintergrund der neuesten Berichte der WELT ist in Kairo ausgeblieben. Die ägyptische Regierung vertritt offiziell den Standpunkt, dass Nuklearwaffen im Nahen Osten nichts zu suchen hätten. Aber solange sich die Regierung in Jerusalem nicht daran halte, so der Standpunkt zahlreicher Experten mit guten Beziehungen zur ägyptischen Staatsspitze, sollte sich Kairo seine Haltung überdenken, keine Nuklearwaffen anzustreben.

Die nordkoreanische Raketentechnologie ist vor allem in denjenigen Ländern des Nahen Ostens besonders beliebt, die auf den schwarzen Listen von westlichen Waffenproduzenten stehen und keine Möglichkeit haben, Raketen westlicher Produktion zu erwerben. Insbesondere Syrien, der Iran und Libyen sollen in diesem Bereich eng mit Nordkorea kooperieren und gelieferte Raketen teilweise mit eigenem Know-how - etwa im Falle Iran - weiterentwickelt und mit einer größeren Reichweite ausgestattet haben.

Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control

Egypt's Budding Nuclear Program

The Risk Report

Volume 2 Number 5 (September-October 1996).

Argentina is building a nuclear reactor in Egypt that will give Cairo its first access to bomb quantities of fissile material, possibly enough plutonium to make one nuclear weapon per year. Although Egypt's nuclear program is now open to international inspection, there is reason for Cairo's foreign suppliers to proceed with caution: High-level Egyptian officials continue to say that Israel's nuclear arsenal is reason enough for Arab nations to build their own atomic bombs. In addition, Cairo is now building ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads.

Egypt's Foreign Minister Amre Mousa is adamant that Israel should be blamed if other Mideast nations build the bomb: "If there is a nuclear program in Israel, then we can blame nobody and no country if they want to acquire the same...this is an invitation to an arms race--a very, very serious and dangerous policy." The Foreign Minister's remarks were made this summer at a gathering of Mideast experts and journalists in Washington, DC. No one at the meeting brought up the fact that virtually all Arab states, including Egypt,

Libya and Syria, are members of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which obliges them not to pursue nuclear weapons.

Egypt joined the Treaty in 1981, but is now one of its leading critics. In 1995, Egypt strongly opposed efforts to extend the Treaty indefinitely. In April of last year, Amre Mousa argued that Israel's failure to adhere to the NPT means the treaty is "incapable of safeguarding Egypt" and has created "an extremely dangerous situation" in the Middle East.

Egypt's nuclear history

At the center of Egypt's nuclear program is the Inshas Nuclear Research Center in Cairo. Inshas hosts a 2-megawatt, Soviet-supplied research reactor that started in 1961 and runs on ten-percent-enriched uranium fuel. The reactor was shut down for renovation during the 1980s, but started up again in 1990. According to Egypt's Atomic Energy Agency, the reactor should serve Egypt's research needs for the next ten years, by which time Egypt hopes to have completed a larger research reactor to replace it.

Egypt also runs a number of other research facilities at Inshas. These include a small French-supplied hot cell complex for plutonium extraction research, the Middle East's first industrial electronic accelerator, and a pilot nuclear fuel factory, completed in 1987, used to process natural uranium mined in Egypt. In addition, Egypt plans to build a larger fuel fabrication plant, reportedly with help from Germany.

Egypt's expanded nuclear activity has raised some eyebrows in Israel. In 1990, the Israeli press reported that Egypt was cooperating with Pakistan, Iraq and Argentina to build a plutonium-producing reactor for nuclear weapons. Argentina later revealed that it was preparing to supply a 20-MWt research reactor to Egypt under international inspection, though Argentina faced competition from other bidders, including the Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd., and France's nuclear giant, Framatome.

By September 1992, Egypt had signed a contract with Inwap, Argentina's leading nuclear organization, to build a 22-megawatt research reactor at Inshas. According to statements by an official at Argentina's embassy in Washington, DC, construction began in March 1993. In 1995, Egypt's *Rose al-Yusuf* magazine reported that Egypt's Minister of Electricity and Energy, Mahim Abazah, had confirmed that a shipment of supplies was en route from Argentina in April, and that the reactor would be completed in 1997. Egyptian officials still expect the reactor to start operation next year.

As Cairo was making up its mind about which type of research reactor to buy, U.S. and Canadian officials reportedly steered Egypt away from Chinese models. In exchange for giving up Chinese imports, Egypt was reportedly promised help from the Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) and the U.S. Bechtel company to study the feasibility of building power reactors in Egypt. The industry trade newsletter, *Nucleonics Week*, reported in September 1992 that the AECL-Bechtel study found that only 30 percent of a Canadian-style power reactor could be locally produced in Egypt.

Egypt still hopes to import power reactors. Egyptian officials have talked since the early 1980s about building up to eight 1,000-MWe reactors to supply up to 40 percent of Egypt's electricity needs. By mid-1985, three international supplier groups had bid to build the first two reactors: one group led by Germany's Kraftwerk Union, a second Franco-Italian group led by Framatome, and a third headed by Westinghouse of the United States. The reactors would be sited at El-Dabaa, outside Alexandria, and would be owned and operated by Egypt's Nuclear Power Plants Authority. But as the *Risk Report* went to press, the Egyptian government had not announced the award of any contract.

Uranium processing

Egypt has also been busy surveying its uranium ore resources. Cairo would like to develop its own ability to make uranium fuel for nuclear reactors. Egypt's Nuclear Materials Authority has directed uranium exploration to concentrate on four areas in the eastern desert: Gabal Gattar, El Missikat, El Erediya and Um Ara. A new uranium-bearing area, Gabal Kadabora, has been discovered in the central eastern desert and is now under evaluation. In addition, the Nuclear Materials Authority is constructing a pilot scale plant to extract uranium from phosphoric acid. Cairo has reportedly signed contracts with Australia, Canada and Niger to buy mining technology and for help in processing uranium ore.

DRAAGSYSTEMEN

Federation of American Scientists

(www.fas.org/nuke/guide/egypt/missile/index.html)

Missile Programs

Egypt has a highly developed weapons production capacity, second in the Middle East only to Israel. In the early 1960s, President Gamal Abdel Nasser pursued a crash missile production program with German assistance at "Factory 333" in Heliopolis, a few miles east of Cairo.¹ Three rockets were reportedly under development there: the 375-km range al Zafar, the 600-km range al Kahar, and the 1,000-km range al Raid. All three systems were canceled when the West German government put an end to the cooperation in 1966.² However, in the early 1970s the Soviet Union supplied Egypt with Frog-7s and Scud-Bs, a few of which were fired against Israel in the Yom Kippur War with little or no effect.³

Egypt is believed to have produced the Scud-B indigenously - perhaps modifying them to extend their range - with some North Korean assistance.⁴ An enhanced Scud-C (called "Project T"), with range/payload of 450 km/985 kg, is reported to have been developed and may be in service.⁵ In cooperation with the French Société Nationale des Poudres et Explosifs (SNPE), Egypt has developed, produced, and deployed the Sakr-80 rocket as a replacement for the aging Frog missiles. The Sakr factory is responsible for producing the warheads, launchers and fire control systems for the Sakr-80. Various warheads were under development there in early 1988, including an HE armor piercing warhead, an antipersonnel/antimateriel submunition warhead, and an antitank minelet warhead; however, a chemical warhead was not planned.⁶ According to press reporting from June 1990, China has signed a protocol with Egypt to help modernize the Sakr missile factory, "enabling it to produce a newer version of Soviet anti-aircraft missiles, the surface-to-surface Scud-B and Silkworm and the Egyptian Sakr rockets."⁷

Egypt began collaborating with Argentina on the Badr-2000 (which parallels the Argentine Condor II) in 1984. The Badr/Condor was to be an advanced two-stage, solid-fuel, inertially guided ballistic missile, and was described as "state-of-the-art." It was expected to deliver a 700 kg payload over 1,000 km, accurate to within 100 meters.⁸ In late September 1989, Assistant Secretary of State John Kelly testified to the House Foreign Affairs Middle East Subcommittee that Egypt had terminated its cooperation with Iraq on the Condor II.⁹ He did not explain when or why the Egyptians withdrew from the project. However, this move followed Egyptian embarrassment over the attempted smuggling, in June 1988, of 200 kg of carbon-carbon material, which is used as a protective coating for ballistic missile warheads. The Egyptian defense minister at the time, Abdel Halim Abu Ghazala, was implicated in the scandal, and was fired in April 1989.¹⁰ Although the Condor II cancellation was a severe set-back to the Egyptian missile program, the collaboration did enhance indigenous capabilities - as did North Korean and other assistance - and provided considerable missile-related technology that undoubtedly has been applied to the Scud improvement program.¹¹

Prior to the 171-nation vote in 1995 extending the NPT, Egypt launched a high visibility campaign to pressure Israel into signing the Treaty. Since the beginnings of its nuclear program in the early 1960s, Israel has fostered a deliberate ambiguity about whether it has developed and deployed operational nuclear weapons and has refused to be a NPT signatory. This ambiguity has allowed Israel to hold a nuclear Sword of Damocles over any potential Arab state threatening it with WMD, while preserving its freedom from NPT constraints. Despite early credible evidence that Israel was intent on becoming a nuclear weapons state and Nasser's vow that, in response, Egypt would "secure atomic weapons at any cost," Egypt has apparently made no significant effort to allocate resources or seek outside assistance in developing a nuclear weapons capability.¹²

<http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/egypt/missile/> - N 12 Nor is there any evidence that Egypt has attempted to develop chemical or biological warheads. Thus, Egypt shows no intention of converting its Scud-Bs and -Cs into WMD.

Concerning missile proliferation, Egypt, though not a member of the MTCR, does not appear to be exploiting its presumed missile production capacity to market these weapons. Resource constraints may be one explanation for Egypt's modest missile capabilities. Another may be that its missile force has been developed only to the level needed to maintain status as a leader among the Arab states and a negotiator with the West. As the recipient of two billions dollars of U.S. aid annually, Egypt has good reason to choose diplomatic pressure, rather than arming Israel's enemies, to get Israel to sign the NPT as part of the Middle East peace process. Its continuing diplomatic efforts bear this out.

Voetnoten

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Resources

Egypt - Ballistic Missile Programmes from CDISS

BIO-CHEMISCHE WAPENS

Federation of American Scientists

(www.fas.org/nuke/guide/egypt/bw/index.html)

Biological Weapons Program

It is reported that Egypt's biological warfare efforts may include work on plague, botulism toxin and the encephalitis virus. Other research is said to include anthrax, Rift Valley fever, and mycotoxicosis. The extent of weaponization of any of these agents is unknown, but the extensive domestic Egypt armaments industry is probably capable of devising a variety of suitable delivery systems.

In 1970, the president of Egypt Anwar al-Sadat was reported to have stated that "Egypt has biological weapons stored in refrigerators and could use them against Israel's crowded population." Al-Sadat's declaration was apparently intended to warn Israel against a nuclear strike, and Israel did in fact contemplate the use of nuclear weapons in the darkest moments of the Yom Kippur War in 1973.

Sources and Resources

- The Evolution of Chemical and Biological Weapons in Egypt Dany Shoham, *Ariel Center for Policy Research* -- Egypt accomplished a fairly broad CBW program, operating two large dual-use factories, bordering each other and located near Cairo, as well as a variety of scattered dual-use supporting facilities.

- Egypt: Egypt War Preparations Against IDF Viewed ; FBIS-NES-98-320 ; 11/17/98 [Tel Aviv Hatzofe in Hebrew 25 Sep 98]

Federation of American Scientists

(www.fas.org/nuke/guide/egypt/cw/index.html)

Chemical Weapons Program

Egypt was the first country in the Middle East to obtain chemical weapons training, indoctrination, and matériel. Egyptian interest in chemical weapons may have been prompted by Israel's construction of the Dimona nuclear reactor in 1958. Chemical weapons are part of the Egyptian army's standard issue. While the size of its arsenal is not known, some estimates suggest that it may be similar to that of Iraq prior to the Gulf War.

During the Yemen War of 1963 through 1967, Egypt evidently used mustard bombs in support of South Yemen against royalist troops in North Yemen. Nasser's adventure in Yemen in 1963 on the side of a military coup began when the Egyptian army fought the Saudi Arabian backed royalist Yemeni tribes was the first time the Egyptian Army fights against Arabs since Ibrahim Pasha campaign against the Wahhabie rebels in Arabia in the 1820's. The use of chemical weapons against the Yemeni tribesmen was the first use of chemical

weapons in the Middle East. During the Yemeni civil war phosgene and mustard aerial bombs killed at least 1,400 people. Some reports claim that Egypt also used an organophosphate nerve agent against Yemeni Royalist forces.

Prior to the 1967 war with Israel, the fact that the Egyptian army was equipped with chemical weapons reportedly led to the preparation in Israel of thousands of graves that were designated for victims of gas attacks. It is also reported that on the eve of the 1973 Yom Kippur war Egypt supplied Syria with chemical weapons.

As of 1990 the Defense Intelligence Agency study "Offensive Chemical Warfare Programs in the Middle East" concluded that Egypt was continuing to conduct research related to chemical agents. For several years prior to the 1991 Gulf War, Egypt was believed to have been working with Iraq on the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. In September 1993 the London Times reported that Egypt had purchased "large quantities" of chemical weapons precursors from India, including about 90 tons of trimethyl phosphate, which is used in the production of mustard gas.

It is almost certain that the Egyptian chemical weapon stockpile continues to include mustard gas and phosgene, as were used in the 1960s in Yemen, and it is reported that the Egyptians also produce VX nerve gas. These agents are probably available for delivery in munitions such as mines, artillery shells, salvo bombs, rockets, air-to-surface bombs and missile warheads. It has been suggested, with some plausibility, that chemical agent warheads have been developed for the "Condor" missile project, which was abandoned, and for the Scud-C missile, which is operational.

As part of the campaign against the Israeli nuclear weapons program, in 1993 Egypt instituted a policy against signing the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which bans the acquisition, development, stockpiling, transfer, retention and use of chemical weapons. Under the terms of the Convention, each State Party is also obligated to destroy chemical weapons it owns or possesses and any chemical weapons production facilities it owns or possesses. The formal negotiations which led to the Chemical Weapons Convention began in the early 1980s and concluded on 3 September 1992 when the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva adopted the text of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction. The CWC will not be global because Iraq, Libya, Syria, North Korea and Egypt have not signed the treaty, while others who have a confirmed or suspected chemical weapons program have signed but may not ratify it. However, in May 2000, the CWC's automatic economic penalties will cut off these countries from the international market in a variety of commercial chemicals that have potential military utility.

Sources and Resources

- The Evolution of Chemical and Biological Weapons in Egypt Dany Shoham, *Ariel Center for Policy Research* -- Egypt accomplished a fairly broad CBW program, operating two large dual-use factories, bordering each other and located near Cairo, as well as a variety of scattered dual-use supporting facilities.
- A Chemical Weapons Atlas By E.J. Hogendoorn Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists September/October 1997 Vol. 53, No. 5
- Egypt: Egypt War Preparations Against IDF Viewed ; FBIS-NES-98-320 ; 11/17/98 [Tel Aviv Hatzofe in Hebrew 25 Sep 98]

NEDERLANDS BELEID

Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Landenoverzicht Egypte

6 december 2001

[...]

4.1 Betrekkingen met Nederland

Nederland en Egypte onderhouden sinds vele jaren goede betrekkingen. In de politieke betrekkingen staan het Israelisch-Arabisch conflict en het Midden-Oosten vredesproces centraal. Er is sprake van een hoge mate van overeenstemming tussen de standpunten van de EU (die het gemeenschappelijk buitenlands- en veiligheidsbeleid van de lidstaten, dus ook Nederland, uitdraagt) en Egypte ten aanzien van het vredesproces. De jarenlange ontwikkelingssamenwerking met Egypte (sinds 1975) heeft verder bijgedragen aan versteviging van de betrekkingen. De economische betrekkingen met Egypte zijn nog bescheiden, maar de laatste jaren toont een aantal Nederlandse bedrijven grote interesse in de mogelijkheden die Egypte biedt. Egypte wordt

gezien als een opkomende markt, met zowel een grote thuismarkt als een regionale functie. Kansen worden met name gezien in de sectoren transport en communicatie, infrastructuur, water en landbouw.

[...]

Ministerie van Defensie

NBC-Proliferatie

20 mei 1998

Notitie van de Minister van Defensie

DE PROLIFERATIE VAN NUCLEAIRE, BIOLOGISCHE EN CHEMISCHE WAPENS EN DE NEDERLANDSE KRIJGSMACHT

[...]

I.III Biologische wapens (BW)

[...]

Egypte lijkt thans niet over een BW-programma te beschikken. Ooit was zo'n programma er wel, maar dat is in de jaren zeventig beëindigd. Thans werkt Egypte wel intensief aan een omvangrijke biotechnologische infrastructuur, met behulp van "dual-use" technieken. Aanwijzingen voor oneigenlijk gebruik zijn er niet. De kennis om biologische wapens te maken is echter niet verloren gegaan.

[...]

NEDERLANDSE WAPENLEVERANTIES AAN EGYPTE (1992-2002)

Bron: Campagne Tegen Wapenhandel (www.antenna.nl/amokmar)

The Netherlands: Transfers and licensed production of major conventional weapons: Exports sorted by supplier. Deals with deliveries or orders made since 1992.

By SIPRI

This register lists major weapons on order or under delivery, or for which the licence was bought and production was under way or completed during 1992-. 'Year(s) of deliveries' includes aggregates of all deliveries and licensed production since the beginning of the contract. Sources and methods for the data collection, and the conventions, abbreviations and acronyms used, are explained in SIPRI Yearbooks. Entries are alphabetical, by supplier, recipient and licensee.

From the SIPRI database as of March 15, 2002

Recipient	No. ordered	Weapon designation	Weapon description	Year of order/licence	Year(s) of deliveries	No. delivered/produced	Comments
Egypt	304	AIFV	IFV	1994	1996-97	304	Ex-Dutch; deal worth \$135 m incl 12 M-577 APC/CPs, 210 AIFV-TOW tank destroyers and 85 AIFV-APC APCs
	85	AIFV-APC	APC	1994	1996	(85)	Ex-Dutch Army; incl 6 AIFV-CP APC/CP version; deal worth \$135 m incl 12 M-577 APC/CPs, 304 AIFV IFVs and 210 AIFV-TOW tank destroyers
	210	AIFV-TOW	Tank destroyer (M)	1994	1996	(210)	Ex-Dutch Army; deal worth \$135 m incl 6 AIFV-CP and 12 M-577 APC/CPs, 304 AIFV IFVs and 79 AIFV-APC APCs
	12	M-113A1	APC	1994	1997	(12)	Ex-Dutch Army; all M-577A1 APC/CP version; deal worth \$135 m incl 599 AIFVs and training

ISRAEL

KERNWAPENS

Federation of American Scientists

(www.fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/nuke/index.html)

Nuclear Weapons

The Israeli nuclear weapons program grew out of the conviction that the Holocaust justified any measures Israel took to ensure its survival. Consequently, Israel has been actively investigating the nuclear option from its earliest days. In 1949, HEMED GIMMEL a special unit of the IDF's Science Corps, began a two-year geological survey of the Negev desert with an eye toward the discovery of uranium reserves. Although no significant sources of uranium were found, recoverable amounts were located in phosphate deposits.

The program took another step forward with the creation of the Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) in 1952. Its chairman, Ernst David Bergmann, had long advocated an Israeli bomb as the best way to ensure "that we shall never again be led as lambs to the slaughter." Bergmann was also head of the Ministry of Defense's Research and Infrastructure Division (known by its Hebrew acronym, EMET), which had taken over the HEMED research centers (HEMED GIMMEL among them, now renamed Machon 4) as part of a reorganization. Under Bergmann, the line between the IAEC and EMET blurred to the point that Machon 4 functioned essentially as the chief laboratory for the IAEC. By 1953, Machon 4 had not only perfected a process for extracting the uranium found in the Negev, but had also developed a new method of producing heavy water, providing Israel with an indigenous capability to produce some of the most important nuclear materials.

For reactor design and construction, Israel sought the assistance of France. Nuclear cooperation between the two nations dates back as far as early 1950's, when construction began on France's 40MWt heavy water reactor and a chemical reprocessing plant at Marcoule. France was a natural partner for Israel and both governments saw an independent nuclear option as a means by which they could maintain a degree of autonomy in the bipolar environment of the cold war.

In the fall of 1956, France agreed to provide Israel with an 18 MWt research reactor. However, the onset of the Suez Crisis a few weeks later changed the situation dramatically. Following Egypt's closure of the Suez Canal in July, France and Britain had agreed with Israel that the latter should provoke a war with Egypt to provide the European nations with the pretext to send in their troops as peacekeepers to occupy and reopen the canal zone. In the wake of the Suez Crisis, the Soviet Union made a thinly veiled threat against the three nations. This episode not only enhanced the Israeli view that an independent nuclear capability was needed to prevent reliance on potentially unreliable allies, but also led to a sense of debt among French leaders that they had failed to fulfill commitments made to a partner. French premier Guy Mollet is even quoted as saying privately that France "owed" the bomb to Israel.

On 3 October 1957, France and Israel signed a revised agreement calling for France to build a 24 MWt reactor (although the cooling systems and waste facilities were designed to handle three times that power) and, in protocols that were not committed to paper, a chemical reprocessing plant. This complex was constructed in secret, and outside the IAEA inspection regime, by French and Israeli technicians at Dimona, in the Negev desert under the leadership of Col. Manes Pratt of the IDF Ordinance Corps.

Both the scale of the project and the secrecy involved made the construction of Dimona a massive undertaking. A new intelligence agency, the Office of Science Liaisons, (LEKEM) was created to provide security and intelligence for the project. At the height construction, some 1,500 Israelis some French workers were employed building Dimona. To maintain secrecy, French customs officials were told that the largest of the reactor components, such as the reactor tank, were part of a desalinization plant bound for Latin America. In addition, after buying heavy water from Norway on the condition that it not be transferred to a third country, the French Air Force secretly flew as much as four tons of the substance to Israel.

Trouble arose in May 1960, when France began to pressure Israel to make the project public and to submit to international inspections of the site, threatening to withhold the reactor fuel unless they did. President de Gaulle was concerned that the inevitable scandal following any revelations about French assistance with the project, especially the chemical reprocessing plant, would have negative repercussions for France's international position, already on shaky ground because of its war in Algeria.

At a subsequent meeting with Ben-Gurion, de Gaulle offered to sell Israel fighter aircraft in exchange for stopping work on the reprocessing plant, and came away from the meeting convinced that the matter was closed. It was not. Over the next few months, Israel worked out a compromise. France would supply the uranium and components already placed on order and would not insist on international inspections. In return, Israel would assure France that they had no intention of making atomic weapons, would not reprocess any plutonium, and would reveal the existence of the reactor, which would be completed without French assistance. In reality, not much changed - French contractors finished work on the reactor and reprocessing plant, uranium fuel was delivered and the reactor went critical in 1964.

The United States first became aware of Dimona's existence after U-2 overflights in 1958 captured the facility's construction, but it was not identified as a nuclear site until two years later. The complex was variously explained as a textile plant, an agricultural station, and a metallurgical research facility, until David Ben-Gurion stated in December 1960 that Dimona complex was a nuclear research center built for "peaceful purposes."

There followed two decades in which the United States, through a combination of benign neglect, erroneous analysis, and successful Israeli deception, failed to discern first the details of Israel's nuclear program. As early as 8 December 1960, the CIA issued a report outlining Dimona's implications for nuclear proliferation, and the CIA station in Tel Aviv had determined by the mid-1960s that the Israeli nuclear weapons program was an established and irreversible fact.

United States inspectors visited Dimona seven times during the 1960s, but they were unable to obtain an accurate picture of the activities carried out there, largely due to tight Israeli control over the timing and agenda of the visits. The Israelis went so far as to install false control room panels and to brick over elevators and hallways that accessed certain areas of the facility. The inspectors were able to report that there was no clear scientific research or civilian nuclear power program justifying such a large reactor - circumstantial evidence of the Israeli bomb program - but found no evidence of "weapons related activities" such as the existence of a plutonium reprocessing plant.

Although the United States government did not encourage or approve of the Israeli nuclear program, it also did nothing to stop it. Walworth Barbour, US ambassador to Israel from 1961-73, the bomb program's crucial years, primarily saw his job as being to insulate the President from facts which might compel him to act on the nuclear issue, allegedly saying at one point that "The President did not send me there to give him problems. He does not want to be told any bad news." After the 1967 war, Barbour even put a stop to military attachés' intelligence collection efforts around Dimona. Even when Barbour did authorize forwarding information, as he did in 1966 when embassy staff learned that Israel was beginning to put nuclear warheads in missiles, the message seemed to disappear into the bureaucracy and was never acted upon.


In early 1968, the CIA issued a report concluding that Israel had successfully started production of nuclear weapons. This estimate, however, was based on an informal conversation between Carl Duckett, head of the CIA's Office of Science and Technology, and Edward Teller, father of the hydrogen bomb. Teller said that, based on conversations with friends in the Israeli scientific and defense establishment, he had concluded that Israel was capable of building the bomb, and that the CIA should not wait for an Israeli test to make a final assessment because that test would never be carried out.

CIA estimates of the Israeli arsenal's size did not improve with time. In 1974, Duckett estimated that Israel had between ten and twenty nuclear weapons. The upper bound was derived from CIA speculation regarding the number of possible Israeli targets, and not from any specific intelligence. Because this target list was presumed to be relatively static, this remained the official American estimate until the early 1980s.

The actual size and composition of Israel's nuclear stockpile is uncertain, and is the subject of various estimates and reports. It is widely reported that Israel had two bombs in 1967, and that Prime Minister Eshkol ordered them armed in Israel's first nuclear alert during the Six-Day War. It is also reported that, fearing defeat in the October 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Israelis assembled 13 twenty-kiloton atomic bombs.

Israel could potentially have produced a few dozen nuclear warheads in the period 1970-1980, and might have possessed 100 to 200 warheads by the mid-1990s. In 1986 descriptions and photographs of Israeli nuclear warheads were published in the London Sunday Times of a purported underground bomb factory. The photographs were taken by Mordechai Vanunu, a dismissed Israeli nuclear technician. His information led some experts to conclude that Israel had a stockpile of 100 to 200 nuclear devices at that time.

By the late 1990s the U.S. Intelligence Community estimated that Israel possessed between 75-130 weapons, based on production estimates. The stockpile would certainly include warheads for mobile Jericho-1 and Jericho-2 missiles, as well as bombs for Israeli aircraft, and may include other tactical nuclear weapons of various types. Some published estimates even claimed that Israel might have as many as 400 nuclear weapons by the late 1990s. We believe these numbers are exaggerated.



The Dimona nuclear reactor is the source of plutonium for Israeli nuclear weapons, and the number of nuclear weapons that could have been produced by Israel can be estimated on the basis of the power level of this reactor. Information made public in 1986 by Mordechai Vanunu indicated that at that time, weapons grade plutonium was being produced at a rate of about 40 kilograms annually. If this figure corresponded with the steady-state capacity of the entire Dimona facility, analysts suggested that the reactor might have a power level of at least 150 megawatts, about twice the power level at which it was believed to be operating around 1970. To accommodate this higher power level, analysts had suggested that Israel had constructed an enlarged cooling system. An alternative interpretation of the information supplied by Vanunu was that the reactor's power level had remained at about 75 megawatts, and that the production rate of plutonium in the early 1980s reflected a backlog of previously generated material.

The upper and lower plausible limits on Israel's stockpile may be bounded by considering several variables, several of which are generic to any nuclear weapons program. The reactor may have operated an average of between 200 and 300 days annually, and produced approximately 0.9 to 1.0 grams of plutonium for each thermal megawatt day. Israel may use between 4 and 5 kilograms of plutonium per weapon [5 kilograms is a conservative estimate, and Vanunu reported that Israeli weapons used 4 kg].

The key variable that is specific to Israel is the power level of the reactor, which is variously reported to be at least 75 MWt and possibly as high as 200 MWt. New high-resolution satellite imagery provides important insight on this matter. The imagery of the Dimona nuclear reactor was acquired by the Public Eye Project of the Federation of American Scientists from Space Imaging Corporation's IKONOS satellite. The cooling towers associated with the Dimona reactor are clearly visible and identifiable in satellite imagery. Comparison of recently acquired commercial IKONOS imagery with declassified American CORONA reconnaissance satellite imagery indicates that no new cooling towers were constructed in the years between 1971 and 2000. This strongly suggests that the reactor's power level has not been increased significantly during this period. This would suggest an annual production rate of plutonium of about 20 kilograms.

Based on plausible upper and lower bounds of the operating practices at the reactor, Israel could have thus produced enough plutonium for at least 100 nuclear weapons, but probably not significantly more than 200 weapons.

Some type of non-nuclear test, perhaps a zero yield or implosion test, occurred on 2 November 1966 [possibly at Al-Naqab in the Negev]. There is no evidence that Israel has ever carried out a nuclear test, although many

observers speculated that a suspected nuclear explosion in the southern Indian Ocean in 1979 was a joint South African-Israeli test.

Sources and Resources

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- Israel and the Bomb Avner Cohen has provides a detailed account of of the political aspects of Israel's nuclear history that draws on thousands of American and Israeli government documents-most of them recently declassified and never before cited-and more than one hundred interviews with key individuals who played important roles in this story.
- Obsessive secrecy undermines democracy By Reuven Pedatzur Ha'aretz. Tuesday, August 8, 2000 -- Cohen published "Israel and the Bomb" in the United States, and a Hebrew translation of the book has appeared here. In the eyes of the defense establishment, Cohen has committed a double sin.
- Fighting to preserve the tattered veil of secrecy *By Ronen Bergman* The publication of Dr. Avner Cohen's book and of the Vanunu trial transcripts set off alarm bells for the Defense Ministry's chief of security, who is striving to protect the traditional opacity regarding Israel's nuclear affairs.
- Blast, from the past to the present By Yirmiyahu Yovel Ha'aretz. 28 July 2000 -- If, in the context of the peace agreements and talks with the United States, Israel were to confirm its nuclear capability - while committing itself to no nuclear testing and pledging to build its defense system on conventional weapons as in the past - maybe then it might achieve at least de facto recognition, if not international legitimacy, for its nuclear weaponry, to be used only as a "last resort" and a tool for safeguarding peace after Israel withdraws.
- Israel The Nuclear Potential of Individual Countries Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons Problems of Extension Appendix 2 *Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service* 6 April 1995
- Israel's Nuclear Weapons - A Case Study by Elizabeth Stevens
- The Samson Option. Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy Seymour M Hersh, [New York: Random House, 1991]
- Israel's Nuclear Development & Strategy: Future Ramifications for the Middle East Regional Balance By Laura Drake
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- Israel: Plutonium Production The Risk Report Volume 2 Number 4 (July-August 1996).
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STRATEGISCHE DOCTRINE

Federation of American Scientists

(www.fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/doctrine/index.html)

Strategic Doctrine

The creation of the State of Israel in 1948 was preceded by more than 50 years of efforts by Zionist leaders to establish a sovereign nation as a homeland for Jews. The desire of Jews to return to what they consider their rightful homeland was first expressed during the Babylonian exile and became a universal Jewish theme after the destruction of Jerusalem by the Romans in 70 A.D. and the dispersal that followed. After the end of World War II, and the near-extirmination of European Jewry by the Nazis, international support for Jews seeking to settle in Palestine overcame British efforts to restrict immigration, and laid the foundation for establishing a Jewish state. On 14 May 1948 the State of Israel was proclaimed. The following day, armies from neighboring Arab nations entered the former Mandate of Palestine to engage Israeli military forces.

The State of Israel has always had a single defense goal - to ensure the existence of Israel and the security of its citizens. Israel is tiny (smaller than New Jersey) when compared to its Arab neighbors. More pointedly, it lacks strategic depth. A hostile fighter could fly across all of Israel (40 nautical miles wide from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea) within four minutes, while traveling at "only" subsonic speed. Israel is unable to field a large standing force compared with those it faces and must rely on its reserves. Israel's small population also increases its sensitivity to civilian and military losses. To make up for quantitative disadvantages, Israel maintains as large a qualitative lead as possible. The IDF makes up for its lack of size by superior maneuverability and firepower, and by relying on intelligence.

Israeli national security strategy is founded on the premise that Israel cannot afford to lose a single war. Because the best way to avoid losing a war is to not fight it in the first place, Israeli strategy begins with the maintenance of a credible deterrent posture, which includes the willingness to carry out preemptive strikes. Should deterrence fail, Israel would seek to prevent escalation, and determine the outcome of war quickly and

decisively. Since it lacks strategic depth, Israel must prevent the enemy from entering its territory, and must try to quickly transfer the battle to enemy territory.

Israel applies its nuclear weapons to all levels of this formula. The total Israeli nuclear stockpile consists of several hundred weapons of various types, including boosted fission and enhanced radiation weapons ("neutron bombs"), as well as nuclear artillery shells. Strategically, Israel uses its long-range missiles and nuclear-capable aircraft (and, some say, submarines with nuclear-armed cruise missiles) to deter both conventional and unconventional attacks, or to launch "the Samson Option", an all-out attack against an adversary should defenses fail and population centers be threatened. In addition, despite Israel's insistence that it "will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East," these systems represent an effective preemptive strike force. At the same time, Israel deploys tactical systems designed to rapidly reduce an invading force. Following the 1973 war, Israel fielded at least three batteries of atomic-capable self-propelled 175mm cannons equipped with a total of no less than 108 warheads, and placed atomic land mines in the Golan Heights during the early 1980s.

Nuclear weapons need not be detonated to be used as weapons. Early in the 1973 war, Israel went on a nuclear alert, partly in the knowledge that it would be detected by the United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviets, Israel assumed, would restrain their Arab allies while the Americans would speed up resupply efforts. While the USSR did inform Egypt that Israel had armed three nuclear weapons, the extent to which Israel's nuclear alert affected the timing of Washington's subsequent decision to rearm Israel is not clear.

Israel does not have an overt nuclear doctrine beyond its insistence that it will not introduce nuclear weapons into the region. Instead, it follows a policy of what Avner Cohen calls "nuclear opacity" - visibly possessing nuclear weapons while denying their existence. This has allowed Israel to enjoy the benefits of being a nuclear weapons state in terms of deterrence without having to suffer the international repercussions of acknowledging their arsenal. Israel also has a strong commitment to preventing its potential adversaries in the region from becoming declared nuclear weapon states, as evidenced by Israel's 1981 raid on Iraq's Osirak nuclear installation.

Given the very long range of the Jericho-2 missile, some analysts have speculated that this system was developed to deter Soviet intervention in the region. The USSR has always been one of the primary targets of Israel's nuclear force, as Israeli assumptions hold that no Arab nation would attack Israel without Soviet support. The purchase of fifty F-4 fighters from the US in 1968 provided Israel with a platform capable of delivering a nuclear payload as far as Moscow, and it has actively pursued imagery and other information necessary for targeting weapons against the USSR. In 1979, the US agreed to provide Israel with access to high-resolution images of its neighbors taken by the KH-11 satellite. Israel was able to use this agreement to view targets of interest in western Russia (as well as to obtain targeting information for the attack on the Osirak reactor). Israel received more such data during the mid-1980s through the espionage activities of Jonathan Pollard.

Although commonly viewed as the ultimate guarantor of its security, the nuclear option has not led Israel to be complacent about national security. On the contrary, it has impelled Israel to seek unquestioned superiority in conventional capability over the Arab armies to forestall use of nuclear weapons as a last resort - as early as 1962-63, prime minister David Ben-Gurion eschewed restructuring the IDF to base it on nuclear weapons. Instead, IDF doctrine and tactics stress quality of weapons versus quantity; integration of the combined firepower of the three branches of the armed forces; effective battlefield command, communications, and real-time intelligence; use of precision-guided munitions and stand-off firepower; and high mobility.

As of 2000, Israel had not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968). It was, however, a party to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water (1963).

Sources and Resources

- Israel's Nuclear Policy: A Cost-Benefit Analysis - Sharad Joshi Strategic Analysis March 2000 Vol. XXIII No. 12 (2089-2110)
- The Third Temple's Holy Of Holies: Israel's Nuclear Weapons Warner D. Farr, LTC, U.S. Army, September 1999
- Israel and the Bomb, Avner Cohen has provides a detailed account of Israel's nuclear history that draws on thousands of American and Israeli government documents-most of them recently declassified and never before cited-and more than one hundred interviews with key individuals who played important roles in this story.
- The Samson Option by Seymour Hersh
- Preserving The Third Temple Commonwealth Israel's Nuclear Strategy By Louis Rene Beres, Professor of Political Science and International Law, Purdue University, *An address to the Department of War Studies King's College, London, October 16, 1996*

DRAAGSYSTEMEN

Federation of American Scientists

(www.fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/missile/index.html)

Missiles

Designation	Stages	Propellant	Range	IOC	Inventory	Comment
<u>Lance</u>	1	solid	130 km	~1975		
<u>Jericho 1</u>	1	solid	~500 km	~1970	? 50-100	
<u>Jericho 2</u>	2	solid	1,500-4,000 km	~1990	some	Shavit space launcher
<u>Popeye Turbo</u>	1	turbojet	200 - km	2000	12	Submarine-launched

Federation of American Scientists

(www.fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/sub/index.html)

Submarines

Three 1,925 ton Type 800 Dolphin class submarines have been built in German shipyards for the Israel Navy. Modern submarines with the most advanced sailing and combat systems in the world, they combine extensive sophistication with very easy operation. The purpose of these submarines is to enable the Israel Navy to meet all the tasks faced in the Mediterranean Sea in the 21st century. The submarines cost \$320 million each, and are twice as big as the aging *Gal*-class submarines that the Israeli navy has relied on to date.

It is generally agreed that these submarines are outfitted with six 533-millimeter torpedo tubes suitable for the 21-inch torpedoes that are normally used on most submarines, including those of the United States. Some reports suggest that the submarines have a total of ten torpedo tubes -- six 533-millimeter and four 650-millimeter. Uniquely, the Soviet navy deployed the Type 65 heavy-weight torpedo using a 650-millimeter tube. The four larger 25.5 inch diameter torpedo tubes could be used to launch a long-range nuclear-capable submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM). According to some reports the submarines may be capable of carrying nuclear-armed Popeye Turbo cruise missiles, with a goal of deterring an enemy from trying to take out its nuclear weapons with a surprise attack. Under a system of rotation, two of the vessels would remain at sea: one in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, the other in the Mediterranean. A third would remain on standby.

The project initially was structured to include an industrial team consisting of HDW and Thyssen Nordseewerke, lead by Ingalls Shipbuilding. The project, under which the boats would be built in the United States by Ingalls using US FMS funds, was cancelled in 1990. The crews of the submarines started training in 1994, and participated in the building process as well as in the acceptance procedures for weapon systems. Germany donated two of these submarines to Israel, which were delivered in 1997. Israel bought a third Dolphin submarine from Germany. The project to build the Israeli Navy's third submarine, named "Tekumah" was launched in Germany on 09 July 1998 with the participation of Defense Ministry Director General Ilan Biran and other naval officers. Tekumah [T'kumah] is the Hebrew word for "revival." The third submarine arrived in Israel during mid-1999.

A major role for hunter, killer and patrol submarines is the destruction of enemy submarines and shipping. In order to achieve this, the submarine must load, store and launch a range of stores. The submarine must also detect its target while attempting to remain covert. The Israel Navy has three Gal submarines. They were built in the 1970s at the Vickers shipyard in Britain, based on German blueprints. The Gal submarines are an important part of the main combat force of the Israel Navy.

The German Type 209 diesel electric submarine is the most popular export-sales submarine in the world, and sales continue as smaller nations modernize their aging fleets. Greece was the first country to order this type of submarine from Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft AG (HDW) of Kiel, Germany, and the first batch of these

submarines entered service in 1971. The 1,200-ton Type 209 submarine is a hunter killer submarine that India purchased from HDW, Germany. The initial contract was for 2 submarines to be sold and for 4 more to be constructed at the Mazagaon docks in Mumbai. The deal however went sour when it was hit by a bribery scandal, after the first four ships were delivered to the Indian Navy.

Advances in electric drive and power conditioning were introduced into the German Type 212. This German submarine has low and balanced signatures including acoustic signatures, longer submerged mission capability and a modern combat system with sophisticated sensors and state of the art torpedoes. The technologies inherent in this design include a fuel cell air independent propulsion (AIP) system with a back up single diesel generator, highly modular arrangements of critical areas and the frame carrying the diesel generator and auxiliary equipment such as the hydraulic pumps, compressors, etc.- is enclosed in a sound absorbent capsule and isolated from the pressure hull. The AIP system utilized is more commonly called 'MESMA'. Translated it means Autonomous Submarine Energy Module and was developed for submarines. The 1,720-ton Dolphin class is evidently somewhat larger than the 1,500-ton Type 212 submarines, and incorporates a conventional diesel-electric propulsion system rather than the AIP system.

Displacement: 1,720 tons submerged

Dimensions: 57 x 6.8 x 6.2 meters (187 x 22.5 x 20.5 feet)

Propulsion: Diesel-electric, 3 diesels, 1 shaft, 4,243 shp, 20 knots

Crew: 35

Sonar: ???

Armament: 6 21 inch torpedo tubes (14 torpedoes & Harpoon SSM)

German-built.

Number	Name	Year	Homeport
??	Dolphin	5/1998	
??	Leviathan	1999	
??	Tekumah	1999	

Sources and Resources

- Israel Acquires New Submarine Howard Diamond Arms Control Today July/August 1999 -- The Dolphin has 10 torpedo tubes (six 533-millimeter and four 650-millimeter) and can carry surface-to-surface missiles or torpedoes.
- Israel to get third German submarine, Military and Arms Transfer News Issue 95/5, 17 March 1995
- Israel buying 3 submarines to carry nuclear missiles By Martin Sieff, The Washington Times July 1, 1998
- Swimming with the Dolphins By Yossi Melman Ha'aretz Tuesday, June 9, 1998
- Swimming with the Dolphins By Yossi Melman Haaretz Tuesday, June 9, 1998 Israel's new Dolphin submarines, built in Germany, will add a new dimension to the nuclear arms race in the Middle East.
- Fleet List: Israeli Navy Maintained by: Andrew Toppan
- Dolphin class (February 4, 1998) (74 K) - The Israeli Navy's latest submarine, the Dolphin class Leviathan conducted her first sea trials from the German Thyssen Nordseewerke shipyard last week.
- TYPE 212 SUBMARINE

Center for Defense Information

Israel's Possible Nuclear Delivery Systems

Note: All specifications are from recent Jane's Information Group publications (*Strategic Weapon Systems*, *Fighting Ships*, *Naval Weapon Systems*, and *All the World's Aircraft*), except "Number Deployed" which is from the International Institute for Strategic Studies' *Military Balance 1996-7*. Disagreements are footnoted (with hypertext links), as are selected facts in the text. Unlike the confirmed nuclear powers, much of the information about the arsenals and potential delivery vehicles of the de facto nuclear powers is sketchy and speculative.

Land-Based Weapons

Jericho-1 (Luz YA-1) SRBM

No Picture Available

Year Deployed: 1973

Dimensions: 10.0 meters length
Weight: 4,500 kilograms
Propulsion: Single-stage
Throw-weight: 500 kilograms
Range: 500 kilometers¹
Guidance: Inertial
Circular Error Probable: Unknown
Warhead: Single
Yield: Conventional, chemical, or nuclear possible
Locations: Unknown
Number Deployed: ~50 missiles²
Primary Contractor: IAI

The Jericho I short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) was developed in the 1960's, reportedly with French assistance. Such aid was concurrent with French nuclear aid, in the form of the Dimona nuclear reactor. This reactor produced the plutonium which was used in Israel's nuclear arsenal.

The Jericho I was based on the French Dassault MD-600 design, and has the Israeli name of "Luz." The missile is reported as having a 500 kilogram high explosive warhead, but could be fitted with nuclear warheads as well. It is unknown whether they are allocated to this role. The Jericho is carried on a wheeled transporter erector vehicle (TEL) or on railroad car launchers. Approximately 100 total of both Jericho I and II missiles are believed constructed.³ Israel is reportedly trying to obtain technology to improve the accuracy of the Jericho missiles, as it currently lacks the components necessary for precision gyroscopes and sensors.⁴

It should be noted for all Israel's purported nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, that the nuclear warheads for these systems may not actually be deployed. In fact, many analysts believe that Israel maintains a nuclear arsenal that is stored but not armed, requiring some preparation before use. This allows for the oft-repeated mantra that "Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the region." The semantic rationalization is that the bomb components are not actually assembled "weapons." There is also the fact that the U.S. Navy deployed nuclear weapons in the region for years in the Sixth Fleet, and the U.S. stationed nuclear weapons at the bomber base in Dharan, Saudi Arabia. Despite the Israeli arsenal's likely unassembled status, as Professor Martin van Creveld of Hebrew University stated, "An A-bomb that is, or is believed to be 'only a screw-driver away,' is nearly as effective a deterrent as one openly brandished."⁵

Jericho-2 (Luz YA-3) MRBM

Year Deployed: 1990
Dimensions: 12.0 meters length, 1.2 meters width
Weight: 6,500 kilograms
Propulsion: Two stage solid propellant
Throw-weight: 1,000 kilograms
Range: 1,500 kilometers⁶
Guidance: Inertial
Circular Error Probable: Unknown
Warhead: Single
Yield: Conventional, chemical, or nuclear possible
Locations: Unknown
Number Deployed: ~50 missiles⁷
Primary Contractor: IAI

The Jericho II improved greatly upon the performance of its predecessor. It was developed in the mid-1970's to early 1980's, with the first test flight in 1986. Unlike the single-stage Jericho I, the Jericho II has two stages, which allow for a greatly increased range of 1,500 kilometers as opposed to 500.

Like its predecessor, the Jericho II is road mobile. In addition to inertial guidance, it may have some sort of terminal guidance as well to increase accuracy -- details are unknown. There also appears to be a South African connection. Unconfirmed reports suggest that there was significant South African funding for the Jericho II, and that the South Africans may even possess modified Jericho IIs under the designation "Arniston."⁸

The payload is reportedly double that of the Jericho I, at 1,000 kilograms, more than enough to carry a nuclear weapon. It is not conclusively known whether the Israelis have allocated nuclear weapons to the Jericho II, but it is extremely likely, given the great range, payload, and capability of the system.

The Jericho II brings a dramatic increase in prompt delivery capability for the Israelis with its long range. It is capable of hitting the entire panoply of targets in the Middle East (particularly Iran), as well as southwestern Russia. There is an even greater incipient capability in Israel's space launch program. The Jericho II and the Shavit (Comet) space launch rocket are very similar. The Shavit launched the first Israeli satellite (Ofeq-1) into orbit in September 1988. The Shavit could conceivably be modified and used to deliver a nuclear weapon. Its mere existence means Israel is capable of building an ICBM, though there appears to be no strategic imperative or political desire to do so.

Air-Based Weapons

F-4E-2000 Phantom

Year Deployed: Unknown

Dimensions: 17.76 meters length, 4.69 meters height, 11,70 meters wingspan

Weight: maximum takeoff - 24,765 kilograms

Propulsion: Two J79-GE-8 turbojets

Range: 1,600 kilometers⁹

Speed: Mach 2+

Maximum Loadout: Four ground-attack munition hardpoints

Weapon Load: 7,200 kilograms¹⁰

Locations: Unknown

Number Deployed: 50 aircraft

Primary Contractor: McDonnell Douglas

The Phantom (officially the Phantom II) was originally designed as a two-seat, two-engine, long-range all-weather attack fighter for American carriers. Initial development began in 1954, although its role was soon changed to that of a missile fighter. The Phantom has had a long and distinguished history since the first F-4A flew in 1958, going through various upgrades and variations and serving with several U.S. allies.

The Israelis have the F-4E version, which was designed as a multi-role fighter capable of air superiority, close air support, and interdiction missions. This version also has an additional fuselage fuel cell for increased range, as well as the leading edge slats developed for the F-4F, which give the aircraft more maneuverability.¹¹ More recently they have entered a refit for their entire force known as Phantom 2000, to extend the life of the aircraft beyond the year 2000. The first aircraft completed modifications in 1989, which include reinforced skin and fuel cells, complete rewiring, and improved avionics, electronic countermeasures, and cockpit enhancements.¹²

Though aging, the Phantoms remain capable aircraft. There is reason to believe they were once allocated to the nuclear role, and so may still be. During the 1973 Yom Kippur War, when Israeli force were being driven back across the Sinai by the Egyptians, and were in jeopardy of losing the Golan to the Syrians, Israel's nuclear forces were reportedly put on heightened alert. This allegedly included placing a squadron of F-4Es on continuous alert, manned by Israel's most elite pilots, ready to strike with Israel's nascent nuclear arsenal.¹³

Another report in *Time* magazine credits Prime Minister Golda Meir with ordering the nuclear weapons armed in preparation for a strike, though "Before any triggers were set, however, the battle on both fronts turned in Israel's favor. The 13 bombs were sent [back] to their desert arsenals."¹⁴ These actions were partially taken to convince the U.S. of the seriousness of the situation, and to intervene, but it does seem that the Middle East came quite close to nuclear conflict in 1973.

Today, despite the Phantom 2000 modernization program, these aircraft are aging. The nuclear bomb delivery role is more likely allocated to the more modern F-16s. However, given the F-4E's past nuclear mission, and the possibility of a continued role, they are listed here.

F-16 Falcon

Year Deployed: 1980

Dimensions: 15.03 meters length, 5.09 meters height, 9.45 meters wingspan

Weight: empty - 8,273 kilograms, maximum takeoff - 19,187 kilograms

Propulsion: F-16A-10 - F100PW200, F-16C-30 - F110GE100A, F-16C-40 - F110GE100

Range: (hi-lo-lo-hi) 630 kilometers¹⁵

Speed: Mach 2+

Maximum Loadout: 1 fuselage hardpoint, 6 wing hardpoints, two wingtip air-to-air missile mounts -- carries various munitions, including nuclear gravity bombs

Weapon Load: 5,400 kilograms¹⁶

Locations: Unknown

Number Deployed: 205 F-16 aircraft
Primary Contractor: Lockheed (General Dynamics)

The F-16 Fighting Falcon has been a very successful American fighter, produced in great numbers (approximately 4,000 aircraft) and widely exported. The design goal was to produce a capable, but inexpensive multirole fighter -- the first test flight took place in December 1976. The A and C versions are single seat, while the B and D versions have two seats. The F-16 is a capable and flexible design, capable of high performance in both the air superiority and ground attack roles, depending on munitions. The flight controls are digital computer-controlled fly-by-wire, complemented by advanced navigation and avionics systems.

The Israeli F-16 have been extensively modified with Israeli equipment, as well as optional U.S. equipment, particularly enhanced jamming and electronic countermeasures equipment.¹⁷ Israel began accepting deliveries of the A-model starting in 1980, with deliveries of the block 40 C-model starting in 1992. Israel was also slated to receive an additional 50 older F-16s A/Bs starting in October 1994. Israel has been the biggest export recipient of the F-16. Given that the Falcon is probably the most capable Israeli attack aircraft, it would likely be tasked with the delivery of nuclear air-to-ground munitions.

Other Weapons

Seymour Hersh alleges that Israel's nuclear artillery infrastructure is particularly large. During the Yom Kippur War there were allegedly three nuclear capable artillery battalions, containing self-propelled 175 mm guns. Later 203 mm nuclear artillery shells were reportedly developed. However, it should be noted that some of Hersh's reporting has been disputed, and these allegations of a sizable nuclear artillery infrastructure cannot be taken as proven fact.

There were also allegations that a flash in the southern Indian Ocean on September 22, 1979, detected by a VELA satellite was a joint Israeli/South African nuclear test. Seymour Hersh has alleged that Israeli Defense Force sources have confirmed that the test was of a nuclear artillery shell, detonated on a barge. Nearby South African and Israeli naval forces lend credence to the allegations, as does the fact that South Africa reportedly completed its first nuclear device a short time afterwards. The covert test allegations are still officially denied today.¹⁸

It was the revelations of nuclear weapons worker Mordechai Vanunu which revealed Israeli's nuclear secrets. He published pictures and detailed descriptions of the secret Dimona reactor and weapon facility in the October 6, 1986 *London Sunday Times*. He estimated the arsenal at 200 weapons, including sophisticated types such as enhanced-radiation (neutron) and even hydrogen bombs.¹⁹ It appears Israel bypassed the first generation of fission weapons all together and went to boosted fission weapons, whereby deuterium and tritium are inserted into the plutonium warhead at the moment of explosion, flooding it with neutrons and "jump starting" the reaction.

There was a real shift in Israel's nuclear posture during the Gulf War, when oblique references nuclear attack became common in response to Saddam Hussein's threats to use chemical weapons against Israel. Indeed, American spy satellites reportedly photographed Israel flexing its nuclear muscles in a way it had not since the Yom Kippur War of 1973. Israel had gone on full nuclear alert and deployed nuclear launchers facing Iraq -- a move probably as much to impress the seriousness of the situation on the watching Americans as to threaten Iraq.²⁰

In short, the Israeli nuclear weapon infrastructure is probably quite large, including the full range of strategic and tactical battlefield weapons.

FOOTNOTES:

¹ Jericho I range listed as 650 kilometers in International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Military Balance, 1995-6*, (London: IISS, 1995), p. 280, range listed as 480 kilometers in Center for Nonproliferation Studies, "Ballistic Missile Developments," *Nonproliferation Review* (Winter 1996), p. 201.

² Listed as 50 each of Jericho I and Jericho II missiles in CNS, *Nonproliferation Review* (Winter 1996), p. 201. There are only "some" Jericho I and II missiles according to IISS, *Military Balance, 1996-7*, p. 135.

³ "Jericho," *Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems*.

⁴ CNS, *Nonproliferation Review* (Winter 1996), p. 176.

⁵ Peter Pry, *Israel's Nuclear Arsenal* (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1984), p. 80.

⁶ Jericho II range is 1,450 kilometers according to CNS, *Nonproliferation Review* (Winter 1996), p. 201.

⁷ Listed as 50 each of Jericho I and Jericho II missiles in CNS, *Nonproliferation Review* (Winter 1996), p. 201. There are only "some" Jericho I and II missiles according to IISS, *Military Balance, 1996-7*, p. 135.

⁸ "Jericho," *Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems*.

⁹ F-4E range given as 840 kilometers in IISS, *Military Balance, 1995-6*, p. 308.

¹⁰ F-4E payload given as 5,900 kilograms in IISS, *Military Balance, 1995-6*, p. 308.

¹¹ *Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 1972-3*, p. 360.

¹² *Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 1993-4*, p. 184.

¹³ Seymour Hersh, *The Sampson Option*, pp. 216-7.

¹⁴ *Time* magazine quotation taken from Ernest Lefever, *Nuclear Arms in the Third World* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1979), p. 76.

¹⁵ F-16 range of 930 kilometer range with high mission profile in IISS, *Military Balance, 1995-6*, p. 308.

¹⁶ IISS, *Military Balance, 1995-6*, p. 308.

¹⁷ *Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 1994-5*, pp. 565-569.

¹⁸ Hersh, *The Samson Option*, p. 271.

¹⁹ Louis Toscano, *Triple Cross: Israel, the Atomic Bomb & the Man Who Spilled the Secrets* (New York: Carol Publishing Group, 1990), p. 12.

²⁰ See Jafee Center for Strategic Studies (Tel Aviv University), *War in the Gulf, Implications for Israel* (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1992), pp. 202-3.

Washington Post

Israel gains nuclear-capable submarines

15 juni 2002

WASHINGTON, June 15 (Xinhuanet) -- Israel has acquired three diesel submarines armed with newly designed cruise missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, the Washington Post reported on Saturday.

The U.S. navy monitored Israeli testing of a new cruise missile from a submarine two years ago off Sri Lanka in the Indian Ocean, former Pentagon officials told the Post.

One former senior American official said U.S. analysts have studied the nuclear capability of the cruise missile, but "it is above top secret knowing whether the sub-launched cruise missiles are nuclear-armed."

A spokesman for the Israeli Embassy in Washington confirmed that his country had recently acquired three submarines from Germany but would not comment on whether they were being outfitted with nuclear weapons.

"There has been no change in Israel's long-standing position not to introduce nuclear weapons in the Middle East," the spokesman said.

The possible move to arm submarines with nuclear weapons suggests that the Israeli government might be increasingly concerned about efforts by Iraq and Iran to develop more accurate long-range missiles capable of knocking out Israel's existing nuclear arsenal.

NEDERLANDS BELEID

Ministerie van Defensie

Militaire Inlichtingendienst (MID) – jaarverslag 2000

[...]

Een belangrijke factor is dat Israël tot dusver als het enige land in de regio beschikt over kernwapens. Dit is van invloed op de relatie tussen Israël en zijn buurlanden en staat regionaal wapenbeheersingsoverleg in de weg. Het Israëlisch nucleaire vermogen is voor landen als Iran en Syrië (en tot voor kort Irak) aanleiding een arsenaal van massavernietigingswapens aan te schaffen met als doel een eigen afschrikking op te bouwen.

[...]

Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Brief minister over de zesde Toetsingsconferentie van het Non-Proliferatie Verdrag

26 800 V – nr.5 – 6 juni 2000

[...] De wijze waarop uiteindelijk Israël werd opgeroepen tot het NPV toe te treden kon naar tevredenheid worden geregeld in bilaterale onderhandelingen tussen de VS en Egypte. Israël wordt nu met naam genoemd in een feitelijk gestelde passage: «The Conference (...) reaffirms the importance of Israel's accession to the NPT and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards (...).» De Arabische landen, aangevoerd door Egypte en gesteund door een aantal andere nietgebonden landen, hielden lang vast aan een zwaardere veroordeling van Israël. Een van de bezwaren die veel landen, waaronder Nederland, daartegen hadden was dat daarmee de balans met de passages over India en Pakistan zou worden verstoord. Het zou immers vreemd zijn twee landen die in het recente verleden kernproeven hadden uitgevoerd minder zwaar te veroordelen dan een land dat in 1996 het CTBT ondertekende. De bovengenoemde Israel-passage was voor de VS alleen aanvaardbaar indien ook de kwestie van niet-naleving van het NPV door Irak in duidelijke bewoordingen zou worden bekritiseerd. Dit laatste was voor Irak moeilijk verteerbaar, hetgeen uiteindelijk bijna een breekpunt vormde. Met de aantekening dat het een andere mening was toegedaan, kon Irak uiteindelijk akkoord gaan met het eindprodukt, waarin het belang van Iraakse samenwerking met het IAEA werd onderstreept en waarin werd gesteld dat het IAEA niet in staat is enige zekerheid te bieden over Iraks naleving van zijn verplichtingen zoals geformuleerd in Veiligheidsraadsresolutie 687. [...]

NEDERLANDSE WAPENHANDEL NAAR ISRAËL; EEN INVENTARISATIE

Bron: Campagne Tegen Wapenhandel (www.antenna.nl/amokmar)

Een breed scala aan Nederlandse wapens werd de afgelopen jaren aan Israël verkocht. Het ging om:

- onderdelen van jachtvliegtuigen (in het kader van de compensatieregeling rond de F-16. Nu weer actueel i.v.m. de participatie in de JSF),
- nachtzicht apparatuur (zowel voor militair als civiel/militair (dual-use) gebruik),
- schakels (dat zijn de verbindingen om er een ketting van te maken) en patronen.
- onderdelen van geschut en pantservoertuigen
- onderdelen van granaten etc.

Onderstaande lijst laat zien voor welke wapens in de jaren 1990-2000 een exportvergunning is verstrekt en welke wapens feitelijk werden geleverd (realisaties).

Er zijn twee tabellen:

1. over 1990 (op basis van een niet geautomatiseerd bestand wapenexportvergunningen)
2. over 1991-2000 (op basis van een gewitte uitdraai wapenexportvergunningen).

Type/Omschrijving	Aantal	Factuur waarde	Datum aanvraag
Schakels 7.62 mm M13	8.000.000	Hfl. 320.000	29/06/90
Schakels 7.62 mm M13	12.000	Hfl. 480	26/06/90
Patronen voor oorlogswapens, kal 7.62 mm	4.600	--	18/06/90
Patronen voor oorlogswapens, kal 7.62 mm	920	Hfl. 4.637	17/05/90
Passieve observatiekijkers, type Lunos met toebehoren	6	Hfl. 117.632	20/07/90
Video camera	1	Hfl. 29.813	05/11/90
Video monitor, type MXRi	1	Hfl. 23.500	07/11/90
Video monitor, type MXRi	1	Hfl. 25.900	09/10/90
Delen van passieve handkijker, type PB4DS	1	Hfl 15.815	09/11/90
Delen van passieve handkijker, type Lunos	-	Hfl 52.273	25/07/90
Delen en toebehoren van passieve handkijker, type PB4DS	-	Hfl 31.489	13/06/90
Delen van passieve handkijker, type PB4DS	-	Hfl 10.244	20/07/90

Delen van passieve handkijker, type Lunos met toebehoren	3	Hfl 58.500	26/10/90
Elektronische meet- en testapparatuur met onderdelen en toebehoren, voor ruimtevaartuigen	3	Hfl. 1.876.000	09/02/90
Elektronische meet- en testapparatuur met onderdelen en toebehoren, voor ruimtevaartuigen	2	Hfl. 1.387.000	06/06/90
Oorlogswapens	9	Hfl. 112.500	02/05/90
Deel van navigatie- en radarapparaat voor onderzeeboot	1	US\$ 10.000	22/01/90
Delen van navigatie- en radarapparaat voor onderzeeboot	--	US\$ 40.000	14/02/90

Code details can be found at SPRI	Omschrijving	Datum afgifte vergunning	Bedrag in gulden	Realisatie in gulden	Realisatie datum	Opmerkingen
00005	Delen van passieve observatiekijkers, type	11/01/91	31.871	29.713	31/12/91	
00015	Delen voor passieve nachtzichtkijker	12/02/91	4.500	25.510 8.035	30/12/91 06/04/92	
00005	Passieve observatiekijkers	05/08/91	200.111	200.111	25/10/91	
00003	15.000 stuks schakels voor patroonbanden; 15.000 stuks clips voor patronen 7.62 mm	12/04/91	3.240	0	-	
00003	Schakels [] 7.62 mm	31/05/91	1.600.000	-	-	
00001	Mitrailleurs (kal 7.62) alsmede delen en toebehoren daarvoor	05/03/93	160.604	-	-	
00003	Clips voor patronen 7.62 mm	13/05/91	37.625	21.700 12.600 3.225	08/08/91 23/08/91 30/08/91	
00003	Schakels [] 7.62 mm ([]	01/05/91	600	600	06/05/91	
00000	'Zie vergunning'	08/04/91	19.364	195.885	1-23/05/91	
00005	Passieve observatiekijkers	11/07/91	79.130	36.153	19/07/91	
00005	Delen van passieve nachtkijker, type	01/08/91	33.871	963	28/11/91	
00005	Delen van passieve observatiekijkers, type	28/08/91	23.731	10.817 7.156 5.758	27/02/92 20/02/92 10/04/92	
00010	Delen van straalmotoren	13/11/91	9.000	68.036	25/09/91	
00015	Delen van passieve observatiekijkers, type [] (2x)	31/10/91 07/10/91	17.924 5.487	2.170 15.746	30/07/92 03/06/92	
00010	Delen van straalmotoren	13/11/91	12.000	-	-	
01537	Antenne- en toestelfilters (2 x)	14/11/91	414, 414	-	-	
01537	Nachtkijker, type [] met delen en toebehoren	05/11/91	14.208	-	-	
-	2 wapens type []	27/11/91	2.400	20.000	07/01/92	
00010	Delen van staalmotoren (3x)	13/02/92	2.039, 1.500, 4.017	2.039 1.500 4.017	19/02/92 19/02/92 10/02/92	
[]	'Zie brief'	31/01/92	1.819	-	-	
[]	'Zie brief'	15/06/92	7.658	-	-	
00001	2 Wapens, type Falourd 2 Wapens, type FAL	23/06/92	3.600	-	-	
00003	Patronen 7.62 mm	12/10/92	12.907	-	-	

00015	Passieve observatiekijkers, net toebehoren	13/02/92	59.630	60.330	05/03/92	
00010	Delen van straalmotoren	06/03/92	22.223	-		
00003	Schakels M13 7,62 mm	13/03/92	28.000	28.000	26/05/92	App. 700.000 seen the price in 1990
00015	Delen van passieve observatiekijkers, type	26/03/92	2.158	2.159	06/04/92	
00010	Delen van straalmotoren	01/06/92	2.945	2.945	19/06/92	
00015	Omhullingen van beeldversterkerbuizen, type []	25/06/92	8.469	8.469	07/08/92	
00010	Jet fuel starters	29/06/92	300.000	227.678 66.129 1.219.000	18/03/93 12/08/92 12/08/93	
00003	Schakels M13 7,62 mm	20/07/92	28.000	-		
00015	Delen van passieve observatiekijkers, type	05/08/92	30.444	29.866	10/08/92	
00015	Delen van passieve observatiekijkers	26/08/92	6.035	6.035	11/02/93	
00015	Delen van observatiekijkers, type	28/10/92	579	577	19/11/92	
00010	Brandstofpompen voor militaire vliegtuigen	08/01/93	2.000.000	(tot. Lev. 10) 760.000	15/01/93- 06/08/93	
00005	Toestellen geschikt voor radionavigatie geschikt voor militaire toepassingen	22/12/92	1.316.271	251.574	21/01/93	
00001	Geweren	17/02/93	2.100	-		
00010	Delen van straalmotoren	22/12/92	1.743	1.743	06/01/93	
00010	Delen van straalmotoren	05/02/93	7.338	7.338	12/02/93	
00015	Delen van passieve observatiekijkers type []	08/03/93	3.218	3.217	23/03/93	
00003	Schakels M13, 7.62 mm	04/05/93	145.563	85.000 60.563	11/05/93 26/05/93	1 link (schakel) = Hfl 0,04, thus 3.6 million links.
00010	Delen van straalmotoren	15/04/93	2.058	2.058	03/05/93	
00010	Deel turbine straalmotor	28/04/93	258	258	03/05/93	
00010	Delen van straalmotoren	10/05/93	751	751	14/06/93	
00010	Delen van straalmotoren bestemd voor F-16 vliegtuigen	10/06/93	1.253	1.253	03/06/93	
00010	Delen van straalmotoren	14/06/93	3.810	3.810	17/06/93	
00010	Delen van straalmotoren	07/07/93	4.790	4.790	19/07/93	
00010	Delen van straalmotoren	01/10/93	2.593	2.593	01/11/93	
00010	Deel van straalmotor	16/11/93	263	263	03/12/93	
00005	Toestellen geschikt voor radionavigatie geschikt voor militaire toepassingen	05/11/93	1.311.946	1.191.703	18/11/93	
00015	Passieve observatiekijkers, type [] en Delen van passieve handkijker []	26/10/93	47.156	45.615	19/11/93	
00010	Delen van straalmotor	23/11/93	1.837	1.837	03/12/93	
00010	Delen van straalmotoren	01/12/93	130.200	121.570 5.655	06/12/93 13/12/93	
0010	Deel van straalmotor	10/12/93	269	1.836	07/12/93	
0010	Delen van straalmotoren	16/12/93	1.075	1.075	23/12/93	
0003	Schakels M13, --- mm	25/03/94	22.575	22.575	29/03/94	
0010	Delen van straalmotoren	17/06/94	472.308	5.655 89.070	04/07/94 24/06/94	
0015c	Delen van passieve observatiekijkers, type [] - - Passieve handkijker, type PB4DS	25/08/94	1.542	1.542	31/08/94	

0006	Delen van ventilatiesystemen voor gevechtsvoertuigen	27/06/95	807	6.500	28/04/95	Export permission after delivery
6A003b	Megapuls camera met ingebouwd meet en verificatiesysteem, met toebehoren	23/05/95	44.609	44.609	02/06/95	
0015	Passief waarnemingssysteem	19/02/96	150.000	-		
0014	Trainingsimulators voor M109 houwitzers, alsmede munitie daarvoor.	17/01/96	4.195.100	-		
0011	Radar	19/02/96	700.000	-		
0004	Lithium batterijen t.b.v. nabijheidsbuis - - -	19/04/96	8.500	2.125 4.250 2.125	07/05/96 04/06/96 02/12/96	
0006b	Remvoeringen voor stuurdifferentieel van M113 militaire voertuigen - - -	08/05/96	1.392	-		
0010a	Delen van landingsgestellen van F-16 vliegtuigen (schokdempers)	27/06/96	46.280			
0007a	0-pinacolylmethylfosfonofluoridaat (Soman) opgelost in acetonitril. Is een zenuwgas NOVA uitending	09/07/96	1	1	22/07/96	
0015d	Infrarood camera's ... met bijbehorende monitor	15/07/96	200.000	(tot. Lev. 40) 46.468.002	30/06/96- 13/03/97	Difference between value export permission and realisation considerable. Means export permiss
0005b	Rondzoekradar, type SCOUT	27/06/96	700.000	700.000	25/07/96	
0010b	Kleppen voor 'Fuga magister trainer aircraft'	29/10/96	35.622	74.213 44.782	22/10/96 26/03/97	
	Delen van militaire luchtvaartuigen, t.w. [] hefschroefvliegtuigen, []	ISRAËL	0010a			
0011	Intercomsysteem alsmede delen daarvoor type ... voor gebruik in tanks	21/02/97	50.000	113.422	09/09/96	
0014	Trainingssimulators (outdoor) voor M109 houwitzers- - -	17/03/97	1.231.425	615.713 615.713	20/02/98 20/02/98	
0010a	Delen van militaire luchtvaartuigen, t.w. Bell hefschroefvliegtuigen, Alfa-Jets, F4-, F104-, E3A-, F-16, A4, F15- en Mirage 3/5-toestellen.	19/12/96	159.819	19.017	18/04/97	
0015d	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuis type, nachtkijker type 25R	19/02/97	13.460	13.460	21/02/97	
MI15d	Warmtebeeld camera, type	13/06/97	200.000	(tot. Lev. 53) 1.507.177	10/03/97- 24/09/97	
ML15c	2e Generatie beeldversterkerbuizen type	16/06/97	6.000	6.000	16/06/97	
ML4a	Lithiumbatterijen voor nabijheidsbuizen UA 6181- - -	19/06/97	19.996	1.001	22/12/97	
ML1a	Pistolen, Bul. Model M5, kal. .38 super	03/10/97	16.068	37.486 29.027	02/12/97 21/11/97	
ML15c	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen type	17/11/97	19.264	19.264	03/12/97	
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen type	31/10/97	21.440	17.007	06/11/97	
ML11	Nummerieke besturingskasten met ingebouwde automatische gegevens verwerkende machine voor militair gebruik	10/02/98	100.732	-		
00015c	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen type ..	18/12/97	491.163	245.581 245.581	24/12/97 26/01/98	
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuis type ..	02/12/97	4.660	4.660	04/12/97	

00007e	75000 St. gasmaskers en 200000 st. filterbussen - - -	09/02/98	13.500.000	13.500.000	31/01/99	
00007e	Gasmaskers (50 000 st.) AVON type [] - - - Filters (100.000 st)	09/02/98	14.559.500	-	-	
00007e	Kleding (125.000 pakken), handschoenen 250.000 paar, en laarzen (125.000 paar) speciaal ontworpen of aangepast voor bescherming tegen biologische, chemische en ---	18/02/98	43.593750	-	-	
00011	Nummerieke besturingskasten met ingebouwde automatische gegevens vererende machine, alsmede kables en toebehoren daarvoor, ontworpen voor militair gebruikt.	06/03/98	10.000.000	(4x) 37.644 205.368 11.130 30.156	20/03/98- 29/10/98	
0004a	Lithium batterijen [] voor nabijheidsbuizen	09/03/98	1.000	1.000	24/03/98	
00014	Trainingssimulatoren inclusief bijbehorende simulatie-munitie, voor M 109 houwitzers	25/05/98	2.130.270	2.130.270	17/07/98	
00015c	Transformatoren (PP0100D) voor 18mm tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen - -	20/07/98	1.309.478	(tot. lev. 6) 798.000	31/07/98- 23/02/99	
00015c	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen, type ML15c	29/07/98	22.552	22.552	07/08/98	
6A002a2a	Tweede generatiebeeldversterkerbuizen, type []	11/08/98	71.065	71.065	23/09/98	
00015c	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen. type	21/09/98	51.017	51.017	09/10/98	
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie laag licht niveau beeldopnemer, type []	03/09/98	18.700	-	-	
00001a	4 pistolen kal. .38 en 1 st. pistool kal. .45ACP	31/11/98	18.514	18.514	30/11/99	
00015c	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen type	01/12/98	714.000	99.920	15/02/99	
00015c	2e Generatie beeldversterkerbuizen type	01/12/98	8.000	8.000	22/12/98	
00014	Delen voor traningssimulator ... houwtizer	04/0699	415.912	(tot. lev. 7) 37.738	20/08/99- 01/03/0	
00014	Simulatie granaten M116 en simulatie punten M137 t.b.v. traningssimulator (outdoor) - - -	04/06/99	63.011	63.011	18/09/99	
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen. type	18/11/98	93.422	93.422	04/12/98	
00015c	Nachtzichtapparatuur voor gebruik onder water	24/12/98	22.848	22.848	04/01/98	
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie beeldversterbuizen type	07/12/98	6.626	6.626	08/01/99	
00015d	Infraroodcamera, typeLION met toebehoren - - -	22/01/99	77.550	77.550	17/06/99	
6A003b3	Laaglichtniveau beeldcamera type ... werkend met 2 ^e generatie beeldversterkerbuis type	29/12/98	24.000	24.000	09/02/99	
00014	Traningsimulator voor de M109 houwtizer	06/01/99	607.718	607.718	15/07/99	
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen, type	18/01/99	9.000	9.000	26/01/99	
00011	Intercomsystemen type ... voor inbouw in militaire T-55 voertuigen	12/02/99	60.000	30.000	16/08/99	
00014	Delen van militaire gevechtsvoertuigen	23/02/99	63.011	4.489	26/02/99	
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie heeldversterkerbuis, type	01/03/99	22.500	22.500	17/03/99	
00015c	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuis, type []	09/03/99	9.158	9.158	19/03/99	
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuis, type	23/03/99	3.777	3.777	15/04/99	
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen.	20/04/99	22.402	22.402	07/06/99	
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen, typen []	14/06/99	3.560	3.560	18/06/99	
00008b6	Rookzwakbuskruit	25/08/99	3.118	1.871	18/10/99	
6A002a2a	2 ^e generatie beeldversterkerbuizen	07/06/99	4.627	4.627	23/06/99	

6A002a2a	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen, typen [] met een fotokathode met een lichtgevoeligheid van minder dan A/lm 2550	24/06/99	1.297.645	162.206	11/08/99	
00015c	2 ^e generatie beeldversterkerbuis	06/08/99	4.500	4.500	06/08/99	
00011	Profielen van aluminium speciaal ontworpen voor militair gebruik. t.b.v. elektronisch bestuurbare fase gestuurde antenne systemen	05/08/99	56.804	-	-	
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen, type	27/07/99	15.000	-	-	
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen, typen [] met een fotokathode met een lichtgevoeligheid van minder dan 550 µ A/lm	05/08/99	26.518	26.518	24/08/99	
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen, type []	30/07/99	15.000	15.000	03/08/99	
00004a	Lithium batterijen UA 6181 voor nabijheidsbuizen	02/09/99	19.928	-	-	
00014	Simulator (small arms trainer) met delen en toebehoren	25/08/99	22.570	22.570	03/09/99	
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen, typen [] met een fotokathode met een lichtgevoeligheid van minder (2x) meer (1x) dan 550µ A/lm	11/08/99 10/08/99 10/08/99	1.145.492 38.481 661.817	(tot.lev. 5) 1.145.492 38.481 (3x) 379.166 199.924 82.727	13/08/99- 18/10/99 01/10/99 01/10/99- 10/12/99	
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen, typen [] met een fotokathode met een lichtgevoeligheid van minder dan 600 µ A/lm	19/08/99	4.668	4.668	08/09/99	
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen, typen [] met een fotokathode met een lichtgevoeligheid van minder dan 550 µ A/lm	23/09/99	23.280	23.280	18/10/99	
00014a	Lood-lood oxyde batterijen, type T.b.v. nabijheidsbuizen, type ... voor 105 mm APAM (Anti-Personnel/Anti-Materiel) granaten.	17/01/00	112.000	31.000 80.000	03/03/00 11/05/01	
00004a	Lithiumbatterijen UA-6215 voor nabijheidsbuizen	08/09/99	3.238	3.238	03/03/00	
00006	Wielen voor pantservoertuigen	16/11/99	224.529	173.782 50.747	25/11/99 02/02/00	
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuis	17/09/99	19.400	19.400	01/10/99	
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen, typen [] met een fotokathode met een lichtgevoeligheid van minder dan 550 µ A/lm	23/09/99	34.919	34.919	02/11/99	
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen,	13/10/99	15.000	-	-	
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen, type []	14/10/99	15.000	27.321 25.161 985	09/11/99 11/11/99 25/04/00	
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie laag licht niveau beeldopnemers, type Fotokathode gevoeligheid van minder dan 550 µ A/lm	15/10/99	76.800	38.400 12.800	29/10/99 23/11/99	
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie laag licht niveau beeldopnemers, type Fotokathode gevoeligheid van minder dan 550 µ A/lm (4x)	29/10/99 04/11/99 (3x)	4.712 9.492 74.721 74.721	4.712 9.492 24.907 (2x) 31.134 18.680		
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie laag licht niveau beeldopnemers, type Fotokathode gevoeligheid van minder dan 550 µ A/lm (2x)	21/12/99 24/12/99	226.226 300	153.247 72.975	01/02/00 10/01/00	

6A002a2a	Tweede generatie laag licht niveau beeldopnemers, type Fotokathode gevoeligheid van minder dan 550 μ A/lm	19/11/99	284.000	406	08/12/99	
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen type ... (3x)	19/11/99 25/11/99	591.545 1.184.510 25.600	(4x) 591.546 (8x) 1.184.508 (2x) 25.600	30/11/99- 22/03/00 26/11/99- 14/01/00 30/11/99 10/12/99	
6A003b3	Tweede generatie licht video camera type []	29/11/99	23.000	23.000	08/12/99	
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen, typen [] met een fotokathode met een lichtgevoeligheid van minder dan 550 μ A/lm (2x)	06/12/99	12.800	12.800	07/12/99	
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen, type []	13/12/99	9.509	(4x) 190.178 190.178 190.178 190.178	21/01/00- 28/02/00	
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen, typen [] met een fotokathode met een lichtgevoeligheid van minder dan 550 μ A/lm (2x)	23/12/99 28/12/99	2.927 300	2.927 300		
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen, typen [] met een fotokathode met een lichtgevoeligheid van minder dan 550 μ A/lm	12/01/00	6.735	6.735	17/01/00	
00011	Intercom systeem type []	11/04/00	40.000	30.000	14/07/00	
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen, typen [] met een fotokathode met een lichtgevoeligheid van meer dan 550 μ A/lm (2x)	17/01/00 24/01/00	112.684, 3.547	- -		
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen, type []	18/01/00	600	600	01/02/00	
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen, typen [] met een fotokathode met een lichtgevoeligheid van meer dan 550 μ A/lm	26/01/00	3.547	3.547	24/03/00	
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen, type []	31/01/00	6.303	6.303	08/02/00	
00015c	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen, type []	21/03/00	3.998	3.998	24/03/00	
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen, type []	07/02/00	586.028	(Tot. lev. 6x) 586.028	22/02/00 21/04/00	
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen, typen [] met een fotokathode met een lichtgevoeligheid van minder dan 550 μ A/lm	21/02/00	25.600	25.600	03/03/00	
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen, type [] (4 st.) XX1700DR (5 st.) en XX1700DS (6 st.) met een fotokathode gevoeligheid van kleiner dan 550 μ A/lm	21/02/00	238.500	63.600 63.600 111.300	07/03/00 25/05/00 15/06/00	
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen, typen []	08/03/00	34.285	27.428	22/03/00	
00006	Tussenaskruisen van periscopen, type [] voor pantservoertuigen	26/04/00	7.083	7.083	02/05/00	
00006	Tankwielen voor pantservoertuigen, type []	05/07/00	192.979	187.994	18/05/00	
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen, typen [] met een fotokathode met een lichtgevoeligheid van meer dan 550 μ A/lm	05/04/00	17.209	17.209	26/05/00	
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen, typen [] (2x)	05/04/00 10/04/00	6.130 31.399	6.130	06/04/00	

00015c	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen, typen []	24/05/00	21.865	8.746	29/05/00 23/01/01	2 ^e Intifada since 29/09/00
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen, typen [] (18 st.) type [] (9 st.) en type [] (1 stuk)	17/04/00	87.703	6.221 34.418 28.402	31/03/00 03/05/00 31/05/00	
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen, typen [] (2 st.) type [] en type [] (1 stuk) met een fotokathode	17/04/00	19.752	10.103 9.649	17/05/00 28/04/00	
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen, typen [] met een fotokathode met een lichtgevoeligheid van meer dan 550 μ A/lm	25/04/00	191.844	57.553 134.291	11/07/00 23/06/00	
00018a	Hardware inclusief software for guidance computer t.b.v. radarvuurgeleidingssysteem, type Flycatcher	12/07/00	150.000	112.000	09/02/01	
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen, typen [] met een fotokathode met een lichtgevoeligheid van meer dan 550 μ A/lm	31/05/00	8.887	8.887	18/07/00	
00010c	Afdichtmateriaal t.b.v. turbinestralmotoren voor F-16 gevechtsvliegtuigen	30/08/00	18.531	18.531	05/10/00	
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen, typen [] met een fotokathode met een lichtgevoeligheid van meer dan 550 μ A/lm	22/06/00	32.737	32.737	28/07/00	
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen, typen []	03/07/00	854.990	151.640	09/09/00	
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen, typen []	03/07/00	28.260	28.260	27/07/00	
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen, typen [] met een fotokathode met een lichtgevoeligheid van minder (1) / meer (1) dan 550 μ A/lm	06/07/00	8.926 3.226	8.926 3.226	05/09/00 14/07/00	
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen, typen XX1450TX met een fotokathode met een lichtgevoeligheid van minder dan 550 μ A/lm	14/07/00	18.000	18.000	09/08/00	
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen, typen []	31/07/00	96.791	6.453 90.339	26/10/00 30/10/00	
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen, typen [] met een fotokathode met een lichtgevoeligheid van minder dan 550 μ A/lm (2x)	28/07/00 31/07/00	9.679 3.273	9.679	02/08/00	
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen, typen [] met een fotokathode met een lichtgevoeligheid van meer dan 550 μ A/lm (2x)	10/08/00	600 19.960	2.950 (2x) 6.944 13.016	09/09/00 08/09/00 112/10/00	
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen, typen [] met een fotokathode met een lichtgevoeligheid van minder dan 550 μ A/lm	18/08/00	27.000	18.000 9.000	25/10/00 18/01/00	
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen, typen [] met een fotokathode met een lichtgevoeligheid van meer dan 600 μ A/lm	22/08/00	13.381	13.381	13/11/00	
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen, typen [] met een fotokathode met een lichtgevoeligheid van minder dan 550 μ A/lm	06/09/00	7.488	-		
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen, typen [] met een fotokathode met een lichtgevoeligheid van minder dan 550 μ A/lm	08/09/00	7.488	7.488	20/09/00	
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen, typen []	25/09/00	8.000	8.000	28/09/00	
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen, typen [] met	05/10/00	215.963	86.385	01/12/00	

	een fotokathode met een lichtgevoeligheid van meer (2x) / minder (1 x) dan 550 μ A/lm (3x)		9.686 3.501	129.578 9.686 3.501	14/12/00 19/10/00 09/11/00	
00006	Wielen van M9 pantserovertuigen	20/12/00	448.472	(tot. Lev 4x) 448.470	03/01/01- 20/03/01	The US equivalent of the British CET is the United Defense LP M9 armored Combat Earthmover (ACE) which saw action in the 1990-91 Gulf War. Over 500 have been built for the US Army and Marine Corps and the export market, with licence production in South Korea by Samsung Aerospace. It is building 197 vehicles with some US components. Wheels made by Van Halteren Metaal, Bunschoten, Netherlands.
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen, typen [] met een fotokathode met een lichtgevoeligheid van minder dan 550 μ A/lm	06/10/00	51.000	51.000	13/10/00	
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen, typen [] met een fotokathode met een lichtgevoeligheid van meer dan 550 μ A/lm	11/10/00	38.337	19.168 19.168	13/11/00 01/12/00	
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen, typen [] met een fotokathode met een lichtgevoeligheid van meer dan 550 μ A/lm	30/10/00	8.255	4.128 4.128	30/10/00 30/10/00	
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen, typen []	01/11/00	9.500	22.476	28/12/00	
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen, typen [] met een fotokathode met een lichtgevoeligheid van meer dan 550 μ A/lm (2x)	13/11/00	11.460 15.681	11.460 -	13/11/00	
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen, typen [] met een fotokathode met een lichtgevoeligheid van meer dan 550 μ A/lm	17/11/00	4.953	4.953	30/01/01	
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen, typen [] met een fotokathode met een lichtgevoeligheid van meer dan 550 μ A/lm	01/12/00	18.283	18.283	18/12/00	
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen, typen [] met een fotokathode met een lichtgevoeligheid van meer dan 550 μ A/lm	12/12/00	19.702	9.851 9.851	05/02/01 29/12/00	
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen, typen [] met een fotokathode met een lichtgevoeligheid van meer dan 550 μ A/lm	19/12/00	77.571	77.571	27/12/00	
6A002a2a	Tweede generatie beeldversterkerbuizen, type []	28/12/00	282.260	161.292 120.969	02/03/01 14/03/01	

MORDECHAI VANUNU

US Campaign to Free Mordechai Vanunu

(www.nonviolence.org/vanunu)

The Vanunu Story

Mordechai Vanunu, a former Israeli nuclear technician, is serving an 18-year sentence in an Israeli prison for blowing the whistle on his government's secret nuclear weapons program. Captured by Israeli agents on September 30, 1986, he spent more than 11 1/2 years in solitary confinement. One of 11 children of Moroccan Jewish parents who emigrated to Israel in 1963, when he was aged 9, Vanunu served in the Israeli army and then went to work as a young man in the Dimona nuclear "research center" in the Negev Desert near his home at Beersheba. The facility harbored an underground plutonium separation plant operated in strictest secrecy. As the years went by he grew increasingly troubled about his work in the nuclear bomb program. In 1985, before leaving Dimona, he took extensive photographs inside the factory in order to document the truth for his countrymen and the entire world.

Traveling through Asia with the film in his backpack, Vanunu made his way to Sydney, Australia, where he found companionship in an Anglican church social justice community with whom he shared the story of his nuclear background. In Sydney he also converted to Christianity and was baptized in July, 1986. A British newspaper, the London Sunday Times, learned of his story and sent a reporter to Sydney to check it out. The newspaper then flew Vanunu to England, where his photos and facts were further checked by British scientists familiar with nuclear weapons. Vanunu's story, published October 5, 1986, gave the world its first authoritative confirmation that tiny Israel had become a major nuclear weapons power, with material for as many as 200 nuclear warheads of advanced design.

Israeli agents got early wind of Vanunu's intentions. Even before publication of the story they had lured him from Britain, abducted him in Italy, and dumped his drugged body onto an Israeli cargo vessel bound for Israel. In the following months he was charged with espionage and treason and convicted at a closed-door trial. All legal appeals have been exhausted.

For the first 11 1/2 years of his imprisonment Vanunu was held in solitary confinement, denied human contact except with his guards, a lawyer, a priest, and the occasional visits of his siblings. This treatment was condemned by Amnesty International as "cruel, inhuman, and degrading."

In recent years, he has also been able to have occasional visits with Nicholas and Mary Eoloff, the St. Paul, Minnesota couple who adopted him in the fall of 1997. On March 12, 1998, he was released into the prison population but denied other privileges. Since then, he has been returned occasionally to solitary confinement due to minor rule infractions. He has also been denied parole or probation. There is growing concern about the effect of his prolonged isolation on his physical and mental health.

The Campaign For His Release

While acknowledging that Vanunu violated his secrecy oath as a nuclear weapons worker, thousands around the world regard him not as a spy or traitor but as one who gave his information freely and without compensation for the sake of others. In countries throughout the world he is honored for his courage and integrity in telling the simple truth at great personal risk.

Vanunu has been repeatedly nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize. The European Parliament has called on Israel to release him on humanitarian grounds, as have the Federation of American Scientists, a task force of the American Physical Society, the International Peace Bureau, the Episcopal and Jewish peace fellowships, and religious, scientific, and cultural leaders and others concerned about human rights violations and the spread of nuclear weapons. Campaigns for his release are active in a dozen countries in addition to the United States and Israel.

The campaign's ultimate goal, inspired by Mordechai Vanunu's example, is a nuclear-free world.

SYRIE

SPECIALE WAPENS

Federation of American Scientists

(www.fas.org/nuke/guide/syria/index.html)

Syria - Special Weapons

Syria is a party to the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and Syria has called for an area free of all weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. Although Syria has long been cited as posing a nuclear proliferation risk, the country seems to have been too strapped for cash to get far. Syria allegedly began a military nuclear program in 1979 and has not provided the IAEA with full information on all its nuclear activities. Syria has claimed that it was interested in nuclear research for medical rather than military purposes, but Israel and the United States have opposed sales of a reactor to Syria on the grounds that it would serve as an important step toward the building of a nuclear weapon.

In 1991, China reported to the IAEA the potential sale of a 30 KW research reactor to Syria. The IAEA blocked the sale and Syria subsequently reduced its nuclear activities. In 1995 the United States pressured Argentina into abandoning a proposed sale of a reactor to Syria. In 1997 it was reported that the Russian government was interested in selling a nuclear reactor to Syria. On 23 February 1998 Syria and Russia signed an agreement on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. In July 1998 the two sides agreed on the time table for the realization of a 25-MW light-water nuclear research center project in Syria with the participation of Russia's Atomstroyeksport and Nikiet. The Syrian fertilizers plant under construction at Homs [34° 40' N 36° 40' E] is owned and operated by the Atomic Energy Commission of Syria. The facility will engage in Uranium recovery from phosphates using the D2EHPA-TOPO process.

Syria has a limited biotechnology infrastructure but could support a limited biological warfare effort. Though Syria is believed to be pursuing the development of biological weapons, it is not believed to have progressed much beyond the research and development phase and may have produced only pilot quantities of usable agent. Syria has signed, but not ratified, the BWC.

Syria has a mature chemical weapons program, begun in the 1970s, incorporating nerve agents, such as sarin, which have completed the weaponization cycle. Future activity will likely focus on CW infrastructure enhancements for agent production and storage, as well as possible research and development of advanced nerve agents. Munitions available for CW agent delivery likely include aerial bombs as well as SCUD missile warheads. Syria has not signed the CWC and is unlikely to do so in the near future.

Syria has been producing chemical warfare agents and munitions since the mid-1980's. While the Syrian program was "quite closely held," former CIA Director William Webster told a Congressional panel in 1989 that the CIA had determined foreign assistance was of "critical importance in allowing Syria to develop its chemical warfare capability. West European firms were instrumental in supplying the required precursor chemicals and equipment. Without the provision of these key elements, Damascus would not have been able to produce chemical weapons".

In addition to mustard gas, Syria is known to be manufacturing nerve gas agents, and can pack CW agents into a wide variety of munitions, including ballistic missiles. Israeli intelligence analysts believe that Syria is actively seeking to manufacture VX agents, which are several magnitudes more powerful than other nerve agents. Syria's current CW stockpiles have been estimated at "several thousand aerial bombs, filled mostly with sarin," and between 50 to 100 ballistic missile warheads.

Syria first acquired CW artillery shells as a "gift" from Egypt just prior to the 1973 war. Shortly thereafter, Syria purchased defensive chemical warfare gear from the USSR and from Czechoslovakia. However, the Soviets are said to have consistently refused to provide manufacturing processes or assistance in building CW facilities in Syria.

Israeli intelligence analysts have expressed their concern with the rapidity and ease with which the Syrians have been able to obtain the know-how to produce VX nerve gas. Secretly assisted by Russian chemical experts, the Syrian military research and development and industrial complex known as the Scientific Studies and Research Center had little trouble getting the required expertise, technology and materials from Russian sources.

General Anatoly Kuntsevich, Russian President Yeltsin's personal adviser on chemical disarmament and Russia's highest official authority on the subject, was dismissed from his position for suspicion of smuggling nerve gas precursors to Syria in early 1995.

General Kuntsevich admitted in an interview in 1998 with the New York Jewish weekly The Forward that shipments to Syria of small amounts of nerve gas components had indeed taken place. According to him, however, these shipments were only intended for "research purposes" and had been authorized by the Russian government under previously undisclosed terms of a treaty with Syria. The materials shipped to Syria were intended for the production of the Soviet/Russian version of the VX nerve agent - code-named Substance 33 or V-gas. Such a deal might have been made in the early '90s or late '80s during a visit to Syria by the then-commander of the Russian Chemical Corps, General Pikalov.

Program Direction

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As might be surmised from its apparently innocent name, the Scientific Studies and Research Center is the Syrian government agency responsible for non-conventional weapons development and production, including research on weapons of mass destruction and missiles that can deliver them.

The overt goals of the Center are to promote and coordinate scientific activities in the country, particularly those related to Education, Research & Development, Consulting, manufacturing and maintenance, and to work on research and development projects needed for the economic and social development of the country, particularly on the computerization of governmental enterprises and institutions.

The the extensive foreign activities of Syrian intelligence services include substantial acquisition efforts focused on biological and chemical weapons. The Syrian procurement structure uses the Scientific Studies and Research Center as cover.

Secretly assisted by Russian chemical experts, the Syrian military research and development and industrial complex known as the Scientific Studies and Research Center had little trouble getting the required expertise, technology and materials from Russian sources to produce VX nerve gas.

The Washington Times reported on July 23, 1996 that the CIA had discovered that Syria's Scientific Studies and Research Center received a shipment of missile components from China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation, China's premier firm selling missiles (particularly M-11s) abroad.

Production facilities

Production facilities have been built with the help of Western firms. Most are controlled by the Scientific Research Council, also known by its French acronym, CERS Syria is now believed capable of producing several hundred tons of CW agents per year.

Four production sites have been positively identified, one located just north of Damascus, and the second near the industrial city of Homs. The third, in Hama, is believed to be producing VX agents in addition to sarin and tabun. Officials in Washington identified a fourth facility dedicated to the production of biological agents in Cerin, while Israeli intelligence is monitoring several additional "suspicious" sites.

Israeli Chief of Staff Ehud Baraq told an audience of leading industrialists in Tel Aviv on December 6, 1991 that Syria's chemical weapons capability was "larger than Iraq's." Several dual-use sites are also of concern, including a pharmaceuticals plant in Aleppo that was left mysteriously "unfinished" in 1989 after the Syrian government had invested nearly \$ 40 million in its construction. Syria also runs a large urea and ammonia plant in Homs, and plans to build a \$ 500 million super-phosphate complex in the desert near Palmyra.

Syrian CW factories have been operating for more than ten years, intelligence analysts agree. Stockpiles of precursor chemicals were purchased in the West in the early 1980s before their export was controlled. Unlike Iraq and Libya, Syria's CW plants tend to be relatively small, and as a result have been harder to detect. In addition to dedicated facilities, Syria can tap the potential of more than a dozen government-run

pharmaceuticals plants spread across the country, which could be converted rapidly to produce a wide variety of CBW agents.

Western suppliers

Syria's principle suppliers of CBW production technology were large chemical brokerage houses in Holland, Switzerland, France, Austria and Germany, including many of the same companies that were supplying Iraq. At least one German company, Schott Glasswerke, has been subjected to an official inquiry, for its delivery of glass-lined reactor vessels, sarin precursors and production equipment to a suspected Syrian poison gas plant. And one French source suggests that the United States may have supplied Syria with precursors and CW production equipment prior to 1986, at a time when Syria was subjected to international sanctions for its attempt to plant a bomb on an El Al plane in London.

Syria has remained far more discreet in its purchasing patterns than either Iran, Iraq, or Libya. As one senior intelligence analyst explained, Syria considers chemical and biological weapons as "strategic" systems, meaning they are intended more as a deterrent than for recurrent, tactical use on the battlefield. Instead of producing large quantities of CBW agents, Syria is seeking to develop a smaller but high quality arsenal, which it can deliver accurately against military targets.

Pharmaceuticals as a cover

Syria has used the expansion of its pharmaceuticals industry as a convenient cover for purchases relating to its CW program, since this is an area where it is impossible to distinguish legitimate civilian projects from military programs.

The use of pharmaceuticals plants for poison gas production appears to have led to a series of accidents over the past year. In 1991, the Syrian Ministry of Health was compelled to close down five pharmaceuticals plants (three in Aleppo, one in Damascus, and one in Homs), following what were termed "complaints from citizens and doctors" that products "did not meet the required standards." Later in 1991, Syria signed a cooperation agreement with Libya in that called for Syrian experts to train the Libyans in pharmaceuticals production.

Major German pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and machine-building companies have helped Syria to establish its modest and well-dispersed production facilities, some with the support of official "Hermes" export credits from the German government. In addition to Schott Glasswerke, which continues to export licensed goods to Syrian chemicals plants, special mixing vats, high temperature furnaces, hot isostatic presses (HIP) and sophisticated machine-tools have been shipped with German export licenses to Syria's Scientific Research Council (CERS) by Ferrostaal, Carl Schenck, Leifeld, Weber GmbH, and other major German companies. It is not believed that these shipments were illegal under German law.

Syria's French Connection

France has played the key role in building up Syria's very well developed pharmaceuticals industry. With the active encouragement of the French embassy in Damascus and French government export credits, the biggest names in the French pharmaceuticals industry flocked to Damascus in the 1980s. Many of them opened branch offices and built production facilities in Syria, to make French pharmaceuticals under license. As a result, the French increased their share from 13.11% of Syria's pharmaceuticals imports in 1982 to 23% by 1986. This was all the more unusual since Syria was expanding its domestic production and therefore importing less during this same period.

The French government screens exports to determine whether goods proposed for sale to Syria, Iran, Libya (and other countries) merit review because of proliferation concerns. While France has been applying the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime for several years, she only began applying controls on production equipment that could go into a chemical weapons plant in early 1992. "Only in the past six months has there been a universal will to impose this type of controls," a senior French foreign ministry official said in May 1992. "Before then, CW production equipment was freely available."

Like Britain and Italy, France has been unwilling to impose unilateral export controls on CW production equipment without an internationally-accepted control regime, so French companies could not accuse the government of putting them at a disadvantage on lucrative Third World markets. The Australia Group, which oversees the control of CW precursors, only finalized a list of production equipment that should also be subjected to international controls in late 1991. It was only adopted (after stiff opposition from France and Great Britain) in June 1992.

"Every day I sign off on export licenses," another senior French licensing official present at the same forum said, "and I wonder whether I have not just signed my resignation. In the area of chemical weapons

manufacturing equipment, it is totally impossible to distinguish between civilian and military end-use," he admitted. "The equipment is strictly identical."

Pharmaceuticals plants

Since Syria simplified the procedures for foreign investments in a May 1991 law, the pharmaceuticals sector has been targeted by Syrian planners for additional expansion. New Syria companies are being set up almost every month, to negotiate licensing and technology transfer agreements with foreign suppliers.

The largest project of this kind has been announced by a well-known Syrian businessman, Saeb Nahas, whose GAS group is partially owned by the Syrian state. GAS owns a 51% share in the newly-formed Ibn Zahr Pharmaceuticals Company, which claims to be negotiating to build "one of the largest pharmaceuticals plants in the Middle East" at a cost of \$ 15 million. Discussions are currently under way with companies in Germany, Britain, and Holland to obtain production licenses and manufacturing technology, and with the European Community to obtain export financing.

Similarly, the American medical supplier group, Baxter International, has contracted to build a factory to produce intravenous fluids for the Syrian military. Of concern in this case are the manufacturing processes, which could be applied to a broad-range of CBW activities, and the end-user, which is the Syrian army. Vigorous intervention by the Simon Wiesenthal Center with Baxter director, G. Marshall Abbey, caused the company to back off from this contract temporarily in 1991. However, it was subsequently reported that Baxter was attempting to complete the sale through the intermediary of an unknown supply house called Medport, located in Amhurst, Ohio.

Despite the attempts to attract private sector interest, the two largest pharmaceuticals conglomerates in Syria, Thameco and DIMAS, remain under rigid state control. Together they control a third company, Saydalaya, which serves as the foreign procurement board for all Syrian imports of chemicals and processed medicines. Thameco is controlled by the Syrian Ministry of Industry and employs approximately 900 people at its principle production site in Damascus. A second plant, built in Aleppo at a cost of nearly \$ 40 million by a consortium of French pharmaceuticals companies in the late 1980s, was reportedly "abandoned" in 1989 because of financial difficulties. However, suspicion remains that Syria may have simply switched suppliers, in order to better disguise conversion of the plant to the production of CW agents.

DIMAS (the General Establishment for Blood and of Medical Industries) is directly controlled by the Syrian Ministry of Defense, and is the only manufacturer of serum in Syria. DIMAS is run by General Hikmat Tahrani, and controls a large production plant in Damascus.

Sources and Methods

- Syria Special Weapons News Reports

CHEMISCHE WAPENS

Central Intelligence Agency

Unclassified CIA Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions - 1 January Through 30 June 2001

[...]

Syria

Syria sought CW-related precursors and expertise from foreign sources during the reporting period. Damascus already has a stockpile of the nerve agent sarin, and it would appear that Syria is trying to develop more toxic and persistent nerve agents. Syria remains dependent on foreign sources for key elements of its CW program, including precursor chemicals and key production equipment. It is highly probable that Syria also is developing an offensive BW capability.

Syria—an NPT signatory with full-scope IAEA safeguards—has a nuclear research center at Dayr Al Jajar. In January 2000, Russia approved a draft cooperative program with Damascus that included cooperation on civil nuclear power. Broader access to Russian expertise could provide opportunities for Syria to expand its indigenous capabilities, should it decide to pursue nuclear weapons. We will continue to monitor Syria's nuclear R&D program for any signs of weapons intent.

During the first half of 2001, Damascus continued work on establishing a solid-propellant rocket motor development and production capability with help from outside countries. Foreign equipment and assistance to its liquid-propellant missile program—primarily from North Korean entities, but also from firms in Russia—

have been and will continue to be essential for Syria's effort. Damascus also continued its efforts to assemble—probably with considerable North Korean assistance—liquid-fueled Scud C missiles. Syria continues to acquire relatively small quantities of ACW—mainly from Russia, other FSU suppliers, China and Iran. But Damascus' outstanding debt to Russia and inability to fund large purchases have hampered negotiations for the large quantity of equipment Syria needs to revitalize its aging defense forces. Damascus is interested in acquiring Russian SA-10 and SA-11 air defense systems, MiG-29 and Su-27 fighters, and T-80 or T-90 main battle tanks, as well as upgrades for the aircraft, armored weapons, and air defense systems already in its inventory. Syria's Defense Minister met with high-level Russian officials in Moscow in May 2001 to negotiate a new military-technical cooperation agreement or arms contracts and address the debt issue, but no new agreements have been completed
[...]

NEDERLANDS BELEID

Ministerie van Defensie

Militaire Inlichtingen Dienst (MID) - Jaarverslag 2001

[...]

Syrië

Het buitenlands beleid van Syrië, waar zoals verwacht president Bashar al-Assad tracht op behoedzame wijze hervormingen door te voeren zonder de stabiliteit van zijn bewind in gevaar te brengen, kan worden gekarakteriseerd als afwachtend. Op dit punt domineren twee dossiers de Syrische agenda: een (vredes)regeling met Israël en de relatie met Libanon. Ten aanzien van het eerste punt heeft zich in 2001 geen enkele nieuwe ontwikkeling voorgedaan. De onderhandelingen zijn begin 2000 afgebroken en sindsdien niet meer hervat. Wat Libanon betreft, heeft Syrië de in 2000 gestarte terugtrekking van militaire eenheden voortgezet. Momenteel bevinden zich nog ongeveer 18.000 Syrische militairen op Libanees grondgebied.

Dit laat onverlet dat Syrië niet zal toestaan dat getornd wordt aan het primaat van de Libanese politiek. De nauwe band met Libanon is voor het Syrische bewind van vitaal belang als tegenwicht tegen de machtspositie van Israël. Een belangrijke rol hierin speelt de Libanese Hezbollah. In de laatste jaren heeft Hezbollah geopereerd binnen een algemeen kader waarvan de begrenzingen oorspronkelijk door Damascus zijn bepaald. Binnen dat kader kan Hezbollah vrij handelen. Van belang hierbij is dat de aanhoudende acties van Hezbollah in Syrische ogen een politiek doel dienen, waarbij rekening gehouden wordt met enig verlies aan materieel en mensenlevens. Zonder een vredesregeling van Israël met Syrië (en dus Libanon) is het onwaarschijnlijk dat aan de activiteiten van Hezbollah guerrilla's in het omstreken Shebaagebied een einde komt, hoewel de gebeurtenissen in de VS wel hebben geleid tot terughoudendheid van de zijde van Hezbollah.

Syrië is zich bewust van zijn tekortschietend, conventionele, militaire potentieel in verhouding met landen als Israël en Turkije. De modernisering van de Syrische strijdkrachten is in de afgelopen tien jaar sterk achtergebleven. Gelet op de huidige financieel-economische omstandigheden lijkt Syrië genoeg te nemen met het in stand houden en zo mogelijk *low budget* moderniseren van het bestaande, conventionele, militaire potentieel. Ter compensatie tracht Syrië zijn non-conventionele arsenaal, in de vorm van ballistische raketten, eventueel voorzien van chemische strijdmiddelen, te vergroten. Ofschoon doelen in NAVO-gebied bereikt kunnen worden, is de Syrische afschrikking primair tegen Israël gericht. Zolang geen sprake is van een vredesregeling met Israël, zal Syrië doorgaan met het uitbreiden van zijn nonconventionele militaire potentieel.

[...]

Landenoverzicht Syrië

22 januari 2002

[...]

4.1 Betrekkingen met Nederland

De bilaterale relaties zijn van bescheiden aard. Dit is voornamelijk vanwege de aard van het Syrische regime (zeer autoritair en gesloten) en het door de staat gedomineerde economische systeem (beperkte ruimte voor de privé-sector). Hoewel er positieve signalen waarneembaar zijn, is het niet erg waarschijnlijk dat deze situatie op korte termijn sterk zal veranderen.

De Nederlandse uitvoer naar Syrië is voor een belangrijk deel van chemische en traditioneel agrarische aard en vertoonde sinds het topjaar 1993 (EURO 130 miljoen) een geleidelijk neergaande lijn tot ongeveer EURO 75 miljoen. In 2000 bedroeg de uitvoer echter weer toegenomen tot EURO 100 mln. Syrië wordt in Nederland vertegenwoordigd door een consulaat in Den Haag, dat ressorteert onder de ambassade in Brussel.

[...]

Minister van Defensie

Antwoorden op Kamervragen over de Defensienota 2000

28-01-2000

26 900, nr. 2

[...]

5. Welke landen zouden bezig zijn met de aanmaak van chemisch en biologische wapens?

Antwoord: Het gaat om landen zoals Irak, Iran, Libië, Noord-Korea en Syrië. De aanmaak van chemische en biologische wapens, waarvan in de Defensienota wordt gesproken, behelst het ontwikkelen van processen voor de productie van dergelijke strijdmiddelen, het opzetten van een aangepaste productie-infrastructuur, het aanleggen van een voorraad grondstoffen (voorlopers), of het aanhouden van munitie die geschikt is om met strijdmiddelen te vullen. Het gaat hierbij zowel om landen die het CW en/of het BW-verdrag hebben ondertekend als om landen die dat nog niet hebben gedaan.

[...]

NBC-Proliferatie

20 mei 1998

Notitie van de Minister van Defensie

DE PROLIFERATIE VAN NUCLEAIRE, BIOLOGISCHE EN CHEMISCHE WAPENS EN DE NEDERLANDSE KRIJGSMACHT

[...]

I.I Nucleaire wapens

[...]

Libië en Syrië hebben op het ogenblik geen militaire nucleaire programma's van betekenis.

[...]

I.II Chemische wapens (CW)

[...]

Landen met aanzienlijke programma's voor chemische wapens zijn China, India, Irak, Iran, Libië, Noord-Korea en Syrië. Zij beschikken over direct inzetbare chemische munitie en houden een omvangrijke productie-infrastructuur in stand. Irak en Syrië zijn geen partij bij het CW-verdrag, China, India en Iran wel.

[...]

Het Syrische CW-programma dateert uit de jaren zeventig en is in de loop der jaren op een vrij hoog technisch niveau gebracht. Het is vooral gericht op de productie van het zenuwgas sarin, maar sinds kort worden er ook andere zenuwgasen geproduceerd, zoals VX. Het Syrische programma is in beperkte mate afhankelijk

gebleven van de import van een aantal basis-chemicaliën. Dit legt een zekere kwantitatieve beperking op aan de Syrische productiemogelijkheden. Er zijn overigens geen aanwijzingen dat Syrië productie op grote schaal nastreeft, zoals Irak. Gezien de militaire doelstellingen van het land is de huidige capaciteit voldoende. Syrië heeft nooit chemische wapens ingezet. Het heeft, evenmin als Libië, het CW-verdrag ondertekend.

[...]

I.III Biologische wapens (BW)

[...]

Ook het Syrische BW-programma dateert uit de jaren tachtig, maar is bescheiden van opzet en omvang, zeker in vergelijking met de Iraanse en de voormalige Iraakse programma's. Ook lijkt Syrië thans niet over wapens met biologische strijdmiddelen te beschikken.

[...]

I.IV Overbrengingsmiddelen

[...]

Syrië zet thans een eigen productielijn op voor Scud-C-raketten (bereik: ongeveer 600 kilometer), daarbij geholpen door Noord-Korea en Iran. In afwachting hiervan heeft Syrië al een aanzienlijk aantal Scuds geassembleerd uit uit het buitenland betrokken componenten. Ook Syrië toont bijzondere belangstelling voor de ontwikkeling van raketten met vaste brandstof.

[...]

Ministerie van Defensie

Missile Defense

Brief aan de Kamer

5 juli 2001

[...]

De staten die primair tot zorg stemmen, en die wij zullen aanduiden met de term risicolanden, zijn Noord-Korea, Iran en Irak en in mindere mate Libië en Syrië, waarvan Iran, Syrië en Libië reeds nu al technisch gezien in staat zijn zuidelijke delen van het NAVO-grondgebied met tactische ballistische raketten te bereiken. In de brief aan Uw Kamer van 30 augustus 2000 (26800 V, nr. 122) is aangegeven dat bij de inschatting van de vraag in hoeverre van deze capaciteiten ook een werkelijke dreiging uitgaat voor Nederland en de overige NAVO-landen meerdere factoren een rol spelen, waaronder de relatie met de afschrikking van de NAVO, de politieke motieven van betreffende landen (intenties) en de effectiviteit van non-proliferatieregimes en –verdragen.

[...]

Syrië tracht zijn arsenaal aan ballistische raketten uit te bouwen, voornamelijk met Noordkoreaanse hulp en materiaal, alsmede met Iraanse hulp en materiaal, zoals ook is bericht in het antwoord van de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken op vragen van de leden Wilders en Weisglas van 4 april 2001 (Kamerstuk 993). Syrië is geen partij bij het CW-verdrag, naar eigen zeggen vanwege het feit dat Israël geen partij bij het NPV is. De regering gaat er op grond van de haar beschikbare informatie van uit dat Syrië over chemische wapens beschikt. De regering gaat ervan uit dat Syrië niet de beschikking heeft over kernwapens en ook geen programma ter verwerving daarvan van enig belang heeft. Evenmin zijn er aanwijzingen dat Syrië een BW-programma van enige betekenis heeft.

[...]

FACTS AND REPORTS

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