

AANVAL OP IRAK

De kwestie van de massavernietigingswapens
Feiten, documenten en overwegingen

PENN – NL Facts and Reports Nr. 13

September 2002

Werkgroep Eurobom

PENN-Nederland

AANVAL OP IRAK


September 2002

PENN, het Project voor Europese Nucleaire Non-proliferatie, is opgezet om:

- * officiële discussies over de toekomst van kernwapens in Europa nauwgezet te volgen en deze te verhelderen;
- * analyses van en commentaren op deze ontwikkelingen te publiceren;
- * verdere maatregelen voor kernontwapening in Europa en substantiële Europese bijdragen aan kernwapenbeheersing, ontwapening en non-proliferatie te stimuleren;
- * te ijveren voor de volledige naleving van het Non-Proliferatieverdrag door de NAVO, de Europese Unie, en haar leden;
- * politieke belemmeringen op te werpen tegen ontwikkelingen die zouden kunnen leiden tot een Europese Unie met kernwapens;
- * te bevorderen dat de Europese Unie en al haar leden uiteindelijk niet-nucleaire leden van het NPV worden.

Working Group Eurobomb/PENN NL
Obrechtstraat 43
3572 EC UTRECHT
THE NETHERLANDS
TEL (+31) (0)30 271 4376
(+31) (0)30 272 2594
FAX (+31) (0)30 271 4759
e-mail: k.koster@inter.nl.net
logo: Len Munnik

Deze publikatie is mogelijk gemaakt door de
W. Alton Jones Foundation



Werkgroep Eurobom

PENN/Netherlands MPI/Netherlands

FACTS AND REPORTS

September 2002 – No. 13

INHOUDSOPGAVE

Inleiding	2
Massavernietigingswapens	3
Lijst van rapporten	3
Wall Street Journal 28012002: Iraq permits an atomic energy group to inspect nuclear site near Baghdad	3
IISS 09092002: Press Statement	4
Washington Post 08092002: Bush, Blair decry Hussein	8
Inspectieregime	10
New York Times 12092002: The Terms of the Debate: What Iraq Has Promised the U.N. on Disarmament	10
VN Resolutie 1284	12
United Nations 19032002: Questions submitted by Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri to U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan	17
Washington Post 02032002: U.S. spied on Iraq via UN	18
Der Spiegel 29072002: Schwedischer Diplomat wirft USA Spionage vor	20
Speech Bush voor de Algemene Vergadering van de VN	22
Kritiek	25
Washington Post 08122001: U.S. scuttles germ war conference move to halt talks stuns European allies	25
The Guardian 15032002: Iraq: the myth and the reality	25
Baltimore Sun 03092002: Case for invading Iraq is full of holes	30
Associated Press 08092002: Cheney defends pre-emptive strike	31
Sunday Herald 08092002: How did Iraq get its weapons? We sold them	32
CNN 09092002: Ritter dismisses report on Iraq	33
Bulletin of Atomic Scientist 10092002: You call that evidence?	34
New York Times 11092002: US lacks up-to-date review of Iraqi arms	35
New York Times 12092002: Excerpts: Kofi Annan's speech to the General Assembly	36
Commentaar	39
Bijlagen	41
Nederlands beleid	41
Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken: landenoverzicht Irak (juni 2002)	41
Ministerie van Defensie: United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM)	41
Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken: beantwoording vragen Van Bommel (06022002)	42
Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken: beantwoording vragen Hoekema en Koenders (06052002)	43
Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken: brief van de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken (04092002)	43
Citaten over beleid VS ten aanzien van Irak	44
Kroniek	53
Overzicht Facts and Reports	54

INLEIDING

In het internationale debat over de legitimatie om een aanvalsoorlog tegen Irak te beginnen, spelen massavernietigingswapens een belangrijke rol. Inzoverre de Amerikaanse regering buitenlandse politieke steun voor de aanvalsplannen noodzakelijk acht, gebruikt hij de kwestie van 'WMD' (Weapons of Mass Destruction) om een sfeer van urgentie te creëren waarbinnen het makkelijker wordt om de grote oppositie tegen een oorlog met Irak te overwinnen.

De precieze stand van zaken met betrekking tot de Irakese WMD is niet duidelijk. Er is voldoende informatie boven water gehaald door de VN inspecteurs (die eind 1998 Irak verlieten) om aan te tonen dat Saddam Hussein inderdaad het bezit van alle drie de categorieën wapens nastreeft. Deze rapporten of delen daaruit zijn te vinden op de websites die voorin in deze Facts & Reports worden genoemd.

Maar alom wordt ook de vraag gesteld: hoe staat het momenteel met de productie van WMD in Irak? Het International Institute for Strategic Studies presenteerde begin september een rapport waarin geen nieuwe informatie stond: Irak kan alleen kernwapens bouwen door toegang tot verrijkt uranium. Die moet geïmporteerd of zelf geproduceerd worden, hetgeen niet in het geheim kan gebeuren. Ook de productie van chemische wapens laat sporen achter die met technische surveillance middelen kunnen worden waargenomen. Mogelijkerwijs is het wel gelukt om biologische wapens te produceren. De vraag is dan of de beschikbare WMD kunnen worden ingezet (beschikbaarheid van draagsystemen), en met welke rationale. Een aanval op Israël zou immers zelfmoord zijn vanwege de nucleaire bewapening van dat land (waar overigens niemand zich druk maakt).

In deze verzameling documenten hebben we een deel van de openbare informatie over deze zaken bij elkaar gebracht, evenals VN resoluties en een reeks recente krantartikelen. In bijlagen hebben we relevante kamerstukken opgenomen, plus een reeks citaten van belangrijke politici en internationale opiniemakers over de plannen om Irak binnen te vallen. We denken dat deze informatie nuttig is voor het publieke debat over de Amerikaanse aanvalsplannen op Irak.

Redactie F&R

MASSAVERNIETIGINGSWAPENS

Lijst van rapporten

Massavernietigingswapens

Rapport Center for Defense Information	www.cdi.org/terrorism/iraq-wmd.cfm
Rapporten Center for Nonproliferation Studies	cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/iraq.htm
	www.nti.org/e_research/e1_iraq_1.html
Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations – United States Senate	foreign.senate.gov/hearings/hrq020731a2.html
	foreign.senate.gov/hearings/hrq020801a.htm

Nucleaire wapens:

Rapporten Federation of American Scientists	www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/nuke/when.htm
	www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/nuke/program.htm
	www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/nuke/iaea.htm
Rapport International Atomic Energy Agency	www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/Press/Booklets/Iraq/iraqindex.html

Chemische wapens:

Rapporten Federation of American Scientists	www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/cw/program.htm
	www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/cw/non-use.htm
	www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/cw/unscom.htm

Biologische wapens:

Rapporten Federation of American Scientists	www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/bw/program.htm
	www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/bw/unscom.htm

Draagsystemen:

Rapporten Federation of American Scientists	www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/missile/index.htm
	www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/missile/unscom.htm

Wall Street Journal

28 januari 2002

Iraq Permits An Atomic Energy Group To Inspect Nuclear Site Near Baghdad

By James M. Dorsey, Staff Reporter of The Wall Street Journal

Iraq allowed a team of inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency into the country to inspect nuclear materials at a site near Baghdad.

The IAEA said Iraq agreed to a "limited" four-day mission, which leaves the team without a broader mandate to inspect other facilities or determine whether Iraq is pursuing a nuclear-weapons program.

"We cannot provide assurances that Iraq is not pursuing a new secret nuclear program," IAEA spokeswoman Melissa Fleming said.

The visit by the IAEA -- an independent organization acting under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, of which Iraq is a signatory -- comes as Iraq seeks to revive its dialogue with the United Nations. The U.N. imposed economic sanctions on Baghdad after the 1991 Gulf War and has demanded that Iraq allow its weapons inspectors, which were barred from Iraq in 1998, back into the country. Iraq is also moving to improve relations with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, which it invaded in 1990.

President Bush, meanwhile, has warned Saddam Hussein that he would "deal with him at the appropriate time" unless the Iraqi leader allows U.N. inspectors access to sites within the country. Iraq denies U.S. allegations that it is secretly developing weapons of mass destruction. "How is it possible to possess the means to develop such weapons under siege and surveillance for more than 11 years?" asked the al-Thawra newspaper, which is a mouthpiece of the ruling Baath party.

The seven IAEA inspectors are being granted access to a former nuclear research center at Tuwaitha, north of Baghdad, where 1.8 tons of low-enriched uranium -- which isn't suitable for use in weapons -- are being stored.

In the early 1990s, the IAEA removed 10 pounds of highly enriched, weapons-grade uranium from Iraq. The agency says it believes the inspections it was able to carry out until 1998 had uncovered all the weapons-grade uranium Iraq had at the time. The Vienna-based group also destroyed what it described as several "sophisticated facilities" where uranium could be enriched and weaponized. But for the past four years, the IAEA says it has been able to verify only that the uranium at Tuwaitha is under lock and key.

"We are not able to go beyond looking at this material and ensuring it remains under the IAEA seal," Ms. Fleming said. "What we need to do is to go anywhere at any time -- and at no notice -- to be able to carry out our work," she said.

International Institute for Strategic Studies

Press Statement

Dr John Chipman - IISS Director

Monday, 9 September - Arundel House, London

Introduction

Welcome to the Launch of a special publication by the IISS: 'Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Net Assessment', An IISS *Strategic Dossier*.

As all of you know well, the IISS has for over 40 years annually published *The Military Balance*. This is the only reliable, publicly available inventory of the world's armed forces, rebel groups and organised non-state armed groups. We have drawn on this experience in analysing material gathered from many different sources in compiling this *Dossier*.

We began to work on the preparation on this *Dossier*, in the month of June. By then it had become evident that the increased attention to the threat posed by Iraq's programmes to develop nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons as well as ballistic missiles, was crying out for a net assessment of this kind. This *Dossier* is the result of intensive work over eight weeks that has drawn on many sources. All of you have received today a copy of the final *Dossier*. In addition we have provided a document providing key excerpts from each chapter in the document. You will see that on each page of the *Dossier* that does not carry a table or graphic there is a 'pull' that extracts the main argument on the page. Read sequentially, these provide a quick summary of the highlights. Finally we have replicated from page 74 of the *Dossier* a table that summarises our net assessment of Iraq's current capabilities. A copy of the statement from which I am now reading will be available at the end of this press conference. I am delighted to be joined today by the Editor of the *Dossier*, Dr Gary Samore, Senior Fellow for Non-Proliferation, and by Dennis Gormley, Consulting Senior Fellow for Defence Policy and Technology.

Our objective has been to assess, as accurately and dispassionately as possible, Iraq's current WMD capacities. The task is challenging. Although UN inspections of Iraq produced a tremendous amount of technical information on the development, objectives and relative capabilities of Iraq's WMD and missile programmes, **Iraq made every effort to obscure its past, obstruct dismantlement of its present assets, and retain capabilities for the future.** Since Iraq forced inspections to end in December 1998, it has become more difficult to learn about its activities and assess its capabilities.

Questions include:

- **The extent to which Iraq has taken advantage of the absence of inspectors to begin reconstituting its programmes**
- **The extent to which Iraq has been able to obtain vital foreign assistance through cracks in the sanction regime**

- **The degree to which Iraq has been able to conduct activities that will have evaded sophisticated surveillance techniques**
- **The degree to which information gathered from defectors on Iraq's programmes can still be relied upon**

Recognising these difficulties, the IISS set out to build its assessment on a strong foundation of technical expertise. We have drawn on recognised technical experts, with long field experience in UNSCOM and IAEA inspections, to provide initial drafts on Iraq's nuclear, biological, chemical, and ballistic missile programmes. We have applied our own expertise and those of many other experts in scrutinising each draft. Each chapter covers the historical development of Iraq's technical capabilities through to the end of the Gulf War. The *Dossier* then assesses the disarmament achievements and the kind of activity that Iraq was able to conceal or continue during the inspection period ending in December 1998. We then carefully analyse what Iraq may have been able to accomplish in each of these key weapon areas since 1998.

UN Resolutions and the History of Inspections

Our report begins by recalling the relevant Security Council Resolutions that followed the cessation of hostilities at the end of the Gulf War. UN Security Council Resolution 687 passed on 3 April 1991, established the formal ceasefire between Coalition forces and Iraq. **Key amongst the ceasefire terms was the prohibition against Iraq's retaining, acquiring or developing WMD and long range missiles.** In addition there was a demand that Iraq unconditionally accept the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of its WMD under international supervision. **Iraq was required to submit within 15 days a declaration of all WMD sites and items.**

In the period that followed passage of the resolution Iraq did everything in its power to avoid these and other obligations placed upon it.

From the start of the inspections by UNSCOM in 1991 through to the demise of UNSCOM in 1998 Iraq practised a series of measures designed to prevent the UN inspectors from finding the full range and extent of its proscribed WMD and missile programmes. Indeed, this activity was so intense, that UNSCOM had to set up a special unit to counter Iraq's efforts. While there were notable successes in defeating Iraqi concealment efforts, many others failed.

The UNSCOM experience demonstrates that no on-site inspections of Iraq's WMD programmes can succeed unless inspectors develop an imaginative and carefully co-ordinated counter-concealment strategy.

On 17 December 1999, one year after UNSCOM left, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1284, reaffirming all previous UNSC resolutions, disbanding UNSCOM, and establishing the UN Monitoring Verification and Inspection Commission or UNMOVIC.

Iraq has continued to reject Resolution 1284 on the grounds that it does not set a clear timetable or criteria for lifting sanctions.

If UNMOVIC inspectors were ever to go to Iraq, it would take them time to develop and refine the unique inspection techniques required. In addition, it would take them considerable field experience to develop the necessary tradecraft to deal with Iraqi obfuscation efforts.

Certainly, the strength of Baghdad's commitment to possess WMD is measurable in part by its efforts to resist unfettered UN inspections.

Nuclear Weapons

The IISS *Dossier* then goes on to analyse Saddam Hussein's nuclear weapons programmes. It carries an extensive examination of Iraq's programmes to produce highly enriched uranium (HEU) through various enrichment technologies, first electro-magnetic separation and then gas centrifuge. On the eve of the Gulf War, Iraq was on the verge of producing significant amounts of HEU that would have allowed it within two to three years to produce its first nuclear weapon. **Had the Gulf War not intervened, Iraq could have accumulated a nuclear stockpile of a dozen or so weapons by the end of the decade.**

The Gulf War heavily damaged Iraq's nuclear facilities. By the end of inspections in 1998, the IAEA was confident that Iraq's indigenous nuclear weapons programme had not produced more than a few grammes of weapons useable nuclear material.

At the same time, Iraq's nuclear potential was not completely eliminated. Most importantly, the scientific and technical expertise of Iraq's nuclear programme survived, and Baghdad has tried to keep its core nuclear teams in place working on various civilian projects.

Since 1998, Iraq has had more opportunities to reconstitute elements of its nuclear programme and to keep these activities secret. Iraq could have completed the necessary theoretical modelling and practical testing of

critical nuclear weapons components. Our report covers this in detail. **As for production of indigenous material, Iraq could take a number of measures to hide a 1000 machine centrifuge plant from surveillance, but it would be more difficult to acquire foreign materials, equipment and components without detection.** It is unlikely that Iraq could have completed a facility for the production of nuclear weapons-useable material in only a few years.

Our net assessment of the current situation is that:

- **Iraq does not possess facilities to produce fissile material in sufficient amounts for nuclear weapons.**
- **It would require several years and extensive foreign assistance to build such fissile material production facilities.**
- **It could, however, assemble nuclear weapons within months if fissile material from foreign sources were obtained.**
- **It could divert domestic civil-use radioisotopes or seek to obtain foreign material for a crude radiological device.**

Biological Weapons

Our *Dossier* then goes on to examine the much more difficult subject of biological weapons. In the mid 1980s, Iraq's BW programme had picked up speed and by 1989, Iraq began to produce BW agent in volume. After its invasion of Kuwait, Baghdad stepped up large scale BW agent production and assembled rudimentary BW munitions. **These weapons were distributed to military units, who were delegated to use them if coalition forces advanced on Baghdad or used nuclear weapons.** Most of Iraq's key BW facilities, which had been successfully hidden from Western intelligence agencies, escaped attack during the Gulf War. After UN inspections began, Baghdad continued to conceal its BW programme until 1995. **By the time UNSCOM's work ended in 1998, it was only able to account for a portion of Iraq's BW munitions, bulk agents, and growth media.**

Again, Iraq retains the expertise and industrial capability to produce agents quickly and in volume if desired. Moreover, Iraq has had a decade of experience countering intelligence and developing effective concealment methods. Western intelligence agencies take seriously defector information to the effect that underground facilities have been built and a fleet of mobile biological production laboratories deployed, though these are hard to confirm.

Iraq can certainly produce new stocks of bulk BW agent, including botulinum toxin and anthrax with its existing facilities, equipment and materials. BW agent could be delivered by short range munitions including artillery shells and rockets. Delivery by ballistic missile is more problematic given that much of the agent would be destroyed on impact and the immediate area of dispersal would be small. Civilian casualties could still be in the hundreds or thousands. **Refurbished L-29 trainer aircraft could operate as weapons-carrying UAVs with a range of over 600km. Such UAVs, in theory, would be considerably more effective than ballistic missiles in delivering CBW. Commando and terrorist attack is also possible.**

Our net assessment of the current situation is that:

- **Iraq has probably retained substantial growth media and BW agent (perhaps thousands of litres of anthrax) from pre 1991 stocks.**
- **The regime is capable of resuming BW Agent production on short notice (in weeks) from existing civilian facilities. It could have produced thousands of litres of anthrax, botulinum toxin and other agents since 1998. Actual stocks cannot be known.**
- **Iraqi production of viral agents is unknown as is the question of whether the regime possesses small pox.**

Chemical Weapons

Compared to its efforts to acquire nuclear and biological weapons, Iraq's chemical weapons (CW) programme was the first to reach full maturity, and included riot control, blister and nerve agents in a variety of munitions including missile warheads, aerial bombs, rockets and artillery shells. Iraq used chemical weapons extensively against Iranian troops from 1982 onwards. **Indeed Iraq emerged from the war with Iran with the largest and most advanced chemical weapons capability in the Middle East at that time.** Between 1988 and 1991 Iraq made further progress in developing binary chemical munitions, producing and weaponising an advanced nerve agent, VX, and developing an indigenous production base for key CW precursors. **The Gulf War however devastated Iraq's primary CW production facilities and a large portion of its stockpile of CW**

munitions. Through to 1998, UNSCOM was able to dispose of large quantities of CW munitions, bulk agent, precursors and production equipment that were not destroyed in combat.

Here too, Iraq was almost certainly able to conceal and salvage key aspects of its CW programme, including CW munitions, agent and precursors. Iraq has retained the experienced personnel, know how and chemical industrial capability to reconstitute elements of its CW programme on an emergency basis.

Iraq could have retained stable precursors for a few hundred tonnes of sarin and cyclosarin and a similar amount of VX. Weaponisation of any retained material would not pose a significant obstacle.

Assessing the production of new CW agent and precursors depends on determining the degree to which Iraq will have chosen to mobilise its civilian chemical industry to produce these capabilities. **Without inspectors present, Iraq would not find it difficult to build on pre 1991 stocks and produce and weaponise fresh agent.**

Unless Iraq has advanced beyond the impact fusing and warhead design of its 1990 era special warheads, its ability to disseminate effectively CW agent on ballistic missiles is questionable, since so much agent would be destroyed on impact. **Iraq's known ability to marry chemical warheads to its rocket and artillery pieces (with ranges up to 30,000 metres) could complicate operations for opposing forces, who would be required to wear protective gear.**

Our net assessment of the current situation is that:

- **Iraq has probably retained a few hundred tonnes of mustard and precursors for a few hundred tonnes of sarin/cyclosarin and perhaps similar amounts of VX from pre-1991 stocks.**
- **It is capable of resuming CW production on short notice (months) from existing civilian facilities. It could have produced hundreds of tonnes of agent (mustard and nerve agents) since 1998. In these circumstances, it is not possible accurately to estimate present stocks.**

Ballistic Missiles

A great deal of attention needs also to be placed on Iraq's ballistic missile capabilities. Iraq is proscribed by UN Resolutions from possessing ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150km. In the mid 1970s Iraq began to import Scud B missiles with a range of 300km from the Soviet Union and ultimately acquired 819. In the mid 1980s Iraq worked to modify the Scud missiles in order to double their range. The new missile, called the *al Hussein*, with a range of 650km, was used during the war against Iran.

During the 1991 Gulf war an *al-Hussein* missile strike against a US military facility in Saudi Arabia caused the greatest number of US casualties in any single incident, and the mobility of the launchers allowed them to evade allied planes, which were unable to destroy any mobile missiles during the war.

In the wake of the Gulf War, much of Iraq's missile infrastructure lay in ruins. (The US and UK, during Operation Desert Fox in December 1998, attacked a number of missile related facilities). During the inspections period Iraq continued to conduct small scale covert research and development on proscribed missiles. In addition, Iraq continued missile related procurement efforts. Despite international sanctions, Iraq covertly negotiated transactions with more than 500 companies. Its interests included liquid propellant engine parts, solid propulsion technology, guidance and control equipment, and many other items. **In one case complete gyroscopes recovered from Russian long range ballistic missiles were even smuggled into Iraq and later recovered by UNSCOM in December 1995.**

UNSCOM attempted to account for all imported missiles and for indigenously produced missiles, but that accounting was incomplete and **it must be presumed that Iraq has been able to retain some of its proscribed missiles. Also, it is likely that Iraqi engineers will have been able to increase the propellant tanks capacities in the *al Samoud* to reach ranges of some 200km with a few hundred kilogrammes payload suitable for CBW delivery.**

Our net assessment of the current situation is that:

- **Iraq has probably retained a small force of about a dozen 650km range *al-Hussein* missiles. These could strike Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran and Kuwait. Could be armed with CBW warheads.**
- **Iraq does not possess facilities to produce long range missiles and it would require several years and extensive foreign assistance to construct such facilities.**
- **Iraq may, in addition, have a small number of *al Samoud* missiles with ranges of up to 200km able to strike Kuwait but only if deployed within the southern no fly zone**

- **It is capable of manufacturing rudimentary CBW warheads; its development of more advanced designs is unknown**
- **Iraq can convert civilian vehicles to provide mobile launchers for its ballistic missiles**

Conclusion

In conclusion, war, sanctions and inspections have reversed and retarded, but not eliminated Iraq's nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and long range missile capacities, nor have they removed Baghdad's enduring interest in developing these capacities. **The retention of WMD capacities by Iraq is self-evidently the core objective of the regime, for it has sacrificed all other domestic and foreign policy goals to this singular aim.** It has retained this single objective, and pursued it in breach of the ceasefire and UN Security Council Resolutions that brought a conditional end to the 1991 Gulf War. Over more than eleven years the Iraqi regime has sought to evade its obligations and undermine support for the sanctions and inspections regime meant to eliminate its WMD capacities and contain its ambitions. Iraq has fought a relatively successful diplomatic war of attrition. It is worth recalling that the international debate 18 months ago was centred on how sanctions against Iraq might be relaxed, and inspections concluded with some dispatch in light of the dwindling willingness to support the containment policy developed in 1991.

Today, after four years without inspections, there can be no certainty about the extent of Iraq's current capacities. A reasonable net assessment is that Iraq has no nuclear weapons but could build one quickly if it acquired sufficient fissile material. It has extensive biological weapons capabilities and a smaller chemical weapons stockpile. It has a small force of ballistic missiles with a range of 650km, that are capable of delivering CBW warheads, and has prepared other delivery methods for CBW, including manned aircraft and UAVs. **Sooner or later, it seems likely that the current Iraqi regime will eventually achieve its objectives.**

In compiling this *Strategic Dossier*, the IISS has sought to put the best available facts on this difficult issue before the wider public. **This Strategic Dossier does not attempt to make a case, either way, as to whether Saddam Hussein's WMD arsenal is a *casus belli per se*. Wait and the threat will grow; strike and the threat may be used.** Clearly, governments have a pressing duty to develop early a strategy to deal comprehensively with this unique international problem.

Washington Post

Bush, Blair decry Hussein

Iraqi threat is real, they say

By Karen DeYoung

Sunday, September 8, 2002

President Bush said yesterday the world has all the evidence it needs that Iraq is continuing to develop weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, as he was host to British Prime Minister Tony Blair for a three-hour strategy session on building international support for aggressive action against Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.

Speaking to reporters before they began closed-door consultations at Camp David, Bush and Blair agreed the Iraqi threat must be addressed quickly. "We owe it to future generations to deal with this problem," Bush said. "The policy of inaction, doing nothing, is not something we can responsibly adhere to," Blair said.

Bush is scheduled to address the United Nations about Iraq on Thursday. His advisers say the speech will lay out the case for urgent action, and warn the international community that time is running out for stopping Hussein's pursuit of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.

With the exception of Blair, U.S. allies have been reluctant to subscribe to the administration's policy of "regime change," and have said they would not participate in a U.S. military invasion to oust the Iraqi leader. Warning that such action would violate international law and destabilize much of the world, they have insisted the United Nations is the proper venue for dealing with Iraq's renegeing on promises to destroy its weapons capability and submit to U.N. inspections.

Led by Vice President Cheney, several senior administration officials have said they see no purpose in another round of inspections, since Hussein repeatedly obstructed efforts that began after Iraq's defeat in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, and has banned inspectors since 1998. Although officials said Bush shares that view, and believes a U.S. invasion of Iraq is inevitable, they said last week that he has agreed to issue one last challenge to the international community to make good on its resolutions against Iraq.

Officials said the U.N. speech would amount to an ultimatum in which Bush will outline the threat in its starkest, most immediate terms and indicate that the United States will not wait much longer for international action. They said some details of the speech are still under discussion, including whether Bush would propose that the Security Council set a deadline for Iraqi compliance or issue a resolution authorizing an international military force to compel inspections.

The president said yesterday that "my administration still supports regime change," then added without elaboration, "There's all kinds of ways to change regimes." Asked whether anyone besides Blair supported his position that Iraq's threat will remain as long as Hussein is in power, Bush said "yes."

He said "a lot of people" agree that Hussein has weapons of mass destruction and has used chemical and biological weapons in the past -- in the late 1980s during attacks against Iraqi Kurds and in Iraq's war with Iran. "A lot of people understand he is unstable. So we've got a lot of support."

Blair, as he often does in appearances with Bush, gave a more specific response. "There are people asking perfectly reasonable questions about this," Blair said. "But the one thing no one can deny is that Saddam Hussein is in breach of the United Nations resolutions on weapons of mass destruction . . . [and] that poses a threat."

Blair has tried to position himself between the president and increasingly outspoken European leaders who fear precipitative U.S. action against Baghdad. British officials said Blair has counseled Bush that he is much more likely to gain international support for an invasion if he allows the U.N. process to run its course.

Blair spent less than six hours on the ground. He arrived at Andrews Air Force Base at midafternoon and traveled by helicopter to the presidential retreat in Maryland for discussions and a quick dinner before returning to London last night.

After Blair's departure, National Security Council spokesman Sean McCormack said that, in addition to Iraq, the prime minister and Bush had discussed the Middle East, and had "agreed on the importance of improving the security situation and intensifying the reconstruction effort" in Afghanistan. Last week, U.S. military bodyguards thwarted an attempt to assassinate Afghan President Hamid Karzai, and a bomb killed 26 people in Kabul. The administration has said it would support the expansion of an international security force, currently deployed only in Kabul, throughout the country but would not contribute troops to it.

As the two leaders, both dressed casually, responded to questions on the Camp David lawn before beginning their talks, it was Blair who repeatedly referred to international responsibility. Iraq, he said, "is an issue not just for America, not just for Britain, it's an issue for the whole of the international community."

As in the coalition against al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, he said, "We want the broadest possible international support. But it's got to be on the basis of actually making sure that the threat that we've outlined" is adequately dealt with .

Blair said "the threat from Saddam Hussein and weapons of mass destruction -- chemical, biological, potentially nuclear weapons capability -- that threat is real. We need only to look at the report from the International Atomic Energy Agency this morning, showing what has been going on at the former nuclear weapon sites to realize that."

The Vienna-based, U.N.-affiliated agency carried out inspections of Iraq's efforts to develop nuclear weapons before Hussein forced all inspectors from his country. IAEA reports chronicled numerous incidents of Iraqi deception and obstruction and the discovery of a sophisticated weapons program, but said that the program had been successfully dismantled by the end of 1998.

Bush, picking up Blair's theme, also referred to the "new [IAEA] report": "I would remind you that when the inspectors first went into Iraq and were denied -- finally denied access, a report came out of the . . . IAEA, that they [Iraqis] were six months away from developing a weapon. I don't know what more evidence we need."

While there is widespread international agreement that Iraq has continued to develop chemical and biological weapons, questions have been raised about whether it has restarted a nuclear arms program. Members of Congress have asked the administration to provide evidence for assertions by Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld that Iraq is close to developing a nuclear weapon.

The joint mention of a "new" report apparently referred to articles in Friday's New York Times and yesterday's British press. They noted that satellite photos obtained by the IAEA indicated new construction at several sites identified as nuclear-related and dismantled during pre-1998 inspections.

But a spokeswoman at IAEA headquarters said yesterday that the agency has issued no new report. She said the newspaper accounts referred to commercially available images the agency made available in July in a presentation that elicited little media interest.

"We didn't want to make a big deal of it, because we have no idea whether it means anything," spokeswoman Melissa Fleming said of the photos. "Construction of a building is one thing. Restarting a nuclear program is another."

"We have a lot of commercial satellite imagery" indicating "that there has been construction at sites that were formerly nuclear," Fleming said. "But what that means, we don't know." She said the agency issued a news release late Friday to "make it clear there is nothing new."

A senior administration official last night confirmed a report in today's New York Times that says Iraq has sought over the past 14 months to buy thousands of specially designed aluminum tubes, which U.S. intelligence officials believe were intended as components of centrifuges to enrich uranium. The story said that all of the attempts, the most recent occurring in the past several months, had been blocked. The official declined to say whether this information was among the "new" evidence of Iraq's nuclear intentions cited by the administration.

Before Blair's arrival yesterday, Bush discussed Iraq at Camp David with senior advisers including Cheney, Rumsfeld, national security adviser Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, CIA Director George J. Tenet, White House Chief of Staff Andrew H. Card Jr. and Rice deputy Stephen Hadley. Powell, Rumsfeld and Tenet left the compound as Blair was arriving.

Last week, Bush said for the first time that he would seek congressional authorization to take whatever action he deemed necessary against Iraq, and began consulting with international leaders. But telephone conversations Friday with the leaders of Russia, France and China yielded little support for his efforts.

Those three countries, along with Britain and the United States, are permanent members of the U.N. Security Council with veto power over any new resolution regarding inspections in Iraq. Such a resolution possibly could

include an implicit or explicit promise that military invasion would follow noncompliance. U.S. officials believe France can probably be persuaded to sign on, but obtaining support from Russia and China -- both of which have economic and diplomatic interests in Iraq -- would be far more difficult.

A Kremlin statement after Bush's telephone call to Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed "serious doubts" about the validity of invading Iraq under international law. China is expected to follow Russia's lead in the Security Council. Although Beijing issued no comment about President Jiang Zemin's talk with Bush, a senior Chinese foreign policy official said Thursday that "we believe that this issue should be settled peacefully."

"We want the Iraq government to abide by the U.N. sanctions," the Chinese official said. "They have not done that. But we also feel that American use of force in the region would be a major destabilizing factor."

Inspectieregime

VN-Resoluties

New York Times

The Terms of the Debate: What Iraq Has Promised the U.N. on Disarmament

September 12, 2002

Following are the main provisions of the United Nations Security Council 1991 resolutions on Iraq:

Resolution 687
Adopted 3 April 1991

The Security Council, . . .

CONSCIOUS also of the statements by Iraq threatening to use weapons in violation of its obligations under the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and of its prior use of chemical weapons, and affirming that grave consequences would follow any further use by Iraq of such weapons, . . .

RECALLING also that Iraq has signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, of 10 April 1972, ...

AWARE of the use by Iraq of ballistic missiles in unprovoked attacks and therefore of the need to take specific measures in regard to such missiles located in Iraq,

CONCERNED by the reports in the hands of member states that Iraq has attempted to acquire materials for a nuclear-weapons program contrary to its obligations under the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968, . . .

8. DECIDES that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of:

(a) All chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities related thereto;

(b) All ballistic missiles within range greater than 150 kilometers, and related major parts and repair and production facilities; . . .

(a) Iraq shall submit to the secretary general, within 15 days of the adoption of the present resolution, a declaration on the locations, amounts and types of all items specified in Paragraph 8 and agree to urgent, on-site inspection as specified below:

(b) The secretary general . . . shall develop and submit to the Council for approval a plan calling for the completion of the following acts within 45 days of such approval:

(i) The forming of a Special Commission which shall carry out immediate on-site inspection of Iraq's biological, chemical and missile capabilities, based on Iraq's declarations and the designation of any additional locations by the Special Commission itself;

(ii) The yielding by Iraq of possession to the Special Commission for destruction, removal or rendering harmless, taking into account the requirements of public safety of all items specified . . . ;

(iii) The provision by the Special Commission to the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency of the assistance and cooperation required in Paragraphs 12 and 13;

10. DECIDES further that Iraq shall unconditionally undertake not to use, develop, construct or acquire any of the items specified in Paragraphs 8 and 9, and requests the secretary general, in consultation with the Special Commission, to develop a plan for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with the present paragraph; . . .

12. DECIDES that Iraq shall unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapon-usable material or any subsystems or components or any research, development, support or manufacturing facilities related to the above; to submit to the secretary general and the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency within 15 days of the adoption of the present resolution a declaration of the locations, amounts and types of all items specified above; to place all of its nuclear-weapon-usable materials under the exclusive control, for custody and removal, of the agency, with the assistance and cooperation of the Special Commission as provided for in the plan of the secretary general discussed in Paragraph 9 (b); to accept, in accordance with the arrangements provided for in Paragraph 13, urgent on-site inspection and the destruction, removal or rendering harmless as appropriate of all items specified above; and to accept the plan discussed in Paragraph 13 for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of its compliance with these undertakings;

13. REQUESTS the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, through the secretary general and with the assistance and cooperation of the Special Commission as provided for in the plan of the secretary general referred to in Paragraph 9 (b), to carry out immediate on-site inspection of Iraq's nuclear capabilities based on Iraq's declarations and the designation of any additional locations by the Special Commission to develop a plan for submission to the Council within 45 days calling for the destruction, removal or rendering harmless as appropriate of all items listed in Paragraph 12; to carry out the plan within forty-five days following approval by the Council and to develop a plan, taking into account the rights and obligations of Iraq under the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with Paragraph 12; . . .

Resolution 707

Adopted 15 April 1991

The Security Council . . .

3. DEMANDS that Iraq

(i) provide full, final and complete disclosure, as required by resolution 687 (1991), of all aspects of its programs to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers, and of all holdings of such weapons, their components and production facilities and locations, as well as all other nuclear programs, including any which it claims are for purposes not related to nuclear-weapon-usable material, without further delay;

(ii) allow the Special Commission, the I.A.E.A. (International Atomic Energy Agency) and their inspection teams immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to any and all areas, facilities, equipment, records and means of transportation which they wish to inspect;

- (iii) cease immediately any attempt to conceal, or any movement or destruction of any material or equipment relating to its nuclear, chemical or biological weapons or ballistic missile programs, or material or equipment relating to its other nuclear activities without notification to and prior consent of the Special Commission;
 - (iv) make available immediately to the Special Commission, the I.A.E.A. and their inspection teams any items to which they were previously denied access;
 - (v) allow the Special Commission, the I.A.E.A. and their inspection teams to conduct both fixed wing and helicopter flights throughout Iraq for all relevant purposes including inspection, surveillance, aerial surveys, transportation and logistics without interference of any kind and upon such terms and conditions as may be determined by the Special Commission, and to make full use of their own aircraft and such airfields in Iraq as they may determine are most appropriate for the work of the commission;
 - (vi) halt all nuclear activities of any kind, except for use of isotopes for medical, agricultural or industrial purposes until the Security Council determines that Iraq is in full compliance with this resolution and Paragraphs 12 and 13 of Resolution 687 (1991), and the I.A.E.A. determines that Iraq is in full compliance with its safeguards agreement with that agency;
 - (vii) ensure the complete implementation of the privileges, immunities and facilities of the representatives of the Special Commission and the I.A.E.A. in accordance with its previous undertakings and their complete safety and freedom of movement;
 - (viii) immediately provide or facilitate the provision of any transportation, medical or logistical support requested by the Special Commission, the I.A.E.A. and their inspection teams;
 - (ix) respond fully, completely and promptly to any questions or requests from the Special Commission, the I.A.E.A. and their inspection teams;
4. DETERMINES that Iraq retains no ownership interest in items to be destroyed, removed or rendered harmless pursuant to Paragraph 12 of resolution 687 (1991);
5. REQUIRES that the government of Iraq forthwith comply fully and without delay with all its international obligations, including those set out in the present resolution, in Resolution 687 (1991), in the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968 and its safeguards agreement with the I.A.E.A.; . . .

Resolution 715

Adopted 11 October 1991

The Security Council . . .

4. DECIDES that the Special Commission, in the exercise of its responsibilities as a subsidiary organ of the Security Council, shall:
- (a) Continue to have the responsibility for designating additional locations for inspection and overflights;
 - (b) Continue to render assistance and cooperation to the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency by providing him by mutual agreement with the necessary special expertise and logistical, informational and other operational support for the carrying out of the plan submitted by him;
 - (c) Perform such other functions, in cooperation in the nuclear field with the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as may be necessary to coordinate activities under the plans approved by the present resolution; . . .

Resolution 1284 (1999)

**Adopted by the Security Council at its 4084th meeting,
on 17 December 1999**

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous relevant resolutions, including its resolutions 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, 699 (1991) of 17 June 1991, 707 (1991) of 15 August 1991, 715 (1991) of 11 October 1991, 986 (1995) of 14 April 1995, 1051 (1996) of 27 March 1996, 1153 (1998) of 20 February 1998, 1175 (1998) of 19 June 1998, 1242 (1999) of 21 May 1999 and 1266 (1999) of 4 October 1999,
 Recalling the approval by the Council in its resolution 715 (1991) of the plans for future ongoing monitoring and verification submitted by the Secretary-General and the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in pursuance of paragraphs 10 and 13 of resolution 687 (1991),
 Welcoming the reports of the three panels on Iraq (S/1999/356), and having held a comprehensive consideration of them and the recommendations contained in them,

Stressing the importance of a comprehensive approach to the full implementation of all relevant Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq and the need for Iraqi compliance with these resolutions, Recalling the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their delivery and the objective of a global ban on chemical weapons as referred to in paragraph 14 of resolution 687 (1991),

Concerned at the humanitarian situation in Iraq, and determined to improve that situation,

Recalling with concern that the repatriation and return of all Kuwaiti and third country nationals or their remains, present in Iraq on or after 2 August 1990, pursuant to paragraph 2 (c) of resolution 686 (1991) of 2 March 1991 and paragraph 30 of resolution 687 (1991), have not yet been fully carried out by Iraq,

Recalling that in its resolutions 686 (1991) and 687 (1991) the Council demanded that Iraq return in the shortest possible time all Kuwaiti property it had seized, and noting with regret that Iraq has still not complied fully with this demand,

Acknowledging the progress made by Iraq towards compliance with the provisions of resolution 687 (1991), but noting that, as a result of its failure to implement the relevant Council resolutions fully, the conditions do not exist which would enable the Council to take a decision pursuant to resolution 687 (1991) to lift the prohibitions referred to in that resolution,

Reiterating the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Kuwait, Iraq and the neighbouring States,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and taking into account that operative provisions of this resolution relate to previous resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter,

A.

1. Decides to establish, as a subsidiary body of the Council, the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) which replaces the Special Commission established pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) of resolution 687 (1991);

2. Decides also that UNMOVIC will undertake the responsibilities mandated to the Special Commission by the Council with regard to the verification of compliance by Iraq with its obligations under paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 of resolution 687 (1991) and other related resolutions, that UNMOVIC will establish and operate, as was recommended by the panel on disarmament and current and future ongoing monitoring and verification issues, a reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification, which will implement the plan approved by the Council in resolution 715 (1991) and address unresolved disarmament issues, and that UNMOVIC will identify, as necessary in accordance with its mandate, additional sites in Iraq to be covered by the reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification;

3. Reaffirms the provisions of the relevant resolutions with regard to the role of the IAEA in addressing compliance by Iraq with paragraphs 12 and 13 of resolution 687 (1991) and other related resolutions, and requests the Director General of the IAEA to maintain this role with the assistance and cooperation of UNMOVIC;

4. Reaffirms its resolutions 687 (1991), 699 (1991), 707 (1991), 715 (1991), 1051 (1996), 1154 (1998) and all other relevant resolutions and statements of its President, which establish the criteria for Iraqi compliance, affirms that the obligations of Iraq referred to in those resolutions and statements with regard to cooperation with the Special Commission, unrestricted access and provision of information will apply in respect of UNMOVIC, and decides in particular that Iraq shall allow UNMOVIC teams immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to any and all areas, facilities, equipment, records and means of transport which they wish to inspect in accordance with the mandate of UNMOVIC, as well as to all officials and other persons under the authority of the Iraqi Government whom UNMOVIC wishes to interview so that UNMOVIC may fully discharge its mandate;

5. Requests the Secretary-General, within 30 days of the adoption of this resolution, to appoint, after consultation with and subject to the approval of the Council, an Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC who will take up his mandated tasks as soon as possible, and, in consultation with the Executive Chairman and the Council members, to appoint suitably qualified experts as a College of Commissioners for UNMOVIC which will meet regularly to review the implementation of this and other relevant resolutions and provide professional advice and guidance to the Executive Chairman, including on significant policy decisions and on written reports to be submitted to the Council through the Secretary-General;

6. Requests the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, within 45 days of his appointment, to submit to the Council, in consultation with and through the Secretary-General, for its approval an organizational plan for UNMOVIC, including its structure, staffing requirements, management guidelines, recruitment and training procedures, incorporating as appropriate the recommendations of the panel on disarmament and current and future ongoing monitoring and verification issues, and recognizing in particular the need for an effective,

cooperative management structure for the new organization, for staffing with suitably qualified and experienced personnel, who would be regarded as international civil servants subject to Article 100 of the Charter of the United Nations, drawn from the broadest possible geographical base, including as he deems necessary from international arms control organizations, and for the provision of high quality technical and cultural training;

7. Decides that UNMOVIC and the IAEA, not later than 60 days after they have both started work in Iraq, will each draw up, for approval by the Council, a work programme for the discharge of their mandates, which will include both the implementation of the reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification, and the key remaining disarmament tasks to be completed by Iraq pursuant to its obligations to comply with the disarmament requirements of resolution 687 (1991) and other related resolutions, which constitute the governing standard of Iraqi compliance, and further decides that what is required of Iraq for the implementation of each task shall be clearly defined and precise;

8. Requests the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and the Director General of the IAEA, drawing on the expertise of other international organizations as appropriate, to establish a unit which will have the responsibilities of the joint unit constituted by the Special Commission and the Director General of the IAEA under paragraph 16 of the export/import mechanism approved by resolution 1051 (1996), and also requests the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, in consultation with the Director General of the IAEA, to resume the revision and updating of the lists of items and technology to which the mechanism applies;

9. Decides that the Government of Iraq shall be liable for the full costs of UNMOVIC and the IAEA in relation to their work under this and other related resolutions on Iraq;

10. Requests Member States to give full cooperation to UNMOVIC and the IAEA in the discharge of their mandates;

11. Decides that UNMOVIC shall take over all assets, liabilities and archives of the Special Commission, and that it shall assume the Special Commission's part in agreements existing between the Special Commission and Iraq and between the United Nations and Iraq, and affirms that the Executive Chairman, the Commissioners and the personnel serving with UNMOVIC shall have the rights, privileges, facilities and immunities of the Special Commission;

12. Requests the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC to report, through the Secretary-General, to the Council, following consultation with the Commissioners, every three months on the work of UNMOVIC, pending submission of the first reports referred to in paragraph 33 below, and to report immediately when the reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification is fully operational in Iraq;

B.

13. Reiterates the obligation of Iraq, in furtherance of its commitment to facilitate the repatriation of all Kuwaiti and third country nationals referred to in paragraph 30 of resolution 687 (1991), to extend all necessary cooperation to the International Committee of the Red Cross, and calls upon the Government of Iraq to resume cooperation with the Tripartite Commission and Technical Subcommittee established to facilitate work on this issue;

14. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council every four months on compliance by Iraq with its obligations regarding the repatriation or return of all Kuwaiti and third country nationals or their remains, to report every six months on the return of all Kuwaiti property, including archives, seized by Iraq, and to appoint a high-level coordinator for these issues;

C.

15. Authorizes States, notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 3 (a), 3 (b) and 4 of resolution 661 (1990) and subsequent relevant resolutions, to permit the import of any volume of petroleum and petroleum products originating in Iraq, including financial and other essential transactions directly relating thereto, as required for the purposes and on the conditions set out in paragraph 1 (a) and (b) and subsequent provisions of resolution 986 (1995) and related resolutions;

16. Underlines, in this context, its intention to take further action, including permitting the use of additional export routes for petroleum and petroleum products, under appropriate conditions otherwise consistent with the purpose and provisions of resolution 986 (1995) and related resolutions;

17. Directs the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) to approve, on the basis of proposals from the Secretary-General, lists of humanitarian items, including foodstuffs, pharmaceutical and medical supplies, as well as basic or standard medical and agricultural equipment and basic or standard educational items, decides, notwithstanding paragraph 3 of resolution 661 (1990) and paragraph 20 of resolution 687 (1991), that supplies of these items will not be submitted for approval of that Committee, except for items subject to the provisions of resolution 1051 (1996), and will be notified to the Secretary-General and financed in accordance with the

provisions of paragraph 8 (a) and 8 (b) of resolution 986 (1995), and requests the Secretary-General to inform the Committee in a timely manner of all such notifications received and actions taken;

18. Requests the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) to appoint, in accordance with resolutions 1175 (1998) and 1210 (1998), a group of experts, including independent inspection agents appointed by the Secretary-General in accordance with paragraph 6 of resolution 986 (1995), decides that this group will be mandated to approve speedily contracts for the parts and the equipments necessary to enable Iraq to increase its exports of petroleum and petroleum products, according to lists of parts and equipments approved by that Committee for each individual project, and requests the Secretary-General to continue to provide for the monitoring of these parts and equipments inside Iraq;

19. Encourages Member States and international organizations to provide supplementary humanitarian assistance to Iraq and published material of an educational character to Iraq;

20. Decides to suspend, for an initial period of six months from the date of the adoption of this resolution and subject to review, the implementation of paragraph 8 (g) of resolution 986 (1995);

21. Requests the Secretary-General to take steps to maximize, drawing as necessary on the advice of specialists, including representatives of international humanitarian organizations, the effectiveness of the arrangements set out in resolution 986 (1995) and related resolutions including the humanitarian benefit to the Iraqi population in all areas of the country, and further requests the Secretary-General to continue to enhance as necessary the United Nations observation process in Iraq, ensuring that all supplies under the humanitarian programme are utilized as authorized, to bring to the attention of the Council any circumstances preventing or impeding effective and equitable distribution and to keep the Council informed of the steps taken towards the implementation of this paragraph;

22. Requests also the Secretary-General to minimize the cost of the United Nations activities associated with the implementation of resolution 986 (1995) as well as the cost of the independent inspection agents and the certified public accountants appointed by him, in accordance with paragraphs 6 and 7 of resolution 986 (1995);

23. Requests further the Secretary-General to provide Iraq and the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) with a daily statement of the status of the escrow account established by paragraph 7 of resolution 986 (1995);

24. Requests the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements, subject to Security Council approval, to allow funds deposited in the escrow account established by resolution 986 (1995) to be used for the purchase of locally produced goods and to meet the local cost for essential civilian needs which have been funded in accordance with the provisions of resolution 986 (1995) and related resolutions, including, where appropriate, the cost of installation and training services;

25. Directs the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) to take a decision on all applications in respect of humanitarian and essential civilian needs within a target of two working days of receipt of these applications from the Secretary-General, and to ensure that all approval and notification letters issued by the Committee stipulate delivery within a specified time, according to the nature of the items to be supplied, and requests the Secretary-General to notify the Committee of all applications for humanitarian items which are included in the list to which the export/import mechanism approved by resolution 1051 (1996) applies;

26. Decides that Hajj pilgrimage flights which do not transport cargo into or out of Iraq are exempt from the provisions of paragraph 3 of resolution 661 (1990) and resolution 670 (1990), provided timely notification of each flight is made to the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990), and requests the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements, for approval by the Security Council, to provide for reasonable expenses related to the Hajj pilgrimage to be met by funds in the escrow account established by resolution 986 (1995);

27. Calls upon the Government of Iraq:

(i) to take all steps to ensure the timely and equitable distribution of all humanitarian goods, in particular medical supplies, and to remove and avoid delays at its warehouses;

(ii) to address effectively the needs of vulnerable groups, including children, pregnant women, the disabled, the elderly and the mentally ill among others, and to allow freer access, without any discrimination, including on the basis of religion or nationality, by United Nations agencies and humanitarian organizations to all areas and sections of the population for evaluation of their nutritional and humanitarian condition;

(iii) to prioritize applications for humanitarian goods under the arrangements set out in resolution 986 (1995) and related resolutions;

(iv) to ensure that those involuntarily displaced receive humanitarian assistance without the need to demonstrate that they have resided for six months in their places of temporary residence;

(v) to extend full cooperation to the United Nations Office for Project Services mine-clearance programme in the three northern Governorates of Iraq and to consider the initiation of the demining efforts in other Governorates;

28. Requests the Secretary-General to report on the progress made in meeting the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people and on the revenues necessary to meet those needs, including recommendations on necessary additions to the current allocation for oil spare parts and equipment, on the basis of a comprehensive survey of the condition of the Iraqi oil production sector, not later than 60 days from the date of the adoption of this resolution and updated thereafter as necessary;

29. Expresses its readiness to authorize additions to the current allocation for oil spare parts and equipment, on the basis of the report and recommendations requested in paragraph 28 above, in order to meet the humanitarian purposes set out in resolution 986 (1995) and related resolutions;

30. Requests the Secretary-General to establish a group of experts, including oil industry experts, to report within 100 days of the date of adoption of this resolution on Iraq's existing petroleum production and export capacity and to make recommendations, to be updated as necessary, on alternatives for increasing Iraq's petroleum production and export capacity in a manner consistent with the purposes of relevant resolutions, and on the options for involving foreign oil companies in Iraq's oil sector, including investments, subject to appropriate monitoring and controls;

31. Notes that in the event of the Council acting as provided for in paragraph 33 of this resolution to suspend the prohibitions referred to in that paragraph, appropriate arrangements and procedures will need, subject to paragraph 35 below, to be agreed by the Council in good time beforehand, including suspension of provisions of resolution 986 (1995) and related resolutions;

32. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the implementation of paragraphs 15 to 30 of this resolution within 30 days of the adoption of this resolution;

D.

33. Expresses its intention, upon receipt of reports from the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and from the Director General of the IAEA that Iraq has cooperated in all respects with UNMOVIC and the IAEA in particular in fulfilling the work programmes in all the aspects referred to in paragraph 7 above, for a period of 120 days after the date on which the Council is in receipt of reports from both UNMOVIC and the IAEA that the reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification is fully operational, to suspend with the fundamental objective of improving the humanitarian situation in Iraq and securing the implementation of the Council's resolutions, for a period of 120 days renewable by the Council, and subject to the elaboration of effective financial and other operational measures to ensure that Iraq does not acquire prohibited items, prohibitions against the import of commodities and products originating in Iraq, and prohibitions against the sale, supply and delivery to Iraq of civilian commodities and products other than those referred to in paragraph 24 of resolution 687 (1991) or those to which the mechanism established by resolution 1051 (1996) applies;

34. Decides that in reporting to the Council for the purposes of paragraph 33 above, the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC will include as a basis for his assessment the progress made in completing the tasks referred to in paragraph 7 above;

35. Decides that if at any time the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC or the Director General of the IAEA reports that Iraq is not cooperating in all respects with UNMOVIC or the IAEA or if Iraq is in the process of acquiring any prohibited items, the suspension of the prohibitions referred to in paragraph 33 above shall terminate on the fifth working day following the report, unless the Council decides to the contrary;

36. Expresses its intention to approve arrangements for effective financial and other operational measures, including on the delivery of and payment for authorized civilian commodities and products to be sold or supplied to Iraq, in order to ensure that Iraq does not acquire prohibited items in the event of suspension of the prohibitions referred to in paragraph 33 above, to begin the elaboration of such measures not later than the date of the receipt of the initial reports referred to in paragraph 33 above, and to approve such arrangements before the Council decision in accordance with that paragraph;

37. Further expresses its intention to take steps, based on the report and recommendations requested in paragraph 30 above, and consistent with the purpose of resolution 986 (1995) and related resolutions, to enable Iraq to increase its petroleum production and export capacity, upon receipt of the reports relating to the cooperation in all respects with UNMOVIC and the IAEA referred to in paragraph 33 above;

38. Reaffirms its intention to act in accordance with the relevant provisions of resolution 687 (1991) on the termination of prohibitions referred to in that resolution;

39. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter and expresses its intention to consider action in accordance with paragraph 33 above no later than 12 months from the date of the adoption of this resolution provided the conditions set out in paragraph 33 above have been satisfied by Iraq.

United Nations

Questions submitted by Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri to U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan
March 7, 2002

Accompanying Note
from U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan

19 March 2002

To: His Excellency Mr. Ole Peter Kolby
President of the Security Council - New York

Dear Mr. President,

I have the honour to convey to the Security Council a number of questions handed to me by the Foreign Minister of Iraq, Mr. Naji Sabri, on 7 March 2002. As I indicated in my briefing to the Council on 8 March, the questions have been rearranged and clustered for the sake of clarity and expediency. Many of the questions lie within the competence of the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, Dr. Hans Blix, in coordination with the IAEA, to answer. However, a number of the questions are addressed to the Security Council.

I should be grateful if you would bring the attached list of questions to the attention of the members of the Security Council. As it is anticipated that the next round of dialogue with the Iraqi delegation will be held during the second half of April, I would appreciate receiving any response the Security Council may wish to provide by 10 April at the latest.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurance of my highest consideration.

Signed,
Kofi A. Annan

Clustered Questions

I. Disarmament/Inspection Issues

Some members of the Security Council state that disarmament talks, as described in Section C of resolution 687, have not been completed. Iraq is not against certainty as a principle.

- What has been achieved in seven years and seven months of Iraq's cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA in the disarmament area?
- How can UNMOVIC start its activities based on what has been accomplished?
- What are the disarmament tasks and the remaining questions to be clarified through inspections, how much time is needed to accomplish these inspections?
- How long would it take UNMOVIC to reach a degree of certainty that Iraq has retained no WMD and to present a report to the Security Council appropriately?
- What kind of inspections is UNMOVIC planning to conduct?
- Would inspections be conducted with the necessary respect of the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Iraq and in accordance with the relevant international conventions?
- What are the Terms of Reference for UNMOVIC, limits of powers of its Executive Chairman and the College of Commissioners?
- Would the Secretary-General supervise the work of UNMOVIC?
- Does UNMOVIC's composition include individuals who have been members of UNSCOM involved in spying activities?
- What are the guarantees that UNMOVIC would not use the same inspection formula which led to the bombing of Iraq in 1998?
- How could US and UK inspectors fulfill a neutral international mandate?

II. Issues relevant to relations between Iraq and the Security Council

Iraq insists on the principle of concurrence in the implementation of the corresponding obligations in order to build confidence between Iraq and the Security Council.

- Do threats to invade Iraq and to change the national government by force violate Security Council resolutions, rules of international law, Charter of the United Nations and Iraq's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity?

- Could one permanent member of the Security Council have a right to its own interpretation of resolutions in order to take unilateral decisions regarding Iraq?
- Is it possible to normalize relations between the Security Council and Iraq under the circumstances when calls are made for invading Iraq and overthrowing its national government by force?
- Could the elimination of the no-fly zones be guaranteed?
- What are the views of the Security Council on declarations that the economic sanctions imposed on Iraq would not be lifted in accordance with relevant resolutions as long as the current national government remains in place?
- Has the Security Council implemented its obligations pursuant to resolution 687 (1991) regarding the lifting of the sanctions, respect of Iraq's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction (paragraph 14)?

III. Iraq's requests for compensation and right of self-defense

- Would Iraq be compensated for the destruction of its economic, educational and other infrastructure caused by the embargo and violations of Iraq's sovereignty?
- Is there an intention to dispatch a team of experts to Iraq to assess the cost of reconstruction in order to submit a report, which would help the Security Council to consider the issue of compensation?
- Does the Security Council agree with Iraq's legitimate right to self-defense in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter and whether this right allows Iraq to acquire conventional defensive weapons?

Washington Post

U.S. Spied on Iraq Via U.N.

By Barton Gellman

Tuesday, March 2, 1999

United States intelligence services infiltrated agents and espionage equipment for three years into United Nations arms control teams in Iraq to eavesdrop on the Iraqi military without the knowledge of the U.N. agency that it used to disguise its work, according to U.S. government employees and documents describing the classified operation.

By all accounts the U.N. Special Commission, or UNSCOM, did not authorize or benefit from this channel of U.S. surveillance. This contrasts with previous statements in which the Clinton administration acknowledged use of eavesdropping equipment but said it was done solely in cooperation with UNSCOM to pierce Iraqi concealment of its illegal weapons.

As recently as last week, the administration asserted again that its intelligence work within UNSCOM was invited by the panel's senior leaders and directed at rooting out Iraq's forbidden missiles and its nuclear, biological and chemical weapons programs.

Deputy State Department spokesman James Foley said in a Feb. 23 briefing that charges of U.S. espionage inside UNSCOM are "unfathomable except as elements which can only serve Saddam Hussein's propaganda machine." Any unrelated intelligence gathered under UNSCOM's umbrella, a high-ranking official told reporters invited to a previous briefing, "was a kind of windfall" resulting from the fact that the Iraqis who worked to thwart UNSCOM were also members of President Saddam Hussein's inner circle.

In fact, according to sources who spoke on condition of anonymity, the United States rigged UNSCOM equipment and office space – without permission – to intercept a high volume of ordinary Iraqi military communications. Those communications, carried between microwave towers and linking Iraqi commanders to infantry and armored forces in the field, were of considerable value to U.S. military planners but generally unrelated to UNSCOM's special weapons mandate.

U.S. government officials said they considered the risk of discrediting an international arms control system by infiltrating it for their own eavesdropping. They said the stakes were so high in the conflict with Iraq, and the probability of discovery so low, that they deemed the risks worth running.

Microwave channels are line-of-sight communications, typically transmitting a narrow beam from hilltop to hilltop and difficult to intercept by aircraft or satellites. American intelligence agencies saw an opportunity to tap into those signals when UNSCOM changed the arrangement it used to monitor distant sites in Iraq with video cameras.

Pioneered in May 1993, UNSCOM's "remote monitoring system" grew over the years to encompass more than 300 arms installations and research facilities in Iraq. For the first three years of operation, the video images

and logs of electrical power use were recorded onto magnetic tape at the remote sites. Inspectors based in Baghdad periodically drove out to collect the tapes.

In March 1996, with Iraq's consent, UNSCOM began transmitting images from the cameras back to Baghdad using radio signals. The signals were boosted by relays, known as repeater stations, arrayed along the paths from the camera sites to Baghdad. The new system gave UNSCOM's inspectors a view of distant facilities in "near real time," a significant improvement.

But unbeknownst to UNSCOM, the U.S. signals and sensor technicians who installed and maintained the system were intelligence operatives, and the repeater stations they built had a covert capability. Hidden in their structure were antennas capable of intercepting microwave transmissions, and the U.S. agents placed some of them near important nodes of Iraqi military communications.

The principal designer of the new system was a military intelligence operative described by a former supervisor as a brilliant engineer and "a pure, energetic, walking, talking slide rule." The engineer and his team undertook repeated "maintenance" missions in Iraq from September 1995 to June 1996, disclosing so little to UNSCOM of their work that the commission's director of operations, Air Force Col. James Moore, clashed repeatedly with the engineer and eventually was recalled by Washington. At least two other technicians lent by the U.S. government to run the remote camera system for UNSCOM were employees of the Central Intelligence Agency's clandestine service. At the request of the U.S. government, the three names are being withheld.

UNSCOM sought out technical resources from the United States and elsewhere. After years of frustration, the commission gradually built what amounted to the first U.N. intelligence-gathering operation. But its reliance on contributing governments led to deceptions within deceptions that eventually helped destroy the special commission.

For years, two conflicting story lines have battled for world opinion as the Security Council debated the future of Iraqi disarmament. The United States and UNSCOM said their use of increasingly intrusive inspections and sophisticated technology was made necessary by Iraq's resistance to full disclosure of its illegal arms. Iraq maintained that the United States and other unfriendly powers were using UNSCOM's access to the country for espionage.

The new disclosures suggest that both claims were true. They come at a delicate moment for those concerned with arms control in Iraq, because the bulk of the U.S. espionage came under cover of the system of "ongoing monitoring and verification" imposed on Iraq by Security Council Resolution 715. Iraq has forbidden arms inspections since the United States and Britain bombarded it in December, and the Security Council is now trying to devise a new system of monitoring to ensure that Iraq does not resume large-scale development of forbidden weapons.

Use of the remote camera system for espionage coincided with another channel of eavesdropping that was known to UNSCOM's top leaders. That channel, code-named Shake the Tree, used commercial scanners to intercept low-powered VHF radio transmissions used by Iraq to direct its concealment efforts against UNSCOM.

The Washington Post and the Boston Globe disclosed that operation in January, and the U.S. government confirmed the stories the same month.

American intelligence agencies elected to pursue a second method of eavesdropping because "we were very concerned about protecting our independence of access" to Iraqi military communications, said a knowledgeable U.S. official. "We did not want to rely on a multinational body that might or might not continue to operate as it was operating."

For that reason, the U.S. government decided not to inform Rolf Ekeus, the Swedish diplomat who was UNSCOM's executive chairman, or his Australian successor, Richard Butler, about the second eavesdropping operation. According to sources in Washington, the CIA notified Charles Duelfer, the American deputy to both men, to help ensure that UNSCOM's headquarters staff did not interfere with the operation. Duelfer did not return telephone calls made over several days for this story.

The remote camera surveillance system has not operated since UNSCOM evacuated all personnel from Iraq in December, immediately before the U.S.-British military strikes. Knowledgeable government employees said the eavesdropping system concealed in it was abandoned before that.

Ekeus, who is now Sweden's ambassador to Washington, said in an interview that he did not believe the United States could have built covert antennas into the video relay system because Iraqi technicians should have discovered them.

"I think it can't be true," he said. "This was stuff that was totally in the hands of Iraq. It was standing out in the rain, so to say. It's really very difficult to believe that anything serious could happen that way. [Iraqi counterintelligence agents] were dismantling these stations all the time, and they would have understood if there was anything that didn't fit" the ostensible task of bringing video signals to Baghdad.

If the United States did use UNSCOM cover for espionage, Ekeus added, "We have always stood against that."

Ekeus cited one of the first controversial inspections, in 1991, when U.S. team leaders reported directly to Washington on what they were finding. "I reacted very strongly against that, and we stopped it," he said.

Until late last week, the U.S. government appeared to deny categorically that it placed covert agents on UNSCOM teams without UNSCOM's knowledge and consent. In a Jan. 7 briefing for six invited newspaper and television reporters, a high-ranking U.S. official said: "We didn't put people on U.N. teams to be agents of the United States. Everyone we put on UNSCOM worked for UNSCOM. There they were part of UNSCOM, not reporting separately. But afterwards, of course," they were debriefed.

In interviews for this story, spokesmen for the CIA, Pentagon, White House and State Department declined to repeat any categorical denials.

"In general our efforts with UNSCOM were focused on how to help UNSCOM, through a number of different means, uncover and track down the mechanisms and the materials associated with weapons of mass destruction," State Department spokesman James P. Rubin said in a prepared statement. "We worked very hard at that. We contributed great resources, personnel and effort. I cannot comment on the specific intelligence question that you raise."

Asked whether use of a multinational arms control panel for U.S. espionage would undermine efforts to halt proliferation elsewhere, Rubin said he could not confirm or deny there had been any such espionage. He added: "The Iraq case was a unique case in history" because other arms control arrangements are voluntary. "UNSCOM never has been seen as a precedent, nor need be seen as a precedent, for other nonproliferation efforts around the world."

UNSCOM's present leader, Butler, declined to be interviewed for this story after being told of the subject. "Richard Butler has no knowledge of these matters and won't comment on allegations the veracity of which is not clear," said his spokesman, Ewen Buchanan.

Privately, according to close associates, Butler expressed distress when he first learned of the allegations, saying any such espionage under UNSCOM cover would discredit other efforts to verify compliance with international weapons pacts. The Australian diplomat wrote his postgraduate dissertation on nuclear nonproliferation and has spent most of his career in arms control.

"If all this stuff turns out to be true, then Rolf Ekeus and I have been played for suckers, haven't we?" he was quoted as saying in one such conversation. "I've spent a lifetime of helping build and defend the nonproliferation regimes. Piggybacking in this manner [by U.S. intelligence] can only serve the interests of those who reject meaningful efforts at arms control."

One U.S. official with direct knowledge said the camera-relay intercepts were "normal military communications, not related to UNSCOM" except insofar as they formed "part of the whole mosaic, and any one piece can help unlock others." One UNSCOM inspector said the U.N. panel had no use for sort of signals overheard on this channel, noting, "We don't have an interest in the troop rotation policy of [Iraq's] V Corps."

A final irony is that the American spies, in turn, were spied upon. Some of UNSCOM's technical staff detected mysterious burst transmissions from the ground that coincided with the overflight of American U-2 spy planes, but were unable to identify their source.

According to knowledgeable sources, an Iranian agent in Baghdad also took note of the encrypted transmissions and sent a message back to Tehran speculating that Americans were running a signals intelligence operation out of the United Nations' Baghdad headquarters.

The British government, in turn, intercepted the Iranian transmission. In May 1997 Britain's General Communications Headquarters asked its American counterpart, the National Security Agency, for an explanation. The Fort Meade-based agency, according to sources, did not provide one.

"We don't tell the British everything, even if they are our closest intelligence ally," said one U.S. official. "They don't tell us everything they're doing either."

Der Spiegel

Schwedischer Diplomat wirft USA Spionage vor

29 juli 2002

Der frühere Chef der Uno-Waffenkontrolleure, Rolf Ekéus, erhebt schwere Anschuldigungen: Die USA sollen die Waffeninspektionen für eigene Spionageaktivitäten missbraucht haben. Amerikanische Medien melden unterdessen, die US-Regierung habe ihre Vorbereitungen für einen Angriff auf den Irak bereits weit vorangetrieben.

Wie der schwedische Diplomat Ekéus am Montag in der Stockholmer Zeitung "Svenska Dagbladet" berichtete, versuchte die US-Regierung unter anderem durch "Infiltration" von zwei Agenten, Material über die Aufenthaltsorte des irakischen Diktators Saddam Hussein zu sammeln. Unter anderem hätten die US-Agenten dafür Abhöreinrichtungen installiert.

Dies sei eindeutig außerhalb des Mandats des Uno-Sicherheitsrates für die Waffeninspektion gewesen und habe ihn persönlich stark verärgert, erklärte Ekéus. Die Führung in Bagdad verwehrt den Uno-Waffeninspektoren mehrfach Zugang zu Anlagen mit der Begründung, es handele sich in Wirklichkeit um von den USA gesteuerte Spionageaktivitäten.

Laut "New York Times" hat die US-Regierung einen Angriffsplan entworfen, dessen Ziel es sei, den irakischen Diktator Saddam Hussein rasch zu stürzen. Das Blatt beruft sich in seinem Bericht auf ranghohe Kreise im US-Verteidigungsministerium. Saddam solle isoliert oder getötet werden. Außerdem soll ein Einsatz irakischer Massenvernichtungswaffen gegen eine angreifende Nation, Verbündete an der Front oder Israel verhindert werden. Der stellvertretende Sprecher des US-Verteidigungsministeriums habe den Bericht nicht kommentieren wollen, schrieb die Zeitung. Inwieweit der Bericht über den Aufmarsch authentisch ist, ist unklar.

Bei einem solchen Angriffsplan würde die Fähigkeit des US-Militärs genutzt, über große Entfernungen hinweg anzugreifen, heißt es in dem Bericht weiter. Befürworter des Planes seien der Auffassung, dass damit ein Einsatz von rund 250.000 Soldaten vermieden werden könne.

Laut "New York Times" wäre es möglich, die stark zentralisierte und autoritäre Kommandostruktur im Irak zu zerstören. Offiziere der mittleren Ebene hätten nicht gelernt zu improvisieren, sollten sie von ihren Kommandeuren abgeschnitten sein, hieß es.

Die Vorteile und Risiken von Angriffen tief im Land seien in der Diskussion, obwohl US-Präsident George W. Bush oder seinen führenden Sicherheitsberatern kein formeller Plan vorgelegt worden sei.

Britische Medien berichteten, ein Angriff auf den Irak werde frühestens im Oktober erfolgen. Da die US-Truppen zum Schutz vor chemischen und biologischen Kampfstoffen den Irak voraussichtlich in Schutzanzügen angreifen müssten, sei ein Angriff im Sommer wegen der hohen Temperaturen unwahrscheinlich.

Bush hatte Irak gemeinsam mit Iran und Nordkorea mehrfach als "Achse des Bösen" bezeichnet und dem Land vorgeworfen, es strebe nach Massenvernichtungswaffen. Einen Angriff auf Irak hatte Bush nicht ausgeschlossen und zuletzt erklärt, Ziel seine Regierung sei der Sturz Saddams.

SPEECH BUSH VOOR DE ALGEMENE VERGADERING VAN DE VN

Office of the Press Secretary
September 12, 2002

President's Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly

- New York, New York

A Decade of Deception and Defiance

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Secretary General, Mr. President, distinguished delegates, and ladies and gentlemen: We meet one year and one day after a terrorist attack brought grief to my country, and brought grief to many citizens of our world. Yesterday, we remembered the innocent lives taken that terrible morning. Today, we turn to the urgent duty of protecting other lives, without illusion and without fear.

[...]

Our common security is challenged by regional conflicts -- ethnic and religious strife that is ancient, but not inevitable. In the Middle East, there can be no peace for either side without freedom for both sides. America stands committed to an independent and democratic Palestine, living side by side with Israel in peace and security. Like all other people, Palestinians deserve a government that serves their interests and listens to their voices. My nation will continue to encourage all parties to step up to their responsibilities as we seek a just and comprehensive settlement to the conflict.

Above all, our principles and our security are challenged today by outlaw groups and regimes that accept no law of morality and have no limit to their violent ambitions. In the attacks on America a year ago, we saw the destructive intentions of our enemies. This threat hides within many nations, including my own. In cells and camps, terrorists are plotting further destruction, and building new bases for their war against civilization. And our greatest fear is that terrorists will find a shortcut to their mad ambitions when an outlaw regime supplies them with the technologies to kill on a massive scale.

In one place -- in one regime -- we find all these dangers, in their most lethal and aggressive forms, exactly the kind of aggressive threat the United Nations was born to confront.

Twelve years ago, Iraq invaded Kuwait without provocation. And the regime's forces were poised to continue their march to seize other countries and their resources. Had Saddam Hussein been appeased instead of stopped, he would have endangered the peace and stability of the world. Yet this aggression was stopped -- by the might of coalition forces and the will of the United Nations.

To suspend hostilities, to spare himself, Iraq's dictator accepted a series of commitments. The terms were clear, to him and to all. And he agreed to prove he is complying with every one of those obligations.

He has proven instead only his contempt for the United Nations, and for all his pledges. By breaking every pledge -- by his deceptions, and by his cruelties -- Saddam Hussein has made the case against himself.

In 1991, Security Council Resolution 688 demanded that the Iraqi regime cease at once the repression of its own people, including the systematic repression of minorities -- which the Council said, threatened international peace and security in the region. This demand goes ignored.

Last year, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights found that Iraq continues to commit extremely grave violations of human rights, and that the regime's repression is all pervasive. Tens of thousands of political opponents and ordinary citizens have been subjected to arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, summary execution, and torture by beating and burning, electric shock, starvation, mutilation, and rape. Wives are tortured in front of their husbands, children in the presence of their parents -- and all of these horrors concealed from the world by the apparatus of a totalitarian state.

In 1991, the U.N. Security Council, through Resolutions 686 and 687, demanded that Iraq return all prisoners from Kuwait and other lands. Iraq's regime agreed. It broke its promise. Last year the Secretary General's high-level coordinator for this issue reported that Kuwait, Saudi, Indian, Syrian, Lebanese, Iranian, Egyptian, Bahraini, and Omani nationals remain unaccounted for -- more than 600 people. One American pilot is among them.

In 1991, the U.N. Security Council, through Resolution 687, demanded that Iraq renounce all involvement with terrorism, and permit no terrorist organizations to operate in Iraq. Iraq's regime agreed. It broke this promise. In violation of Security Council Resolution 1373, Iraq continues to shelter and support terrorist organizations that direct violence against Iran, Israel, and Western governments. Iraqi dissidents abroad are targeted for murder. In 1993, Iraq attempted to assassinate the Emir of Kuwait and a former American

President. Iraq's government openly praised the attacks of September the 11th. And al Qaeda terrorists escaped from Afghanistan and are known to be in Iraq.

In 1991, the Iraqi regime agreed to destroy and stop developing all weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles, and to prove to the world it has done so by complying with rigorous inspections. Iraq has broken every aspect of this fundamental pledge.

From 1991 to 1995, the Iraqi regime said it had no biological weapons. After a senior official in its weapons program defected and exposed this lie, the regime admitted to producing tens of thousands of liters of anthrax and other deadly biological agents for use with Scud warheads, aerial bombs, and aircraft spray tanks. U.N. inspectors believe Iraq has produced two to four times the amount of biological agents it declared, and has failed to account for more than three metric tons of material that could be used to produce biological weapons. Right now, Iraq is expanding and improving facilities that were used for the production of biological weapons. United Nations' inspections also revealed that Iraq likely maintains stockpiles of VX, mustard and other chemical agents, and that the regime is rebuilding and expanding facilities capable of producing chemical weapons.

And in 1995, after four years of deception, Iraq finally admitted it had a crash nuclear weapons program prior to the Gulf War. We know now, were it not for that war, the regime in Iraq would likely have possessed a nuclear weapon no later than 1993.

Today, Iraq continues to withhold important information about its nuclear program -- weapons design, procurement logs, experiment data, an accounting of nuclear materials and documentation of foreign assistance. Iraq employs capable nuclear scientists and technicians. It retains physical infrastructure needed to build a nuclear weapon. Iraq has made several attempts to buy high-strength aluminum tubes used to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon. Should Iraq acquire fissile material, it would be able to build a nuclear weapon within a year. And Iraq's state-controlled media has reported numerous meetings between Saddam Hussein and his nuclear scientists, leaving little doubt about his continued appetite for these weapons.

Iraq also possesses a force of Scud-type missiles with ranges beyond the 150 kilometers permitted by the U.N. Work at testing and production facilities shows that Iraq is building more long-range missiles that it can inflict mass death throughout the region.

In 1990, after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the world imposed economic sanctions on Iraq. Those sanctions were maintained after the war to compel the regime's compliance with Security Council resolutions. In time, Iraq was allowed to use oil revenues to buy food. Saddam Hussein has subverted this program, working around the sanctions to buy missile technology and military materials. He blames the suffering of Iraq's people on the United Nations, even as he uses his oil wealth to build lavish palaces for himself, and to buy arms for his country. By refusing to comply with his own agreements, he bears full guilt for the hunger and misery of innocent Iraqi citizens.

In 1991, Iraq promised U.N. inspectors immediate and unrestricted access to verify Iraq's commitment to rid itself of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles. Iraq broke this promise, spending seven years deceiving, evading, and harassing U.N. inspectors before ceasing cooperation entirely. Just months after the 1991 cease-fire, the Security Council twice renewed its demand that the Iraqi regime cooperate fully with inspectors, condemning Iraq's serious violations of its obligations. The Security Council again renewed that demand in 1994, and twice more in 1996, deploring Iraq's clear violations of its obligations. The Security Council renewed its demand three more times in 1997, citing flagrant violations; and three more times in 1998, calling Iraq's behavior totally unacceptable. And in 1999, the demand was renewed yet again.

As we meet today, it's been almost four years since the last U.N. inspectors set foot in Iraq, four years for the Iraqi regime to plan, and to build, and to test behind the cloak of secrecy.

We know that Saddam Hussein pursued weapons of mass murder even when inspectors were in his country. Are we to assume that he stopped when they left? The history, the logic, and the facts lead to one conclusion: Saddam Hussein's regime is a grave and gathering danger. To suggest otherwise is to hope against the evidence. To assume this regime's good faith is to bet the lives of millions and the peace of the world in a reckless gamble. And this is a risk we must not take.

Delegates to the General Assembly, we have been more than patient. We've tried sanctions. We've tried the carrot of oil for food, and the stick of coalition military strikes. But Saddam Hussein has defied all these efforts and continues to develop weapons of mass destruction. The first time we may be completely certain he has a -- nuclear weapons is when, God forbids, he uses one. We owe it to all our citizens to do everything in our power to prevent that day from coming.

The conduct of the Iraqi regime is a threat to the authority of the United Nations, and a threat to peace. Iraq has answered a decade of U.N. demands with a decade of defiance. All the world now faces a test, and the United Nations a difficult and defining moment. Are Security Council resolutions to be honored and enforced,

or cast aside without consequence? Will the United Nations serve the purpose of its founding, or will it be irrelevant?

The United States helped found the United Nations. We want the United Nations to be effective, and respectful, and successful. We want the resolutions of the world's most important multilateral body to be enforced. And right now those resolutions are being unilaterally subverted by the Iraqi regime. Our partnership of nations can meet the test before us, by making clear what we now expect of the Iraqi regime.

If the Iraqi regime wishes peace, it will immediately and unconditionally forswear, disclose, and remove or destroy all weapons of mass destruction, long-range missiles, and all related material.

If the Iraqi regime wishes peace, it will immediately end all support for terrorism and act to suppress it, as all states are required to do by U.N. Security Council resolutions.

If the Iraqi regime wishes peace, it will cease persecution of its civilian population, including Shi'a, Sunnis, Kurds, Turkomans, and others, again as required by Security Council resolutions.

If the Iraqi regime wishes peace, it will release or account for all Gulf War personnel whose fate is still unknown. It will return the remains of any who are deceased, return stolen property, accept liability for losses resulting from the invasion of Kuwait, and fully cooperate with international efforts to resolve these issues, as required by Security Council resolutions.

If the Iraqi regime wishes peace, it will release or account for all Gulf War personnel whose fate is still unknown. It will return the remains of any who are deceased, return stolen property, accept liability for losses resulting from the invasion of Kuwait, and fully cooperate with the international efforts to resolve these issues, as required by Security Council resolutions.

If the Iraqi regime wishes peace, it will immediately end all illicit trade outside the oil-for-food program. It will accept U.N. administration of funds from that program, to ensure that the money is used fairly and promptly for the benefit of the Iraqi people.

If all these steps are taken, it will signal a new openness and accountability in Iraq. And it could open the prospect of the United Nations helping to build a government that represents all Iraqis -- a government based on respect for human rights, economic liberty, and internationally supervised elections.

The United States has no quarrel with the Iraqi people; they've suffered too long in silent captivity. Liberty for the Iraqi people is a great moral cause, and a great strategic goal. The people of Iraq deserve it; the security of all nations requires it. Free societies do not intimidate through cruelty and conquest, and open societies do not threaten the world with mass murder. The United States supports political and economic liberty in a unified Iraq.

We can harbor no illusions -- and that's important today to remember. Saddam Hussein attacked Iran in 1980 and Kuwait in 1990. He's fired ballistic missiles at Iran and Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Israel. His regime once ordered the killing of every person between the ages of 15 and 70 in certain Kurdish villages in northern Iraq. He has gassed many Iranians, and 40 Iraqi villages.

My nation will work with the U.N. Security Council to meet our common challenge. If Iraq's regime defies us again, the world must move deliberately, decisively to hold Iraq to account. We will work with the U.N. Security Council for the necessary resolutions. But the purposes of the United States should not be doubted. The Security Council resolutions will be enforced -- the just demands of peace and security will be met -- or action will be unavoidable. And a regime that has lost its legitimacy will also lose its power.

Events can turn in one of two ways: If we fail to act in the face of danger, the people of Iraq will continue to live in brutal submission. The regime will have new power to bully and dominate and conquer its neighbors, condemning the Middle East to more years of bloodshed and fear. The regime will remain unstable -- the region will remain unstable, with little hope of freedom, and isolated from the progress of our times. With every step the Iraqi regime takes toward gaining and deploying the most terrible weapons, our own options to confront that regime will narrow. And if an emboldened regime were to supply these weapons to terrorist allies, then the attacks of September the 11th would be a prelude to far greater horrors.

If we meet our responsibilities, if we overcome this danger, we can arrive at a very different future. The people of Iraq can shake off their captivity. They can one day join a democratic Afghanistan and a democratic Palestine, inspiring reforms throughout the Muslim world. These nations can show by their example that honest government, and respect for women, and the great Islamic tradition of learning can triumph in the Middle East and beyond. And we will show that the promise of the United Nations can be fulfilled in our time. Neither of these outcomes is certain. Both have been set before us. We must choose between a world of fear and a world of progress. We cannot stand by and do nothing while dangers gather. We must stand up for our security, and for the permanent rights and the hopes of mankind. By heritage and by choice, the United States of America will make that stand. And, delegates to the United Nations, you have the power to make that stand, as well.

KRITIEK

Washington Post

U.S. Scuttles Germ War Conference Move to Halt Talks Stuns European Allies

8 December 2001

Mike Allen / Steven Mufson

An international conference on germ warfare disbanded in chaos and anger last night after the United States sought to cut off discussions about enforcing the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. (..) The purpose of the conference, held in Geneva, was to discuss the progress of a group that has been trying for six years to negotiate legally binding measures to enforce compliance.

Yesterday, the final day of the three-week conference, the United States stunned European allies by proposing to terminate the group's mandate. Convinced that the action would turn the conference into a failure, organizers suspended international discussions until at least November 2002. The breakup of the meeting renewed complaints from Europe that President Bush was acting unilaterally and not heeding concerns of the nation's allies. (..)

A State Department official said the Bush administration believed the enforcement protocol under discussion would not prevent rogue nations from acquiring or developing biological weapons if they were determined to do so. "If the conference had continued, there was a danger that continued negotiations would have undermined our concerted efforts to strengthen the convention," the official said. (..)

Tibor Toth, a Hungarian official who was the conference's president, said delegates decided to suspend their work for a year instead of bringing the meeting to an unsuccessful end. "The differences between positions seemed to be irreconcilable, at least in the time remaining today," he said. "The draft final declaration was 95 percent ready." (..)

Elisa D. Harris, the National Security Council's director for nonproliferation throughout the Clinton administration, said that despite fears about the use of anthrax as a weapon, "the Bush administration has blown up an international meeting aimed at making it more difficult for countries to acquire these biological capabilities."

But Larry M. Wortzel, a national security specialist at the conservative Heritage Foundation, said that refusing to be a party to doomed verification efforts is "the sanest thing this administration has done," since the United States has been deceived so often by countries that continued buildups of biological weapons. (..)

Last month, as the Geneva conference opened, Bolton presented a U.S. plan that would not make the protocol legally binding under international law, but include it in a politically binding final document. The U.S. package also left out provisions that would have established an international implementing body with the power to investigate suspicious facilities and perform routine visits to declared facilities. However, the U.S. package retained some of the protocol's measures, such as a requirement for any country that signs the treaty to pass laws criminalizing activities prohibited by the treaty. About half of the signatories do not have such laws currently, experts say. The U.S. package would also expand the mandate of the secretary general of the United Nations to investigate suspicious disease outbreaks, clarify vague provisions for resolving compliance concerns and make it easier to extradite criminals who use biological weapons. (..)

The Federation of American Scientists, which promotes disarmament, issued a statement calling the U.S. action "sabotage," and said that European diplomats "privately accused the U.S. of deceiving them."

The Guardian

Iraq: the myth and the reality

Julian Borger, Richard Norton-Taylor, Ewen MacAskill and Brian Whitaker

Friday March 15, 2002

As the drumbeat grows louder for a possible attack on Baghdad, we ask arms inspectors and military and foreign affairs experts: is Saddam as dangerous as the US makes out, and what would be the consequences of war?

1. Does Iraq have, or is it developing, weapons of mass destruction?

The case for military action against Saddam Hussein stands or falls on this apparently simple factual question. President George Bush and his deputy, Dick Cheney, backed by Tony Blair, claim there is no doubt that Baghdad possesses and could use weapons of mass destruction, and so, as Mr Bush put it, "inaction is not an option".

Most analysts, however, concede that there is considerable doubt about the extent of Saddam's weapons programme, and about how dangerous it could be to the rest of the world. What is not in doubt is that Saddam has a record of aggressively pursuing the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, and has had more than three years since the UN weapons inspectors withdrew to try to reconstitute his former nuclear, biological and chemical programmes.

At the centre of the debate on Iraq's weapons capability are the inspectors from the now-defunct United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (Unsc), who spent seven years, from 1991 to 1998, attempting to gain access to the regime's arms facilities. Despite their shared technical background, not all of them can agree on the facts.

Charles Duelfer, an American who was deputy chairman of Unsc, believes the Iraqis still have dangerous weapons in their arsenal - probably not nuclear warheads, but possibly chemical weapons and, almost certainly and most worryingly, biological agents.

"The biological issue is the biggest issue and the least understood," Mr Duelfer says. "[Saddam] has mobile labs, which have the capacity to produce stuff in large quantities, and he's continuing to build weapons."

Mr Duelfer's judgment is that Iraq "retained a missile capability that could constitute a strategic reserve; how effective that would be is an open question".

Not effective at all, says Scott Ritter, who stands as a vocal minority at the other end of the former arms inspector divide. While in Unsc he gained the reputation of being one of its most aggressive sleuths, but he has since sharply shifted tack and is today a leading sceptic on the issue.

Mr Ritter is sure the Iraqis never succeeded in turning their chemical and biological agents into a weapon that could spray its lethal warhead over a large area.

"They lacked an effective dispensing mechanism. That requires specific capabilities, like bomblets, and the ability to aerosolise the weapon. Missiles require a precise fusing mechanism which Iraq never had."

Although Mr Ritter concedes that 5-10% of Iraq's known pre-1990 stockpile of chemical and biological arms has not been accounted for, he argues that even if Saddam had tried to hide this remnant of his arsenal "it would no longer be viable". Weapons built before the Gulf war that slipped through the Unsc net would by now have passed their sell-by date.

Ali Muhsin Hamid, the Arab League's ambassador in London, agrees. UN inspectors destroyed 95% of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, and the remaining 5% has been rendered unuseable by the fact that Iraq is prevented under sanctions from replacing equipment needed to deploy them.

Ben Bradshaw, the Foreign Office minister responsible for the Middle East, including policy on Iraq, has no doubts that "Iraq has and is developing weapons of mass destruction. We cannot afford to ignore his weapons".

More specifically, Saddam is developing new missile-launching technology that would allow him to strike beyond the 150km (93-mile) limit imposed by the UN. Israel and several Gulf states would lie within his range.

Most analysts believe that Iraq has so far failed to procure long-range missiles able to deliver weapons of mass destruction. However, it has developed an unmanned aerial vehicle modelled on a converted jet trainer aircraft, which the CIA said recently had been adapted to deliver chemical or, more likely, biological warfare agents.

The most vexed area of disagreement relates to the most profound fear: is Saddam building nuclear weapons? Western intelligence agencies and independent analysts all agree that nuclear weapons are far more difficult to develop than chemical or biological, simply because of the difficulty involved in acquiring fissile material.

Rosemary Hollis, head of the Middle East programme at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, says that from discussions with nuclear scientists it seemed clear that Iraq does not have the capacity to build nuclear weapons. She suggests that the emphasis now on Saddam's nuclear ambitions is dictated by Washington's plans for a pre-emptive strike on Iraq.

Mr Bradshaw believes that Iraq has restarted its nuclear weapons programme. "Saddam could develop a nuclear weapon within five years," he says, though he adds that would only happen "if controls are lifted".

Opponents of military intervention such as Mr Ritter counter that even before Saddam was walled in by sanctions and international surveillance he failed to create a nuclear bomb.

Were Saddam to possess fully operational weapons of mass destruction, would he use them? Among Iraqis themselves, there is rare agreement between supporters and opponents of the Baghdad regime that Saddam is unlikely to do so. Dr Burhan Chalabi, an Iraqi-born British businessman and a strong critic of sanctions

against Iraq, said deploying such weapons would serve no useful purpose. "Apart from Kuwait and Israel, Iraq has made peace with all its neighbours, including Saudi Arabia."

Brigadier-General Najib Salihi, a prominent member of the Iraqi opposition, agrees. Saddam would risk losing control of both the army and his people if he pressed the button, he says.

Mr Bradshaw points out that Saddam has already used chemical weapons against Iran and against the Kurds of northern Iraq at Halabja, attacking and killing them with mustard gas and the nerve agent tabun.

To which Mr Ritter replies: "Under international law, at what point do we justify a war about bad behaviour in the past?"

2. What evidence is there for Saddam's possession or development of weapons of mass destruction?

For the Iraqi-born Dr Chalabi, the answer is blunt: "There is no evidence."

Mr Hamid, of the Arab League, makes the same point more expansively. Talk of "evidence" is political rhetoric, he says. "Either the US aim is to force Iraq to accept the inspectors again or to have this issue burning in order to distract the attention of Arabs from the situation in the Palestinian occupied territories."

Sir John Moberly, who was the British ambassador to Baghdad between 1982 and 1985, argues that to dismiss any fear of the regime as rhetoric is to belie the evidence of history. Though he concedes he is not privy to specifics, he is familiar with Saddam's past duplicity.

"The Iraqis said they had abandoned weapons programmes but we found later when one of the leadership defected to Jordan that the programmes were continuing."

Exhibit A in the debate over Iraq's weapons of mass destruction is the final substantive report delivered by Unscm in January 1999, in which it gave an account of what biological and chemical weapons had been accounted for and what remained unknown. The document confirms that much of the pre-1990 stockpile was destroyed either in the Iran-Iraq war or under Unscm supervision. For the rest, though, the key recurring phrase was "cannot be verified".

Colonel Terry Taylor, a former UN inspector in Iraq, says he and his colleagues had proof that the Iraqis had weaponised anthrax, botulinum toxin and aflatoxin. They also carried out research and development work on other agents including ricin (a toxin) and animal and plant agents, and had several hundreds of tons of mustard agent in missiles, artillery and rocket form, as well as a weaponised version of the nerve agent sarin.

"The most worrying outstanding issue is that Unscm had documentary proof that the Iraqis had acquired hundreds of tons of the chemicals essential to the production of VX nerve agent - one of the most deadly nerve agents developed in recent times. They refused to disclose the location and confirm the quantities."

Col Taylor adds that the Iraqi engineers and scientists are still in place to develop and produce similar weapons. "Having been at close quarters with these programmes over a number of years in Iraq I concluded that they would make every effort to conceal their weapons of mass destruction programmes and continue to develop them as far as possible."

Mr Duelfer described as "very credible" an Iraqi defector named Adnan al-Haideri who fled Iraq last year. Mr al-Haideri, a civil engineer, claimed that he had worked on renovations to secret weapons of mass destruction facilities concealed in private villas, wells and under the Saddam Hussein hospital in Baghdad.

Evidence of a nuclear capability is sketchy. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which is responsible for monitoring nuclear weapons and which is still making visits to Iraq, is upbeat, concluding recently that there is no sign of a surviving programme.

However, the comfort that affords is undermined by Mr Duelfer and Mr Ritter who for once can agree that the IAEA has proved largely ineffectual. Key components of three prototype nuclear bombs are reported to have been made before the Gulf war but were never handed over, including the high explosive "lenses" designed to force the fissile core to implode.

However, according to Mr Ritter the same Iraqi source which revealed the existence of the three lenses also said that the delicate devices had been roughly handled and wrecked by Saddam's Special Republican Guard. "What the Iraqis retained is useless," he says.

Mr Duelfer accepts that it is unlikely Saddam has a nuclear bomb, but argues that there is credible evidence from defectors and other intelligence that the Iraqi leader is marshalling his nuclear experts to have a fresh attempt at building a bomb.

3. Would an offer to allow UN weapons inspectors back into Iraq be a meaningful and sufficient response to negate the threat of military force?

Again, the experts at the centre of the dispute - the arms inspectors - cannot agree. The most optimistic view comes from Hans Blix, the Swedish head of Unmovic, which in 1999 replaced Unscm after it was expelled from Iraq. He is confident that once his newly trained 230-strong team of inspectors are back in Iraq they will

have a real impact. He is also certain that this route would be a much safer and more efficient way of removing the fangs from the regime than a military offensive.

"Ten years and thousands of inspections and reports later it is recognised that Unsc's efforts probably led to the destruction of more weapons of mass destruction than did the Gulf war," he says.

Mr Duelfer, with years of experience of Saddam's evasions, is less sanguine about Unmovic's chances. "Blix can do no more than what Iraq permits and the security council is willing to back up," he says, pointing out that as a UN body, it would have to make its information and intelligence available to countries such as France, Russia and China, which have had a history of sympathy and cooperation with Iraq.

Sir John Moberly thinks that if the Iraqis did allow the inspectors back, they would take much wind out of US military sails. "It will be very difficult to carry out any attack and maintain support internationally if Iraq has complied."

Other analysts suggest the US is adopting a cynical approach. For Mr Ritter, no Iraqi response would be sufficient to stop an attack by an administration that has set its sights on "regime change".

Dr Chalabi also sees a double game being played. "If the Americans have made up their mind to attack Iraq, they don't need any excuse such as demanding to send inspectors back. This is just spin to prepare public opinion for an attack."

Mr Hamid, of the Arab League, says the only way to convince Arabs that the US is genuine in its resolve to deal with weapons of mass destruction is to tackle Israel's nuclear arsenal as well as Iraq's. "If the Israeli weapons are looked at, the Arabs will feel that the US is serious, fair, even-handed and objective."

In the strategy being pursued by Washington and London, access to UN inspectors and military action are inextricably linked - one depends on the other. The British government now shares the Bush administration's view that there is no chance of Saddam allowing in UN inspectors without a credible threat of serious military action.

Col Taylor agrees with that view. For him, bargaining is not on the agenda. "You have to demonstrate to Baghdad that substantial and credible military action will take place. You cannot negotiate with Saddam Hussein."

4. How easily, and with what risks, could Saddam be removed militarily?

For many defence analysts, the answer to this question takes us back to the beginning. If Saddam does have weapons of mass destruction and is ready to use them, then the battle to topple him will be neither easy nor risk-free.

Rear Admiral (retired) Stephen Baker, the chief analyst at the Centre for Defence Information in Washington, stresses that such weapons have to be regarded with utmost respect. "We would have to have a very, very robust defensive response."

The attacking forces would need to have airborne tactical aircraft with precision-guided missiles, as well as upgraded Patriot missiles, able to intercept Iraqi missiles minutes after they were launched.

John Pike, who runs GlobalSecurity.org - a military and intelligence online newsletter - said the greatest danger could be an Iraqi attack on Israel, instantly transforming the conflict into one that pits all Arabs against the Jewish state and its supporters. Pentagon planners, he said, "are having a very hard time coming up with a workable plan which does not involve chemical or biological weapons versus Israel".

How much resistance could the 400,000-strong Iraqi army put up? There is general agreement that the bulk of the force, made up of conscripts, will not fight. Adm Baker believes that even applies to the elite Republican Guard. "They have paid attention to Desert Storm. They know the lethality of the coalition and the US."

But Judith Yaphe, a former senior analyst on Iraq for the CIA now at the National Defence University, warns that the Republican Guard has grown "a lot leaner and meaner" since the Gulf war.

Once again, Mr Ritter takes the most radical view. "The Republican Guard never cracked during Desert Storm," he says. "They always fought. And the Special Republican Guard, about 50,000 to 60,000 men, will fight to the death."

Moreover, Mr Ritter said, the ruling Baath party would mobilise a guerrilla resistance. US casualties, he predicted, could run to hundreds and perhaps thousands. Iraqi deaths would be in the tens of thousands or higher.

Dr Chalabi paints a similar doom-laden picture. Just as the US has been unable to pin down the leader of al-Qaida, so Saddam could simply disappear into the Baghdad crowds.

"Saddam is one person in 25 million. He would be more difficult to find than Bin Laden. He has only to put on a dishdasha and walk in the souq, and nobody would recognise him."

Any serious military campaign would take months of planning, say British defence officials. They dismiss as extremely unlikely a ground invasion that would require tens of thousands of troops, the support of neighbouring countries and a massive bombing campaign.

"Where would American troops invade from?" asks a senior defence official, adding that only Kuwait would provide a base, and even then with extreme reluctance.

In Afghanistan, much of the fighting against al-Qaida and the Taliban was conducted by local opposition groups. Gen Salihi thinks Iraqi opposition groups would be just as crucial in any strike against Saddam, and insists that were these groups properly supported by the US then victory would be guaranteed.

"That's a dream," says Ms Yaphe, who scoffs at the idea of a substantial involvement of local opposition forces. "It's going to be 99% American effort."

Sir John Moberly also questions any central role for the Iraqi opposition. "The Americans hope a lot of Iraqis would rise up. I am not sure that would be the case. The Kurds would not want to get involved and the Shia Muslims in the south, who have the best military capability, look to Iran as their mentor. It was not very sensible to include Iran in the 'axis of evil'."

5. If America went to war with Iraq, would it be in the British national interest to take part?

"Absolutely not," says Paul Rogers, professor of peace studies at Bradford University. "It would risk destabilising the the whole region."

Dr Hollis is also fearful that by backing a US strike, Britain could be brought into the firing line. Iraq could be provoked into establishing direct links with al-Qaida and provide the network with more recruits, she says, raising the spectre of terrorist attacks on Britain.

But for diplomats such as Sir John Moberly a middle path needs to be struck. "It would certainly be in the British interest not to be creating problems for the Americans," he says. But nor should Tony Blair allow himself to be seen as Washington's puppet. "We have to be ready to support the Americans, but not accept everything they do."

6. What kind of regime would replace Saddam were he toppled?

No Iraqi with an ounce of decency will ever accept a government bearing the stamp "Made in the USA". So says Dr Chalabi, who ridicules the idea of exiled opposition leaders returning to Baghdad to replace Saddam. "Once the dollars stop, none of these dollar-revolutionaries in the opposition will leave the comfort of London and New York to live in Baghdad and rule people that most of them haven't seen since the Gulf war."

Gen Salihi, by contrast, holds up the vision of a post-Saddam multiparty democracy representing all peoples and religions. The Kurds must get their rights, within a united Iraq, and no group or family should dominate Iraq alone.

"A democratic system can resolve all problems and give all groups a chance to participate in the next government," he says.

It is precisely Iraq's ethnic and religious diversity that would be the problem were Saddam overthrown, believes Mr Hamid, of the Arab League. He prophesies not one, but several civil wars inside Iraq.

Whitehall officials also speak of a potential "nightmare scenario" with Iraq split into three parts, with the Kurds in the north demanding a separate state, something which would be fiercely opposed by Turkey, Iran and Syria.

"There is an enormous risk of expectations. Kurdistan is not what people want," said a defence official.

At worst, says Sir John, such would be the instability that there would be a great temptation to replace Saddam with another Saddam - another iron-fisted military man.

"The US has a personal animus against Saddam. I do not think they have a clear idea of what they are going to do or what the results will be."

7. Would removing Saddam by force make the world a safer place?

"The biggest danger is you might remove one danger and increase another," says Dr Hollis, referring to the prospect of further alienating Arab and Muslim opinion at a time when "Israel was being allowed to get away with murder".

"It is most likely to lead to further tension and conflict", says Prof Rogers. Alternative solutions would have to be found, he added.

For Dr Chalabi, the Middle East is only safe with an Iraq that is fully intact and fully participating in the peace process. Mr Hamid goes further, warning that war would be "a disaster for the region, because Iraq's neighbours will be flooded with tens of thousands of Iraqi refugees".

Mr Duelfer sounds a rare note of hope, not least for Iraq itself. "Iraq could be the engine of development in the Middle East. It can rebuild itself. They've got a lot of real talented people, and there is a lot more holding Iraq together than pulling it apart."

In the end, this question also circles back to the beginning, and President Bush's maxim: Inaction is not an option. "Saddam Hussein is a danger to Iraq, to the region and to the world," says Col Taylor. "Whatever you do entails risks, but the risk in not doing anything is more risky."

Baltimore Sun

Case for invading Iraq is full of holes

By Steve Chapman

Originally published September 3, 2002

In the usual sequence, a nation is presented with a powerful cause for war and then proceeds to fight. After Sept. 11, Americans didn't need tortured explanations of why the United States should invade Afghanistan. But in the case of Iraq, the Bush administration began by making plans to get rid of Saddam Hussein, and realized only later that it might need to explain why. Judging from Vice President Dick Cheney's recent effort to rally support, it's still groping for a good excuse.

Mr. Cheney went before the national convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars to announce that Mr. Hussein is a bad man who has chemical and biological agents and hopes to develop nuclear weapons as well. Nobody really denies that, but most of the world views the prospect without undue hysteria.

The vice president said it would be intolerable for Mr. Hussein to expand his arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. Why? Because "he is amassing them to use against our friends, our allies, and against us."

If he were to get nukes, Mr. Hussein would "seek domination of the entire Middle East, take control of a great portion of the world's energy supplies, directly threaten America's friends throughout the region, and subject the United States or any other nation to nuclear blackmail," Mr. Cheney said.

But several countries have nuclear weapons, and none has found them very useful in making others do their bidding. Israel hasn't been able to force its neighbors to accept its treatment of the Palestinians. India hasn't coerced Pakistan to give up its claims to Kashmir. China hasn't succeeded in reclaiming Taiwan.

The argument is that Mr. Hussein is so reckless that he would be more successful. But what stops a nuclear power from carrying out a nuclear attack, or attempting nuclear blackmail, is not inborn self-restraint. It's the prospect of nuclear retaliation.

What evidence do we have that the Iraqi tyrant is influenced by such piddly considerations? Only his own behavior. We don't have to wonder if he can be deterred from using weapons of mass destruction. He already has been. During the Persian Gulf war, he had chemical and biological weapons that he could have used against Saudi Arabia, against Israel or against U.S. forces. But he knew the United States and Israel had nuclear missiles that could reach Baghdad, and himself.

The administration makes much of Mr. Hussein's use of poison gas against Iran and against Kurdish insurgents at home. But he did so on the assumption that his opponents couldn't respond with anything comparable. He won't have that assurance if he threatens a nuclear attack on us or our friends.

The New Republic heaps contempt on the notion that "there is the rational gassing of innocents and the irrational gassing of innocents," preferring "to insist that the use of weapons of mass destruction denotes a general derangement." Oh? Was President Truman deranged when he dropped the bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki? If Mr. Hussein were crazy, he would have used his weapons of mass destruction in 1991 rather than swallow a humiliating defeat.

It's argued that a nuclear-armed Hussein could invade Kuwait or Saudi Arabia and force the United States to stay out by threatening to vaporize New York. If that strategy were feasible, though, the Soviet Union would have overrun Western Europe during the Cold War.

Besides, after more than a decade of economic sanctions, Iraq no longer has the offensive capability to mount any serious military campaign. For that, Mr. Hussein would need a lot of tanks, aircraft and other weapons.

But as University of Chicago strategist Robert Pape points out, "Unlike biological weapons, he can't use tanks if they're buried in the sand. He can use them only if they're out in the open and he conducts training with them."

And if he does that, we can easily blow them to pieces before he can use them.

If the problem were that Mr. Hussein could threaten his neighbors, you would expect his neighbors to be even more worried about him than we are. In fact, nearby countries such as Saudi Arabia are among the most vocal opponents of a U.S. invasion. Aside from Israel, other countries in the Middle East see him as no great danger. So why does Mr. Hussein want weapons of mass destruction? For their only real function - deterring other countries from attacking him. If he had nuclear weapons, the United States would have to drop the idea of

invading Iraq to overthrow its government. But if the only value of an Iraqi bomb is Mr. Hussein's self-preservation, it's hardly worth going to war over. For months, we've been wondering why the administration has been so reluctant to make the case for invading Iraq. Now we have the answer: Because there isn't one.

Associated Press

Cheney Defends Pre-Emptive Doctrine

By Scott Lindlaw
8 September 2002

WASHINGTON (AP) — The United States is justified in striking any country it believes is planning an attack against America, Vice President Cheney said Sunday, applying the Bush administration's new foreign policy doctrine on pre-emptive military action to Iraq.

Saddam Hussein has accelerated his biological weapons programs and is "actively and aggressively" seeking a nuclear bomb, Cheney said, citing unspecified intelligence gathered over the past 12 months to 14 months. "And increasingly, we believe the United States will become the target of those activities," he said.

Cheney and top administration officials took to the Sunday talk shows as part of President Bush's effort to convince the public, Congress and other countries that action against Saddam is urgently needed.

The officials cited the Sept. 11 attacks in making the case that the world cannot wait to find out whether the Iraqi president has weapons of mass destruction.

"Imagine, a September 11 with weapons of mass destruction. It's not 3,000; it's tens of thousands of innocent men, women and children," Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld said on CBS's "Face the Nation."

Cheney said he did not know for sure whether Saddam already has a nuclear weapon. Gen. Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said he did not think so.

"The problem here is that there will always be some uncertainty about how quickly he can acquire nuclear weapons. But we don't want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud," national security adviser Condoleezza Rice told CNN's "Late Edition."

"How long are we going to wait to deal with what is clearly a gathering threat against the United States, against our allies and against his own region?"

Bush will address the United Nations on Thursday to build his case for action against Iraq. But Secretary of State Colin Powell said whatever the United Nations decides, Bush will reserve the right to go it alone against Iraq.

"The president will retain all of his authority and options to act in a way that may be appropriate for us to act unilaterally to defend ourselves," Powell said on "Fox News Sunday."

Bush outlined a new doctrine in June warning he will take "pre-emptive action, when necessary, to defend our liberty and to defend our lives." He mentioned no specific nations at the time. On Sunday, Cheney pointed a finger directly at Iraq.

Critics, some of them in countries allied with the United States, have questioned whether military action to achieve the U.S. government's goal of overthrowing Saddam Hussein from power is legal under international law.

Cheney said in the case of Iraq, such action is justified. "If we have reason to believe someone is preparing an attack against the U.S., has developed that capability, harbors those aspirations, then I think the U.S. is justified in dealing with that, if necessary, by military force," Cheney said.

Added Powell: "When you can intercept a terrorist act that is heading your way or you can deal with a regime or a situation before it comes to a crisis level and threatens you, then it is an option that you should keep in mind and on the table."

Saddam has the technical expertise and designs for a nuclear weapon, and has been seeking a type of aluminum tube needed to enrich uranium for a weapon, Cheney and Powell said. "We know we have a part of the picture and that part of the picture tells us that he is in fact actively and aggressively seeking to acquire nuclear weapons," Cheney said.

Iraq's vice president denied Sunday that his country is trying to collect nuclear material or building up sites that U.N. weapons inspectors used to visit. Taha Yassin Ramadan, speaking to reporters in Baghdad, charged that the United States and Britain are seeking an excuse to attack Iraq.

"They are telling lies and lies to make others believe them," Ramadan said.

Bush administration officials expressed deep skepticism about giving Saddam another chance to open up his country to U.N. weapons inspectors. Officials say Bush is considering giving Saddam a last-ditch deadline for allowing unfettered access to weapons inspectors.

“The issue is not inspectors or inspections. That is a tool,” Powell said. “Disarmament is the issue. And we will stay focused on that, and we believe that regime change is the surest way to make sure that it’s disarmed.” Cheney said that if the United States led an attack on Iraq, American forces would have to stay there for a prolonged period afterward to ensure “we stood up a new government and helped the Iraqi people decide how they want to govern themselves until there was a peaceful stability.”

War could be very costly, he said. But, he added, “The danger of an attack against the U.S. by someone with the weapons that Saddam Hussein now possesses or is acquiring is far more costly than what it would cost us to go deal with this problem.”

Sunday Herald

How did Iraq get its weapons? We sold them

By Neil Mackay and Felicity Arbuthnot
8 September 2002

The US and Britain sold Saddam Hussein the technology and materials Iraq needed to develop nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction.

Reports by the US Senate’s committee on banking, housing and urban affairs -- which oversees American exports policy -- reveal that the US, under the successive administrations of Ronald Reagan and George Bush Sr, sold materials including anthrax, VX nerve gas, West Nile fever germs and botulism to Iraq right up until March 1992, as well as germs similar to tuberculosis and pneumonia. Other bacteria sold included brucella melitensis, which damages major organs, and clostridium perfringens, which causes gas gangrene.

Classified US Defence Department documents also seen by the Sunday Herald show that Britain sold Iraq the drug pralidoxime, an antidote to nerve gas, in March 1992, after the end of the Gulf war. Pralidoxime can be reverse engineered to create nerve gas.

The Senate committee’s reports on ‘US Chemical and Biological Warfare-Related Dual-Use Exports to Iraq’, undertaken in 1992 in the wake of the Gulf war, give the date and destination of all US exports. The reports show, for example, that on May 2, 1986, two batches of bacillus anthracis -- the micro-organism that causes anthrax -- were shipped to the Iraqi Ministry of Higher Education, along with two batches of the bacterium clostridium botulinum, the agent that causes deadly botulism poisoning.

One batch each of salmonella and E coli were shipped to the Iraqi State Company for Drug Industries on August 31, 1987. Other shipments went from the US to the Iraq Atomic Energy Commission on July 11, 1988; the Department of Biology at the University of Basrah in November 1989; the Department of Microbiology at Baghdad University in June 1985; the Ministry of Health in April 1985 and Officers’ City, a military complex in Baghdad, in March and April 1986.

The shipments to Iraq went on even after Saddam Hussein ordered the gassing of the Kurdish town of Halabja, in which at least 5000 men, women and children died. The atrocity, which shocked the world, took place in March 1988, but a month later the components and materials of weapons of mass destruction were continuing to arrive in Baghdad from the US.

The Senate report also makes clear that: ‘The United States provided the government of Iraq with ‘dual use’ licensed materials which assisted in the development of Iraqi chemical, biological and missile-system programmes.’

This assistance, according to the report, included ‘chemical warfare-agent precursors, chemical warfare-agent production facility plans and technical drawings, chemical warfare filling equipment, biological warfare-related materials, missile fabrication equipment and missile system guidance equipment’.

Donald Riegle, then chairman of the committee, said: ‘UN inspectors had identified many United States manufactured items that had been exported from the United States to Iraq under licences issued by the Department of Commerce, and [established] that these items were used to further Iraq’s chemical and nuclear weapons development and its missile delivery system development programmes.’

Riegle added that, between January 1985 and August 1990, the ‘executive branch of our government approved 771 different export licences for sale of dual-use technology to Iraq. I think that is a devastating record’.

It is thought the information contained in the Senate committee reports is likely to make up much of the ‘evidence of proof’ that Bush and Blair will reveal in the coming days to justify the US and Britain going to

war with Iraq. It is unlikely, however, that the two leaders will admit it was the Western powers that armed Saddam with these weapons of mass destruction.

However, Bush and Blair will also have to prove that Saddam still has chemical, biological and nuclear capabilities. This looks like a difficult case to clinch in view of the fact that Scott Ritter, the UN's former chief weapons inspector in Iraq, says the United Nations destroyed most of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and doubts that Saddam could have rebuilt his stocks by now.

According to Ritter, between 90% and 95% of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction were destroyed by the UN. He believes the remainder were probably used or destroyed during 'the ravages of the Gulf War'.

Ritter has described himself as a 'card-carrying Republican' who voted for George W Bush. Nevertheless, he has called the president a 'liar' over his claims that Saddam Hussein is a threat to America.

Ritter has also alleged that the manufacture of chemical and biological weapons emits certain gases, which would have been detected by satellite. 'We have seen none of this,' he insists. 'If Iraq was producing weapons today, we would have definitive proof.'

He also dismisses claims that Iraq may have a nuclear weapons capacity or be on the verge of attaining one, saying that gamma-particle atomic radiation from the radioactive materials in the warheads would also have been detected by western surveillance.

The UN's former co-ordinator in Iraq and former UN under-secretary general, Count Hans von Sponeck, has also told the Sunday Herald that he believes the West is lying about Iraq's weapons programme.

Von Sponeck visited the Al-Dora and Faluja factories near Baghdad in 1999 after they were 'comprehensively trashed' on the orders of UN inspectors, on the grounds that they were suspected of being chemical weapons plants. He returned to the site late in July this year, with a German TV crew, and said both plants were still wrecked.

'We filmed the evidence of the dishonesty of the claims that they were producing chemical and biological weapons,' von Sponeck has told the Sunday Herald. 'They are indeed in the same destroyed state which we witnessed in 1999. There was no trace of any resumed activity at all.'

CNN

Ritter dismisses report on Iraq

9 September 2002

BAGHDAD, Iraq (CNN) --Ex-U.N. weapons inspector Scott Ritter has branded an independent think-tank's report on Iraq's capability to launch a nuclear attack as "all speculative."

Ritter, who criticised the U.S.' threat of military action against Baghdad during a speech to the Iraqi National Assembly at the weekend, attacked the report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) as being only "rhetorical."

The IISS's report into Iraq's arms programmes, published on Monday, warns Iraq could assemble a nuclear weapon in months if it receives foreign help.

The independent international research group that examines political, economic and military trends, also said at a news conference in London that Iraq could have been stockpiling chemical and biological weapons since 1998 when U.N. inspectors left the country and were refused permission to return.

Ritter, who resigned from his job in 1998 amid acrimony with the U.S., said: "Where are the facts... what evidence do they cite for this enduring interest?"

"Where are the factories? Where are the weapons?" He added: "It's all rhetorical. It's all speculative."

"It is meaningless, with the sad exception that hawks in the Bush administration are going to point to this as a justification for war."

Ritter quit his job as weapons inspector after claiming the U.S. deliberately instigated a crisis with the regime of President Saddam Hussein so it could launch a bombing campaign -- despite there being no longer any need for aggressive inspections of Iraqi sites after 1995 when UNSCOM verified that it had fundamentally disarmed.

He also accused the U.S. of preventing UNSCOM inspectors from doing their jobs effectively and now appears set to enter a slanging match with the U.S. over its claims that Saddam now holds weapons of mass destruction which he plans to use.

U.S. President George W. Bush is trying to garner international support for military action against Saddam.

U.S. Senator Richard Shelby, vice-chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, told CNN Ritter was "idealistic", adding there was no credence to Ritter's statements and he appeared to be courting Saddam.

When asked about Shelby's comments, Ritter said, "Well, Senator Shelby, with all due respect, back off buddy, I'm an American citizen doing the right thing for the United States of America. I'm not courting Saddam or the Iraqi people. I'm courting the American public."

'Let's go face-to-face'

He challenged Shelby to a debate on the weapons issue. "Let's do it face to face in front of a TV camera," Ritter said. "I guarantee you this. I'll win that debate."

Ritter also threw scorn on U.S. claims that Saddam is trying to bolster his nuclear programme by attempting to acquire aluminum tubes, an element in producing nuclear weapons.

National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice has said the tubes "are only really suited for nuclear weapons programmes, centrifuge programmes."

Centrifuge programmes are one way to separate weapons-grade uranium from natural uranium.

"We're going to go to war over thousands of aluminum pipes?" said Ritter. "This is patently ridiculous. These are aluminum pipes coming in for civilian use. They are not being transferred to a covert nuclear processing plant."

"I'm going to need a helluva lot more than some aluminum tubes before I'm convinced there's a case for war," Ritter added. "We cannot go to war because Vice President (Dick) Cheney is worried about aluminum pipes. This is ridiculous."

He quoted a report by the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1998 which said Iraq had no nuclear weapons capability, so how, he asked, "suddenly are they an emerging nuclear threat?"

Ritter added that when the inspectors left Iraq, they had certified the country was between 90 and 95 percent disarmed.

During his speech to the Iraqi parliament on Sunday he denied allegations that the Iraqis had interfered with the inspection process.

He said the United States "seems to be on the verge of making a historical mistake" in its calls for ousting the Iraqi president and his regime.

But in a CNN interview Monday, Vice President Dick Cheney said previous international efforts to contain Iraq have failed -- which "puts us in the position we are in today where we even have to think about the possibility of military action in Iraq."

"We have to deal with that emerging threat," Cheney said. "The question is how best to do it, and we would like to have the support of the international community as we go forward here."

The White House accuses Hussein of seeking weapons of mass destruction, violating U.N. resolutions dating back to the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

Secretary of State Colin Powell told NBC's "Today" show Monday that the U.S. has the intelligence to prove that Iraq is developing weapons of mass destruction - but "It is not for us to prove they have it; it is for them to prove they don't have it," he said.

Bulletin of Atomic Scientists

You call that evidence?

Linda Rothstein, Editor

The Bush administration has begun to produce what it calls evidence to support its claim that Iraq is moving very near a nuclear weapon capability. But a story in Sunday's New York Times (September 8, 2002), especially as elaborated by administration officials on Sunday talk shows, actually suggests just the opposite—that Iraq is not as close as it was before the Gulf War.

In a front-page story, Times reporters Michael Gordon and Judith Miller write that they were told by administration officials that Iraq has been trying to buy specially designed aluminum tubes to be used to fabricate gas centrifuges in which to produce weapon-grade uranium. How does that compare to what we know about the state of Iraq's nuclear program in 1991?

After the Gulf War, U.N. Special Commission inspectors discovered that although Iraq had spent billions of dollars over nearly two decades, its efforts to produce weapon-grade uranium had basically come up empty.

Iraq had been using two methods: One program involved building giant "calutrons," a clumsy technology the United States had abandoned in the 1940s. For decades that technology had been considered so primitive and inefficient that it was unlikely ever to be copied; everything anyone could want to know about it was available

in the open literature. It's hard to say what an Iraqi success with this method would have meant, but in any case, the calutrons were destroyed.

The second method—and certainly the modern method of choice—was to build a "cascade" of centrifuges to separate the fissile constituents of uranium from the non-fissile. A cascade consists of thousands of centrifuges, all of which must be able to withstand spinning at extraordinarily high speed.

Inspectors discovered that although the Iraqis had brought in centrifuge experts from Germany and purchased specialty steel from German and Swiss companies, they had spoiled most of the material—failing to shape it properly or otherwise maltreating it. Essentially, the Iraqi centrifuge program was a failure. And if the Iraqis were to depend on producing weapon material through the centrifuge process—rather than trying to obtain it on the black market—experts say it would probably take five or six years.

Now we are expected to believe that Iraq is closer to a nuclear weapon capability because it is starting all over again! Admittedly, this time Iraq is trying to get different materials with which to construct the centrifuges—and perhaps they hope to save time by getting it preformed as tubes.

Mysteriously, Vice President Dick Cheney said on Meet the Press that he could not comment on what the administration knows, only on what had appeared in the Times—in other words, he would discuss only a selective, agreed-upon leak. He then asserted that the administration knew of only one attempted purchase of aluminum tubes because, he said, "we intercepted" that shipment. And if, he said, one shipment had been intercepted, how many others might have gotten through?

These comments, of course, raise more questions than they answer. First, just who is the "we" Cheney refers to? The U.S. government? An ally? In any case, it is someone who has no name. This story certainly leaves the rest of us wondering if anyone has made an effort to find out anything about the possible supplier or suppliers, because of their potential violation of treaties forbidding the export of weapons-usable industrial items.

Things got murkier after Condoleezza Rice's appearance on CNN's Late Edition. Although her discussion of the issue was more general, her remarks were more in line with the Times story; she said "we" knew about a series of shipments of tubes.

How strange is a story in which one official argues the case of a single shipment while others say there have been a number of shipments, yet no one expresses any interest in the source? Are the same unnamed but all-knowing "we" not at all interested in asking alleged suppliers what they think they're doing, or bringing any pressure on them to cut it out? And why hasn't anyone in the media been able to tease out a single bit of independent, corroborating information?

(And just a little tip for those assigned to leak additional new "evidence" of a stepped-up Iraqi nuclear threat: The tubing in centrifuges is not nearly as hard to acquire or assemble as the mechanisms that allow them to spin at rapid speeds; getting that stuff right, and getting thousands of centrifuges working in concert, is really hard. Also, leakers, please note: Should you want to claim that an Iraqi cascade is already in operation, such a facility uses as much energy as a fairly large city; it could be detected by its heat signature alone.)

The aluminum tubing story—and others to come—may be taken at face value by an insufficiently skeptical press, but the decision to go to war is simply too important to let the administration "wing it" in presenting its rationale. As Jon Stewart of the Daily Show asked recently about the administration's attitude toward the American public, "Do they think we're retarded?"

New York Times

U.S. Lacks Up-to-Date Review of Iraqi Arms

By Eric Schmitt and Alison Mitchell
September 11, 2002

WASHINGTON, Sept. 10 — Senior intelligence officials acknowledged today that the government had not compiled an updated, cross-agency assessment of Iraq's nuclear, chemical and biological weapons capacities, although the Bush administration is pressing for a quick statement of support for military action against Saddam Hussein.

Intelligence officials, responding to repeated complaints from Senate Democrats, said today that they were working on the authoritative document. The last such thorough assessment on Iraq's clandestine weapons was produced about two years ago, Senate and administration officials said today.

Senior Bush administration officials have given Iraq's pursuit of nuclear weapons as the main argument that the United States must act now to oust President Hussein, before the Iraqi leader acquires nuclear arms and alters the strategic balance in the Persian Gulf.

But the administration has not yet prepared what is called a national intelligence estimate, the intelligence community's most definitive written judgment on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs. The document contains the coordinated intelligence assessments from the Pentagon, State Department, Central Intelligence Agency and other government entities and any significant dissenting views.

Some Democrats said they wanted to see such an intelligence estimate before they voted on a Congressional resolution backing military action against Iraq. "What did we learn from Sept. 11? That we had a failure of coordination of America's intelligence capability," said Senator Richard J. Durbin, an Illinois Democrat on the Intelligence Committee. "Now we're being asked to consider going to war and vote on it within days, and we learn that our intelligence community has not coordinated their efforts to put together this critical document that's essential for us to make this decision."

George J. Tenet, the director of central intelligence, and John E. McLaughlin, the C.I.A.'s deputy director, assured senators in classified briefings on Capitol Hill today that the intelligence community was in the midst of producing an updated intelligence assessment on Iraq, which senators and administration officials said could be completed within weeks.

Administration officials and some Senate Republicans sought to play down the lack of an updated national intelligence estimate. Senator Bob Graham, a Florida Democrat who heads the Intelligence Committee, first requested the new analysis on July 22 in a letter to the C.I.A., officials said.

While there are major gaps in what American intelligence knows about Iraq's abilities, there is a large amount of information in the public record, including C.I.A. testimony, reports by United Nations inspectors, and assessments from private groups like the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

"There are a variety of documents out there on the overall W.M.D. threat, which includes Iraq," said one American intelligence official, using the initials that stand for weapons of mass destruction.

But Senator John Kerry, a Massachusetts Democrat on the Foreign Relations Committee, said there was no cross-agency judgment on Iraq's unconventional arsenal. "What I'm looking for," he said, "is the latest compilation that cross-analyzes agency assessments, that really gives you the best, state-of-the-art, up-to-date, full analysis of where they are." The national intelligence estimate represents the consensus of the full range of intelligence agencies produced by a rigorous cross-agency review.

"There's a certain extra credibility that goes along with that process," said Joseph S. Nye, a former chairman of the National Intelligence Council, which writes the national intelligence estimate.

Even as briefings continued on Capitol Hill, Democrats stepped up their opposition to a Congressional vote before the election.

"Unless there's some absolute urgent necessity to have this debate prior the election, I think it would be a much more thoughtful and constructive and nonpartisan debate if it takes place after the election," said Senator Joseph I. Lieberman, a Connecticut Democrat.

Senator Trent Lott of Mississippi, the Republican leader, said a show of support by Congress would strengthen the President's hand with allies. "I think people need to know what's going on and where their representatives stand," he said.

Senator Tom Daschle of South Dakota, the Democratic leader, said that if Mr. Bush insisted on a vote before the election "I don't think we have much choice but to respect the decision." But he added, "I think that's a deliberative judgment that hopefully will be made in concert and not dictated to the Congress."

In contrast to many Republicans, Representative Dick Armey of Texas, the House majority leader, continued to sound reluctant to go to war, recalling the failed raid in Mogadishu, Somalia, in 1993 that killed 18 American soldiers. "It broke our hearts," he said. "So I will need to see a plan before I will cast a vote. I need to see that it's necessary."

New York Times

Excerpts: Kofi Annan's Speech to the General Assembly

September 12, 2002

UNITED NATIONS, Sept. 11 — Following are excerpts from a speech prepared by Secretary General Kofi Annan for delivery to the General Assembly on Thursday:

We cannot begin today without reflecting on yesterday's anniversary — on the criminal challenge so brutally thrown in our faces on Sept. 11, 2001. The terrorist attacks of that day were not an isolated event. They were an extreme example of a global scourge, which requires a broad, sustained and global response. Broad, because terrorism can be defeated only if all nations unite against it. Sustained, because the battle against terrorism will not be won easily, or overnight. It requires patience and persistence. And global, because terrorism is a widespread and complex phenomenon, with many deep roots and exacerbating factors.

Mr. President, I believe that such a response can only succeed if we make full use of multilateral institutions... I also believe that every government that is committed to the rule of law at home must be committed also to the rule of law abroad. All states have a clear interest, as well as a clear responsibility, to uphold international law and maintain international order.

Our founding fathers, the statesmen of 1945, had learnt that lesson from the bitter experience of two world wars and a great Depression. They recognized that international security is not a zero-sum game. Peace, security and freedom are not finite commodities — like land, oil or gold — which one state can acquire at another's expense. On the contrary, the more peace, security and freedom any one state has, the more its neighbors are likely to have.

And they recognized that by agreeing to exercise sovereignty together, they could gain a hold over problems that would defeat any one of them acting separately.

If those lessons were clear in 1945, should they not be much more so today, in the age of globalization? . . .

Individual states may defend themselves, by striking back at terrorist groups and the countries that harbor or support them. But only concerted vigilance and cooperation among all states, with constant, systematic exchange of information, offers any real hope of denying terrorists their opportunities.

On all these matters, for any one state — large or small — choosing to follow or reject the multilateral path must not be a simple matter of political convenience. It has consequences far beyond the immediate context...

Any state, if attacked, retains the inherent right of self defense under Article 51 of the Charter. But beyond that, when states decide to use force to deal with broader threats to international peace and security, there is no substitute for the unique legitimacy provided by the United Nations.

Member states attach fundamental importance to such legitimacy and to the international rule of law. They have shown — notably in the action to liberate Kuwait 12 years ago — that they are willing to take actions under the authority of the Security Council, which they would not be willing to take without it.

The existence of an effective international security system depends on the Council's authority — and therefore the Council having the political will to act, even in the most difficult cases, when agreement seems elusive at the outset. The primary criterion for putting an issue on the Council's agenda should not be the receptiveness of the parties, but the existence of a grave threat to world peace.

Mr. President, let me now turn to four current threats to world peace, where true leadership and effective action are badly needed.

First, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Many of us have recently been struggling to reconcile Israel's legitimate security concerns with Palestinian humanitarian needs. But these limited objectives cannot be achieved in isolation from the wider political context. We must return to the search for a just and comprehensive solution, which alone can bring security and prosperity to both peoples, and indeed to the whole region.

The ultimate shape of a Middle East peace settlement is well known. It was defined long ago in Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and its Israeli-Palestinian components were spelt out even more clearly in Resolution 1397: land for peace; an end to terror and to occupation; two states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side within secure and recognized borders.

Both parties accept this vision. But we can reach it only if we move rapidly and in parallel on all fronts. The so-called "sequential" approach has failed. . . . As we agreed at the Quartet meeting in Washington last May, an international peace conference is needed without delay, to set out a roadmap of parallel steps: steps to strengthen Israel's security, steps to strengthen Palestinian economic and political institutions and steps to settle the details of the final peace agreement. Meanwhile, humanitarian steps to relieve Palestinian suffering must be intensified. The need is urgent.

Second, the leadership of Iraq continues to defy mandatory resolutions adopted by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter. I have engaged Iraq in an in-depth discussion on a range of issues, including the need for arms inspectors to return, in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions.

Efforts to obtain Iraq's compliance with the Council's resolutions must continue. I appeal to all who have influence with Iraq's leaders to impress on them the vital importance of accepting the weapons inspections. This is the indispensable first step towards assuring the world that all Iraq's weapons of mass destruction have indeed been eliminated and — let me stress — towards the suspension and eventual ending of the sanctions that are causing so many hardships for the Iraqi people.

I urge Iraq to comply with its obligations — for the sake of its own people, and for the sake of world order. If Iraq's defiance continues, the Security Council must face its responsibilities.

Third, permit me to press all of you, as leaders of the international community, to maintain your commitment to Afghanistan. I know I speak for all in welcoming President Karzai to this Assembly, and congratulating him on his escape from last week's vicious assassination attempt — a graphic reminder of how hard it is to uproot the remnants of terrorism in any country where it has taken root. It was the international community's shameful neglect of Afghanistan in the 1990's that allowed that country to slide into chaos, providing a fertile breeding ground for Al Qaeda.

Today, Afghanistan urgently needs help in two areas. The government must be helped to extend its authority throughout the country. Without this, all else will fail. And donors must follow through on their commitments to help with rehabilitation, reconstruction and development. Otherwise the Afghan people will lose hope — and desperation, we know, breeds violence.

Fourth, and finally, in South Asia the world has recently come closer than for many years past to a direct conflict between two nuclear-weapon-capable countries. The situation may now have calmed a little, but it remains perilous. The underlying causes must be addressed. . . .

Excellencies, let me conclude by reminding you of your pledge two years ago, at the Millennium Summit, "to make the United Nations a more effective instrument" in the service of the world's peoples. . . . Let us all recognize, from now on — in each of our capitals, in every nation, large and small — that the global interest is our national interest.

COMMENTAAR

De rapporten die nu een belangrijke rol spelen in het politieke besluitvormingsproces dat kan uitlopen op een oorlog met Irak, zijn van belang voor de meningsvorming. De kern van het IISS rapport (zie de press statement van 9 september jl.) is de stelling dat Irak binnen enkele maanden kernwapens kan ontwikkelen. Dat is geen nieuws en was al vastgesteld in de rapporten op de website van de Federation of American Scientists, het Center for Defense Information en de IAEA zelf (zie de rapporten op de websites die op p 3 worden opgesomd). Er is een nieuw element aan het debat toegevoegd, namelijk de levering van een aantal buizen die alleen geschikt zouden zijn voor de bouw van ultracentrifuges, voor het verrijken van uranium. Volgens de Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists zou het ingebruikneming van een ultracentrifuge fabriek een hoeveelheid energie verbruiken gelijk aan dat nodig voor een kleine stad. Zo een energiebron zou makkelijk worden gedetecteerd door verkenningssatellieten vanwege de warmte straling die afgegeven wordt (Zie BAS 100902). Het gaat hier om indicaties over toekomstige ontwikkelingen. In feite is Irak verder verwijderd van een kernwapen dan het in 1991 was. Er is geen bewijs dat het beschikt over de mogelijkheid om kernwapens te bouwen, noch over inzetbare kernwapens. In diverse rapporten is al vastgesteld dat volledige zekerheid alleen kan worden verkregen door een permanent inspectieregime. Scott Ritter, de voormalige inspecteur van de UNSCOM, stelt op grond van de controles die tot 1998 plaatsvonden, dat de productiecapaciteit voor massavernietigingswapens van Irak grotendeels ontmanteld is. Hij stelt ook dat de technische surveillance (door satellieten en verkenningsvliegtuigen) van Irak de afgelopen vier jaar eventuele hervatting van de productie van chemische wapens of de aanwezigheid van verrijkt uranium zou hebben waargenomen.

Als er wel massavernietigingswapens (nucleair, biologisch en chemisch) of WMD aanwezig zijn in Irak, is ook de vraag naar de draagsystemen relevant (zie FAS website, p3). Volgens deze schattingen zijn er een tiental Scud raketten beschikbaar, met een bereik van een paar honderd kilometer. Er wordt onderzoek gedaan naar raketten met een groter bereik, maar ze zijn niet operationeel.

Er is onduidelijkheid over de zogenaamde 'weaponisation' van de Irakese WMD: kunnen ze gemonteerd worden op de draagraketten? Zo niet, dan is de dreiging die van de wapens uitgaat sterk verminderd.

Als Irak wel beschikt over inzetbare WMD, gemonteerd op raketten, blijft de vraag bestaan onder welke omstandigheden ze worden ingezet. Is er een scenario te bedenken waarin Irak een aanval op haar buurlanden uitvoert met deze wapens? Een aanval op Israël zou een vorm van zelfmoord zijn, gezien de hoge mate van waarschijnlijkheid dat dit land met kernwapens een tegenslag zou uitvoeren. Een aanval op Amerikaanse schepen zou ook tegenaanvallen tot gevolg hebben, wellicht ook met kernwapens (deze mogelijkheid wordt uitdrukkelijk open gehouden in de Amerikaanse nucleaire doctrine). Wat heeft het dan voor zin om andere buurlanden met WMD aan te vallen? In feite is er alleen één situatie waarin die dreiging logisch is: namelijk één waarin Irak wordt aangevallen en het voortbestaan van het regime direct wordt bedreigd.

Blijft over een ander scenario dat in de media is terug te vinden: namelijk het overhandigen van WMD (wellicht alleen in de vorm van een container of pakket) aan een terroristische groepering. De meest beruchte, Al Qaeda, heeft weinig op met Saddam Hussein. De leider van dit netwerk, Bin Laden, deed in 1990 een aanbod aan Saoedië Arabie om een leger te rekruteren om dat land te beschermen tegen Irak, nadat het Koewit was binnengevallen. Saddam Hoessein van zijn kant zal niet genegen zijn om een eventuele kernbom af te staan aan een groep die zich uiteindelijk tegen hem zou keren. Een CIA rapport aangehaald in de Washington Post van 10 september jl. stelde dat er geen enkel verband is gevonden tussen Irak en Al Qaeda. Ook dit scenario is dus onwaarschijnlijk.

Het is bovendien nogal merkwaardig dat, als er wel een onmiddellijk gevaar dreigde, dat Israël geen 'pre-emptive strike' tegen de installaties heeft uitgevoerd, zoals ze dat in 1981 al deed.

Effectieve inspecties kunnen een oplossing vormen, maar als men deze weg volgt dan lijkt het logisch dat men niet tegelijkertijd kan streven naar omverwerping van de regering. Daar hoort logischerwijs ook bij uitzicht op een einde of verlichting van de sancties, en geen spionage operaties onder het mom van inspecties.

Vragen

1. Welke bewijzen bestaan er ten aanzien van de aanwezigheid van WMD in Irak?
2. Wat is de risico analyse van Israël tav dit gevaar?
3. Klopt het dat detectie met technische middelen van zowel het productie proces van chemische wapens als de aanwezigheid van verrijkt uranium?
4. Welke technische middelen worden er gebruikt?

5. Is het mogelijk om de inspectie eisen te combineren met een gedeeltelijke verlichting van de sancties?
6. Is het mogelijk om te garanderen dat er geen spionage activiteiten zullen plaatsvinden onder de dekmantel van inspecties?

Beleid

De Amerikaanse regering wil oorlog voeren tegen Irak. De expliciete doelstelling was om de regering van Saddam Hoessein omver te werpen. Daarnaast werd gesteld dat er een verband was tussen Irak en Al Qaeda, dwz dat de aanlagen van 11 september deels door Saddam Hussein zouden zijn ondersteund en wellicht uitgevoerd. Door de CIA is vastgesteld dat hiervan geen sprake was.

Inmiddels is het oorlogsdoel bijgesteld: de Amerikaans president zegt dat het hem te doen is om de massavernietigingswapens van Irak. Deze zouden een directe dreiging vormen voor de VS. Zoals door alle deskundigen wordt erkend, is er geen sprake van een verandering in de aard van deze dreiging: namelijk dat op den duur (men noemt vijf jaar) en met veel buitenlandse hulp Irak een eigen kernwapen zou kunnen bouwen. De vraag is of het mogelijk is om die buitenlandse hulp (bijv een lading verrijkt uranium) Irak in te krijgen zonder dat deze wordt waargenomen door de vele observatiemiddelen waarover de VS beschikt.

Het tijdspad is cruciaal: het zal nog jaren duren voor er sprake kan zijn van een Irakese bom en dan alleen als de voorbereidingen niet worden waargenomen. Er is dus geen reden om nu een oorlog daarover te beginnen. De urgentie die door de Amerikaanse verklaringen wordt gesuggereerd bestaat niet, en dat betekent dat er meer ruimte is voor het bewerkstelligen van de terugkeer van de wapeninspecteurs (VN resolutie 1284). Het is ook van belang om de effectiviteit vast te stellen van de technische surveillance die nu al plaatsvindt, waarbij met name moet worden gedacht aan de informatie verzameld door militaire waarnemings satellieten.

Samenvattend: er is behoefte aan meer informatie over de status van de Irakese WMD en of die inzetbaar zijn. Ook als ze dat zijn is een plausibele rationale noodzakelijk om de inzet daarvan te verklaren. Die is nog steeds niet gegeven. Daarom lijkt het alsof de rationale achter de oorlog niet zozeer te maken heeft met de WMD als met het omverwerpen van de huidige Irakese regering.

BIJLAGEN

Nederlands beleid

Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Landenoverzicht Irak

Juni 2002

[...] Buitenlands beleid en veiligheidsbeleid

Het Iraakse buitenlands- en veiligheidsbeleid werd lange tijd gedomineerd door de behoefte aan een goede toegang tot de Golf en door Saddam Hoesseins perceptie van zichzelf als de natuurlijke leider van de gehele Arabische wereld. Dit heeft geleid tot de twee eerder genoemde oorlogen.

De militaire verzwakking van Irak na de Golfoorlog had binnenlandse onrust tot gevolg (zie binnenlandse politiek). Na de mislukte opstanden in Noord en Zuid Irak, zijn door de VS, en VK en Frankrijk in deze twee gebieden de zogenaamde no-fly zones ingesteld ter bescherming van de lokale bevolkingsgroepen. In het zuiden werd de zone na een offensief van Iraakse troepen in Noord-Irak op 3 september 1996 uitgebreid van de 32e tot de 33e breedtegraad.

Na de beëindiging van de Iraakse bezetting van Koeweit heeft de Veiligheidsraad Irak een aantal verplichtingen opgelegd, waaraan Bagdad moet voldoen alvorens de tegen het land ingestelde sancties kunnen worden opgeheven. De United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) werd in het leven geroepen om toe te zien op vernietiging van een belangrijk deel van het Iraakse wapenarsenaal, terwijl het IAEA opdracht kreeg tot inspectie en ontmanteling van het Iraakse nucleaire programma.

Irak heeft voortdurend barrières opgeworpen tegen inspecties. Hierdoor blijft de verdenking gehandhaafd dat de Iraakse bewapeningsprogramma's nog niet volledig zijn ontmanteld. Sinds de militaire operatie 'Desert Fox' van december 1998, toen UNSCOM werd opgeheven, weigert Irak de wapeninspecteurs toegang te verlenen tot zijn grondgebied waardoor effectieve wapeninspecties onmogelijk zijn geworden.

Na een jaar intensieve consultaties in de Veiligheidsraad werd op 17 december 1999 een nieuwe omnibusresolutie inzake Irak aangenomen, Veiligheidsraadresolutie 1284 (zie economische situatie). Deze resolutie moet enerzijds nieuwe wapeninspecties in Irak mogelijk maken en anderzijds verbetering van de humanitaire situatie in Irak in gang zetten.

Irak wordt tevens inzake Koeweitse krijgsgevangenen en de teruggave van Koeweits bezit opgeroepen de samenwerking met een zogenaamde Tripartiete Commissie en het Internationale Rode Kruis te hervatten.

Tevens werd een nieuwe ontwapeningscommissie (UNMOVIC) opgericht, die onder leiding staat van de Zweed Hans Blix. De internationale gemeenschap eist dat inspecties in Irak zo spoedig mogelijk hervat worden.

[...]

Betrekkingen met Nederland

Nederland en Irak onderhouden diplomatieke betrekkingen. Irak is in Nederland vertegenwoordigd op het niveau van Tijdelijk Zaakgelastigde. Sinds april 2002 is ook Nederland in Irak vertegenwoordigd op het niveau van Tijdelijk Zaakgelastigde. [...]

Ministerie van Defensie

United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM)

Nederlandse betrokkenheid: 1991-1998

Krijgsmachtdeel: militairen en burgers

Totale aantal betrokken militairen: 14

Achtergrond

De Veiligheidsraad stelde op 3 april 1991 in een resolutie dat Irak zich diende te houden aan internationale verdragen die de productie en het gebruik van nucleaire-, chemische- en biologische wapens verbieden. Tijdens de Operatie Desert Storm was de internationale gemeenschap bevreesd geweest dat Irak deze wapens zou gaan gebruiken. Het toezicht op de naleving werd uitgeoefend door het International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) voor het nucleaire deel. De nieuw opgerichte United Nations Special Commission

(UNSCOM) concentreerde zich vanaf april 1991 op de vernietiging van biologische en chemische wapens. Dit VN-programma is in maart 1994 afgesloten, echter aansluitend daarop is een "provisory ongoing monitoring" van Iraakse chemische installaties door inspectieteams ingesteld. Op 31 oktober 1998 zette Irak alle medewerking stop. Unscm trok zich op 10 november 1998 terug uit Irak. De ondervonden tegenwerking resulteerde eind 1998 in nieuwe luchtaanvallen (Operatie Desert Fox) op de Iraakse militaire infrastructuur.

Nederlandse bijdrage

Nederland leverde in de periode 1991 tot 1998 in totaal veertien militaire- en of burger specialisten op het gebied van Nucleaire Biologische en Chemische (NBC) oorlogvoering, steeds voor een periode van twee tot zeven maanden. Vanuit het Hoofdkwartier van de VN in New York werd door de Nederlanders regelmatig deelgenomen aan inspecties van Iraakse installaties door het Verification en Monitoring Centre in Bagdad.

Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Beantwoording vraag van het lid Van Bommel gesteld tijdens de regeling van 5 februari over de State of the Union

Brief van de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken aan de Tweede Kamer
6 februari 2002 – buza020066

[...] In de reacties op de speech van President Bush wordt vooral verwezen naar de passages over een zgn. "axis of evil" die zou bestaan uit Noord-Korea, Iran en Irak. Voor een zinvolle discussie is het belangrijk dat niet zozeer de retoriek, maar vooral de substantie in het oog wordt gehouden. [...]

Irak heeft tenminste de benodigde kennis voor de ontwikkeling van massavernietigingswapens. Wegens gebrek aan internationale controle bestaat weliswaar geen volledig inzicht in de Iraakse ambities, maar de recente geschiedenis heeft aangetoond dat Irak de inzet van massavernietigingswapens niet heeft geschuwd. Mede in het licht hiervan is het niet aanvaardbaar dat Irak blijft weigeren VN-wapeninspecteurs op het grondgebied toe te laten.

Daarom spant de internationale gemeenschap, w.o. naast de VS ook de Europese Unie en Nederland, zich in om dergelijke vraagstukken in deze, en andere, landen aan te pakken. Daartoe worden in multilateraal en bilateraal verband initiatieven ondernomen.

Die betreffen in eerste instantie het effectieve functioneren van het Non-Proliferatie verdrag en van het systeem van waarborgen die in IAEA-kader zijn ontwikkeld.

Tevens wordt door middel van de specifieke exportcontroleregimes (de zgn. Nuclear Suppliers Group, de Australie-groep, het Wassenaar-arrangement, het Missile Technology Control Regime) zoveel mogelijk voorkomen dat risico-landen de beschikking krijgen over voor massavernietigingswapens benodigde kennis, technologie en materialen. De EU participeert in de Korean Energy Development Organisation (KEDO), waarbij Noord-Korea de beschikking moet krijgen over lichtwaterreactoren, die minder proliferatiegevoelig zijn dan de zwaarwaterreactoren die het wilde gaan gebruiken.

Door politieke druk op landen als Rusland wordt getracht te voorkomen dat Iran en Irak leveranties kunnen ontvangen die kunnen worden gebruikt voor de aanmaak van massavernietigingswapens. Op uitnodiging van Nederland en andere EU-lidstaten zal Iran op 7 en 8 februari a.s. deelnemen aan de eerste onderhandelingsbijeenkomst over de International Gedragscode tegen de proliferatie van Ballistische Raketten (ICOC) in Parijs.

Nederland blijft in VN-verband aandringen op zo spoedig mogelijke toelating door Irak van UNMOVIC; de sancties jegens Irak zijn er, bij gebreke van inspecties, op gericht om te voorkomen dat Irak zijn olie-revenuen zou gebruiken voor de aankoop van militair relevante goederen, inclusief dual use goederen.

In het licht van het bovenstaande is en blijft een kritische houding van de internationale gemeenschap ten opzichte van de drie landen die President Bush in zijn 'State of the Union' noemde, volledig gerechtvaardigd, ook al zijn er tussen de drie wel verschillen aan te geven. Het beleid is en blijft er dan ook op gericht deze landen de mogelijkheid van (verdere) ontwikkeling van massavernietigingswapens en hun overbrengingsmiddelen zoveel mogelijk te ontzeggen. Het belang daarvan kan niet voldoende worden onderstreept.

Voor Nederland is, waar van toepassing via de EU, de VN en andere kanalen, de Verenigde Staten een vanzelfsprekende partner voor het realiseren van dergelijke gezamenlijke doelstellingen. Daarbij roept Nederland de VS op om ook te (blijven) participeren in de multilaterale fora en verdragsmechanismen die daarvoor in het leven zijn geroepen, w.o. het CTBT en een deugdelijk verificatiemechanisme bij het

Biologische Wapenverdrag. Goed functionerende multilaterale arrangementen kunnen een effectieve bescherming bieden tegen gevaren verbonden aan de proliferatie van massavernietigingswapens. [...]

Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Beantwoording Kamervragen leden Hoekema en Koenders over de OPCW en Irak

Brief van de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken aan de Tweede Kamer
6 mei 2002 – nr. 1095

[...] Nederland is voorstander van de universaliteit van het Chemische Wapens Verdrag. Het zou een lidmaatschap van Irak in de OPCW verwelkomen. Dit zou Irak overigens niet ontslaan van de ontwapeningsverplichtingen vastgelegd in VR resolutie 1284, waarin wordt gesteld dat Irak op alle punten aantoonbaar medewerking dient te verlenen aan de uitvoering van het mandaat van UNMOVIC en de IAEA. [...]

Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

23 432 De situatie in het Midden-Oosten

Nr. 56 Brief van de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken

Den Haag, 4 september 2002

Aan de Voorzitter van de Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal,

Onder verwijzing naar het verzoek van de leden Koenders (PvdA) en De Graaf (D66), zoals gedaan tijdens de Regeling van Werkzaamheden op 3 september, bericht ik u als volgt.

Het lijkt weinig twijfel dat Irak beschikt over massavernietigingswapens. De vraag is vooral welke en hoeveel. Bij de wapeninspecties door de VN, die eind 1998 werden afgebroken, bleek Irak te beschikken over een aanzienlijk arsenaal aan massavernietigingswapens (MVW). Bovendien behoort Irak tot de zeer weinige landen die deze wapens ooit werkelijk hebben ingezet, namelijk in de oorlog met Iran en tegen de eigen – Koerdische – bevolking. Er bestaat naar mijn mening geen twijfel dat Irak na het vertrek van de VN wapeninspecteurs (UNSCOM), en ondanks het bestaan van het controleregime voor wat betreft de invoer van «dual use» goederen is doorgegaan met ontwikkeling van met name biologische en chemische wapens. De dreiging die daarvan uitgaat is reëel en wordt, naarmate de tijd verstrijkt, steeds ernstiger.

In de periode na 11 september 2001 is duidelijk geworden dat de internationale gemeenschap zich actiever dient in te zetten om een einde te maken aan de risico's die zijn verbonden aan deze situatie. In de Nederlandse visie, gedeeld door de EU-partners zoals bleek tijdens het jongste Gymnich overleg te Helsingör, dient Irak thans onmiddellijk te voldoen aan de eisen die terzake door de VN Veiligheidsraad zijn gesteld (laatstelijk in resolutie 1284), te weten de «onvoorwaardelijke en onmiddellijke terugkeer van de wapeninspecteurs, die onbelemmerd hun werk moeten kunnen doen». In concreto betekent dit de toelating door Irak van het klaarstaande team van wapeninspecteurs (thans UNMOVIC geheten), onder leiding van de heer Hans Blix. Dat is waar Irak aan moet voldoen en daarover kan geen enkel misverstand bestaan.

Dinsdag 2 september jl. sprak de Secretaris-Generaal van de VN en marge van de top in Johannesburg met de Iraakse vice-premier Tariq Aziz. SG Annan verklaarde na afloop dat hij in dit stadium niet kon zeggen dat Irak een beslissing heeft genomen de VN inspecteurs toe te laten. Hij voegde daaraan toe dat Irak bepaalde garanties verlangt.

De regering acht deze aanhoudende weigering van Irak om de VN-wapeninspecteurs onvoorwaardelijk toe te laten niet aanvaardbaar. Irak beweert weliswaar geen massavernietigingswapens meer in zijn bezit te hebben, maar het is aan Irak om dit te bewijzen, en wel door mee te werken aan het door de internationale gemeenschap opgelegde inspectieregime. Ik acht de op Irak uitgeoefende druk van groot belang om dit land te bewegen tot uitvoering van alle relevante VN-resoluties. Wanneer uiteindelijk die druk, waaronder ik nadrukkelijk ook de Amerikaanse uitspraken met betrekking tot de optie van militaire actie reken, onvoldoende zou blijken, sluit ik niet bij voorbaat uit dat inderdaad militair optreden, met het doel de naleving van de relevante VR-resoluties af te dwingen, aan de orde kan komen. Een dergelijk militair optreden zou, zowel in de regio als daarbuiten, het gewenste politieke draagvlak kunnen verwerven door een nieuwe VR-resolutie terzake. De regering acht een dergelijke resolutie wenselijk.

Tijdens het Gymnich overleg werd door alle partners het belang van consultaties met de VS onderstreept. Het verheugt mij dat de VS zich hiertoe bereid hebben verklaard. Een eerste gelegenheid daartoe voor de EU wordt geboden door de ontmoeting die de ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken van de EU volgende week te New York zullen hebben met hun ambtgenoot Colin Powell en marge van de Algemene Vergadering van de VN. Daarbij zal van Nederlandse zijde ook aandacht worden gevraagd voor de opstelling van de buurlanden van Irak. Mede in dat verband hecht Nederland groot belang aan een actieve Amerikaanse inzet om voortgang te boeken bij een oplossing van het Israelisch-Palestijns conflict. Bovendien zal ik aandacht vragen voor de toekomst van Irak na een eventueel militair optreden en de gevolgen van een en ander voor de verhoudingen binnen de regio.

De Amerikaanse regering heeft gesteld dat de dreiging die uitgaat van het bezit door Irak van MVW kan worden bezworen door een verandering van regime in Bagdad. Over de wijze waarop, en in het bijzonder omtrent de eventuele inzet van militaire middelen, bestaat in Washington thans nog geen vastomlijnd plan.

Vooropgesteld zij dat zeer weinigen in Irak en in de rest van de wereld een verandering van regime in Bagdad zouden betreuren, gezien de uitzonderlijke wreedheid van het regime, de onderdrukking van de bevolking en de ernst en intensiteit van mensenrechtenschendingen. Een verbetering van de situatie in Irak zou tevens kunnen leiden tot een terugkeer van de vele vluchtelingen, waarvan een aanzienlijk deel ook in ons land een toevlucht heeft gevonden.

Naar Nederlands inzicht, dat binnen de EU en in de rest van de wereld breed wordt gedeeld, moet de aandacht vooralsnog gericht blijven op de dreiging die uitgaat van de Iraakse MVW. Indien als uitkomst van het te volgen VN-traject als «ultimum remedium» moet worden overgegaan tot militaire actie, hetgeen – nogmaals – niet bij voorbaat valt uit te sluiten, zou «regime change» daarvan overigens een gevolg kunnen zijn. Inmiddels wordt in kringen van de Iraakse oppositie in ballingschap gesproken over de toekomst van Irak, nadat een verandering van regime zou hebben plaatsgevonden. Dat is een zaak die allereerst de Irakezen zelf aangaat. Berichten als zou de Nederlandse regering al hebben ingestemd met het organiseren van een conferentie door de Iraakse oppositie in Nederland zijn niet juist. Een verzoek terzake – dat overigens niet nodig is – van de zijde van de Iraakse oppositie heeft de regering niet bereikt.

Citaten over beleid VS ten aanzien van Irak

(Landen in alfabetische volgorde, uitspraken per land in omgekeerd chronologische volgorde)

China

Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan: “Using force or threats of force is unhelpful in solving the Iraq issue and will increase regional instability and tensions. Iraq should completely and effectively implement the Security Council resolutions, cooperate with the UN and actively improve relations with its neighbors. The sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Iraq should also be respected.”

(Xinhua News Agency, Use of force unhelpful in solving Iraq issue: Chinese PM, 27 August 2002)

Denemarken

Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen: “It is vitally important to pursue the U.N. track. [...] Here and now, we should concentrate our efforts on ensuring that international weapons inspectors can get free and unhindered access [to Iraq].”

(AP, EU says 'vitally important' for U.S. to deal with Iraq through UN, 4 September 2002)

Duitsland

Kandidaat-Bondskanselier Edmund Stoiber: “The decision and the mission is a matter for the United Nations. This does not tally with the wishes of a country to act alone, without consultation and without the mandate of the international community.”

(Times, Germany at one in opposing Iraq attack, 30 August 2002)

Bondskanselier Gerhard Schröder: “Ich kann nur davor warnen, ohne an die Folgen zu denken und ohne eine politische Konzeption für den gesamten Nahen Osten zu haben, jetzt über Krieg im Irak zu diskutieren und darüber zu reden.”

(Bundesregierung, persmededeling, 3 augustus 2002)

Joschka Fischer, Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken: “To talk now of having to push through a change in government in Baghdad with a military intervention, that’s a false assessment of priorities.”

(CNN, German leaders warn on Iraq attack, 3 augustus 2002)

Egypte

President Hosni Mubarak: “If you strike at the Iraqi people because of one or two individuals and leave the Palestinian issue [unsolved], not a single [Arab] ruler will be able to curb the popular sentiments. We fear a state of disorder and chaos may prevail in the region.”

(The Guardian, Attack on Iraq would create chaos in Middle East, Egypt cautions US, 28 August 2002)

Europese Unie

Buitenlandcoördinator Javier Solana: “Wir glauben, dass es ein großer Fehler wäre, eine solche Militäroperation (gegen Irak) im Alleingang anzugehen. Mit Sicherheit wäre es für den Rest der Welt schlecht, vermutlich aber auch für die USA selbst. Und deswegen sagen wir den Amerikanern in aller Klarheit: Die Vorstellung, man könnte den Mittleren Osten mit militärischen Mitteln neu ordnen, ist schlecht durchdacht. [...] Ein solches Vorgehen [Präventiv-Krieg] wäre mit dem internationalen Recht nicht vereinbar. [...] Es kann sein, dass es notwendig wird, dem Irak mit militärischen Mitteln zu drohen. Aber diese Entscheidung kann nur von der Uno getroffen werden.”

(Berliner Zeitung, Solana warnt USA vor Krieg, 4 September 2002).

Frankrijk

Minister of Foreign Affairs Dominique de Villepin: “Ohne eine Entscheidung des Sicherheitsrats darf es keine militärische Aktion geben.”

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, Villepin, Irak und das Spiel über die Bande, 30 August 2002)

President Jacques Chirac: [The prospect of a U.S. war against Iraq is] “worrying and would be contrary to the respect of law and the authority of the Security Council.[..] The Security Council will have to decide which measures to take.”

(Washington Post, Iraq calls weapons inspections irrelevant, 30 August 2002)

President Jacques Chirac: “I do not want to imagine an attack against Iraq, an attack which – were it to happen – could only be justified if it were decided on by the security council.”

(The Guardian, ‘UN must sanction’ Iraq strike, 31 juli 2002)

India

Bashwant Sinha, Foreign Minister: “In the name of Indian government I call on all the world states, especially Arabs, to announce their solidarity with Iraq and to refuse any military action on it.”

(Iraq News Agency, India supports Iraq, 19 augustus 2002)

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

Press release: “With reference to an article published today in the New York Times, the International Atomic Energy Agency would like to state that it has no new information on Iraq's nuclear programme since December 1998 when its inspectors left Iraq. Only through a resumption of inspections in accordance with

Security Council Resolution 687 and other relevant resolutions can the Agency draw any conclusion with regard to Iraq's compliance with its obligations under the above resolutions relating to its nuclear activities.” (Press release, Iraq and IAEA inspections, 6 September 2002)

Irak

Naji Sabri, Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken: “Het is duidelijk dat Amerika druk heeft uitgeoefend op het hoofd van het inspectieteam, Hans Blix, om de gesprekken [tussen de VN en Irak over hervatting van de wapeninspecties] te dwarsbomen en een gezamenlijke overeenkomst te verhinderen.” (Volkskrant, Bush wil ‘alle middelen’ inzetten tegen Irak, 10 juli 2002)

Israël

Ranaan Gissin, senior advisor of Prime Minister Sharon: “Any postponement of an attack on Iraq at this stage will serve no purpose. It will only give Saddam Hussein more of an opportunity to accelerate his programme of weapons of mass destruction.” (Guardian, Israel puts pressure on US to strike Iraq, 17 augustus 2002)

Jordanië

Koning Abdullah: “In all the years I have seen in the international community, everybody is saying this is a bad idea. If it seems America says we want to hit Baghdad, that’s not what Jordanians think, or the British, the French, the Russians, the Chinese and everybody else. [...] Blair has tremendous concerns about how this would unravel.” (Washington Post, Abdullah: Foreign leaders oppose attack, 1 augustus 2002)

Nederland

Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken: “U hebt via verschillende kanalen kennis kunnen nemen van hetgeen in Helsingör is besproken en welk standpunt de EU heeft ingenomen. U hebt mij niet als dissident gehoord en er mag dus van worden uitgegaan dat de regering dat standpunt onderschrijft. [...] Versta mij niet verkeerd: ik zeg hier niet dat Irak over nucleaire wapens beschikt, maar gebruik dit wel ter adstructie van mijn stelling dat de dreiging die van Saddam Hoessein in Irak uitgaat levensgroot is. En die wordt steeds groter als wij berusten in de huidige situatie en geen grotere druk op Irak uitoefenen om wapeninspecteurs toe te laten. [...] Saddam Hoessein moet op dit onderwerp bewijzen, via de onvoorwaardelijke, vrije, aangekondigde en onaangekondigde toegang van wapeninspecteurs, dat hij niet over massavernietigingswapens beschikt. Laten wij niet in de verkeerde redenering vervallen [...] dat wij zouden moeten bewijzen dat hij massavernietigingswapens heeft. [...] Wat is het antwoord op de dreiging van Saddam Hoessein? Dat loopt langs het spoor van de Veiligheidsraad van de VN. [...] Het gaat om de op basis van de Veiligheidsraadresolutie geëiste terugkeer van de wapeninspecteurs. Daar staan wij hier en nu voor, dat is de boodschap waarmee ik namens de regering volgende week naar New York afreis. [...] Ook wat de regering betreft, wordt het spoor van de Veiligheidsraad niet beëindigd in de onverhoopte situatie dat Saddam Hoessein de inspecteurs niet wil. Ook dan is nog de opvatting van de regering dat wij niet van dat spoor afwijken. Dat is uiteraard ook de boodschap die met de Amerikaanse administratie zal worden besproken. De Nederlandse regering vindt dat de Veiligheidsraad ervoor is om dit soort onderwerpen te bespreken. [...] Als de internationale gemeenschap nu reeds uitspreekt dat, wat er ook gebeurt en wat de houding van de Iraakse president ook zal zijn, er geen verdere stap volgt, dan weet ik één ding zeker. Dan komen de inspecteurs er nooit in. Dat kunnen wij dan vergeten. Desalniettemin spreek ik ook hier [...] de wenselijkheid van een resolutie van de Veiligheidsraad uit. Ik heb het politieke argument gegeven waarom er geen conditio sine qua non is vermeld, waarom er niet ‘noodzakelijk’ staat. Dan zou je je bij voorbaat van het instrument en het argument laten ontnemen om, zo je daartoe zou willen overgaan, een stap verder te zetten. Ook als die verdere stap wordt gezet, zal de volledige inspanning van de Nederlandse regering erop gericht zijn dat dit via de Veiligheidsraad gebeurt. Ik hoop dat het dan lukt, maar ik weet het niet zeker. [...] Je wilt graag een resolutie

van de Veiligheidsraad als dat nodig is. Je kunt je echter niet afhankelijk maken van het veto van één permanent lid. Dat is mijn politieke argument. [...] Er is in dit verband ook de mogelijkheid van een verandering van het regime in Irak genoemd. Zo'n verandering vind ik op zichzelf onvoldoende basis voor het gebruik van militair geweld. [...] Maar de legitimatie voor het optreden van de internationale gemeenschap ligt voor mij nagelvast in de kwestie van de massavernietigingswapens. Daarom vormen de inspecteurs ook de eerste stap, het gaat om het bezit van deze wapens en om de enorme dreiging die ervan uitgaat. Dat is dus de basis, ook voor onze inbreng volgende week in de gesprekken met de Amerikaanse regering. Het gaat om de massavernietigingswapens en daarop zijn overigens ook de resoluties van de Veiligheidsraad gericht, niet op een verandering van regime.”

(Debat over de brief van de minister van Buitenlandse Zaken over Irak, Tweede Kamer, 5 september 2002)

Overig

Hans Blix, chief U.N. arms inspector: “If the Iraqis conclude that an invasion by someone is inevitable then they might conclude that it is not very meaningful to have inspections. If inspectors are allowed in and if they are given really unfettered access with no delays...then I think this might play an important role and we would be eager to do that and to help toward a non-belligerent solution.”

(New York Times, Invasion talk won't get inspectors into Iraq – Blix, 18 augustus 2002)

Iran en Bahrein: “Iran and Bahrain declare their determined opposition to any unilateral military action against Iraq.”

(New York Times, Bahrain opposes U.S. attack on Iraq, 18 augustus 2002)

Gen. Wesley Clark, U.S.A. (Ret.), Supreme Allied Commander Europe 1997-2000: “In the twilight of World War II we recognized the need for allies. We understood the need to prevent conflict, not just fight it, and we affirmed the idea that we must banish from the world what President Harry Truman, addressing the founding of the United Nations, called "the fundamental philosophy of our enemies, namely, that 'might makes right.'" Truman went on to say that we must "prove by our acts that right makes might." Since September 11, America has been in a similar position: the most powerful nation in the world, but facing a deadly enemy. The United States has the opportunity to use the power of the international institutions it established to triumph over terrorists who threaten not just the United States, but the world. What a tragedy it will be if we walk away from our own efforts, and from 60 years of post-World War II experience, to tackle the problem of terror without using fully the instruments of international law and persuasion that we ourselves created.”

(Washington Monthly, An army of one?, 16 augustus 2002)

Wereldraad van Kerken: “At this particular moment in history, US churches are called to speak out against the threat of a military attack by their government against Iraq.”

(Wereldraad van Kerken, Statement, 12 augustus 2002)

General Sir Michael Rose, former head of SAS and of UN forces in Bosnia: “There are huge political and military risks associated with launching largescale ground forces into Iraq.”

(Evening Standard, The madness of going to war with Iraq, 29 juli 2002)

Colonel Richard Dunn III (retired), former US Army strategist: “I'd argue that containment is certainly a better approach than either marching on Baghdad or destabilizing the Iraqi government by killing Saddam.”

(Washington Post, Some top military brass favor status quo in Iraq, 27 juli 2002)

Jim Cornette, former US Air Force biological warfare expert: “We've bottled him [Saddam] up for 11 years, so we're doing okay. I don't know the reason the administration is so focused on Iraq. I'm very puzzled by it.”

(Washington Post, Some top military brass favor status quo in Iraq, 27 juli 2002)

Hans von Sponeck, former UN humanitarian aid coordinator for Iraq from 1998-2000: “Europe is increasingly uncomfortable with this unilateral insistence on solving the Iraqi conflict militarily. In varying degrees the same applies to countries in the Middle East. [...] An entire region is being destabilised to suit American preferences for political change in Iraq. Concurrently, a systematic dis- and mis-information

campaign, one of the biggest ever undertaken by the US authorities, is intensifying. The US and the international public are being sedated daily with increasing doses of propaganda about the threat Iraq poses to the world in 2002. [...] A war on Iraq justified by conjecture is politically foolish and morally repugnant. In the words of the Archbishop of Wales, Dr Rowan Williams: "It is deplorable that the world's most powerful nations continue to regard war, and the threat of war, as an acceptable instrument of foreign policy."

The US Department of Defence and the CIA know perfectly well that today's Iraq poses no threat to anyone in the region, let alone in the United States. To argue otherwise is dishonest. [...] One does not need to be a specialist in weapons of mass destruction to conclude that these sites had been rendered harmless and have remained in this condition. The truly worrying fact is that the US Department of Defence has all of this information. Why then, one must ask, does the Bush administration want to include Iraq in its fight against terrorism? Is it really too far-fetched to suggest that the US government does not want UN arms inspectors back in Iraq? Do they fear that this would lead to a political drama of the first order since the inspectors would confirm what individuals such as Scott Ritter have argued for some time, that Iraq no longer possesses any capacity to produce weapons of mass destruction? This indeed would be the final blow to the "war against Iraq" policy of the Bush administration, a policy that no one else wants. The Iraqis would be well advised to seize this opportunity and open their doors without delay to time-limited arms inspectors, thereby confirming that they indeed have nothing to hide.

This would make a US war against Iraq next to impossible and start the long journey towards the country's return to normality."

(The Guardian, Go on, call Bush's bluff, 22 juli 2002)

Pakistan

President Pervez Musharraf: "We have got too much on our hands here in this region to get involved in anything else [an attack on Iraq], especially when one is very conscious that this shall have very negative repercussions in the Islamic world."

(Washington Times, Musharraf warns of turmoil, 30 August 2002)

Rusland

Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken Ivanov: "Elk besluit om geweld te gebruiken tegen Irak bemoeilijkt niet alleen het bereiken van een akkoord over Irak, ook de situatie in de Golf en het Midden-Oosten wordt er door ondermijnd."

(Eindhovens Dagblad, Rusland waarschuwt VS voor aanval op Irak, 3 September 2002)

Russisch Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken: "Moscow believes that the Iraqi proposal [invitation to Hans Blix for talks in Baghdad] is an important step towards solving this problem by political and diplomatic means in accordance with the UN security council's resolutions."

(The Guardian, Serious offer or just an attempt to buy time?, 3 augustus 2002)

Spanje

Ana Palacio, Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken: "In Europe, we all understand that the world would be a better place without Saddam Hussein. We are willing to go as far as the U.N. asks us," Palacio told Washington Post reporters and editors. "Nevertheless, we are very much concerned by the day after. You oust Saddam Hussein, then what?"

(Washington Post, Spain's Foreign Minister seeks details of Iraq plan, 13 augustus 2002)

Turkije

Premier Bulent Ecevit: "... trying to convince the US administration to give up the operation. We can make a concrete distribution towards peace in Iraq alongside the United States without a military operation."

(The Guardian, Turkey deals a blow to action against Saddam, 1 augustus 2002)

Verenigd Koninkrijk

Prime Minister Tony Blair: “The point that I would emphasize to you is that the threat from Saddam Hussein and weapons of mass destruction, chemical, biological, potentially nuclear weapons capability, that threat is real. We only need to look at the report from the International Atomic Agency this morning showing what has been going on at the former nuclear weapons sites to realize that. And the policy of inaction is not a policy we can responsibly subscribe to. So the purpose of our discussion today is to work out the right strategy for dealing with this, because deal with it we must. [...] As I said to you I think at the press conference we gave earlier in the week, this is an issue for the whole of the international community. But the U.N. has got to be the way of dealing with this issue, not the way of avoiding dealing with it. Now, of course, as we showed before in relation to Afghanistan, we want the broadest possible international support, but it's got to be on the basis of actually making sure that the threat that we've outlined is properly adhered to.”

(US Department of State, Transcript: Bush, Blair say international community must act on Iraq, 7 september 2002)

Alice Mahon MP, Harold Best MP, Mick Clapham MP, Sue Doughty MP: “Like King Abdullah of Jordan, we think that an attack on Iraq by the United States would be a mistake. [...] There is broad agreement internationally that if George Bush pressed ahead with a military adventure against Iraq, he would generate even more problems for the populations of the region. The most likely impact would be to provide succour for the very terrorist forces that the Bush administration purports to wage war on. We therefore welcome Iraq's invitation to Hans Blix, the United Nations chief weapons inspector, to visit Baghdad to get weapons monitoring back on track as soon as possible. This crisis requires a political and diplomatic solution. The war on terrorism must not be allowed to become the pretext for US military escalation.”

(Ingezonden brief, The Guardian, 5 augustus 2002)

Menzies Campbell, Liberal Democrat's foreign affairs spokesman: “In international affairs it is not enough to claim a moral authority in cases where the United Nations has been involved. There will be no world order if the most powerful states are entitled to remove other governments at will. There is no doctrine of international law which justifies regime change.”

(Guardian, Bush aide cites case for Saddam's removal, 15 augustus 2002)

Gerald Kaufman MP: “Today, there is substantial resistance in the parliamentary Labour party against war on Iraq, not just from the usual suspects, the Tam Dalyells and the Alan Simpsons, but from many mainstream MPs. Tony Blair would find it difficult to support and participate in a war against Iraq whose majority in the House of Commons was provided by the Conservatives. [...] Bush, himself the most intellectually backward American president of my political lifetime, is surrounded by advisers whose bellicosity is exceeded only by their political, military and diplomatic illiteracy. Pity the man who relies on Rumsfeld, Cheney and Rice for counsel.”

(The Spectator, Why I oppose an attack on Iraq, 17 augustus 2002)

Verenigde Staten

Senator Russel D. Feingold (Democrat of Wisconsin): “The Constitution says that Congress has the sole power to declare war. [Not getting congressional approval] is an affront to Congress and to the American people

(Philadelphia Inquirer, Top Democrats say Congress must OK war, 30 August 2002)

Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton: “Well, the policy of the Bush administration is that for the good of the people of Iraq and in the interest of peace and stability in the region, that there should be a change of regime in Baghdad. [...] it's, I think, a very prudent and logical conclusion that he needs to be replaced, and the people of Iraq need to be given the chance to have a representative government elected. Now, how regime change is accomplished is a subject that's still open for decision. So there is no decision on the use of military force, and indeed a number of possibilities are being considered. We think what's important now is for people around the world to appreciate and understand the danger that Saddam Hussein's regime poses. And that's one reason why we're engaged in consultations here in Japan and elsewhere.

(Question: A recent Pentagon report did not rule out the possibility of nuclear attack. Is it possible that nuclear weapons will be used against Iraq?)

Well, again, since there's no decision on the use of military force, there's no decision on exactly how it would be carried out. But I think the important message for Saddam to learn is that he would be very poorly advised to even consider using any of his weapons of mass destruction against the United States or its friends or allies. We gave him that message during the Persian Gulf Crisis of 1990-91. It's important that he understand that message again, because the use of weapons of mass destruction can only have terrible consequences for everybody involved."

(US Embassy Tokyo Press Office, Interview with Fuji-TV, Tokyo, 27 August 2002)

Vice-President Dick Cheney: "There is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction; there is no doubt that he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us. [Even if U.N. inspectors were allowed to return to Iraq, their presence] "would provide no assurance whatsoever of his compliance with U.N. resolutions. On the contrary, there is a great danger that it would provide false comfort that Saddam was somehow back in his box. Meanwhile, he would continue to plot."

(Wendy S. Ross, Cheney warns of dangers of Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq, 26 August 2002)

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld: "[M]y impression is that the Russian administration is fairly pragmatic at this stage, and their interest in the United States is greater than their interest in Iraq. And I suspect that the current leadership in Russia's interest in continuing to kind of point that country towards the West, towards Western Europe, towards North America, is a -- somewhat stronger than their old relationship with Iraq. And I therefore think it would not have an adverse effect on our relationship."

(David Denny, Rumsfeld says attack on Iraq would not harm U.S.-Russia relations, 21 August 2002)

Richard Perle, Pentagon adviser: "Our European allies are just not relevant to this [attack on Iraq]. And the one of some importance, the United Kingdom, is, I believe, going to be with us. The rest of the Europeans prefer to look the other way or cut deals with Saddam or buy him off in various ways."

(New York Times, Europeans not needed for Iraq attack – U.S. adviser, 18 August 2002)

Condoleezza Rice, National Security Adviser: "This is an evil man who, left to his own devices, will wreak havoc again on his own population, his neighbours and, if he gets weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them, all of us, is a very powerful moral case for regime change. We certainly do not have the luxury of doing nothing. Clearly, if Saddam Hussein is left in power doing the things that he is doing now, this is a threat that will emerge, and emerge in a very big way. This is a regime that we know has twice tried and come closer than we thought at the time to acquiring nuclear weapons. He has used chemical weapons against his own people and against his neighbors, he has invaded his neighbors, he has killed thousands of his own people. He shoots at our planes, our airplanes, in the no-fly zones where we are trying to enforce U.N. security resolutions."

(Washington Post, Rice lays out case for war in Iraq, 16 August 2002)

General Brent Scowcroft (Ret.), chairman of the president's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board: "Israel would have to expect to be the first casualty, as in 1991 when Saddam sought to bring Israel into the Gulf conflict. This time, using weapons of mass destruction, he might succeed, provoking Israel to respond, perhaps with nuclear weapons, unleashing an Armageddon in the Middle East. [...] Possibly the most dire consequences would be the effect in the region. The shared view in the region is that Iraq is principally an obsession of the U.S. The obsession of the region, however, is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. If we were seen to be turning our backs on that bitter conflict--which the region, rightly or wrongly, perceives to be clearly within our power to resolve--in order to go after Iraq, there would be an explosion of outrage against us. We would be seen as ignoring a key interest of the Muslim world in order to satisfy what is seen to be a narrow American interest."

(Wall Street Journal, Don't attack Saddam, 15 August 2002)

Senator Carl Levin (Democrat of Michigan): "If he [Saddam Hussein] initiated their [weapons of mass destruction] use, it would lead to his own destruction. If he loves himself more than he hates us and hates Israel, then he would probably not initiate their use. But there is no doubt that if we attacked him, he would use every weapon of mass destruction he has."

(CNN, Senator: Iraq would fight back, not start war, 3 August 2002)

Colin Powell, Secretary of State: “The Iraqis have constantly tried to find a way around their obligations with respect to the inspections. They have met several times now with Secretary General Kofi Annan and with Hans Blix. They understand what is required of them. There is no need for further clarification or discussion of a comprehensive approach. The approach is clear and spelled out in appropriate U.N. Security Council resolutions. Inspections aren’t the issue; disarmament is the issue. [...] The President [Bush] has previously said that he supported inspections, but we have to understand clearly that the goal is not inspection for inspection’s sake. The goal has to be disarmament and removal of all capacity for weapons of mass destruction. Having said all of that within U.N. context, the United States continues to believe that regime change will be in the best interests of the Iraqi people, people of the region and the world.”
(US Department of State, Press Briefing, Manila, Philippines, 3 augustus 2002)

Senator Diana Feinstein (Democrat of California): “Thus far, the administration has submitted no evidence of any Iraqi connection to 9/11 to this Congress, and the resolution authorizing the use of force against al-Qaida is specifically worded so that hard evidence of such a connection is needed to justify military action. Conclusive proof that Saddam Hussein is, indeed, harboring weapons of mass destruction, that he is providing shelter for al-Qaida terrorist cells, or that he is in any way linked to the attacks of September 11 would quickly galvanize support for military action. As of now, however, no such evidence has been substantiated. At this time, moreover, I know of no formal support for a full-scale military action from any other nation. I know of no formal grant to fly over or landing rights which would be granted by any nation in connection with any invasion plan. As far as I know at this point, the United States would be alone, unilaterally taking action. To take action without support from our allies or the United Nations would clearly identify the United States as an aggressor and may well prompt a series of potentially catastrophic actions.

[...] Before rushing precipitously forward in an attack on Iraq, I urge the Bush administration to work with allies and the United Nations to develop a multilateral approach to compel Iraq to live up to its obligations under Security Council Resolution 687. Should Iraq be unwilling to live up to its obligations and the President determines that there is just cause for military action against Iraq, I urge him to come before this Congress, to come before the American people, to make his case and let us in turn discharge our constitutional duty to debate and vote on the authorization of the use of force.”
(US Department of State, Senators Feinstein, Leahy submit resolution on using force against Iraq, 1 augustus 2002)

Senator Chuck Hagel (Republican of Nebraska): “You can’t just drop the 82nd Airborne into Baghdad and it will all be over. [...] Would we further destabilize the entire Middle East if we took military action against him [Saddam Hussein]? Who would be our allies? And what kind of support would there be inside Iraq? These kinds of questions are critical. You could inflame the whole Middle East plus Iran.”
(Washington Post, Citing qualms, lawmakers seek details on Iraq, 31 juli 2002)

Senator Christopher J. Dodd (Democrat of Connecticut): “Unease is a fair description of the feeling on Capitol Hill. There’s a sense we’re going to do something relatively soon, but there’s also a sense that no one’s thought about much more than that.”
(Washington Post, Citing qualms, lawmakers seek details on Iraq, 31 juli 2002)

Senator Bob Graham (Democrat of Florida), chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence: “The central reality is uncertainty, and the defectors’ stories only reinforce that. None of the people we met claimed to have conclusive knowledge of the status of Iraq’s weapons program.”
(Washington Post, In assessing Iraq’s arsenal, the ‘reality is uncertainty’, 31 juli 2002)

Al Gore, voormalig vice-president: “I certainly question why we would be publicly blustering and announcing an invasion a year or two years in advance. [...] I do think the situation our country faces now is fundamentally different than what we faced on the eve of the Gulf War. If the rest of the world does not see what it regards as a sufficient provocation to justify an invasion by the United States, then the diplomatic cost would be extremely high.”
(San Francisco Chronicle, Gore questions timing, international support for an Iraq invasion, 26 juli 2002)

Yemen

President Ali Abdullah Saleh: “Yemen is maintaining the Arab stance that rejects striking (Iraq) because it is unjustifiable, especially after Iraq has declared its willingness to start dialogue on (weapons) inspection.”

(New York Times, Bahrain opposes U.S. attack on Iraq, 18 augustus 2002)

Zuid-Afrika

Former President Nelson Mandela: “The United States has made serious mistakes in the conduct of its foreign affairs, which have had unfortunate repercussions long after the decisions were taken. [...] If you look at those matters, you will come to the conclusion that the attitude of the United States of America is a threat to world peace. Because what [America] is saying is that if you are afraid of a veto in the Security Council, you can go outside and take action and violate the sovereignty of other countries. That is the message they are sending to the world. That must be condemned in the strongest terms. And you will notice that France, Germany Russia, China are against this decision. It is clearly a decision that is motivated by George W. Bush’s desire to please the arms and oil industries in the United States of America. [...] Neither Bush nor [British Prime Minister] Tony Blair has provided any evidence that such weapons [of mass destruction] exist [in Iraq]. But what we know is that Israel has weapons of mass destruction. Nobody talks about that. Why should there be one standard for one country, especially because it is black, and another one for another country, Israel, that is white. [...] There is one compromise and one only, and that is the United Nations. If the United States and Britain go to the United Nations and the United Nations says we have concrete evidence of the existence of these weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and we feel that we must do something about it, we would all support it.

(Newsweek, Nelson Mandela: The United States of America is a threat to world peace, 10 September 2002)

Former President Nelson Mandela: “What they [United States] are introducing is chaos in international affairs and we condemn that in the strongest terms. [...] We are really appalled by any country whether it is a superpower or a poor country that goes outside the United Nations and attacks independent countries. [...] I think it is his advisers that are misleading (Bush). The United States must be exemplary in everything that they do. [...] No one must be allowed to take the law into their own hands. [...] The message they are sending is that if you are afraid of a veto in the Security Council then you can do what you want.”

(The Johannesburg Star, Mandela ‘appaled’ by US policy on Iraq, 2 september 2002)

KRONIEK

September

3	Brussel	EU Working Party on Global Disarmament and Arms Control
4	Brussel	EU Working Party on Non-Proliferation
10	Brussel	EU Working Party on Transatlantic Relations
12-20	New York	Algemene Vergadering Verenigde Naties - Algemeen Debat
16-20	Wenen	Algemene Conferentie IAEA
16-20	Geneve	Vierde bijeenkomst van Staten partij bij de Ottawa Conventie
17	Den Haag	Prinsjesdag
17	Den Haag	Manifestatie Platform 'Keer het tij'
17	Brussel	EU Working Party on Transatlantic Relations
22	Duitsland	Parlementsverkiezingen
23-29	Brussel	Europese Raad
24-25	Warschau	
30 – 4 okt	Wenen	CTBT Werkgroep A
30 – 1 nov	New York	Algemene Vergadering Verenigde Naties – First Committee

Oktober

4-5	Brussel	Informeel bijeenkomst EU Ministers van Defensie
5	Kleine Brogel	Bomspotting – burgerinspectie naar Amerikaanse kernwapens
6	Lakenheath	Aktie tegen Amerikaanse kernwapens
7-11	Den Haag	Conferentie van Staten partij bij het Chemische Wapensverdrag
18-28	Den Haag	Herfstreces Tweede Kamer
24-25	Brussel	Buitengewone bijeenkomst van de Europese Raad

November

5	USA	Wetgevende verkiezingen
7-10	Florence	European Social Forum
11-15	Wenen	CTBT PrepCom
11-22	Geneve	5 ^{de} Review Conference van de Biologische Wapensconventie
15-19	Istanboel	NAVO Parlementaire Assemblee
21-22	Praag	NAVO Summit

December

2-5	Parijs	WEU Assemblee
10-12	Den Haag	Behandeling begrotingen Buitenlandse Zaken en Defensie in Tweede Kamer
10-13	Den Haag	31 ^e reguliere sessie van de Uitvoerende Raad van de OPCW
12-13	Kopenhagen	Eurotop
20-20 jan	Den Haag	Kerstreces Tweede Kamer

FACTS AND REPORTS

Eerder verschenen in de reeks PENN – NL Facts and Reports:

1. US unilateralism – official foreign comments
Citaten van internationale politici en diplomaten over het Amerikaans unilateralisme.
(januari 2002)
2. Veiligheidsvraagstukken en de verkiezingen – standpunten van de politieke partijen
Relevante delen van de partijprogramma's van de Nederlandse politieke partijen, plus citaten van politici op het terrein van oorlog en vrede.
(februari 2002)
3. Transatlantic relations – recent developments
Overzicht van recente ontwikkelingen in de transatlantische betrekkingen, met name binnen de NAVO, mede naar aanleiding van uitspraken in de State of the Union.
(maart 2002)
4. Ontwikkelingen betreffende kernwapens en de Nederlandse politiek – briefing paper
Periodiek overzicht van ontwikkelingen rond kernwapens in de internationale en nationale politiek, met uitgebreide hoeveelheid bijlagen.
(maart 2002)
5. Nucleaire vraagstukken – standpunten van de Nederlandse regering en de Tweede Kamer
Overzicht april 2001 – april 2002
(april 2002)
6. Crisis in de OPCW – de verwijdering van directeur-generaal Bustani
Documenten en artikelen over het ontslag van directeur-generaal Bustani van het OPCW
(mei 2002)
7. Prepcom van het NPV – nucleaire ontwapening stopt
Verklaringen en rapporten van staten en ngo's tijdens de Prepcom van het NPV
(juni 2002)
8. Verdrag van Moskou – détente tussen Rusland en Verenigde Staten
Informatie over het Verdrag van Moskou, ontwikkelingen daaromheen en commentaar erop
(juni 2002)
9. Joint Strike Fighter – achtergrondberichten
De belangrijkste achtergrondberichten over de vervanging van de F16 uit de Nederlandse pers.
(mei 2002)
10. Konfrontatie in Zuid-Azië – de kernwapenwedloop tussen India en Pakistan
Basisgegevens over de nucleaire strijdkrachten en doctrines van India en Pakistan, Nederlandse wapenexport en wapenexportbeleid en een oproep om een nucleair treffen te voorkomen
(juni 2002)
11. Massavernietigingswapens in het Midden-Oosten (1) – Egypte, Israël, Syrië
Basisinformatie over de proliferatie van nucleaire, biologische en chemische wapens in Egypte, Israël en Syrië en verklaringen van de Nederlandse regering hierover
(juli 2002)
12. Amerikaans unilateralisme II – officiële reacties
Citaten van internationale politici, diplomaten en NGO's over het Amerikaans unilateralisme.

Deze uitgaven zijn te bestellen door € 5,- per exemplaar (incl. verzendkosten) over te maken op rekening nummer 7549774 van Stichting AMOK inz Werkgroep Eurobom te Utrecht o/vv F&R 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 of 11.