

AANVAL OP IRAK (2)

Recente ontwikkelingen

PENN – NL Facts and Reports Nr. 13

September 2002

Werkgroep Eurobom

PENN-Nederland

AANVAL OP IRAK (2)


Oktober 2002

PENN, het Project voor Europese Nucleaire Non-proliferatie, is opgezet om:

- * officiële discussies over de toekomst van kernwapens in Europa nauwgezet te volgen en deze te verhelderen;
- * analyses van en commentaren op deze ontwikkelingen te publiceren;
- * verdere maatregelen voor kernontwapening in Europa en substantiële Europese bijdragen aan kernwapenbeheersing, ontwapening en non-proliferatie te stimuleren;
- * te ijveren voor de volledige naleving van het Non-Proliferatieverdrag door de NAVO, de Europese Unie, en haar leden;
- * politieke belemmeringen op te werpen tegen ontwikkelingen die zouden kunnen leiden tot een Europese Unie met kernwapens;
- * te bevorderen dat de Europese Unie en al haar leden uiteindelijk niet-nucleaire leden van het NPV worden.

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Deze publikatie is mogelijk gemaakt door de
W. Alton Jones Foundation



Werkgroep Eurobom

PENN/Netherlands MPI/Netherlands

FACTS AND REPORTS

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INLEIDING

De ontwikkelingen rondom Irak volgen elkaar op in een bijzonder hoog tempo. Om die reden leek het ons van belang om een nieuw nummer van Facts & Reports uit te brengen, waarin de belangrijkste gebeurtenissen en documenten worden gebundeld. Van groot belang zijn vanzelfsprekend de extra VN resoluties die door de Britse en Amerikaanse regeringen worden geëist, en de totstandkoming van de resolutie in het Amerikaans congres waarin de president de goedkeuring krijgt voor militair optreden die hij, politiek gezien, beschouwt als noodzakelijk. De stand van zaken mbt de VN resolutie wordt in een aantal kranteartikelen uit de doeken gedaan, evenals die in het Amerikaanse Congres. Daarnaast komt het inspectieproces zelf aan de orde: wat houdt het in, wat zijn de beperkingen van de procedures waarmee naar massavernietigingswapens wordt gezocht? In de vorige F&R werd de stand van zaken mbt massavernietigingswapens opgesomd. In deze F&R wordt de nieuwste informatie hierover afgedrukt, met name het Britse regeringsrapport en de kritiek erop, die al snel deel uitmaakte van het debat.

Verder wordt ook de vraag naar de oorsprong van die geavanceerde wapentechnologie in Irak gesteld. De Iraakse regering kreeg tijdens de eerste Golfoorlog (1980-1988) en daarna volop steun van westerse landen, inclusief Nederland, om massavernietigingswapens te ontwikkelen. Dit wordt deels uit de doeken gedaan in de artikelen en rapporten die in de bijlage opgenomen zijn. Vooral interessant zijn de twee Congres rapporten over de Amerikaans steun aan Irak, destijds bezegeld met een bezoek aan Bagdad door Donald Rumsfeld, toen speciale afgevaardigde van de regering Reagan voor het Midden Oosten (en tegenwoordig minister van defensie).

Dit document is ook te vinden op ons website: www.eurobomb.nl

Redactie F&R

CONGRES-RESOLUTIE

CNN

Congress mixed on Iraq resolution

Last line could lead to 'World War III,' critic says

From Dana Bash and Ted Barrett - CNN Washington Bureau
20 September 2002

WASHINGTON (CNN) --A White House draft of a congressional resolution authorizing the use of military force against Iraq was met with a decidedly mixed reaction on Capitol Hill, as many rank-and-file Democrats questioned its scope and what they see as a lack of emphasis on international cooperation.

But both Senate Democratic Leader Tom Daschle and House Democratic Leader Dick Gephardt said they will work to build bipartisan support for a resolution and many members predicted one will pass in the next few weeks by a wide margin. "I share the administration's goals in dealing with Iraq and its weapons of mass destruction," said Gephardt, who called the draft "an important first step."

Testifying before the House International Relations Committee, Secretary of State Colin Powell urged legislators to approve the resolution authorizing force, saying not doing so would "undercut my efforts."

"A lukewarm, weak, eviscerated resolution coming out of the Congress would not serve my diplomatic purposes," Powell said.

Daschle, who met for more than two hours behind closed doors with his Democratic caucus, called the resolution "something we can work on" but said "we have a long way to go in working on the draft." "Our expectation is that we can do it together, our hope is that we can do it together, Republicans and Democrats, we have questions, we have some issues that we want to raise with the administration about the resolution and the wording, but that is to be expected," said Daschle.

Other Democrats coming out the meeting said there was a lot of concern that the language was too broad, particularly the last line of the draft resolution, which says that "force" should be used against "the threat posed by Iraq, and restore international peace and security in the region." That line, say some members of Congress, is too vague and could allow the president to use force in other Mideast nations beyond Iraq.

"We are interested in keeping the focus on Iraq, not on other countries in the region that may also pose a threat or a concern to the United States, and I think that is one of the issues we want to raise with the administration as we continue our discussions," said Daschle.

"That is probably a bit ambitious," said Sen. Evan Bayh, D-Indiana, who is generally supportive of using U.S. military force against Saddam Hussein. "Would this authorize an invasion of Iran? Or how about Syria? They're in the region. I think we ought to stay focused here, and that is staying focused on Iraq," he said.

Also, some key Democrats maintain Congress should vote to support Bush's efforts to push the United Nations toward a multi-lateral approach before authorizing U.S. military action.

"I think clearly there's been movement that we wanted [at the U.N.]," said Sen. Richard Durbin, D-Illinois. "Now the president sends to Congress this challenge, which basically says, ignore the United Nations, the United States is going to do this alone. I think it's the wrong way to go." Durbin said he was "disappointed" with the draft resolution.

Sen. Carl Levin, D-Michigan, who chairs the Armed Services Committee, said: "I'd like the focus of the resolution to be on urging the U.N. to take action, setting a deadline, an ultimatum to have the very strong inspections, to force inspections and to authorize member nations to use military force to implement that resolution calling for the very strong inspections and disarmament."

And Sen. Dianne Feinstein, D-California, said, "The United Nations should be given an opportunity to compel adherence to the 16 or so resolutions in the past which Iraq has effectively not complied with ... maybe some language could be added."

The second-ranking Democrat in the House, Rep. Nancy Pelosi of California, said she would not support the resolution in its current form -- in part because of its unilateral approach, she said -- but will keep her mind open if Congress makes changes to the draft language.

But many lawmakers -- mostly Republicans -- point out the United Nations already has passed many resolutions in an attempt to force Hussein to let weapons inspectors back into Iraq and stop his buildup of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons.

The proposed congressional resolution authorizing force refers to both those U.N. resolutions as well as past congressional votes.

"How many times do we have to do this?" said Sen. Minority Leader Trent Lott, R-Mississippi. "Haven't we been through this, not only the United Nations but in the Senate? So I mean it is time to quit waffling and weaseling around. The United Nations is going to have to get reaction to their resolutions and they are going to have to get compliance or we are going to have to back up our very strong words."

Daschle said regardless of whether there is agreement or not, the Senate will take up a resolution as soon as the week of October 1.

The Senate majority leader acknowledged that unlike the resolution authorizing force in response to terrorist attacks last fall, he does not "expect unanimity as there was after 9/11."

Feingold: Resolution an 'affront to the Constitution'

Despite Democratic leaders' desire to get maximum bipartisan support for the resolution, some in their party dismissed outright what the White House sent to Congress.

Sen. Russ Feingold, D-Wisconsin, called it a "non-starter" and an "affront to the Constitution."

"This proposal is a case of the administration telling Congress to stop asking questions and literally 'leaves it all to us.' To endorse such language would be irresponsible," said Feingold.

The language could lead to a "miniature Armageddon" or "potential World War III," said Democratic Rep. Alcee Hastings, who said he will write an alternative resolution with fellow liberal Rep. Barney Frank, D-Massachusetts, that would place more pre-conditions on Bush before he could use force in Iraq. "Nothing in our intelligence suggests that Iraq is ready to attack Washington or Fort Lauderdale," Hastings, of Florida, said.

Rep. Jim McDermott, a Washington Democrat, agreed. "There is no question that Saddam Hussein is not a nice person or that he's broken the resolutions of the United Nations, but that does not give us the power to pre-emptively strike a country," he said. "Once you start down that road, where do you stop?"

One Democratic congressional source said the president may have gained some support by leaving out an explicit call for a "regime change" in Iraq. Others, however, say the language is too vague in that regard.

"I have no hesitation to use force. I believe the threat is real," said Sen. Mary Landrieu, D-Louisiana. "The president should have maximum flexibility ... but I do think our objectives need to be very clear.

"It may be too vague. It needs to say regime change and for the promotion of some semblance of democratic government."

Washington Post

Gore Gives Warning On Iraq

War Could Hurt Effort Against Terror, He Says

By Dan Balz - Tuesday, September 24, 2002; Page A01

Former vice president Al Gore sharply challenged President Bush on Iraq yesterday, warning that the administration's apparent determination to launch military action to dislodge Saddam Hussein will "severely damage" the overall war on terrorism and "weaken" U.S. leadership in the world.

In one of the most forceful critiques to date by any leading Democrat, Gore challenged the administration's new doctrine of preemption, gave voice to critics who question the political timing of the administration's push for quick action in Congress and the United Nations. Gore also said Bush has set his sights on getting rid of Hussein because the hunt for Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda terrorists has bogged down.

Gore said Bush's concentration on Iraq has squandered the worldwide support engendered by the attacks of last Sept. 11 and turned the United States into a focus of "anger and apprehension" around the world.

"By shifting from his early focus after September 11 on war against terrorism to war against Iraq, the president has manifestly disposed of the sympathy, goodwill and solidarity compiled by America and transformed it into a sense of deep misgiving and even hostility," he said.

Gore's speech, the text of which was made available in Washington, came as work continued in Congress and at the U.N. on resolutions that would authorize Bush to use force to remove Hussein from power in Iraq. White House officials were negotiating with Democrats and Republicans over the language of the resolution, which Gore called far too broad. Debate could begin next week.

Bush, on a campaign trip to New Jersey, renewed his call for quick action at the United Nations on a tough resolution aimed at disarming Hussein, saying this case will show whether the U.N. is still relevant. But former president Jimmy Carter said he is "deeply concerned" about administration policy, calling it "a radical

departure" from 50 years of tradition by Republican and Democratic presidents. Carter said the shift represented "a great danger to our country."

Gore's remarks, delivered before the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco, put him at odds with many of the other possible 2004 Democratic presidential candidates, who have been generally to strongly supportive of Bush on Iraq. Until yesterday, only Sen. John F. Kerry (D-Mass.) and Vermont Gov. Howard Dean have offered notable dissent, although Kerry has left open the possibility of voting for the resolution in Congress.

Gore was silent on Iraq as the debate over Bush's policy heated up at the United Nations and in Congress, although he has been hawkish on the subject of Hussein. In 1991, Gore was among the few Democrats in the Senate to vote for a resolution authorizing President George H.W. Bush to go to war against Iraq. In a speech in February, he contended that the war on terrorism would not be completed without a "final reckoning" with Hussein.

Yesterday, he made clear that he believes Bush is rushing too rapidly to confront Hussein and argued that, without broad international support, Bush's policy could have disastrous consequences for the United States and the world.

"I am deeply concerned that the policy we are presently following with respect to Iraq has the potential to seriously damage our ability to win the war against terrorism and to weaken our ability to lead the world in this new century," Gore said, according to the text.

Gore chided the administration for its failure to stay the course in Afghanistan and stay in the hunt for the terrorists responsible for the Sept. 11 attacks. "I do not believe that we should allow ourselves to be distracted from this urgent task simply because it is proving to be more difficult and lengthy than predicted," he said. "Great nations persevere and then prevail. They do not jump from one unfinished task to another."

Hussein, Gore's text stated, "does pose a serious threat" to stability in the Persian Gulf, and he acknowledged that there is no international law that prevents the United States from acting, even unilaterally, if there is a choice "between law and survival." But he added, "Such a choice is not presented."

Gore spokesman Jano Cabrera said Gore would support unilateral action if there were an imminent threat against the United States by Hussein's possession of weapons of mass destruction, but said the former vice president believes an "imminent threat has not been pointed out by this administration."

Republican National Committee spokesman Jim Dyke brushed aside Gore's critique as politically motivated. "The whole speech was a contradiction within a contradiction and really highlights the fact that this is a guy who can't recognize leadership," Dyke said. "To me, he sounded more like a political hack than a presidential candidate."

Gore questioned whether the administration has either a plan or the stamina to stay in Iraq long enough after a war to assure stability, and warned that it could come to resemble the situation today in Afghanistan, with far greater consequences. "If we end the war in Iraq the way we ended the war in Afghanistan, we could easily be worse off than we are today," said Gore, who has indicated he will decide by the end of the year if he will seek the presidency again.

Gore drew a sharp contrast between the current president and his father on Iraq. Gore said that war in 1991 was justified by the fact that Iraq had invaded Kuwait, that Bush's father worked "patiently and skillfully" to build a broad coalition and did not come to Congress for support until the midterm elections had been concluded and the U.N. had passed a tough resolution.

Gore said that in this case it is the United States contemplating invading another nation, and that American taxpayers will have to shoulder the entire cost of the war. He also suggested that Bush and Republicans are using the war for political gain.

Among other possible Democratic presidential candidates, Sens. Joseph I. Lieberman (Conn.) and John Edwards (N.C.) and House Minority Leader Richard A. Gephardt (Mo.) have offered strong support for Bush on Iraq, with all saying the United States should be prepared to act alone if the international community balks. Senate Majority Leader Thomas A. Daschle (D-S.D.) initially resisted an early vote on the Iraq resolution but later said he would welcome a vote before the election. Kerry has raised questions about the administration's policy, arguing that Bush should be more willing to exhaust peaceful means of disarming Iraq before resorting to war.

At the United Nations, officials intend to begin discussions today with Britain on a revised draft resolution that would tighten the rules for conducting inspections, according to council diplomats. Their hope is to secure passage before the U.N. chief weapons inspector, Hans Blix, travels to Vienna early next week for meetings with Iraqi officials to work out the final arrangement for the resumption of inspections.

Text: House Resolution Authorizing the Use of U.S. Force Against Iraq

By the Associated Press - 3 October 2002

Following is the text of a resolution to authorize the use of force against Iraq agreed upon yesterday by President Bush and House leaders.

WHEREAS in 1990 in response to Iraq's war of aggression against and illegal occupation of Kuwait, the United States forged a coalition of nations to liberate Kuwait and its people in order to defend the national security of the United States and enforce United Nations Security Council resolutions relating to Iraq,

WHEREAS after the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, Iraq entered into a United Nations sponsored cease-fire agreement pursuant to which Iraq unequivocally agreed, among other things, to eliminate its nuclear, biological and chemical weapons programs and the means to deliver and develop them and to end its support for international terrorism,

WHEREAS the efforts of international weapons inspectors, United States intelligence agencies and Iraqi defectors led to the discovery that Iraq had large stockpiles of chemical weapons and a large-scale biological weapons program, and that Iraq had an advanced nuclear weapons development program that was much closer to producing a nuclear weapon than intelligence reporting had previously indicated,

WHEREAS Iraq, in direct and flagrant violation of the cease-fire, attempted to thwart the efforts of weapons inspectors to identify and destroy Iraq's weapons of mass destruction stockpiles and development capabilities, which finally resulted in the withdrawal of inspectors from Iraq on Oct. 31, 1998,

WHEREAS in 1998 Congress concluded that Iraq's continuing weapons of mass destruction programs threatened vital United States interests and international peace and security, declared Iraq to be in "material and unacceptable breach of its international obligations" and urged the president "to take appropriate action, in accordance with the Constitution and relevant laws of the United States, to bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations" (Public Law 105-235),

WHEREAS Iraq both poses a continuing threat to the national security of the United States and international peace and security in the Persian Gulf region and remains in material and unacceptable breach of its international obligations by, among other things, continuing to possess and develop a significant chemical and biological weapons capability, actively seeking a nuclear weapons capability and supporting and harboring terrorist organizations,

WHEREAS Iraq persists in violating resolutions of the United Nations Security Council by continuing to engage in brutal repression of its civilian population thereby threatening international peace and security in the region by refusing to release, repatriate or account for non-Iraqi citizens wrongfully detained by Iraq, including an American serviceman, and by failing to return property wrongfully seized by Iraq from Kuwait,

WHEREAS the current Iraqi regime has demonstrated its capability and willingness to use weapons of mass destruction against other nations and its own people,

WHEREAS the current Iraqi regime has demonstrated its continuing hostility toward and willingness to attack the United States, including by attempting in 1993 to assassinate former President Bush and by firing on many thousands of occasions on United States and Coalition Armed Forces engaged in enforcing the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council,

WHEREAS members of Al Qaida, an organization bearing responsibility for attacks on the United States, its citizens, and interests, including the attacks that occurred on Sept. 11, 2001, are known to be in Iraq,

WHEREAS Iraq continues to aid and harbor other international terrorist organizations, including organizations that threaten the lives and safety of American citizens,

WHEREAS the attacks on the United States of Sept. 11, 2001, underscored the gravity of the threat posed by the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by international terrorist organizations,

WHEREAS Iraq's demonstrated capability and willingness to use weapons of mass destruction, the risk that the current Iraqi regime will either employ those weapons to launch a surprise attack against the United States or its Armed Forces or provide them to international terrorists who would do so and the extreme magnitude of harm that would result to the United States and its citizens from such an attack, combine to justify action by the United States to defend itself,

WHEREAS United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 authorizes the use of all necessary means to enforce United Nations Security Council Resolution 660 and subsequent relevant resolutions and to compel Iraq to cease certain activities that threaten international peace and security, including the development of weapons of mass destruction and refusal or obstruction of United Nations weapons inspections in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 687, repression of its civilian population in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 688, and threatening its neighbors or United Nations operations in Iraq in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 949,

WHEREAS Congress in the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1) has authorized the president "to use United States Armed Forces pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (1990) in order to achieve implementation of Security Council Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 674, and 677,"

WHEREAS in December 1991, Congress expressed its sense that it "supports the use of all necessary means to achieve the goals of United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 as being consistent with the Authorization of Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1)," that Iraq's repression of its civilian population violates United Nations Security Council Resolution 688 and "constitutes a continuing threat to the peace, security, and stability of the Persian Gulf region," and that Congress, "supports the use of all necessary means to achieve the goals of United Nations Security Council Resolution 688",

WHEREAS the Iraq Liberation Act (Public Law 105-338) expressed the sense of Congress that it should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove from power the current Iraqi regime and promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime,

WHEREAS on Sept. 12, 2002, President Bush committed the United States to "work with the United Nations Security Council to meet our common challenge" posed by Iraq and to "work for the necessary resolutions," while also making clear that "the Security Council resolutions will be enforced, and the just demands of peace and security will be met, or action will be unavoidable,"

WHEREAS the United States is determined to prosecute the war on terrorism and Iraq's ongoing support for international terrorist groups combined with its development of weapons of mass destruction in direct violation of its obligations under the 1991 cease-fire and other United Nations Security Council resolutions make clear that it is in the national security interests of the United States and in furtherance of the war on terrorism that all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions be enforced, including through the use of force if necessary,

WHEREAS Congress has taken steps to pursue vigorously the war on terrorism through the provision of authorities and funding requested by the president to take the necessary actions against international terrorists and terrorist organizations, including those nations, organizations or persons who planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on Sept. 11, 2001, or harbored such persons or organizations,

WHEREAS the president and Congress are determined to continue to take all appropriate actions against international terrorists and terrorist organizations, including those nations, organizations or persons who planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on Sept. 11, 2001, or harbored such persons or organizations,

WHEREAS the president has authority under the Constitution to take action in order to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the United States, as Congress recognized in the joint resolution on Authorization for Use of Military Force (Public Law 107-40), and

WHEREAS it is in the national security of the United States to restore international peace and security to the Persian Gulf region;

Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1:

This joint resolution may be cited as the "Authorization for the Use of Military Force Against Iraq."

SECTION 2:

SUPPORT FOR UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS.

The Congress of the United States supports the efforts by the president to:

- (a) strictly enforce through the United Nations Security Council all relevant Security Council resolutions applicable to Iraq and encourages him in those efforts; and
- (b) obtain prompt and decisive action by the Security Council to ensure that Iraq abandons its strategy of delay, evasion and noncompliance and promptly and strictly complies with all relevant Security Council resolutions.

SECTION 3:

AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES.

(a) AUTHORIZATION. The president is authorized to use the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to

- (1) defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and
- (2) enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions regarding Iraq.

(b) PRESIDENTIAL determination.

In connection with the exercise of the authority granted in subsection (a) to use force the president shall, prior to such exercise or as soon thereafter as may be feasible, but no later than 48 hours after exercising such

authority, make available to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the president pro tempore of the Senate his determination that

(1) reliance by the United States on further diplomatic or other peaceful means alone either (A) will not adequately protect the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq or (B) is not likely to lead to enforcement of all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq, and

(2) acting pursuant to this resolution is consistent with the United States and other countries continuing to take the necessary actions against international terrorists and terrorist organizations, including those nations, organizations or persons who planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorists attacks that occurred on Sept. 11, 2001.

(c) WAR powers resolution requirements.

(1) Specific statutory authorization. Consistent with section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, the Congress declares that this section is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution.

(2) Applicability of other requirements. Nothing in this resolution supersedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution.

SECTION 4:

REPORTS TO CONGRESS.

(a) The president shall, at least once every 60 days, submit to the Congress a report on matters relevant to this joint resolution, including actions taken pursuant to the exercise of authority granted in section 2 and the status of planning for efforts that are expected to be required after such actions are completed, including those actions described in section 7 of Public Law 105-338 (the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998).

(b) To the extent that the submission of any report described in subsection (a) coincides with the submission of any other report on matters relevant to this joint resolution otherwise required to be submitted to Congress pursuant to the reporting requirements of Public Law 93-148 (the War Powers Resolution), all such reports may be submitted as a single consolidated report to the Congress.

(c) To the extent that the information required by section 3 of Public Law 102-1 is included in the report required by this section, such report shall be considered as meeting the requirements of section 3 of Public Law 102-1.

VN-RESOLUTIE

Los Angeles Times

Iraq Excludes Palaces From Inspection Sites

Diplomacy: Baghdad now opposes 'new, bad resolutions' involving access to compounds. Bush reviews detailed military options.

By Robin Wright – Times Staff writer
September 22 2002

WASHINGTON -- After agreeing last week to allow U.N. weapons inspectors unconditional access, Iraq reversed course Saturday and said it would not abide by any new U.N. resolution allowing monitors entry to key presidential compounds.

Baghdad's latest gambit came as the Bush administration was preparing for a week of intense lobbying both at home and at the United Nations to win passage of at least one resolution needed to confront Iraqi President Saddam Hussein over his alleged failure to surrender weapons of mass destruction.

While Washington is still pursuing a diplomatic course, the administration is also fine-tuning military plans in the event Iraq fails to cooperate. President Bush is reviewing detailed military options delivered to the White House by the Pentagon this month, U.S. officials said Saturday. "He has options before him, and he is reviewing those options," White House spokesman Sean McCormack said.

The classified document was drawn up by Army Gen. Tommy Franks, chief of Central Command, the unit that would orchestrate an offensive in the Persian Gulf region. It outlines the requirements to wage war, including numbers of troops, warplanes, ships and munitions, officials said.

Franks, who stopped in Kuwait during a tour of the region to talk with local commanders, said Saturday that his forces were ready. "We are prepared to undertake whatever activities and whatever actions we may be directed to take by our nation," he said. Franks cautioned, however, that no decision had been made.

The Iraqi announcement, which followed a meeting between Hussein and his top officials, could further complicate delicate diplomatic efforts to avoid the use of force. "Iraq declared it will not deal with any new resolution that contradicts what has been agreed upon with the U.N. secretary-general," the government said in a brief announcement read on Iraqi radio. "American officials are trying ... to issue new, bad resolutions from the Security Council," the statement added.

Saturday's move appeared to be an attempt to undermine a sweeping and tough new U.N. resolution that is expected to be circulated Monday at the Security Council by the United States and Britain, U.N. diplomats said Saturday. That resolution would charge U.N. teams with checking any and all sites suspected of having information on nuclear, biological or chemical weapons and ballistic missiles. It would also, in effect, scrap any past compromises.

The Iraqi statement referred particularly to a 1998 agreement between Iraq and U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan on Iraq's sprawling presidential compounds, which have many facilities besides Hussein's personal palaces.

For seven years, Baghdad refused entry to the facilities on the grounds that such inspections would infringe on Iraq's sovereignty. A compromise in 1998 gave inspectors access, but only if they were accompanied by an array of diplomats--a deal that prolonged the process and gave Iraq a new channel of appeal, according to former weapons inspectors.

Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld said Saturday that Baghdad's latest ploy was not unexpected. "Anyone who has watched the past decade has seen the Iraqi government ... change their position depending on what they thought was tactically advantageous to them and kind of jerk the United Nations around," he said in an interview on CNN. "So it is no surprise at all."

The Iraqi move could boost U.S. efforts at winning congressional support for a resolution authorizing the use of force, if necessary, to confront Hussein. "Saddam thinks he can go back to where we left off, to when he was still setting the rules of the game. But there's no tolerance for that in this administration--and he doesn't get it," said Judith Yaphe, an Iraq expert and former intelligence analyst now at National Defense University in Washington. "He won a lot of support last week when he agreed to allow the weapons inspectors to return. Now he's lost the advantage he gained."

But the United States and Britain are still facing an uphill battle at the United Nations, where there are growing indications that the Bush administration may have to settle for two resolutions: one outlining the

specific terms for Iraqi compliance in giving up its deadliest arms and the second on the consequences if Baghdad balks.

Russia, which has veto power at the Security Council, appears to be coming around to supporting a resolution after questioning last week whether one was necessary, U.N. diplomats said Saturday. "We're not there yet, but we're headed in the right direction," said a State Department official who requested anonymity after White House talks with Russian leaders Friday.

And a British diplomat said Saturday that none of the 15 nations on the Security Council are now opposed to a strict resolution on arms inspections. But France, which also has a veto, does not want the use of force or the consequences of noncompliance in any initial resolution. Many Arab countries and other Security Council members, which do not have veto power but could form an important bloc, also favor separating the issue of military action from the inspections.

"We favor a two-step process because we want the strongest international support to whatever decision is taken by the Security Council, so that the international community is not divided and so Saddam Hussein does not believe he can rely on any country to help him delay. He must feel that at every step the world is united," said a French diplomat who requested anonymity.

Although the United States and Britain still intend to introduce a single resolution, a British envoy said Saturday that "the threat part of the resolution--the 'or else' clause--will be the hardest part" to negotiate.

From the U.S. perspective, the real catch is the timing of the resolutions. The French and others do not want a second resolution taken to the floor until Iraq is judged to be in violation, which could be months down the road.

"It will be easier to get world support if we first urge the Iraqi regime to disarm and, if the regime does not comply, then to think of the consequences," the French envoy said. But Washington fears that the Iraqis will merely procrastinate without the threat of force hanging over their heads, a situation that could both prolong the process of disarmament and defer the prospects of military intervention.

"Baghdad's decision to allow weapons inspectors back after President Bush's speech proves once again that the Iraqis only act when they have a gun to their heads. Without a strong message about the risks it faces for noncompliance in one resolution, the U.N. risks being messed around yet again," the British diplomat said.

BBC

Russia resists new Iraq resolution

28 September 2002

A US envoy has ended talks in Moscow with no sign that he has won Russian support for a tough new draft UN resolution on Iraq.

Speaking after the meeting, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said Moscow "still favours the quickest possible return of UN weapons inspectors to Iraq".

"The necessary conditions for this exist. But we are prepared to look carefully at the position of all the members of the UN Security Council," he said.

US envoy Marc Grossman is seeking backing for a resolution that would allow the United States to attack Iraq if Baghdad failed to comply with weapons inspections.

Mr Ivanov said Mr Grossman and UK Foreign Office political director Peter Ricketts argued for the resolution, and "consultations are continuing with our experts, who are noting their proposals".

Mr Grossman said he was satisfied with the consultations, and he had not sought agreement on the text of the draft resolution. "I think it is fair to say everybody agreed there was a challenge to the United Nations, to the Security Council, and that all of us who are permanent members... want to see if we can solve it," he told reporters. "I was very pleased to hear that."

Iraqi defiance

Earlier, Iraq rejected the proposed resolution, which the United States and Britain want passed by the United Nations Security Council next week. Russia, France and China - the other three veto-wielding permanent members of the Security Council - remain to be convinced. According to diplomats at the UN, the resolution would give Iraq seven days to accept unlimited weapons inspections.

Iraqi Vice-President Taha Yassin Ramadan has said any move that harmed Baghdad would not be accepted. "The stance from the inspectors has been decided and any additional procedure that aims at harming Iraq won't be accepted," he said.

[...]

The Times

Britain and US fail to win backing over Iraq

By Richard Beeston, Diplomatic Editor and Robin Shepherd in Moscow
30 September 2002

UNITED NATIONS and Iraqi officials will resume negotiations today on the return of weapons inspectors to Baghdad, with the fate of the talks clouded by open divisions within the UN Security Council on the need for a tough new resolution against President Saddam Hussein.

After a weekend of intense but largely fruitless lobbying by the United States and Britain to win backing from China, France and Russia for a new ultimatum against Iraq, Hans Blix, the UN's chief weapons inspector, will meet a high-ranking Iraqi delegation in Vienna this morning.

UN officials said yesterday that the two-day talks would focus on the technical details of the return of scores on inspectors, who were withdrawn in 1998. In particular the UN needs to arrange offices, transport, communications, accommodation, landing sites for aircraft and to open new offices in the regional capitals Basra and Mosul.

The talks were made possible when Iraq backed down after four years of stalling and agreed to allow the inspectors to resume their hunt for suspected chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic weapons programmes.

Mr Blix, executive chairman of the UN Monitoring Verification and Inspection Commission (Unmovic), will be joined by Jacques Baute, his opposite number at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), for negotiations with General Amir al-Saadi, an Iraqi presidential adviser, Hassam Muhammad Amin, the head of Iraq's monitoring directorate, and Saeed Hassan, an Iraqi diplomat.

The UN wants to have its teams on the ground in Baghdad in two weeks' time, but there were grave doubts yesterday whether the inspectors would be able to return until the Security Council can agree on the wording of a new UN resolution, which gives Iraq one month to comply to strict new conditions. It is possible that even if there is an agreement on the technical details of the inspectors' return to Baghdad, another round of talks may be required to establish the rules under which they will work.

The US draft resolution requires Iraq to reveal all its banned weapons of mass destruction within seven days. It would then have 23 days to co-operate fully with weapons inspectors, who would be protected on the ground by an armed UN security force. The new inspection terms would also override previous agreements between the UN and Iraq, which secured special restrictions on searching eight presidential palace compounds, which cover about 12 square miles.

Iraq will try to exploit the differences among UN power-brokers by promising Mr Blix co-operation with weapons inspectors that falls short of American and British demands. Already Iraq has dismissed the terms of the new resolution as giving Washington an excuse to go to war. "The position on the new inspectors has been decided and any new measure intended to harm Iraq is unacceptable," Taha Yassin Ramadan, the Iraqi Vice-President, said.

His objections seemed to be shared in Paris, Moscow and Beijing, where American and British envoys tried but failed to win the backing of their fellow permanent members of the Security Council, who have veto rights in the chamber.

France is pressing for two resolutions, one that would set out the mission of the inspectors and a second that would authorise the use of force only if Baghdad did not comply. The Kremlin does not want any more resolutions but simply the return of inspectors under existing arrangements.

Yesterday Tony Blair said that a compromise was possible. Britain was not opposed to the idea of two resolutions and the wording of the existing draft could be toned down.

"The most important thing is to get a very clear determination from the United Nations Security Council," Mr Blair said. "We must make it absolutely clear that Saddam and the Iraqi regime either agree to disarm themselves of these weapons they should never have had in the first place or action will follow."

Hours before he spoke American and British warplanes attacked radar targets at Basra airport for the second time in five days.

US congressmen visiting Baghdad said that they had been told by Tariq Aziz, the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister, that Saddam was prepared to let in weapons inspectors "no questions asked".

Text of U.S. Resolution on Iraq

By the Associated Press – 3 October 2002

The following is a text of the U.S. draft resolution calling for the U.N. Security Council to authorize force against Iraq if it fails to comply with weapons inspections. It was obtained by The Associated Press.

Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions, in particular its resolutions 661 (1990) of August 1990, 686 (1991) of 2 March 1991, 678 (1990) of 29 November 1990, 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, 688 (1991) of 5 April 1991, 986 (1995) of 14 April, 1995 and 1284 (1999) of 17 December 1999, and all the relevant statements of its President and noting the additional resolution () issued by the Council as a companion hereto.

Recognizing the threat of Iraq's noncompliance with Security Council resolutions and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles poses to international peace and security.

Recalling that its resolution 678 (1991) authorized member states to use all necessary means to uphold and implement its resolution 660 (1990) and all relevant resolutions subsequent to resolution 660 and to restore international peace and security in the area.

Further recalling that its resolution 687 (1991) imposed obligations on Iraq as a necessary step for achievement of its stated objective of restoring international peace and security in the area.

Deploring the fact that Iraq has never provided an accurate, full, final, and complete disclosure, as required by resolution 687 (1991), of all aspects of its programs to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with a range greater than one hundred and fifty kilometers, and of all holdings of such weapons, their component and production facilities and locations, as well as all other nuclear programs, including any which it claims are for purposes not related to nuclear weapons-usable material.

Deploring further that Iraq repeatedly refused to allow access to sites designated by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), refused to cooperate fully and unconditionally with UNSCOM and international Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) weapons inspectors, as required by resolution 687 (1991), ultimately ceased all cooperation with UNSCOM and IAEA in 1998 and for the last three years has failed to provide immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Committee (UNMOVIC) established in resolution 1284 (1999) as the successor organization to UNSCOM and the IAEA, as it was first obliged to do pursuant to resolution 687 (1991), and as the council has repeatedly demanded that it do, and regretting the consequent prolonging of the crisis in the region and the suffering of the Iraqi people.

Deploring also that the Government of Iraq has failed to comply with its commitments pursuant to resolution 687 (1991) with regard to terrorism, pursuant to resolution 688 (1991) to end repression of its civilian population and to provide access by international humanitarian organizations to all those in need of assistance in Iraq, and pursuant to resolutions 686 (1991), 687 (1991), and 1284 (1999) to return or cooperate in accounting for Kuwaiti and third party nationals wrongfully detained by Iraq, or to return Kuwaiti property wrongfully seized by Iraq.

Recalling that in its resolution 687 (1991) the Council declared that a cease-fire would be based on acceptance by Iraq of the provisions of that resolution, including the obligations on Iraq contained therein.

Determined to ensure full and immediate compliance by Iraq without conditions or restrictions with its obligations under resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions and recalling that the resolutions of the council constitute the governing standard of Iraqi compliance.

Recalling that the effective operation of UNMOVIC, as the successor organization to the Special Commission, and the IAEA, is essential for the implementation of resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions.

Noting the letter dated 16 September 2002 from Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Secretary General is the necessary first step toward rectifying Iraq's continued failure to comply with relevant Security Council resolutions.

Determined to secure full compliance with its decisions.

Acting under chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

Decides that Iraq is still, and has for a number of years, in material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions, including resolution 687 (1991), in particular through Iraq's failure to cooperate with United Nations inspectors and the IAEA and to complete the actions required under paragraphs 8 to 13 of resolution 687 (1991).

Decides that in order to begin to comply with its disarmament obligations, the government of Iraq shall provide to the Security Council prior to the beginning of inspections and not later than 30 days from the date of this resolution an acceptable and currently accurate, full and complete declaration of all aspects of its programs to develop chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and unmanned aerial

vehicles, including all holdings and precise locations of such weapons, components, sub-components, stocks of agents, and related material and equipment, the locations and work of its research, development and production facilities, as well as all other chemical, biological and nuclear programs, including any which it claims are for purposes not related to weapons production or material.

Decides that Iraq shall provide UNMOVIC and IAEA immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to any and all areas, facilities, buildings, equipment, records, and means of transport which they wish to inspect, as well as immediate, unimpeded, unrestricted and private access to all officials and other persons whom UNMOVIC or IAEA wish to interview pursuant to any aspects of their mandates; further decides that UNMOVIC and the IAEA may at their discretion conduct interviews inside or outside of Iraq, facilitate the travel of those interviewed and family members outside of Iraq, and that such interviews shall occur without the presence of observers from the Iraqi government, and instructs UNMOVIC and requests the IAEA to resume inspections by () ;

To that end, demands that Iraq immediately comply with its obligations: decides that Iraq shall submit to UNMOVIC all outstanding biannual declarations, and decides that any permanent member of the Security Council may recommend to UNMOVIC and IAEA sites to be inspected, persons to be interviewed, the conditions of such interviews, and data to be collected and receive a report on the results:

Decides that, in view of the prolonged interruption by Iraq of the presence of UNMOVIC and IAEA and in order for them to accomplish the tasks set forth in paragraph 3 above, the Security Council hereby establishes the following revised procedures, notwithstanding prior understandings, to facilitate their work in Iraq: UNMOVIC and IAEA shall determine the personnel on their inspection teams, except that any permanent member of the Security Council may request to be represented on any inspection team with the same rights and protections accorded other members of the team, shall have unrestricted, and immediate movement to and from inspection sites, and the right to inspect any sites and buildings, including unrestricted access to presidential sites notwithstanding the provisions of resolution 1154 (1998), shall be provided regional bases and operating bases throughout Iraq, including offices for inspections teams in regions outside Baghdad; shall have the right to names of all personnel associated with Iraq's chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile programs, and the associated research, development and production facilities, teams shall be accompanied at their bases by sufficient U.N. security forces to protect them, shall have the right to declare for the purpose of this resolution no-fly/no-drive zones, exclusion zones, and/or ground and air transit corridors, (which shall be enforced by U.N. security forces or by member states;) shall have the free and unrestricted use and landing of fixed and rotary winged aircraft, including unmanned reconnaissance vehicles; shall have the right at their sole discretion verifiably to remove, destroy or render harmless all prohibited weapons, subsystems, components, records, materials, and other related items, and the right to impound or close any facilities or equipment for the production thereof; shall have the right to unrestricted voice and data communications, including encrypted communications; shall have the right to free import and use of equipment or materials for inspection and to seize and export any equipment, materials, documents taken during inspections and shall have the access to any information that any member is willing to provide; further decides that these procedures shall be binding on Iraq:

Decides further that Iraq shall immediately cease, and shall not take or threaten hostile acts directed against any representative or personnel of the United Nations or of any member states taking action pursuant to any Security Council Resolution:

Requests the Secretary General immediately to notify Iraq of the foregoing steps in paragraph 5 and decides that within seven days following such notification, Iraq shall state its acceptance of these steps and the provisions of paragraph 2,3,4 and 6 above;

Requests all Member States to give full support to UNMOVIC and the IAEA in the discharge of their mandates, including by providing any information on Iraqi attempts, including since 1998, to acquire prohibited items;

Directs the Executive Director of UNMOVIC and the Director General of the IAEA to report immediately to the Council any interference with or problems with respect the execution of their mission;

Decides that false statements or omissions in the declaration submitted by Iraq to the Council and the failure by Iraq at any time to comply and cooperate fully in accordance with the provisions laid out in this resolution, shall constitute a further material breach of Iraq's obligations, and that such breach authorizes member states to use all necessary means to restore international peace and security in the area;

Decides to remain seized of the matter.

NEDERLANDS BELEID

ONTMOETING DE HOOP SCHEFFER - POWELL

Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

'VS NIET UIT OP EENZIJDIGE AANVAL OP IRAK'

24 september 2002

De Verenigde Staten is niet uit op een eenzijdige aanval op Irak. Dat is de conclusie van minister Jaap de Hoop Scheffer (Buitenlandse Zaken) na een gesprek met zijn Amerikaanse ambtgenoot Colin Powell.

Amerika en Nederland willen beide dat de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties zich in een nieuwe resolutie uitsprekt voor een terugkeer van de wapeninspecteurs naar Irak. In deze resolutie moet sprake zijn van een strenger inspectieregime, 'zodat de Irakese regering niet wederom de gelegenheid krijgt, zoals zo vaak in het verleden is gebeurd, om via list, bedrog en trucs het werk van de inspecteurs onmogelijk te maken', aldus De Hoop Scheffer. Een verandering van het regime in Irak is daarbij geen uitgangspunt: 'De Veiligheidsraadsresoluties die er zijn, gaan niet over de verandering van het regime. Dat is ook niet de optie en de inzet van de Nederlandse regering. Die resoluties gaan over ontwapening en over het afzien van massavernietigingswapens.'

Naast de ontmoeting met Powell heeft De Hoop Scheffer in Washington gesproken met Condoleezza Rice, de veiligheidsadviseur van de Amerikaanse regering. Op 8 oktober zal De Hoop Scheffer ook een ontmoeting hebben met Igor Ivanov, de minister van Buitenlandse Zaken van de Russische Federatie. Ook dan zal onder meer worden gesproken over de kwestie Irak.

MOTIES TWEEDE KAMER

Tweede Kamer

23 432 De situatie in het Midden-Oosten

Nr. 57 MOTIE VAN DE LEDEN KOENDERS EN TH. C. DE GRAAF

Voorgesteld 5 september 2002

De Kamer, gehoord de beraadslaging, van mening:

- dat Irak dient te voldoen aan VN-veiligheidsraadsresoluties, waaronder resolutie 1284, te weten de «onvoorwaardelijke en onmiddellijke terugkeer van de wapeninspecteurs, die onbelemmerd hun werk moeten kunnen doen»;
- dat diplomatieke middelen om het conflict met Irak op te lossen volstrekte prioriteit hebben en militaire acties geen automatische mogen zijn;
- dat eventuele bewijzen van c.q. sterke aanwijzingen voor het bezit en de mogelijkheid tot de inzet elders van massavernietigingswapens door Irak en de eventuele betrokkenheid bij internationaal terrorisme openbaar gemaakt dienen te worden;
- dat eventuele militaire acties tegen Irak vooraf getoetst moeten worden aan criteria van legitimiteit, effectiviteit en proportionaliteit en de uitputting van andere, bestaande strategieën;
- dat een unilateraal tot stand gekomen preventief optreden van de Verenigde Staten tegen Irak overtuigende rechtsgrond ontbeert en politiek ongewenst is;
- dat een nieuw diplomatiek offensief, gericht op de gehele regio ter oplossing van het Israëliësch-Palestijns conflict een grotere prioriteit dient te hebben en daarbij tevens samenwerking met de Arabische landen moet worden gezocht;
- dat de tot stand gekomen alliantie tegen het terrorisme actieve ondersteuning verdient;

verzoekt de regering, zich actief in te zetten voor de totstandkoming van een gemeenschappelijk EU- en NAVO-standpunt en een VN-Veiligheidsraadsresolutie, die op bovenstaande uitgangspunten zijn gebaseerd; verzoekt de regering tevens bilateraal en in EU-verband druk op de regering van de VS uit te oefenen om te komen tot een beleid dat op bovenstaande principes gebaseerd is, en gaat over tot de orde van de dag.

Koenders, De Graaf

23 432 De situatie in het Midden-Oosten

Nr. 60 GEWIJZIGDE MOTIE VAN HET LID KARIMI EN VAN BOMMEL

Ter vervanging van die gedrukt onder nrs. 58 en 59 - Voorgesteld 10 september 2002

De Kamer, gehoord de beraadslaging,
constaterende, dat de Verenigde Staten zich blijkbaar voorbereiden op een oorlog tegen Irak;
overwegende, dat een aanval tegen Irak volgens het internationale recht niet is gelegitimeerd;
van mening, dat een oorlog tegen Irak de stabiliteit in het Midden-Oosten en de wereldvrede ernstig en vergaand kan verstoren;
van mening, dat het reële gevaar dat uitgaat van het regime van Saddam Hoessein en van het Iraakse wapenprogramma het beste op een nietmilitaire wijze aangepakt kan worden door het ter plekke inspecteren, verifiëren en vernietigen van verboden wapens;
verzoekt de regering een aanval op Irak af te wijzen en zowel bilateraal als in EU-, NAVO- en VN-verband alles in het werk te stellen om de Verenigde Staten ervan te weerhouden om een oorlog tegen Irak te beginnen, en gaat over tot de orde van de dag.

Karimi, Van Bommel

Handelingen Tweede Kamer 10 september 2002 – 96-5689

[...] In stemming komt de motie-Koenders/Th.C. de Graaf (23432, nr. 57).

De **voorzitter**: Ik constateer dat de aanwezige leden van de fracties van de SP, GroenLinks, de PvdA en D66 voor deze motie hebben gestemd en die van de overige fracties ertegen, zodat zij is verworpen.

In stemming komt de motie-Karimi/Van Bommel (23432, nr. 60).

De **voorzitter**: Ik constateer dat de aanwezige leden van de fracties van de SP en GroenLinks voor deze motie hebben gestemd en die van de overige fracties ertegen, zodat zij is verworpen. [...]

BEGROTING BUITENLANDSE ZAKEN

Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Memorie van Toelichting Begroting Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 2003

28600 V – nr. 2 – 23 september 2002

[...] Wat betreft Irak moet worden nagestreefd dat het land volledig voldoet aan alle ontwapeningseisen, zoals gesteld in VN-resoluties, en in het bijzonder met betrekking tot de toelating van VN-wapeninspecteurs en het uitvoeren van wapeninspecties. [...] De Nederlandse betrokkenheid bij de ontwikkelingen in het Midden-Oosten zal onverminderd groot zijn, om vrede en stabiliteit te bereiken in die regio. Centraal hierbij staan het Israëliësch-Palestijnse conflict en het vraagstuk Irak. Alhoewel het vredesproces in het Midden-Oosten een betreurenswaardige en forse terugslag ondergaat, blijft Nederland – onder meer via contacten met de betrokken partijen – energiek participeren in de zoektocht naar een oplossing die de mensen in de regio een politiek en economisch perspectief geeft – naast het verzekeren van de veiligheid. De Europese Unie dient zich daarbij actief te blijven opstellen met optimale inzet van instrumenten, waaronder de rol van Hoge Vertegenwoordiger Solana. Omdat de betrokkenheid van de Verenigde Staten voor de oplossing van het conflict in het Midden-Oosten onmisbaar blijft, zal Nederland zich ervoor inzetten dat de EU in nauwe samenspraak met de VS en de VN opereert. [...]

BRIEF MINISTER VAN BUITENLANDSE ZAKEN

30 september 2002 – DAM 450/02 – Brief aan de Tweede Kamer inzake Irak

Zeer geachte Voorzitter,

Met het oog op het Algemeen Overleg inzake Irak op 1 oktober a.s. en ten verfolge op mijn brief van 4 september jl. met kenmerk DAM-407/02, bericht ik u als volgt.

De belangrijkste ontwikkeling sinds het debat in uw Kamer op 5 september jl. is het ontstaan van een brede internationale consensus, dat via het VN-spoor een afdoend antwoord gevonden moet worden op het streven van Irak om, in strijd met de VR-resoluties terzake, massavernietigingswapens te verwerven. De redes voor de Algemene Vergadering van de VN van respectievelijk de Secretaris-Generaal en de President van de Verenigde Staten op 12 september jl., zijn hiervan de uitdrukking.

Beiden wezen op het belang van het handhaven van het gezag van de VN, wanneer er sprake is van een bedreiging van de vrede. SG Annan legde daarbij een rechtstreeks verband tussen het gezag van de Veiligheidsraad en zijn politieke wil om op te treden. President Bush zag de wereldgemeenschap voor een 'test' gesteld; de VN was geconfronteerd met de vraag of zij zou voldoen aan haar roeping of verzinken in irrelevantie.

Hierop is vanuit de wereldgemeenschap positief gereageerd, onder meer door de EU, die sinds het jongste Gymnich-overleg te Helsingör, mede als gevolg van de opstelling van ons land, gekozen heeft voor een effectieve aanpak via de VN. Maar ook een land als Saoedi-Arabië heeft sindsdien ondubbelzinnig gesteld zijn plicht als lid van de VN te aanvaarden en mede te zullen werken aan het afdwingen van uitvoering door Irak van alle relevante VR-resoluties.

Het staat wel vast dat het deze internationale eensgezindheid is geweest die geleid heeft tot de instemming van Irak met de onvoorwaardelijke terugkeer van de wapeninspecteurs. Dit is een noodzakelijke eerste stap, maar ook niet meer dan dat. De terugkeer van de wapeninspecteurs is niet een doel op zichzelf, maar een middel tot het doel: de ontmanteling van het Irakese potentieel aan massavernietigingswapens en hun overbrengingsmiddelen.

Nog zal moeten blijken wat de waarde van de Irakese toezegging is. Gezien de ervaringen in het verleden is, naar de mening van de VS en vele andere landen, waaronder Nederland, scepsis zeker op zijn plaats. De inspanningen van de internationale gemeenschap zijn gericht op de zo spoedig mogelijke terugkeer van de inspecteurs naar Irak. Na een gesprek met Irak op 18 september jl. heeft het hoofd van UNMOVIC, de heer Hans Blix, op 19 september jl. een tijdpad voor actie onder VN-Veiligheidsraadresolutie 1284 gepresenteerd. Heden sprak Blix in Wenen met vertegenwoordigers van Irak. Hij streeft er naar op 15 oktober a.s. een voorbereidende missie in Bagdad te stationeren.

Binnen de Veiligheidsraad wordt op dit moment, op basis van een Brits voorstel dat met de VS is afgestemd, gewerkt aan nieuwe teksten die moeten leiden tot één of meer resoluties die het werk van UNMOVIC de noodzakelijke steun in de rug zullen geven. De inspecteurs dienen ongestoord en doeltreffend hun werk te kunnen doen, zo is ook de opvatting van de Nederlandse regering. Daartoe dient onder andere te worden verzekerd dat zij onvoorwaardelijke, onmiddellijke en onbepaalde toegang krijgen tot alle plaatsen en tot alle informatie die voor het bereiken van het doel noodzakelijk c.q. relevant zijn.

Daarnaast heeft de Amerikaanse regering inmiddels het Congres een ontwerp-resolutie voorgelegd die haar moet machtigen om de uitvoering door Irak van de relevante VR-resoluties zonodig met militair geweld af te dwingen.

Vorige week heeft de Britse regering een rapport uitgegeven omtrent het bezit door Irak van massavernietigingswapens en over de capaciteit die verder te ontwikkelen. De analyse in dit rapport van het streven van het Iraakse regime om in strijd met de VR-resoluties capaciteit te verwerven met betrekking tot massavernietigingswapens, alsmede de dreiging die daarvan uitgaat in het licht van de aard van het bewind in Bagdad, stemt overeen met het beeld dat de Nederlandse regering daarvan heeft.

De regering heeft vastgesteld dat de VS op overtuigende wijze inhoud hebben gegeven aan hun toezegging met partners te zullen consulteren. Bij mijn recente bezoek aan Washington is mij in gesprekken met de Amerikaanse autoriteiten, met name met mijn ambtgenoot Powell en met Nationaal Veiligheidsadviseur Dr. Rice, gebleken dat de Nederlandse - en Europese - opstelling door hen is gewaardeerd en meegewogen bij het besluit te kiezen voor de weg via de VN. Het is in dat licht een goede zaak dat in Europees kader overeenstemming kon worden bereikt over het belang van het volgen van het VN-spoor. Dit heeft voorts een positieve invloed gehad bij de vele gesprekken die in New York zijn gevoerd met andere leden van de wereldgemeenschap, met name uit de regio van het Midden-Oosten.

Om bij te dragen aan het succes van de thans ingezette benadering is het noodzakelijk dat de individuele leden van de VN daarvoor hun politieke gewicht in de schaal leggen. De regering is ervan overtuigd dat de door Irak uitgesproken bereidheid mee te werken met UNMOVIC uitsluitend te danken is aan de sterke internationale druk, in het bijzonder de dreiging met militaire middelen. De regering meent dat die druk in stand moet blijven om Irak ertoe te bewegen daadwerkelijk mee te werken aan de uitvoering van de desbetreffende resoluties van de Veiligheidsraad en aan de ontmanteling van zijn arsenaal van massavernietigingswapens.

MASSAVERNIEGINGSWAPENS

Britse regering

Iraq's weapons of mass destruction – the assesment of the British Government

24 september 2002

[...]

Executive Summary

1. Under Saddam Hussein Iraq developed chemical and biological weapons, acquired missiles allowing it to attack neighbouring countries with these weapons and persistently tried to develop a nuclear bomb. Saddam has used chemical weapons, both against Iran and against his own people. Following the Gulf War, Iraq had to admit to all this. And in the ceasefire of 1991 Saddam agreed unconditionally to give up his weapons of mass destruction.

2. Much information about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction is already in the public domain from UN reports and from Iraqi defectors. This points clearly to Iraq's continuing possession, after 1991, of chemical and biological agents and weapons produced before the Gulf War. It shows that Iraq has refurbished sites formerly associated with the production of chemical and biological agents. And it indicates that Iraq remains able to manufacture these agents, and to use bombs, shells, artillery rockets and ballistic missiles to deliver them.

3. An independent and well-researched overview of this public evidence was provided by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) on 9 September. The IISS report also suggested that Iraq could assemble nuclear weapons within months of obtaining fissile material from foreign sources.

4. As well as the public evidence, however, significant additional information is available to the Government from secret intelligence sources, described in more detail in this paper. This intelligence cannot tell us about everything. However, it provides a fuller picture of Iraqi plans and capabilities. It shows that Saddam Hussein attaches great importance to possessing weapons of mass destruction which he regards as the basis for Iraq's regional power. It shows that he does not regard them only as weapons of last resort. He is ready to use them, including against his own population, and is determined to retain them, in breach of United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR).

5. Intelligence also shows that Iraq is preparing plans to conceal evidence of these weapons, including incriminating documents, from renewed inspections. And it confirms that despite sanctions and the policy of containment, Saddam has continued to make progress with his illicit weapons programmes.

6. As a result of the intelligence we judge that Iraq has:

- continued to produce chemical and biological agents;
- military plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons, including against its own Shia population. Some of these weapons are deployable within 45 minutes of an order to use them;
- command and control arrangements in place to use chemical and biological weapons. Authority ultimately resides with Saddam Hussein. (There is intelligence that he may have delegated this authority to his son Qusai);
- developed mobile laboratories for military use, corroborating earlier reports about the mobile production of biological warfare agents;
- pursued illegal programmes to procure controlled materials of potential use in the production of chemical and biological weapons programmes;
- tried covertly to acquire technology and materials which could be used in the production of nuclear weapons;
- sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa, despite having no active civil nuclear power programme that could require it;
- recalled specialists to work on its nuclear programme;
- illegally retained up to 20 al-Hussein missiles, with a range of 650km, capable of carrying chemical or biological warheads;
- started deploying its al-Samoud liquid propellant missile, and has used the absence of weapons inspectors to work on extending its range to at least 200km, which is beyond the limit of 150km imposed by the United Nations;
- started producing the solid-propellant Ababil-100, and is making efforts to extend its range to at least 200km, which is beyond the limit of 150km imposed by the United Nations;

- constructed a new engine test stand for the development of missiles capable of reaching the UK Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus and NATO members (Greece and Turkey), as well as all Iraq's Gulf neighbours and Israel;
- pursued illegal programmes to procure materials for use in its illegal development of long range missiles;
- learnt lessons from previous UN weapons inspections and has already begun to conceal sensitive equipment and documentation in advance of the return of inspectors.

7. These judgements reflect the views of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). More details on the judgements and on the development of the JIC's assessments since 1998 are set out in Part 1 of this paper.

8. Iraq's weapons of mass destruction are in breach of international law. Under a series of UN Security Council Resolutions Iraq is obliged to destroy its holdings of these weapons under the supervision of UN inspectors. Part 2 of the paper sets out the key UN Security Council Resolutions. It also summarises the history of the UN inspection regime and Iraq's history of deception, intimidation and concealment in its dealings with the UN inspectors.

9. But the threat from Iraq does not depend solely on the capabilities we have described. It arises also because of the violent and aggressive nature of Saddam Hussein's regime. His record of internal repression and external aggression gives rise to unique concerns about the threat he poses. The paper briefly outlines in Part 3 Saddam's rise to power, the nature of his regime and his history of regional aggression. Saddam's human rights abuses are also catalogued, including his record of torture, mass arrests and summary executions.

10. The paper briefly sets out how Iraq is able to finance its weapons programme. Drawing on illicit earnings generated outside UN control, Iraq generated illegal income of some \$3 billion in 2001.

[...]

Chapter 3

The current position: 1998–2002

1. This chapter sets out what we know of Saddam Hussein's chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, drawing on all the available evidence. While it takes account of the results from UN inspections and other publicly available information, it also draws heavily on the latest intelligence about Iraqi efforts to develop their programmes and capabilities since 1998. The **main conclusions** are that:

- Iraq has a useable chemical and biological weapons capability, in breach of UNSCR 687, which has included recent production of chemical and biological agents;
- Saddam continues to attach great importance to the possession of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles which he regards as being the basis for Iraq's regional power. He is determined to retain these capabilities;
- Iraq can deliver chemical and biological agents using an extensive range of artillery shells, free-fall bombs, sprayers and ballistic missiles;
- Iraq continues to work on developing nuclear weapons, in breach of its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and in breach of UNSCR 687. Uranium has been sought from Africa that has no civil nuclear application in Iraq;
- Iraq possesses extended-range versions of the SCUD ballistic missile in breach of UNSCR 687 which are capable of reaching Cyprus, Eastern Turkey, Tehran and Israel. It is also developing longer-range ballistic missiles;
- Iraq's current military planning specifically envisages the use of chemical and biological weapons;
- Iraq's military forces are able to use chemical and biological weapons, with command, control and logistical arrangements in place. The Iraqi military are able to deploy these weapons within 45 minutes of a decision to do so;
- Iraq has learnt lessons from previous UN weapons inspections and is already taking steps to conceal and disperse sensitive equipment and documentation in advance of the return of inspectors;
- Iraq's chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missiles programmes are well-funded.

[...]

Het complete rapport is te vinden op diverse websites van de Britse overheid:

Downing Street No10 (www.pm.gov.uk)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office (www.fco.gov.uk)

Ministry of Defence (www.mod.uk)

The Stationery Office (www.official-documents.co.uk)

The dishonest case for a war on Iraq

by Alan Simpson, MP - Chair of Labour Against the War

Dr Glen Rangwala - lecturer in politics at Newnham College, University of Cambridge

23 September 2002

There is no case for a war on Iraq. It has not threatened to attack the US or Europe. It is not connected to al-Qa'ida. There is no evidence that it has new weapons of mass destruction, or that it possesses the means of delivering them.

This pamphlet separates the evidence for what we know about Iraq from the wild suppositions used as the pretext for a war.

1. Threat

For there to be a threat to the wider world from Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, there need to be two distinct components: the capability (the presence of weapons of mass destruction or their precursor elements, together with a delivery system) and the intention to use weapons of mass destruction.

Most of the discussion on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction from British and American governmental sources has focused on Iraq's capabilities. However, a more fundamental question is why the Iraqi regime would ever use weapons of mass destruction. There are three aspects to this:

(a) External military use.

The US administration has repeatedly stated that Iraq is a "clear and present danger" to the safety and security of ordinary Americans. Yet the Iraqi leadership have never used weapons of mass destruction against the US or Europe, nor threatened to. Plans or proposals for the use of weapons of mass destruction by Iraq against these countries have never been discovered, and in their absence can only be presumed to be non-existent.

Iraq would face massive reprisals if its leadership ever ordered the use of weapons of mass destruction on the US or Europe. It is difficult to imagine circumstances in which the Iraqi regime would use these weapons directly against any Western country. The only conceivable exception would be if the Iraqi leaders felt they had nothing left to lose: that is, if they were convinced of their own imminent demise as a result of an invasion. Weapons of mass destruction were not used by Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War, despite having both a much more developed capacity than it holds at present (see below) and the routing of its army. The best way to avoid prompting Iraqi leaders to use any non-conventional capacity would be to refrain from invading Iraq or attempting to assassinate or depose its rulers.

The only occasion on which the Iraqi government used weapons of mass destruction against another country was against Iran from 1981/82 to 1988. The use of mustard agents had a devastating impact on Iranian troops in the first years of the war, and the civilian death toll from the use of sarin and tabun numbers in the thousands. However, it should be noted that the use of chemical weapons was undertaken with the compliance of the rest of the world. The US Secretary of State acknowledged that he was aware of reports of Iraqi use of chemical weapons from 1983, and a United Nations team confirmed Iraqi use in a report of 16 March 1984. Nevertheless, the US administration provided "crop-spraying" helicopters to Iraq (subsequently used in chemical attacks on the Kurds in 1988), gave Iraq access to intelligence information that allowed Iraq to "calibrate" its mustard attacks on Iranian troops (1984), seconded its air force officers to work with their Iraqi counterparts (from 1986), approved technological exports to Iraq's missile procurement agency to extend the missiles' range (1988), and blocked bills condemning Iraq in the House of Representatives (1985) and Senate (1988).

Most crucially, the US and UK blocked condemnation of Iraq's known chemical weapons attacks at the UN Security Council. No resolution was passed during the war that specifically criticised Iraq's use of chemical weapons, despite the wishes of the majority to condemn this use. The only criticism of Iraq from the Security Council came in the form of non-binding Presidential statements (over which no country has a veto). The 21 March 1986 statement recognised that "chemical weapons on many occasions have been used by Iraqi forces against Iranian forces"; this statement was opposed by the United States, the sole country to vote against it in the Security Council (the UK abstained).

In summary, Iraq has never used chemical weapons against an external enemy without the acquiescence of the most powerful states. It has done so only in the knowledge that it would be protected from condemnation and countermeasures by a superpower. There is no reason to suspect that the Iraqi leadership now places any

military gains it might achieve through the use of chemical weapons above its desire to form international alliances with major powers.

Further reading: "U.S. Diplomatic and Commercial Relationships with Iraq, 1980 - 2 August 1990", www.casi.org.uk/info/usdocs/usiraq80s90s.html

(b) Arming terrorists

One prospect raised by President Bush in his State of the Union address of 29 January was that hostile countries such as Iraq could supply non-state organisations with weapons of mass destruction, to use against the US:

"By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States."

The State Department's annual report on terrorism, released on 30 April 2001, stated that the Iraqi regime "has not attempted an anti Western terrorist attack" since 1993. The small paramilitary groups that Iraq supports, such as the Arab Liberation Front (in Palestine) and the Mujahidin e-Khalq (Iran), have no access to Iraq's more advanced weaponry, let alone weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, these groups have never carried out attacks on the US or Europe, and have little if any supporting infrastructure in those countries. The Iraqi regime has no credible links to al-Qa'ida, either in the perpetration of the 11 September attack, or in the presence in eastern Iraqi Kurdistan (controlled by the US-backed Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, not the Iraqi government, since 1991) of Ansar al-Islam. This group is an off-shoot of the US-backed Islamic Movement of Iraqi Kurdistan which has taken funds and arms from Iran and (reportedly) from al-Qa'ida.

The Iraqi regime has not been shown to have any intention of attacking the Western world, and it knows that it would be subject to massive reprisals if it did so. In summary, Iraq has shown no indication that it would be willing to use terrorists to threaten the outside world with weapons of mass destruction.

Further reading: "Did Mohamed Atta Meet an Iraqi Spy in Prague?", at slate.msn.com/?id=2070410

(c) Internal repression by the Iraqi military

As part of the Anfal campaign against the Kurds (February to September 1988), the Iraqi regime used chemical weapons extensively against its own civilian population. Between 50,000 and 186,000 Kurds were killed in these attacks, over 1,200 Kurdish villages were destroyed, and 300,000 Kurds were displaced. The most infamous chemical assault was on the town of Halabja in March 1988, which killed 5,000 people. Human Rights Watch regards the Anfal campaign as an act of genocide.

The Anfal campaign was carried out with the acquiescence of the West.

Rather than condemn the massacres of Kurds, the US escalated its support for Iraq. It joined in Iraq's attacks on Iranian facilities, blowing up two Iranian oil rigs and destroying an Iranian frigate a month after the Halabja attack. Within two months, senior US officials were encouraging corporate co-ordination through an Iraqi state-sponsored forum. The US administration opposed, and eventually blocked, a US Senate bill that cut off loans to Iraq. The US approved exports to Iraq of items with dual civilian and military use at double the rate in the aftermath of Halabja as it did before 1988. Iraqi written guarantees about civilian use were accepted by the US commerce department, which did not request licences and reviews (as it did for many other countries). The Bush Administration approved \$695,000 worth of advanced data transmission devices the day before Iraq invaded Kuwait.

As for the UK, ten days after the Foreign Office verbally condemned the Halabja massacre, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry rewarded Iraq by extending £400 million worth of credits to trade with Iraq.

The Iraqi regime has never used chemical weapons in the face of formal international opposition. The most effective way of preventing any future use against Iraqi civilians is to put this at the top of the human rights agenda between Iraq and the UN. The Iraqi regime's intentions to use chemical weapons against the Kurds will not be terminated by provoking a further conflict between the Iraqi state and its Kurdish population in which the Kurds are recruited as proxy forces. The original repression of the Kurds escalated into genocide in response to Iran's procurement of the support of the two main Kurdish parties for its military efforts from 1986. This is essentially the same role that the US sees for the Kurds in its current war preparations.

Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction are a false focus if the concern is with regional security. Chemical weapons were not used for Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. A peaceful Gulf region can be achieved only through building political links between Iraq and its neighbours. This is why the Arab states of the Middle East have started to reintegrate Iraq into regional networks and purposeful dialogue. Their interests are ill-served by attempts to turn the countries of the Gulf against each other once again.

Further reading: Dilip Hiro, "When US turned a blind eye to poison gas", at www.observer.co.uk/focus/story/0,6903,784125,00.html

2. Nuclear

In 1998, when the US ordered UN weapons inspectors to leave Iraq, it was widely accepted the Iraq's nuclear capacity had been wholly dismantled. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), charged with monitoring Iraq's nuclear facilities after the Gulf War, reported to the Security Council on 8 October 1997 and subsequently Iraq had compiled a "full, final and complete" account of its previous nuclear projects, and there was no indication of any prohibited activity. The IAEA's fact sheet from 25 April 2002, entitled "Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Programme", recorded that "There were no indications that there remains in Iraq any physical capability for the production of amounts of weapons-usable nuclear material of any practical significance."

In recent months, however, the UK government has put primary emphasis on Iraq's alleged nuclear programme. UK ministers have made three major claims:

(a) That Iraq was within three years of developing a nuclear bomb in 1991.

This could be true. Uranium was imported from Portugal, France, Italy and other countries; uranium enrichment facilities operated at Tuwaitha, Tarmiya, and Rashidiya, and centrifuge enrichment facilities were being built at al-Furat, largely with German assistance. Theoretical studies were underway into the design of reactors to produce plutonium, and laboratory trials were carried out at Tuwaitha. The main centre for the development of nuclear weapons was al-Atheer, where experiments with high explosives were carried out. However, IAEA experts maintain that Iraq has never had the capacity to enrich uranium sufficiently for a bomb and was extremely dependent on imports to create centrifuge facilities (report of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 28 June 2002). If this is so, Iraq may have only been close to developing a bomb if US and European assistance had continued to the same extent as before.

In the Gulf War, all Iraq's facilities capable of producing material for a nuclear programme and for enriching uranium were destroyed. The IAEA inspected and completed the destruction of these facilities, with the compliance of the Iraqi government. From 1991, the IAEA removed all known weapon usable materials from Iraq, including 22.4kg of highly enriched uranium. The IAEA left 1.8 tonnes of low-grade uranium in heavyweight sealed barrels at the Tuwaitha facilities. This uranium has remained untouched by the Iraqis, and is inspected annually by experts from the IAEA, who have confirmed that the seals had never been tampered with. The remaining facilities at Tuwaitha and buildings at al-Atheer were destroyed by the IAEA by 1992.

(b) That Iraq could make a nuclear device "within three years" without foreign assistance.

This claim, repeated by a UK Foreign Office minister, derives from a statement from the head of Germany's Federal Intelligence Service (BND) in February 2001 that Iraq could enrich its own uranium and construct its own nuclear device in three to six years. This claim was backed up by a statement from the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control that Iraq's only uranium extraction facility at al-Qaim has been rebuilt (it had been destroyed in 1991). If Iraq was again extracting uranium, then it could reasonably be presumed that it was intending to enrich and weaponise it. The allegation about Iraq's extraction of uranium, however, seems to be wrong.

Since the emergence of these claims, a number of journalists have visited al-Qaim and have found it in a state of disrepair. Paul McGeough, the much-respected Middle East correspondent of the Sydney Morning Herald, wrote on 4 September 2002 that the site appeared to be a "near-vacant lot ... as the result of a clean-up supervised by the [IAEA]". Reuters reporters have confirmed the same impression. If Iraq was hiding its nuclear extraction facilities every time a journalist visits, this would beg the question of when any extraction could actually take place.

If Iraq has no operating facilities to extract uranium, and if it continues to refrain from accessing the low-grade uranium sealed at Tuwaitha, then there is no way it could produce a nuclear device without foreign assistance.

Furthermore, enriching uranium requires substantial infrastructure and a power supply that could be easily spotted by US satellites. No such information has been provided. Over the past year, US and UK sources have made much of the fact that Iraq has attempted to import specialized steel and aluminium tubes that could be used in gas centrifuges that enrich uranium. According to the Washington Post (10 September 2002), such tubes are also used in making conventional artillery rockets, which Iraq is not prohibited from developing or possessing under UN resolutions. As David Albright, former IAEA inspector in Iraq and director of the Institute for Science and International Security, told the Washington Post, "This is actually a weak indicator for suggesting centrifuges -- it just doesn't build a case. I don't yet see evidence that says Iraq is close."

(c) That Iraq could have a nuclear bomb "within months" if fissile material is acquired from abroad.

Even the US Department of Defence recognises that claims about Iraq's imminent production of a nuclear bomb are not credible: "Iraq would need five or more years and key foreign assistance to rebuild the infrastructure to enrich enough material for a nuclear weapon" (January 2001 intelligence estimate). However, the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) managed to hit the headlines in September 2002 by

claiming that Iraq "could assemble nuclear weapons within months if fissile material from foreign sources were obtained." This claim is no more than a tautology.

If Iraq could import the core material for a bomb, then it would have a bomb. Obtaining the fissile material is the most difficult part of constructing any nuclear device, and there are no signs that Iraq has attempted to obtain any such material from abroad. According to the Nuclear Control Institute (nci.org/heu.htm), "With bomb-grade, high-enriched uranium (HEU), a student could make a bomb powerful enough to destroy a city". Unless we are to stop any students of physics from entering Iraq, the best control on the circulation of fissile material would be to invest resources into safeguarding Russia's nuclear material. We would then need to complete a fissile-material cut-off treaty as agreed by the UN General Assembly in 1993.

On 7 September 2002, Tony Blair and George Bush proclaimed that commercial satellite photographs showing new buildings near a facility that had been part of Iraq's nuclear programme before 1991 were "proof" of Iraqi intentions. By contrast, a spokesperson from the IAEA - which had provided the pictures months earlier - said: "We have no idea whether it means anything. Construction of a building is one thing. Restarting a nuclear program is another."

Further reading:

IAEA's fact sheet from 25 April 2002, entitled "Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Programme" www.iaea.org/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/nwp2.html Garry Dillon (IAEA Action Team in Iraq: Director of Operations from January 1994, head from June 1997), "The IAEA Iraq Action Team Record: Activities and Findings", in Iraq: A New Approach (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, August 2002), at www.ceip.org/files/pdf/Iraq.Report.pdf

3. Chemical and biological

Allegations about Iraq's chemical and biological weapons fall into three categories:

- that Iraq has retained weapons that were produced before 1991.
- that Iraq has kept or rebuilt facilities since 1998, which are allegedly producing or able to produce new chemical or biological agents that can subsequently be weaponised; and
- that Iraq could threaten other countries by delivering these agents, by missile or through other means.

(a) Retained stocks? Up to 1998, a substantial part of the work of the weapons inspectors in Iraq was to track down chemical and biological agents that Iraq produced before their entry in 1991, and to check the documentation that showed how much of each agent Iraq had manufactured. However, the amount Iraq is thought to have produced in the 1980s was found to be greater than the quantity that Iraq or the inspectors verified as having destroyed. The discrepancy between the two levels is the amount that remains - in the inspectors' language - "unaccounted for".

The levels of agents that are unaccounted for in this way is large: 600 metric tonnes of chemical agents, such as mustard gas, VX and sarin; and extensive amounts of biological agents, including thousands of litres of anthrax as well as quantities of botulinum toxin, aflatoxin, and gas gangrene, all of which had been weaponised before 1991. But the fact that these quantities are unaccounted for does not mean that they still exist. Iraq has never provided a full declaration of its use of chemical and biological weapons against Iran in the 1980-88 war, and destroyed large quantities of its own stocks of these weapons in 1991 without keeping sufficient proof of its actions.

In some cases, it is quite clear that the stocks no longer exist in usable form. Most chemical and biological agents are subject to processes of deterioration. A working paper by the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (Unscm) from January 1998 noted that: "Taking into consideration the conditions and the quality of CW-agents and munitions produced by Iraq at that time, there is no possibility of weapons remaining from the mid-1980's" (quoted in Ritter, *Arms Control Today*, June 2000). Many other chemical or biological warfare agents have a shorter shelf life. The sarin produced by Iraq in the 1980s was found to have up to 40% impurities, entailing that it would deteriorate within two years. With regard to biological weapons, the assessment by Professor Anthony H. Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies should be taken seriously: "The shelf-life and lethality of Iraq's weapons is unknown, but it seems likely that the shelf-life was limited. In balance, it seems probable that any agents Iraq retained after the Gulf War now have very limited lethality, if any" (Iraq's Past and Future Biological Weapons Capabilities, 1998, p.13).

There are two potential exceptions for materials that would not be expected to have deteriorated if produced before 1991. Mustard gas has been found to persist over time, as shown when Unscm discovered four intact mustard-filled artillery shells that would still have constituted a viable weapon. Unscm oversaw the destruction of 12,747 of Iraq's 13,500 mustard shells. The Iraqi regime claimed that the remaining shells had been destroyed by US/UK bombardment. This claim has not been verified or disproved. However, as former UN weapons inspector Scott Ritter notes, "A few hundred 155 mm mustard shells have little military value on

the modern battlefield. A meaningful CW attack using artillery requires thousands of rounds. Retention of such a limited number of shells makes no sense and cannot be viewed as a serious threat."

The other potential exception is VX nerve agent. It became clear to Unscm during the 1990s that Iraq had succeeded before 1991 in producing stabilised VX in its laboratories - that is, VX agents that would not deteriorate over time. However, to produce significant stocks of VX requires advanced technology that Iraq did not have. Iraq did have some elements of the production equipment for developing VX on a large scale. Unscm tested this equipment before destroying it in 1996, and found that it had never been used. This would indicate that Iraq, despite its attempts before 1991, had never succeeded in producing VX on a significant scale.

(b) Re-built facilities? If the stocks that Iraq had produced before 1991 are no longer a credible threat, then what of the facilities that Iraq may still have to produce more weapons of mass destruction? The major facilities that Iraq had prior to 1991 have all been destroyed. The Muthanna State Establishment, Iraq's main plant for the production of chemical warfare agents, was destroyed partially through aerial bombardment and partly under Unscm supervision. Al-Hakam, Iraq's main biological weapons facility that was designed to make up to 50,000 litres of anthrax, botulinum toxin and other agents a year, was destroyed in May-June 1996.

However, US and UK officials have claimed that new plants have been built since 1998. Among the allegations are that two chemical plants that were used to produce weapons before 1991 have been rebuilt at Fallujah; further chemical and biological weapons sites have been partially constructed at Daura and Taji; and that "mobile biological production laboratories" have been deployed that would be able to circumvent any inspectors who are re-admitted into Iraq. It has also been claimed that other existing civilian facilities have been partially converted so as to be able to produce agents for weapons of mass destruction.

These allegations are difficult to assess. Even the IISS study of September 2002 - edited by Gary Samore who had been a senior member of President Clinton's staff and thus involved two years before in the making of the allegations - concluded that the claims about mobile laboratories were "hard to confirm". Much of the information comes from individuals who claim to have been scientists employed by the Iraqi government but who have now "defected" to Europe or the US. The US has offered financial rewards to scientists who defect, as well as guarantees of asylum. As a result, many of the claims may be exaggerated, highly speculative or simply concocted. US State Department officials have often mentioned that they do not take verbal information obtained from defectors seriously; it may be more plausible to assume that their information is publicised more as part of attempts to win support for a war than to make a realistic assessment of Iraqi weapons development.

The Iraqi government has invited journalists to visit some of the sites that the UK and US have mentioned. For example, journalists who visited the Taji warehouse in mid-August - which the US claimed days before was a major biological weapons facility - found only "boxes of powdered milk from Yemen, Vietnam, Tunisia and Indonesia and sacks of sugar imported from Egypt and India", according to the Reuters correspondent. The visiting journalists are not weapons inspectors, and do not have the resources to monitor facilities for chemical agents or radiation; but they are able to ascertain if major new production facilities have been constructed. Now that the Iraqi Foreign Minister has made an unconditional offer to the UN to readmit weapons inspectors (on 16 September), allegations about the production of new facilities can be checked. However, the British Foreign Secretary and the White House have both disparaged the Iraqi offer, even though it could lead to the verified disarmament of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.

(c) Delivering an attack? Possession of chemical or biological agents is not enough to threaten another country, even if the Iraqi regime desired to. British and American claims about possession have therefore been linked to allegations that Iraq could fire these agents on missiles, which could even reach Europe.

The first problem with this claim is the very low number of longer range missiles that Iraq might have. According to Unscm, by 1997, 817 out of Iraq's known 819 ballistic missiles had been certifiably destroyed. On the worst-case assumption that Iraq has salvaged some of the parts for these missiles and has reconstructed them since 1998, even Charles Duelfer - former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, deputy head of Unscm and strong proponent of an invasion of Iraq - has provided an estimate of only 12 to 14 missiles held by Iraq. Even under this scenario, it is difficult to see Iraq posing a threat to the rest of the world through its missiles. Furthermore, biological weapons cannot be effectively dispersed through ballistic missiles. According to the IISS, much of the biological agent would be destroyed on impact and the area of dispersal would be small. For example, if anthrax is filled into missile warheads, up to 95% of the content is not dispersed (according to the Director of Intelligence of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff: www.bt.usf.edu/reports/Anthraxthreat.pdf).

British ministers have made much of the claim that Iraq has experimented with using small Czech-built L-29 training jets as remote-controlled drones, which could deliver chemical and biological weapons. Such drones were apparently spotted at Iraq's Talil airbase in 1998. A British defence official invoked the possibility that if these drones were flown at low altitudes under the right conditions, a single drone could unleash a toxic cloud engulfing several city blocks. He labelled them "drones of death". The hyperbole is misleading: even if Iraq has designed such planes, they would not serve their purpose, as drones are easy to shoot down. A simple air defence system would be enough to prevent the drones from causing damage to neighbouring countries. The L-29 has a total range of less than 400 miles: it would be all but impossible to use it in an attack on Israel. The only possibility for their use against Western targets would be their potential deployment against invading troops.

Further reading: Scott Ritter (former head of Unsc's Concealment Unit), "The Case for Iraq's Qualitative Disarmament", from Arms Control Today (June 2000), at www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_06/iraqjun.asp

4. Conclusion

Many of the assessments of Iraq's development of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons are based largely on a hypothetical analysis of what could be done by the Iraqi regime if it was determined to produce these weapons. Using worst-case scenarios, they present Iraq's potential activities - such as importing fissile material or producing anthrax spores - as an immediate threat. Whilst such assessments may be valuable in order to understand the range of possibilities, they do not provide any evidence of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction or the Iraqi regime's intention to use them. As Hans Blix, executive chairman of Unmovic - the new UN weapons inspection body - said on 10 September, there is much that is unknown about Iraq's programmes,

"but this is not the same as saying there are weapons of mass destruction. If I had solid evidence that Iraq retained weapons of mass destruction or were constructing such weapons I would take it to the Security Council."

You cannot launch a war on the basis of unconfirmed suspicions of both weapons and intentions. It would be better to take up Iraq's unconditional offer of 16 September to allow inspectors to return, and to reject the plans for an invasion to achieve "regime change".

The US and UK policy has been to provide disincentives to Iraqi compliance rather than incentives. The UK has refused to rule out its support for "regime change" even if a full weapons inspections system is in place: Foreign Secretary Jack Straw has only said that the possibility of an invasion "recedes" in such circumstances. Senior members of the present US administration have been more forthright: Vice-President Cheney labelled the return of weapons inspectors to Iraq as counterproductive in his Nashville speech of 26 August. Inspections would be counterproductive to US war plans, but would also serve to discover - and if necessary, constrain - Iraq's weapons programmes.

If the Iraqi regime is led to believe that the US has made an invasion inevitable, it will have no reason to co-operate with weapons inspectors. As Hans Blix said on 18 August, "If the Iraqis conclude that an invasion by someone is inevitable then they might conclude that it's not very meaningful to have inspections."

The Iraqi regime also has a clear disincentive if it believes that the weapons inspectors will - like their predecessors in Unsc - collect information that the US government would use to plot its overthrow. That Unsc was engaged in such actions is now beyond doubt. Its executive director from 1991 to 1997, Rolf Ekéus, said on 28 July that the US tried to gather information about Iraq's security services, its conventional military capacity and even the location of Saddam Hussein through the supposedly impartial weapons inspections programme. It is not hard to guess why the US wanted such information.

Iraq has repeatedly asked for a clear timetable for the lifting of economic sanctions to be coupled with the weapons inspections system. This is not an unreasonable demand: in fact, it was the agreement made in the ceasefire that ended the Gulf War, and which the US in particular has done so much since 1991 to obscure. The ceasefire agreement - Security Council Resolution 687 - lays out the elements of a political solution: an independent weapons inspectorate, an end to the threat of war, a clear timetable to lifting economic sanctions, and the creation of a weapons of mass destruction free zone in the Middle East (entailing the need for the end of Israel's nuclear arsenal).

On each of these four points, the US in particular stands in clear violation of the terms of the agreement.

The consequences of that violation have been apparent in the deterioration of the weapons inspections system. Garry B. Dillon, the Director of Operations of the IAEA Action Team in Iraq from January 1994, and its head from June 1997, characterised Iraq's compliance with the nuclear inspectorate from late 1991 to mid-1998 as "essentially adequate" (in the paper cited on p.4 above). Dillon concludes that "Iraq's motivation to co-operate was shattered by the statement [by the then-US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright] that, regardless of Iraq's compliance, the embargo and the sanctions would not be lifted as long as President Saddam Hussein

remained in power". Backing a "carrot and stick" approach to Iraq, Dillon argues that "the carrot should represent a tangible benefit, not merely the withholding of the stick. Indeed, during 1998, Iraq repeatedly claimed that 'the light at the end of the tunnel had gone out.'"

If the US and UK re-engage with the political process that was laid out in the ceasefire resolution, Iraq will once again be provided with reasons to cooperate with the weapons inspectorate. That possibility, which will remove the need for instigating a humanitarian crisis inside Iraq and instability in the region, should not be dismissed lightly.

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Philadelphia Inquirer

Iraq has failed in quest for bomb ingredients

By Jonathan S. Landay - Inquirer Washington Bureau
13 September 2002

WASHINGTON - President Bush said yesterday that Iraq could make a nuclear bomb within a year of obtaining enriched uranium or plutonium. But Saddam Hussein has been unable to get that nuclear fuel for more than a decade. There are two ways for him to obtain these fissile materials: purchasing them on the black market, or making them himself. U.S. officials and independent experts said he had had no luck at either.

Despite "trying like the dickens," according to a senior U.S. official, Iraqi front companies are not believed to have succeeded in buying any significant quantities of highly enriched uranium or plutonium. "It's hard, because there is not much of it out there, and there are a lot of people trying to prevent bad people from getting it," the official said, speaking on condition of anonymity.

Moreover, there is no evidence that Iraq has succeeded in rebuilding its fissile-materials production facilities, some of which were destroyed by U.S. bombs in the 1991 Persian Gulf war and others by U.N. inspectors afterward, U.S. officials and experts said.

In fact, Bush's contention yesterday that Iraq has attempted to buy high-strength aluminum tubes for enriching uranium indicates that the country has only begun the years of work needed to reach production. The tubes would be used to build high-speed centrifuges, and it would take considerable time to build, network and operate them long enough to obtain sufficient quantities of bomb-grade material.

Bush said in his speech to the U.N. General Assembly that the world could not wait for certainty about Hussein's nuclear plans. "The first time that we may be completely certain he has nuclear weapons is when, God forbid, he uses one," the President said in making his case for action on Iraq.

Most U.S. officials and independent experts agree that Iraq is trying to rebuild its nuclear-weapons program. But they say that after nearly four years without U.N. weapons inspections, it is nearly impossible to say with certainty how much progress Baghdad has made.

Iraq embarked on a massive nuclear-weapons program after Israeli jet fighters destroyed its Osirak reactor in 1981, eliminating it as a source of plutonium. Experts inside and outside the U.S. government said that by the 1991 gulf war, Iraq's program was much further along than had been suspected by the U.S. intelligence community or the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Iraqi scientists and technicians secretly overcame most of the substantial hurdles and were progressing toward building an implosion-type device. In such a device, a jacket of conventional explosives is used to compress a mass of plutonium or highly enriched uranium until it explodes in a nuclear detonation.

According to materials IAEA inspectors gathered, Iraqi scientists developed key non-nuclear components for such a bomb, including a complex firing system and the conventional explosives that would be required to compress plutonium or highly enriched uranium. That work was enhanced by know-how Iraq obtained at a U.S. government seminar in 1989, according to Khidir Hamza, a former director of Iraq's nuclear program who defected in 1994.

Iraqi scientists also were pursuing a number of processes to obtain the fuel for a nuclear weapon, concentrating on separating uranium 235 from other uranium isotopes. After its 1990 invasion of Kuwait, Iraq

launched a crash program to obtain uranium 235 by separating it chemically from highly enriched uranium illegally diverted from two IAEA-policed research reactors.

U.S. bombs badly damaged Iraq's chemical-separation plant. After the war, IAEA inspectors charged with dismantling Iraq's nuclear program removed the highly enriched uranium from the two reactors. The IAEA contends that by the time U.N. inspections ended in 1998 it had uncovered and destroyed virtually all of Iraq's nuclear-weapons facilities. But it also says that only a resumption of the inspections can verify whether Iraq has resumed its pursuit of a nuclear bomb.

Meanwhile, a new analysis by an influential think tank says a U.S. invasion of Iraq could prompt Hussein to unleash his chemical or biological weapons. The report, by Iraq expert Anthony Cordesman for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, also says the United States is months from being fully prepared for an invasion.

Cordesman, a former intelligence analyst at the Defense Department, made some of the same arguments Bush has: Iraq probably is trying to develop biological weapons so deadly they would rival nuclear weapons in terms of casualties, he wrote, and Hussein could give such weapons to terrorists.

Current worst-case scenarios involve Iraq's using chemical or biological weapons to inflict serious casualties on U.S. forces or Israel, Cordesman wrote. Either scenario could prompt the United States or Israel to threaten Iraq with - or even use - nuclear weapons, he wrote. Hussein "must realize that major, highly lethal, Iraqi CBRN [chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear] strikes on Israeli population centers are likely to trigger a nuclear war," Cordesman wrote.

The Guardian

Sifting the old claims from new and suspicions from assertions of fact

Tony Blair declared yesterday that his long-awaited dossier on Iraq proves Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction programme is 'up and running'. As politicians clashed over the 50-page report, the Guardian put its main findings to a panel of seven experts. Ranging from former weapons inspectors to academics on both sides of the Atlantic, their responses ranged from the sceptical to the enthusiastic

Nicholas Watt and David Pallister
Wednesday September 25, 2002

Nuclear weapons

The claims

- Scientists recalled in 1998 to nuclear weapons programme
- Iraq seeking to acquire key elements for gas centrifuge system to enrich uranium for a bomb - includes 60,000 aluminium tubes, entire magnet production and vacuum pumps
- Attempts to secure "significant quantities" of uranium from Africa
- Ending or weakening of sanctions would allow Iraq to produce a bomb on its own after at least five years. With foreign help, it could be one or two years

The assessment

Scientists agree that the individual elements that Iraq is alleged to have tried to buy for a gas centrifuge system are not significant on their own, but collectively they suggest a concerted effort to build a bomb.

Gary Samore of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, which recently produced its own assessment of the Iraqi threat, said: "Individually many of these have dual-use applications and taken alone none of them amounts to a smoking gun. But together this is highly suggestive that Iraq is trying to make a gas centrifuge system."

His remarks were echoed by David Kay, UN chief weapons inspector between 1991 and 1992. "The aluminium tubes are significant - that is the first time we have seen that number of tubes. That is a genuinely industrial scale production. But it all has to go together because the tubes are nothing on their own. They have to be spun at incredible speed."

Mr Kay was also struck by Iraq's alleged attempt to procure an entire magnet production line. There is no other use for them, he said, than in the uranium enrichment process.

One of the key allegations in the dossier - that the Iraqis have tried to procure uranium from Africa - did not come as a surprise to Mr Kay who said that the claim was first made by an Iraqi defector. Basing this claim on "intelligence" in the dossier suggests that MI6 may have better information than the defector, but the information is too vague to be able to make a judgment.

Mr Kay said: "I do not know whether to be concerned or really, really worried. If they attempted to get uranium from Africa I would be concerned. If they succeeded, then my concern goes up several levels."

But Bhupendra Jasani, visiting professor at the department of war studies, King's College London, said that the allegations about Africa needed to be backed up by more evidence. "Uranium ore on its own is no good, so you need to ask where is it being processed, how it will take weapons form and how it will be put onto a warhead. Lots of stages are missing."

Prof Jasani said that it would be relatively easy to prove whether a uranium enrichment plant had been set up. "An enrichment plant needs a very large source of electric power. It also needs cooling facilities, such as a river or a pond, because the centrifuge moves at great speed. You can see water being discharged through thermal imaging." All these would be signs, he said, that "it is an enrichment plant and not a Tesco".

Chemical weapons

The claims

- Continuing production of chemical weapons. Attempts to procure dual-use chemicals and industrial chemical production resumed at renovated sites formerly associated with its chemical warfare programme.
- Capacity to produce significant quantities of mustard gas within weeks and nerve agents within months.
- Chlorine and phenol produced at Fallujah 2, north-west of Baghdad, could be used as precursors for chemical agents
- Command and control system in place to launch a chemical weapon within 45 minutes of an order

The assessment

Most expert observers agree that Iraq is continuing to develop chemical weapons, that it already has some in stock and that it has a limited capacity to deliver them over both battlefield and longer ranges. The dossier does little to expand on the detailed summary published last month by the International Institute for Strategic Studies . That concluded: "On balance, an arsenal of this size is insufficient for sustained offensive military operations and is unlikely to inflict militarily significant casualties on well-trained and well-equipped troops." Observers point out that the dossier's intelligence in this area is weak, mainly because the plants are ostensibly for civilian, industrial production. "Without UN weapons inspectors," the dossier said, "it is very difficult to be sure about the true nature of many of Iraq's facilities."

Prof Jasani is making a study of Iraq's chemical plants from commercial satellite imagery. Dual-use plants are the most difficult to analyse, he said. "But it is possible to detect tell-tale signs. At Fullujah 2, for example, one can see it is a highly sensitive place with military perimeter fencing in a highly secured area. Then there are the defences like anti-aircraft guns. Generally, secure places in remote areas with good transportation facilities and a large water supply can be considered suspect."

He added that he would have liked to have seen some sequential photographs in the dossier showing how the places were gradually rebuilt to back up that contention.

Apart from the knowledge that Iraq retained unaccountable amounts of material and delivery systems after the inspectors left in 1998, the dossier provides no hard evidence of either military applications at these plants or of successful procurement abroad. Much reliance is placed on the fact that the country did manufacture chemical weapons in the past, and was prepared to use them.

The suggestion that a chemical or biological weapon could be launched in 45 minutes is regarded as credible. Wyn Bowen, a UN weapons inspector in 1997-98 and now a senior lecturer in defence studies, King's College, London, said that lapse of time would be possible for certain delivery systems. "I suppose they are referring to aerial bombs or artillery shells which are the easiest to deliver. It just takes a telephone call. The time is less likely for a missile unless they have been well-maintained and the crew is properly trained. But if that's the case a chemical or biological warhead could be launched in that time."

Trevor Findlay, director of the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre in London, was unsure about the 45-minute claim. "It's a bit vague because it makes no mention of what delivery system would be used within 45 minutes. Does it mean artillery shells, gravity bombs or ballistic missiles? It gives the impression that it is talking about ballistic missiles but that is not clear.

"That is of course deliberate because the intelligence information must be protected - this report is not footnoted."

Despite his doubts, Dr Findlay described the dossier as "credible". But he added: "It does not give new grounds for a pre-emptive strike against Iraq. It does add grist to the mill for the UN security council's deliberations on a new resolution."

Biological weapons

The claims

- Iraq continues to produce biological agents and has the means to deliver them as weapons. It is "judged to be self-sufficient in the technology required to produce biological weapons", which include anthrax, botulinum toxin, aflatoxin and ricin.
- Intelligence suggests that Iraq was starting to produce biological warfare agents in mobile production facilities and could produce agents within weeks if required

The assessment

Iraq did not acknowledge that it had made biological weapons - as opposed to manufacturing the agents - until the defection of Hussein Kamal, Saddam's son-in-law, in 1995.

According to the former weapons inspector Scott Ritter, he told UNSCOM: "I ordered destruction of all weapons - biological, chemical, missile, nuclear - all were destroyed."

Ritter himself commented: "Everything Hussein Kamal said about Iraq's undeclared weapons programs was confirmed."

Since the inspectors left, however, defectors have alleged that the programme is continuing.

The dossier does not enhance what was already known and published, according to western military experts.

"The short answer is that very little is new," says Professor Paul Rogers of the Bradford University peace studies department. The IISS report, drawing on published sources, concluded: "Iraq retains a significant capability to produce BW agent. It may have substantial stocks of previously produced agent which it successfully concealed from UNSCOM." Delivery systems, said the IISS, were "limited" and inaccurate.

The dossier does not produce hard evidence that civilian facilities are being turned to dual use and the limited reconstruction of suspect sites is based on satellite pictures.

The assertion that Iraq can produce agents within weeks is in the public domain.

Mobile production facilities are also known about. A recent defector has said that disguised refrigerated Renault trucks have been converted to biological production laboratories.

The foot and mouth plant at al-Dawra which was used to produce botulinum toxin and possibly anthrax was renovated last year after a formal request by Iraq to the United Nations food and agriculture organisation based in Rome. After an inspection the FAO recommended that renovations went ahead.

Ballistic missiles

The claims

- Work began in 1998 to develop missiles with range over 1,000km, contravening UN rules which impose 150km limit
- Up to 20 al-Hussein missiles, used in attacks on Israel and Saudi Arabia and Israel in the Gulf war, have been retained in breach of UN
- Iraq plans to extend the range of al-Samoud and Ababil-100 missiles to 200km
- Missile production infrastructure was rebuilt after allied bombing
- Iraqi agents and "front companies in third countries" are attempting to acquire propellant chemicals for ballistic missiles

The assessment

Scientists agree that a satellite image on page 29 of the dossier, which shows a large new weapons stand at an Iraqi test facility, is highly significant. But the satellite image is of such poor quality that they warned they have to accept the government at its word.

Wyn Bowen, a weapons inspector from 1997 to 1998 who is a senior lecturer in defence studies at King's College London, said the satellite photo shows the Iraqis are looking at the development of a larger engine.

"The bigger the test stand, the larger the engine and the longer the range of the missile. But there are unlikely to be any flight tests of the missiles with a range over 150km because that would be detected." His remarks were echoed by Mr Kay. He said: "I have not seen those weapons stands before. The map is scary as hell for the European allies who would be within its range."

But Mr Kay and Dr Bowen disagreed on the government's claim that 20 al-Hussein missiles have been hidden by the Iraqis. Dr Bowen said this claim was new.

Mr Kay said that Britain and the US had long claimed that Iraq had hidden around 20 of the missiles, in contrast to the UN which believes the figure is less than a dozen. "This is a long and complex argument," he said.

Dr Samore attached great significance to the claim that Iraq has rebuilt its missile infrastructure, most notably at the al-Mamoun plant to produce ammonium perchlorate - a key ingredient in the production of solid propellant rockets. "We have known that Iraq has rebuilt its facilities but this is the first time that [al-Mamoun] has been identified." Mr Kay thought that weapons inspectors would be greatly interested in this section of the dossier. "The missile programme is the one thing that inspectors can threaten the most. You can hide existing ones but you cannot hide new ones.

"Al-Mamoun is a facility that inspectors can go to and sit on top of. You can be sure whether castings are being made for non-approved missiles."

Mr Kay was particularly disturbed by the dossier's claim that Iraqi agents are attempting to procure propellant chemicals for ballistic missiles. "That is significant. That sort of paragraph is what we would like to have more detail on. If they seek to acquire those sorts of things from a country like Ukraine, which has poor export licence system, then we have a great deal to worry about."

Willingness to use weapons

The claims

- Saddam attaches great importance to weapons of mass destruction, believing they form the basis for his standing in the region
- Iraq is prepared to use weapons on his own people, particularly Shia Muslims in the south

The assessment

The International Institute for Strategic Studies believes that Saddam attaches great importance to chemical weapons because they played a decisive role in forcing the Iranians to the negotiating table at the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988.

Academics are divided on this interpretation of history, but they all agree that Saddam believes that retaining weapons of mass destruction are crucial to his survival.

Rosemary Hollis, of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, said: "The academic wisdom is that Saddam's motives are to do with survival and his stature. But if he uses them it will be the end because the rules have changed. When he used poison gas on the Iranians in 1984 he was called to account by the Americans, but this was not pursued vigorously. That has changed."

Dr Hollis was sceptical of the dossier's claim that Saddam would use chemical weapons on his own people, in particular the Shia Muslims of the south. "That is a wild card and sounds like a bit of a wind up. That claim can only be made on the basis of the extrapolation of facts from the way in which the Shia rebellion in the south was crushed so brutally in 1991. This claim is not based on fact, it is based on supposition."

Dr Findlay said that Britain's claim that Saddam would like to attack its Shia population was speculation. He added: "What is missing from the dossier is anything serious about intention. If Iraq is bellicose towards its neighbours that should be brought out. But there is no discussion of that. There is lots about Iraq's capabilities. But the question is whether Iraq is planning to use its weapons for anything other than deterrence and self-defence."

Sources of information

The claims

The government was constrained by the need to protect its sources of intelligence. This meant that crucial new claims in the dossier, such as the allegation that Iraq has sought to buy uranium from Africa, could not be substantiated.

The assessment

Academics and scientists were divided on whether the government could have provided more details.

Prof Jasani said that the dossier could have made greater use of "before and after" satellite pictures - the only images were grainy photographs showing current sites. "It is disappointing the way they have dealt with satellite images," he said. "If you are going to convince people then they should have made more use of this."

Prof Jasani was critical of one of the main satellite pictures on page 20 of the dossier which shows the Ibn Sina Company at Tarmiyah.

"This was a nuclear site, it is significant that it is now chemical related. It would have been nice to have had a before and after image. They could have shown it soon after the Gulf war when a lot of facilities were destroyed. I have a 1991 image from a French satellite. It shows that a lot was destroyed. You can now see that new buildings have cropped up. They could have shown the change very easily."

But Mr Kay was impressed by the dossier and believed that the government had struck the right balance of providing strong evidence without compromising its intelligence sources. "It is a very useful dossier. I have not found anything pulled together in this way before. "

Agency Disavows Report On Iraq Arms

By Joseph Curl, The Washington Times
27 September 2002

The International Atomic Energy Agency says that a report cited by President Bush as evidence that Iraq in 1998 was "six months away" from developing a nuclear weapon does not exist. "There's never been a report like that issued from this agency," Mark Gwozdecky, the IAEA's chief spokesman, said yesterday in a telephone interview from the agency's headquarters in Vienna, Austria. "We've never put a time frame on how long it might take Iraq to construct a nuclear weapon in 1998," said the spokesman of the agency charged with assessing Iraq's nuclear capability for the United Nations.

In a Sept. 7 news conference with British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Mr. Bush said: "I would remind you that when the inspectors first went into Iraq and were denied finally denied access [in 1998], a report came out of the Atomic the IAEA that they were six months away from developing a weapon. "I don't know what more evidence we need," said the president, defending his administration's case that Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein was building weapons of mass destruction.

The White House says Mr. Bush was referring to an earlier IAEA report. "He's referring to 1991 there," said Deputy Press Secretary Scott McClellan. "In '91, there was a report saying that after the war they found out they were about six months away." Mr. Gwozdecky said no such report was ever issued by the IAEA in 1991.

Many news agencies including The Washington Times reported Mr. Bush's Sept. 7 comments as referring to a 1998 IAEA report. The White House did not ask for a correction from The Times.

To clear up the confusion, Mr. McClellan cited two news articles from 1991: a July 16 story in the London Times by Michael Evans and a July 18 story in the New York Times by Paul Lewis. But neither article cites an IAEA report on Iraq's nuclear-weapons program or states that Saddam was only six months away from "developing a weapon" as claimed by Mr. Bush.

The article by Mr. Evans says: "Jay Davis, an American expert working for the U.N. special commission charged with removing Iraq's nuclear capability, said Iraq was only six months away from the large-scale production of enriched uranium at two plants inspected by UN officials."

The Lewis article said Iraq in 1991 had a uranium "enrichment plant using electromagnetic technology [that] was about six months from becoming operational."

In October 1998, just before Saddam kicked U.N. weapons inspectors out of Iraq, the IAEA laid out a case opposite of Mr. Bush's Sept. 7 declaration. "There are no indications that there remains in Iraq any physical capability for the production of weapon-usable nuclear material of any practical significance," IAEA Director-General Mohammed Elbaradei wrote in a report to U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan.

Mr. Bush and Mr. Blair on Sept. 7 cited an agency "report" declaring that satellite photography revealed the Iraqis had undertaken new construction at several nuclear-related sites. This week, the IAEA said no such report existed.

The IAEA also took issue with a Sept. 9 report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies cited by the Bush administration that concludes Saddam "could build a nuclear bomb within months if he were able to obtain fissile material." "There is no evidence in our view that can be substantiated on Iraq's nuclear-weapons program. If anybody tells you they know the nuclear situation in Iraq right now, in the absence of four years of inspections, I would say that they're misleading you because there isn't solid evidence out there," Mr. Gwozdecky said.

"I don't know where they have determined that Iraq has retained this much weaponization capability because when we left in December '98 we had concluded that we had neutralized their nuclear-weapons program. We had confiscated their fissile material. We had destroyed all their key buildings and equipment," he said.

Mr. Gwozdecky said there is no evidence about Saddam's nuclear capability right now either through his organization, other agencies or any government.

INSPECTIES

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

August 2002

A new approach: Coercive inspections

Jessica Mathews

The summary proposal that follows draws heavily on the expertise of all those who participated in the Carnegie discussions on Iraq and on the individually authored papers. Further explanation and greater detail on virtually every point, especially the proposal's military aspects, can be found therein. See: <http://www.ceip.org/files/pdf/Iraq.Report.pdf>

With rising emphasis in recent months, the president has made clear that the United States' number one concern in Iraq is its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). No link has yet been found between Baghdad's assertively secular regime and radical Islamist terrorists. There is much else about the Iraqi government that is fiercely objectionable but nothing that presents an imminent threat to the region, the United States, or the world. Thus, the United States' primary goal is, and should be, to deal with the WMD threat.

In light of what is now a four-year-long absence of international inspectors from the country, it has been widely assumed that the United States has only two options regarding that threat: continue to do nothing to find and destroy Iraq's nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile programs, or pursue covert action or a full-scale military operation to overthrow Saddam Hussein. At best, the latter would be a unilateral initiative with grudging partners.

This paper proposes a third approach, a middle ground between an unacceptable status quo that allows Iraqi WMD programs to continue and the enormous costs and risks of an invasion. It proposes a new regime of coercive international inspections.

A powerful, multinational military force, created by the UN Security Council, would enable UN and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection teams to carry out "comply or else" inspections. The "or else" is overthrow of the regime. The burden of choosing war is placed squarely on Saddam Hussein.

The middle-ground option is a radical change from the earlier international inspection effort in which the playing field was tilted steeply in Iraq's favor. It requires a military commitment sufficient to pose a credible threat to Iraq and would take a vigorous diplomatic initiative on Washington's part to launch. Long-term success would require *sustained* unity of purpose among the major powers.

These difficulties make this approach attractive only in comparison to the alternatives, but in that light, its virtues emerge sharply. Inspections backed by a force authorized by the UN Security Council would carry unimpeachable legitimacy and command broad international support. The effort would therefore strengthen, rather than undermine, the cooperation the United States needs for long-term success in the war against terrorism. It would avoid a direct blow to the authority of the Security Council and the rule of law. It would avoid setting a dangerous precedent of a unilateral right to attack in "preventive self-defense." Although not likely to be welcomed by Iraq's neighbors, it would be their clear choice over war. Regional assistance (basing, over-flight rights, and so on) should therefore be more forthcoming. If successful, it would reduce Iraq's WMD threat to negligible levels. If a failure, it would lay an operational and political basis for a transition to a war to oust Saddam. The United States would be seen to have worked through the United Nations with the rest of the world rather than alone, and Iraq's intent would have been cleanly tested and found wanting. Baghdad would be isolated. In these circumstances, the risks to the region of a war to overthrow Iraq's government—from domestic pressure on shaky governments (Pakistan) to governments misreading U.S. intentions (Iran) to heightened Arab and Islamic anger toward the United States—would be sharply diminished.

Compared to a war aimed at regime change, the approach greatly reduces the risk of Saddam's using whatever WMD he has (probably against Israel) while a force aimed at his destruction is being assembled. On the political front, coercive inspections avoid the looming question of what regime would replace the current government. It would also avoid the risks of persistent instability in Iraq, its possible disintegration into Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish regions, and the need to station tens of thousands of U.S. troops in the country for what could be a very long time.

A year ago, this approach would have been impossible.

Since then, however, four factors have combined to make it achievable:

- greatly increased concern about WMD in the wake of September 11,
- Iraq's continued lies and intransigence even after major reform of the UN sanctions regime,
- Russia's embrace of the United States after the September 11 attacks, and
- the Bush administration's threats of unilateral military action, which have opened a political space that did not exist before.

Together, these changes have restored a consensus among the Security Council's five permanent members (P-5) regarding the need for action on Iraq's WMD that has not existed for the past five years.

CORE PREMISES

Several key premises underlie the new approach.

Inspections can work. In their first five years, the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), which was responsible for inspecting and disarming Iraq's chemical, biological, and missile materials and capacities, and the IAEA Iraq Action Team, which did the same for Iraq's nuclear ones, achieved substantial successes. With sufficient human and technological resources, time, and political support, inspections can reduce Iraq's WMD threat, if not to zero, to a negligible level. (The term *inspections* encompasses a resumed discovery and disarmament phase and intrusive, ongoing monitoring and verification extending to dual-use facilities and the activities of key individuals.)

Saddam Hussein's overwhelming priority is to stay in power. He will never willingly give up pursuit of WMD, but he will do so if convinced that the only alternative is his certain destruction and that of his regime.

A credible and continuing military threat involvingsubstantial forces on Iraq's borders willbe necessary both to get the inspectors back into Iraq and to enable them to do their job. The record from 1991 to the present makes clear that Iraq views UN WMD inspections as war by other means. There is no reason to expect this to change. Sanctions, inducements, negotiations, or periodic air strikes will not suffice to restore effective inspection. Negotiations in the present circumstances only serve Baghdad's goals of delay and diversion.

The UNSCOM/IAEA successes also critically depended on unity of purpose within the UN Security Council. No amount of military force will be effective without unwavering political resolve behind it. Effective inspections cannot be reestablished until a way forward is found that the major powers and key regional states can support under the UN Charter.

NEGOTIATING COERCIVE INSPECTIONS

From roughly 1997 until recently, determined Iraqi diplomacy succeeded in dividing the P-5. Today, principally due to Iraq's behavior, Russia's new geopolitical stance, and U.S.-led reform of the sanctions regime, a limited consensus has reemerged.

There is now agreement that Iraq has not met its obligations under UN Resolution 687 (which created the inspections regime) and that there is a need for the return of inspectors to Iraq. There is also support behind the new, yet-to-be tested inspection team known as the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC, created in December 1999 under Resolution 1284).

Because three members of the P-5 abstained on the vote to create UNMOVIC, this development is particularly noteworthy. The May 2002 adoption of a revised sanctions plan was further evidence of a still fragile but real and evolving convergence of view on the Security Council.

Perhaps paradoxically, U.S. threats to act unilaterally against Iraq have the potential to strengthen this limited consensus. France, Russia, and China strongly share the view that only the Security Council can authorize the use of force—a view to which Great Britain is also sympathetic. All four know that after eleven years of the United Nations' handling of the issue, a U.S. decision to act unilaterally against Iraq would be a tremendous blow to the authority of the institution and the Security Council in particular. They want to avoid any further marginalization of the Council since that would translate into a diminution of their individual influence. Thus, U.S. threats provide these four countries with a shared interest in finding a formula for the use of force against Iraq that would be effective, acceptable to the United States, and able to be authorized by the Council as a whole.

That formula could be found in a resolution authorizingmultinational enforcement action to enable UNMOVIC to carry out its mandate.

Achieving such an outcome would require a tremendous diplomatic effort on Washington's part. That, however, should not be seen as a serious deterrent. Achieving desired outcomes without resort to war is, in the first instance, what power is for. Launching the middle-ground approach would amount, in effect, to Washington and the rest of the P-5 re-seizing the diplomatic initiative from Baghdad.

The critical element will be that the United States makes clear that it forswears unilateral military action against Iraq for as long as international inspections are working. The United States would have to convince Iraq and others that this is not a perfunctory bow to international opinion preparatory to an invasion and that

the United States' intent is to see inspections succeed, not a ruse to have them quickly fail. If Iraq is not convinced, it would have no reason to comply; indeed, quite the reverse because Baghdad would need whatever WMD it has to deter or fight a U.S. attack. *Given the past history, many countries will be deeply skeptical. To succeed Washington will have to be steady, unequivocal, and unambiguous on this point.*

This does not mean that Washington need alter its declaratory policy favoring regime change in Iraq. Its stance would be that the United States continues to support regime change but will not take action to force it while Iraq is in full compliance with international inspections. There would be nothing unusual in such a position. The United States has, for example, had a declaratory policy for regime change in Cuba for more than forty years.

Beyond the Security Council, U.S. diplomacy will need to recognize the significant differences in strategic interests among the states in the region. Some want a strong Iraq to offset Iran. Others fear a prosperous, pro-West Iraq producing oil to its full potential. Many fear and oppose U.S. military dominance in the region. Virtually all, however, agree that Iraq should be free of WMD, and they universally fear the instability that is likely to accompany a violent overthrow of the Iraqi government.

Moreover, notwithstanding the substantial U.S. presence required for enforced inspections and what will be widely felt to be an unfair double standard (acting against Iraq's WMD but not against Israel's), public opinion throughout the region would certainly be less aroused by multilateral inspections than by a unilateral U.S. invasion. Thus, if faced with a choice between a war to achieve regime change and an armed, multilateral effort to eradicate Iraq's WMD, all the region's governments are likely to share a clear preference for the latter.

IMPLEMENTING COERCIVE INSPECTIONS

Under the coercive inspections plan, the Security Council would authorize the creation of an Inspections Implementation Force (IIF) to act as the enforcement arm for UNMOVIC and the IAEA task force. Under the new resolution, the inspections process is transformed from a game of cat and mouse punctuated by diversions and manufactured crises, in which conditions heavily favor Iraqi obstruction, into a last chance, "comply or else" operation. The inspection teams would return to Iraq accompanied by a military arm strong enough to force immediate entry into any site at any time with complete security for the inspection team. No terms would be negotiated regarding the dates, duration, or modalities of inspection. If Iraq chose not to accept, or established a record of noncompliance, the U.S. regime-change option or, better, a UN authorization of "use of all necessary means" would come into play.

Overall control is vested in the civilian executive chairman of the inspection teams. He would determine what sites will be inspected, without interference from the Security Council, and whether military forces should accompany any particular inspection. Some inspections—for example, personnel interviews—may be better conducted without any accompanying force; others will require maximum insurance of prompt entry and protection. The size and composition of the accompanying force would be the decision of the IIF commander, and its employment would be under his command.

The IIF must be strong and mobile enough to support full inspection of any site, including so-called sensitive sites and those previously designated as off limits. "No-fly" and "no-drive" zones near to-be-inspected sites would be imposed with minimal advance notice to Baghdad. Violations of these bans would subject the opposing forces to attack.

Robust operational and communications security would allow surprise inspections. In the event surprise fails and "spontaneous" gatherings of civilians attempt to impede inspections, rapid response riot control units must be available.

The IIF must be highly mobile, composed principally of air and armored cavalry units. It might include an armored cavalry regiment or equivalent on the Jordan-Iraq border, an air-mobile brigade in eastern Turkey, and two or more brigades and corps-sized infrastructure based in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Air support including fighter and fighterbomber aircraft and continuous air and ground surveillance, provided by AWACS and JSTARS, will be required.

The IIF must have a highly sophisticated intelligence capability. Iraq has become quite experienced in concealment and in its ability to penetrate and mislead inspection teams. It has had four unimpeded years to construct new underground sites, build mobile facilities, alter records, and so on. To overcome that advantage and ensure military success, the force must be equipped with the full range of reconnaissance, surveillance, listening, encryption, and photo interpretation capabilities. The bulk of the force will be U.S. For critical political reasons, however, the IIF must be as multinational as possible and as small as practicable. Its design and composition should strive to make clear that the IIF is not a U.S. invasion force in disguise, but a UN enforcement force. Optimally, it would include, at a minimum, elements from all of the P-5, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, as well as others in the region.

Consistent with the IIF's mandate and UN origin, Washington will have to rigorously resist the temptation to use the force's access and the information it collects for purposes unrelated to its job. Nothing will more quickly sow division within the Security Council than excesses in this regard.

Operationally, on the civilian front, experts disagree as to whether UNMOVIC's mandate contains disabling weaknesses. Although some provisions could certainly be improved, it would be unwise to attempt to renegotiate Resolution 1284. Some of its weaknesses can be overcome in practice by tacit agreement (some have already been), some will be met by the vastly greater technological capabilities conferred by the IIF, and some can be corrected through the language of the IIF resolution.

Four factors are critical:

Adequate time. The inspection process must not be placed under any arbitrary deadline because that would provide Baghdad with an enormous incentive for delay. It is in everyone's interest to complete the disarmament phase of the job as quickly as possible, but timelines cannot be fixed in advance.

Experienced personnel. UNMOVIC must not be forced to climb a learning curve as UNSCOM did but must be ready to operate with maximum effectiveness from the outset. To do so, it must be able to take full advantage of individuals with irreplaceable, on-the-ground experience.

Provision for two-way intelligence sharing with national governments. UNSCOM experience proves that provision for intelligence sharing with national governments is indispensable. Inspectors need much information not available from open sources or commercial satellites and prompt, direct access to defectors. For their part, intelligence agencies will not provide a flow of information without feedback on its value and accuracy. It must be accepted by all governments that such interactions are necessary and that the dialogue between providers and users would be on a strictly confidential, bilateral basis, protected from other governments. The individual in charge of information collection and assessment on the inspection team should have an intelligence background and command the trust of those governments that provide the bulk of the intelligence.

Ability to track Iraqi procurement activities outside the country. UNSCOM discovered covert transactions between Iraq and more than 500 companies from more than 40 countries between 1993 and 1998. Successful inspections would absolutely depend, therefore, on the team's authority to track procurement efforts both inside and outside Iraq, including at Iraqi embassies abroad. Accordingly, UNMOVIC should include a staff of specially trained customs experts, and inspections would need to include relevant ministries, commercial banks, and trading companies.

As with military intelligence, tracking Iraqi procurement must not be used to collect unrelated commercial or technical intelligence or impede legal trade.

CONCLUSION

War should never be undertaken until the alternatives have been exhausted. In this case that moral imperative is buttressed by the very real possibility that a war to overthrow Saddam Hussein, *even if successful in doing so*, could subtract more from U.S. security and long-term political interests than it adds.

Political chaos in Iraq or an equally bad successor regime committed to WMD to prevent an invasion from ever happening again, possibly horrible costs to Israel, greater enmity toward the United States among Arab and other Muslim publics, a severe blow to the authority of the United Nations and the Security Council, and a giant step by the United States toward—in Zbigniew Brzezinski's phrase—political self-isolation are just some of the costs, in addition to potentially severe economic impacts and the loss of American and innocent Iraqi lives, that must be weighed. In this case an alternative does exist. It blends the imperative for military threat against a regime that has learned how to divide and conquer the major powers with the legitimacy of UN sanction and multilateral action. Technically and operationally, it is less demanding than a war. Diplomatically, it requires a much greater effort for a greater gain. The message of an unswerving international determination to halt WMD proliferation will be heard far beyond Iraq. The only real question is can the major powers see their mutual interest, act together, and stay the course? Who is more determined—Iraq or the P-5?

Washington Post

Inspections in Iraq Would Take Months

U.S. Says Tougher Resolution Needed

By Karen DeYoung and Walter Pincus - Washington Post Staff Writers
Wednesday, September 18, 2002; Page A20

Under existing U.N. Security Council resolutions, returning weapons inspectors would take at least five months to fully commence operations in Iraq and report on Baghdad's initial cooperation, and up to a year to preliminarily assess whether Iraq still possesses weapons of mass destruction or the capability to produce them.

That extended timeframe could lead to both Iraqi deception and a loss of international and congressional momentum for stepped-up pressure against Baghdad, according to U.S. and British officials. It also helps account for the skepticism with which Washington and London greeted Iraq's promise this week to allow the return of weapons inspectors for the first time in four years.

In continuing to press for a new U.N. inspections resolution, despite Iraq's apparent agreement to those already on the books, sources said the Bush administration wants an accelerated timetable and much tougher and more definitive standards for judging Iraqi cooperation, in addition to U.N.-authorized consequences for noncompliance. "We want clear criteria and benchmarks in a new resolution that enables us all to agree without any equivocation that either [Iraqi President] Saddam Hussein is behaving, or he is not cooperating," said one source.

Administration officials are also concerned that a lengthy inspection timetable, under what they consider vague guidelines, would leave U.S. military planning for an invasion of Iraq in limbo. The military is poised to launch operations against Iraq within six to eight weeks after being told to do so by Bush, according to one well-placed officer.

The Bush administration has repeatedly insisted it has no confidence in any offer from Hussein. Yesterday U.S. officials released a report detailing "the Iraqi regime's repeated pattern of accepting inspections 'without conditions' and then demanding conditions, often at gunpoint" since the U.N. first ordered its disarmament in 1991. U.N. inspectors withdrew from Iraq in 1998, and Iraq has barred them from returning ever since.

Officials in the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) have said there are ways to speed up the timetable or adjust their efforts to arrive at an early assessment. But it appears highly unlikely they could achieve any meaningful results in the "days and weeks" being discussed by the administration. "We will not drag our feet," said one UNMOVIC official. "But we can't snap our fingers and have it all there tomorrow."

Under the most recent U.N. inspection outline, Security Council Resolution 1284, adopted in 1999, the UNMOVIC team has 60 days after commencing operations in Iraq to draw up a detailed "work program" for inspection of suspected biological and chemical weapons-related sites and other activities. That program, along with a similar document compiled by a separate inspection team from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), must then be approved by the Security Council.

UNMOVIC has a list of 700 potential biological and chemical sites that were either already inspected by its predecessor agency, the U.N. Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), and must be rechecked; were on the list to be checked when inspectors departed in 1998; or have been added on the basis of intelligence and other information gathered over the past four years.

But there are many steps to be taken before even that initial process can begin, including what IAEA spokeswoman Melissa Fleming called "practical issues" such as "where can a plane land? Can inspectors go in without visas?"

The building left by UNSCOM in Baghdad has to be reopened. Telephones, computers, office equipment and a testing laboratory left there four years ago have to be replaced or upgraded. Vehicles, including fixed-wing aircraft, have to be procured. Purchases of about 100 cameras and satellite telephones have been arranged, but delivery will take time. Medical personnel and interpreters have to be hired. Provisions for inspector security must be made.

As for the IAEA, which has its own list of potential inspection sites, "we don't have anything on the ground," Fleming said. "There is the facility we occupied when we were there before. We have no idea what shape it is in after four years. . . . We need cars, we need to reestablish our detection capabilities." Fleming noted, however, that nuclear detection is slightly less complicated than finding biological or chemical weapons because "nuclear leaves a footprint" that can be located by radiation detectors and other devices.

"We say a year . . . to allow for adequate time" to determine whether Iraq has restarted the nuclear program the IAEA certified had been completely destroyed by inspectors before their departure, Fleming said. Any shorter timeframe "depends on what the Security Council would want us to report on," she said.

After the work plan is adopted, UNMOVIC and IAEA have 120 days to make an initial report on whether Iraq is cooperating, not only in allowing complete and unfettered access to any and all locations, but also in handing over all requested documents and allowing interviews with any Iraqi officials.

Under the terms of Resolution 1284, after an additional 120 days, assuming cooperation, certain sanctions against Iraq could be suspended. But cooperation with inspections does not necessarily mean compliance with

disarmament demands, a conclusion inspectors cannot begin to draw until the process is well underway. "We could report within a year," the UNMOVIC official said, "though some think that is far too long. . . . But if you want an effective system, you can't be too hasty."

The Guardian

Iraq and UN agree over weapons inspectors

1 October 2002

The chief UN weapons inspector for Iraq said tonight that tentative agreement has been reached with Baghdad on the return of his team to check for the presence of illegal, nuclear, chemical or biological weapons.

Hans Blix said the Iraqi representatives have said "that they accept all the rights of inspections that are laid down" in previous resolutions authorising UN inspections.

The agreement, thrashed out in Vienna, comes ahead of any new UN security resolution on weapons inspection which is currently being sought by Washington and London. A new UN resolution may change the Iraqi position and there have been reports that sources close to the inspection team fear this could undermine their mission.

The main progress for the inspectors was on practical details such as an agreement that the UN team will now be allowed to fly into Baghdad's main airport, rather than one further way.

The decision on whether to amend the agreement will be taken by the UN security council when Mr Blix reports back on Thursday. If the UN security council formally approves the mission it could begin by the third week of October.

Suggesting that little stood in the way for the resumption of inspections, Amir Al Sadi, the head of the Iraqi negotiation team, told reporters: "We expect the advance party to arrive in Baghdad in about two weeks."

Mr Al Sadi declined to outline specifics on what was agreed but suggested terms of the inspection would be regulated by previous security council resolutions. That would keep spontaneous inspection of Saddam Hussein's presidential palaces - a US demand - off the agenda.

The negotiations were to determine how far Iraq will let the UN inspect government buildings and presidential palaces but also to amend a 1998 UN-Iraq agreement on inspections that restricted the inspectors' access to eight presidential sites.

The Bush administration is pushing for a resolution that would eliminate the conditions from an earlier agreement in 1998, saying that failure to comply would result in grave consequences.

Mr Blix said the talks focused on practical aspects of the renewed inspections such as, "Where do you fly into Baghdad ... what are the customs controls ... the accommodation of inspectors in Baghdad ... the movement within Iraq. We have talked openly about them, and we have gone through what you can at this stage," he said.

President Saddam pledged unconditional access to sites across Iraq last month but Baghdad has since rejected the notion of a new UN resolution - that would broaden and toughen the inspection regime.

An Iraqi cabinet spokesman said today that threats of war will not force the country to accept any new UN resolutions it finds objectionable. [...]

The Times

Britain and US will block moves to go back

From James Bone in New York

3 October 2002

BRITAIN and the United States plan to block the return of weapons inspectors to Iraq until the United Nations Security Council gives them a tough new mandate and Iraq discloses all its weapons of mass destruction.

Hans Blix, the UN's chief weapons inspector, has said that the first inspectors could be on the ground under existing arrangements within two weeks, but US officials say that Washington will go into "thwart mode" if he tries to move too soon.

The British and US Ambassadors at the UN will repeat that message to Dr Blix today when he briefs a meeting of the Security Council on his talks with Iraqi officials.

COMMENTAAR EN VRAGEN

Zoals blijkt uit de documenten afgedrukt in dit paper, zijn twee beleidsontwikkelingen van beslissend belang in de kwestie van het oorlogvoeren tegen Irak. Ten eerste de VN resolutie die aandringt op volledige toegang tot alle locaties gerelateerd aan massavernietigingswapens in Irak. Ten tijde van schrijven zag het eruit dat het Franse plan voor twee resoluties zou worden gevolgd. De eerste zou volledige toegang eisen voor de inspecteurs, de tweede zou dan bij tegenwerking een ultimatum vormen aan Irak, met als dreiging militair ingrijpen. Daarmee zou de noodzakelijke legitimatie voor de aanval door de VS aanwezig zijn.

Het andere proces bestaat uit de onderhandelingen in het Amerikaanse Congres voor een resolutie waarin goedkeuring wordt gegeven aan de president voor een aanval op Irak. De tendens daar was dat de Democraten wel krities waren over de plannen van president Bush, maar in laatste instantie akkoord zouden gaan, ook met een aanval zonder VN resolutie.

Intussen werd er in Wenen onderhandeld met de Iraakse regering over de precieze afspraken aangaande de inspecties. Daar kwam men op 1 oktober tot een overeenkomst die toegang tot de paleizen uitsluit. Volledige toegang tot heel het land is vermoedelijk alleen mogelijk als eerdere beperkingen op de inspecteurs, afgesproken in onderhandelingen met VN secretaris-generaal Kofi Annan in 1998, worden afgebroken. Daarvoor zou een nieuwe resolutie noodzakelijk zijn. .

De drie processen zijn nauw met elkaar verbonden. De uiteindelijke vraag is hoeveel handelingsruimte wordt opgeëist door de inspecteurs in de praktijk en hoeveel ze krijgen van de Iraakse regering. De inspecteurs zullen ongeveer half oktober terugkeren naar Irak.

Er van uitgaand dat de verschillende resoluties dan zijn aangenomen blijft de praktisch politieke vraag staan welke gebeurtenissen door de Amerikaanse regering zullen worden gebruikt als opmaat naar militair optreden. In ieder geval hebben zowel de Britse als de Nederlandse en Israëliëse regering bij voorbaat hun steun toegezegd.

De ratio achter die steun lijkt de gedeelde analyse als zouden Iraakse massavernietigingswapens een onmiddellijk gevaar vormen. De basis voor dit gevaar is door de Westerse landen zelf gelegd in de tachtiger jaren, toen Donald Rumsfeld – de huidige minister van defensie - in 1983 als speciale vertegenwoordiger van President Reagan met een vriendschappelijk bezoek aan Saddam Hoessein afspraken initieerde voor een miljarden dollars omvattend hulpprogramma van technologieze steun, waar ook andere westerse landen inclusief Nederland aan meededen (zie bijlage).

Vragen:

1. Beschouwt de regering de massavernietigingswapens inderdaad als een onmiddellijk dreigend gevaar voor Europa?
2. Hoe komt die dreiging tot uiting?
3. Wat is de bewijsvoering voor die dreiging?
4. Wat is de positie van de regering over de eerdere westerse steun aan de opbouw van het arsenaal van massavernietigingswapens van Irak?
5. Waarom steunt de Nederlandse regering de unilaterale politiek van de Verenigde Staten?

BIJLAGEN

CITATEN

Ari Fleischer, White House Press Secretary: ““The policy...remains regime change, of course.”
(White House, Press gaggle, 13 September 2002)

Colin Powell, Secretary of State: [The president] “still believes that regime change would be the best answer.”
(ABC, Good Morning America, 13 September 2002)

George Bush, President: ““Yes. That's (regime change) the policy of the government.”
(AFP, Bush warns Washington may strike Iraq absent UN action, 19 September 2002)

Colin Powell, Secretary of State: “The U.S. continues to believe that the best way to disarm Iraq is through a regime change.”
(BBC Interview, 25 September 2002)

OPSTELLING DUITSLAND

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung

Schröder bekräftigt deutsches Nein
3 Oktober 2002

Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder hat seine Ablehnung einer militärischen Intervention in Irak bekräftigt. „Wir haben vor den Wahlen in Deutschland unsere Position definiert, nach den Wahlen in Deutschland gilt nichts anderes“, sagte Schröder nach einem Treffen mit dem französischen Präsidenten Jacques Chirac am Mittwochabend in Paris. Chirac wiederholte seine Ablehnung einer einzigen von den USA gewünschten neuen UNO-Resolution, die einem Militäreinsatz in Irak einen „automatischen Charakter“ verleihen würde. [...]

AMERIKAANSE STRATEGIE

The White House

The National Security Strategy of the United States of America
September 2002

[...]

V. Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction

The nature of the Cold War threat required the United States — with our allies and friends — to emphasize deterrence of the enemy’s use of force, producing a grim strategy of mutual assured destruction. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, our security environment has undergone profound transformation.

Having moved from confrontation to cooperation as the hallmark of our relationship with Russia, the dividends are evident: an end to the balance of terror that divided us; an historic reduction in the nuclear arsenals on both sides; and cooperation in areas such as counterterrorism and missile defense that until recently were inconceivable.

But new deadly challenges have emerged from rogue states and terrorists. None of these contemporary threats rival the sheer destructive power that was arrayed against us by the Soviet Union. However, the nature and motivations of these new adversaries, their determination to obtain destructive powers hitherto available only

to the world's strongest states, and the greater likelihood that they will use weapons of mass destruction against us, make today's security environment more complex and dangerous.

In the 1990s we witnessed the emergence of a small number of rogue states that, while different in important ways, share a number of attributes.

These states:

- brutalize their own people and squander their national resources for the personal gain of the rulers;
- display no regard for international law, threaten their neighbors, and callously violate international treaties to which they are party;
- are determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction, along with other advanced military technology, to be used as threats or offensively to achieve the aggressive designs of these regimes;
- sponsor terrorism around the globe; and
- reject basic human values and hate the United States and everything for which it stands.

At the time of the Gulf War, we acquired irrefutable proof that Iraq's designs were not limited to the chemical weapons it had used against Iran and its own people, but also extended to the acquisition of nuclear weapons and biological agents. In the past decade North Korea has become the world's principal purveyor of ballistic missiles, and has tested increasingly capable missiles while developing its own WMD arsenal. Other rogue regimes seek nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons as well. These states' pursuit of, and global trade in, such weapons has become a looming threat to all nations.

We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends. Our response must take full advantage of strengthened alliances, the establishment of new partnerships with former adversaries, innovation in the use of military forces, modern technologies, including the development of an effective missile defense system, and increased emphasis on intelligence collection and analysis.

Our comprehensive strategy to combat WMD includes:

- *Proactive counterproliferation efforts.* We must deter and defend against the threat before it is unleashed. We must ensure that key capabilities — detection, active and passive defenses, and counterforce capabilities — are integrated into our defense transformation and our homeland security systems. Counterproliferation must also be integrated into the doctrine, training, and equipping of our forces and those of our allies to ensure that we can prevail in any conflict with WMD-armed adversaries.
- *Strengthened nonproliferation efforts to prevent rogue states and terrorists from acquiring the materials, technologies, and expertise necessary for weapons of mass destruction.* We will enhance diplomacy, arms control, multilateral export controls, and threat reduction assistance that impede states and terrorists seeking WMD, and when necessary, interdict enabling technologies and materials. We will continue to build coalitions to support these efforts, encouraging their increased political and financial support for nonproliferation and threat reduction programs. The recent G-8 agreement to commit up to \$20 billion to a global partnership against proliferation marks a major step forward.
- *Effective consequence management to respond to the effects of WMD use, whether by terrorists or hostile states.* Minimizing the effects of WMD use against our people will help deter those who possess such weapons and dissuade those who seek to acquire them by persuading enemies that they cannot attain their desired ends. The United States must also be prepared to respond to the effects of WMD use against our forces abroad, and to help friends and allies if they are attacked.

It has taken almost a decade for us to comprehend the true nature of this new threat. Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. The inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today's threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries' choice of weapons, do not permit that option. We cannot let our enemies strike first.

- In the Cold War, especially following the Cuban missile crisis, we faced a generally status quo, risk-averse adversary. Deterrence was an effective defense. But deterrence based only upon the threat of retaliation is less likely to work against leaders of rogue states more willing to take risks, gambling with the lives of their people, and the wealth of their nations.
- In the Cold War, weapons of mass destruction were considered weapons of last resort whose use risked the destruction of those who used them. Today, our enemies see weapons of mass destruction as weapons of choice. For rogue states these weapons are tools of intimidation and military aggression against their neighbors. These weapons may also allow these states to attempt to blackmail the United States and our allies

to prevent us from deterring or repelling the aggressive behavior of rogue states. Such states also see these weapons as their best means of overcoming the conventional superiority of the United States.

- Traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents; whose so-called soldiers seek martyrdom in death and whose most potent protection is statelessness. The overlap between states that sponsor terror and those that pursue WMD compels us to action.

For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack. Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent threat — most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack.

We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using conventional means. They know such attacks would fail. Instead, they rely on acts of terror and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction — weapons that can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used without warning.

The targets of these attacks are our military forces and our civilian population, in direct violation of one of the principal norms of the law of warfare. As was demonstrated by the losses on September 11, 2001, mass civilian casualties is the specific objective of terrorists and these losses would be exponentially more severe if terrorists acquired and used weapons of mass destruction.

The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction — and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.

The United States will not use force in all cases to preempt emerging threats, nor should nations use preemption as a pretext for aggression. Yet in an age where the enemies of civilization openly and actively seek the world's most destructive technologies, the United States cannot remain idle while dangers gather.

We will always proceed deliberately, weighing the consequences of our actions. To support preemptive options, we will:

- build better, more integrated intelligence capabilities to provide timely, accurate information on threats, wherever they may emerge;
- coordinate closely with allies to form a common assessment of the most dangerous threats; and
- continue to transform our military forces to ensure our ability to conduct rapid and precise operations to achieve decisive results.

The purpose of our actions will always be to eliminate a specific threat to the United States or our allies and friends. The reasons for our actions will be clear, the force measured, and the cause just.

[...]

GESCHIEDENIS

ZNet

The Saddam in Rumsfeld's Closet

by Jeremy Scahill; August 02, 2002

“Man and the turtle are very much alike. Neither makes any progress without sticking his neck out.” —Donald Rumsfeld

Five years before Saddam Hussein's now infamous 1988 gassing of the Kurds, a key meeting took place in Baghdad that would play a significant role in forging close ties between Saddam Hussein and Washington. It happened at a time when Saddam was first alleged to have used chemical weapons. The meeting in late December 1983 paved the way for an official restoration of relations between Iraq and the US, which had been severed since the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.

With the Iran-Iraq war escalating, President Ronald Reagan dispatched his Middle East envoy, a former secretary of defense, to Baghdad with a hand-written letter to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and a message that Washington was willing at any moment to resume diplomatic relations.

That envoy was Donald Rumsfeld.

Rumsfeld's December 19-20, 1983 visit to Baghdad made him the highest-ranking US official to visit Iraq in 6 years. He met Saddam and the two discussed "topics of mutual interest," according to the Iraqi Foreign Ministry. "[Saddam] made it clear that Iraq was not interested in making mischief in the world," Rumsfeld later told *The New York Times*. "It struck us as useful to have a relationship, given that we were interested in solving the Mideast problems."

Just 12 days after the meeting, on January 1, 1984, *The Washington Post* reported that the United States "in a shift in policy, has informed friendly Persian Gulf nations that the defeat of Iraq in the 3-year-old war with Iran would be 'contrary to U.S. interests' and has made several moves to prevent that result."

In March of 1984, with the Iran-Iraq war growing more brutal by the day, Rumsfeld was back in Baghdad for meetings with then-Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz. On the day of his visit, March 24th, UPI reported from the United Nations: "Mustard gas laced with a nerve agent has been used on Iranian soldiers in the 43-month Persian Gulf War between Iran and Iraq, a team of U.N. experts has concluded... Meanwhile, in the Iraqi capital of Baghdad, U.S. presidential envoy Donald Rumsfeld held talks with Foreign Minister Tarek Aziz (sic) on the Gulf war before leaving for an unspecified destination."

The day before, the Iranian news agency alleged that Iraq launched another chemical weapons assault on the southern battlefield, injuring 600 Iranian soldiers. "Chemical weapons in the form of aerial bombs have been used in the areas inspected in Iran by the specialists," the U.N. report said. "The types of chemical agents used were bis-(2-chlorethyl)-sulfide, also known as mustard gas, and ethyl N, N-dimethylphosphoroamidocyanide, a nerve agent known as Tabun."

Prior to the release of the UN report, the US State Department on March 5th had issued a statement saying "available evidence indicates that Iraq has used lethal chemical weapons."

Commenting on the UN report, US Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick was quoted by *The New York Times* as saying, "We think that the use of chemical weapons is a very serious matter. We've made that clear in general and particular."

Compared with the rhetoric emanating from the current administration, based on speculations about what Saddam might have, Kirkpatrick's reaction was hardly a call to action.

Most glaring is that Donald Rumsfeld was in Iraq as the 1984 UN report was issued and said nothing about the allegations of chemical weapons use, despite State Department "evidence." On the contrary, *The New York Times* reported from Baghdad on March 29, 1984, "American diplomats pronounce themselves satisfied with relations between Iraq and the United States and suggest that normal diplomatic ties have been restored in all but name."

A month and a half later, in May 1984, Donald Rumsfeld resigned. In November of that year, full diplomatic relations between Iraq and the US were fully restored. Two years later, in an article about Rumsfeld's aspirations to run for the 1988 Republican Presidential nomination, the *Chicago Tribune Magazine* listed among Rumsfeld's achievements helping to "reopen U.S. relations with Iraq." The *Tribune* failed to mention that this help came at a time when, according to the US State Department, Iraq was actively using chemical weapons.

Throughout the period that Rumsfeld was Reagan's Middle East envoy, Iraq was frantically purchasing hardware from American firms, empowered by the White House to sell. The buying frenzy began immediately after Iraq was removed from the list of alleged sponsors of terrorism in 1982. According to a February 13, 1991 *Los Angeles Times* article:

"First on Hussein's shopping list was helicopters -- he bought 60 Hughes helicopters and trainers with little notice. However, a second order of 10 twin-engine Bell "Huey" helicopters, like those used to carry combat troops in Vietnam, prompted congressional opposition in August, 1983... Nonetheless, the sale was approved."

In 1984, according to *The LA Times*, the State Department—in the name of "increased American penetration of the extremely competitive civilian aircraft market"—pushed through the sale of 45 Bell 214ST helicopters to Iraq. The helicopters, worth some \$200 million, were originally designed for military purposes. *The New York Times* later reported that Saddam "transferred many, if not all [of these helicopters] to his military."

In 1988, Saddam's forces attacked Kurdish civilians with poisonous gas from Iraqi helicopters and planes. U.S. intelligence sources told *The LA Times* in 1991, they "believe that the American-built helicopters were among those dropping the deadly bombs."

In response to the gassing, sweeping sanctions were unanimously passed by the US Senate that would have denied Iraq access to most US technology. The measure was killed by the White House.

Senior officials later told reporters they did not press for punishment of Iraq at the time because they wanted to shore up Iraq's ability to pursue the war with Iran. Extensive research uncovered no public statements by Donald Rumsfeld publicly expressing even remote concern about Iraq's use or possession of chemical weapons until the week Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, when he appeared on an ABC news special.

Eight years later, Donald Rumsfeld signed on to an "open letter" to President Clinton, calling on him to eliminate "the threat posed by Saddam." It urged Clinton to "provide the leadership necessary to save ourselves and the world from the scourge of Saddam and the weapons of mass destruction that he refuses to relinquish."

In 1984, Donald Rumsfeld was in a position to draw the world's attention to Saddam's chemical threat. He was in Baghdad as the UN concluded that chemical weapons had been used against Iran. He was armed with a fresh communication from the State Department that it had "available evidence" Iraq was using chemical weapons. But Rumsfeld said nothing.

Washington now speaks of Saddam's threat and the consequences of a failure to act. Despite the fact that the administration has failed to provide even a shred of concrete proof that Iraq has links to Al Qaeda or has resumed production of chemical or biological agents, Rumsfeld insists that "the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence."

But there is evidence of the absence of Donald Rumsfeld's voice at the very moment when Iraq's alleged threat to international security first emerged. And in this case, the evidence of absence is indeed evidence.

NBC

Rumsfeld key player in Iraq policy shift

Cables, Natl. Security Council affidavit reveal depth of U.S. assistance to Saddam despite chemical arsenal

By Robert Windrem - NBC NEWS

18 August 2002

Aug. 18 — State Department cables and court records reveal a wealth of information on how U.S. foreign policy shifted in the 1980s to help Iraq. Virtually all of the information is in the words of key participants, including Donald Rumsfeld, now secretary of defense.

The new information on the policy shift toward Iraq, and Rumsfeld's role in it, comes as The New York Times reported Sunday that United States gave Iraq vital battle-planning help during its war with Iran as part of a secret program under President Reagan — even though U.S. intelligence agencies knew the Iraqis would unleash chemical weapons.

The covert program involved more than 60 officers of the Defense Intelligence Agency who helped Iraq in its eight-year war with Iran by providing detailed information on Iranian military deployments, tactical planning for battles, plans for airstrikes and bomb-damage assessments, the Times said.

The Times said it based its report on comments by senior U.S. military officers with direct knowledge of the program, most of whom spoke on condition of anonymity.

Iraq and neighboring Iran waged a vicious war from September 1980 to August 1988. An estimated 1 million people were killed and millions more were dislocated by the fighting.

Scope of the relationship

It has been known for some time that the United States provided intelligence assistance to Iraq during the war in the form of satellite photography to help the Iraqis understand how Iranian forces were deployed. But the full scope of the program had not been known until now, the Times said.

The cables and court records obtained by NBC News reveal the scope and nature of Rumsfeld's role in shaping U.S. policy.

Although U.S. officials deny that the United States looked the other way while Iraq used American intelligence data to plan chemical weapons assaults against Iran in the 1980s, there is evidence in declassified State Department cables and court records to indicate that even though the United States was aware that Iraq had used chemical weapons against Iranian troops, it was ready to help Iraq in thwarting Iranian "human-wave" attacks.

The Iraqis used chemical weapons mainly to halt the Iranian "human wave" attacks beginning in 1983, although they also used cluster bombs and fuel air explosives.

Iranian victory top concern

President Reagan authorized Rumsfeld to travel to Baghdad as part of a trip throughout the Middle East, the arrangements being made between the U.S. Interests Section in Baghdad and then-Iraqi Foreign Ministry Undersecretary Mohammed Sahhaf, according to State Department documents obtained by the National Security Archives under the Freedom of Information Act. [Sahhaf is now Iraqi Foreign Minister.]

The visit, which included meetings with Aziz and Saddam Hussein, was laid out in cables sent by the Interests Section and Rumsfeld himself to George Shultz, then the secretary of state.

Rumsfeld informed the Interests Section that he was “pleased with the positive response...to your sounding,” adding that he would “probably be carrying a presidential message for Saddam [cq].” Arrangements were made for a visit on the night of Dec. 19-20, 1983.

State Department officials who met with Sahhaf noted that “perhaps the greatest benefit of the visit would be the establishment of direct contact between an envoy of President Reagan and President Saddam Hussein.”

‘A thoughtful man’

Rumsfeld did carry a conciliatory letter from Reagan to Saddam. The letter has not been released, but parts of it were quoted in the State Department cables. Saddam at one point expressed “great pleasure” at the letter, and Aziz quoted Reagan as saying “the Iran-Iraq war could pose serious problems for the economic and security interests of the U.S., its friends in the region and in the free world.”

Rumsfeld first met with Tariq Aziz, then foreign minister on Dec. 19. Rumsfeld laid out the shared interests of the two countries, telling Aziz: “While there were a number of differences of view between us, we also see a number of areas of common interest. We both desire regional peace, stability and correcting regional imbalance.”

In a response, described by a member of Rumsfeld’s team as “eloquent,” Aziz said renewed U.S.-Iraqi ties were possible. Aziz told Rumsfeld that he would find Saddam “a thoughtful man who analyzed and learned from experience.”

U.S. sympathy with Iraqi aims

Rumsfeld lamented that it was unfortunate an entire generation of Iraqis and Americans were growing up without contact with each other and promised the United States “would approach our allies in terms of specific instances where they are either directly or indirectly providing weapons which enable Iran to continue the war, and would try to foster strategic understanding of the dangers of focusing on narrow, short-term interests.”

Rumsfeld’s own notes of the meeting, — notes that presumably included the specifics of what the United States could do to help Iraq beyond asking U.S. allies to end arms exports to Iran — were sent separately to the Secretary of State, and were edited by the State Department’s Freedom of Information Act Office. However, what was released indicates American empathy with Saddam’s intentions. “I indicated our desire to have the war mediated and ended peacefully without further escalating tension in the Middle East. I offered our willingness to do more...” according to Rumsfeld’s notes. Eight lines of text laying out the specifics were redacted.

Indication of support

In a talking-points memo prepared by the State Department, Rumsfeld was asked to note that the United States hoped for a peaceful solution to the Iran-Iraq war, but to also deliver the following message to Saddam: “The [United States government] recognizes Iraq’s current disadvantage in a war of attrition since Iran has access to the Gulf while Iraq does not would regard any major reversal of Iraq’s fortunes as strategic defeat for the west,” a clear indication of which side the U.S. was prepared to support.

The talking points memo also noted that it was “possible” that Iraq would suggest to Rumsfeld that “the U.S. could lift restrictions on some military items Iraq wishes to purchase from third parties.”

Other issues in the Middle East, ostensibly the main reason for Rumsfeld’s trip, were also laid out in the memo, but were viewed as secondary. In one discussion, however, Rumsfeld was asked to seek Saddam’s personal advice on dealing with Syria.

Israeli offer of aid to Iraq

In his affidavit, Teicher noted that Rumsfeld was carrying a letter offering help from then-Israeli Foreign Minister Itzhak Shamir. “Israeli Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir asked Rumsfeld if the United States would deliver a secret offer of Israeli assistance to Iraq. The United States agreed. I traveled with Rumsfeld to Baghdad and was present at the meeting in which Rumsfeld told Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz about

Israel's offer of assistance. Aziz refused even to accept the Israelis' letter to Hussein offering assistance, because Aziz told us that he would be executed on the spot by Hussein if he did so."

Rumsfeld did note that United States "efforts to assist were inhibited by certain things that made it difficult for us, citing use of chemical weapons, possible escalation in the Gulf and human rights."

In fact, the United States knew that Iraq has used poison gas against Iranian troops a few months before and that Iraq was building its own chemical weapons infrastructure. Iraq would use chemical weapons against Iran and later against the Kurds, for the remainder of the Iran-Iraq war, the most notorious being the bombing of the Kurdish town of Halabja in 1988.

Human wave attacks

When Rumsfeld met with Saddam the following morning, accompanied by State Department Arab experts Robert Pelletreau and William Eagleton, Iraqi television videotaped the opening greetings and delivery of President Reagan's letter to the Iraqi leader. Saddam was dressed in military uniform, a pistol on his hip. Rumsfeld conveyed his pleasure at being in Baghdad.

While there was no discussion of U.S. military help to Iraq, Rumsfeld reiterated to Saddam the United States' intention of eliminating arms deliveries to Iran, stating "The U.S. and Iraq shared interests in preventing Iranian and Syrian expansion." He said the U.S. was urging other states to curtail arms sales to Iran and believed it had successfully closed off U.S.-controlled exports by third countries to Iran.

For Saddam, the tenor and tone of Rumsfeld's visit was a major positive.

"Saddam Hussein showed obvious pleasure with the President's letter and Rumsfeld's visit and in remarks," Teicher's affidavit says. "[It] removed whatever obstacles remained in the way of resuming diplomatic relations but did not take the decision to do so."

The Associated Press and Reuters contributed to this report.

Chicago Sun-Times

Following Iraq's Bioweapons Trail

By Robert Novak
September 26, 2002

Sen. Robert Byrd, a master at hectoring executive branch witnesses, asked Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld a provocative question last week: Did the United States help Saddam Hussein produce weapons of biological warfare? Rumsfeld brushed off the Senate's 84-year-old president pro tem like a Pentagon reporter. But a paper trail indicates Rumsfeld should have answered yes.

An eight-year-old Senate report confirms that disease-producing and poisonous materials were exported, under U.S. government license, to Iraq from 1985 to 1988 during the Iran-Iraq war. Furthermore, the report adds, the American-exported materials were identical to microorganisms destroyed by United Nations inspectors after the Gulf War. The shipments were approved despite allegations that Saddam used biological weapons against Kurdish rebels and (according to the current official U.S. position) initiated war with Iran.

This record is no argument for or against waging war against the Iraqi regime, but current U.S. officials are not eager to reconstruct the mostly secret relationship between the two countries. While biological warfare exports were approved by the U.S. government, the first President George Bush signed a policy directive proposing "normal" relations with Saddam in the interest of Middle East stability. Looking at a little U.S.-Iraqi history might be useful on the eve of a fateful military undertaking.

At a Senate Armed Services hearing last Thursday, Byrd tried to disinter that history. "Did the United States help Iraq to acquire the building blocks of biological weapons during the Iran-Iraq war?" he asked Rumsfeld. "Certainly not to my knowledge," Rumsfeld replied. When Byrd persisted by reading a current Newsweek article reporting these exports, Rumsfeld said, "I have never heard anything like what you've read, I have no knowledge of it whatsoever, and I doubt it."

That suggests Rumsfeld also has not read the sole surviving copy of a May 25, 1994, Senate Banking Committee report. In 1985 (five years after the Iraq-Iran war started) and succeeding years, said the report, "pathogenic (meaning "disease producing"), toxigenic (meaning "poisonous") and other biological research materials were exported to Iraq, pursuant to application and licensing by the U.S. Department of Commerce." It added: "These exported biological materials were not attenuated or weakened and were capable of reproduction."

The report then details 70 shipments (including anthrax bacillus) from the United States to Iraqi government agencies over three years, concluding, "It was later learned that these microorganisms exported by the United States were identical to those the United Nations inspectors found and recovered from the Iraqi biological warfare program."

With Baghdad having survived combat against Iran's revolutionary regime with U.S. help, President George H.W. Bush signed National Security Directive 26 on Oct. 2, 1989. Classified "secret" but recently declassified, it said: "Normal relations between the United States and Iraq would serve our longer-term interests and promote stability in both the Gulf and the Middle East. The United States government should propose economic and political incentives for Iraq to moderate its behavior and to increase our influence with Iraq."

Bush the elder, who said recently that he "hates" Saddam, saw no reason then to oust the Iraqi dictator. On the contrary, the government's approval of exporting microorganisms to Iraq coincided with the Bush administration's decision to save Saddam from defeat by the Iranian mullahs.

The Newsweek article (by Christopher Dickey and Evan Thomas) that so interested Byrd reported on Rumsfeld's visit to Baghdad on Dec. 20, 1983, that launched U.S. support for Saddam against Iran. Answering Byrd's questions, Rumsfeld said he did meet with Saddam and Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, but was dismissive about assisting "as a private citizen . . . only for a period of months." Rumsfeld contended he was then interested in curbing terrorism in Lebanon.

Quite a different account was given in a sworn court statement by Howard Teicher on Jan. 31, 1995. Teicher, a National Security Council aide who accompanied Rumsfeld to Baghdad, said Rumsfeld relayed Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's offer to help Iraq in its war. "Aziz refused even to accept the Israeli's letter to [Saddam] Hussein offering assistance," said Teicher, "because Aziz told us that he would be executed on the spot." Such recollections of the recent past make for uncomfortable officials in Washington and Jerusalem today.

[Pagina 46-54: oude krantenartikelen, niet elektronisch beschikbaar]

KRONIEK

September

3	Brussel	EU Working Party on Global Disarmament and Arms Control
4	Brussel	EU Working Party on Non-Proliferation
10	Brussel	EU Working Party on Transatlantic Relations
12-20	New York	Algemene Vergadering Verenigde Naties - Algemeen Debat
16-20	Wenen	Algemene Conferentie IAEA
16-20	Geneve	Vierde bijeenkomst van Staten partij bij de Ottawa Conventie
17	Den Haag	Prinsjesdag
17	Den Haag	Manifestatie Platform 'Keer het tij'
17	Brussel	EU Working Party on Transatlantic Relations
22	Duitsland	Parlementsverkiezingen
23-29	Brussel	Europese Raad
24-25	Warschau	Vergadering NAVO-Defensie ministers
30 – 4 okt	Wenen	CTBT Werkgroep A
30 – 1 nov	New York	Algemene Vergadering Verenigde Naties – First Committee

Oktober

4-5	Brussel	Informeel bijeenkomst EU Ministers van Defensie
5	Kleine Brogel	Bomspotting – burgerinspectie naar Amerikaanse kernwapens
6	Lakenheath	Aktie tegen Amerikaanse kernwapens
7-11	Den Haag	Conferentie van Staten partij bij het Chemische Wapensverdrag
18-28	Den Haag	Herfstreces Tweede Kamer
24-25	Brussel	Buitengewone bijeenkomst van de Europese Raad

November

5	USA	Wetgevende verkiezingen
7-10	Florence	European Social Forum
11-15	Wenen	CTBT PrepCom
11-22	Geneve	5 ^{de} Review Conference van de Biologische Wapensconventie
15-19	Istanboel	NAVO Parlementaire Assemblee
21-22	Praag	NAVO Summit

December

2-5	Parijs	WEU Assemblee
10-12	Den Haag	Behandeling begrotingen Buitenlandse Zaken en Defensie in Tweede Kamer
10-13	Den Haag	31 ^e reguliere sessie van de Uitvoerende Raad van de OPCW
12-13	Kopenhagen	Eurotop
20-20 jan	Den Haag	Kerstreces Tweede Kamer

ERRATA EERDERE FACTS AND REPORTS

NUMMER 1 -US UNILATERALISM

Hele text: “quotations” moet zijn: “quotes”

NUMMER 2 - TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS

P 4: onder “political framework”: correctie: “The military role of the alliance appears to have become irrelevant as a consequence of the way in which....”

P 8: Bron: “Office of the Press Secretary, White House, 29 January 2002”

NUMMER 10 - KONFRONTATIE IN ZUID-AZIE

p 5: Bron moet zijn: website van de “Federation of American Scientists”

p 26: Tabellen afkomstig van het website van de “Federation of American Scientists” - www.fas.org

p 28: Publicatiedatum artikel: 6 June 2002

p 37: In de derde alinea ("Een week later...") klopt de chronologie niet. Het gaat hier om 19 december 2000. De genoemde leveranties hebben dan ook betrekking op het goedkeuren van drie vergunningen een week na de brief aan de Tweede Kamer van 12 december 2000, waarin al de opheffing van het embargo werd aangekondigd (en was een voorbeeld van de in de eerste alinea aangehaalde pogingen van Paars het embargo te stoppen). Dit gaat dus vooraf aan de voorgaande alinea, en is een zaak die exact een jaar ervoor speelde!

In de laatste alinea moet het gaan om een vervolgorde voor Flycatchers, in het midden van de jaren tachtig Nederland's grootste Indiase wapenorder ooit.

p 39: Oproep Parliamentary Network for Nuclear Disarmament werd gedaan op 31 mei 2002

FACTS AND REPORTS

Eerder verschenen in de reeks PENN – NL Facts and Reports:

1. US unilateralism – official foreign comments
Citaten van internationale politici en diplomaten over het Amerikaans unilateralisme.
(januari 2002)
2. Veiligheidsvraagstukken en de verkiezingen – standpunten van de politieke partijen
Relevante delen van de partijprogramma's van de Nederlandse politieke partijen, plus citaten van politici op het terrein van oorlog en vrede.
(februari 2002)
3. Transatlantic relations – recent developments
Overzicht van recente ontwikkelingen in de transatlantische betrekkingen, met name binnen de NAVO, mede naar aanleiding van uitspraken in de State of the Union.
(maart 2002)
4. Ontwikkelingen betreffende kernwapens en de Nederlandse politiek – briefing paper
Periodiek overzicht van ontwikkelingen rond kernwapens in de internationale en nationale politiek, met uitgebreide hoeveelheid bijlagen.
(maart 2002)
5. Nucleaire vraagstukken – standpunten van de Nederlandse regering en de Tweede Kamer
Overzicht april 2001 – april 2002
(april 2002)
6. Crisis in de OPCW – de verwijdering van directeur-generaal Bustani
Documenten en artikelen over het ontslag van directeur-generaal Bustani van het OPCW
(mei 2002)
7. Prepcom van het NPV – nucleaire ontwapening stopt
Verklaringen en rapporten van staten en ngo's tijdens de Prepcom van het NPV
(juni 2002)
8. Verdrag van Moskou – détente tussen Rusland en Verenigde Staten
Informatie over het Verdrag van Moskou, ontwikkelingen daaromheen en commentaar erop
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De belangrijkste achtergrondberichten over de vervanging van de F16 uit de Nederlandse pers.
(mei 2002)
10. Konfrontatie in Zuid-Azië – de kernwapenwedloop tussen India en Pakistan
Basisgegevens over de nucleaire strijdkrachten en doctrines van India en Pakistan, Nederlandse wapenexport en wapenexportbeleid en een oproep om een nucleair treffen te voorkomen
(juni 2002)
11. Massavernietigingswapens in het Midden-Oosten (1) – Egypte, Israël, Syrië
Basisinformatie over de proliferatie van nucleaire, biologische en chemische wapens in Egypte, Israël en Syrië en verklaringen van de Nederlandse regering hierover
(juli 2002)
12. Amerikaans unilateralisme II – officiële reacties
Citaten van internationale politici, diplomaten en NGO's over het Amerikaans unilateralisme.
13. Aanval op Irak – de kwestie van de massavernietigingswapens; feiten, documenten en overwegingen

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