

**DOCUMENTEN FIRST COMMITTEE
VERENIGDE NATIES 2002**

Resoluties, verklaringen, rapporten

PENN – NL Facts and Reports Nr. 15

Oktober 2002

Werkgroep Eurobom

PENN-Nederland

DOCUMENTEN FIRST COMMITTEE
VERENIGDE NATIES


Oktober 2002

PENN, het Project voor Europese Nucleaire Non-proliferatie, is opgezet om:

- * officiële discussies over de toekomst van kernwapens in Europa nauwgezet te volgen en deze te verhelderen;
- * analyses van en commentaren op deze ontwikkelingen te publiceren;
- * verdere maatregelen voor kernontwapening in Europa en substantiële Europese bijdragen aan kernwapenbeheersing, ontwapening en non-proliferatie te stimuleren;
- * te ijveren voor de volledige naleving van het Non-Proliferatieverdrag door de NAVO, de Europese Unie, en haar leden;
- * politieke belemmeringen op te werpen tegen ontwikkelingen die zouden kunnen leiden tot een Europese Unie met kernwapens;
- * te bevorderen dat de Europese Unie en al haar leden uiteindelijk niet-nucleaire leden van het NPV worden.

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Werkgroep Eurobom

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FACTS AND REPORTS

Oktober 2002 – No. 15

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INLEIDING

De jaarlijkse debatten in de First Committee van de Verenigde Naties over ontwapeningsvraagstukken vormen de aanleiding voor een uitgave van F&R op dit gebied. In deze uitgave vindt u belangrijke uitspraken over massavernietigingswapens van de regeringsvertegenwoordigers, de voorlopige teksten van een aantal resoluties en een selectie van de toespraken die in de vergadering van het First Committee gehouden zijn. Op de website van de Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), www.reachingcriticalwill.org, vindt u een volledig bestand van deze teksten. Tenslotte geven we in ons commentaar een aantal suggesties voor vragen aan de Nederlandse regering over haar kernwapenbeleid. Steun aan de resolutie van de Nieuwe Agenda Coalitie (zie elders in deze uitgave) zou een goed signaal zijn naar de rest van de wereld.

Onze bedoeling met deze uitgave is om Nederlandse parlementariërs, niet-gouvernementele organisaties en andere geïnteresseerden op de hoogte te houden van de ontwikkelingen in de VN. Deze zijn dit jaar van extra belang, vanwege de verwickelingen rondom Irak. De kwestie van inspecties en de aanwezigheid van massavernietigingswapens speelt beslist in de achtergrond van de First Committee vergaderingen mee. We zullen in een volgend nummer van F&R hier ook op terugkomen. Zie verder de eerder verschenen F&R teksten op onze website: www.eurobomb.nl

Redactie F&R

VOORGESTELDE RESOLUTIES

United Nations A/C.1/57/L.2 - General Assembly
1 October 2002

02-61405 (E) 011002
Fifty-seventh session - First Committee
Agenda item 66 - General and complete disarmament

Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden: draft resolution

Reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 55/33 D of 20 November 2000,

Taking into account the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*, issued on 8 July 1996, A/51/218, annex; see also *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996*, p. 226. and its unanimous conclusion that "there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control",

Stressing the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, a goal to which all States parties to the Treaty are committed under its article VI, *2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document*, vol. I (NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II)), Part I, Article VI and eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs, para. 6 under para. 15.

Reaffirming the necessity of strict compliance by all parties with their obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the necessity of upholding their commitments in associated decisions and final documents agreed at the 2000 and 1995 Review Conference,

Noting the importance attached to the issue of reducing non-strategic nuclear weapons by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in his report to the Millennium Assembly, See A/54/2000.

Stressing the commitment made in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to the further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, See *2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document*, vol. I (NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II)), Part I, Article VI and eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs, para. 9 under para. 15.

Concerned that the total number of nuclear weapons deployed and in stockpile still amounts to many thousands,

Reiterating the particular responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States for transparent, verifiable and irreversible reductions in nuclear weapons leading to nuclear disarmament,

1. *Agrees* that the further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons should be accorded priority;
2. *Agrees also* that the reduction and elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons should be included as an integral part of the nuclear-arms reduction and disarmament process;
3. *Agrees further* that the reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons should be carried out in a transparent and irreversible manner;
4. *Agrees* on the importance of preserving, reaffirming, implementing and building upon the 1991 and 1992 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics/Russian Federation on non-strategic nuclear weapons;
5. *Calls upon* the Russian Federation and the United States of America to codify the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives into a legally binding treaty;
6. *Calls* for further confidence-building and transparency measures to reduce the threats posed by non-strategic nuclear weapons;
7. *Calls also* for concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of non-strategic nuclear weapons systems;
8. *Calls upon* the Russian Federation and the United States of America to initiate negotiations on an effectively verifiable agreement on significant reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons;

9. *Agrees* on the importance of special security and physical protection measures for the transport and storage of non-strategic nuclear weapons;
10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit a report to the General Assembly at its fifty-eighth session containing the views of Member States on the issue of reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons;
11. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-eighth session an item entitled "Reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons".
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A/C.1/57/L.3 - United Nations General Assembly
1 October 2002

02-61411 (E) 011002 - *0261411*
Fifty-seventh session - First Committee
Agenda item 66 (b)

General and complete disarmament: towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda

Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden: draft resolution
Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 53/77 Y of 4 December 1998, 54/54 G of 1 December 1999 and 55/33 C of 20 November 2000,

Convinced that the existence of nuclear weapons is a threat to the survival of humanity,

Declaring that the participation of the international community as a whole is central to the maintenance and enhancement of international peace and stability and that international security is a collective concern requiring collective engagement,

Declaring also that internationally negotiated treaties in the field of disarmament have made a fundamental contribution to international peace and security, and that unilateral and bilateral nuclear disarmament measures complement the treaty-based multilateral approach towards nuclear disarmament,

Recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, issued on 8 July 1996, *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion*, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 226. and its unanimous conclusion that "there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control",

Declaring that any presumption of the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States is incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and with the broader goal of the maintenance of international peace and security,

Declaring also that it is essential that the fundamental principles of transparency, verification and irreversibility should apply to all nuclear disarmament measures,

Convinced that the further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons constitutes an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process,

Declaring that each article of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is binding on the respective States parties at all times and in all circumstances and that it is imperative that all States parties be held fully accountable with respect to the strict compliance with their obligations under the Treaty, and that the undertakings therein on nuclear disarmament have been given and that implementation of them remains the imperative,

Expressing its deep concern that, to date, there have been few advances in the implementation of the thirteen steps agreed to at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Stressing the importance of regular reporting in promoting confidence in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Expressing its deep concern at the continued failure of the Conference on Disarmament to deal with nuclear disarmament and to resume negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and

effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,

Expressing grave concern that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has not yet entered into force,

Expressing deep concern that the total number of nuclear weapons deployed and stockpiled still amounts to thousands, and at the continuing possibility that nuclear weapons could be used,

Acknowledging that reductions in the numbers of deployed strategic nuclear warheads envisaged by the Treaty of Moscow represent a positive step in the process of nuclear de-escalation between the United States of America and the Russian Federation, while stressing that reductions in deployments and in operational status cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons,

Noting that, despite these bilateral achievements, there is no sign of efforts involving all of the five nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons,

Expressing its deep concern about emerging approaches to the broader role of nuclear weapons as part of security strategies, including the development of new types, and rationalizations for the use, of nuclear weapons,

Expressing concern that the development of strategic missile defences could impact negatively on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and lead to a new arms race on earth and in outer space,

Stressing that no steps should be taken which would lead to the weaponization of outer space,

Expressing its deep concern at the continued retention of the nuclear-weapons option by those three States that have not yet acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, in particular given the effects of regional volatility on international security, and in this context, the continued regional tensions and deteriorating security situation in South Asia and the Middle East,

Welcoming progress in the further development of nuclear-weapon-free zones in some regions and, in particular, the consolidation of that in the southern hemisphere and adjacent areas,

Recalling the United Nations Millennium Declaration, Resolution 55/2. in which the Heads of State and Government resolved to strive for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons, and to keep all options open for achieving this aim, including the possibility of convening an international conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers,

Taking into consideration the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States, in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all the States parties to the Treaty are committed under article VI of the Treaty, 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, vol. I (NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I-II)), Part I, Article VI and eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs, para. 6 under para. 15.

1. *Reaffirms* that the growing possibility that nuclear weapons could be used represents a continued risk for humanity;

2. *Calls upon* all States to refrain from any action that could lead to a new nuclear-arms race or that could impact negatively on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation;

3. *Also calls upon* all States to observe international treaties in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and to duly fulfil all obligations flowing from those treaties;

4. *Further calls upon* all States parties to pursue, with determination and with continued vigour, the full and effective implementation of the substantial agreements reached at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the outcome of which provides the requisite blueprint to achieve nuclear disarmament;

5. *Calls upon* the nuclear-weapon States to respect fully their existing commitments with regard to security assurances, pending the conclusion of multilaterally negotiated legally binding security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties, and agrees to prioritize this issue with a view to recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

6. *Also calls upon* the nuclear-weapon States to increase their transparency and accountability with regard to their nuclear weapons arsenals and their implementation of disarmament measures;

7. *Reaffirms* the necessity for the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to consider regular reports to be submitted by all States parties on the implementation of article VI as outlined in paragraph 15, subparagraph 12, of the 2000 Final Document, and on paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision;

8. *Calls upon* nuclear-weapon States to implement the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons commitments to apply the principle of irreversibility by destroying their nuclear warheads in the context of strategic nuclear reductions and avoid keeping them in a state that lends itself to their possible redeployment;

9. *Agrees on* the importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty;
10. *Calls for* the upholding and maintenance of the moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty;
11. *Reaffirms* that the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is particularly urgent since the process of the installation of an international system to monitor nuclear-weapons tests under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is more advanced than the real prospects of entry into force of the Treaty, a situation which is not consistent with a universal and comprehensive test-ban treaty;
12. *Agrees* that the further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons should be accorded priority and that nuclear-weapon States must live up to their commitments in this regard;
13. *Agrees also* that reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons should be carried out in a transparent and irreversible manner and that the reduction and elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons should be included in the overall arms reductions negotiations. In this context, urgent action should be taken to achieve:
 - (a) Further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process;
 - (b) Further confidence-building and transparency measures to reduce the threats posed by non-strategic nuclear weapons;
 - (c) Concrete agreed measures to reduce further the operational status of nuclear-weapons systems, and to
 - (d) Formalize existing informal bilateral arrangements regarding non-strategic nuclear reductions, such as the Bush-Gorbachev declarations of 1991, into legally binding agreements;
14. *Calls upon* nuclear-weapon States to undertake the necessary steps towards the seamless integration of all five nuclear-weapon States into a process leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons;
15. *Agrees* that the Conference on Disarmament should establish without delay an ad hoc committee to deal with nuclear disarmament;
16. *Agrees also* that the Conference on Disarmament should resume negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives;
17. *Agrees further* that the Conference on Disarmament should complete the examination and updating of the mandate on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects, as contained in its decision of 13 February 1992, CD/1125. and re-establish an ad hoc committee as early as possible;
18. *Calls upon* those three States that are not yet parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States, promptly and without condition, and to bring into force the required comprehensive safeguards agreements, together with additional protocols, consistent with the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards approved by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency on 15 May 1997, International Atomic Energy Agency, INFCIRC/540 (Corrected). for ensuring nuclear non-proliferation, and to reverse clearly and urgently any policies to pursue any nuclear weapons development or deployment and refrain from any action that could undermine regional and international peace and security and the efforts of the international community towards nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation;
19. *Calls upon* those States that have not yet done so to conclude full-scope safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency and to conclude additional protocols to their safeguards agreements on the basis of the Model Protocol;
20. *Reaffirms* the conviction that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned enhances global and regional peace and security, strengthens the nuclear non-proliferation regime and contributes towards realizing the objective of nuclear disarmament, and supports proposals for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones where they do not yet exist, such as in the Middle East and South Asia;
21. *Calls* for the completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Russian Federation and the United States of America and for consideration to be given to the possible inclusion of other nuclear-weapon States;
22. *Calls upon* all nuclear-weapon States to make arrangements for the placing, as soon as practicable, of their fissile material no longer required for military purposes under International Atomic Energy Agency or other relevant international verification and to make arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes in order to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes;

23. *Affirms* that a nuclear-weapon-free world will ultimately require the underpinning of a universal and multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument or a framework encompassing a mutually reinforcing set of instruments;

24. *Acknowledges* the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 55/33/C, A/56/309, and requests him, within existing resources, to prepare a report on the implementation of the present resolution;

25. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-eighth session the item entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda", and to review the implementation of the present resolution at that session.

A /C. 1/57/L.4 - General Assembly
4 October 2002

Fifty-seventh session - First Committee
Agenda item 73 - Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

Australia, Mexico and New Zealand: draft resolution

Comprehensive Nuclear—Test-Ban Treaty

The General Assembly,

Reiterating that the cessation of nuclear weapon test explosions constitutes an effective nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation measure,

Recalling that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, adopted by its resolution 50/245 of 10 September 1996, was opened for signature on 24 September 1996,

Stressing that a universal and effectively verifiable Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty constitutes a fundamental instrument in the field of disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation,

Encouraged by the signing of the Treaty by one hundred and sixty-six States, including forty-one of the forty-four needed for its entry into force, and welcoming the ratification of ninety-six States, including thirty-one of the forty-four needed for its entry into force, among which there are three nuclear-weapon States,

Recalling its resolution 55/41 of 20 November 2000,

Welcoming the Final Declaration of the Conference on Measures to Facilitate the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, held in New York from 11 to 13 November 2001,

1. *Stresses* the importance and urgency of signature and ratification, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the earliest entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty;

2. *Welcomes* the contributions by the States signatories to the work of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, in particular to its efforts to ensure that the Treaty's verification regime will be capable of meeting the verification requirements of the Treaty upon its entry into force, in accordance with article IV of the Treaty;

3. *Urges* States to maintain their moratoria on nuclear weapons test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, pending the entry into force of the Treaty;

4. *Urges* all States that have not yet signed the Treaty to sign and ratify it as soon as possible and to refrain from acts that would defeat its object and purpose in the meanwhile;

5. *Urges* all States that have signed but not yet ratified the Treaty, in particular those whose ratification is needed for its entry into force, to accelerate their ratification processes with a view to their earliest successful conclusion;

6. *Urges* all States to remain seized of the issue at the highest political level;

7. *Decides* to include in the Provisional agenda of its fifty-eighth session an item entitled "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty".

United Nations A/C.1/57/L.8 - General Assembly
9 October 2002
Fifty-seventh session - First Committee
Agenda item 66 (i)

General and complete disarmament: Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament

South Africa, On behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 49/75 I of 15 December 1994, 50/70 F of 12 December 1995, 51/45 C of 10 December 1996, 52/38 F of 9 December 1997, 53/77 AA of 4 December 1998, 54/54 U of 1 December 1999, 55/33 M of 20 November 2000 and 56/24 D of 29 November 2001,

Recalling also that, there being a consensus to do so in each case, three special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament were held in 1978, 1982 and 1988, respectively,

Bearing in mind the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, adopted by consensus at the first special session devoted to disarmament, which included the Declaration, Programme of Action and Machinery for Disarmament,

Bearing in mind also the objective of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, *Taking note* of paragraph 145 of the Final Document of the Twelfth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Durban, South Africa, from 29 August to 3 September 1998, which supported the convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament which would offer an opportunity to review, from a perspective more in tune with the current international situation, the most critical aspects of the process of disarmament and to mobilize the international community and public opinion in favour of the elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and of the control and reduction of conventional weapons,

Taking note also of the report of the 1999 substantive session of the Disarmament Commission and of the fact that no consensus was reached on the item entitled "Fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament",

Desiring to build upon the substantive exchange of views on the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament during the 1999 substantive session of the Disarmament Commission,

Recalling the United Nations Millennium Declaration adopted by the Heads of State and Government during the United Nations Millennium Summit held in New York from 6 to 8 September 2000 in which they resolved "to strive for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons and to keep all options open for achieving this aim, including the possibility of convening an international conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers",

Reiterating its conviction that a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament can set the future course of action in the field of disarmament, arms control and related international security matters,

Emphasizing the importance of multilateralism in the process of disarmament, arms control and related international security matters,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations (A/57/120) regarding the views of Member States of the United Nations on the objectives, agenda and timing of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament,

1. *Decides* to establish an open-ended working group to consider the objectives and agenda, including the establishment of the preparatory committee, for the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, taking note of the paper presented by the Chairman of Working Group II during the 1999 substantive session of the Disarmament Commission as well as the reports of the Secretary-General of the United Nations regarding the views of Member States of the United Nations on the objectives, agenda and timing of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament;
2. *Requests* the open-ended working group to meet for an organizational session in order to set the date for its substantive sessions, and to submit a report on its work, including substantive recommendations, before the end of the fifty-seventh General Assembly session;
3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide the open-ended working group with the necessary assistance and services as may be required to discharge its tasks;

4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-eighth session the item entitled "Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament".

United Nations A/C.1/57/L.10 - General Assembly
9 October 2002
Fifty-seventh session - First Committee
Agenda item 66 - General and complete disarmament

South Africa, On behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation

The General Assembly,

Determined to foster strict respect for the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations,

Recalling its resolution 56/24 T of 29 November 2001 on "Multilateral cooperation in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation and global efforts against terrorism" and other relevant resolutions,

Recalling also the purpose of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations,

Recalling the Millennium Declaration, which states, inter alia, that the responsibility for managing worldwide economic and social development, as well as threats to international peace and security, must be shared among the nations of the world and should be exercised multilaterally and that as the most universal and most representative organization in the world, the United Nations must play the central role,

Convinced that in the globalization era and the information revolution, arms regulation, non-proliferation and disarmament problems are more than ever the concern of all countries in the world, which are affected one way or another by these problems and therefore should have the possibility to participate in the negotiations that arise to tackle them,

Bearing in mind the existence of a wide structure of arms and disarmament regulation agreements resulting from non-discriminatory multilateral negotiations with the participation of a large number of countries regardless of their size and power,

Aware of the need to further advance in the field of arms regulation, non-proliferation and disarmament on the basis of universal, multilateral, non-discriminatory negotiations with the goal of reaching general and complete disarmament under strict international control,

Recognizing the complementarity of bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral negotiations on disarmament,

Recognizing that the proliferation and development of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons is among the most immediate threats against international peace and security which need to be dealt with, with the highest priority,

Considering that the multilateral disarmament agreements provide the mechanism for the States Parties to consult one another and to cooperate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of, the provisions of the agreements and that such consultations and cooperation may also be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with the United Nations Charter,

Stressing that international cooperation, peaceful settlement of disputes, dialogue and confidence-building measures would essentially contribute to the creation of multilateral and bilateral friendly relations among peoples and nations,

Being concerned about the continuous erosion of multilateralism in the field of arms regulation, non-proliferation and disarmament, and recognizing that the resort to unilateral actions by the Member States in resolving their security concerns would jeopardize international peace and security and undermines confidence in the international security system as well as the foundations of the United Nations itself,

Reaffirming the absolute validity of multilateral diplomacy in the field of disarmament and determined to promote multilateralism as an essential way to develop arms regulation and disarmament negotiations,

1. *Reaffirms* multilateralism as the core principle in negotiations in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation with a view to maintaining and strengthening universal norms and enlarging their scope;
2. *Reaffirms* further multilateralism as the core principle in resolving disarmament and non-proliferation concerns;
3. *Urges* the participation of all interested States in multilateral negotiations on arms regulation, non-proliferation and disarmament in a non-discriminatory manner;
4. *Underlines* the importance of preserving the existing agreements on arms regulation and disarmament, which constitute an expression of the results of the international cooperation and multilateral negotiations in response to the challenges facing mankind;
5. *Calls* once again upon all Member States to renew and fulfil their individual and collective commitments to multilateral cooperation as an important means of pursuing and achieving their common objectives in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation;
6. *Requests* the States Parties to the relevant instruments on weapons of mass destruction to consult and cooperate among themselves in resolving their concerns with regard to cases of non-compliance as well as on their implementation, in accordance with the procedures defined in those instruments, and refrain from resorting or threatening to resort to unilateral actions or directing unverified non-compliance accusations against one another, to resolve their concerns;
7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to seek the views of the Member States on the issue of promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation and to submit a report to the General Assembly at its fifty-eighth session;
8. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-eighth session an item entitled "Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation".

CITATEN UIT ALGEMENE VERGADERING

Citaten uit de september-sessies van de 57^e Algemene Vergadering van de Verenigde Naties die betrekking hebben op onderwerpen uit de First Committee.
In alfabetische volgorde.

Australië

H.E. The Honourable Alexander Downer, MP Minister for Foreign Affairs: “The terrorist threat has given new urgency to our disarmament and nonproliferation goals, and demands a renewed effort to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction - both to non-state and state actors. [...] We have to be alive to the willingness of terrorist groups to develop and use chemical, biological or nuclear weapons. [...] Australia, for its part, intends to pursue practical and effective measures through international non-proliferation treaty regimes and export control arrangements. These regimes and arrangements have delivered tangible security benefits, and should be supported strongly.”
(13 september 2002)

Canada

H.E. The Honourable William Graham, Minister For Foreign Affairs: “The G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, concluded at Kananaskis in June, is another concrete example of our joint commitment to battle terrorism and other threats to peace. [...] We also support reform in other areas, notably the near moribund disarmament commission and its glacial progress of non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament, where recent gains such as the UN Program of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons and the negotiations on an International Code of Conduct on missiles are being overshadowed by myriad compliance problems.”
(12 september 2002)

China

H.E. Mr. Tang Jiaxuan, Minister for Foreign Affairs: “China is actively committed to international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation process and supports the consolidation and strengthening of international non-proliferation regimes on the basis of universal participation and non-discrimination. Not long ago, the Chinese Government promulgated the Regulations on Export Controls of Missiles and Related Items and Technologies and its Control List, which marked a fresh step forward in bringing about rule of law in our export control work. The Chinese Government will complete further improvement on its export management mechanisms for biological and chemical dual-use items in the near future. China supports the international community in taking effective measures to prevent the dangerous trend of weaponization in outer space.”
(13 september 2002)

Egypte

H.E. Mr. Ahmed Maher El Sayed, Minister for Foreign Affairs: “The persistence of volatile conflicts and the dangers of the possession by states, organizations or individuals of weapons of mass destruction, make it incumbent upon us to afford more diligence to disarmament issues. At the regional level, Egypt has repeatedly called for serious engagement to rid the Middle East of all weapons of mass destruction, with nuclear weapons at their forefront, and to place all nuclear facilities in the region, without exception, under international supervision. Peace and security cannot be established in the Middle East while a grave disparity persists between the rights and obligations of the states of the region that upsets its balance of power. The stability of the region will only be achieved when Israel accedes to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) being as it is the only state in the region that has not done so to date. This stability will also be attained by proceeding

towards the implementation of President Mubarak's initiative to rid the Middle East of all weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.

(13 september 2002)

Europese Unie

H.E. Anders Fog Rasmussen, Prime Minister of Denmark: "With the adoption of the Millennium Declaration, the United Nations has been given renewed impetus to deal globally with: conflict prevention, crisis management, humanitarian assistance, post-conflict rehabilitation and development, and disarmament and arms control. [...] Iraq is in breach of several resolutions of the Security Council on her disarmament obligations - these obligations must be complied with immediately. The European Union is determined to support further efforts of the United Nations to that end."

(12 september 2002)

Frankrijk

H.E. Mr. Dominique De Villepin, Minister For Foreign Affairs: "A year ago, to consternation and horror, New York and Washington were struck in unprecedented attacks. No one, now, can disregard the dark side of the world: international terrorism combining archaism with technology; shifting underground criminal networks coupled with a growing risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. [...] In the Great Lakes region, the accords signed in Lusaka, Pretoria and Luanda must be implemented. They must lead to the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the disarmament of foreign armed groups, and to reconciliation and the return to peace in the region. [...] Let us keep up our action against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The President of the Republic of France has proposed that the Security Council meet at the highest level in 2003, on the sidelines of the General Assembly, for two purposes: to review nonproliferation policy and give it new impetus."

(12 september 2002)

Ierland

H.E. Mr. Brian Cowen, Minister for Foreign Affairs: "We call on Iraq to respect its obligations and implement in full and without preconditions all the Security Council resolutions addressed to it. The weapons inspectors must be allowed in to do the work authorised by the Security Council. [...] The proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction - chemical, biological and nuclear - is, of course, an issue that goes far beyond Iraq. They represent a major threat to international peace and security. The international instruments and regimes to control the spread, and bring about the elimination, of such weapons must be strengthened and fully implemented. Ultimately, the long term control and elimination of Weapons of Mass Destruction can only be achieved through a comprehensive and rigorous system of international treaties and obligations that are verifiable and universal."

(13 september 2002)

India

H.E. Mr. Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Prime Minister: "In our South Asian region, nuclear blackmail has emerged over the last few months as a new arrow in the quiver of State-sponsored terrorism. Dark threats were held out that actions by India to stamp out cross-border terrorism could provoke a nuclear war. To succumb to such blatant nuclear terrorism would mean forgetting the bitter lessons of the September 11 tragedy."

(13 september 2002)

Indonesië

H.E. Mr. Hassan Wirajuda, Minister For Foreign Affairs: “The same is true with our endeavours to advance the disarmament agenda-which is another imperative. For until the states concerned rid themselves of their arsenals of mass destruction-whether nuclear, biological or chemical-the danger remains that much if not all of the human race could be wiped out in a single holocaust.”

(18 september 2002)

Irak

H.E. Mr. Naji Sabri, Minister For Foreign Affairs: “I Hereby declare before you that Iraq is clear of all nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. If there are any one amongst you who might still worry that the fabrications announced by American officials about Iraq may possibly be true, our country is ready to receive any scientific experts accompanied by politicians you choose to represent any one of your countries to tell us which places and scientific and industrial installations they would wish to see, particularly those about which the American officials have been fabricating false stories, alleging that they contain prohibited materials or activities. If such experts and politicians visit Iraq, we shall provide them with all the facilities they need to achieve their objective, that is to see the true facts as they are. [...] As what matters for us basically is that our rights, sovereignty, and security be respected in accordance with international law, we have accepted the return of the inspection teams to Iraq taking into consideration the arrangements that should safeguard these principles, and achieve, with transparency the goal of making sure that Iraq no longer possesses nuclear, biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction. Along with you, we are waiting to see.”

(19 september 2002)

Iran

H.E. Dr. Kamal Kharrazi, Minister for Foreign Affairs: “The current trend of the international disarmament negotiations is a source of great concern, leading to further vulnerability and fragility of the international security. The Conference on Disarmament, after its fruitful years of activities in early 1990's, is stuck for the fifth consecutive year in endless discussion about its program of work. Rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by a permanent Member of the Security Council and the holder of the largest nuclear arsenal, and its withdrawal from negotiation on the CTBT Sight Inspection Operation Manual do all point to this state's policy of unilateralism. Further signs of such policy are withdrawal from the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty, blocking of the negotiations on a protocol strengthening the implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention and going against the judgment of the international community to regulate trade and transfer of small arms and light weapons. Based on the experience of the past, the way out of this abnormal situation is to refocus attention to strengthening international disarmament and arms control instruments through the multilateral negotiation mechanisms. It is only through developing a broader view of international cooperation and respect for the rule of law that progress and success in the field of disarmament and international security issues could be guaranteed.”

(15 september 2002)

Israël

H.E. Mr. Shimon Peres, Deputy Prime Minister And Minister For Foreign Affairs: “We cannot allow dark forces to possess weapons of mass destruction, aware of their whim to destroy the life of innocent people. We shall not turn our lives to sleepless nights and nightmare days. [...] We don't have the right to ignore the danger. We don't have the option to postpone its imminence.”

(18 september 2002)

Japan

H.E. Mr. Junichiro Koizumi, Prime Minister: “In the fourth place, I would like to touch upon the nuclear disarmament issue. I believe that Japan, as the only country in human history to have suffered nuclear

devastation, has a significant role to play in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Japan will continue its efforts to realize a peaceful and safe world free of nuclear weapons as early as possible. Toward that end, we will propose a draft resolution titled "A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons" at this session of the General Assembly, and will redouble our efforts to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty.”
(13 september 2002)

Nieuw-Zeeland

H.E. The Honourable Phil Goff, Minister for Foreign Affairs And Trade: “A further issue on which greater progress must be made is that of disarmament. The fact that humanity survived the nightmare of potential nuclear destruction during the Cold War cannot be allowed to make us complacent about on-going threats from weapons of mass destruction. We welcome the Treaty of Moscow and agreement by Russia and the United States to cut the number of strategic nuclear weapons each country deploys. These reductions however are not a substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, these weapons. In some respects even greater danger is posed by short-range tactical nuclear weapons. There is a real risk that these could be launched by accident or in confusion, with no time available for communication between opposing sides. [...] Terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, environmental degradation, people smuggling, drug-trafficking, diseases such as HIV/Aids and unsustainable depletion of our resources, are all global problems which require a collective response.
(14 september 2002)

Noord-Korea

H.E. Mr. CHOE Su Hon, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs: “International issues such as conflict, disarmament, terrorism and sustainable development should be discussed and decided with full participation of all UN members in conformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.”
(17 september 2002)

Pakistan

H.E. General Pervez Musharraf, President: “To ensure sustainable peace and stability in South Asia, a Kashmir solution should be accompanied by agreed measures for nuclear restraint and a conventional arms balance between India and Pakistan. India's ongoing massive military build up reflects its known desire for domination over South Asia and the Indian Ocean. In the interest of regional and global stability, this must be discouraged.”
(12 september 2002)

Spanje

H.E. Mrs. Ana Palacio, Minister for Foreign Affairs: “Disarmament is another challenge for all of us, despite progress achieved in fields such as Antipersonnel Mines, Small Arms or Chemical Weapons. In this context, Spain follows the development of events related with Iraq with understandable concern. For the sake of international security and stability and for the welfare of the Iraqi people, we hope that the announced immediate and unconditional return of the UN arm inspectors in accordance with Security Council Resolutions 687 and 1284 will be confirmed. The Iraqi regime, which is in clear breach of these Resolutions, must destroy its weapons of mass destruction, under the supervision of the international community. This is the only possible path leading to a lifting of the sanctions and to the normalization of Iraq's relations with the international community. If necessary, the international community must accept its responsibilities in order to ensure compliance with the Resolutions approved by the Organization, which embodies international legitimacy.”
(17 september 2002)

Wit-Rusland

H.E. Mr. Mikhail Khvostov, Minister for Foreign Affairs: “This year has been marked by important agreements concerning the prospects for strategic stability. Belarus welcomes the signing in Moscow of the Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Potentials between the Russian Federation and the United States and supports the development of a constructive dialogue between the nuclear states as the necessary prerequisite for creating a genuinely safe multipolar world. It is necessary to continue international efforts to ensure the entering into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. A new impetus must also be given to the work of the Conference on Disarmament. The world also needs concerted dynamic actions in the field of reduction of conventional weapons. Adherent to the policy of transparency and strengthening of confidence and security, Belarus has made its contribution to the setting up of new security architecture from Vancouver to Vladivostok by having deposited the instruments of ratification of the Open Skies Treaty in November 2001. At the current session we intend to introduce a draft resolution entitled "Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons" which is, in our opinion, very urgent. We hope for its unanimous support, as was the case at the previous sessions of the General Assembly.”

(17 september 2002)

Zweden

H.E. Ms. Anna Lindh, Minister For Foreign Affairs: “Disarmament of weapons of mass destruction requires global co-operation. International as well as national security depends on strong multilateral frameworks. This is no less true in the field of disarmament. There our task is to implement and reinforce the important international conventions banning or regulating weapons of mass destruction. A verification regime is necessary to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. A failure to reach concrete progress in November will have serious consequences. The Chemical Weapons Convention provides for the destruction of a whole category of weapons of mass destruction. This is true disarmament, and it should be implemented in a full and timely manner. The Convention will be reviewed in April next year, for the first time in its young history. Implementing the agreements made at the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conferences is of fundamental importance. That goes particularly for the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, and twelve other steps towards accomplishing that goal. As part of the New Agenda Coalition, Sweden will continue to contribute to this process. The disarmament process should also encompass non-strategic nuclear weapons, as confirmed at the last NPT Review Conference. It is vital that the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty enters into force. I call upon all states to adhere to the Treaty. The Conference on Disarmament must start substantive work when it resumes its session early next year. It is unacceptable that a few countries continue to block progress there. Sweden, Algeria, Belgium, Chile and Colombia have recently presented a proposal for a Programme of Work, which takes into consideration the interests of all parties. I urge China and the USA to actively work for a solution.

(19 september 2002)

VERKLARINGEN IN FIRST COMMITTEE

Australië

H.E. Mr. Michael Smith, Permanent Representative to the United Nations in Geneva: “[...] We must also remain resolute in our collective determination to strengthen multilateral mechanisms to meet the threat posed by WMD and their delivery systems. We consider the continuing close engagement by member states in multilateral processes of vital importance to promoting security objectives. Multilateral mechanisms raise the bar against WMD proliferation by establishing norms and facilitating verification of compliance and they complement plurilateral, regional and national non-proliferation efforts and arrangements.

We all aware of Iraq’s attempts over many years to circumvent international norms against WMD proliferation. Australia considers that the international community cannot allow these violations to go unchecked and that firm action by the United Nations Security Council is required to rectify this situation. Getting inspectors back into Iraq, backed by a strong Security Council Resolution providing for full and unfettered access to all sites, is just the first step. We must remember that our goal remains disarming Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction. Apart from addressing the threat to international security posed by Iraq, we must avoid creating a precedent which other would-be proliferators might be tempted to exploit.

The proliferation of nuclear weapons remains one of the most serious challenges to global security. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) serves as the cornerstone for global efforts seeking to curb the spread of such weapons and to work toward the goal of nuclear disarmament. Australia was particularly gratified by the recent announcement by Cuba that it would accede to the NPT, marking an important step toward universalisation. We take this opportunity to urge the three states which remain outside the treaty to reconsider their position, and to take steps toward NPT accession.

Australia welcomed the outcomes of the First Preparatory Committee meeting of the 2005 NPT Review Conference which took place in April this year. While we see many challenges ahead in the 2005 review cycle, we take heart from positive developments. For example, US-Russian agreement on the Moscow Treaty is a tangible step towards realisation of NPT disarmament objectives.

The CTBT is a key element of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation framework. Australia is determined to continue to work actively to bring the Treaty into force. In this respect, I draw your attention to the Joint Declaration Australia, Japan and the Netherlands launched in New York last month in support of the CTBT. The Declaration encouraged ongoing support for the development of the CTBT’s verification machinery, adherence to the treaty, and set out an action plan to expedite entry into force of the Treaty. We encourage other UN members to associate themselves with the declaration before it is submitted to the Secretary-General.

With 166 signatories and 94 ratifiers, there should be no doubt that the CTBT represents widespread recognition of a powerful international norm against nuclear testing. In this regard, Australia is pleased that a voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing continues to hold. We strongly urge all nuclear weapon and capable states to continue to uphold this moratorium.

The universal implementation of the IAEA’s strengthened safeguards system is another clear nuclear non-proliferation priority, and an area in which further headway can be made by the international community in the lead-up to the next NPT Review Conference. Achieving this objective would contribute significantly to a climate favourable to further cuts in nuclear arms. Australia is helping a number of regional countries with ratification and implementation of the Additional Protocols. [...]

Australia invites all states to support fresh attempts to achieve a breakthrough on commencement of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). The negotiation of an FMCT is a priority disarmament and non-proliferation objective. It is disappointing that, despite repeated endorsement of proposals to negotiate a FMCT, after several years we are still no closer to the start of formal negotiations. We are encouraged that the Netherlands and other countries have undertaken informal discussions on FMCT issues. In the meantime, Australia and other cut-off treaty supporters calls upon all relevant states to uphold moratoria on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons purposes.

Australia is strongly committed to preventing the spread of chemical and biological weapons. We were disappointed that efforts last year to conclude a protocol to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) proved unsuccessful and that the Fifth BWC Review Conference subsequently failed to agree on a forward program. In light of these setbacks, it is vital that momentum towards strengthening the BCW is renewed at the resumed Review Conference in November. Australia urges all states to increase their efforts to achieve practical and effective international measures promoting effective implementation of the BWC.

We are pleased that the difficulties which hampered the work of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical weapons (OPCW) have been resolved and that the OPCW is pursuing its objectives with renewed vigour. We reiterate our earlier calls for all states that have not signed and ratified the CWC to do so as soon as possible to ensure its enhanced effectiveness through universal membership.

Preventing the proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of delivering WMD is a key Australian priority. We welcome the Netherlands' invitation to host a conference from 25-26 November to adopt the International Code of Conduct against ballistic missile proliferation. The Code represents an important practical step to address the problem of ballistic missile proliferation and build confidence at regional and global levels (and does not preclude further initiatives in the future). We urge all states to sign on to the Code. [...]

(New York, 7 October 2002)

Canada

Mr. Christopher Westdal, Ambassador for Disarmament: “[...] Foremost among these instruments is the NPT. Its universalization remains a key Canadian priority. That is why we were happy to welcome Cuba's decision to adhere to the NPT and to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. That welcome act reinforces rules-based multilateralism to contend with threats old and new to international security. Canada calls on India, Israel and Pakistan, still outside the Treaty, to join.

A related high priority is enhanced accountability, the base on which the NPT was indefinitely extended six years ago. At the PrepCom this spring, we emphasized the reporting requirement in the 13-step Action Plan agreed at the 2000 Review Conference. We are consulting with interested States Parties and will address this subject in further preparations for the 2005 Review. At the heart of the NPT, non-proliferation and disarmament are bound one to the other. Canada thus welcomed the Treaty of Moscow, in which the United States and the Russian Federation, launching a new security partnership and high-level dialogue through the Consultative Group on Strategic Security, agreed to reduce their nuclear arsenals. Codification, verifiability, transparency and irreversibility set the highest standards by which the international community marks progress in this field.

We are committed as well to a comprehensive nuclear test ban, essential to both non-proliferation and disarmament. Though several key states have yet to sign or ratify the CTBT, encouraging progress has been achieved. Ninety-four states are on board and an impressive international monitoring system has been established to deter and detect explosive nuclear tests. We urge all states to ensure its continued funding and to support the Provisional Technical Secretariat's vital work – and, of course, we urge all states to sign and ratify the Treaty itself. Meanwhile, it is crucial that the moratorium on tests be sustained. [...]

Other weapons of mass destruction pose ominous threats. We are thus concerned that the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention lacks effective means to ensure compliance and that our sustained effort to negotiate a Protocol to that end has so far been fruitless. At the resumed Review Conference next month, we want to reaffirm that biological weapons are repugnant, abhorrent. And we will want to plan concerted, cooperative, practical BTWC implementation.

Another old threat – chemical weapons – haunts us still. Since we last met, the Chemical Weapons Convention has marked its fifth anniversary in force. The Convention is now supported by 146 states parties, a remarkable total, and there are good prospects for more adherents in the near future. The less good news, though, is that the OPCW still struggles to fulfil its vital mandate. Next month, State Parties must ensure that the organization gets the resources it needs to do its job, verification and inspections above all.

We recognized anew a year ago that we need multilateralism that works, disarmament and non-proliferation pacts that sustain confidence. That means transparency and verification. It also means effective action to ensure compliance. The headlines these days are all about our response to suspected violations. There is much at stake for the future of multilateral arms control. We all know that doing nothing is not an option. We know as well though that we need to get it right. Canada favours collective action through the United Nations. [...]

In closing, I want to pay tribute to the contribution to our deliberations of civil society. NGOs play a vital role in research, analysis and information sharing. Our work would be virtually impossible in this day and age without them. Canada consults systematically with national and international NGOs. We welcome and value their interest and active support. [...]

(New York, 30 September 2002)

China

H.E. Ambassador Hu Xiaodi: “[...] To prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery means and to eliminate those weapons eventually is crucial for maintaining and enhancing international peace and security. The increasing threat of terrorism today has brought more urgency to international non-proliferation efforts and new challenges to the international non-proliferation regime.

The proliferation of WMD and their delivery means has complex causes and is directly related to the regional and global security environment. Its fundamental solution requires the improvement of overall international relations and lies in political, legal and diplomatic means. Use or threat of force does not help and would prove counter-productive. Full participation of and close cooperation among all states is the prerequisite for the success of international non-proliferation efforts, and the guarantee for the impartiality and sustainability in these efforts. In this regard, we should give full play to the role of the United Nations and other international organizations.

China supports the efforts by the United Nations, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. We welcome the valuable report submitted by the UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Missiles. China is in favor of making necessary amendments to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, and hopes that all parties will bridge their differences in a constructive manner so as to enable the early conclusion of the amending process. In March 2002, China completed the legal procedures for the entry into force of the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement between China and IAEA, the first among the five Nuclear-Weapon States to do so. We encourage those states have not yet done so to take the same step at an early date, thus contributing to the strengthening of the IAEA safeguards regime.

China has always been firm in its policy of not supporting, encouraging or assisting other countries to develop WMD. As a country with certain scientific, technological and industrial capabilities, China is fully aware of its international non-proliferation responsibility. Over decades, China has adopted strict measures on the domestic management and export control of sensitive items and technologies, making concrete contribution to the international non-proliferation process.

For years, China has constantly improved its export control mechanism and promulgated a series of laws and regulations on the export control of sensitive items on the basis of its own practice and drawing upon the experience of other countries. In view of the new situation after its entry into WTO and the September 11th terrorist attacks, China has intensified its efforts to enhance its export control by legal means. Recently, the Chinese Government promulgated the Regulations on Export Control of Missiles and Missile-related Items and Technologies and the Missiles and Missile-related Items and Technologies Export Control List. China has thus put its export control of missiles and related items and technologies as well as missile-related dual-use items and technologies into a legal framework. Moreover, to further improve export controls of chemical and biological dual-use items, the Chinese Government will promulgate in the near future the Administrative Rules on Export Control of Chemical Items and Related Equipment and Technologies and the Regulations on Export Control of Biological Dual-use Items and Related Equipment and Technologies. With the promulgation of the above-mentioned regulations, China will establish a comprehensive system of export controls over sensitive items covering nuclear, biological, chemical and missile fields. We will continue to enhance law enforcement to ensure full implementation of the existing laws and regulations, and to improve our non-proliferation mechanism in light of the changing situation. We would also like to further broaden and deepen exchanges and cooperation with other countries in the non-proliferation field so as to make greater contribution to the international non-proliferation process.

Disarmament and non-proliferation are mutually complementary. Without effective non-proliferation, disarmament could hardly be achieved; without progress in disarmament, non-proliferation could hardly be effective and sustainable. Therefore, to preserve the authority and universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is critical for nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. In this connection, China welcomes the decision of Cuba to prepare for accession to the NPT and the ratification of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. China supports the full implementation of the thirteen nuclear disarmament steps as contained in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference on the premise of maintaining global strategic stability and undiminished security for all countries. China always supports and is ready to contribute to the NPT review process.

China welcomes the new treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation on the reduction of strategic offensive forces. China hopes that the U.S. and Russia, as countries with the largest nuclear arsenals and bearing special and primary responsibilities for nuclear disarmament, will continue to drastically reduce and destroy their nuclear weapons in a verifiable and irreversible way.

Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is an important step toward nuclear disarmament. China supports its early entry into force. It is critical for all the Nuclear-Weapon States to maintain the nuclear

testing moratorium before the treaty enters into force. China has actively participated in the work of the CTBTO PrepCom and is carrying out domestic preparations for the implementation of the treaty. China is ready to work with the international community to facilitate the early entry into force of the treaty.

To prohibit the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons is of significance in the nuclear disarmament process. China supports the early negotiation and conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT). We hope that the Conference on Disarmament (CD) could reach a comprehensive and balanced program of work as soon as possible, so as to commence the FMCT negotiation. China has shown considerable flexibility to that end. We expect other countries to respond positively so that the CD could carry out substantive work at an early date.

After more than a decade since the end of the Cold War, it has become common aspiration of the international community to shake off the Cold War mentality. To achieve this objective, we should, first and foremost, establish a new concept of cooperative security and seek common security for all countries. In the field of strategic security, the reliance on nuclear weapons should be diminished. To develop missile defense systems designed to strengthen unilateral deterrence, lower the threshold for nuclear weapon use and increase targets for nuclear attacks run counter to the trend of the times. That is not only detrimental to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, but also harmful to international peace, security and stability.

As a Chinese saying goes, prevention is better than cure. One of the major purposes of arms control is to prevent new arms races in new fields. Today, this preventive function is most salient in outer space. With the dramatic development of space science and technology, more and more countries are benefiting from the peaceful uses of outer space, and our daily life is increasingly linked to outer space. Peaceful uses of outer space offer a bright prospect for the progress of human civilization. However, the shadow of weaponization of outer space is looming large. We must set to work urgently to ensure peaceful uses of outer space and to prevent it from becoming a new battlefield.

While looking back with regret at the historical mistakes of the cold war in competing for nuclear advantage, we should be wise enough to avoid repeating the same mistakes and to prevent the weaponization of and an arms race in outer space. This is an issue where the world peace and the long-term interest of all countries are at stake. It is encouraging to note that this issue is drawing increasing attention from the international community as demonstrated by the UN General Assembly resolutions adopted for many consecutive years and NGOs seminars devoted to this issue.

As the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, the Conference on Disarmament should re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on PAROS and start substantive work with a view to negotiating and concluding an international legal instrument on preventing the weaponization of and an arms race in outer space at an early date. For this purpose, China together with Russia and some other countries, submitted to the CD a working paper titled Possible Elements for a Future International Legal Agreement on the Prevention of the Deployment of Weapons in Outer Space, and the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects (CD/1679) in June this year. This working paper is also circulated as an official document of the current session of UNGA (A/57/418). We would like to register our gratitude to the countries concerned for their useful comments and suggestions, and will continue to conduct serious and earnest discussions on this issue with all parties, further drawing on their views and suggestions to improve and enrich the above-mentioned document.

China always strictly and faithfully fulfills its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and actively supports and participates in the work of the OPCW. We would like to congratulate H.E. Ambassador Rogelio Pfirter on his assumption of the Director-General of the OPCW. We believe that, under the leadership of Ambassador Pfirter, the OPCW will pass this transitional period smoothly, get back on track and make new progress in the implementation of the Convention. China is ready to work with other member states for the comprehensive and effective implementations of the convention and the smooth operation of the OPCW.

With the joint efforts of China and Japan, progress has been made last year in the disposal of chemical weapons abandoned by Japan on the Chinese territory. We hope that the substantive destruction process will start as soon as possible so that the grave threat posed by these weapons to the local environment and the lives and property of the local people can be eliminated within the time-frame set forth in the Convention.

China has supported and actively participated in the negotiation of the protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). We deeply regret that the protocol failed to come to fruition as expected. In the current situation, it is particularly important to strengthen the effectiveness of the Convention. Therefore, China welcomes and is willing to discuss within the multilateral framework any suggestions and measures aimed at strengthening the effectiveness of the Convention. As the resumed session of the Fifth BWC Review Conference is approaching, China wishes to work with other parties in a constructive manner to seek

consensus on the specific mechanism and measures for strengthening the effectiveness of the Convention, so that the conference could achieve concrete results. [...]"

(New York, 1 October 2002)

Egypte

Alaa Issa: "With regard to global non-proliferation efforts, it is with deep regret that we are now before another session of the General Assembly with no progress or results to show towards achieving universality of the NPT in the Middle East, an objective that is overwhelmingly supported by the wider body of the international community, whether in the context of the General assembly of the NPT States Parties. In fact, the Middle East has witnessed more violence and escalation in rhetoric during the past year than any of us could have thought possible. Achievement of universal adherence to the NPT in the Middle East remains a priority for Egypt as well as for the overwhelming membership of the international community, and we shall continue to pursue this issue in the General Assembly through a resolution calling for for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free-zone in the Middle East and another that calls upon Israel, the only state in the Middle East that has not yet acceded to the NPT, to accede to the Treaty.

Furthermore, we welcome the announcement by Iraq to allow the resumption of arms inspections on its soil by the UN and its cooperation in these efforts, which are an essential step towards the lifting of sanctions that were imposed on Iraq over a decade ago. But we must also recall that the efforts to be pursued in Iraq were mandated by the UN Security Council in 1991 as steps towards the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their delivery. Despite this fact, more than a decade has passed since the adoption of Security Council Resolution 687 and no progress has been achieved towards reaching this essential objective. It is our firm belief that the credibility of the non-proliferation regime in the Middle East and beyond will depend to a significant extent on future action by the international community and by the Security Council towards realizing the wider objectives of disarmament and non-proliferation efforts in the Middle East. [...]"

(New York, 7 October 2002)

Europese Unie

H.E. Ambassador Erling Harild Nielsen of Denmark: "The security and stability of the international community is being challenged, both globally and regionally, by the risks brought about by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. [...] The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) remains the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. The EU supports wholeheartedly the objectives laid down in the Treaty and is committed to the effective implementation of the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference and of the decisions and the resolutions adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. The EU welcomes the work of the 1st Preparatory Meeting held in New York in April 2002 and calls on all States to make a success of the preparatory meetings leading up to the Review Conference in 2005. The preparatory work should be a balanced exercise, paying due attention to all aspects of the Treaty's implementation: nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament as well as peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The Union welcomes the announcement of the signature by the United States and the Federation of Russia of a new treaty on the reduction of their strategic nuclear arsenals. In this context, the principles of irreversibility and transparency remain important. This treaty is a step forward and a positive contribution to the efforts of the international community in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. The EU hopes that it will be followed by other initiatives to strengthen international security and stability.

The European Union continues to attach special importance to achieving universal adherence to the NPT. The EU therefore welcomes the recent announcement by Cuba that it intends to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state and calls upon those States not yet parties to the NPT to accede as non-nuclear weapons states.

The importance and urgency of continuing the signing and ratification process of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in order to enable its entry into force as soon as possible as was underlined in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. The Union wishes to reiterate that it spares no efforts in promoting the early entry into force of the Treaty and universal accession to it. It is with this in mind that the Union expresses its full support for the rapid establishment and for the operation of the verification regime. To ensure that the resolve of the international community does not weaken, it calls on all those States

that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the CTBT, without delay and without conditions, in particular those States whose ratification is required for the Treaty to enter into force.

The negotiation at the Conference on Disarmament of a non-discriminatory and universal Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (FMCT) constitutes an essential stage in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. The European Union regrets that a consensus has not yet been reached in the Conference on Disarmament in order to launch the negotiation with the mandate approved in 1995 and in 1998. We reiterate our call to the members of the CD to make every effort to attain the objective as soon as possible. The EU has stated that the 'Amorim proposal' contains elements for a rapid agreement if all CD members display a spirit of openness and pragmatism. In this respect, the Union restates its view that the work of the CD's subsidiary bodies should begin without delay on the basis of mandates which are sufficiently pragmatic and broad to be the subject of an agreement and cover the FMCT, nuclear disarmament and the prevention of the arms race in outer space.

It is regrettable that the CD has now finished its fourth consecutive year without consensus on a work programme. The EU, however, welcomes that new and creative ideas for a work programme have been put forward during this years' sessions of the CD, including a cross-group effort and other efforts by EU Member States to develop a work programme. The EU hopes such initiatives will receive constructive attention from all the CD delegations in the coming months – hopefully enabling us to start substantive work in the CD from the outset of the first session of 2003.

Furthermore, the European Union would like to recall its attachment to the follow-up of the enlargement process of the CD that is the only multilateral negotiating forum for disarmament and arms control. The follow-up on this process is of great importance in particular to those members of the European Union that are not yet members of the Conference as well as the associated countries with the Union which have submitted their request for admission to this Conference.

The IAEA's international safeguards system is the fundamental pillar of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. We share the concerns of the IAEA and regret that 48 States Parties to the NPT have not yet entered into comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA. We call upon those States to fulfil their obligations in accordance with Article III of the Treaty and to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements as a matter of urgency.

The EU considers Additional Protocols to be an integral part of the IAEA safeguards system. The Union accords a high priority to the implementation of an Additional Protocol by all concerned states. We therefore urge concerned states to conclude and implement an Additional Protocol as soon as possible. All Member States of the EU have committed themselves to enter their Additional Protocols into force simultaneously and we aim to do so as soon as possible.

The EU wishes to recall its concern regarding the continued existence of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and material in States not parties to the NPT or equivalent treaties. The EU appeals to all states not party to the NPT to place all their nuclear activities under IAEA-safeguards.

The European Union believes that the creation of internationally recognised nuclear-weapon-free-zones, based on arrangements freely concluded between the States of the region, strengthens regional and global peace and security. We welcome and support signature and ratification by the nuclear weapons States of the relevant Protocols of nuclear weapons free zones and look forward to the entry into force of the African nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty at an early date.

In the same context, we repeat our appeal to the countries of South Asia to make every effort to prevent an arms race in the region. We continue to urge India and Pakistan to cooperate in the efforts of the international community to strengthen the non-proliferation and disarmament regime. We repeat our call for them to implement the specific measures set out in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1172, in particular acceding to the NPT and the signing and ratification of the CTBT. Both countries have declared moratoria on nuclear testing and willingness to participate in the negotiation of a FMCT. We call on them to take all necessary measures towards fulfilling their stated intention.

While we note with interest the commitment made by the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea at Pyongyang on 17 September that it would comply with all related international agreements in the nuclear field, we remain seriously concerned by its continuing failure to implement fully its binding safeguards agreement with the IAEA. We deplore the lack of tangible progress made on important verification issues over the past year. The EU urges the DPRK to work with the IAEA to implement the specific verification steps proposed last year without further delay and in full compliance with its safeguards agreement. The European Union repeats its appeal to the DPRK to sign and ratify unconditionally the CTBT without delay. Finally, the European Union also notes with interest the DPRK's stated intention of continuing its moratorium on missiles and expresses its concern with regard to DPRK exports of missiles and missile technology.

The EU remains committed to the full implementation of the UN Security Council Resolutions on the Middle East and the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT. We continue to support efforts to establish an effective verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. Furthermore, we call on all States in the region that have not done so to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA, to negotiate such agreements and bring them into force as soon as possible. The European Union believes that the accession of all States in the region to the conventions banning chemical and biological weapons and to the NPT would make an essential and extremely significant contribution to peace and to regional and global security.

It remains a matter of concern to the EU, that three and a half years have passed since the IAEA has been able to implement its mandate in Iraq under relevant UN Security Council resolutions, and that the Agency remains unable to provide any assurances regarding Iraq's compliance with its obligations under those resolutions. We note with interest that Iraq's Foreign Minister in a letter of 16 September 2002 to the United Nations Secretary General announced the decision of the Iraqi Government to let the weapons inspectors return to Iraq. The EU strongly urges Iraq without conditions to implement in full and without any delays all relevant Security Council resolutions, and to enable the IAEA and the UN Monitoring and Verification Commission (UNMOVIC) to carry out its mandate in Iraq.

The European Union is deeply concerned about the growing proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction. The EU sees an urgent need for the development of globally accepted norms and practices in support of ballistic missile non-proliferation. The International Code of Conduct against the proliferation of ballistic missiles will be an important first step towards the integration of ballistic missiles in the multilateral non-proliferation and disarmament regime. The Code also confirms the commitment by Subscribing States to the United Nations Declaration on International co-operation in the exploration and use of outer space for the benefit and in the interest of all states. The EU is prepared to work together with other Subscribing States to further develop the Code.

The European Union has supported from the very beginning, the drafting of an international code. The EU is aware that the Code is not the only missile initiative around. It was never meant to be. The EU would welcome increased UN involvement in the missile issue. We therefore welcome the conclusion of the UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Missiles that – quote – it is essential to have continued international efforts to deal with the issue of missiles – unquote. It is, however, also important to achieve quick results of a truly substantive nature. We think that the ICOC is the most concrete and advanced initiative in this field. The European Union urges all States to attend the ICOC launching conference in the Hague on 25-26 November 2002 and join the Code.

The European Union considers the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) a unique instrument for a complete ban on chemical weapons and for their destruction under international verification. The European Union has carried out demarches to promote universal adherence to the States that have yet to sign and ratify the Convention.

The European Union also recalls the importance of Articles IV and V of the Convention, obliging relevant States to destroy 100% of their chemical weapons and their chemical weapons production facilities not later than ten years after the entry into force of the Convention. The European Union calls on all the States Parties concerned to do everything to ensure compliance with the prescribed deadlines. We are fully aware of the application by the Russian Federation of a revised delayed draft plan for destruction of its chemical weapons. The European Union stresses the importance of ensuring that the OPCW and all member states be provided with the relevant information to allow decisions on such new deadlines.

The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention represents a key instrument to prevent biological agents or toxins from being used as weapons. The total ban on such weapons of mass destruction becomes especially important in the light of their actual use for terrorist purposes over the last year. The European Union attaches high priority to the strengthening of the Convention and a successful Outcome of the Fifth Review Conference when it resumes in November of this year. Member States of the EU have considered the issue of national compliance and legislative and regulatory implementation measures and support proposals to strengthen such measures. The Union has presented proposals to this effect as well as on confidence building on non-compliance clarification and investigation during the first part of the Fifth Review Conference in November of 2001. The European Union believes that such proposals could be agreed for a follow-up process to strengthen the BTWC when the Review Conference resumes in November of this year. The Union is consulting with States Parties for a consensus along these lines at the Review Conference and encourages other States Parties to take a similar approach.

September 11 has highlighted the importance of effective export control measures. The European Union finds it essential that all exporting states assume their responsibilities and take measures to ensure that exports of sensitive materials, equipment and technologies are subject to appropriate surveillance and control. Export

controls ensure that transfers take place for peaceful purposes as required by the relevant conventions and treaties facilitating also co-operation and technological development.

In this context the European Union supports the efforts of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group, The Missile Technology Control Regime and the Wassenaar Arrangement, of which all European member states are members – to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery and – in the case of the Wassenaar Arrangement – to promote transparency and greater responsibility in transfer of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies.”

(Danish Presidency of the European Union, 30 September 2002)

India

H.E. Mr. Rakesh Sood, Ambassador: “[...] Let me begin with the grave threat that confronts and preoccupies all of us. Addressing the General Assembly last year, the UN Secretary General said: “While the world was unable to prevent the 11 September attacks, there is much we can do to help prevent future terrorist acts carried out with weapons of mass destruction. The greatest danger arises from a non-State group – or even an individual – acquiring and using a nuclear, biological or chemical weapon. Such a weapon could be delivered without the need for any missile or other sophisticated delivery system”. The UN Secretary General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters has since dealt with the threat posed by terrorism and WMD and has made certain useful recommendations. Further steps need to be taken in the UN framework since this is not a problem specific to a particular country or region. Given the global implications, it will not be sufficient to address the problem behind closed doors of selective clubs. Hence, India proposes to introduce a new resolution in this Committee, requesting the Secretary General to undertake a study on issues related to “Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction”, with the assistance of a Panel of Governmental Experts. Given the need for urgency, the resolution proposes that the study be completed during the first half of 2003 and submitted to the General Assembly at its fifty-eight session, next year. I hope that all members of this Committee will be able to support this timely initiative.

The issue of nuclear weapons pre-dates our concern with ‘terrorism’ and goes beyond. The indivisible security that we are all entitled to will be possible only when we succeed in eliminating all nuclear weapons from the arsenals of the world. Despite being compelled to exercise our nuclear option, in order to preserve our strategic autonomy, India remains committed to the goal of global nuclear disarmament. My delegation is bringing before this committee yet again, as it has done since 1982, the resolution calling for a convention to be negotiated for prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances.

The failure of the existing non-proliferation regime can be attributed to its very discriminatory nature, which has been extended in perpetuity, thus compounding the problem. Until unequivocal undertakings given for the total elimination of nuclear arsenals are honoured, it will be necessary for all nuclear weapon States to take steps to reassure the world that they will reduce the risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. There can be no justifications for thousands of nuclear weapons to be maintained in a state of hair trigger alert with possible disastrous consequences. The call in the UN Millennium Declaration to seek to eliminate the dangers posed by weapons of mass destruction, including by convening an international conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers cannot be ignored any more. India’s resolution entitled ‘Reducing Nuclear Danger’ will be presented to this committee for the fifth consecutive year with the expectation that it will receive wider support and convince those who are still skeptical of the need for early concrete action.

As India prepares to assume its responsibilities as the President of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) from 1 January, 2003, let me reiterate the commitment of my country to participate constructively, and in good faith, in the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) negotiations in order to develop a non-discriminatory and verifiable treaty to prohibit the future production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices. India is also committed to prevent the further militarisation and weaponisation of outer space, which should be preserved for the full range of cooperative, peaceful and developmental activities. These commitments had prompted India to support the compromise Amorim Proposal as a possible way forward to commence substantive work in the CD. Since that proposal could not lead to a consensus among all members, we have welcomed the cross-group initiative of five Ambassadors and expressed our readiness to support it, if it can lead us out of the long prevailing stalemate at the Conference. [...]

There has been in recent years an excessive reliance on export controls, in the name of non-proliferation, by select groups of countries. While such measures have not been effective, denial of so called dual-use technology and equipment have done immense damage to the peaceful technology and equipment have done immense damage to the peaceful developmental efforts of developing countries in a number of spheres of economic activity. There is a need for an effective and transparent system of export controls that would

conform to the objectives of non-proliferation without affecting peaceful applications of these technologies. There is no place for discriminatory mechanisms, some of which run contrary to existing treaty provisions, that deprive developing countries of the benefits of path-breaking scientific and technological developments. In order to address this critical issue, India will bring to this Committee, as it has done since 1989, a resolution entitled 'Role of Science and Technology in the Context of International Security and Disarmament.'

All of us have a stake in ensuring that all the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention are implemented fully and effectively. As an original State Party to this non-discriminatory treaty, India is fully committed to this task. We are also relieved that certain unhealthy developments that threatened the working of the OPCW have been resolved with cooperation of all States Parties.

India is deeply concerned by the circumstances in which the Fifth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention last year had to be abruptly adjourned. The developments since then also do not bode well for the resumed Review Conference this year. The anthrax incidents of last year, instead of prompting the world community to act collectively to challenge the threat of Biological Weapons, have instead led to a path that rejects the framework for multilateral action and may threaten the norm that has existed for thirty years. While national implementation measures and certain group efforts may be worth pursuing, they cannot substitute for meaningful multilateral efforts to strengthen the Convention. We hope that the resumed Review Conference can be saved from failure by at least reaching agreement on a modest follow up work in the truly multilateral context. At a time when the threat from BW proliferation and bioterrorism is of great concern to the people, it would be tragic to undermine the norm established by the BWC. [...]"

(New York, 7 October 2002)

Iran

H.E. Dr. Javad Zarif, Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran: “[...] September 11th illustrated the imperative of revising the existing security doctrines based on the acquisition of huge arsenals of weaponry including nuclear weapons as claimed means of maintaining peace and stability. Weapons of mass destruction envisaged once to guarantee the security of their possessors are today more than ever the sources of real concern and dangerous tools in the hands of irresponsible entities. The Nuclear Weapon States have therefore a moral and legal duty and obligation to pursue the total elimination of their stockpiles in order to open the way to a complete global ban.

Today, nuclear weapons serve no other purpose than to antagonize, and are in fact a persistent menace to international peace and security. Nuclear weapons continue to inhibit genuine confidence so essential in reforming international relations and enhancing cooperation. The threats of nuclear arms are thus not removed until and unless such weapons are eradicated and a nuclear weapon free world is established.

This is not just an ideal or utopian vision of our future; it is a serious demand of the world community, supported by sound political and legal assertions. The Nuclear Weapon States are required and committed by the obligations to pursue systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally with the ultimate goal of their elimination. In this context, the preservation of nuclear weaponry for future use, not only questions the credibility of bilateral arms control efforts, but ignites more dangers for security through their possible submission to accidents, misuse and terrorist attacks.

While complete and verifiable nuclear disarmament is our collective goal and commitment, the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime should be accorded high priority on the international agenda. It is a source of grave concern that the emergence of new doctrines, based on pre-emption and enlarging the scope of the use of nuclear weapons, as defined in the Nuclear Posture Review, undermine the very foundations of the non-proliferation regime with grave consequences for the regional as well as international security environment.

On the positive side, I congratulate the Government of Cuba for its decision to accede to the NPT. We sincerely hope that this initiative would serve as a further step towards universality of the Treaty. I would also like to welcome the realization of a nuclear weapon free zone in Central Asia. The establishment of nuclear weapon free zones is an essential instrument to consolidate nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Yet, the impediments towards the establishment of a zone free from all weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East have aggravated tension in the region. The States in the region have continuously expressed their serious concern over the well documented Israeli pursuit and acquisition of a wide range of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. It is indeed ironic that a regime which has posed the gravest danger to regional and international peace and security for decades, rejected and violated every single resolution of the Security Council and General Assembly, and flouted all international regimes on weapons on mass destruction has received not only acquiescence, but in fact material support for its WMD program from the very state

which has made leveling of baseless allegations about others a priority in its global policy. Even more ironic is the fact that Israel itself has been an active source of misinformation and propaganda about others. It is thus absolutely essential for the international community to actively pursue the implementation of a 30 year old decision of the General assembly on the establishment of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

The individual and collective efforts by Nuclear Weapon States to reduce their arsenals toward a total elimination of nuclear weapons should be complemented through revitalization of nuclear disarmament negotiations on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. Unfortunately, disarmament negotiations have faced severe setbacks, which in some important areas have undermined the decade-long endeavors by the international community to ban weapons of mass destruction. The negotiations on a protocol strengthening the implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention, which was blocked at the very final stage of its conclusion and adoption, await good will and practical initiatives to exit from the impasse. The situation is more difficult to be justified in an era which is overwhelmed by the threats of the weapons of mass destruction. [...]"

(New York, 4 October 2002)

Israël

Jeremy N. Issacharoff, Deputy Director-General for Strategic Affairs: “[...] Among the issues on the agenda of the First Committee in recent years have been two resolutions regarding the Middle East. One resolution deals with the notion of establishing a nuclear weapons free zone in the region. This resolution has commanded consensus over twenty years and while we have certain reservations regarding its language, we attach great importance to the annual endorsement of this idea. We do so particularly as the area of the Middle East is clearly lacking in any confidence building measures or dialogue on affairs relating to arms control and regional security.

The second resolution relates to the ‘risk’ of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. This a contentious text that seeks to focus on only one aspect of the regional security environment and ignore the region’s greatest proliferation dangers and its inherent instability. It also chooses to disregard the extreme hostility of certain countries in the region that continue to reject any form of peaceful reconciliation and coexistence with Israel. In many ways, the tabling of this resolution constitutes an annual declaration by its sponsors, that they prefer to continue to try and alienate Israel, rather than engage it and pursue ideas that might foster and encourage cooperative ventures for the good of regional stability. It is unfortunate that this is the message that they have chosen to send my country. [...]

Israel continues to view the regional context as the primary and essential framework to forward critical arms control measures predicated on a comprehensive and durable peace in the area of the Middle East. In recent years, Israel has sought to lay enduring foundations of peace and stability in our region based on an historic reconciliation, embodying the notions of compromise, mutual trust and respect, open borders and good neighbourliness. The basis for coexistence between Israel and its neighbours was laid in the bilateral peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan and we still hope to widen this process. [...]

In our area it would be impossible to forget that chemical weapons have been used in wars by more than one state in the region and Iraq has used such weapons against its own Kurdish citizens in Halabja. There are other states in the region that possess extensive chemical and biological weapon capabilities with the means to deliver them. I naturally looked for the resolutions in this committee that deal with this troubling aspect of the Middle Eastern security – but my search was in vain.

In order complete this bleak picture, the past activities of UNSCOM and the IAEA in Iraq, demonstrate the real risk of WMD and ballistic missile proliferation. Other countries in the region still seek nuclear weapons and the technology to sustain such a capability. In Iran, for example, these capabilities are sought in conjunction with longer-range means of delivery and over the last year we have witnessed an escalation in the rhetoric that Iran has directed against Israel. In light of this we have little choice but to regard this combination of mass destruction capabilities with extreme hostility to Israel, as an emerging existential threat. [...]

The central danger of terror merging with weapons of mass destruction casts as dark a shadow on the strategic environment as it does on the regional one, particularly the Middle East. It is clearly all the more alarming in a region, in which certain countries have nurtured and sponsored terror as an everyday tool of diplomacy and also seek to develop weapons of mass destruction in contravention of their international commitments. If such countries are so willing to finance and supply rockets and conventional weaponry to terrorists, what will prevent them from providing these same terrorists non-conventional weapons? The international community cannot wait and allow this question to remain unanswered.

By considering the so-called 'Risk' resolution that singles out Israel in this body, the First Committee not only leaves the foregoing question unanswered, but also completely ignores additional and critical challenges to the stability of the entire Middle East. It also ignores the fact that there is no regional political process that could further peace and arms control in the area because of the deep and ingrained hostility to Israel. Progress in these critical areas can only be achieved by efforts from both sides. [...]"

(New York, 10 October 2002)

Japan

H.E. Dr. Kuniko Inoguchi, Representative of Japan: "[...] It is the fervent wish of Japan, as the only country to have experienced the devastation by nuclear bombs to see the realization of a safe, nuclear-weapon-free world. We believe that the most effective way to achieve this goal is through practical and concrete steps in nuclear disarmament. Japan highly values the signing of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions between Russia and the United States, and expects that this Treaty should serve as an important step toward nuclear disarmament efforts.

At the same time, we are gravely concerned about the obstacles to the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). This Treaty represents a historic multilateral step toward nuclear disarmament and strengthens the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Japan has been doing its utmost, through bilateral contacts and multilateral means, to encourage non-signatories and non-ratifiers to accede to it. Last month, building on the achievements of the Article XIV Conference in November 2001, Japan, together with Australia and the Netherlands, took the initiative of issuing a joint ministerial statement on the CTBT. The three countries are inviting other countries to be included in the list of issuers; currently eighteen foreign ministers from all geographic regions are on the list. The statement will be forwarded to the Secretary General to be circulated as an official document of the U.N. I would like to take this opportunity to call upon all States to join this meaningful statement. In addition, my country is fully cooperating with the Preparatory Committee of the CTBT Organization for the establishment of a verification system. Pending the entry into force of this Treaty, however, it is imperative that the states concerned maintain the moratoria on nuclear-weapon-test explosions.

We are deeply disappointed at the six-year-long stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament and its failure again this year to commence negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT). An FMCT would be a significant step for nuclear non-proliferation and an essential building block for further nuclear disarmament. Moreover, the strengthened control of nuclear materials under an FMCT will aid in the prevention of nuclear and radiological terrorism. For these reasons, negotiations should be commenced immediately, in accordance with the mandate that was agreed upon in 1995. A series of educational seminars which the Netherlands is currently conducting is benefiting all delegations in Geneva by preparing them for the negotiations once they begin. [...]

Again this year, my delegation will submit to the General Assembly a draft resolution entitled "A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons." We look forward to its adoption with the support of an overwhelming majority of Member States. [...]"

(New York, 1 October 2002)

New Agenda Coalition

Ambassador Mary Whelan, Permanent Representative of Ireland to the United Nations in Geneva: I will [...] give the Committee an overview of the NAC position on a number of issues which are detailed in the two draft resolutions which we will put forward at this session.

The first of these draft resolutions, entitled "*Towards a nuclear weapon free world: the need for a new agenda*", builds on the previous work of the New Agenda Coalition at the 2000 NPT Review Conference and at last April's Preparatory Committee meeting for the 2005 Review Conference. As such, it represents a NAC contribution to the ongoing Review process and to the goals of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

It is the firm belief of the NAC that the horrific events which took place one year ago in this city have underlined the importance of the multilateral approach to disarmament. These events and the possibility that terrorists could make use of weapons of mass destruction have highlighted the importance of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. These attacks have been a wake-up call. It is time to take the necessary collective action in relation to nuclear disarmament.

In 1995, the NPT States Parties renewed their commitment to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective nuclear disarmament measures. By the time we reach the NPT Review Conference of 2005 a full decade will

have passed. The undertakings made by States Parties at the 2000 NPT Review Conference have mapped out the practical steps through which such progress can be achieved. The ongoing NPT Preparatory Committee process provides a facilitating framework. We, as an international community, must take the agreed practical steps. Our continued indecision leaves us as vulnerable to a nuclear event as at any time in our history.

We believe that the first NAC draft resolution represents an opportunity to consolidate and to enhance the contribution that negotiated treaties can make to international nuclear security. We have already fallen behind in this endeavour. Now is the time to reinvigorate the wider nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation debate so as to respond with tangible results.

Without rehearsing the content of the initial NAC resolution I urge like-minded States to join us in, calling upon the Conference on Disarmament to establish an *ad hoc* committee to deal specifically with nuclear disarmament, wishing to see the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty enter into force as soon as possible with confirmation of the moratorium on all test explosions, expressing our deep concern about the continued retention of the nuclear weapons option by the three States who have not yet acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and calling on them to do so and bring into force full-scope IAEA safeguards, seeking the resumption of negotiations on a treaty to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives, wanting to prevent an arms race in outer space and calling on the Conference on Disarmament to re-establish an *ad hoc* committee to deal with this issue, calling on nuclear-weapon States to respect fully their existing commitments with regard to security assurances and for recommendations on this issue to be made to the 2005 NPT Review Conference.

Emerging approaches to the broader role of nuclear weapons, including the development of new types of nuclear weapons and new rationalisations for their use, give urgency to our concerns. There is an accumulation of nuclear risk. There is a disturbing trend of convergence between the possible deployment of tactical nuclear weapons and conventional ones. This trend is among the many horizontal and vertical pressures which are extending the range of nuclear and related threats which we face.

In an effort to highlight the particular threat posed by tactical nuclear weapons, we as NAC partners will put forward a second draft resolution which will include:

- a call for the reduction of Tactical Nuclear Weapons to be given priority and carried out in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner.

- a call to further reduce the operational status of Tactical Nuclear Weapons.

The NAC Group strongly contends that it is not tenable to leave our internationally agreed nuclear disarmament action strategies in open-ended abeyance. The two resolutions we are putting forward can act as a catalyst for meaningful progress and concrete action. They have the necessary operational flexibility to meet the concerns of all like-minded States. By way of a positive outcome to this session's debate, we invite like-minded States to support our draft resolutions in a spirit of shared global concern.

(Statement to the First Committee on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition, 30 September 2002)

Nieuw-Zeeland

Deborah Panckhurst, Representative of New Zealand: “[...] New Zealand has consistently sought to push the disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation agenda forward. Now, during this time of increased uncertainty, it is not a time when States should be pulling back from multilateral initiatives. Instead we should be reinvigorating these efforts. As New Zealand's Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Hon Phil Goff, said during this year's General Assembly debate: “It is essential that we renew our commitment to multilateralism as the best way to address global problems.” In other words, collective problems require collective solutions.

At the cornerstone of New Zealand's disarmament policy is a drive for a world free of nuclear weapons. We have continued to work with our New Agenda Coalition partners towards real and substantive action being taken on the 13 Steps agreed to at the 2000 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In this regard, we welcome the news of Cuba's intention to accede to the NPT and urge those few countries still outside the Treaty to follow Cuba's example, and accede as non-nuclear weapon states, as soon as possible. [...]

The first and crucial step of the Programme of Action agreed at the 2002 NPT Review Conference – the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty – is still not within sight. The CTBT is a contribution towards the systematic reduction of nuclear weapons and the prevention of nuclear proliferation by ridding the world of nuclear weapons test explosions. The failure so far to bring into force this fundamental step towards non-proliferation and disarmament threatens to undermine the credibility of disarmament negotiations.

New Zealand declared itself and its waters a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in 1987 with the passage of the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act. The South Pacific is also a NWFZ and there are other NWFZs around the world. We support Brazil's initiative to join the NWFZs in the Southern Hemisphere to create a Southern Hemisphere free of nuclear weapons. This is in no way an attempt to impinge on the rights all States enjoy under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, but would comprise a positive act of common purpose. [...]

It is an issue of deep concern to New Zealand that the preparations for the resumed Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention, scheduled to take place in November this year, are in difficulty. States have negotiated for years towards the development and implementation of a compliance mechanism for the Biological Weapons Convention. The technology and science that feeds into biosecurity and bioterrorism is being rapidly developed. But while the United Nations is still struggling to identify and eliminate biological weapons developed in one State, and we have witnessed the use of BW in another State, we have been unable to bring the negotiation for a system of verification and compliance to completion.

2002 has been a challenging year for the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The process of changing the leadership of the Technical Secretariat was a difficult one for all of us, but we are confident that the new Director General, Rogelio Pfrter of Argentina, has the skills to take the OPCW forwards. He has made a fine start.

2003 can be expected to present challenges as well. Member States must seize the opportunity provided by the First Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention to give tangible effect to our determination, 'for the sake of all (hu)mankind,' to 'exclude completely the possibility of the use of chemical weapons.' That is surely our task, and we should not fool ourselves that it is complete. [...]"

(New York, 30 September 2002)

Pakistan

Shaukat Umer, Ambassador: "[...] 4. The threat of force looms larger than ever in South Asia, which has been described as the most dangerous place on earth. The situation in this volatile region emphatically illustrates the inadmissible preference for war over diplomacy. Nearly a million troops have been deployed along our borders and the Line of Control in Kashmir with just one objective: to force Pakistan to back away from the principled position that disputes between India and Pakistan should be resolved through the application of the UN Charter and not the use of force. The rejection of this legitimate demand has been accompanied by naked threats of military action and pre-emptive strikes. Is it not a monumental irony that aggression is being threatened against a country for urging the implementation of the United Nations Security Council resolutions on Kashmir. [...]"

7. The nuclearization of the region also warrants the creation of a new security structure founded on dialogue, peace, arms control and cooperation. Accordingly, Pakistan has proposed the establishment of a Strategic Restraint Regime in South Asia, encompassing the following principles:

One: India and Pakistan should formalize their respective unilateral nuclear test moratoriums, perhaps through a bilateral treaty;

Two: Not operationally weaponize nuclear capable missile systems;

Three: Not operationally deploy nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, and to keep them on de-alert;

Four: Formalize the previous understanding to provide prior and adequate notification of flight tests of missiles;

Five: Observe a moratorium on the acquisition, deployment or development of Anti-Ballistic Missile systems;

Six: Implement further confidence-building and transparency measures to reduce the risk of the use of nuclear weapons by miscalculation or accident;

Seven: Open discussions on the nuclear security doctrines of the two countries with a view to forestalling an all out nuclear arms race;

Eight: An agreement on non-use of force, including the non-use of nuclear weapons;

Nine: Conventional arms balance and a political mechanism for the resolutions of disputes, particularly Kashmir.

8. At the global level, the arms control and disarmament agenda has, regrettably, achieved neither its potential nor its promise. In our view, the long-standing objective of general and complete disarmament under strong and effective international control, as stipulated in the Final Document of SSOD-I, remains relevant as ever, and should be pursued with the greatest vigour. The following steps are of fundamental importance:

One: The existing huge nuclear inventories be attenuated substantially. The Moscow Treaty constitutes a salutary first step in this direction in that it reduces the imminent threat posed by deployed nuclear weapons.

However, the long term threat remains undiminished. Real threat reduction requires destruction of nuclear weapons, which we hope would eventually happen to be followed by general and complete disarmament.

Two: The NPT nuclear-weapon States are 'unequivocally' committed to the elimination of nuclear weapons. This commitment needs to be operationalized. Negotiations should commence on Nuclear Disarmament at the earliest in the Conference on Disarmament.

Three: Adequate measures in the form of a multilaterally negotiated legal instrument will be necessary to prevent an arms race in outer space. Missile Defense creates the Sisyphean dilemma of plunging the world into another costly and destabilizing arms race. Sustainable security cannot be achieved in the midst of an interminable arms race.

Four: Multilateral negotiations must convene to conclude a legally-binding international instrument on negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon states in accordance with the UN resolutions. Such an instrument would provide credible guarantees against the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Five: Regional approaches to international security and disarmament must be strengthened, especially in tension-ridden regions such as the Middle East and South Asia. Every region has its sui generis dynamics. Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation require effective redressal of security imbalances at the regional level. In accordance with its traditional resolution on Regional Disarmament, Pakistan has proposed this item for inclusion in the Agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. Only one delegation demurred.

9. Other steps should include: a) commitment to the CTBT and, pending its entry into force, continued observance of unilateral moratoriums by the nuclear-weapon states; b) conclusion of a universal, non-discriminatory and verifiable Fissile Materials Treaty; c) full implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention; d) removal of artificial hindrances to the promotion of peaceful applications of nuclear technology.

10. At the same time, Member States should strengthen their domestic and export controls on sensitive materials, equipment and technologies in accordance with their obligations under relevant international legal instruments. Pakistan, being party to both the BWC and the CWC, and a State with nuclear capability, is fully conscious of its responsibilities. A National Command Authority, under the Chairmanship of the Head of Government and including three Federal Ministers and Chiefs of Armed Services, has been set up to provide policy direction, supervise the deployment and employment of assets and approve measures to ensure custodial safety and complete institutional control. We will continue to strengthen our controls as required.

11. Axiomatically, cooperative security at the global, regional and sub-regional levels cannot be achieved unilaterally. Indeed, the multilateral approach offers the best hope. It is unfortunate that the Conference on Disarmament remains mired in an impasse. It must develop a balanced programme of work which answers to the concerns of all parties.

12. The international community also needs to address the issue of missiles in a cooperative spirit. We appreciate the works done by the Panel of Governmental Experts on Missiles, set up the Secretary General last year. For understandable reasons, their Report remained inconclusive.

13. We favour the elaborations of a global treaty on missiles as part of a comprehensive disarmament programme. Accordingly, we have proposed the item of 'Missiles in all aspects' for inclusion in the Agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. A global treaty will take time. We are ready to consider global interim measures aimed at reducing missile related threats at all levels. These could range from de-alerting nuclear weapons and missile systems to involving multilaterally negotiated controls over the transfer of sensitive technologies and supplemented by alternative measures for maintaining military balance, especially in volatile regions, and enhancing cooperation in technologies for peaceful purposes.

14. We regret the fact that the Fifth BWC Review Conference last year had to be suspended. In view of the evolving threats, particularly in the context of bio-terrorism, this instrument should be further strengthened. To this end, Pakistan would continue to remain engaged. The reconvened Fifth Review Conference in November would need to agree on a balanced and meaningful follow-up programme, encompassing both regulatory and promotional activities. [...]"

(New York, 10 October 2002)

Rusland

Andrey Granovsky, Ambassador: "[...] We would like to underline that diminishing the role of the international law, withdrawing from the key agreements assuring strategic stability, international security and the rule of law in the world are only likely to feed terrorism, exacerbate threats to international security and weaken safety of the world community.

Russia is committed to strict implementation of our obligations in the field of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation, and we second our words with deeds.

The period of strategic offensive weapons reduction provided for in START I was concluded last December. Under this Treaty, each Party was to reduce the number of its strategic delivery means and warheads attributed to them to 1600 and 6000 respectively within seven years after the entry into force of this Treaty. Russia has fully implemented its obligations under these provisions before the end of that period and by the check date, December 5, 2001, had reduced the number of its deployed strategic delivery means (the ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers) and warheads attributed to them to 1136 and 5518 respectively.

We destroyed the last nuclear warhead removed from the territory of Ukraine to Russia in October 2001.

Russia consistently and successfully carries out the measures that were announced within its 1991-1992 unilateral disarmament initiatives with regard to nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Through our strenuous and continuous efforts, all the weapons of the former Soviet Union have been withdrawn to the territory of Russia and brought under steady control. We would like to draw your attention once again to the Russian proposal to withdraw all the nuclear weapons to the territory of the nuclear states, which they belong to. So we will be more confident of its safety and security.

The Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty concluded by Russia and the United States at the Moscow Summit last May is another major step towards nuclear disarmament. The Treaty legally binds each Party to reduce, on the basis of reciprocity, its aggregate number of strategic nuclear warheads to the agreed level of 1700-2200 by December 31, 2012, i.e. provides for threefold reduction if compared with the level established under START I. And according to its terms, START I will remain in force till December 5, 2009, and may be extended by mutual consent of the Parties – thus, strategic offensive weapons of Russia and the United States will be subject to double complementary limitations of both Treaties at least till the end of this period. The new Treaty provides for its further improvement, strengthening and updating. To this end, a special Bilateral Commission on Implementation is to be created. Russia is going to ratify the new Treaty by the end of the year.

Like any other agreements, the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty has been made possible by the willingness of Russia and the United States to make mutual concessions and build new strategic relations in facing new threats, which they formalized in the Joint Declaration adopted at the same Summit, as well as to reaffirm close interrelation between strategic offensive and defensive weapons.

According to the decisions taken at the Moscow Summit held in May, working out a system of predictability and confidence-building measures in the anti-missile defense sphere is underway. That will help redress the situation after the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. To discuss strategic security issues on a regular basis, a special mechanism was established – the Consultative Group composed of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Ministers of Russia and the United States, who held their first meeting in Washington on September 20. The similar mechanism is also to be created with France.

Russia attaches great importance to political and diplomatic efforts to resolve the problem of missile non-proliferation. We positively evaluate the work done by the group of governmental experts within the United Nations on the missile nonproliferation issues. We believe that such work should be continued. When preparing the expert report, Russia introduced a draft Memorandum of Intent in the missile non-proliferation area, which was to define further steps in that area. The document reflects the Russia's concept of the Global Control System for Nonproliferation of Missiles and Missile Technologies, which assures wide and nondiscriminatory participation of all concerned states in developing such measures under the UN auspices.

We think it is of crucial importance to take into account opinions and proposals of all the concerned states when drafting the International code of conduct on the prevention of ballistic missile proliferation which is under discussion now. An important aspect of the missile nonproliferation issue is to guarantee the legal right of each and every state to peaceful development of outer space.

The issue of preventing the militarization of outer space is acquiring more and more topicality. At the 56th UNGA session Russia put forward a proposal on a possible basis for the comprehensive arrangement on non-deployment of weapons in space. Before such an arrangement is reached, the Russian side proposed to declare a moratorium on weapon deployment in outer space.

These proposals were further elaborated in the Conference on Disarmament working paper 'Possible elements for a future international legal arrangement on the prevention of the deployment of weapons in outer space, the threat or use of force against outer space objects' introduced by Russia and China along with Belarus, Vietnam, Zimbabwe, Indonesia and Syria. It has received the initial approval by a number of states participating in the Conference and in our opinion could be discussed within the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. In order to make the document widely known, Russia and China have distributed it as a document of the current UNGA session.

The fact that during several previous sessions the UN General Assembly adopted the resolution on preventing an arms race in outer space by overwhelming majority serves as the evidence of the wide international support for this idea.

When interviewed by the Russian mass media on October 2, 2002, Igor S. Ivanov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, declared Russia's willingness to take another measure of transparency and confidence-building in outer space, which is to provide early notification of the forthcoming space launches.

We would also like to reaffirm the importance of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a key tool to prevent such weapons from spreading, as a factor contributing to regional and global stability. We support the decision taken at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. We encourage fruitful work of the NPT Review Conference to be held in 2005. One of the most significant events that we would like to underscore in the context of the NPT universalization is Cuba's intention to accede to the Treaty and to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco. We hope that this decision will influence the attitude of other states, still abstaining from acceding to this fundamental document.

The recent G-8 Summit decision on the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction deserves special attention in the light of the necessity to coordinate the international efforts to eliminate the risks of nuclear terrorism. It is also of great importance to enhance international legal documents on physical protection of nuclear materials and handling of radioactive materials and spent fuel. Russia urges the world community to promptly draft and conclude an international convention on combating nuclear terrorism.

We would like to express our satisfaction with the IAEA efforts, in particular in strengthening of the IAEA Safeguards system. We support the IAEA project on innovative nuclear reactors and fuel cycles, which is in line with the initiative launched by Vladimir V. Putin, President of the Russian Federation, to develop proliferation-proof nuclear technologies.

Russia regards the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) as one of the basic instruments in the sphere of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation, safeguarding strategic stability and security. The importance of this Treaty is confirmed by the Joint Statement of the foreign ministers of 18 states in support of the CTBT, which was made at the General Assembly session on September 14, 2002. We appeal to all countries that have not yet signed and ratified the Treaty to do so as soon as possible and especially to those countries whose ratification is required for the Treaty to enter into force. It is also important to adhere to the moratorium on nuclear weapon tests and whatsoever nuclear explosions until the CTBT enter into force.

We consider the Chemical Weapons Convention to be an effective tool to consolidate international peace and security and find it necessary to assure its universal character. We applaud the important decisions taken at the September session of the OPCW Executive Council 2002, which allow the Russian Federation to implement its commitments under the Convention in a systematic and consistent manner. We attribute the decisions taken by this authoritative international organization, to no small extent, to Russia's continuous adherence to its international commitments in the area of chemical disarmament as well as to the specific steps to implement this complex and expensive program.

Favoring the continuation of the multilateral efforts to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), we are willing to discuss also the proposals that supplement the verification mechanisms, on enhancing the Convention during the second stage of the 5th Review Conference in November. [...]"
(New York, 9 October 2002)

Verenigde Staten

Stephen G. Rademaker, Assistant Secretary for Arms Control: "[...] I note with great satisfaction the approach of the tenth anniversary of the UN Register of Conventional Arms. The participation of more than 160 countries in the Register process makes it truly a global confidence-building measure, and I look forward to it becoming a universal measure in the years to come.

It is a great pleasure for me to appear before this Committee for the first time to discuss the approach of the United States to arms control and nonproliferation. Nowhere else in the world could as much arms control expertise and experience be found together in one room. I look forward to working with you, learning from you, and making progress in confronting the challenges we face.

We meet at a time of both great promise and great danger.

- Promise, because the two states with by far the largest stockpiles of nuclear weapons, recognizing they are no longer adversaries, have decided to reduce their nuclear forces dramatically.

- Danger, because the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is increasing and the terrorist attacks whose anniversaries we recently commemorated make abundantly clear the threats we will all face if terrorists gain access to such weapons.

In speaking to you today, I would like to highlight the continuing importance of arms control in light of both this promise and this danger.

Bilateral agreements

The demise of Communism in the former Soviet Union and the end of the cold War were among the most dramatic – and most positive – developments in international relations of the past half century. Not everyone appreciated the new opportunities presented by these developments, however, and many were reluctant to part with familiar institutions of the Cold War. It was widely predicted, for example, that the ABM Treaty could not be ended without plunging the world into a new arms race.

We have proven over the past year, however, that these predictions were ill-founded. The ABM Treaty was amicably terminated, and the U.S. and Russia promptly agreed to implement the largest reduction ever in deployed nuclear forces.

The rapid negotiation of the U.S. – Russian Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, or “Moscow Treaty” for short, and the accompanying Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship, was made possible by the new strategic framework President Bush constructed with Russia. As contrasted with strategic arms control during the Cold War, the negotiation of these agreements did not require years to work out complicated limits, sub-limits, and verification regimes – regimes that both countries agreed were unnecessary in this Treaty. In a few short months, the United States and Russia were able to record in a formal, long-lasting treaty the decisions each had made on the reduction of its strategic nuclear warheads.

Thus the two parties put into legal form their respective commitments to each reduce by several thousands the number of strategic nuclear warheads to 1,700 to 2,200 by the end of 2012. These reductions represent a cut of about two thirds below current levels and far below the Cold War figures.

At the same time, the United States and Russia agreed on a Joint Declaration, which addresses broader aspects of the new strategic framework. It focuses on the closely linked threats of international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and acknowledges the major improvements in the nature of the U.S. – Russian strategic relationship. It establishes a Consultative Group for Strategic Security, which held its first meeting two weeks ago in Washington. This body, which includes the foreign and defense ministers of the two countries, will permit us to continue discussions to explore additional ways to enhance transparency and predictability.

In concluding the Moscow Treaty, the United States has once again taken steps in accordance with Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction

Regrettably, just as the world is turning away from the balance of terror between the superpowers, we find ourselves confronted with a dramatically increased threat of terrorism. We Americans have seen first hand the havoc terrorists could wreak when armed with knives. We shudder to imagine how much more death and destruction they would seek to inflict if they chose to use weapons of mass destruction.

This is nothing less than a fight between civilization and barbarism. There are roles in this fight for the law enforcement community, the military, public health workers, and others. What the arms control community can do is to strengthen the international framework to prevent weapons of mass destruction from falling into the hands of terrorists, or into the hands of states that support terrorism as matter of national policy. The arms control community can also better enforce obligations undertaken in the existing frameworks. Obligations must be lived up to if they are to serve as useful purpose.

We believe every country in the world should belong to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention, and the Chemical Weapons Convention; that every country belonging to them should fully comply with their provisions; and that Parties must hold each other accountable and take appropriate steps to deter violations.

The universal adoption of the IAEA Additional Protocol would give us greater assurance of compliance with the NPT. In this regard, I am pleased to report that earlier this year the President submitted to the United States Senate the U.S. Additional Protocol. Through IAEA safeguards and other means, the international community must sustain efforts to reduce the threat of diversion of nuclear materials, equipment, and technology.

The strong U.S. commitment to effective multilateral arms control is demonstrated by our actions over the past year with respect to the OPCW. When the United States and other parties to the CWC realized that the OPCW was not being effectively administered, the politically expedient course would have been to remain

silent while the CWC slowly atrophied. Indeed, many countries strongly counseled us to follow precisely such a course. We chose instead, however, to initiate efforts to revitalize the Organization. Now that the OPCW is under new leadership, we are confident that it can effectively enforce international norms with respect to chemical weapons, provided it receives sufficient support from the international community. Accordingly, the United States is making a voluntary contribution to the organization of some \$2 million. In addition, we have decided to upgrade our diplomatic representation at the OPCW in The Hague. We urge other members to join us in making such voluntary contributions to the OPCW, and in taking other steps to underscore international support for Director General Pfirter as he begins to revitalize this important institution of multilateral arms control.

Treaty Compliance

Measures to assist in verification of compliance are key features of most traditional arms control regimes, which often included provisions for declarations, inspections, and even the establishment of implementation bodies. There are instances, such as biological weapons, where other approaches are more appropriate, but in general it is the policy of the United States to support fully the efforts of such organizations as the IAEA and the OPCW. The international community must use all means at its disposal to ensure not just that key multilateral arms control treaties are complied with, but also that we keep weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery out of the hands of terrorists and state sponsors of terrorists.

The United States will introduce a resolution in this session of the First Committee that reiterates the value the international community places on compliance with arms control and nonproliferation treaty regimes. In the past, similar resolutions have achieved unanimous support. In current circumstances, I hope we can count on no less.

Conference on Disarmament

Beyond the existing regimes, the United States has repeatedly expressed support for efforts to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. We support negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament of an FMCT that would advance the security interests of the negotiating parties. The effort by some CD members to hold up progress on a matter which all agree is ripe for negotiation in an attempt to force negotiations in unrelated areas is a perversion of the consensus rule of the Conference. Persisting in these efforts most assuredly will not succeed in forcing the premature commencement of negotiations in other areas. The continued deadlock in the CD will serve only to further marginalize it in international security affairs and lead more nations to question the continued utility of the forum.

Radiological weapons

The terrorist threat has also forced us to focus renewed attention on radiological weapons. We must foreclose the possibility of terrorists obtaining possession of radiological material and constructing a radiation dispersion weapon or 'dirty bomb'. The IAEA and other bodies are working on ways of improving the physical control of such material.

I appreciate the hard work and commitment of First Committee delegates in bringing forward more than fifty resolutions every year. But the grave new threats we presently face demonstrate the urgent need for actions on the part of each member state. The number of resolutions we push through every year will be of little comfort if our efforts fail to reverse the spread of weapons of mass destruction and do not prevent such weapons from falling into the wrong hands. The overriding goal of the United States through our international arms control and nonproliferation efforts is to make the world safer and more secure. I know it is a goal that you share, and I look forward to working with all of you in this critical endeavor.

Zuid-Afrika

Statement: "[...] There has also been little progress on nuclear disarmament and little to show on the thirteen nuclear disarmament steps agreed to by all of the NPT's States Parties at the 2000 Review Conference. While de-alerting and reliance on substantively fewer deployed nuclear weapons had made significant gains in the Moscow Treaty; real disarmament has not been addressed. Furthermore, the First Preparatory Committee in the new NPT Review cycle was disappointing. Although some delegations expended much energy and effort on proposals and reports, no substantive interaction took place and we ended up talking at each other but not with each other. This will need to be remedied for the second PrepCom and future deliberations.

As a country that stepped back from the nuclear weapons abyss, South Africa remains totally committed to the complete elimination of these weapons. We will, along with our partners in the New Agenda, submit two

resolutions to the First Committee this year and count on past supporters to again join us in our pursuit towards a nuclear weapon-free world. [...]

While the proliferation of missiles is deemed to be one of the escalating and immediate challenges to international peace and security, we were unable to collectively address even the most basic concerns in this field. The report of the UN Panel of Governmental Experts on missiles in all its aspects is a sad reflection of the current state of disarmament affairs. Panel members had vigorous discussions, but could not agree on a single recommendation for a course of action and couldn't even agree on what the nature of the problem was.

The draft International Code of Conduct against the Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles (ICOC) has undergone some development phases in which South Africa has actively participated. Its success will depend on the degree to which the final draft will be able to attract support, especially from those States possessing these ballistic missiles. Early drafts have not managed to adequately address the utilisation of the benefits of space for peaceful purposes and while at this early stage the ICOC only attempts to address proliferation, it would be important to have a disarmament goal included.

The lack of progress regarding the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) continues to be of concern to my delegation. The Joint Ministerial Declaration in support of the CTBT released by Ministers of Foreign Affairs of eighteen countries on 14 September 2002, underlines the urgency and commitment Ministers have accorded entry into force of the Treaty.

In the area of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the situation has also moved from bad to worse – with a faint glimmer of hope being vested in the resumed meeting of the suspended BWC Review Conference, which is to take place in Geneva during November 2002. We had believed that the inability of the States Parties to adopt the draft Protocol to strengthen the implementation of the BWC, which had been the subject of detailed and protracted negotiation over so many years, was a low point in the history of the Convention and we had consequently approached the Review Conference in 2001 with scepticism and a low expectation. It, however, turned out to be possible for even scepticism and a low expectation to be further disappointed when the Conference had to be suspended, unable to even agree on a minimalist common position. The reconvened Review Conference will therefore be starting from a low point and it will be important for the overwhelming number of States Parties, who had joined together from all political groupings during the meetings in 2001, not to be forced into accepting a failure. South Africa was persuaded by the strong arguments put forward at the Review Conference by many of the States Parties (from all of the political groupings) that it would be important for the States Parties not to allow a situation where no further work is done to enhance the implementation of the BWC. These States Parties, many of whom are sitting in this room, insisted that a vacuum in the period until the next Review Conference in 2006 would be detrimental for the Convention and for our fight against the biological weapons threats confronting the international community, also as these threats are exacerbated by the scourge of terrorism. To this end, South Africa would support a proposal at the reconvened meeting of the Review Conference that would include:

- The rapid conclusion of the Review Conference's work with a focus on future work to enhance the implementation of the Convention, also without raising divisive issues where it is known that agreement will not be possible;
- No reference to the BWC Ad Hoc Group and its draft Protocol in the final documents of the Review Conference;
- Agreement to establish a Group or Groups of Experts to deal with a limited and non-exhaustive list of specific issues related to the Convention and to consider and reach agreement on proposals that could enhance the implementation of the Convention;
- Annual meetings of the Group or Groups of Experts for a period of approximately four weeks in two separate periods. If there is time still available after the reconvened meeting of the Review Conference in November has completed its work, then the remaining time could be used by the newly established Expert Group or Groups to begin initial consideration of their work;
- Annual meetings of the States Parties for a limited duration of time (a few days) that would consider the work of the Group or Groups and decide upon further work once issues had been dealt with. The annual meeting should coincide with one of the periods of time that have been allocated for a meeting of the Expert Group or Groups; and,
- The possible strengthening of the UN Secretariat in the area of biological weapons so as to assist the States Parties, especially from developing countries, in the abovementioned work.

With respect to the Chemical Weapons Convention the past year has proved to be somewhat of a challenge. The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has been required to deal with difficult institutional challenges which have resulted in a lack of focus on the core business of the Organisation. South Africa is gratified that these difficulties now appear to have been resolved, and we take this opportunity to

wish Ambassador Rogerio Pfirter every success in his new role as Director-General of the OPCW. The OPCW has also once again faced the challenge of under-funding in 2002. The upcoming Conference of States Parties in The Hague will seek to approve a budget that accurately reflects the needs of the Organisation to fulfil its mandate of ensuring the complete elimination of chemical weapons. The principle of 'the possessor pays' has been clearly defined in the Convention and those countries that do possess such weapons must accept the responsibility they have brought upon themselves by developing these weapons in the first place. The world's only disarmament treaty dedicated to the elimination of an entire category of weapons of mass destruction must not be allowed to falter because of attempts by possessors to engage in creative accounting. Given the international security climate and the widely acknowledged fact that chemical weapons are an easy option in the terrorist's arsenal, the Member States of the Chemical Weapons Convention need to ensure that the OPCW focuses very clearly and effectively on its core functions of destruction and non-proliferation of chemical weapons.

South Africa welcomes the decision by Iraq to unconditionally allow the United Nations and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors into that country so as to fulfil their task on the verification of the destruction of the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and WMD capabilities in accordance with the decisions of the Security Council. The situation in Iraq, including its non-compliance with international non-proliferation obligations – particularly as related to Iraq's obligations under the BWC and the NPT as well as their use of chemical weapons and missile delivery systems – has been a source of concern for the international community. The completion of investigation into, and verification of, the destruction of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capabilities has been much delayed, and South Africa would call on Iraq to come into full compliance with its obligations in this regard. [...]"

(New York, 2 October 2002)

COMMENTAAR EN VRAGEN

De onderhandelingen in het First Committee van de VN zijn een herhaling van zetten die ook vorig jaar plaatsvonden, maar nu tegen de achtergrond van grote veranderingen in het stelsel van internationale veiligheidsverdragen. In december vorige jaar kondigde de Amerikaanse regering aan dat ze eenzijdig het ABM verdrag zou verlaten, in verband met haar plannen om een anti-raketschild aan te leggen. Daarnaast ontkoek ze die maand haar steun aan het opzetten van een verificatie mechanisme voor een Biologische Wapen Conventie, waardoor de conferentie daarover mislukte. In het voorjaar kwam er in mei nog een overeenkomst tot stand tussen Rusland en de VS over de vermindering van strategische wapens (zie Facts & Reports nr 8, juli 2002), maar die kwam neer op een afspraak over het opslaan van kernkoppen met de mogelijkheid om ze indien nodig weer snel operationeel te maken.

Deze en andere ontwikkelingen op het gebied van massavernietigingswapens kwamen aan de orde in de inleidende toespraken die werden gehouden tijdens de eerste vergaderingen van het First Committee, en in de tekst van de concept resoluties die werden aangeboden. Na onderhandelingen voor eventuele tekstwijzigingen worden deze resoluties eind oktober ter stemming in het First Committee aangeboden, en vervolgens doorgestuurd naar de Algemene Vergadering. De politiek meest interessante waren de twee resoluties ingediend door de Nieuwe Agenda Coalitie, en betreffende algemene nucleaire ontwapening, de andere de zaak van de tactische kernwapens. De eerste riep op tot het vasthouden aan internationale verdragen gericht op kernontwapening en non-proliferatie, de tweede pleitte voor een grotere prioriteit voor het reduceren van de aantallen niet-strategische kernwapens. Tussentappen zoals het vastleggen van eerdere unilaterale stappen en grotere doorzichtigheid betreffende deze categorie wapens worden ook bepleit (zie de concept teksten elders in dit bulletin).

De tweede NAC resolutie is relevant voor de Nederlandse politiek omdat de aanwezigheid van kernwapens op Volkel nog steeds niet bevestigd of ontkent wordt door de Nederlandse regering. Ondanks de verklaringen die de afgelopen jaren door de NAVO regeringen zijn afgelegd over de wenselijkheid van meer 'doorzichtigheid' over het kernwapenbeleid, zoals neergelegd in het 'paragraaf 32' rapport van de NAVO, lijkt de openbaarheid over kernwapens nog steeds een fictie.

Ter herinnering: het 'paragraaf 32' rapport werd door de NAVO ministerraad in december 2002 aangenomen. Daarin stond als een van de beleidsdoelen het volgende: "Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament." (13-Dec-2000 NATO Press Releases M-NAC-2(2000)121 Report on Options for Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs), Verification, Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament December 2000)

Vorig jaar erkende de regering in antwoord op vragen dat de op Volkel gestationeerde F-16's een kernwapentaak hebben, maar niet dat er kernwapens op Volkel liggen (Brief van de minister van defensie aan de Tweede Kamer 9 nov. 2001 28 000 X nr. 19).

Vraag: is dit nu de volledige bijdrage van de Nederlandse regering aan 'transparency' zoals in het paragraaf 32 rapport bedoelt? Wil de minister in het kader van de beoogde 'transparency' bevestigen of ontkennen dat er kernwapens op Volkel liggen?

Uitbreiding van de NAVO

Over uitbreiding van de NAVO wordt op de top in Praag in november een principe besluit genomen. Dat betekent ook uitbreiding van het aantal landen dat de nucleaire politiek van de NAVO onderschrijft, dwz de bereidheid om onder bepaalde omstandigheden kernwapens in te zetten.

Een vraag aan de regering in het licht van de boven aangehaalde VN resoluties is nu: worden er beperkingen vastgelegd wat betreft de plaatsing van kernwapens in de nieuwe lidstaten, of de stationering van draagsystemen voor kernwapens, zoals aanvalsvliegtuigen?

NAVO nucleaire doctrine

In het bekend geworden deel van het Amerikaanse 'Nuclear Posture Review', een document dat de regering eind 2001 schreef om haar nucleaire doctrine uit te leggen aan het Congres, staat dat de NAVO nucleaire doctrine wellicht in navolging van het Amerikaanse zal worden herzien:

"Dual-capable aircraft and nuclear weapons in support of NATO. DoD will not seek any change to the current posture in FY02 but will review both issues to assess whether any modifications to the current posture are appropriate to adapt to the changing threat environment. A plan is already underway to conduct a NATO review of U.S. and allied dual capable aircraft in Europe and to present recommendations to Ministers in

summer of 2002. Dual capable aircraft and deployed weapons are important to the continued viability of NATO's nuclear deterrent strategy and any changes need to be discussed within the alliance." (p. 44) Nuclear Posture Review Report Submitted to Congress on 31 December 2001 (8 January 2002)

Vraag: wordt dit plan inderdaad uitgevoerd in de NAVO? Wordt de nucleaire doctrine van de NAVO op enigerlei wijze verandert, of zijn er aanzetten tot verandering?

Het lijkt ons van belang om een oplossing te vinden voor de evidente tegenstrijdigheid in het Nederlandse kernwapenbeleid. De pogingen van de Nederlandse regering om tegen de proliferatie van massavernietigingswapens op te treden zijn tot mislukken gedoemd als het eigen beleid gebaseerd blijft op de mogelijke inzet van kernwapens door Nederlandse vliegtuigen in NAVO verband. De tegenstrijdigheid is evident voor de rest van de wereld, en de krampachtige geheimhouding over de aanwezigheid van kernwapens op Nederlands grondgebied des te meer.

BIJLAGEN

United Nations A/57/92 - General Assembly
21 June 2002

02-43741 (E) 250602 250602

Fifty-seventh session - Item 67 (f) of the preliminary list*

General and complete disarmament: preservation of and compliance with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems

Letter dated 20 June 2002 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit the text of the statement of 14 June 2002 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation concerning the legal status of the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (see annex). I should be grateful if this letter and the annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly under item 67 (f) of the preliminary list.

(Signed) Sergei Lavrov

* A/57/50/Rev.1.

Annex to the letter dated 20 June 2002 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation on the legal status of the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms

In May 2000, the Russian Federation ratified the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II Treaty) and the New York memoranda of understanding of 26 September 1997 on the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. In this connection, there was a mutual understanding with the American side that the United States would do the same. This would have made it possible to put into effect these important agreements concerning the strategic offensive and defensive arms of the two countries.

However, the United States refused to ratify the START II Treaty and the New York memoranda of understanding. In addition, on 13 June 2002, the United States withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, with the result that this international legal instrument, which for three decades stood as the cornerstone of strategic stability, has ceased to be in force. In the light of these actions by the United States and on the basis of the provisions of the Federal Law on ratification of the START II Treaty, the Russian Federation notes that none of the prerequisites for the entry into force of the START II Treaty exist and no longer considers itself bound by the obligation under international law to refrain from actions that could deprive this Treaty of its object and goal.

14 June 2002

United Nations A/57/401 - General Assembly
12 September 2002

02-58862 (E) 200902

Fifty-seventh session - Item 67 (h) of the provisional agenda*

General and complete disarmament

Reducing nuclear danger Report of the Secretary-General**

Summary

The General Assembly, in its resolution 56/24 C of 29 November 2001, requested the Secretary-General to report on the steps he has taken towards the implementation of the seven recommendations identified in the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters that would significantly reduce the risk of nuclear war, including the proposal contained in the United Nations Millennium Declaration for convening an international conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers.

The current report outlines a number of events that have contributed to the implementation of the recommendations of the Advisory Board. In this connection, the Secretary-General has concluded that the time is not yet ripe for the consideration of interim measures leading up to the convening of an international conference. In the area of education and training, the Secretary-General underlines the readiness of the United Nations to make a contribution to the implementation of the recommendations contained in the United Nations study on disarmament and nonproliferation education that is before the General Assembly at its current session (A/57/124). The Secretary-General reiterates his call on all Member States to renew their efforts to overcome their differences in the interest of international peace and security, not least in reducing nuclear danger.

* A/57/150; ** This report covers events up to 30 August 2002.

2 - A/57/401

I. Introduction

1. The General Assembly, in its resolution 56/24 C of 29 November 2001, requested the Secretary-General to take steps towards the implementation of the seven recommendations identified in the report of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters on reducing nuclear danger (A/56/400), that would significantly reduce the risk of nuclear war, including the proposal contained in the United Nations Millennium Declaration¹ for convening an international conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers, and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its fiftyseventh session. The present report is submitted in response to that request.

II. Recent activities aimed at the implementation of the recommendations of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters

2. Weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, continue to be a primary concern of the work of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. Advocacy of nuclear disarmament and the further strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime have continued to be part of United Nations activities in the context of the promotion of international peace and security in general and of disarmament in particular.

3. On 11 November 2001, in his opening remarks to the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in New York, the Secretary-General noted that the events of 11 September 2001 had highlighted the need to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and to maintain the momentum of efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons from the world's arsenals. The Secretary-General affirmed that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was a crucial element in the nonproliferation regime and that further delays in its entry into force not only would increase the risk that nuclear testing would resume, but also would make nonproliferation harder to sustain. The Secretary-General added that every effort must be made to reduce the risk of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists.

4. The Secretary-General, in his message to the opening of the 2002 session of the Conference on Disarmament, called upon Member States to change the prolonged pattern of inactivity in multilateral disarmament and to bridge the divergent views and interests of Member States on mechanisms to deal with the two outstanding issues — nuclear disarmament and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Secretary-General further stressed that it was essential to begin negotiations on banning the production of fissile material for weapons purposes.²

5. In addition, on numerous occasions, the Secretary-General has reiterated his call for the peaceful settlement of disputes and for confidencebuilding measures in areas of tension and has called upon relevant Member States to maintain a continuous dialogue aimed at resolving their differences through non-violent means.

6. The United Nations has continued to support initiatives by Member States, intergovernmental organizations, academic and research institutions and non-governmental organizations that promote a dialogue on security and disarmament issues, including nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs has represented the United Nations at numerous events that addressed nuclear issues, including a meeting organized by the Permanent Mission of Indonesia to the United Nations on 20 and 21 April 2002, in Princeton, United States of America, aimed at brainstorming on the politics of nuclear weapons and the implications for strategic stability. Furthermore, the Under-Secretary-General has contributed articles to various publications, setting out the position of the United Nations on nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation.

7. A number of events addressing nuclear issues were also organized by the Department for Disarmament Affairs. On 14 March 2002, the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean held a regional seminar at United Nations Headquarters for the States members of the Latin American and Caribbean Group, entitled “Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Issues — Towards the 2005 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference”. The seminar contributed to fostering discussion on issues expected to figure prominently on the agenda of the forthcoming review process of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The fifth Conference on Disarmament Issues organized by the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific held from 7 to 9 August 2002 in Kyoto, Japan, addressed the impact of terrorism on international and regional security and disarmament. In that context, it discussed issues relating to improved physical protection of nuclear materials and the protection of nuclear facilities against sabotage. From 25 to 29 March 2002, the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa cooperated with the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization on following up on the implementation of a programme to encourage the universality of the Treaty in Africa. The Regional Centre in Africa also lent its support to a seminar for African States on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, organized by the International Atomic Energy Agency in cooperation with the Government of South Africa. The seminar, which was held from 24 to 27 June 2002, addressed in particular the role of safeguards agreements and additional protocols.

8. The Department for Disarmament Affairs and the Government of China jointly sponsored a conference entitled “Disarmament Agenda for the Twenty-first Century” at Beijing from 2 to 4 April 2002. Senior government officials, scholars, researchers, parliamentarians and representatives of NGOs from 29 countries participated in the conference. As part of the broader examination of disarmament and security issues, the questions of nuclear disarmament and the elimination of nuclear dangers were discussed.

9. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones has long been recognized as an important contribution to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Accordingly, the United Nations has always been supportive of such initiatives, whether they relate to strengthening zones which have already been established or to the process of creating such zone. In that connection, the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, in August 2002, visited Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, the five countries negotiating the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia. The Under-Secretary-General held meetings at the highest levels to reiterate the support of the United Nations for the initiative and to extend any additional assistance that the Governments might need to conclude their negotiations.

10. The United Nations has also continued to lend its support to a variety of initiatives by the international community to promote and advance efforts aimed at the de-alerting of nuclear weapons, the review of nuclear doctrines and the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons.

11. As regards the proposal contained in the United Nations Millennium Declaration for convening an international conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers, the Secretary-General has concluded, on the basis of his consultations with Member States, that the time is not yet ripe for the consideration of interim measures leading up to the convening of such a conference. He will nevertheless remain seized of the matter and, as recommended by the Advisory Board, will continue to encourage Member States to endeavour to create the conditions that would allow the emergence of an international consensus to hold an international conference.

12. In the area of education and training, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 55/33 E of 20 November 2000, the Secretary-General appointed a Group of Governmental Experts to prepare a United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education. The study is before the General Assembly at its current session.³

13. The Secretary-General shares the finding of the Expert Group that there is a great need for disarmament and non-proliferation education to combat ignorance and complacency in the face of current nuclear dangers. The Group puts forward a series of recommendations to Member States, the United Nations, other international organizations and nongovernmental organizations on ways to promote, individually and cooperatively, disarmament and nonproliferation education, with special emphasis on weapons of mass destruction. The United Nations stands ready to make its contribution to the implementation of the recommendations.

III. Conclusion

14. In an atmosphere of continuing stalemate in multilateral deliberations and negotiations in the area of disarmament, the Secretary-General wishes to reiterate his call on all Member States to renew their efforts to overcome their differences in the interest of international peace and security, not least in reducing nuclear danger. For its part, the United Nations will continue to fulfil its mandate in contributing to reducing nuclear

danger through advocacy for nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation, the promotion of dialogue on proposals and new ideas and support for disarmament and non-proliferation education and information.

Notes

1 General Assembly resolution 55/2.

2 See CD/PV.889, p. 4.

3 A/57/124.

United Nations A/57/425 - General Assembly
Agenda item 66 - General and complete disarmament

Letter dated 23 September 2002 from the Permanent Representative of Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit a communiqué (see annex) issued on 13 September by the Foreign Ministers of the New Agenda Coalition countries (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden) following a meeting in which the Ministers reviewed progress on their joint initiative, entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda". I would be grateful if you would kindly circulate the present letter and its annex as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 66: "General and complete disarmament".

(Signed) Richard Ryan

Ambassador - Permanent Representative

Annex to the letter dated 23 September 2002 from the Permanent Representative of Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General
Ministerial Declaration by the New Agenda Coalition in the margins of the fifty-seventh session of the General Assembly
13 September 2002

The Foreign Ministers of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden, meeting at the fifty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly, reviewed developments on nuclear disarmament. The New Agenda Ministers expressed their dissatisfaction at the lack of progress in implementing the undertakings made by States Parties at the 2000 Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The New Agenda Ministers reaffirmed their view that the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons is incompatible with the non-proliferation regime and with the broader goal of promoting international peace and security. Ministers acknowledged that reductions in the numbers of deployed strategic nuclear warheads envisaged by the Treaty of Moscow represent a positive step in the process of nuclear de-escalation between the United States of America and the Russian Federation. At the same time, they stressed that reductions in the deployment and operational status of nuclear weapons cannot be a substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, these weapons. They expressed concern at new approaches to the broader role of nuclear weapons as part of security strategies, including the development of new types of weapons.

The New Agenda Ministers urged the international community to intensify its efforts to achieve universal adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. They called on India, Pakistan and Israel to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear weapons States and to place their facilities under comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.

Ministers stressed that the current cycle for review of the Treaty would need to take stock of the implementation of the commitments of the 1995 and 2000 review conferences. In this regard, they recalled the position paper which the New Agenda Coalition had submitted to the first meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of Parties to the Treaty and looked forward to developing the ideas contained therein.

To contribute further to the goals of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation, the Foreign Ministers announced their intention to table a draft resolution at the current session of the General Assembly. They expressed the hope that the resolution would attract widespread support.

The Ministers of the New Agenda Coalition announced that they would also be submitting a specific draft resolution to the General Assembly on prioritizing further cuts in non-strategic nuclear weapons.

JOINT MINISTERIAL STATEMENT ON THE CTBT

September 14, 2002 - New York

1. We, the Foreign Ministers who have issued this statement, join together to reaffirm the vision which was the basis for the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. That vision was for a treaty which would rid the world of nuclear weapons test explosions and would contribute to systematic and progressive reduction of nuclear weapons and the prevention of nuclear proliferation, as a major instrument in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.
2. The early entry into force of the CTBT, which would bring about the cessation of all nuclear weapon test explosions and any other nuclear explosions, has been identified by the UN General Assembly as being central to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives. The last Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) also emphasised the importance of the CTBT, listing its entry into force as the first of a series of practical steps needed to achieve NPT nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives.
3. The prevention of the proliferation of materials, technologies and knowledge which can be used for weapons of mass destruction is one of the most important challenges the world is facing today. Additional international tensions have developed since the CTBT was negotiated, which make entry into force of the Treaty, within the broader framework of multilateral arms control and non-proliferation efforts, even more urgent today. We affirm that the CTBT has an essential role to play in strengthening global peace and security. This role should be recognised by all of us.
4. We call upon all States that have not yet signed and ratified the CTBT to sign and ratify the Treaty as soon as possible, in particular those whose ratification is needed for its entry into force. To help bring this about, we will make representations as appropriate, individually or together, including at regional and multilateral meetings, in order to make the Treaty a focus of attention at the highest political levels. The scientific community, non-governmental organisations and other elements of civil society also have a role to play, in raising awareness of and in strengthening support for the Treaty.
5. We call upon all States to continue a moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions. Voluntary adherence to such a moratorium is of the highest importance, but cannot serve as a substitute for entry into force of the Treaty. Only the CTBT offers to the global community the prospect of a permanent and legally binding commitment to end nuclear testing.
6. We consider that it is vital to maintain momentum in building the verification machinery, so that it is ready to guarantee compliance with the Treaty. We appeal to all States Signatories to make available the financial resources needed to build and operate the verification system as soon as possible, through full and timely payment of assessed contributions. Completing the verification system foreseen in the Treaty by entry into force will ensure a high level of confidence that States are maintaining their treaty commitments.
7. The verification system will be unprecedented in its global reach. In addition to its primary function, it will bring scientific and civil benefits, particularly to developing countries, through technology transfer and exchange of scientific know-how, as a result of the installation and use of seismic, radionuclide, infrasound and hydroacoustic networks. Moreover, technical cooperation between states can help to enhance the already impressive verification capabilities under the CTBT. We will be seeking ways to ensure that co-operation among States Signatories allows for effective technical assistance, and we call upon other States to join us in this endeavour.
8. We will spare no effort in seeking to realise the vision of a ban on nuclear weapons test explosions which culminated in conclusion of the CTBT in 1996, and invite our fellow Foreign Ministers to join us in this task.

Alexander Downer (Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia); William Graham (Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada); Maria Soledad Alvear Valenzuela (Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Chile); Dominique Galouzeau de Villepin (Minister of Foreign Affairs of the French Republic); Laszlo Kovacs (Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary); Yoriko Kawaguchi (Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan); Marwan Al Muasher (Minister for Foreign Affairs of Jordan); Jaap de Hoop Scheffer (Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands); Phil Goff (Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of New Zealand); Choi Sung-hong (Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Republic of Korea); Alhaji Sule Lamido (Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Nigeria); Allan Wagner Tizon (Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Peru); Blas F.Ople (Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines); Igor S.Ivanov (Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation); Nkosazana Clarice Dlamini-Zuma (Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of South Africa); Anna Lindh (Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden); Professor Sukru Sina Gurel (Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey); Jack Straw (Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom)

KRONIEK

September

3	Brussel	EU Working Party on Global Disarmament and Arms Control
4	Brussel	EU Working Party on Non-Proliferation
10	Brussel	EU Working Party on Transatlantic Relations
12-20	New York	Algemene Vergadering Verenigde Naties - Algemeen Debat
16-20	Wenen	Algemene Conferentie IAEA
16-20	Geneve	Vierde bijeenkomst van Staten partij bij de Ottawa Conventie
17	Den Haag	Prinsjesdag
17	Den Haag	Manifestatie Platform 'Keer het tij'
17	Brussel	EU Working Party on Transatlantic Relations
22	Duitsland	Parlementsverkiezingen
23-29	Brussel	Europese Raad
24-25	Warschau	Vergadering NAVO-Defensie ministers
30 – 4 okt	Wenen	CTBT Werkgroep A
30 – 1 nov	New York	Algemene Vergadering Verenigde Naties – First Committee

Oktober

4-5	Brussel	Informeel bijeenkomst EU Ministers van Defensie
5	Kleine Brogel	Bomspotting – burgerinspectie naar Amerikaanse kernwapens
6	Lakenheath	Aktie tegen Amerikaanse kernwapens
7-11	Den Haag	Conferentie van Staten partij bij het Chemische Wapensverdrag
18-28	Den Haag	Herfstreces Tweede Kamer
24-25	Brussel	Buitengewone bijeenkomst van de Europese Raad

November

5	USA	Wetgevende verkiezingen
7-10	Florence	European Social Forum
11-15	Wenen	CTBT PrepCom
11-22	Geneve	5 ^{de} Review Conference van de Biologische Wapensconventie
15-19	Istanboel	NAVO Parlementaire Assemblee
21-22	Praag	NAVO Summit

December

2-5	Parijs	WEU Assemblee
10-12	Den Haag	Behandeling begrotingen Buitenlandse Zaken en Defensie in Tweede Kamer
10-13	Den Haag	31 ^e reguliere sessie van de Uitvoerende Raad van de OPCW
12-13	Kopenhagen	Eurotop
20-20 jan	Den Haag	Kerstreces Tweede Kamer

FACTS AND REPORTS

Eerder verschenen in de reeks PENN – NL Facts and Reports:

1. US unilateralism – official foreign comments
Citaten van internationale politici en diplomaten over het Amerikaans unilateralisme.
(januari 2002)
2. Veiligheidsvraagstukken en de verkiezingen – standpunten van de politieke partijen
Relevante delen van de partijprogramma's van de Nederlandse politieke partijen, plus citaten van politici op het terrein van oorlog en vrede.
(februari 2002)
3. Transatlantic relations – recent developments
Overzicht van recente ontwikkelingen in de transatlantische betrekkingen, met name binnen de NAVO, mede naar aanleiding van uitspraken in de State of the Union.
(maart 2002)
4. Ontwikkelingen betreffende kernwapens en de Nederlandse politiek – briefing paper
Periodiek overzicht van ontwikkelingen rond kernwapens in de internationale en nationale politiek, met uitgebreide hoeveelheid bijlagen.
(maart 2002)
5. Nucleaire vraagstukken – standpunten van de Nederlandse regering en de Tweede Kamer
Overzicht april 2001 – april 2002
(april 2002)
6. Crisis in de OPCW – de verwijdering van directeur-generaal Bustani
Documenten en artikelen over het ontslag van directeur-generaal Bustani van het OPCW
(mei 2002)
7. Prepcom van het NPV – nucleaire ontwapening stopt
Verklaringen en rapporten van staten en ngo's tijdens de Prepcom van het NPV
(juni 2002)
8. Verdrag van Moskou – détente tussen Rusland en Verenigde Staten
Informatie over het Verdrag van Moskou, ontwikkelingen daaromheen en commentaar erop
(juni 2002)
9. Joint Strike Fighter – achtergrondberichten
De belangrijkste achtergrondberichten over de vervanging van de F16 uit de Nederlandse pers.
(mei 2002)
10. Konfrontatie in Zuid-Azië – de kernwapenwedloop tussen India en Pakistan
Basisgegevens over de nucleaire strijdkrachten en doctrines van India en Pakistan, Nederlandse wapenexport en wapenexportbeleid en een oproep om een nucleair treffen te voorkomen
(juni 2002)
11. Massavernietigingswapens in het Midden-Oosten (1) – Egypte, Israël, Syrië
Basisinformatie over de proliferatie van nucleaire, biologische en chemische wapens in Egypte, Israël en Syrië en verklaringen van de Nederlandse regering hierover
(juli 2002)
12. Amerikaans unilateralisme II – officiële reacties
Citaten van internationale politici, diplomaten en NGO's over het Amerikaans unilateralisme.
13. Aanval op Irak – de kwestie van de massavernietigingswapens; feiten, documenten en overwegingen
14. Aanval op Irak (2) – recente ontwikkelingen

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