

INTERNATIONAAL VEILIGHEIDSBELEID VERENIGDE STATEN

Officiële documenten en reacties van de Nederlandse regering

PENN – NL Facts and Reports Nr. 18

December 2002

Werkgroep Eurobom

PENN-Nederland

**INTERNATIONAAL VEILIGHEIDSBELEID
VERENIGDE STATEN**


December 2002

**PENN, het Project voor Europese Nucleaire
Non-proliferatie, is opgezet om:**

- * officiële discussies over de toekomst van kernwapens in Europa nauwgezet te volgen en deze te verhelderen;
- * analyses van en commentaren op deze ontwikkelingen te publiceren;
- * verdere maatregelen voor kernontwapening in Europa en substantiële Europese bijdragen aan kernwapenbeheersing, ontwapening en non-proliferatie te stimuleren;
- * te ijveren voor de volledige naleving van het Non-Proliferatieverdrag door de NAVO, de Europese Unie, en haar leden;
- * politieke belemmeringen op te werpen tegen ontwikkelingen die zouden kunnen leiden tot een Europese Unie met kernwapens;
- * te bevorderen dat de Europese Unie en al haar leden uiteindelijk niet-nucleaire leden van het NPV worden.

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FACTS AND REPORTS

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INLEIDING

Hoewel we al eerder de ontwikkelingen in het Amerikaans kernwapenbeleid (de 'Nuclear Posture Review' NPR) volgden leek het zinvol om dit document met twee later verschenen Amerikaanse regeringsdocumenten bij elkaar te brengen, samen met de reactie daarop van de Nederlands regering. Het NPR was geen beleidsdocument, maar de laatste twee wel. Op de National Security Strategy gepubliceerd in september reageerde de Nederlandse regering in november met een uitgebreide reactie. Op het december-document hebben we nog geen reactie, maar gezien de inhoud is het van groot belang om die te krijgen. Het verschijnen van dat document ('National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction') moet vooral gezien worden in het licht van de dreigende oorlog tegen Irak. Daar zou immers een situatie kunnen ontstaan zoals in het document omschreven staat: een bedreiging met de inzet van massavernietigingswapens, die door de VS eventueel (ook van te voren) beantwoord kan worden met kernwapens. Het hoeft geen betoog dat daarmee een bijzonder grote stap zou worden gezet naar een nieuwe en gevaarlijker wereldorde. Als de kernwapenstaten kernwapens gaan gebruiken, welke rem is er dan nog op andere landen om zelf kernwapens of andere massavernietigingswapens te ontwikkelen en ze ook in te zetten?

Het is van belang dat er een debat plaatsvindt bij de bondgenoten van de Verenigde Staten, aangezien ook zij voor de gevolgen van het Amerikaanse beleid zullen opdraaien. In Nederland zou het onderwerp ook ter sprake moeten komen in de verkiezingscampagne. Hopelijk is deze uitgave van nut voor allen die onze zorgen delen.

Redactie Facts and Reports

NATIONAL STRATEGY TO COMBAT WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Washington Post

Preemptive Strikes Part Of U.S. Strategic Doctrine

'All Options' Open for Countering Unconventional Arms

By Mike Allen and Barton Gellman - Wednesday, December 11, 2002; Page A01

A Bush administration strategy announced yesterday calls for the preemptive use of military and covert force before an enemy unleashes weapons of mass destruction, and underscores the United States's willingness to retaliate with nuclear weapons for chemical or biological attacks on U.S. soil or against American troops overseas.

The strategy introduces a more aggressive approach to combating weapons of mass destruction, and it comes as the nation prepares for a possible war with Iraq.

A version of the strategy that was released by the White House said the United States will "respond with overwhelming force," including "all options," to the use of biological, chemical, radiological or nuclear weapons on the nation, its troops or its allies.

However, a classified version of the strategy goes even further: It breaks with 50 years of U.S. counterproliferation efforts by authorizing preemptive strikes on states and terrorist groups that are close to acquiring weapons of mass destruction or the long-range missiles capable of delivering them. The policy aims to prevent the transfer of weapons components or to destroy them before they can be assembled.

In a top-secret appendix, the directive names Iran, Syria, North Korea and Libya among the countries that are the central focus of the new U.S. approach. Administration officials said that does not imply that President Bush intends to use military force, covert or overt, in any of those countries. He is determined, they said, to stop transfers of weapons components in or out of their borders.

The policy sets out the practical ramifications of Bush's doctrine of preemption, contained in a national security strategy released in September, which turns away from the Cold War doctrine based on deterrence and containment. The preemption doctrine favors taking on hostile states before they can strike.

It broadens a warning that was made to Iraq on the eve of the Persian Gulf War of 1991. A letter from President George H.W. Bush promised "the strongest possible response" if Iraq were to use chemical and biological weapons against U.S. and allied troops.

But the new policy is more specific, detailing the consequences of an enemy's use of weapons of mass destruction. "The United States will continue to make clear that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force -- including through resort to all of our options -- to the use of WMD against the United States, our forces abroad, and friends and allies," the document says.

The timing of the document's release yesterday sends an unmistakable message to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein about the potential consequences of using nonconventional weapons in a future war.

A senior administration official, briefing reporters on the new strategy, said those options include nuclear force. The official said the 1991 letter had its intended effect. "He [Hussein] didn't cross the line of using chemical or biological weapons," the official said. "The Iraqis have told us that they interpreted that letter as meaning that the United States would use nuclear weapons, and it was a powerful deterrent."

In the past, U.S. officials saw some advantage in keeping the world guessing about how the United States would respond to evidence that a country or a terrorist group was hiding weapons of mass destruction deep underground. And Bush administration officials were at pains yesterday to insist that there is nothing new in their formulation.

Under Bush, however, Pentagon officials appear to have taken a step closer to the possible, limited use of nuclear weapons by pursuing new and more usable ones. A review of nuclear policy completed by defense officials a year ago put added emphasis on developing low-yield nuclear weapons that could be used to burrow deep into the earth and destroy underground complexes, including stores of chemical and biological arms. This has raised questions about whether the administration is lowering the threshold for using nuclear weapons.

Officials deny that they are doing so. But they also argue that the strategic calculations necessary for combating terrorism and hostile nations must inherently be different from those used during the Cold War, when deterrence meant simply convincing the Soviets that the United States, if attacked, could and would wipe them out. Against today's new enemies, the administration has argued, it may be necessary to strike preemptively and with nuclear weapons that would keep fallout to a minimum.

The administration published a broader national security strategy in September, and the preparation of a separate policy on weapons of mass destruction reflects the seriousness with which the administration takes the threat of attacks from rogue states and terrorist organizations. "Every administration seems to come under criticism for not having a strategy," the official said.

The six-page strategy released by the White House yesterday was a declassified extract of a top secret directive signed by Bush in May after resolving interagency disputes dating to January. It is among the first major policy collaborations of the National Security Council and the new Homeland Security Council, whose chairman is Tom Ridge. The classified version is identified jointly as National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 17 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 4.

The new strategy does not repudiate "traditional measures" of diplomacy, multinational arms control agreements and export controls. But in its classified form, and in the interagency process that drafted it, the directive is premised on a view that "traditional nonproliferation has failed, and now we're going into active interdiction," according to one participant who spoke without authority from the White House.

Active interdiction, the official said, "is physical -- it's disruption, it's destruction in any form, whether kinetic or cyber."

Explaining the new approach, one official gave the hypothetical scenario of a ship using the Philippines as a transshipment point for special weapons to Libya. "We're going to interdict or destroy or disrupt that shipment or, during the transloading process, it is going to mysteriously disappear," the official said.

The official spoke as Spanish special forces, with U.S. intelligence support, stopped a North Korean ship bound for Yemen with Scud missiles. In rare cases, previous presidents have mounted preemptive strikes against nonconventional weapons. Those episodes, including the August 1998 missile strike on an alleged Sudanese chemical weapons plant and the bombing of some targets in Iraq four months later, have generally come in retaliation for specific enemy attacks.

Bush hinted at the new approach in a Dec. 11, 2001, speech at the Citadel, speaking of active counterproliferation. By January, a draft of NSPD 17 was circulating in the State Department, the White House, the Defense Department and the intelligence agencies. State Department officials objected to some elements of the new approach but failed to carry the decision. The Homeland Security Office, represented by policy director Richard A. Falkenrath, interjected itself as jointly responsible for managing the consequences of a successful attack on the United States. Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, according to one participant, objected in April to language that he believed commingled military and domestic lines of authority. Bush signed the draft unchanged in May.

The intention, in theory, is not fundamentally new. The Clinton administration's Presidential Decision Directive 62, "Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Americans Overseas," had classified language that one former official summarized as: "If you think terrorists will get access to WMD, there is an extremely low threshold that the United States should act" militarily.

White House

National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction

December 2002

INTRODUCTION

Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) -- nuclear, biological, and chemical -- in the possession of hostile states and terrorists represent one of the greatest security challenges facing the United States. We must pursue a comprehensive strategy to counter this threat in all of its dimensions.

An effective strategy for countering WMD, including their use and further proliferation, is an integral component of the National Security Strategy of the United States of America. As with the war on terrorism, our strategy for homeland security, and our new concept of deterrence, the U.S. approach to combat WMD represents a fundamental change from the past. To succeed, we must take full advantage of today's opportunities, including the application of new technologies, increased emphasis on intelligence collection and analysis, the strengthening of alliance relationships, and the establishment of new partnerships with former adversaries.

Weapons of mass destruction could enable adversaries to inflict massive harm on the United States, our military forces at home and abroad, and our friends and allies. Some states, including several that have supported and continue to support terrorism, already possess WMD and are seeking even greater capabilities, as tools of coercion and intimidation. For them, these are not weapons of last resort, but militarily useful weapons of choice intended to overcome our nation's advantages in conventional forces and to deter us from

responding to aggression against our friends and allies in regions of vital interest. In addition, terrorist groups are seeking to acquire WMD with the stated purpose of killing large numbers of our people and those of friends and allies -- without compunction and without warning.

We will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes and terrorists to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons. We must accord the highest priority to the protection of the United States, our forces, and our friends and allies from the existing and growing WMD threat.

PILLARS OF OUR NATIONAL STRATEGY

Our National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction has three principal pillars:

Counterproliferation to Combat WMD Use

The possession and increased likelihood of use of WMD by hostile states and terrorists are realities of the contemporary security environment. It is therefore critical that the U. S. military and appropriate civilian agencies be prepared to deter and defend against the full range of possible WMD employment scenarios. We will ensure that all needed capabilities to combat WMD are fully integrated into the emerging defense transformation plan and into our homeland security posture. Counterproliferation will also be fully integrated into the basic doctrine, training, and equipping of all forces, in order to ensure that they can sustain operations to decisively defeat WMD-armed adversaries.

Strengthened Nonproliferation to Combat WMD Proliferation

The United States, our friends and allies, and the broader international community must undertake every effort to prevent states and terrorists from acquiring WMD and missiles. We must enhance traditional measures -- diplomacy, arms control, multilateral agreements, threat reduction assistance, and export controls -- that seek to dissuade or impede proliferant states and terrorist networks, as well as to slow and make more costly their access to sensitive technologies, material, and expertise. We must ensure compliance with relevant international agreements, including the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). The United States will continue to work with other states to improve their capability to prevent unauthorized transfers of WMD and missile technology, expertise, and material. We will identify and pursue new methods of prevention, such as national criminalization of proliferation activities and expanded safety and security measures.

Consequence Management to Respond to WMD Use

Finally, the United States must be prepared to respond to the use of WMD against our citizens, our military forces, and those of friends and allies. We will develop and maintain the capability to reduce to the extent possible the potentially horrific consequences of WMD attacks at home and abroad.

The three pillars of the U.S. national strategy to combat WMD are seamless elements of a comprehensive approach. Serving to integrate the pillars are four cross-cutting enabling functions that need to be pursued on a priority basis: intelligence collection and analysis on WMD, delivery systems, and related technologies; research and development to improve our ability to respond to evolving threats; bilateral and multilateral cooperation; and targeted strategies against hostile states and terrorists.

COUNTERPROLIFERATION

We know from experience that we cannot always be successful in preventing and containing the proliferation of WMD to hostile states and terrorists. Therefore, U.S. military and appropriate civilian agencies must possess the full range of operational capabilities to counter the threat and use of WMD by states and terrorists against the United States, our military forces, and friends and allies.

Interdiction

Effective interdiction is a critical part of the U.S. strategy to combat WMD and their delivery means. We must enhance the capabilities of our military, intelligence, technical, and law enforcement communities to prevent the movement of WMD materials, technology, and expertise to hostile states and terrorist organizations.

Deterrence

Today's threats are far more diverse and less predictable than those of the past. States hostile to the United States and to our friends and allies have demonstrated their willingness to take high risks to achieve their goals, and are aggressively pursuing WMD and their means of delivery as critical tools in this effort. As a consequence, we require new methods of deterrence. A strong declaratory policy and effective military forces are essential elements of our contemporary deterrent posture, along with the full range of political tools to

persuade potential adversaries not to seek or use WMD. The United States will continue to make clear that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force -- including through resort to all of our options -- to the use of WMD against the United States, our forces abroad, and friends and allies.

In addition to our conventional and nuclear response and defense capabilities, our overall deterrent posture against WMD threats is reinforced by effective intelligence, surveillance, interdiction, and domestic law enforcement capabilities. Such combined capabilities enhance deterrence both by devaluing an adversary's WMD and missiles, and by posing the prospect of an overwhelming response to any use of such weapons.

Defense and Mitigation

Because deterrence may not succeed, and because of the potentially devastating consequences of WMD use against our forces and civilian population, U.S. military forces and appropriate civilian agencies must have the capability to defend against WMD-armed adversaries, including in appropriate cases through preemptive measures. This requires capabilities to detect and destroy an adversary's WMD assets before these weapons are used. In addition, robust active and passive defenses and mitigation measures must be in place to enable U.S. military forces and appropriate civilian agencies to accomplish their missions, and to assist friends and allies when WMD are used.

Active defenses disrupt, disable, or destroy WMD en route to their targets. Active defenses include vigorous air defense and effective missile defenses against today's threats. Passive defenses must be tailored to the unique characteristics of the various forms of WMD. The United States must also have the ability rapidly and effectively to mitigate the effects of a WMD attack against our deployed forces.

Our approach to defend against biological threats has long been based on our approach to chemical threats, despite the fundamental differences between these weapons. The United States is developing a new approach to provide us and our friends and allies with an effective defense against biological weapons.

Finally, U.S. military forces and domestic law enforcement agencies as appropriate must stand ready to respond against the source of any WMD attack. The primary objective of a response is to disrupt an imminent attack or an attack in progress, and eliminate the threat of future attacks. As with deterrence and prevention, an effective response requires rapid attribution and robust strike capability. We must accelerate efforts to field new capabilities to defeat WMD-related assets. The United States needs to be prepared to conduct post-conflict operations to destroy or dismantle any residual WMD capabilities of the hostile state or terrorist network. An effective U.S. response not only will eliminate the source of a WMD attack but will also have a powerful deterrent effect upon other adversaries that possess or seek WMD or missiles.

NONPROLIFERATION

Active Nonproliferation Diplomacy

The United States will actively employ diplomatic approaches in bilateral and multilateral settings in pursuit of our nonproliferation goals. We must dissuade supplier states from cooperating with proliferant states and induce proliferant states to end their WMD and missile programs. We will hold countries responsible for complying with their commitments. In addition, we will continue to build coalitions to support our efforts, as well as to seek their increased support for nonproliferation and threat reduction cooperation programs. However, should our wide-ranging nonproliferation efforts fail, we must have available the full range of operational capabilities necessary to defend against the possible employment of WMD.

Multilateral Regimes

Existing nonproliferation and arms control regimes play an important role in our overall strategy. The United States will support those regimes that are currently in force, and work to improve the effectiveness of, and compliance with, those regimes. Consistent with other policy priorities, we will also promote new agreements and arrangements that serve our nonproliferation goals. Overall, we seek to cultivate an international environment that is more conducive to nonproliferation. Our efforts will include:

Nuclear

-- Strengthening of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), including through ratification of an IAEA Additional Protocol by all NPT states parties, assurances that all states put in place full-scope IAEA safeguards agreements, and appropriate increases in funding for the Agency;

-- Negotiating a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty that advances U.S. security interests; and

-- Strengthening the Nuclear Suppliers Group and Zangger Committee.

Chemical and Biological

-- Effective functioning of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons;

- Identification and promotion of constructive and realistic measures to strengthen the BWC and thereby to help meet the biological weapons threat; and
- Strengthening of the Australia Group.

Missile

- Strengthening the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), including through support for universal adherence to the International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.

Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Cooperation

The United States pursues a wide range of programs, including the Nunn-Lugar program, designed to address the proliferation threat stemming from the large quantities of Soviet-legacy WMD and missile-related expertise and materials. Maintaining an extensive and efficient set of nonproliferation and threat reduction assistance programs to Russia and other former Soviet states is a high priority. We will also continue to encourage friends and allies to increase their contributions to these programs, particularly through the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. In addition, we will work with other states to improve the security of their WMD-related materials.

Controls on Nuclear Materials

In addition to programs with former Soviet states to reduce fissile material and improve the security of that which remains, the United States will continue to discourage the worldwide accumulation of separated plutonium and to minimize the use of highly-enriched uranium. As outlined in the National Energy Policy, the United States will work in collaboration with international partners to develop recycle and fuel treatment technologies that are cleaner, more efficient, less waste-intensive, and more proliferation-resistant.

U.S. Export Controls

We must ensure that the implementation of U.S. export controls furthers our nonproliferation and other national security goals, while recognizing the realities that American businesses face in the increasingly globalized marketplace.

We will work to update and strengthen export controls using existing authorities. We also seek new legislation to improve the ability of our export control system to give full weight to both nonproliferation objectives and commercial interests. Our overall goal is to focus our resources on truly sensitive exports to hostile states or those that engage in onward proliferation, while removing unnecessary barriers in the global marketplace.

Nonproliferation Sanctions

Sanctions can be a valuable component of our overall strategy against WMD proliferation. At times, however, sanctions have proven inflexible and ineffective. We will develop a comprehensive sanctions policy to better integrate sanctions into our overall strategy and work with Congress to consolidate and modify existing sanctions legislation.

WMD CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT

Defending the American homeland is the most basic responsibility of our government. As part of our defense, the United States must be fully prepared to respond to the consequences of WMD use on our soil, whether by hostile states or by terrorists. We must also be prepared to respond to the effects of WMD use against our forces deployed abroad, and to assist friends and allies.

The National Strategy for Homeland Security discusses U.S. Government programs to deal with the consequences of the use of a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapon in the United States. A number of these programs offer training, planning, and assistance to state and local governments. To maximize their effectiveness, these efforts need to be integrated and comprehensive. Our first responders must have the full range of protective, medical, and remediation tools to identify, assess, and respond rapidly to a WMD event on our territory.

The White House Office of Homeland Security will coordinate all federal efforts to prepare for and mitigate the consequences of terrorist attacks within the United States, including those involving WMD. The Office of Homeland Security will also work closely with state and local governments to ensure their planning, training, and equipment requirements are addressed. These issues, including the roles of the Department of Homeland Security, are addressed in detail in the National Strategy for Homeland Security.

The National Security Council's Office of Combating Terrorism coordinates and helps improve U. S. efforts to respond to and manage the recovery from terrorist attacks outside the United States. In cooperation with the Office of Combating Terrorism, the Department of State coordinates interagency efforts to work with our friends and allies to develop their own emergency preparedness and consequence management capabilities.

INTEGRATING THE PILLARS

Several critical enabling functions serve to integrate the three pillars -- counterproliferation, nonproliferation, and consequence management -- of the U.S. National Strategy to Combat WMD.

Improved Intelligence Collection and Analysis

A more accurate and complete understanding of the full range of WMD threats is, and will remain, among the highest U. S. intelligence priorities, to enable us to prevent proliferation, and to deter or defend against those who would use those capabilities against us. Improving our ability to obtain timely and accurate knowledge of adversaries' offensive and defensive capabilities, plans, and intentions is key to developing effective counter- and nonproliferation policies and capabilities. Particular emphasis must be accorded to improving: intelligence regarding WMD-related facilities and activities; interaction among U.S. intelligence, law enforcement, and military agencies; and intelligence cooperation with friends and allies.

Research and Development

The United States has a critical need for cutting-edge technology that can quickly and effectively detect, analyze, facilitate interdiction of, defend against, defeat, and mitigate the consequences of WMD. Numerous U.S. Government departments and agencies are currently engaged in the essential research and development to support our overall strategy against WMD proliferation.

The new Counterproliferation Technology Coordination Committee, consisting of senior representatives from all concerned agencies, will act to improve interagency coordination of U.S. Government counterproliferation research and development efforts. The Committee will assist in identifying priorities, gaps, and overlaps in existing programs and in examining options for future investment strategies.

Strengthened International Cooperation

WMD represent a threat not just to the United States, but also to our friends and allies and the broader international community. For this reason, it is vital that we work closely with like-minded countries on all elements of our comprehensive proliferation strategy.

Targeted Strategies Against Proliferants

All elements of the overall U. S. strategy to combat WMD must be brought to bear in targeted strategies against supplier and recipient states of WMD proliferation concern, as well as against terrorist groups which seek to acquire WMD.

A few states are dedicated proliferators, whose leaders are determined to develop, maintain, and improve their WMD and delivery capabilities, which directly threaten the United States, U.S. forces overseas, and/or our friends and allies. Because each of these regimes is different, we will pursue country-specific strategies that best enable us and our friends and allies to prevent, deter, and defend against WMD and missile threats from each of them. These strategies must also take into account the growing cooperation among proliferant states -- so-called secondary proliferation -- which challenges us to think in new ways about specific country strategies.

One of the most difficult challenges we face is to prevent, deter, and defend against the acquisition and use of WMD by terrorist groups. The current and potential future linkages between terrorist groups and state sponsors of terrorism are particularly dangerous and require priority attention. The full range of counterproliferation, nonproliferation, and consequence management measures must be brought to bear against the WMD terrorist threat, just as they are against states of greatest proliferation concern.

END NOTE

Our National Strategy to Combat WMD requires much of all of us -- the Executive Branch, the Congress, state and local governments, the American people, and our friends and allies. The requirements to prevent, deter, defend against, and respond to today's WMD threats are complex and challenging. But they are not daunting. We can and will succeed in the tasks laid out in this strategy; we have no other choice.

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

White House

The National Security Strategy of the United States of America

September 2002

[...] III. Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Global Terrorism and Work to Prevent Attacks Against Us and Our Friends

We will disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations by:

[...]

- defending the United States, the American people, and our interests at home and abroad by identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches our borders. While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of selfdefense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country [...]

V. Prevent Our Enemies From Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction

“The gravest danger to freedom lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. When the spread of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons, along with ballistic missile technology—when that occurs, even weak states and small groups could attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations. Our enemies have declared this very intention, and have been caught seeking these terrible weapons. They want the capability to blackmail us, or to harm us, or to harm our friends—and we will oppose them with all our power.”

President Bush
West Point, New York
June 1, 2002

The nature of the Cold War threat required the United States—with our allies and friends—to emphasize deterrence of the enemy’s use of force, producing a grim strategy of mutual assured destruction. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, our security environment has undergone profound transformation.

Having moved from confrontation to cooperation as the hallmark of our relationship with Russia, the dividends are evident: an end to the balance of terror that divided us; an historic reduction in the nuclear arsenals on both sides; and cooperation in areas such as counterterrorism and missile defense that until recently were inconceivable.

But new deadly challenges have emerged from rogue states and terrorists. None of these contemporary threats rival the sheer destructive power that was arrayed against us by the Soviet Union. However, the nature and motivations of these new adversaries, their determination to obtain destructive powers hitherto available only to the world’s strongest states, and the greater likelihood that they will use weapons of mass destruction against us, make today’s security environment more complex and dangerous.

In the 1990s we witnessed the emergence of a small number of rogue states that, while different in important ways, share a number of attributes. These states:

- brutalize their own people and squander their national resources for the personal gain of the rulers;
- display no regard for international law, threaten their neighbors, and callously violate international treaties to which they are party;
- are determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction, along with other advanced military technology, to be used as threats or offensively to achieve the aggressive designs of these regimes;
- sponsor terrorism around the globe; and
- reject basic human values and hate the United States and everything for which it stands.

At the time of the Gulf War, we acquired irrefutable proof that Iraq’s designs were not limited to the chemical weapons it had used against Iran and its own people, but also extended to the acquisition of nuclear weapons and biological agents. In the past decade North Korea has become the world’s principal purveyor of ballistic

missiles, and has tested increasingly capable missiles while developing its own WMD arsenal. Other rogue regimes seek nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons as well. These states' pursuit of, and global trade in, such weapons has become a looming threat to all nations.

We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends. Our response must take full advantage of strengthened alliances, the establishment of new partnerships with former adversaries, innovation in the use of military forces, modern technologies, including the development of an effective missile defense system, and increased emphasis on intelligence collection and analysis.

Our comprehensive strategy to combat WMD includes:

- *Proactive counterproliferation efforts.* We must deter and defend against the threat before it is unleashed. We must ensure that key capabilities—detection, active and passive defenses, and counterforce capabilities—are integrated into our defense transformation and our homeland security systems. Counterproliferation must also be integrated into the doctrine, training, and equipping of our forces and those of our allies to ensure that we can prevail in any conflict with WMD-armed adversaries.
- *Strengthened nonproliferation efforts to prevent rogue states and terrorists from acquiring the materials, technologies, and expertise necessary for weapons of mass destruction.* We will enhance diplomacy, arms control, multilateral export controls, and threat reduction assistance that impede states and terrorists seeking WMD, and when necessary, interdict enabling technologies and materials. We will continue to build coalitions to support these efforts, encouraging their increased political and financial support for nonproliferation and threat reduction programs. The recent G-8 agreement to commit up to \$20 billion to a global partnership against proliferation marks a major step forward.
- *Effective consequence management to respond to the effects of WMD use, whether by terrorists or hostile states.* Minimizing the effects of WMD use against our people will help deter those who possess such weapons and dissuade those who seek to acquire them by persuading enemies that they cannot attain their desired ends. The United States must also be prepared to respond to the effects of WMD use against our forces abroad, and to help friends and allies if they are attacked.

It has taken almost a decade for us to comprehend the true nature of this new threat. Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. The inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today's threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries' choice of weapons, do not permit that option. We cannot let our enemies strike first.

In the Cold War, especially following the Cuban missile crisis, we faced a generally status quo, risk-averse adversary. Deterrence was an effective defense. But deterrence based only upon the threat of retaliation is less likely to work against leaders of rogue states more willing to take risks, gambling with the lives of their people, and the wealth of their nations.

- In the Cold War, weapons of mass destruction were considered weapons of last resort whose use risked the destruction of those who used them. Today, our enemies see weapons of mass destruction as weapons of choice. For rogue states these weapons are tools of intimidation and military aggression against their neighbors. These weapons may also allow these states to attempt to blackmail the United States and our allies to prevent us from deterring or repelling the aggressive behavior of rogue states. Such states also see these weapons as their best means of overcoming the conventional superiority of the United States.
- Traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents; whose so-called soldiers seek martyrdom in death and whose most potent protection is statelessness. The overlap between states that sponsor terror and those that pursue WMD compels us to action.

For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack. Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent threat—most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack.

We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using conventional means. They know such attacks would fail. Instead, they rely on acts of terror and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction—weapons that can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used without warning.

The targets of these attacks are our military forces and our civilian population, in direct violation of one of the principal norms of the law of warfare. As was demonstrated by the losses on September 11, 2001, mass

civilian casualties is the specific objective of terrorists and these losses would be exponentially more severe if terrorists acquired and used weapons of mass destruction.

The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction— and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.

The United States will not use force in all cases to preempt emerging threats, nor should nations use preemption as a pretext for aggression. Yet in an age where the enemies of civilization openly and actively seek the world's most destructive technologies, the United States cannot remain idle while dangers gather. We will always proceed deliberately, weighing the consequences of our actions. To support preemptive options, we will:

- build better, more integrated intelligence capabilities to provide timely, accurate information on threats, wherever they may emerge;
- coordinate closely with allies to form a common assessment of the most dangerous threats; and
- continue to transform our military forces to ensure our ability to conduct rapid and precise operations to achieve decisive results.

The purpose of our actions will always be to eliminate a specific threat to the United States or our allies and friends. The reasons for our actions will be clear, the force measured, and the cause just. [...]

NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW [Excerpts]

Submitted to Congress on 31 December 2001.

8 January 2002

Nuclear Posture Review Report

Foreword

The Congress directed the Defense Department to conduct a comprehensive Nuclear Posture Review to lay out the direction for American nuclear forces over the next five to ten years. The Department has completed that review and prepared the attached report.

Early on, we recognized that the new security environment demanded that the Department go beyond the Congressional mandate in developing a strategic posture for the 21st century. President Bush had already directed the Defense Department to transform America's military and prepare it for the new, unpredictable world in which we will be living. The result of his direction is the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Building on the (QDR) this Nuclear Posture Review puts in motion a major change in our approach to the role of nuclear offensive forces in our deterrent strategy and presents the blueprint for transforming our strategic posture.

This report establishes a New Triad, composed of:

- Offensive strike systems (both nuclear and non-nuclear);
- Defenses (both active and passive); and
- A revitalized defense infrastructure that will provide new capabilities in a timely fashion to meet emerging threats.

This New Triad is bound together by enhanced command and control (C2) and intelligence systems.

The establishment of this New Triad can both reduce our dependence on nuclear weapons and improve our ability to deter attack in the face of proliferating WMD capabilities in two ways:

- The addition of defenses (along with the prospects for timely adjustments to force capabilities and enhanced C2 and intelligence systems) means that the U.S. will no longer be as heavily dependent on offensive strike forces to enforce deterrence as it was during the Cold War.
- The addition of non-nuclear strike forces--including conventional strike and information operations--means that the U.S. will be less dependent than it has been in the past on nuclear forces to provide its offensive deterrent capability.

The combination of new capabilities that make up the New Triad reduce the risk to the nation as it draws its nuclear forces toward the goal of 1,700-2,200 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads announced by President Bush on November 13, 2001.

The following is a summary of the highlights in this report.

First and foremost, the Nuclear Posture Review puts the Cold War practices related to planning for strategic forces behind us. In the decade since the collapse of the Soviet Union, planning for the employment of U.S. nuclear forces has undergone only modest revision, despite the new relationship between the U.S. and Russia. Few changes had been made to the size or composition of the strategic nuclear force beyond those required by the START Treaty. At the same time, plans and funding for sustaining some critical elements of that force have been inadequate.

As a result of this review, the U.S. will no longer plan, size or sustain its forces as though Russia presented merely a smaller version of the threat posed by the former Soviet Union. Following the direction laid down for U.S. defense planning in the Quadrennial Defense Review, the Nuclear Posture Review shifts planning for America's strategic forces from the threat-based approach of the Cold War to a capabilities-based approach. This new approach should provide, over the coming decades, a credible deterrent at the lowest level of nuclear weapons consistent with U.S. and allied security.

Second, we have concluded that a strategic posture that relies solely on offensive nuclear forces is inappropriate for deterring the potential adversaries we will face in the 21st century. Terrorists or rogue states armed with weapons of mass destruction will likely test America's security commitments to its allies and friends. In response, we will need a range of capabilities to assure friend and foe alike of U.S. resolve. A broader array of capability is needed to dissuade states from undertaking political, military, or technical courses of action that would threaten U.S. and allied security. U.S. forces must pose a credible deterrent to potential adversaries who have access to modern military technology, including NBC weapons and the means

to deliver them over long distances. Finally, U.S. strategic forces need to provide the President with a range of options to defeat any aggressor.

To meet the nation's defense goals in the 21st century, the first leg of the New Triad, the offensive strike leg, will go beyond the Cold War triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and long-range nuclear-armed bombers. ICBMs, SLBMs, bombers and nuclear weapons will, of course, continue to play a vital role. However, they will be just part of the first leg of the New Triad, integrated with new non-nuclear strategic capabilities that strengthen the credibility of our offensive deterrence.

The second leg of the New Triad requires development and deployment of both active and passive defenses--a recognition that offensive capabilities alone may not deter aggression in the new security environment of the 21st century. The events of September 11, 2001 underscore this reality. Active and passive defenses will not be perfect. However, by denying or reducing the effectiveness of limited attacks, defenses can discourage attacks, provide new capabilities for managing crises, and provide insurance against the failure of traditional deterrence.

The third leg of the New Triad is a responsive defense infrastructure. Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. defense infrastructure has contracted and our nuclear infrastructure has atrophied. New approaches to development and procurement of new capabilities are being designed so that it will not take 20 years or more to field new generations of weapon systems. With respect to the nuclear infrastructure, it needs to be repaired to increase confidence in the deployed forces, eliminate unneeded weapons, and mitigate the risks of technological surprise. Maintaining our ability to respond to large strategic changes can permit us to reduce our nuclear arsenal and, at the same time, dissuade adversaries from starting a competition in nuclear armaments.

The effectiveness of this New Triad depends upon command and control, intelligence, and adaptive planning. "Exquisite" intelligence on the intentions and capabilities of adversaries can permit timely adjustments to the force and improve the precision with which it can strike and defend. The ability to plan the employment of the strike and defense forces flexibly and rapidly will provide the U.S. with a significant advantage in managing crises, deterring attack and conducting military operations.

Constructing the New Triad, reducing our deployed nuclear weapons, and increasing flexibility in our strategic posture has resource implications. It costs money to retire old weapons systems and create new capabilities. Restoring the defense infrastructure, developing and deploying strategic defenses, improving our command and control, intelligence, planning, and non-nuclear strike capabilities require new defense initiatives and investments. However, these investments can make the U.S. more secure while reducing our dependence on nuclear weapons.

The Quadrennial Defense Review established the foundation for America's post-Cold War defense strategy. Building on the Quadrennial Defense Review, the Nuclear Posture Review will transform the Cold War era offensive nuclear triad into a New Triad designed for the decades to come.

Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense

Body of the Report

"Nuclear weapons play a critical role in the defense capabilities of the United States, its allies and friends. They provide credible military options to deter a wide range of threats, including WMD and large-scale conventional military force. These nuclear capabilities possess unique properties that give the United States options to hold at risk classes of targets [that are] important to achieve strategic and political objectives." (p. 7)

However, "U.S. nuclear forces, alone are unsuited to most of the contingencies for which the United States prepares. The United States and allied interests may not require nuclear strikes." A "new mix" of nuclear, non-nuclear, and defensive capabilities "is required for the diverse set of potential adversaries and unexpected threats the United States may confront in the coming decades." (p. 7)

"Greater flexibility is needed with respect to nuclear forces and planning than was the case during the Cold War. The assets most valued by the spectrum of potential adversaries in the new security environment may be diverse and, in some cases, U.S. understanding of what an adversary values may evolve. Consequently, although the number of weapons needed to hold those assets at risk has declined, U.S. nuclear forces still require the capability to hold at risk a wide range of target types. This capability is key to the role of nuclear forces in supporting an effective deterrence strategy relative to a broad spectrum of potential opponents under a variety of contingencies. Nuclear attack options that vary in scale, scope, and purpose will complement other military capabilities. The combination can provide the range of options needed to pose a credible deterrent to

adversaries whose values and calculations of risk and of gain and loss may be very different from and more difficult to discern than those of past adversaries.” (p. 7)

"Advances in defensive technologies will allow U.S. non-nuclear and nuclear capabilities to be coupled with active and passive defenses to help provide deterrence and protection against attack, preserve U.S. freedom of action, and strengthen the credibility of U.S. alliance commitments. " (p. 7)

"Missile defenses are beginning to emerge as systems that can have an effect on the strategic and operational calculations of potential adversaries. They are now capable of providing, active defense against short- to medium-range threats." (p. 11)

U.S. military forces themselves, including nuclear forces will now be used to "dissuade adversaries from undertaking military programs or operations that could threaten U.S. interests or those of allies and friends." (p. 9)

"Defensive systems capable of intercepting ballistic missiles may reduce the need for nuclear weapons to hold at risk an adversary's missile launchers." (p. 9)

"A modern, responsive nuclear weapons sector of the infrastructure is indispensable, especially as the size of the operationally deployed nuclear arsenal is reduced." (p. 10-11)

"The planning process [for the New Triad] not only must produce a variety of flexible, pre-planned non-nuclear and nuclear options, but also incorporate sufficient adaptability to support the timely construction of additional options in a crisis or unexpected conflict." (p. 11)

II. "CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE NEW TRIAD TO DEFENSE POLICY GOALS" (p.12)

(Assure, Dissuade, Deter, Defeat)

"ASSURE" — "U.S. nuclear forces will continue to provide assurance to security partners, particularly in the presence of known or suspected threats of nuclear, biological, or chemical attacks or in the event of surprising military developments. This assurance can serve to reduce the incentives for friendly countries to acquire nuclear weapons of their own to deter such threats and circumstances. Nuclear capabilities also assure the U.S. public that the United States will not be subject to coercion based on a false perception of U.S. weakness among potential adversaries. (p. 12)

"Defense of the U.S. homeland and protection of forward bases increase the ability of the United States to counteract WMD-backed coercive threats and to use its power projection forces in the defense of allies and friends." (p. 13)

"DISSUADE" — "Systems capable of striking a wide range of targets throughout an adversary's territory may dissuade a potential adversary from pursuing threatening capabilities. For example, a demonstration of the linkage between long-range precision strike weapons and real-time intelligence systems may dissuade a potential adversary from investing heavily in mobile ballistic missiles." (p. 12)

"Defenses can make it more arduous and costly for an adversary to compete militarily with or wage war against the United States. The demonstration of a range of technologies and systems for missile defense can have a dissuasive effect on potential adversaries. The problem of countering missile defenses, especially defensive systems with multiple layers, presents a potential adversary with the prospect of a difficult, time-consuming and expensive undertaking." (p. 13)

"The capacity of the infrastructure to upgrade existing weapon systems, surge production of weapons, or develop and field entirely new systems for the New Triad can discourage other countries from competing militarily with the United States." (p. 14)

"DETER" — "[Missile] [D]efense of U.S. territory and power projection forces, including U.S. forces abroad, combined with the certainty of U.S. ability to strike in response, can bring into better balance U.S. stakes and risks in a regional confrontation and thus reinforce the credibility of U. S. guarantees designed to deter attacks on allies and friends."

"The [defense R&D and industrial] infrastructure must provide confidence in the reliability of the nuclear stockpile and the ability of command and control structures to withstand attack. More broadly, [it] helps to enhance deterrence of aggression by supporting improved U.S. capabilities to hold at risk high-value targets in the face of an adversary's efforts to conceal, harden, and disperse them." (p. 14)

"DEFEAT" — "Composed of both non-nuclear systems and nuclear weapons, the strike element of the New Triad can provide greater flexibility in the design and conduct of military campaigns to defeat opponents decisively. Non-nuclear strike capabilities may be particularly useful to limit collateral damage and conflict escalation. Nuclear weapons could be employed against targets able to withstand non-nuclear attack, (for example, deep underground bunkers or bio-weapon facilities)." (p. 12-13)

"Missile defenses could defeat small-scale missile attacks intended to coerce the United States into abandoning an embattled ally or friend. Defenses that provided protection for strike capabilities of the New Triad and for other power projection forces would improve the ability of the United States and its allies and

friends to counterattack an enemy. They may also provide the President with an option to manage a crisis involving one or more missile and WMD-armed opponents." (p. 13)

COMMAND, CONTROL, PLANNING, AND INTELLIGENCE (p. 15)

"As forces are incrementally changed to meet the New Triad force requirements, command and control (C2) becomes more critical to ensure the effectiveness of the elements of the residual force structure... Strike options will require intricate planning, flexibility, and interface with decision makers throughout the engagement process. Command and control will become more complex and the supporting systems and platforms will require augmentation, modernization, and replacement." (p. 15)

"Accurate and timely targeting information can increase both the lethality of strike capabilities and the possibilities for non-nuclear strike capabilities to substitute for nuclear weapons or provide for the timely positioning of missile defense assets." (p. 15)

DEFENSE POLICY GOALS AND RELATED NUCLEAR WEAPONS REQUIREMENTS (p. 15)

"In a fluid security environment, the precise nuclear force level necessary for the future cannot be predicted with certainty. The goal of reducing, over the next decade, the U.S. operationally deployed strategic nuclear force to the range of between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads provides a degree of flexibility necessary to accommodate changes in the security environment that could affect U.S. nuclear requirements." (p. 15)

SIZING THE NUCLEAR FORCE (p. 16)

"In setting requirements for nuclear strike capabilities, distinctions can be made among the contingencies for which the United States must be prepared. Contingencies can be categorized as immediate, potential or unexpected."

"Immediate contingencies involve well-recognized current dangers... Current examples of immediate contingencies include an Iraqi attack on Israel or its neighbors, a North Korean attack on South Korea, or a military confrontation over the status of Taiwan."

"Potential contingencies are plausible, but not immediate dangers. For example, the emergence of a new, hostile military coalition against the United States or its allies in which one or more members possesses WMD and the means of delivery is a potential contingency that could have major consequences for U.S. defense planning, including plans for nuclear forces." (p. 16)

Unexpected contingencies are sudden and unpredicted security challenges," like the Cuban Missile Crisis. "Contemporary illustrations might include a sudden regime change by which an existing nuclear arsenal comes into the hands of a new, hostile leadership group, or an opponents surprise unveiling of WMD capabilities." Ibid.

"North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Libya are among the countries that could be involved in immediate, potential, or unexpected contingencies. All have longstanding hostility toward the United States and its security partners; North Korea and Iraq in particular have been chronic military concerns. All sponsor or harbor terrorists, and all have active WMD and missile programs." Ibid

"Due to the combination of China's still developing strategic objectives and its ongoing modernization of its nuclear and non nuclear forces, China is a country that could be involved in an immediate or potential contingency." (p. 16-17)

"Russia maintains the most formidable nuclear forces, aside from the United States, and substantial, if less impressive, conventional capabilities. There now are, however, no ideological sources of conflict with Moscow, as there were during the Cold War. The United States seeks a more cooperative relationship with Russia and a move away from the balance-of-terror policy framework, which by definition is an expression of mutual distrust and hostility. As a result, a [nuclear strike] contingency involving Russia, while plausible, is not expected." (p. 17)

(U) "Adjusting U.S. immediate nuclear force requirements in recognition of the changed relationship with Russia is a critical step away from the Cold War policy of mutual vulnerability and toward more cooperative relations." (p. 17)

(S) "Russia's nuclear forces and programs, nevertheless, remain a concern. Russia faces many strategic problems around its periphery and its future course cannot be charted with certainty. U.S. planning must take this into account. In the event that U.S. relations with Russia significantly worsen in the future, the U.S. may need to revise its nuclear force levels and posture." (p. 17)

OPERATIONALLY DEPLOYED AND RESPONSIVE NUCLEAR FORCES

"The operationally deployed forces are sized to provide the capabilities required to meet the U.S. defense goals in the context of immediate, and unexpected contingencies. That is, a sufficient number of forces must

be available on short notice to counter known threats while preserving a small, additional margin in the event of a surprise development. The 1700-2200 warheads the United States is scheduled to deploy in 2012 would constitute the operationally deployed force.” (p. 17)

“The responsive force is intended to provide a capability to augment the operationally deployed force to meet potential contingencies ... The responsive force ... retains the option for leadership to increase the number of operationally delayed forces in proportion to the severity of an evolving crisis. A responsive force need not be available in a matter of days, but in weeks, months, or even years. For example, additional bombs could be brought out of the non-deployed stockpile in days or weeks. By contrast, adding additional weapons to the ICBM force could take as long as a year for a squadron in a wing. The responsive force [also] provides a reserve from which replacements can be provided for operationally deployed weapons that evidence reliability problems.”

US NUCLEAR FORCE SIZE

“Based on current projections, an operationally deployed force of 1700-2200 strategic nuclear warheads by 2012 ...will support U.S. deterrence policy to hold at risk what opponents value, including their instruments of political control and military power, and to deny opponents their war aims. The types of targets to be held at risk for deterrence purposes include leadership and military capabilities, particularly WMD, military command facilities and other centers of control and infrastructure that support military forces.”

“The planned force structure for 2012 comprises 14 Trident SSBNs (with two of the 14 in overhaul at any time) 500 Minuteman III ICBMs, 76 B-52H bombers, and 21 B-2 bombers.”

THE PATH FOR NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS

“A conceptual path toward an operationally deployed force of 1,700-2,200 warheads in 2012 ... eliminates Peacekeeper ICBMs, removes 4 Trident SSBNs from strategic service, and downloads weapons from Trident SLBMs, Minuteman III ICBMs; and B-52H and B-2 bombers. This will result in 3,800 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads by 2007 (SLBM warheads for SSBNs in overhaul will not be counted as operationally deployed because those submarines are unavailable for alert patrols).” (p. 19)

“Subsequent reductions below the 3,800 operationally deployed warheads can be achieved through a variety of methods. The precise method will be determined in the course of periodic reviews the Department will conduct beginning in 2003. The Secretary of Defense will direct that these reviews be undertaken with the participation of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Commander in Chief of U.S. Strategic Forces Command, and the NNSA Administrator.” (p. 19)

III. CREATING THE NEW TRIAD

“To meet the demands of the New Triad, an overhaul of existing capabilities is needed. This includes improving the tools used to build and execute strike plans so that the national leadership can adapt pre-planned options, or construct new options, during highly dynamic crisis situations.” (p. 23)

“In addition, the technology base and production readiness infrastructures of both DoD and NNSA must be modernized so that the United States will be able to adjust to rapidly changing situationsadjustments may be needed to match capabilities of the remaining nuclear forces to new missions... a need may arise to modify, upgrade, or replace portions of the extant nuclear force or develop concepts for follow-on nuclear weapons better suited is the nation's needs. It is unlikely that a reduced version of the Cold War nuclear arsenal will be precisely the nuclear force that the United States will require in 2012 and beyond.” (p. 23)

“The FY04 DPG [Defense Planning Guidance] will provide guidance to coordinate and deconflict requirements for nuclear and non nuclear systems.” (p. 24)

“Initiatives reflected in the proposed FY03-07 Future Years Defense Plan (FYPD) include:

- *Mobile and Relocatable Targets.* DoD proposed to develop a systems-level approach, applied across the Services, for holding at risk critical mobile targets.
- *Defeating Hard and Deeply-Buried Targets.* DoD would implement a program to improve significantly the means to locate, identify, characterize, and target adversarial hard and deeply buried targets.
- *Long Range Strike.* DoD will pursue a systems level approach to defeat critical fixed and mobile targets at varying ranges, in all terrain and weather conditions, and in denied areas.
- *Guided Missile Submarines (SSGNs).* DoD has proposed to fund the conversion of four SSBNs, withdrawn from the strategic nuclear service, to SSGN configuration.
- *Precision Strike.* Effort to increase the number of targets than can be attacked on a single mission. Elements include a “Multifunction Information Distribution System” to provide “a jam-resistant, secure, digital network

for exchange of critical information for strike capabilities," a "Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile," A "Small Diameter Bomb," and the "Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle."

- *New Strike System*. "DoD will begin in FY03 to explore concepts for a new strike system that might arm the converted SSGNs. Desired capabilities for this new strike weapon include timely arrival on target, precision, and the ability to be retargeted rapidly." (p. 24-25)

Ballistic Missile Defense

"The President has stated that the mission for missile defense is to protect all 50 states, our deployed forces, and our friends and allies against ballistic missile attacks. The Department has reorganized its ballistic missile defense program. The program is pursuing missile defense based on the following guidance:

- Missile defense is most effective if it is layered; that is, able to intercept ballistic missiles of any range in all phases of their flight.
- The United States seeks effective defenses against attacks by small numbers of longer range missiles as well as defenses against attacks by larger numbers of short- and medium-range missiles.
- Missile defense systems, like all military systems, can be less than 100-percent effective and still make a significant contribution to security by enhancing deterrence and saving lives if deterrence fails." (p. 25)

"Other than the PAC-3, the United States has not yet chosen systems for deployment; that decision will depend on the evolution of both technology and the threat. The Department is exploring a wide range of alternative approaches. There are two dimensions to the missile defense program: near-term emergency capabilities; and improved variants of these capabilities leading to more robust, operational systems. Several near-term and mid-term options (2003-2008) that could provide an emergency missile defense capability are under consideration, including:

- A single Airborne Laser for boost-phase intercepts may be available for limited operations against ballistic missiles of all ranges;
- A rudimentary ground-based midcourse system, consisting of a small number of interceptors taken from the test program and an upgraded Cobra Dane radar in Alaska, could be available against longer-range threats to the United States; and
- A sea-based Aegis system could be available to provide rudimentary midcourse capability against short to medium-range threats." (p. 26)

"Based on the technical progress of these systems, the United States could deploy operational capabilities beginning in the 2006-2008 period including:

- 2-3 Airborne Laser aircraft
- Additional ground-based midcourse sites
- 4 sea-based midcourse ships
- terminal systems, able to defend against shorter range threats: PAC-3, which began deployment in 2001, and THAAD, which could be available by 2008." (p. 26)

"DOD will develop the low-orbit constellation of SBIRS-Low satellites to support missile defense. This system will provide capabilities to track enemy ballistic missiles and to assist in the discrimination of reentry vehicles and other objects in flight." (p. 28)

Command and Control Intelligence

[the Secretary of Defense] "established a Federal Advisory Committee (FAC) to conduct an independent, end-to-end review of all activities involved in maintaining the highest standards of nuclear weapons safety, security, control, and reliability." This "*End-to-End Review*" was conducted concurrently with the NPR but was not completed before the NPR deadline. While the review is not yet final, the FAC presented an "urgent preliminary finding to the Secretary subsequent to the events of September 11 identifying the need to expand the current nuclear command and control (C2) architecture to a true national command and control conferencing system." (p. 26)

"The attacks of September 11 dramatically highlighted the requirement for secure, wideband communications between fixed and mobile command centers and national decision makers. The Department is developing a secure wideband communications architecture and procedures ... The Department will initiate a satellite communications system in FY03, the *Advanced Wideband System (AWS)*, that incorporates interoperable laser communications and will be designed to meet the needs of the defense and intelligence community for wideband tactical, protected tactical (replaces Advanced EHF satellites) broadcast, and relay communications with a planned system first launch during FY09. The Department supports the effort to implement a secure,

wideband capability on all strategic C2 platforms. Wideband complements, but does not replace, the requirement for assured, survivable, and enduring nuclear C2." (p. 27)

The "2001 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States" provided immediate upgrades to aircraft for national leadership, and the Department has programmed funding for additional wideband upgrades including the E-4 National Airborne Operations Center aircraft.

"Three Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) spacecraft are planned for an initial operating capability of FY08 that will provide nuclear-survivable (e.g. against high altitude electromagnetic pulse), anti-jam, low and medium data rate communications to strategic and tactical users."

"The Department will initiate in FY03 an Extremely High Frequency (EHF) communications satellites program primarily for national and strategic users requiring nuclear protected communications in the mid-latitude and polar regions with a planned first launch during FY09. Survivable, jam-resistant, secure voice conferencing among principal nuclear C2 decision makers remains essential to facilitate discussions of tactical warning and assessment, response options, and force management." (p. 27)

"... substantial investment in nuclear C2 cryptographic systems ... new nuclear C2 capabilities must be leveraged with new technologies. (p. 27)

Intelligence

"Significant capability shortfalls currently exist in: finding and tracking mobile and relocatable targets and WMD sites; locating, identifying, and characterizing hard and deeply buried targets (HDBTs); [and] providing intelligence support to Information Operations and federated intelligence operations " (p. 28)

"To provide continuous and persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance of critical regions, the Department proposes to develop in its FY03-07 FYDP a "system of systems that consists of space, airborne, surface, and subsurface capabilities. Sensors for this system will include a mix of phenomenology, allow for agile and flexible response, and operate across the electro-magnetic spectrum." (p. 28)

"New concepts for persistent surveillance - from air- and space-based platforms - including hyper-spectral imaging, are proposed in the FY03 budget. (ibid).

"Intelligence for Information Operations (IO). Information Operations targeting, weaponeering, and execution requires intelligence collection of finer granularity and depth than is currently available. The intelligence community lacks adequate data on most adversary computer local area networks and other command and control systems. Additionally, there is limited analytical capability to exploit these networks using IO tools. Investments must continue in order to upgrade and, populate the Modernized Integrated Database to enable effective IO targeting, weaponeering, and combat assessment essential to the New Triad."

Adaptive Planning (p. 29)

"The current nuclear planning system, including target identification, weapons system assignment, and the nuclear command and control system requirements, is optimized to support large, deliberately planned nuclear strikes. In the future, as the nation moves beyond the concept of a large, Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) and moves toward more flexibility, adaptive planning will play a much larger role."

"Deliberate planning creates executable war plans, prepared in advance, for anticipated contingencies. Adaptive planning is used to generate war plans quickly in time critical-situations. Deliberate planning provides the foundation for adaptive planning by identifying individual weapon/target combinations that could be executed in crises."

"For contingencies for which no adaptive planning has been done, fully adaptive planning will be required. The desire to shorten the time between identifying a target and having an option available will place significant stress on the nuclear planning process as it currently exists. Presently 12-48 hours is required to develop a plan to attack a single new target, depending on the weapon system to be employed. A more flexible planning system is needed to address the requirements of adaptive planning."

"To make the Strategic Warfare Planning System (SWPS) more responsive to adaptive planning scenarios, a comprehensive SWPS Transformation Study has been initiated and is being conducted by U.S. Strategic Command. Results will be available in late spring 2002. To meet the requirements of adaptive planning, an upgrade of the existing nuclear C2 architecture is needed.

DOD Infrastructure Issues

"DOD has identified shortfalls in current infrastructure sustainment programs for nuclear platforms. These include the following: solid rocket motor design, development and testing; technology for current and future strategic systems; improved surveillance and assessment capabilities; command and control platforms and systems; and design, development, and production of radiation-hardened parts." (p. 30)

"In support of this effort, the **Defense Science Board Task Force on System Technology for the Future US Strategic Posture** is considering strategies for enhancing the ability of the U.S. technology base to deal with or hedge against uncertainties in the nature and timing of potential strategic threats, the capability of the technology and industrial base to respond in a timely manner, and the adequacy and responsiveness of science and technology programs related to possible future strategic capabilities. In addition, the **U.S. Strategic Command Advisory Group on Strategic Platforms** is addressing weapon system viability and nuclear force readiness." (p. 30)

The Current U.S. Nuclear Warhead Infrastructure

"Underinvestment in the infrastructure - in particular the production complex - has increased the risks that if substantial problems in the stockpile are discovered, future options to refurbish or replace existing designs will be limited. For example, although an interim pit production capability will be established later in this decade, no current capability exists to build and certify plutonium pits, certain secondary components, or complete warheads." (p. 30)

"The need is clear for a revitalized nuclear weapons complex that will: ...be able, if directed, to design, develop, manufacture, and certify new warheads in response to new national requirements; and maintain readiness to resume underground nuclear testing if required." (p. 30)

Stockpile Maintenance

"DOD and NNSA are in the preliminary stages of determining the requirements for nuclear warheads for the New Triad. As the New Triad is developed and fielded, DoD and NNSA will have to reassess how the warheads in the stockpile are characterized. At present, the warhead stockpile is divided into two categories: active and inactive:

- Active stock pile warheads are maintained in a ready-for-use configuration with tritium and other limited life components installed. They incorporate the latest warhead modifications. The active stockpile includes all deployed warheads, warheads for the responsive force, and logistics spares for each warhead type.

- Inactive stockpile warheads do not have limited life components installed, and may not have the latest warhead modifications. These warheads serve a number of purposes ranging from reliability replacements that act as a hedge against the discovery of a problem with a large number of active warheads, to the more predictable replacement of warheads consumed by quality assurance and reliability testing. This hedge is required because the United States will not have, for a decade or more, the capacity to produce certain new components for warheads. The time it would take to deploy warheads in the inactive stockpile depends on the delivery system, and availability of tritium gas and other limited-life components. These warheads or their components could also be used to provide new capabilities. This time would range from weeks in the case of bombers, to years in the case of ICBMs." (p. 31-32)

"There are almost 8,000 warheads in the active stockpile today. As the initial nuclear warhead reductions are implemented, some warheads will be transferred from the active to the inactive stockpile. For example, the removal from strategic service of the 4 SSBNs will result in the transfer of over 700 W76 warheads to the inactive stockpile. By 2012 approximately 3,000 warheads, now in the active stockpile, are planned to be transferred to the inactive stockpile or retired." (p. 32)

"Some of the W87 Peacekeeper warheads will be redeployed on Minuteman ICBMs under the Safety Enhanced Reentry Vehicle (SERV) program. Each W87 warhead will displace one W62, or three W78 warheads currently deployed on Minuteman. To provide warhead diversity in the force, some SERV-modified Minuteman missiles would carry the W78 warhead. A number of W78 and W87 warheads will be retained as reliability replacements and surveillance assets to support the responsive force. In addition, the W62 will be retired by the end of Fiscal Year 2009. (p. 32)

"The active stockpiles also includes the nonstrategic nuclear weapons."

"The United States will retain an inactive stockpile of nuclear weapons. The size of that stockpile is yet to be determined. It will be driven by the capacity of the nuclear weapon complex to refurbish and dismantle weapons. For example, today the complex can process - either refurbish or dismantle - roughly 350 weapons per year. If the NNSA's proposed plan is funded, that number should increase to roughly 600 per year." (p. 32)

"A major challenge for nuclear weapons programs over the next two decades will be to refurbish, and thereby extend the life of, at least seven types of nuclear warheads" [a table lists these as B61 -3, 4, 10; B61-7, 11; W76; W78; W80-0, 1; B83-0; B83-1; W87; and W88.]

Restoring Production Infrastructure

*"Warhead Assembly and Disassembly:...*Plans are underway to expand the capacity and capability of the Pantex Plant to meet the planned workload for dismantlement and remanufacturing of existing weapons." (p. 33)

"Uranium Operations: At least seven to eight years of effort will be required to restore the capability to produce a complete nuclear weapon secondary at the Y-12 Plant in Tennessee. Qualified processes for some material and manufacturing steps are not currently in place. Plans are underway to expand the capacity and capability of the Y-12 Plant to meet the planned workload for replacing warhead secondaries, and other uranium components." (p. 33)

"Plutonium Operations: One glaring shortfall is the inability to fabricate and certify weapon primaries, or so-called "pits". Work is underway to establish an interim capability at Los Alamos National Laboratory late in this decade to meet current demand created by destructive surveillance testing on the W88 warhead. For the long term a new modern production facility will be needed to deal with the large-scale replacement of components and new production." (p. 33)

"Other Component and Material Production:... Tritium production, halted since 1988, is programmed to resume in FY03 with first deliveries to the stockpile scheduled for FY06. Additionally, warhead refurbishment plans require modern facilities at Y-12's Special Materials Complex for manufacturing unique materials." (p. 14)

NNSA Initiatives for Nuclear Weapons Programs

"As a result of the NPR, NNSA will undertake several initiatives...

Advanced Concepts Initiative:...There are several nuclear weapon options that might provide important advantages for enhancing the nation's deterrence posture: possible modifications to existing weapons to provide additional yield flexibility in the stockpile; improved earth penetrating weapons (EPWs) to counter the increased use by potential adversaries of hardened and deeply buried facilities; and warheads that reduce collateral damage. (p. 34-35)

"To further assess these and other nuclear weapons options in connection with meeting new or emerging military requirements, the NNSA will reestablish advanced warhead concepts teams at each of the national laboratories and at headquarters in Washington. This will provide unique opportunities to train our next generation of weapon designers and engineers. DoD and NNSA will also jointly review potential programs to provide nuclear capabilities, and identify opportunities for further study, including assessments of whether nuclear testing would be required to field such warheads." (p. 35)

"The [Feb. 2001 Foster] Panel recommendation that DOE/NNSA assess the feasibility and cost of reducing the time [to resume testing] to 'well below the Congressionally-mandated one year' (sense of the Congress as expressed in the 1996 Resolution of Ratification for the START II Treaty) was addressed as part of the NPR." (p. 35)

"Test Readiness is maintained principally by the participation of nuclear test program personnel in an active program of stockpile stewardship experiments carried out underground at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). There are two concerns about the current test readiness program."

"First, ... the current 2-3 year test readiness posture will not be sustainable as more and more experienced test personnel retire. Not all of the techniques and processes required to carry out underground nuclear tests - including nuclear diagnostic instrumentation, containment, design and emplacement of diagnostic equipment in a vertical shaft, drillback and radiochemical analysis are exercised with the subcritical experimentation work carried out at the NTS. As experienced personnel retire, it will become more difficult to train new people in these techniques, further degrading test readiness. This argues for an approach in which all key capabilities required to conduct underground nuclear tests are identified and exercised on projects making use of a variety of nuclear testing related skills." (p. 35-36)

"Second, the 2-3 year posture may be too long to address any serious defect that might be discovered in the future."

"Given the certainty of surprise in the future and the broad spectrum of threats, the United States also must have the capability to understand the technological implications of nuclear weapon concepts and countermeasures tested by other states, to ensure that U.S. weapons and delivery platforms (including advanced conventional strike systems) perform effectively. If necessary, this will enable the United States to initiate research into whether it needs to develop an entirely new capability - one that is not a modification of an existing weapon - in time to address the threat." (p. 36)

"To address these concerns... NNSA proposes over the next three years to enhance test readiness by: augmenting key personnel and increasing their operational proficiency; beginning the mentoring of the next generation of testing personnel; conducting additional field experiments including additional subcritical

experiments and test related exercises of appropriate fidelity; replacing key underground-test-unique components (e.g. Field Test Neutron Generators); modernizing certain test diagnostic capabilities; and decreasing the time required to show regulatory and safety compliance. DoD and NNSA will work to refine test scenarios and evaluate cost/benefit tradeoffs in order to determine, implement, and sustain the optimum test readiness time that best supports the New Triad." (p. 36)

Meeting Warhead Production Commitments to DoDA key capability that must be recovered is manufacture of plutonium pits. In addition to our efforts to establish a limited production capability at Los Alamos, NNSA will accelerate preliminary design work on a modern pit manufacturing facility so that new production capacity can be brought on line when it is needed." (p. 36)

People with Critical Skills

The DoD and NNSA will jointly support opportunities that provide end-to-end demonstration of integrated capabilities involved with warhead design, development, manufacturing, and warhead/weapon integration. A key objective is to exercise critical skills for adapting warheads to DoD weapon delivery systems; ...NNSA will include the following as goals for the new Advanced Concepts Initiative:

- Transfer of warhead design knowledge from the current generation of designers to the next generation
- Exercise of DoD/NNSA program integration skills.

Nuclear Force Sustainment and Modernization

"No plans to phase-out [dual-capable] F-15E; Phase-out F-16 once dual-capable JSF is deployed."

[Concerning ICBMs] "The focus of the Department's efforts are to extend the life of the MM III weapons system until 2020 while beginning the requirements process for the next-generation ICBM"

A comprehensive set of sustainment programs are planned or underway:

- Guidance Replacement Program (GRP)
- Propulsion Replacement Program (PRP)
- Propulsion System Rocket Engine (PSRE) life extension program ("replaces aging components in the post-boost vehicle")
- Rapid Execution and Combat Targeting (REACT) service life extension program
- Environmental Control System (ECS)
- Safety Enhanced Reentry Vehicle (SERV) program.

"The SERV program reconfigures the MM III ICBM to carry the Mk21 reentry vehicle which is currently deployed on Peacekeeper missiles." (p. 41)

"Peacekeeper deactivation will occur over a 36-month period [beginning in FY03] with missiles remaining on alert and fully mission capable throughout the deactivation period. ...The Department analyzed the role of the Peacekeeper against projected threats in the post-Cold War environment and judged that its retirement would not have an adverse effect on the sufficiency of U.S. nuclear forces. DoD plans to retain the booster stages for potential future uses such as space launch or target vehicles." (p. 41)

Follow on ICBM: The Air Force Systems Command (AFSPC) led the Ballistic Missile Requirements (BMR) Study (1998 to 2000) which documented a number of needs beyond the current baseline ICBM mission, such as extended range, trajectory shaping, strategic relocatable targets, and hardened deeply buried targets, that the next generation ICBM could address. The Land Based Strategic Nuclear Deterrence Mission Needs Statement (MNS) drew from the analysis done in the BMR study in documenting the need for ICBMs beyond 2020. To expand on the MNS and address alternatives for the follow on ICBM, AFSPC plans to conduct an analysis of alternatives in FY04 and FY05 with an IOC by 2018. This work will ensure the requirements generation process and the acquisition process remain on track for the future ICBM force." (p. 41)

Trident SSBN: . . .The Administration intends to convert four SSBNs from the current force of 18 submarines to carry special operations forces as well as conventional cruise missiles. Achieving this force structure also requires converting four of the eight Trident I (C-4) SSBNs to carry the Trident D-5 missile. The Navy has extended the Trident hull life to 44 years. This in turn will require the DoD to extend the service life of the D-5 SWS [Strategic Weapons System] as well. The first of the 14 Trident SSBNs remaining in service will be retired in 2029." (p. 42)

Trident II SLBM: ... DoD will fund the D-5 Life Extension Program, which continues production of D-5 missiles, and upgrades the guidance and missile electronics systems on existing missiles. The continued production of additional D-5 missiles is needed in order to prevent a shortage of missiles in the next decade." (p. 42)

Follow-on SSBN: ... DoD assumes the continued requirement for a sea-based strategic nuclear force. Therefore, the timeframe when the next generation SSBN will need to be deployed is about 2029 when the

first of the remaining operational Trident SSBNs is planned to be retired. The Navy is currently studying two options for future follow-on SSBNs: (1) a variant of Virginia-class nuclear attack submarines (SSN); and (2) a dedicated SSBN (either a new design or a derivative of the Trident SSBN) ... If the decision is made to develop a new dedicated SSBN, a program would have to be initiated around 2016 to ensure that a new platform is available in 2029." (p. 42)

"Follow-on SLBM. A new SLBM would be needed in about 2029 to match the schedule for a follow-on SSBN. The Navy has begun studies to examine range-payload requirements and missile size, but no specific plans for a follow-on SLBM at this point other than extending the service life of the Trident D-5." (p. 42)

"Common Missile. The Department of Defense does not plan to pursue a common ICBM/SLBM ballistic missile at this time. However, the Air Force and Navy are currently cooperating in research and development on common technologies related to current and future ballistic missiles - the Guidance Applications Program (GAP), Reentry Systems Applications Program (RSAP), Propulsion Applications Program (PAP), and Technology for the Sustainment of Strategic Systems (TSSS) programs." (p. 42-43)

Heavy Bombers/Air Launched Cruise Missiles (p. 43)

Strategic Bombers. The Air Force plans to keep the current B-2 and B-52 fleet operational for another 35-40 years. An aggressive sustainment and modernization effort for both platforms is required to support this plan. In particular, upgrades to communications, avionics, processors, radar systems, displays, and navigation equipment are essential to keep the fleet affordable and operationally relevant throughout this period.

"Assured, worldwide, survivable two way connectivity between the National Command Authorities and the strategic bomber force is a fundamental element of strategic command and control. B-52s and B-2s must transition to Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellite communications in order to ensure continued Connectivity with National Command elements."

"Situational Awareness (SA) and electronic countermeasures (ECM) remain the highest priority B-52 upgrades. The inability to adapt to and counter threats, the high failure rate of SA and ECM equipment components, parts obsolescence, and a vanishing vendor base severely limit the B-52's ability to operate in a combat environment. To that end, the Electronic Countermeasure Improvement, Situational Awareness Defense Improvement, and Low-Mid Band Jammer replacement programs are essential to ensuring the B-52 remains a viable combat asset beyond 2006."

The B-52 also requires a highly reliable and accurate navigation system to conduct worldwide tasking and nuclear weapons deliveries. The Inertial Navigation system (INS) represents the heart of the B-52 navigation suite but is reaching the end of service life and is increasingly cost-prohibitive to support. The Avionics Mid-Life Improvement program addresses this issue by replacing the INS and other obsolete B-52 avionics components required for precision navigation and weapons delivery."

Several upgrades are currently underway on the B-2. These upgrades include AHFM (Alternate High Frequency Material) which improves the ability to maintain the low observable materials of the aircraft: UHF/SATCOM upgrade; JASSM upgrade; Mk-82 Smart Bomb Rack Assembly upgrade; and Link-16 upgrade.

"Air-Launched Weapons Systems. The Air Force recently determined that its current force of cruise missiles can be sustained until 2030." (p. 43)

"Follow-on Strategic Bombers" Based on current estimates, "a new bomber will need to be operational by approximately 2040. A need for additional or improved bomber capabilities could, however, move the 'need date' closer to the present... The Air Force recently funded a science and technology effort for the Long-Range Strike Aerospace Platform-X to further explore options." (p. 43-44)

"Follow-on Air Launched Weapon Systems. There are no plans at this time for a follow-on nuclear ALCM... However, conventional cruise missile programs (such as the Extended Range Cruise Missile) are planned that could support an accelerated timetable if necessary, but would have to be modified to carry nuclear warheads."

Dual-Capable Aircraft, DoD is considering options and their associated costs to either extend the life of the dual capable F-16C/Ds and F-15Es or make a block upgrade to the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) aircraft... The Operational Requirements Document for the JSF requires that initial design permit nuclear capability to be incorporated at a later date (after IOC, currently scheduled for 2012) at an affordable price."

"Dual-capable aircraft and nuclear weapons in support of NATO. DoD will not seek any change to the current posture in FY02 but will review both issues to assess whether any modifications to the current posture are appropriate to adapt to the changing threat environment. A plan is already underway to conduct a NATO review of U.S. and allied dual capable aircraft in Europe and to present recommendations to Ministers in summer of 2002. Dual capable aircraft and deployed weapons are important to the continued viability of NATO's nuclear deterrent strategy and any changes need to be discussed within the alliance." (p. 44)

Tankers The current fleet of KC-135s will be operational for the next 35-40 years. The aging fleet will begin a long phased retirement starting in 2013 and continuing until approximately 2040. The Air Force anticipates constant upgrades to avionics, displays, and navigation equipment over the coming years. However, the current KC-135 fleet is not equipped with a survivable communications capability, limiting its effectiveness in a stressed environment. The Air Force is evaluating a follow-on tanker in conjunction with a follow-on common airframe airlift and special missions platform. The service is also considering the lease or purchase of 100 off-the-shelf 767 tankers as an interim measure prior to the need to produce the KC-X replacement platform. In developing alternatives, consideration needs to be given to the possibility that aircraft will operate in a nuclear, biological and chemical weapons environment." (p. 44-45)

Robust Flight Testing, Aging, and Surveillance. Air Force and Navy nuclear systems require robust flight-testing programs to provide operationally representative data on weapon system performance and to predict weapon system reliability and accuracy... Currently, only the D-5 missile system fulfils the required annual flight tests." (p. 45)

Nuclear Warhead Sustainment... The active stockpile quantities will be sufficient to arm the operationally deployed and responsive nuclear force, and provide sufficient logistics spares. The inactive stockpile will consist of warhead types in the active stockpile plus the W84 and B83 Mod 0, which have no active stockpile counterparts. The W62 warhead will be retired in FY09." (p. 45)

"The NNSA has initiated a program to energize design work on advanced concepts at the three design laboratories. This initiative will be focused on evolving DoD requirements." (p. 46)

Limitations in the Present Nuclear Force

"Today's nuclear arsenal continues to reflect its Cold War origin, characterized by moderate delivery accuracy, limited earth penetrator capability, high-yield warheads, silo and sea-based ballistic missiles with multiple independent reentry vehicles, and limited retargeting capability."

"New capabilities must be developed to defeat emerging threats such as hard and deeply buried targets (HDBT), to find and attack mobile and relocatable targets, to defeat chemical or biological agents, and to improve accuracy and limit collateral damage. Development of these capabilities, to include extensive research and timely fielding of new systems to address these challenges, are imperative to make the New Triad a reality."

Defeating Hard and Deeply Buried Targets

"More than 70 countries now use underground Facilities (UGFs) for military purposes. In June 1998, the Defense Science Board Task force on Underground Facilities that there are over 10,000 UGFs worldwide. Approximately 1,100 UGFs were known or suspected strategic (WMD, ballistic missile basing, leadership or top echelon command and control) sites. Updated estimates from DIA reveal this number has now grown to over 1,400. A majority of the strategic facilities are deep underground facilities. These facilities are generally the most difficult to defeat because of the depth of the facility and the uncertainty of the exact location. At present the United States lacks adequate means to deal with these strategic facilities. A detailed report on this issue was provided to the Congress recently (Report to Congress on the Defeat of Hard and Deeply Buried Targets, July 2001). (p. 46)

"To deny the enemy sanctuary in HDBTs requires timely identification and characterization of potential targets, realistic defeat alternatives, and accurate assessment of damage done by the attack. Achieving the desired level of capability requires the integration of Service and National systems into a robust, highly responsive system of systems capable of addressing the threat. Improved command and control and intelligence in support of the New Triad will be a key enabler to address this capability shortfall." (p. 47)

"In general, current conventional weapons can only 'deny' or 'disrupt' the functioning of HDBTs and require highly accurate intelligence and precise weapon delivery - a degree of accuracy and precision frequently missing under actual combat conditions. Similarly, current conventional weapons are not effective for the long term physical destruction of deep, underground facilities. (p. 47)

"The United States currently has a very limited ground penetration capability with its only earth penetrating nuclear weapon, the B61 Mod 11 gravity bomb. This single-yield, non-precision weapon cannot survive penetration into many types of terrain in which hardened underground facilities are located. Given these limitations, the targeting of a number of hardened, underground facilities is limited to an attack against surface features, which does not provide a high probability of defeat of these important targets." (p. 47)

"With a more effective earth penetrator, many buried targets could be attacked using a weapon with a much lower yield than would be required with a surface burst weapon. This lower yield would achieve the same damage while producing less fallout (by a factor of ten to twenty) than would the much larger yield surface

burst. For defeat of very deep or larger underground facilities, penetrating weapons with large yields would be needed to collapse the facility." (p. 47)

"To defeat HDBT it is necessary to improve significantly U.S. means to locate, identify, characterize, and target HDBTs. This objective also requires deliberate pre-planned and practiced missions and the development and procurement of several types of conventional earth penetrating munitions. A number of Special Operations Forces and information capabilities will need to be developed to support this goal. Investment and organization will yield a new level of capability for the stated objectives by 2007, with new technologies deployed by 2012. One effort to improve the U.S. capability against HDBTs is a joint DoD/DOE phase 6.2/6.2A Study to be started in April 2002. This effort will identify whether an existing warhead in a 5,000 pound class penetrator would provide significantly enhanced earth penetration capabilities compared to the B61 Mod 11." (p. 47)

Mobile and Relocatable Targets

"One of the greatest challenges today is accounting for the location uncertainty of mobile and relocatable targets... To respond to this challenge, collection systems and techniques that defeat adversary relocation capabilities must be developed. Sensors must also be capable of defeating camouflage and concealment efforts and detecting and exploiting new command and control systems."

"To locate successfully and maintain track on mobile targets until a weapon can be planned and executed, several enhancements need to be made to the current collection capability. Today's satellite constellation is not optimized for the current and developing mobile target challenge. Planned improvements to this constellation would provide the capability to rapidly and accurately locate and track mobile targets from the time they deploy from garrison until they return. Sensors with rapid revisit or dwell capability over deployment areas combined with automated exploitation sides are required to provide this capability." (p. 47-48)

Defeat of Chemical and Biological Agents

DoD and DOE efforts are underway to counter the asymmetric use of chemical and biological weapons (referred to as *agent defeat*). Agent Defeat Weapon (ADW) concepts are being evaluated to deny access to, immobilize, neutralize, or destroy chemical or biological weapons. Overcoming uncertainties in intelligence regarding agent production and storage locations as well as physical geometries of known facilities and contents appear to be the largest challenges. A variety of ADW concepts are currently under study, including thermal, chemical, or radiological neutralization of chemical/biological materials in production or storage facilities, as well as several types of kinetic penetrators to immobilize or deny use of those materials." (p. 48)

Improved Accuracy for Effectiveness and Reduced Collateral Damage

"Desired capabilities for nuclear weapons systems in flexible, adaptable strike plans include options for variable and reduced yields, high accuracy, and timely employment. These capabilities would help deter enemy use of WMD or limit collateral damage, should the United States have to defeat enemy WMD capabilities." (p. 48)

Nuclear Force Modernization

"The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has initiated a *Strategic Deterrent Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment* to characterize the requirements for nuclear weapon systems in the 2020 timeframe. The assessment is to be complete in early FY03." (p. 48)

"DoD, in coordination with the NNSA, will evaluate nuclear weapon options to increase weapon system effectiveness and flexibility and to limit collateral damage. Capability improvements are likely to be needed to correct the limitations of the existing nuclear forces." (p. 49)

V. NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS AND IMPLEMENTATIONS FOR ARMS CONTROL

Initial Reductions

"When these reductions [i.e. retire 50 Peacekeepers, remove 4 Trident SSBNs, and convert B-1's to solely conventional role] are complete in FY06, the number of U.S. operationally deployed strategic warheads will be reduced by about 1,300 warheads accountable under the START I Treaty (based on attribution rules at the time these decisions were made). The four Trident submarines that will be removed from service will remain accountable under the START I Treaty." (p. 51)

"The Department analyzed the role of the Peacekeeper against projected threats in the post Cold War environment and judged that its retirement would not have an adverse effect on the sufficiency of U.S. nuclear forces... Funding has been programmed, beginning in FY03, to retire these weapons in a phased approach to

coincide with the Trident D-5 transition to the Pacific fleet and to retain and maintain the silos for future options. These silos, and the four Trident submarines converted to SSGNs, will remain accountable under the START I Treaty."

"Additional strategic nuclear reduction will be achieved by lowering the number of warheads assigned to the operationally deployed force. By the end of FY07, U.S. operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads should total no more than 3,800. The drawdown of the operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads will preserve force structure in that, aside from the Peacekeeper ICBM and the four Trident SSBNs, no additional strategic delivery platforms are scheduled to be eliminated from strategic service. These reductions are to be completed between FY03 and FY07, and will result in approximately a 40% reduction in number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads from the present."

Longer Term Reductions

"With regard to additional reductions beyond FY07, the United States plans to decrease the number of warheads on its ballistic missile force by "downloading." Regarding bombers, reductions will be made by lowering the number of operationally deployed weapons, i.e. those available for loading at operational bomber bases."

"Warheads that will count as operationally deployed are: for ballistic missiles, the actual number of nuclear weapons loaded on the ICBMs or SLBMs; for bombers, those nuclear weapons located in weapon storage areas at bomber bases (except for a small number of spares)."

START II Treaty

"...the Russian resolution of ratification, adopted in 2000, contains unacceptable provision contrary to the new strategic framework and establishment of the New Triad."

De-Alerting

"U.S. forces are not on "hair trigger" alert and rigorous safeguards exist to ensure the highest levels of nuclear weapons safety, security, reliability, and command and control. Multiple, stringent procedural and technical safeguards are in place to guard against U.S. accidental and unauthorized launch."

"The New Triad addresses concerns about the accidental or unauthorized launch of certain foreign forces. For example, it provides missile defenses to protect the United States, its allies, and friends against limited or unauthorized launches. It also will provide a spectrum of defensive and non-nuclear response options to an accidental or unauthorized launch, allowing the United States to tailor an appropriate response to the specific event and to limit the danger of escalation."

"The elimination of the Peacekeeper ICBM will be phased to correspond with the introduction of the Trident II (D-5) missile in the Pacific. As they are eliminated, those Peacekeeper missiles remaining during the elimination process will be kept on alert to provide a necessary contribution to the U.S. portfolio of capabilities." (p. 54)

"Following the initial phase of U.S. nuclear reductions, subsequent reductions will be achieved by downloading warheads from missiles and bombers. Force structure will be retained as the basis for reconstructing the responsive force. Delivery systems will not be retired following initial reductions and downloaded warheads will be retained as needed for the responsive force." (p. 54)

The Comprehensive Test Ban

"The United States has not conducted nuclear tests since 1992 and supports the continued observance of the testing moratorium. While the United States is making every effort to maintain the stockpile without additional nuclear testing, this may not be possible for the indefinite future. Some problems in the stockpile due to aging and manufacturing defects have already been identified. Increasingly, objective judgments about capability in a non-testing environment will become far more difficult. Each year the DoD and DOE will reassess the need to resume nuclear testing and will make recommendations to the President. Nuclear nations have a responsibility to assure the safety and reliability of their own nuclear weapons." (p. 55)

Transparency

"The START I Treaty includes provisions that provide a useful baseline of transparency for offensive strategic forces. Any additional transparency that may be useful to provide added confidence and predictability would be in the form of separate political commitments."

CITATEN AMERIKAANSE REGERING

White House

Statement by President Bush

11 december 2002

Today I have issued the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. The strategy establishes a comprehensive approach to counter the growing threat from weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons. This strategy is integral to the National Security Strategy of the United States of America and the National Strategy for Homeland Security. We will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes and terrorists to threaten our Nation and our friends and allies with the world's most destructive weapons.

Weapons of mass destruction pose a grave danger. They could allow America's adversaries to inflict massive harm against our country, our military forces abroad, and our friends and allies. Some rogue states, including several that support terrorism, already possess WMD and are seeking even greater capabilities, as tools of coercion. For them, these are weapons of choice intended to deter us from responding to their aggression against our friends in vital regions of interest. For terrorists, WMD would provide the ability to kill large numbers of our people without warning. They would give them the power to murder without conscience on a scale to match their hatred for our country and our values.

Our national strategy to combat WMD is based on three pillars. We will pursue robust counterproliferation policies and capabilities to deter and defend against the use of these weapons. We will strengthen nonproliferation measures to prevent states and terrorists from acquiring WMD. We will increase our preparations to respond effectively to any use of WMD against us or our friends and allies. To succeed, we must use new technologies, strengthen our intelligence capabilities, work even more closely with allies, and establish new partnerships with other key states, including former adversaries.

The need to prevent, deter, defend against, and respond to WMD threats presents our Nation with a difficult and complex challenge. The strategy I have issued today asks much of our Federal Government, our state and local institutions, and, indeed, every citizen. The threat is real and the stakes are high. Success against this threat is a requirement of history -- one that the United States will meet with confidence and determination.

White House

White House Report: Missile Ship, WMD Strategy, Chile, Turkey/EU

(Press Secretary Ari Fleischer briefed December 11) (850)

White House On Its National Strategy To Combat WMD

Asked to comment on the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction that was released December 11 by the White House, [Press Secretary Ari] Fleischer said the announcement "represents a comprehensive guide for how seriously the United States takes the need to counter weapons of mass destruction proliferation."

"And it underscores" and "ties together in a very comprehensive fashion the fact that we will engage against the development of weapons of mass destruction through counterproliferation, through nonproliferation and, if necessary, through response," the press secretary said.

The document, he said, is a "declarative statement of how seriously the United States would take it in the event that weapons of mass destruction were used. And it's a reiteration of a statement that has been made previously. But this time, it ties it all together to make clear that the United States will, indeed, respond," Fleischer said.

The message to all, he said, "whether they are states or whether they are terrorists -- or states that are hosting terrorists, is that they should not engage in any such use because the United States will respond, as we deem appropriate."

NEDERLANDS BELEID

Ministeries van Buitenlandse Zaken en van Defensie

Missile Defense

**Brief van de Ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken en van Defensie aan de Tweede Kamer
27857 – nr. 2, 25 maart 2002**

[...] Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)

Op 9 januari jl. presenteerde het Pentagon de uitkomsten van de herziening van de nucleaire strijdkrachtenstructuur (Nuclear Posture Review). In het kader van de topontmoeting tussen President Bush en President Poetin in Crawford, op 13 november 2001, waren al enkele kengetallen van deze herziening bekend geworden, in het bijzonder de door President Bush eenzijdig aangekondigde verkleining van het Amerikaanse strategische kernwapenarsenaal tot 1 700–2 200 actieve (operationally deployed) kernwapens over de komende 10 jaar.

Nieuwe triade

Als gevolg van de NPR zal het afschrikkingsbeleid van de VS niet langer uitsluitend berusten op met kernwapens uitgeruste intercontinentale ballistische raketten (ICBM's), nucleaire onderzeeërs en strategische bommenwerpers. Deze triade wordt vervangen door een nieuwe triade waarin, naast kernwapens, een rol is weggelegd voor conventionele middelen, verdedigingsmiddelen en het vermogen de nucleaire strijdkrachten snel uit te breiden in antwoord op nieuwe dreigingen (responsive defense infrastructure). De nieuwe triade bestaat uit:

- een offensieve vergeldingscapaciteit, bestaande uit een sterk gereduceerde hoeveelheid offensieve strategische kernwapens – in feite de oude triade in afgeslankte vorm – en conventionele wapens;
- passieve en actieve verdedigingsmiddelen, waaronder missile defense;
- een «responsive defense infrastructure», waarvan onder meer reservevoorraden kernkoppen en een versterkte nucleaire productie- en testinfrastructuur deel uitmaken.

De samenhang en de effectiviteit van deze nieuwe triade wordt gewaarborgd door een verbeterde bevelsstructuur (command & control) en inlichtingensystemen.

Bij de samenstelling van deze triade is de VS niet uitgegaan van een tevoren gedefinieerde stabiele dreiging, zoals tijdens de Koude Oorlog. In plaats daarvan moet de nieuwe triade de VS in staat stellen snel en doeltreffend te reageren op onverwachte ontwikkelingen in de internationale veiligheidssituatie. In die zin is sprake van een verschuiving van een «threat based approach» naar een «capabilities based approach».

Vermindering van de hoeveelheid strategische kernwapens

De NPR maakt duidelijk dat het huidige aantal strategische kernwapens van ca. 6000 in eerste instantie tot aan 2007 zal worden verminderd tot 3800. Wat betreft systeemreducties, maakt de NPR melding van het uitfaseren van de Peacekeeper ICBM, de ombouw van vier strategische onderzeeërs (Trident I) voor conventionele kruisraketten en het beëindigen van de nucleaire rol van de B-1 strategische bommenwerpers. Andere systemen krijgen een «life extension programme» waardoor ze tot minstens 2020 meegaan. De reductie van actieve kernkoppen wordt gerealiseerd uit de genoemde reductie van wapensystemen, het niet langer voorzien van meer kernkoppen (MIRV-en) van de Minuteman III ICBM en uit niet nader gespecificeerde reducties van de overblijvende systemen. In 2007 zou worden besloten hoe de verdere vermindering tot 1700–2200 kernkoppen gestalte krijgt (te realiseren in 2012). De VS handhaaft ook met dit afgeslankte strategische kernwapenarsenaal het nucleaire afschrikkingsevenwicht met Rusland (en China).

Missile defense

De missile defense-plannen van de Verenigde Staten zijn erop gericht bescherming te bieden tegen de toekomstige dreiging van een beperkt aantal lange-afstandsraketten van risicolanden en de al bestaande dreiging van korte en in toenemende mate ook middellange afstandsraketten.

Gestreefd wordt naar een combinatie van systemen die deze raketten in verschillende fasen van hun vlucht kunnen onderscheppen en samen een gelaagde verdediging vormen. In dat verband worden verschillende systemen ontwikkeld en beproefd (zie onze brief van 5 juli 2001). Tevens wordt overwogen binnen enkele jaren nog niet volledige ontwikkelde systemen te ontplooiën. Definitieve besluiten zijn nog niet genomen. Veel is afhankelijk van de technische en financiële haalbaarheid van de verschillende opties. Dat deze niet is verzekerd blijkt uit het recente besluit van het Pentagon de ontwikkeling van het «Navy Area Theater Ballistic

Missile Defense System»-programma te beëindigen.

Responsive defense infrastructure

Het derde element van de NPR, de «responsive defense infrastructure», moet de VS in staat stellen vooral de nucleaire strijdkrachten snel uit te breiden in antwoord op onverhoopte, nieuwe dreigingen. Het gaat hierbij onder meer om het behoud van een productiecapaciteit en de verkorting van de voorbereidingstijd voor kernproeven, wanneer een dergelijke beslissing genomen zou worden. De Amerikaanse regering heeft overigens ontkend dat zij zou overwegen kernproeven te hervatten. Voorts wil de VS een reservevoorraad kernkoppen (hedge) aanhouden. Een deel van de niet-operationele kernkoppen wordt daartoe opgeslagen. Om hoeveel kernkoppen het gaat, is nog niet bekend en kennelijk ook nog niet besloten. Op zichzelf is het aanhouden van een reservevoorraad overigens niet nieuw. De door de regering-Clinton uitgevoerde NPR (1994) stelde vast dat de VS een reservevoorraad kernkoppen zouden handhaven van 10 500, ook als in het kader van het START II-verdrag het aantal operationele kernkoppen zou worden verminderd tot 2500. [...]

Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Missile Defense

Brief van de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken aan de Tweede Kamer 27857 – nr. 3, 27 maart 2002

In reactie op het verzoek van de Vaste Commissie voor Buitenlandse Zaken, vervat in de brief van 13 maart jl., een «oordeel te geven over de onlangs uitgelekte berichten over de Amerikaanse planning voor mogelijke kernaanvallen, waarbij de nucleaire drempel zou worden verlaagd, en daarbij in te gaan op de risico's van een dergelijk beleid», heb ik de eer u, mede namens de Minister van Defensie, als volgt te berichten.

Op 25 maart jl. ging uw Kamer een brief van ons toe, waarin wij zijn ingegaan op de Amerikaanse strategische herziening (Kamerstuk 27 857, nr. 2). Daarin is ook uitgebreid ingegaan op de Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), de herziening van de nucleaire strijdkrachtenstructuur. Met betrekking tot de berichten die de afgelopen weken in de pers zijn verschenen kunnen wij in aanvulling op onze eerdere brief het volgende vermelden.

De Amerikaanse regering heeft de NPR opgesteld op verzoek van het Congres. Deze NPR is vervat in een geclassificeerd document dat in januari jl. aan het Amerikaanse Congres is aangeboden. De regering heeft niet de beschikking over dit geclassificeerde document. Voor onze brief van 25 maart jl. hebben wij ons gebaseerd op datgene wat publiekelijk door de VS over de NPR is bekendgemaakt en op hierover door de VS in NAVO-kader verstrekte informatie.

Op grond van de ons ter beschikking staande informatie hebben wij beschreven hoe de VS een concept voor een nieuwe «triade» heeft ontwikkeld om de geloofwaardigheid van het Amerikaanse afschrikingsbeleid in een door nieuwe onzekerheden gekenschetste wereld te waarborgen.

Het gaat in de NPR in de eerste plaats om de afschrikking. Het rapport doet geen uitspraken over doelen of over pre-emptieve aanvallen. De NPR bevat geen plannen of richtlijnen voor de operationele inzet van kernwapens. De Amerikaanse autoriteiten hebben dit in hun reactie op de recente persberichten ook onderstreept.

De VS heeft ontkend de drempel voor het gebruik van kernwapens te verlagen. Door de ontwikkeling van conventionele en defensieve capaciteiten in het kader van de nieuwe «triade» is het doel van de NPR juist de afhankelijkheid van kernwapens te verminderen, hetgeen ook tot uitdrukking komt in de voorgenomen reducties in operationele kernwapens.

Veiligheidsadviseur Rice heeft daarnaast gewezen op het belang van een effectieve afschrikking, die vereist dat een tegenstander gelooft dat men een dreigement kan waarmaken, hetgeen in dit geval flexibiliteit vereist in een door onzekerheden gekenschetste dreigingsomgeving. Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken Powell heeft voorts ontkend dat zou zijn besloten tot de ontwikkeling van nieuwe, kleinere kernwapens (« mini-nukes»).

De regering heeft dus geen reden aan te nemen dat de drempel tegen het gebruik van kernwapens zou zijn verlaagd. Evenals de Verenigde Staten beschouwt de regering het Non-proliferatieverdrag (NPV) als de hoeksteen van de nucleaire non-proliferatie en ontwapening. Indien de Amerikaanse regering concrete voornemens zou hebben die in tegenspraak zouden zijn met het NPV of dit verdrag zouden ondermijnen, zal de regering de Amerikaanse regering hierop aanspreken.

Missile Defense – Bestrijding internationaal terrorisme
Verslag Algemeen Overleg Vaste Kamercommissies voor Buitenlandse Zaken en Defensie
27857 – 27925 – nr. 4, vastgesteld 16 april 2002 (AO op 28 maart 2002)

[...] De minister [van Buitenlandse Zaken] zegt voorts dat het nucleaire concept van de VS niet is gewijzigd. Hij meent dat de leden ten onrechte berichten die niet rechtstreeks van de Amerikaanse regering komen als een vertaling van het beleid zien. De NPR is overigens geen planning. Het is een brede, conceptuele analyse die op verzoek van het congres door de administratie is opgesteld. De nucleaire doctrine wordt er niet mee gewijzigd en de drempel voor de inzet van kernwapens niet verlaagd. Het streven is juist te komen tot een hogere nucleaire drempel. Wel wil men wapens kunnen ontwikkelen die diep ingegraven bunkers zouden kunnen vernietigen. Het doel is het afschrikkingseffect van het arsenaal te versterken. Het is dus ook niet de bedoeling dat de VS iets af willen doen aan het testmoratorium. [...]

Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Kabinetstandpunt over de nieuwe nationale veiligheidsstrategie van de Verenigde Staten
Brief van de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken aan de Tweede Kamer
28600V nr. 12 – 15 november 2002

[...]

Notitie De Nieuwe Nationale Veiligheidsstrategie van de VS

1 De Amerikaanse Nationale Veiligheidsstrategie

De Amerikaanse regering heeft in september het document ‘The National Security Strategy of the United States’ naar het Congres gezonden.¹ Het document brengt de wereldwijde belangen en doeleinden van de VS in kaart. Het dient als richtsnoer en rechtvaardiging voor politieke keuzes. De nieuwe Amerikaanse veiligheidsstrategie gaat duidelijk verder dan slechts het uiteenzetten van de militaire doctrine. Het bevat een brede politieke agenda en gaat naast militaire aspecten onder andere in op mensenrechten, samenwerking met anderen om regionale crises aan te pakken, economische groei in ontwikkelingslanden, democratisering en aanpassing van de nationale veiligheidsinstellingen in de VS. Rode draad is een activistische Amerikaanse internationale opstelling, waarvoor ook de financiële middelen worden vrijgemaakt.

Vergelijking van dit document met dat van President Clinton uit 1999 toont aan dat op een aantal terreinen eerder ingezette lijnen worden voortgezet of versterkt. Vanzelfsprekend hebben de terroristische aanslagen van 11 september 2001 een grote invloed op de nieuwe veiligheidsstrategie van de regering-Bush. Een aantal dreigingen krijgt veel aandacht, in het bijzonder: regionale instabiliteit, massavernietigingswapens en terrorisme.

Gelet op de veelheid van onderwerpen beperkt deze notitie zich tot de belangrijkste: de noodzaak tot internationale samenwerking, nieuwe dreigingen en ‘preemptive action’ (preëemptief optreden), aanpassing van de NAVO, niet-militaire aspecten van veiligheid, en bilateraal beleid.

2 Samenwerking in een interdependente wereld

Uit het document spreekt nadrukkelijk het besef dat de VS, ondanks de eigen militaire, economische en politieke kracht, kwetsbaar zijn vanwege de ongrijpbaarheid en onberekenbaarheid van terroristische netwerken en schurkenstaten. De VS beseffen dat zij in een steeds meer interdependente wereld niet kunnen zonder voortdurende, nauwe samenwerking in internationale organisaties en met de bondgenoten en gelijkgezinde staten. De grenzen tussen buitenlands en binnenlands beleid vervagen. Op nagenoeg alle beleidsterreinen wordt de noodzaak van internationale samenwerking benadrukt. Het document stelt expliciet: ‘We are guided by the conviction that no nation can build a safer, better world alone.’ Daar wordt dan wel aan toegevoegd dat de VS niet voelt voor internationale overeenkomsten die slechts een symbolische betekenis hebben, ‘to rally support for an ideal without furthering its attainment.’

Terwijl de VS zich voortdurend zullen inspannen om samen te werken en zich van de steun van de internationale gemeenschap te verzekeren, zullen zij echter niet aarzelen unilateraal te handelen wanneer dat nodig is. Laatstgenoemd standpunt wijkt overigens niet wezenlijk af van de politiek van President Clinton in zijn ‘National Security Strategy for a new century’ uit 1999.²

Vanuit een typisch Amerikaanse mengeling van principes en belangen verplichten de VS zich op te treden ter 'bevordering van een machtsevenwicht dat de vrijheid dient.' De ambitie is het wereldwijd vergroten van de vrijheid en veiligheid. 'We will actively work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world.' Kortom een internationalistische, activistische benadering geschoeid op Amerikaanse leest: 'The US national security strategy will be based on a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and of our national interests.'

Om een situatie te creëren waarin alle landen kunnen streven naar vrede en vrijheid, dient veel geïnvesteerd te worden in goede relaties met regionale machten als Rusland, India en China. Maar daartoe beperkt Washington zich niet; de VS voelen zich gecommiteerd aan internationale instellingen als de VN, de WTO, de OAS, de NAVO en aan andere bestaande allianties. De VS, zo stelt het document, nemen internationale verplichtingen serieus. Uit het document valt echter ook op te maken dat de VS vinden dat internationale organisaties een doel (moeten) dienen, maar geen doel op zich zijn.

De EU wordt op economisch gebied gepresenteerd als 'close friend and ally', waarmee intensief wordt geconsulteerd. Op afzonderlijke dossiers wordt de noodzaak tot samenwerking met de EU eveneens benadrukt: (financiële) strijd tegen het terrorisme, ontwikkelingssamenwerking in het algemeen, en als samenwerkingspartner voor het Afrika-beleid. Daarnaast verwelkomt het document de Europese inspanningen om te komen tot een beter gemeenschappelijk buitenlands- en defensiebeleid. De VS committeren zich aan nauwe consultaties om deze ontwikkelingen te laten aansluiten bij de NAVO.

3 Nieuwe dreigingen en 'preemptive action'

In de analyse van de veiligheidssituatie richt het document zich vooral op regionale instabiliteit, massavernietigingswapens en terrorisme. Het document benadrukt dat we te maken hebben met dreigingen die anders zijn - en in sommige opzichten gevaarlijker - dan die ten tijde van de Koude Oorlog: 'We are menaced less by fleets and armies than by catastrophic technologies in the hands of embittered few'. Het zwartste scenario dat voorzien wordt, en waar volgens de Amerikaanse regering ernstig rekening mee gehouden moet worden, is dat terroristen beschikking krijgen over massavernietigingswapens. Meer in het algemeen wordt gesteld: 'The gravest danger that our nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology.'

De Amerikaanse regering beklemtoont dat traditionele vormen van afschrikking niet werken tegen een vijand die bereid is desnoods met zelfmoordacties dood en verderf te zaaien. De aanslagen van 11 september laten geen andere conclusie toe. Ook werkt afschrikking niet goed tegen leiders van 'schurkenstaten', die bereid zijn enorme risico's te nemen en de levens van hun bevolking in de waagschaal te stellen.

In het licht van de genoemde dreigingen wijst het document onder meer op het belang van een versterkte inspanning m.b.t. contra-proliferatie en non-proliferatie van massavernietigingswapens. Daarnaast is er de militaire optie, inclusief de mogelijkheid van 'preemptive actions', om terroristische aanslagen te verhinderen en/of te voorkomen dat schurkenstaten met massavernietigingswapens in staat zijn de VS te chanteren. In de veiligheidsstrategie van 1999 stelde de toenmalige Amerikaanse regering al dat zij proportioneel, preëemptief optreden tegen een 'imminent threat' gerechtvaardigd achtte in het geval van een aanzienlijke dreiging voor de nationale veiligheid.³ De huidige veiligheidsstrategie zet deze lijn versterkt voort en geeft een onderbouwing van de optie om indien noodzakelijk preëemptief op te treden.

In zijn gesprek met de minister van Buitenlandse Zaken op 23 september jl. bevestigde Secretary of State Powell dat de mogelijkheid van 'preemptive action' niet nieuw is. Nieuw is wel, zo stelde Powell, het bewustzijn na 11 september dat terroristen niet door afschrikking en indamming kunnen worden afgestopt. De internationale omgeving is veranderd en de VS passen zich daaraan aan. Om die reden stelt de nieuwe veiligheidsstrategie: 'We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries.'

Volgens de Amerikaanse veiligheidsstrategie willen de VS bepaald geen voorschot nemen op preëemptief optreden overal ter wereld. De inzet blijft om zich van de steun van de internationale gemeenschap te verzekeren. Indien dat evenwel niet mogelijk is, zullen de VS, indien nodig, het recht van zelfverdediging uitoefenen en desnoods eenzijdig preëemptief optreden tegen terroristen en 'schurkenstaten'.⁴ De redenen voor dergelijke acties moeten duidelijk zijn, het gebruik van geweld proportioneel en er dient een goede rechtvaardiging voor te zijn. Tevens wordt erop gewezen dat dergelijke acties niet noodzakelijkerwijs militair hoeven te zijn.

Het daadwerkelijk optreden door de VS tegen 'onmiddellijke dreiging' in het licht van de andersoortige capaciteiten en doeleinden van tegenstanders - desnoods unilateraal - kan verreikende gevolgen hebben. Daarbij is overigens de wijze waarop de VS in de praktijk gebruik maakt van het concept 'preemptive action' minstens zo belangrijk als het concept zelf. De aanpak door de VS van de kwestie Irak via de Veiligheidsraad is in dit opzicht een belangrijk signaal.

Uitgangspunt zou moeten zijn dat van een land niet kan worden verwacht dat het passief afwacht indien er duidelijke aanwijzingen zijn dat een terroristische aanval op zijn grondgebied of inwoners op handen is. Door duidelijk te verklaren dat preëemptief optreden mogelijk is, wordt bovendien de drempel hoger voor terroristen en schurkenstaten die een aanval beramen.

De Amerikaanse veiligheidsstrategie stelt dat landen 'preemption' niet als voorwendsel voor agressie mogen gebruiken. Dat lijkt vanzelfsprekend, maar er blijft niettemin een risico dat het concept door sommige landen toch misbruikt zou worden. Van essentieel belang is dat het concept van 'preemptive action' strookt met het geheel van internationale rechtsregels over het gebruik van geweld (d.w.z. het uitgangspunt van een geweldverbod, behalve in geval van zelfverdediging of van toestemming door de Veiligheidsraad).

De Amerikaanse strategie stelt: 'We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and intentions of today's adversaries.' De aanslagen van 11 september hebben immers duidelijk gemaakt dat niet-staatelijke actoren, met steun van bepaalde staten, een bedreiging vormen voor de nationale veiligheid van andere staten. In de discussie over het concept van 'onmiddellijke dreiging' zou de vraag centraal moeten staan aan welke politieke en juridische voorwaarden een daadwerkelijk militair optreden daartegen zou moeten voldoen. Hierbij zou getracht kunnen worden een nadere omschrijving te geven van de redenen voor dergelijke acties, de proportionaliteit en de rechtvaardigingsgrond. De vraag hoe misbruik van het concept kan worden voorkomen dient in dit verband nadrukkelijk te worden meegenomen. Die discussie zal zowel bilateraal als in de relevante fora, zoals NAVO en VN, gevoerd moeten worden.

Tot slot stelt het document dat de Amerikaanse strijdkrachten sterk zullen blijven, om potentiële tegenstanders te ontmoedigen militaire capaciteiten op te bouwen die de macht van de VS overtreffen. De opmerking over het ontmoedigen van potentiële tegenstanders, die in de pers veel aandacht heeft gekregen, is in feite tamelijk theoretisch: geen enkel land zal de komende decennia in staat zijn de VS militair te evenaren. Het geeft wel aan dat de regering Bush vast van zin is zwaar in de opbouw van militaire capaciteiten te blijven investeren. Naarmate Europa daarbij achter blijft, kan dat een groeiend probleem in de NAVO vormen.

4 NAVO

Het belang van de NAVO als steunpilaar voor transatlantische en Europese veiligheid wordt herbevestigd, maar het document stelt ook dat de NAVO zich verder moet aanpassen om zich tegen de nieuwe dreigingen teweer te stellen. Zo dient onder andere een snel inzetbare mobiele, goed getrainde strijdmacht in het veld gebracht te kunnen worden. Minister van Defensie Rumsfeld heeft hierover concrete voorstellen gedaan tijdens de vergadering van de NAVO ministers van Defensie in Warschau op 24-25 september jl. Tijdens de NAVO-Top in Praag op 21-22 november zal hierover een principebesluit worden genomen. Tevens zullen de NAVO-landen in Praag aangeven op welke gebieden zij hun inspanningen op defensiegebied zullen vergroten via meer samenwerking, taakspecialisatie en door meer investeringen.

De NAVO zal verder worden uitgebreid. Namen en aantallen worden in het document nog niet genoemd. De algemene verwachting is dat de NAVO-landen in Praag akkoord zullen gaan met een uitbreiding met zeven landen (Bulgarije, Estland, Letland, Litouwen, Roemenië, Slowakije en Slovenië).

5 Niet-militaire aspecten van veiligheid

Het document volgt een omvattende benadering van veiligheid en legt uitdrukkelijk verband tussen de militaire en niet-militaire aspecten van het veiligheidsbeleid. In het hoofdstuk over internationale handel worden toe te juichen uitspraken over het belang van vrije markten en vrije handel gevolgd door een paragraaf over 'transitional safeguards' voor Amerikaanse sectoren, zoals bijvoorbeeld de landbouw en staalindustrie. De voordelen van vrijhandel hangen af van het afdwingen van 'fair trade practices', zo wordt gesteld. 'These safeguards help ensure that the benefits of free trade do not come at the expense of American workers.' Dat laatste klinkt als een ongewenst voorbehoud, d.w.z. dat de beleden vrijhandelsprincipes op een gegeven moment (bijvoorbeeld om binnenlandspolitieke motieven) terzijde zouden kunnen worden geschoven.

Ook ontwikkelingssamenwerking maakt integraal deel uit van de brede Amerikaanse veiligheidsstrategie en het document toont een actievere opstelling dan in de aanvangsfase, vanuit het besef dat ontwikkelingssamenwerking een belangrijke bijdrage kan leveren aan de collectieve inspanningen ten behoeve van meer stabiliteit in de wereld.

De doelstellingen zijn breed: vergroting van democratie, ontwikkeling en het bevorderen van vrije markten. Expliciet wordt gesteld dat hulp zal worden ingezet 'to promote freedom'. Het verband tussen armoede en terrorisme wordt alleen indirect gelegd: zwakke staten bieden een vluchtplaats voor terroristen. In feite wordt daarmee 'good governance' tot een zelfstandige doelstelling van de Amerikaanse ontwikkelingssamenwerking verklaard.

De VS willen zich niet committeren aan de internationale consensus zoals o.a. Nederland en de overgrote meerderheid van donoren doet in zijn ontwikkelingsbeleid. Daarbij gaat het vooral om de achtste doelstelling

van de 'Millennium Development Goals', namelijk het besteden van 0,7% van BNP aan 'Official Development Assistance' (ODA). Terwijl de internationaal aanvaarde ontwikkelingsdoelstellingen onvermeld blijven, wordt wel een eigen doelstelling geïntroduceerd. De VS willen de hulp verdubbelen aan ontwikkelingslanden die beschikken over een redelijk bestuur, economische vrijheid voorstaan en in mensen investeren. Deze zogenoemde 'Millennium Challenge Account' (MCA) zal dit soort landen belonen, maar tegelijkertijd zal vermoedelijk de Amerikaanse hulp aan landen die hier niet aan voldoen teruglopen. Het is nog onduidelijk wie de MCA zal beheren en hoe de allocatiecriteria zullen worden uitgewerkt.

Bij de vermelding van het voorstel (dat nog door het Congres goedgekeurd moet worden) dat de VS zijn 'core development assistance' met vijftig procent zullen verhogen, past de kanttekening dat de VS, zelfs bij deze op zich natuurlijk toe te juichen ontwikkeling, zich in de DAC-statistieken over de ODA/BNP-ratio nog altijd in de onderste regionen zullen bevinden.

Europa is hier, anders dan op het terrein van de militaire inspanningen, de seniore partner van de VS.

Alles afwegende kan het actievere Amerikaanse beleid t.a.v. ontwikkelingssamenwerking niet de claim waarmaken dat de VS op dit terrein een voorhoederol spelen. Niet alleen ontbreekt de wil om substantiële vooruitgang te maken richting de internationale doelstelling voor een hulpomvang van 0,7% van het BNP. Maar ook inhoudelijk wordt niet gerept van het moderne acquis op het gebied van ontwikkelingsfinanciering zoals onlangs vastgelegd in de Monterrey consensus. De VS doen – naar het zich laat aanzien bewust – geen poging aansluiting te vinden bij de internationale campagne gericht op het bereiken van de Millenniumdoelstellingen. De eigen doelstelling die wordt geïntroduceerd mist elke vorm van internationale afstemming.

Dat neemt niet weg dat in de strategie serieus aandacht wordt besteed aan het belangrijke element van de internationale welvaartsverdeling en dat de tekst een aantal interessante aanknopingspunten (integrale aanpak, 'good governance', koppeling input-resultaat) biedt voor een intensievere dialoog tussen de VS en Europa op het gebied van ontwikkelingssamenwerking, als bijdrage aan een integrale veiligheidsstrategie.

Het document wijdt ook enkele passages aan het klimaat. Inhoudelijk bevat het geen nieuws. Kyoto wordt niet genoemd. Er wordt verwezen naar het in februari 2002 gelanceerde initiatief op het gebied van klimaat en verbetering van luchtkwaliteit. Het is onduidelijk met welke maatregelen de Amerikaanse regering de reducties wil realiseren. De enige positieve noten zijn dat de VS zich onverkort gebonden achten aan de 'Convention on Climate Change', dat ze erkennen dat er inmiddels voldoende wetenschappelijk bewijs is om tot actie over te gaan en dat ze doorgaan met het ondersteunen van ontwikkelingslanden bij de aanpak van de klimaatproblematiek.

6 Regionaal en bilateraal beleid

Het document noemt vier regionale prioriteiten: het Midden-Oosten, Zuid-Azië, het Westelijk Halfrond en Afrika.

Per continent richt de Amerikaanse strategie zich op specifieke landen als speerpunten van beleid. In Azië zijn dat India, Pakistan en Indonesië, waarbij vooral de aandacht voor India opmerkelijk is. Daarnaast heeft '11/9' een nieuwe stimulans gegeven aan de bestaande relatie met Australië, Japan en Korea. Op het Westelijk Halfrond worden specifiek de landen Mexico, Brazilië, Canada, Chili en Colombia genoemd, met een focus op de drugs gerelateerde misdaad en de relaties tussen drugs en terrorisme. Met betrekking tot Afrika legt het stuk nadruk op de landen Zuid-Afrika, Nigeria, Kenia en Ethiopië als 'anchors for regional engagement and focused attention'. In Afrika zien de VS een rol in coördinatie met de Europese bondgenoten, genoemde staten en (sub-) regionale organisaties. Nadruk wordt eveneens gelegd op regionale economische instrumenten als de Free Trade Area of the Americas, de African Growth and Opportunity Act en het equivalent voor het Caribische gebied.

Over het Midden-Oosten bevat het stuk weinig nieuws. Het Midden-Oosten-conflict wordt kritiek genoemd vanwege het menselijk lijden, de nauwe relaties met Israël en de Arabische landen en het belang van de regio voor de VS. De VS committeren zich aan een onafhankelijk en democratisch Palestina naast een Israël dat in vrede en veiligheid moet kunnen leven. Volgens het document bedreigt de bezetting Israëls identiteit en democratie. De VS blijven de Israëlische leiders aanmoedigen om te komen tot concrete stappen om tot een Palestijnse staat te komen, inclusief terugtrekking tot de posities van vóór 28 september 2000 en het stoppen van nederzettingenpolitiek in de bezette gebieden.

7 Samenvattend oordeel

De nieuwe Amerikaanse veiligheidsstrategie beoogt een antwoord te geven op de grote dreigingen waarvoor de VS zich in het bijzonder na '11/9' gesteld zien. Uit het document spreekt een pro-actieve opstelling om deze dreigingen aan te pakken. De Amerikaanse regering is voornemens verschillende middelen, dus niet alleen militaire, aan te wenden om de veiligheid en vrijheid van de VS en de wereld te bevorderen. De brede

veiligheidsstrategie gaat ook in op aspecten als mensenrechten, economische politiek, klimaat en ontwikkelingssamenwerking. Van belang is ook dat deze politiek niet alleen met de mond wordt beleden, maar dat daarvoor ook de middelen worden vrijmaakt, niet alleen op militair gebied, maar ook (zij het aanzienlijk minder in omvang) op het gebied van ontwikkelingssamenwerking.

De Amerikaanse regering benadrukt dat internationale samenwerking voorop blijft staan. Anderzijds blijft President Bush zich het recht voorbehouden, net zoals zijn voorgangers, om eenzijdig militaire acties uit te voeren, indien optreden samen met anderen niet mogelijk blijkt. Aangezien ongrijpbare terroristische tegenstanders en onberekenbare leiders van 'schurkenstaten' niet door afschrikking en indamming kunnen worden afgestopt, sluit hij niet uit desnoods preëemptief in actie te zullen komen.

Over het concept van onmiddellijke dreiging dient een discussie gevoerd te worden, waarbij de vraag centraal zou moeten staan aan welke politieke en juridische voorwaarden een preëemptief optreden moet voldoen. Daarbij gaat het m.n. om de redenen voor dergelijke acties, de proportionaliteit en de rechtvaardigingsgrond, juist om te voorkomen dat het concept wordt misbruikt. Uiteindelijk zal ook een dergelijk optreden moeten voldoen aan het geheel van internationale rechtsregels over het gebruik van geweld.

Daarnaast is er behoefte aan 'global governance', gericht op het welzijn van de samenleving in brede zin. Daartoe zal bij het vormgeven, uitwerken en handhaven van multilateraal overeen te komen spelregels en afspraken meer dan tot nu toe het geval is rekening moeten worden gehouden met de ongelijke uitgangspositie van landen. De globalisering moet gezamenlijk dusdanig gemanaged worden dat de voordelen van globalisering aan zoveel mogelijk landen en mensen ten goede komen en dat de risico's voor de zwakste deelnemers zo gering mogelijk zijn.

Als slotopmerking: het is overigens duidelijk dat de verschillende spelers in Washington verschillende accenten leggen. Ook al om die reden is het zaak voor de Europeanen, als goede vrienden en trouwe bondgenoten van de VS, om actief en constructief in te spelen op de discussie in de VS.

Noten:

1. De Amerikaanse president is wettelijk verplicht zijn visie op de nationale veiligheid te geven, op grond van de Goldwater-Nicols Defence Department Reorganization Act uit 1986. De integrale tekst van het nieuwe nationale veiligheidsbeleid is te vinden op www.whitehouse.gov/homeland.
2. 'We act in alliance or partnership when other states share our interests, but unilaterally when compelling national interests so demand.' (A National Security Strategy for a new century, 1999, p.14)
3. Over de aanval in 1998 op locaties in Afghanistan en Sudan schrijft de regering Clinton: 'The strikes were a necessary and proportionate response to the imminent threat of further terrorist attacks against US personnel and facilities, and demonstrated that no country can be a safe haven for terrorists.' (pp.14,15)
4. Het is opvallend dat de term 'rogue states' wel wordt gebruikt, maar de gevoelige term 'axis of evil' uit het vocabulaire is verdwenen. Irak wordt slechts kort vermeld als één van de schurkenstaten, die beschikt over massavernietigingswapens. Iran wordt niet met zoveel woorden als schurkenstaat genoemd. Overigens komt de term 'schurkenstaat' ook in de Strategie van 1999 voor.

COMMENTAAR EN VRAGEN

Het op 11 december vrijgegeven Amerikaanse beleidsdocument met de titel 'National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction' markeert een belangrijke nieuwe stap in het Amerikaanse buitenland beleid. Gezien vanuit een breder kader gaat het om een verdere ontwikkeling in het unilaterisme van de Amerikaanse regering. In het beperktere kader van het nucleaire beleid, dat wil zeggen de strategie die de VS hanteert voor kernwapeninzet, gaat het om een verdere verruiming van de criteria die de VS officieel hanteert.

Het 'Nuclear Posture Review' (waarvan het openbare deel in deze F&R is afgedrukt) was een informatiedocument van het Pentagon voor het Amerikaanse Congres. Het gaf een gedetailleerde beschrijving van de veranderde samenstelling van de afschrikking 'triade'. Omdat er ook sprake was van potentiële doellanden beschouwde een groot deel van de buitenwereld dit ook als een indicatie van de bedoelingen en het eventuele gebruik van de kernwapenmacht van de VS. Desgevraagd daarover vertelde de toenmalige minister van Aartsen van buitenlandse zaken in de Tweede Kamer afgelopen maart dat de Amerikaanse regering hem had verteld dat het niet om een beleidsdocument ging, maar een "*brede, conceptuele analyse*". Formeel moest immers zo een document de status krijgen van een 'presidential directive', wilde het als een beleidsdocument tellen.

Welnu, die status heeft het nucleaire beleid inmiddels gekregen via 'The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction' dat op 11 december aan de wereld gepresenteerd werd. Daarin wordt onomwonden vastgesteld dat "*should our wide-ranging nonproliferation efforts fail, we must have available the full range of operational capacities necessary to defend against the possible employment of WMD.*" Het gebruik van het woord 'possible' is veelzeggend: het impliceert dat als de Amerikaanse regering een vermoeden heeft dat een land in het bezit zal komen van massavernietigingswapens dat de "full range of operational capacities" kan worden ingezet: dus inclusief kernwapens.

Dit laatste document was in september voorafgegaan door nog een beleidsdocument: de 'National Security Strategy' waar het Witte Huis stelt dat "*proactive counterproliferation efforts*" tegen landen bewapend met WMD, noodzakelijk zijn. In datzelfde document wordt expliciet gesteld dat "*...the United States will, if necessary, act pre-emptively.*"

Het 'Nuclear Posture Review' dat begin dit jaar deels openbaar werd gemaakt, had het over het behoud van de kernwapenrijkmachten en het aanpassen daarvan voor gebruik tegen ingegraven doelen zoals bunkers, en over het moderniseren van de beschikbare kernwapens.

Op het 'Posture Review' heeft het toenmalige kabinet gereageerd met de boven aangehaalde ontkenning dat het om een beleidsdocument ging (tijdens een Algemeen Overleg op 28 maart).

Over de nieuwe nationale veiligheidsstrategie die in september werd bekend gemaakt door de VS werd op 15 november jl. door de nieuwe minister van buitenlandse zaken De Hoop Scheffer van het inmiddels demissionaire kabinet Balkenende een brief naar de Kamer gestuurd. Daarin schrijft de minister: "*Uitgangspunt zou moeten zijn dat van een land niet kan worden verwacht dat het passief afwacht indien er duidelijke aanwijzingen zijn dat een terroristische aanval op zijn grondgebied of inwoners op handen is. Door duidelijk te verklaren dat preëemptief optreden mogelijk is, wordt bovendien de drempel hoger voor terroristen en schurkenstaten die een aanval beramen.*"

De Amerikaanse veiligheidsstrategie stelt dat landen 'preemption' niet als voorwendsel voor agressie mogen gebruiken. Dat lijkt vanzelfsprekend, maar er blijft niettemin een risico dat het concept door sommige landen toch misbruikt zou worden. Van essentieel belang is dat het concept van 'pre-emptive action' strookt met het geheel van internationale rechtsregels over het gebruik van geweld (d.w.z. het uitgangspunt van een geweldverbod, behalve in geval van zelfverdediging of van toestemming door de Veiligheidsraad)."

De regering is dus kennelijk wel bezorgd over de vrijheid van handelen die de regering van de VS naar zich toe trekt, en stelt de vraag hoe "*misbruik van het concept kan worden voorkomen.*"

Bovendien schrijft ze in de slotparagraaf: "*Over het concept van onmiddellijke dreiging dient een discussie gevoerd te worden, waarbij de vraag centraal zou moeten staan aan welke politieke en juridische voorwaarden een preëemptief optreden moet voldoen. Daarbij gaat het m.n. om de redenen voor dergelijke acties, de proportionaliteit en de rechtvaardigingsgrond, juist om te voorkomen dat het concept wordt misbruikt. Uiteindelijk zal ook een dergelijk optreden moeten voldoen aan het geheel van internationale rechtsregels over het gebruik van geweld.*"

Deze bezorgdheid zal door het net in december verschenen Amerikaanse document niet zijn weggenomen. Het is van belang dat de Nederlandse regering ook daar op reageert, in het licht van haar eerdere opmerkingen. Het gaat immers om de bereidheid van de belangrijkste NAVO bondgenoot om toezeggingen over nucleaire ontwapening te ontduiken en garanties aan de ondertekenaars van het Non-Proliferatie Verdrag (het grootste deel van de wereld: alleen India, Pakistan en Israël hebben niet getekend) te ondermijnen. De garanties houden immers in dat de ondertekenaars niet worden bedreigd met de inzet van kernwapens door een van de vijf officiële kernwapenstaten: het gaat om de negatieve veiligheids garanties die in 1995 werden gegeven door die vijf staten. Verder ligt er ook een verplichting om naar nucleaire ontwapening te werken, zowel als uitvloeisel van de tekst van het NPV als in de belofte die in 2000 in het slotdocument van een evaluatieconferentie van het verdrag werd gemaakt. Aan de regering en natuurlijk de politieke partijen zouden de volgende vragen moeten worden gesteld:

1. Gelooft de regering dat de Amerikaanse regering het door haar uitgestippelde beleid daadwerkelijk zal uitvoeren?
2. Onder welke voorwaarden zou de regering instemmen met een preemptive aanval? Dat wil zeggen onder welke 'juridische en politieke voorwaarden'?
3. Hoe denkt de regering te kunnen controleren dat er een dreiging voor de VS bestaat die een 'preemptive' aanval zou rechtvaardigen? Vertrouwt ze hier simpelweg op de informatie die de VS haar verstrekt?

KRONIEK 2003

20 januari-28 maart	Conference on Disarmament, Geneve
21-23 januari	EU Commissie buitenlandse zaken, mensenrechten, gemeenschappelijke veiligheid en defensiebeleid, Brussel
22 januari	Tweede Kamerverkiezingen in Nederland
27-28 januari	EU Commissie buitenlandse zaken, mensenrechten, gemeenschappelijke veiligheid en defensiebeleid, Brussel
28 januari	Laatste dag verkiezingsreces
6-7 februari	Jaarlijkse Munich Security Conference
18-19 februari	EU Commissie buitenlandse zaken, mensenrechten, gemeenschappelijke veiligheid en defensiebeleid, Brussel
20-21 februari	OVSE Parlementaire Assemblée winterbijeenkomst in Wenen
28 februari-9 maart	NPT PrepCom, Geneve
11 maart	Provinciale Statenverkiezingen in Nederland
17-19 maart	EU Commissie buitenlandse zaken, mensenrechten, gemeenschappelijke veiligheid en defensiebeleid, Brussel
24-25 maart	EU Commissie buitenlandse zaken, mensenrechten, gemeenschappelijke veiligheid en defensiebeleid, Brussel
28-30 april	EU Commissie buitenlandse zaken, mensenrechten, gemeenschappelijke veiligheid en defensiebeleid, Brussel
12-16 mei	8 ^e Sessie van de OPCW Conference of the States Parties, Den Haag
20-22 mei	EU Commissie buitenlandse zaken, mensenrechten, gemeenschappelijke veiligheid en defensiebeleid, Brussel
24-28 mei	NAVO Parlementaire Assemblée in Praag
30 mei	Gezamenlijke EU-G8 bijeenkomst, Sint Petersburg
1-2 juni	G8-bijeenkomst in Evain-les-Bains (ovb)
2-4 juni	WEU Assemblée, Parijs
10-11 juni	EU Commissie buitenlandse zaken, mensenrechten, gemeenschappelijke veiligheid en defensiebeleid, Brussel
12-27 juni	Conference on Disarmament, Geneve
16-17 juni	EU Commissie buitenlandse zaken, mensenrechten, gemeenschappelijke veiligheid en defensiebeleid, Brussel
5-9 juli	12 ^e OVSE Parlementaire Assemblée in Rotterdam
7-8 juli	EU Commissie buitenlandse zaken, mensenrechten, gemeenschappelijke veiligheid en defensiebeleid, Brussel
11 juli-24 augustus	Reces Europees Parlement
15-19 september	IAEA General Conference in Wenen
28 augustus-10 sept	Conference on Disarmament, Geneve
7-11 november	NAVO Parlementaire Assemblée in Orlando
10-14 november	BWC States Parties bijeenkomst, Geneve
1-3 december	WEU Assemblée, Parijs

FACTS AND REPORTS

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Citaten van internationale politici en diplomaten over het Amerikaans unilateralisme.
2. Veiligheidsvraagstukken en de verkiezingen – standpunten van de politieke partijen
Relevante delen van de partijprogramma's van de Nederlandse politieke partijen, plus citaten van politici op het terrein van oorlog en vrede.
3. Transatlantic relations – recent developments
Overzicht van recente ontwikkelingen in de transatlantische betrekkingen, met name binnen de NAVO, mede naar aanleiding van uitspraken in de State of the Union.
4. Ontwikkelingen betreffende kernwapens en de Nederlandse politiek – briefing paper
Periodiek overzicht van ontwikkelingen rond kernwapens in de internationale en nationale politiek, met uitgebreide hoeveelheid bijlagen.
5. Nucleaire vraagstukken – standpunten van de Nederlandse regering en de Tweede Kamer
Overzicht april 2001 – april 2002
6. Crisis in de OPCW – de verwijdering van directeur-generaal Bustani
Documenten en artikelen over het ontslag van directeur-generaal Bustani van het OPCW
7. Prepcom van het NPV – nucleaire ontwapening stopt
Verklaringen en rapporten van staten en ngo's tijdens de Prepcom van het NPV
8. Verdrag van Moskou – détente tussen Rusland en Verenigde Staten
Informatie over het Verdrag van Moskou, ontwikkelingen daaromheen en commentaar erop
9. Joint Strike Fighter – achtergrondberichten
De belangrijkste achtergrondberichten over de vervanging van de F16 uit de Nederlandse pers.
10. Konfrontatie in Zuid-Azië – de kernwapenwedloop tussen India en Pakistan
Basisgegevens over de nucleaire strijdkrachten en doctrines van India en Pakistan, Nederlandse wapenexport en wapenexportbeleid en een oproep om een nucleair treffen te voorkomen
11. Massavernietigingswapens in het Midden-Oosten (1) – Egypte, Israël, Syrië
Basisinformatie over de proliferatie van nucleaire, biologische en chemische wapens in Egypte, Israël en Syrië en verklaringen van de Nederlandse regering hierover
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