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# KOREA

De tweede crisis

**PENN – NL Facts and Reports Nr. 20**

Januari 2003

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Werkgroep Eurobom

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PENN-Nederland

**KOREA**


December 2002

**PENN, het Project voor Europese Nucleaire Non-proliferatie**, is opgezet om:

- \* officiële discussies over de toekomst van kernwapens in Europa nauwgezet te volgen en deze te verhelderen;
- \* analyses van en commentaren op deze ontwikkelingen te publiceren;
- \* verdere maatregelen voor kernontwapening in Europa en substantiële Europese bijdragen aan kernwapenbeheersing, ontwapening en non-proliferatie te stimuleren;
- \* te ijveren voor de volledige naleving van het Non-Proliferatieverdrag door de NAVO, de Europese Unie, en haar leden;
- \* politieke belemmeringen op te werpen tegen ontwikkelingen die zouden kunnen leiden tot een Europese Unie met kernwapens;
- \* te bevorderen dat de Europese Unie en al haar leden uiteindelijk niet-nucleaire leden van het NPV worden.

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# Werkgroep Eurobom

PENN/Netherlands MPI/Netherlands

## FACTS AND REPORTS

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Januari 2003 – No. 20

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## INLEIDING

Naast de crisis rondom Irak is er ook één ontstaan met Noord-Korea. Dat land wordt al jaren gerekend tot de 'drempelstaten', dat wil zeggen landen die in staat zijn om snel een kernwapen te maken. Sommige bronnen stellen zelfs dat Noord Korea al de beschikking heeft over kernwapens, of in ieder geval de splijtstof om een aantal te maken. Over biologische en chemische wapens beschikt Noord Korea ook, plus raket-draagsystemen die wellicht kunnen worden uitgerust met biologische of chemische koppen. In dat licht bezien is het lidmaatschap van Noord-Korea van de veiligheidsverdragen die grenzen stellen aan het bezit, ontwikkeling en gebruik van zulke massavenietigingswapens van groot belang. De crisis die sinds het najaar 2002 speelt is het gevolg van een verklaring die Noord-Korea volgens de Amerikaanse regering op 4 oktober maakte dat het in het bezit is van kernwapens, de opzegging van eerdere afspraken over het bevriezen van kernwapenontwikkeling programma's en later de terugtrekking uit het Non-Proliferatie Verdrag. De nieuwe Zuidkoreaanse regering heeft in reactie op deze ontwikkelingen opgeroepen tot onderhandelingen en voorlopig heeft de Amerikaanse regering dit aanvaard. Cruciaal in dit proces is de mogelijkheid om op vreedzame wijze een reünie van de twee Korea's op gang te brengen, op zo een manier dat de regerende elite in Noord-Korea het proces accepteert. Stappen in die richting werden al gemaakt (aanleggen van verbindingen tussen noord en zuid, familieherenigingen, een aanzet voor een vrije investeringszone in Noord-Korea) maar dreigen nu teniet te worden gedaan door een potentiële confrontatie met de VS. Hoewel president Bush sussende woorden uitspreekt (vermoedelijk omdat een tweede confrontatie naast die met Irak hem niet goed uitkomt) is de crisis minstens deels het gevolg van het verwaarlozen van de afspraken die na een eerdere crisis in 1994 tot stand kwamen. Die ontwikkelingen worden in deze F&R gedocumenteerd, met het gebruikelijke commentaar aan het slot.

Redactie Facts and Reports

# DOCUMENTEN

## KERNWAPENS

### Federation of American Scientists

([www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/nuke/index.html](http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/nuke/index.html))

#### **Nuclear weapons program**

October 2002

#### **Current Status**

In early October of 2002, Assistant Secretary of State James Kelley informed North Korean officials that the United States was aware that North Korea had a program underway to enrich uranium for use in nuclear weapons. Initially North Korea denied this, but later confirmed the veracity of the US claim. In confirming that they had an active nuclear weapons program, they also declared the Agreed Framework nullified.

The Agreed Framework signed by the United States and North Korea on October 21, 1994 in Geneva agreed that:

- North Korea would freeze its existing nuclear program and agree to enhanced International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards
- Both sides would cooperate to replace the D.P.R.K.'s graphite-moderated reactors for related facilities with light-water (LWR) power plants.
- Both countries would move toward full normalization of political and economic relations.
- Both sides will work together for peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula.
- And that both sides would work to strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Prior to the establishment of the Agreed Framework, intelligence sources believe that North Korea could have extracted plutonium from their reactors for use in nuclear weapons-perhaps enough for one or two nuclear weapons.

Nevertheless, it is unclear whether it has actually produced or possesses nuclear weapons due to difficulties in developing detonation devices.

#### **History**

North Korea maintains uranium mines with four million tons of exploitable high-quality uranium. In the mid-1960s, it established a large-scale atomic energy research complex in Yongbyon and trained specialists from students who had studied in the Soviet Union. Under the cooperation agreement concluded between the USSR and the DPRK, a nuclear research center was constructed near the small town of Yongbyon. In 1965 a Soviet IRT-2M research reactor was assembled for this center. From 1965 through 1973 fuel (fuel elements) enriched to 10 percent was supplied to the DPRK for this reactor.

In the 1970s it focused study on the nuclear fuel cycle including refining, conversion and fabrication. In 1974 Korean specialists independently modernized Soviet IRT-2M research reactor in the same way that other reactors operating in the USSR and other countries had been modernized, bringing its capacity up to 8 megawatts and switching to fuel enriched to 80 percent. Subsequently, the degree of fuel enrichment was reduced. In the same period the DPRK began to build a 5 MWe research reactor, what is called the "second reactor." In 1977 the DPRK concluded an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], allowing the latter to inspect a research reactor which was built with the assistance of the USSR.

The North Korean nuclear weapons program dates back to the 1980s. In the 1980s, focusing on practical uses of nuclear energy and the completion of a nuclear weapon development system, North Korea began to operate facilities for uranium fabrication and conversion. It began construction of a 200 MWe nuclear reactor and nuclear reprocessing facilities in Taechon and Yongbyon, respectively, and conducted high-explosive detonation tests. In 1985 US officials announced for the first time that they had intelligence data proving that a secret nuclear reactor was being built 90 km north of Pyongyang near the small town of Yongbyon. The installation at Yongbyon had been known for eight years from official IAEA reports. In 1985, under international pressure, Pyongyang acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). However, the DPRK refused to sign a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an obligation it had as a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

In July 1990 *The Washington Post* reported that new satellite photographs showed the presence in Yongbyon of a structure which could possibly be used to separate plutonium from nuclear fuel.

In a major initiative in July 1988, South Korean President Roh Tae Woo called for new efforts to promote North-South exchanges, family reunification, inter-Korean trade, and contact in international forums. Roh followed up this initiative in a UN General Assembly speech in which South Korea offered for the first time to discuss security matters with the North. Initial meetings that grew out of Roh's proposals started in September 1989. In September 1990, the first of eight prime minister-level meetings between North Korean and South Korean officials took place in Seoul, beginning an especially fruitful period of dialogue. The prime ministerial talks resulted in two major agreements: the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Exchanges, and Cooperation (the "basic agreement") and the Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (the "joint declaration").

In late 1991 North and South Korea signed the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, Exchanges and Cooperation and the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The Joint Declaration called for a bilateral nuclear inspection regime to verify the denuclearization of the peninsula. The Declaration, which came into force on 19 February 1992, states that the two sides "shall not test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons," and that they "shall not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities." A procedure for inter-Korean inspection was to be organized and a North-South Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC) was mandated with verification of the denuclearization of the peninsula.

On 30 January 1992 the DPRK also signed a nuclear safeguards agreement with the IAEA, as it had pledged to do in 1985 when acceding to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This safeguards agreement allowed IAEA inspections to begin in June 1992. In March 1992, the JNCC was established in accordance with the joint declaration, but subsequent meetings failed to reach agreement on the main issue of establishing a bilateral inspection regime.

When North Korean Deputy Prime Minister Kim Tal-Hyon visited South Korea for economic talks in July 1992, President Roh Tae Woo announced that full North-South Economic Cooperation would not be possible without resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue. There was little progress toward the establishment of an inspection regime, and dialogue between the South and North stalled in the fall of 1992.

The North's agreement to accept IAEA safeguards initiated a series of IAEA inspections of North Korea's nuclear facilities. This promising development was halted by the North's refusal in January 1993 to allow special inspections of two unreported facilities suspected of holding nuclear waste. Ignoring the South-North Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, North Korea refused IAEA inspections and operated nuclear reprocessing facilities, making the world suspicious of its nuclear intentions.

Lack of progress on implementation of the denuclearization accord triggered actions on both sides that led to North Korea's March 12, 1993, announcement of its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The North's threat to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) brought North-South progress to an abrupt halt. Tensions ran high on the Korean Peninsula as the confrontation between North Korea and the United States deepened.

The UN Security Council on 11 May 1993 passed a resolution urging the DPRK to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and to implement the 1991 North-South denuclearization accord. It also urged all member states to encourage the DPRK to respond positively to this resolution and to facilitate a solution.

The US responded by holding political-level talks with the DPRK in early June 1993 that led to a joint statement outlining the basic principles for continued US-DPRK dialogue and North Korea's "suspending" its withdrawal from the NPT. A second round of talks was held July 14-19, 1993, in Geneva. The talks set the guidelines for resolving the nuclear issue, improving U.S.-North Korean relations, and restarting inter-Korean talks, but further negotiations deadlocked.

Following the DPRK's spring 1994 unloading of fuel from its five-megawatt nuclear reactor and the resultant US push for UN sanctions, former President Carter's visit to Pyongyang in June 1994 helped to defuse tensions and resulted in renewed South-North talks. A third round of talks between the US and the DPRK opened in Geneva on July 8, 1994. However, the sudden death of North Korean leader Kim Il Sung on July 8, 1994 halted plans for a first ever South-North presidential summit and led to another period of inter-Korean animosity. The talks were recessed upon news of the death of North Korean President Kim Il Sung, then resumed in August. These talks concluded with the Agreed Framework.

Under the framework agreement, the North would freeze and eventually dismantle its existing suspect nuclear program, including the 50 MW and 200 MW graphite-moderated reactors under construction, as well as its existing 5 MW reactor and nuclear fuel reprocessing facility. In return, Pyongyang would be provided with alternative energy, initially in the form of heavy oil, and eventually two proliferation-resistant light water reactors (LWR). The two 1,000 MW light-water nuclear reactors would be safer and would produce much less plutonium, in order to help boost the supply of electricity in the North, which is now in a critical shortage. The

agreement also included gradual improvement of relations between the US and the DPRK, and committed North Korea to engage in South-North dialogue.

A few weeks after the signing of the Agreed Framework, President Kim loosened restrictions on South Korean firms desiring to pursue business opportunities with the North. Although North Korea continued to refuse official overtures by the South, economic contacts appeared to be expanding gradually.

A close examination by the IAEA of the radioactive isotope content in the nuclear waste revealed that North Korea had extracted about 24 kilograms of Plutonium. North Korea was supposed to have produced 0.9 gram of Plutonium per megawatt every day over a 4-year period from 1987 to 1991. The 0.9 gram per day multiplied by 365 days by 4 years and by 30 megawatts equals to 39 kilograms. When the yearly operation ratio is presumed to be 60 percent, the actual amount was estimated at 60% of 39 kilograms, or some 23.4 kilograms. Since 20-kiloton standard nuclear warhead has 8 kilograms of critical mass, this amounts to mass of material of nuclear fission out of which about 3 nuclear warheads could be extracted.

Estimates vary of both the amount of plutonium in North Korea's possession and number of nuclear weapons that could be manufactured from the material. South Korean, Japanese, and Russian intelligence estimates of the amount of plutonium separated, for example, are reported to be higher -- 7 to 22 kilograms, 16 to 24 kilograms, and 20 kilograms, respectively -- than the reported US estimate of about 12 kilograms. At least two of the estimates are said to be based on the assumption that North Korea removed fuel rods from the 5-MW(e) reactor and subsequently reprocessed the fuel during slowdowns in the reactor's operations in 1990 and 1991. The variations in the estimates about the number of weapons that could be produced from the material depend on a variety of factors, including assumptions about North Korea's reprocessing capabilities -- advanced technology yields more material -- and the amount of plutonium it takes to make a nuclear weapon. Until January 1994, the Department of Energy (DOE) estimated that 8 kilograms would be needed to make a small nuclear weapon. Thus, the United States' estimate of 12 kilograms could result in one to two bombs. In January 1994, however, DOE reduced the estimate of the amount of plutonium needed to 4 kilograms--enough to make up to three bombs if the US estimate is used and up to six bombs if the other estimates are used.

On 22 April 1997, U.S. Defense Department spokesman Kenneth Bacon officially stated, "When the U.S.-North Korea nuclear agreement was signed in Geneva in 1994, the U.S. intelligence authorities already believed North Korea had produced plutonium enough for at least one nuclear weapon." This was the first time the United States confirmed North Korea's possession of plutonium.

In accordance with the terms of the 1994 framework, the US Government in January 1995 responded to North Korea's decision to freeze its nuclear program and cooperate with US and IAEA verification efforts by easing economic sanctions against North Korea in four areas through:

- Authorizing transactions related to telecommunications connections, credit card use for personal or travel-related transactions, and the opening of journalists' offices;
- Authorizing D.P.R.K. use of the U.S. banking system to clear transactions not originating or terminating in the United States and unblocking frozen assets where there is no D.P.R.K. Government interest;
- Authorizing imports of magnesite, a refractory material used in the U.S. steel industry--North Korea and China are the world's primary sources of this raw material; and
- Authorizing transactions related to future establishment of liaison offices, case-by-case participation of U.S. companies in the light water reactor project, supply of alternative energy, and disposition of spent nuclear fuel as provided for by the agreed framework, in a manner consistent with applicable laws.

Smooth implementation of the 1994 agreed framework was obstructed for a time by North Korea's refusal to accept South Korean-designed LWR model reactors. US and DPRK negotiators met for three weeks in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, and on June 12, 1995, reached an accord resolving this issue. North Korea agreed to accept the decisions of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) with respect to the model for the LWRs and agreed that KEDO would select a prime contractor to carry out the LWR project. The KEDO executive board announced that it had selected the South Korean-designed Ulchin 3-4 LWR as the reference model for the project and that a South Korean firm would be the prime contractor. The South Korean prime contractor would be responsible for all aspects of the LWR project including design, manufacture, construction, and management. In this Kuala Lumpur accord to the 1994 Geneva agreed framework, the DPRK also agreed to negotiate directly with KEDO on all outstanding issues related to the LWR project. On December 15, 1995, KEDO and the DPRK signed the Light Water Reactor Supply Agreement. KEDO teams have also made a number of trips to North Korea to survey the proposed reactor site; in the spring of 1996, KEDO and the DPRK began negotiations on implementing protocols to the supply agreement.

Pyongyang is cooperating with Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, whose leading members are South Korea, the United States and Japan. KEDO has reached an agreement on the provision of the light-water nuclear reactors by 2003, and, in return, North Korea has frozen its nuclear program. South Korea, which has promised to bear the lion's share of the reactor project cost estimated at US\$4.5 billion, is asking the United States to put up at least a symbolic amount. The US administration, however, has said it can make no contribution to the construction cost as Congress has not appropriated the necessary budget. An official in Seoul, however, said that South Korea cannot drop its demand simply because of domestic problems in the United States. The US Congress has been delaying approval of the cost for the reactor project. South Korean officials said the U.S. refusal to share the reactor cost would make it difficult for them to obtain approval from the National Assembly for the South Korean share.

Since the conclusion of the Supply Agreement in December 1995, six related protocols have come into effect and three rounds of expert-level negotiations have produced solid results. The ROK power company, Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO), is the prime contractor for this project and has as its responsibility the design, manufacture, procurement, construction and management of the reactors. On 19 August 1997 KEDO and North Korea held a groundbreaking ceremony to begin construction of two light-water reactors.

In October 2002, North Korean officials acknowledged the existence of a clandestine program to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons that is in violation of the Agreed Framework and other agreements.

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#### The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization

#### **Agreed Framework between The United States of America and The Democratic People's Republic of Korea**

Geneva, October 21, 1994

Delegations of the governments of the United States of America (U.S.) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) held talks in Geneva from September 23 to October 21, 1994, to negotiate an overall resolution of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula.

Both sides reaffirmed the importance of attaining the objectives contained in the August 12, 1994 Agreed Statement between the U.S. and the DPRK and upholding the principles of the June 11, 1993 Joint Statement of the U.S. and the DPRK to achieve peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. The U.S. and the DPRK decided to take the following actions for the resolution of the nuclear issue:

I. Both sides will cooperate to replace the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities with light-water reactor (LWR) power plants.

1) In accordance with the October 20, 1994 letter of assurance from the U.S. President, the U.S. will undertake to make arrangements for the provision to the DPRK of a LWR project with a total generating capacity of approximately 2,000 MW(e) by a target date of 2003.

- The U.S. will organize under its leadership an international consortium to finance and supply the LWR project to be provided to the DPRK. The U.S., representing the international consortium, will serve as the principal point of contact with the DPRK for the LWR project.
- The U.S., representing the consortium, will make best efforts to secure the conclusion of a supply contract with the DPRK within six months of the date of this Document for the provision of the LWR project. Contract talks will begin as soon as possible after the date of this Document.
- As necessary, the U.S. and the DPRK will conclude a bilateral agreement for cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.



- 2) In accordance with the October 20, 1994 letter of assurance from the U.S. President, the U.S., representing the consortium, will make arrangements to offset the energy foregone due to the freeze of the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities, pending completion of the first LWR unit.
- Alternative energy will be provided in the form of heavy oil for heating and electricity production.
- Deliveries of heavy oil will begin within three months of the date of this Document and will reach a rate of 500,000 tons annually, in accordance with an agreed schedule of deliveries.
- 3) Upon receipt of U.S. assurances for the provision of LWR's and for arrangements for interim energy alternatives, the DPRK will freeze its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities and will eventually dismantle these reactors and related facilities.
- The freeze on the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities will be fully implemented within one month of the date of this Document. During this one-month period, and throughout the freeze, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be allowed to monitor this freeze, and the DPRK will provide full cooperation to the IAEA for this purpose.
- Dismantlement of the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities will be completed when the LWR project is completed.
- The U.S. and the DPRK will cooperate in finding a method to store safely the spent fuel from the 5 MW(e) experimental reactor during the construction of the LWR project, and to dispose of the fuel in a safe manner that does not involve reprocessing in the DPRK.
- 4) As soon as possible after the date of this document U.S. and DPRK experts will hold two sets of experts talks.
- At one set of talks, experts will discuss issues related to alternative energy and the replacement of the graphite-moderated reactor program with the LWR project.
- At the other set of talks, experts will discuss specific arrangements for spent fuel storage and ultimate disposition.

II. The two sides will move toward full normalization of political and economic relations.

- 1) Within three months of the date of this Document, both sides will reduce barriers to trade and investment, including restrictions on telecommunications services and financial transactions.
- 2) Each side will open a liaison office in the other's capital following resolution of consular and other technical issues through expert level discussions.
- 3) As progress is made on issues of concern to each side, the U.S. and the DPRK will upgrade bilateral relations to the Ambassadorial level.

III. Both sides will work together for peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula.

- 1) The U.S. will provide formal assurances to the DPRK, against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the U.S.
- 2) The DPRK will consistently take steps to implement the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
- 3) The DPRK will engage in North-South dialogue, as this Agreed Framework will help create an atmosphere that promotes such dialogue.

IV. Both sides will work together to strengthen the international nuclear non proliferation regime.

- 1) The DPRK will remain a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and will allow implementation of its safeguards agreement under the Treaty.
- 2) Upon conclusion of the supply contract for the provision of the LWR project, ad hoc and routine inspections will resume under the DPRK's safeguards agreement with the IAEA with respect to the facilities not subject to the freeze. Pending conclusion of the supply contract, inspections required by the IAEA for the continuity of safeguards will continue at the facilities not subject to the freeze.
- 3) When a significant portion of the LWR project is completed, but before delivery of key nuclear components, the DPRK will come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA (INFCIRC/403), including taking all steps that may be deemed necessary by the IAEA, following consultations with the Agency with regard to verifying the accuracy and completeness of the DPRK's initial report on all nuclear material in the DPRK.

Robert L. Gallucci, Head of Delegation of the United States of America, Ambassador at Large of the United States of America

Kang Sok Ju, Head of the Delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, First Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

**Conclusion of non-aggression treaty between DPRK and US, key to the settlement of nuclear issue, declares FM spokesman**

25 October 2002

A spokesman for the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on October 25 released a statement as regards the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula. He said: "Dramatic changes are taking place on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia in the new century. Inter-Korean relations and the DPRK's relations with Russia, China and Japan have entered a new important phase and bold measures have been taken to reconnect inter-Korean railroads which have remained cut for over half a century, settle the past with Japan and do away with the legacies of the last century.

The DPRK has taken a series of new steps in economic management to quicken the economy, including the establishment of a special economic zone, in conformity with the changed situation and specific conditions of the country.

These developments tangibly contribute to peace in Asia and the rest of the world. Almost all the countries, except the United States, welcomed these measures, a great encouragement to the DPRK.

It was against this background that the DPRK recently received a special envoy of the US president in the hope that this might help fundamentally redress hostile relations with the US and settle the outstanding issues on an equal footing.

To our great regret, however, the Pyongyang visit of the US special envoy convinced the DPRK that the hostile attempt of the Bush administration to stifle the DPRK by force and backpedal the favourable developments of the situation on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia has reached its highest watermark.

He asserted with no evidence that the DPRK has been actively engaged in the enriched uranium programme in pursuit of developing nuclear weapons in violation of the DPRK-USA Agreed Framework (AF). He even intimidated the DPRK side by claiming that unless the DPRK halts it, there would be no dialogue with the US and the DPRK-Japan and north-south relations would be in jeopardy.

The US unilateralism and high-handedness took the DPRK rather by surprise. The US is sadly mistaken if it thinks such a gangster-like logic would work with the DPRK.

As far as the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula is concerned, it came to the fore as the US massively stockpiled nuclear weapons in south Korea and its vicinity and threatened the DPRK, a small country, with those weapons for nearly half a century, pursuing a hard-line stance in accordance with its strategy for world supremacy.

The AF was adopted in October 1994, but the US has been disqualified from talking about its implementation. Under Article 1 of the AF the US is obliged to provide light water reactors (LWR) power plants to the DPRK by a target date of 2003 in return for the DPRK's freeze of graphite-moderated reactors and their related facilities. But only site preparation for the LWR was made though eight years have passed since the DPRK's freeze of its nuclear facilities.

This will cause the DPRK an annual loss of 1,000 MW (e) in 2003 when the first light water reactor is scheduled to be completed and that of 2,000 MW (e) from the next year.

Under Article 2 of the AF the two sides are obliged to move toward full normalization of political and economic relations. Over the last eight years, however, the US has persistently pursued the hostile policy toward the DPRK and maintained economic sanctions on it. The former has gone to full length to dub the latter as part of the "axis of evil".

Under Article 3 of the AF the US is obliged to give formal assurances to the DPRK against the threat or use of nuclear weapons. However, the US listed the DPRK as a target of its preemptive nuclear attack.

Under Article 4 of the AF and Paragraph G of its confidential minute the DPRK is to allow nuclear inspections only after the "delivery of essential non-nuclear components for the first LWR unit, including turbines and generators" is completed. But the US has already come forward with a unilateral demand of nuclear inspection in a bid to convince the international community of the DPRK's violation of the AF. This compelled the DPRK to make public the confidential minute for the first time.

In the final analysis, the US has observed none of the four articles of the AF. No one but the US knows whether it had willingness to implement the AF when it was adopted or signed it, calculating that the DPRK would collapse sooner or later.

However, the Bush administration named the DPRK as part of the "axis of evil" and a target of its preemptive nuclear strike. Obviously, this was a declaration of war against the DPRK, and making the DPRK-US Joint Statement and the Agreed Framework cease to be valid.

In the long run, the Bush administration has adopted it as its policy to make a preemptive nuclear strike on the DPRK. Such moves, a gross violation of the basic spirit of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, reduced the North-South Joint Declaration on Denuclearization to a dead document.

Its reckless political, economic and military pressure is seriously threatening the DPRK's right to subsistence, creating a grave situation on the Korean peninsula.

If anyone would think that the DPRK would sit with its arms folded under such a situation, it is the height of folly.

That was why the DPRK told the special envoy of the US president that the DPRK was entitled to possess not only nuclear weapon but any type of weapon more powerful than that in order to protect its sovereignty and right to subsistence from the ever-growing US nuclear threat.

The DPRK, which values its sovereignty above all else, was left with no other proper answer to the US arrogant and impertinent behaviour.

The DPRK has neither need nor duty to explain something to the US which is seeking to attack it if it refuses to disarm itself.

Nevertheless, the DPRK, with greatest magnanimity, made it clear that it was ready to seek a negotiated solution to this issue on the following conditions: first, the US recognizes the DPRK's sovereignty; second, it assures the DPRK of non-aggression and third, the US does not hinder the economic development of the DPRK.

Nowadays, the US and its followers assert that negotiations should be held after the DPRK puts down its weapons. This is a very abnormal logic. How then can the DPRK counter any attack barehanded?

In the final analysis, their assertions mean that the DPRK should yield to pressure. Surrender means death. Nobody can match anyone ready to die. This is the faith and will of the army and people of the DPRK determined to remain faithful to the army-centred policy.

The DPRK's stand is consistent. The DPRK considers that it is a reasonable and realistic solution to the nuclear issue to conclude a non-aggression treaty between the DPRK and the US if the grave situation on the Korean peninsula is to be eased.

If the US legally assures the DPRK of non-aggression, including the no use of nuclear weapons by concluding such a treaty, the DPRK will be ready to clear the former of its security concerns. The criterion of the settlement of all problems for the DPRK, a small country, is the removal of the threat to its sovereignty and right to subsistence.

There may be negotiations or the use of deterrence to meet this criterion, but the DPRK prefers the former as far as possible.

#### US Department of State

#### **Text: Joint U.S.-Japan-ROK Trilateral Statement on North Korea**

(Leaders call on North Korea to dismantle nuclear program) (590)

26 October 2002

President Bush, Republic of Korea President Kim Dae-Jung, and Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi agree that North Korea's program to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons is a violation of several agreements and called on North Korea in a statement October 26 to dismantle the program in a prompt and verifiable manner.

The three leaders met on the margins of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meetings in Los Cabos, Mexico.

The three leaders stressed their commitment to resolve the matter peacefully and reaffirmed that continued close consultations and trilateral coordination remain vital to the success of their efforts towards North Korea.

Following is the text of the statement:

The White House Office of the Press Secretary

(Los Cabos, Mexico)

October 26, 2002

## Joint U.S.-Japan-ROK Trilateral Statement

Today President George W. Bush, President Kim Dae-Jung, and Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi met to reaffirm their commitment to a peaceful Korean peninsula free of nuclear weapons.

The three leaders agreed that North Korea's program to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons is a violation of the Agreed Framework, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, North Korea's IAEA safeguards agreement, and the South-North Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. The three leaders called upon North Korea to dismantle this program in a prompt and verifiable manner and to come into full compliance with all its international commitments in conformity with North Korea's recent commitment in the Japan-North Korea Pyongyang Declaration. In this context, the three leaders agreed to continue close coordination.

The three leaders stressed their commitment to resolve this matter peacefully in close consultation trilaterally and with other concerned nations around the globe.

The three leaders agreed that South-North dialogue and the opening of Japan-DPRK normalization talks can serve as important channels to call upon the North to respond quickly and convincingly to the international communities' demands for a denuclearized Korean peninsula. President Kim briefed that during the recent South-North Ministerial Meeting held in Pyongyang, the South strongly urged North Korea to take immediate action for a prompt and peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue. Prime Minister Koizumi reiterated that Japan-DPRK normalization should promote not only bilateral relations with North Korea, but also contribute to peace and stability of the region. In this regard, Prime Minister Koizumi stressed that Japan-North Korea normalization talks would not be concluded without full compliance with the Pyongyang Declaration between Japan and North Korea, in particular with regard to the security issues, including the nuclear issue, and abduction issues. President Bush reiterated his February statement in South Korea that the United States has no intention of invading North Korea as well as the fact that he had been prepared to pursue a bold approach to transforming U.S.-DPRK relations.

The three leaders noted the potential for North Korea to benefit from greater participation as a member of the international community. However, the three leaders agreed that North Korea's relations with the international community now rest on North Korea's prompt and visible actions to dismantle its program to produce highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons.

With a view to contributing to regional as well as international peace and stability, the three leaders reaffirmed that continued close consultations and trilateral coordination remain vital to the success of their efforts towards North Korea.

## APEC

### **Text: APEC Leaders Urge N. Korea To End Nuclear Weapons Program**

27 October 2002

APEC leaders issued the following statement during their meetings in Los Cabos, Mexico October 27:

#### APEC Leaders' Statement on North Korea

We note the potential for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to benefit economically from greater participation as a member of the Asia Pacific community. Such a prospect will rest upon a nuclear weapons-free status on the Korean Peninsula. We reiterate our continued support for the nuclear non-proliferation regime. We uphold that a nuclear weapons-free Korean Peninsula is important to the peace and stability of the Peninsula and Northeast Asia, and is also in the interests of all members of the region. We call upon the DPRK to visibly honor its commitment to give up nuclear weapons programs and reaffirm our commitment to ensure a peaceful resolution of this issue.

## US State Department

### **Joint statement by the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group**

Released in Tokyo, Japan on November 9, 2002

"The delegations of Japan, the United States of America and the Republic of Korea, headed respectively by Director-General of Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau Hitoshi Tanaka, Assistant Secretary of State for East

Asian and Pacific Affairs James A. Kelly, and Deputy Foreign Minister, Ambassador Lee Tae-sik, held this year's fifth Japan-U.S.-Republic of Korea Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group meeting in Tokyo on November 9.

The three delegations reconfirmed that North Korea's program to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons is a violation of the Agreed Framework, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, North Korea's International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards agreement, and the South-North Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The three delegations once again called upon North Korea to dismantle this program in a prompt and verifiable manner.

The three delegations, recalling the Joint U.S.-Japan-Republic of Korea Trilateral Statement issued at the recent Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Leaders meeting, reaffirmed their commitment to seek to resolve this matter peacefully in close consultation trilaterally and with other concerned nations around the globe. In this regard, they discussed the range of options available to them collectively in their diplomatic efforts, and welcomed numerous strong statements by the international community calling on North Korea to end its nuclear weapons programs and abide by its international commitments.

The three delegations reaffirmed that South-North and Japan-Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea dialogues serve as important channels to resolve bilateral concerns and to call upon North Korea to respond quickly and visibly to the international community's demands for a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. As stated in the Joint U.S.-Japan-Republic of Korea Trilateral Statement, North Korea can benefit from greater participation as a member of the international community, but that participation rests on North Korea's prompt and verifiable dismantling of its nuclear weapons programs.

Finally, the three delegations reiterated that continued close consultations and trilateral coordination remain vital to the success of their individual efforts and agreed to hold the next round of trilateral consultations in the near future to further coordinate their respective policies toward North Korea."

## KEDO

### **KEDO Executive Board Meeting Concludes - November 14, 2002**

KEDO's Executive Board members, the European Union, Japan, Republic of Korea, and the United States, concluded their meeting by issuing the following statement:

The Executive Board of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) met today in New York to discuss the implications of North Korea's acknowledgement that it is pursuing a program to produce highly-enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. The Executive Board, consisting of the United States, the Republic of Korea, Japan, and the European Union, agreed on the following:

- To condemn North Korea's pursuit of a nuclear weapons program, which is a clear and serious violation of its obligations under the Agreed Framework, the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), its IAEA Safeguards Agreement, and the Joint South-North Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
- North Korea's nuclear weapons program is a shared challenge to all responsible states.
- This program threatens regional and international security and undermines the international nonproliferation regime based on the NPT.
- North Korea must promptly eliminate its nuclear weapons program in a visible and verifiable manner.
- South-North Korea, Japan-North Korea, and EU-North Korea dialogues serve as important channels to resolve bilateral and international concerns and to call upon North Korea to visibly and quickly honor its commitment to give up its nuclear weapons program. North Korea's future relations and interaction with KEDO and the members of its Executive Board hinge on the complete and permanent elimination of its nuclear weapons program.
- Heavy fuel oil deliveries will be suspended beginning with the December shipment. Future shipments will depend on North Korea's concrete and credible actions to dismantle completely its highly-enriched uranium program. In this light, other KEDO activities with North Korea will be reviewed.
- The Executive Board will continue to consult on next steps with regard to future activities of KEDO.

## Disarmament Diplomacy

**'Time to Decide Who Is to Blame for the Collapse': North Korean Statement on Agreed Framework**  
*Statement by the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), November 21.*

Note: the Foreign Ministry statement was issued in response to the November 14 decision by the Executive Board of the Korean Peninsular Energy Development Corporation (KEDO) to suspend shipments of heavy oil to North Korea in protest at Pyongyang's apparent admission of a clandestine uranium-enrichment programme. See Disarmament Documentation, November 2002, for the text of the November 14 KEDO announcement.

The decision [by KEDO] is a wanton violation of article 1 of the [1994 Agreed] Framework [AF] which stipulates that the United States of America, representing the Korean Energy Development Organization in accordance with the October 20, 1994, guarantee message of the US President, shall adopt a measure to make for the loss of energy in return for the freezing of the graphite moderated reactors and their related facilities of the DPRK till the completion of light water reactor [LWR] no. 1 and it shall supply heavy oil for the use of heat and electricity production as alternative energy.

The above-mentioned article is the only one of the four articles of the framework that has been observed.

With a view to playing down the responsibility for breaking its international commitment, the US described the decision as "collective will" of KEDO member nations. It is as clear as noonday that in actuality the US Government made a decision to stop supplying heavy oil before forcing it upon KEDO, which is not a signatory of the framework.

In making public the decision the US claimed that the DPRK violated the framework first.

Now that the US unilaterally gave up its last commitment under the framework, the DPRK acknowledges that it is high time to decide upon who is to blame for the collapse of the framework. It is well known to the world that the US has violated the framework and boycotted the implementation of its commitments. The US has drastically delayed the construction of LWRs, worked out a plan for a preemptive nuclear attack on the DPRK and listed the latter as part of an "axis of evil." It is also well known to the world that the US has so far threatened the DPRK by incessantly staging large-scale nuclear war exercises of various types against the DPRK, a variant of the "Team Spirit" war exercise, in South Korea and its vicinity.

The US hard-line policy to stifle the DPRK fully betrayed its true colors in the wake of the Bush administration's listing the DPRK as part of an "axis of evil" and announcement of its plan for a preemptive nuclear attack on the DPRK. The US outcries for disarming the DPRK are, in essence, little short of calling upon the DPRK to abandon its system. This was more clearly evidenced by the statement of the US President issued on November 15.

The US gravely insulted the spirit of the UN Charter by listing a UN member nation as part of an "axis of evil", to say nothing of the agreed framework. It also wantonly transgressed the basic spirit of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty by singling out nuclear-free states as the targets of its preemptive nuclear attack.

The DPRK has exercised its forbearance to the full.

With a view to keeping the AF from being derailed at any cost the DPRK proposed the US for concluding a non-aggression treaty between the DPRK and the US as a way of settling the nuclear issue on October 25. The DPRK proposal for concluding a non-aggression treaty is, in essence, the only realistic solution to the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula as it is aimed to settle the issues caused by the threat from the US by the way of removing it. The US President and all other authorities said that the US has no intention to invade the DPRK. So, if they are sincere in their remarks, there is no reason whatsoever for them not to give legal assurances of non-aggression to the DPRK. But the US responded to the DPRK proposal for concluding a non-aggression treaty with a decision to stop supplying heavy oil to the DPRK.

The US assertion that the DPRK violated the framework is a burglary logic of America-style superpower chauvinism that a big country may threaten a small country as it wishes but a small country should not try to cope with such threat.

The US is seriously mistaken if it thinks this logic will work on the Korean Peninsula.

## IAEA

### **IAEA Board of Governors Adopts Resolution on Safeguards in the DPRK**

29 November 2002

The IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution on the implementation of IAEA safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) at its meetings in Vienna 29 November 2002. The [Board](#) is the 35-member policymaking body of the Agency.

Full text of the resolution:

The Board of Governors,

- a. *Recalling* its resolutions GOV/2636, GOV/2639, GOV/2645, GOV/2692, GOV/2711 and GOV/2742, and General Conference resolutions GC(XXXVII)RES/624, GC(XXXVIII)RES/16, GC(39)RES/3, GC(40)RES/4, GC(41)RES/22, GC(42)RES/2, GC(43)RES/3, GC(44)RES/26, GC(45)RES/16, and GC(46)RES/14,
- b. *Noting* that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and reaffirming that the IAEA-DPRK safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/403) under the NPT remains binding and in force,
- c. *Recalling further* resolution 825 (1993) adopted by the Security Council of the United Nations on 11 May 1993 and 31 March 1994, 30 May 1994 and 4 November 1994 statements by the President of the United Nations Security Council, particularly the request to take all steps the Agency deems necessary to verify full compliance by the DPRK with its safeguards agreement with the Agency,
- d. *Noting with extreme concern* recent reports of an unsafeguarded DPRK uranium enrichment programme, and the DPRK statement of 25 October 2002 that it is "entitled to possess not only nuclear weapons but any type of weapon more powerful than that,"
- e. *Mindful* of the indispensable role of the IAEA in continuing to monitor the freeze on nuclear facilities in the DPRK as requested by the Security Council,
- f. *Recognizing* the importance to the international community of maintaining peace, stability, and the nuclear weapons-free status of the Korean Peninsula, and declaring its readiness to promote a peaceful resolution of the DPRK nuclear issue,
- g. *Noting* that the IAEA Secretariat has sent two letters (17 and 18 October 2002) to the authorities of the DPRK, asking them to cooperate with the Agency and seeking clarification of reported information about a programme to enrich uranium,
- h. *Having considered* the report of the Director General at its meeting of 28 November 2002,
  1. *Reiterates* its previous calls to the DPRK to comply fully and promptly with its safeguards agreement and to co-operate fully with the Agency to that end;
  2. *Endorses* the statement by the Director General on 17 October 2002 in which he expressed "deep concern" regarding reported information that the DPRK has a programme to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons, and the action taken by the Director General to seek information from the DPRK on any such activity;
  3. *Insists* that the DPRK urgently and constructively respond to letters from the IAEA Secretariat requesting clarification of the reported uranium enrichment programme;
  4. *Calls upon* the DPRK to accept without delay the proposal of the Director General to despatch a senior team to the DPRK, or to receive a DPRK team in Vienna, to clarify the aforementioned uranium enrichment programme;
  5. *Recognises* that such a programme, or any other covert nuclear activities, would constitute a violation of the DPRK's international commitments, including the DPRK's safeguards agreement with the Agency pursuant to the NPT;
  6. *Deplores* the DPRK's repeated public statements that it is entitled to possess nuclear weapons, which runs contrary to its obligations under the NPT not to develop or possess nuclear weapons;
  7. *Urges* the DPRK to provide to the Agency all relevant information concerning the reported uranium enrichment programme, and other relevant nuclear fuel cycle facilities;
  8. *Urges* the DPRK to cooperate with the Agency with a view to opening immediately all relevant facilities to IAEA inspection and safeguards, as required under its comprehensive safeguards agreement;
  9. *Urges* the DPRK to give up any nuclear weapons programme, expeditiously and in a verifiable manner;
  10. *Requests* the Director General to transmit this resolution to the DPRK, to continue dialogue with the DPRK with a view toward urgent resolution of the issues above, and to report again to the Board of Governors on the matter at its next meeting or when deemed necessary; and
  11. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

Pyongyang Times

### **DPRK to lift nuclear freeze and resume nuclear development**

12 December 2002

A spokesman for the DPRK Foreign Ministry published a statement on December 12 in connection with the suspension of fuel oil supply to the DPRK.

The following is its full text:

The United States, in the wake of the announcement on November 14 of its decision to suspend the supply of heavy oil to the DPRK, a US commitment subject to the DPRK-US Agreed Framework, stopped the shipment of heavy oil from December.

Thus, the US commitment to the supply of heavy oil pursuant to the Agreed Framework has been abandoned not only by words, but by action.

The US is trying to create an atmosphere necessary for making its renouncement of heavy oil supply look justified by claiming that the DPRK violated the AF first by "admitting the nuclear development programme". But it is a foolish attempt.

The US is entirely responsible for violating both the spirit and articles of the AF by labelling the DPRK as part of an "axis of evil" and listing it as a target of preemptive nuclear strike.

The US single assertion about the "DPRK's admission of the nuclear development programme" is the phrase the US presidential envoy coined on his own after visiting Pyongyang in early October. There is no need to give detailed accounts of it.

The DPRK government is consistent in settling the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula in a peaceful way.

From this point of view, the DPRK has exhibited great self-control and patience even in the face of the current worst situation when the Agreed Framework has been brought to a rupture by the US and the US nuclear threat has become a reality.

Nevertheless, the United States took a hasty measure to suspend the provision of heavy oil first and is putting increasing pressure on the DPRK to give up the nuclear development programme in the way that makes the verification possible. This is an explicit expression of the US attempt to disarm the DPRK by the use of force and destroy Korean socialism.

The supply of fuel oil to the DPRK is neither aid nor cooperation, but is the commitment the US must honour to make up for the power loss the DPRK suffers by freezing its nuclear power plants that were in operation or under construction.

The US refusal of undertaking such an obligation has produced a vacuum in the DPRK's power generation.

The government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, under the present grave situation, is compelled to lift the nuclear freeze it had undertaken on condition that it will be supplied with 500,000 tons of heavy oil on a year-to-year basis in line with the DPRK-US Agreed Framework and immediately restart the operation and construction of nuclear facilities needed for power output.

The re-freeze of nuclear facilities by the DPRK is up to the US.

### Pyongyang Times

#### **IAEA urged to call inspectors back**

27 December 2002

Ri Je Son, director general of the General Department of Atomic Energy, sent a letter on December 27, 2002, to Mohamed El Baradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Referring to the lifting of the freeze on the DPRK's nuclear facilities that he notified in his December 14, 2002 letter, and the follow-up measures, he said:

"The DPRK government decided to lift the freeze on nuclear facilities it was obliged by the DPRK-US Agreed Framework on condition that the US delivers 500,000 tons of heavy oil to the DPRK each year and immediately resume the operation and construction of nuclear facilities necessary for power generation, as a response to the dubbing of DPRK as part of an "axis of evil" by the US, listing it as a target of preemptive nuclear strike and bringing the AF to a rupture by suspending the delivery of heavy oil.

As a result, the DPRK's reactor projects so far suspended will be completed, and as part of its preparations to secure a number of spent fuel rods to be replaced during the operation of the reactors, the radiochemical laboratory will resume operation.

Arrangements for the running of the radiochemical laboratory will soon be completed. With the lifting of freeze on nuclear facilities, the mission of the IAEA inspectors who have been staying in Nyongbyon to monitor the freeze on nuclear facilities pursuant to the DPRK-US Agreed Framework will end automatically.

Paragraph 3a of Article 1 of the DPRK-US Agreed Framework reads: "The freeze on the DPRK's graphite-



moderated reactors and related facilities will be fully implemented within one month of the date of this document. During this one-month period, and throughout the freeze, the International Atomic Energy Agency will be allowed to monitor this freeze, and the DPRK will provide full cooperation to the IAEA for this purpose."

The stay of IAEA inspectors does not accord with the above-mentioned agreement. As they have no justification to stay longer the DPRK government decided to send them out."

## IAEA

### **IAEA Board of Governors Adopts Resolution on Safeguards in North Korea**

6 January 2003

The IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution on the implementation of IAEA safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) 6 January 2003. The Board -- the 35-member policymaking body of the Agency -- took the action after consideration of a report from IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei.

#### **Full text of the resolution:**

The Board of Governors,

- a. **Recalling** its resolutions GOV/2636, GOV/2639, GOV/2645, GOV/2692, GOV/2711 and GOV/2742 and General Conference resolutions GC(XXXVII)RES/624, GC(XXXVIII)RES/16, GC(39)RES/3, GC(40)RES/4, GC(41)RES/22, GC(42)RES/2, GC(43)RES/3, GC(44)RES/26, GC(45)RES/16 and GC(46)RES/14,
- b. **Recalling** also its resolution GOV/2002/60 of 29 November 2002, and noting that there has been no positive response by the DPRK to that resolution or to the efforts of the Director General pursuant to it,
- c. **Noting** that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and **reaffirming** that the IAEA-DPRK safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/403) under the NPT remains binding and in force, and that both the IAEA and DPRK have an obligation to co-operate to facilitate the implementation of the safeguards provided for in that agreement;
- d. **Noting with grave concern** the report of the Director General on the Implementation of Safeguards in the DPRK (GOV/2002/62), particularly the statement that the Agency is at present unable to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material in the DPRK, and
- e. **Having considered** the report of the Director General at its meeting of 6 January 2003,
  1. **Takes note** of the Director General's report and expresses support for the efforts of the Director General and the Secretariat to implement safeguards in the DPRK in accordance with the safeguards agreement;
  2. **Reiterates** its previous calls to the DPRK to comply promptly and fully with its safeguards agreement, which remains binding and in force;
  3. **Stresses** its desire for a peaceful resolution of this issue, including its support for efforts to promote through diplomatic means the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula;
  4. **Deplores in the strongest terms** DPRK's unilateral acts to remove and impede the functioning of containment and surveillance equipment at its nuclear facilities and the nuclear material contained therein, including the expulsion of IAEA inspectors, which renders the Agency unable to verify, pursuant to its safeguards agreement with the DPRK, that there has been no diversion of nuclear material in the DPRK;
  5. **Considers** that the DPRK's actions are of great non-proliferation concern and make the Agency unable at present to verify that all nuclear material in the DPRK is declared and submitted to Agency safeguards;
  6. **Calls upon** the DPRK to co-operate urgently and fully with the Agency:
    - i. by allowing the re-establishment of the required containment and surveillance measures at its nuclear facilities and the full implementation of all the required safeguards measures at all times including the return of IAEA inspectors;
    - ii. by complying with the Board's resolution of 29 November 2002 (GOV/2002/60) and the Secretariat's letters seeking clarification of its reported uranium enrichment programme, as well as by giving up any nuclear weapons programme expeditiously and in a verifiable manner;

- iii. by enabling the Agency to verify that all nuclear material in the DPRK is declared and is subject to safeguards; and
- iv. by meeting immediately, as a first step, with IAEA officials;
7. ***Affirms*** that unless the DPRK takes all necessary steps to allow the Agency to implement all the required safeguards measures, the DPRK will be in further non-compliance with its safeguards agreement;
8. ***Requests*** the Director General to transmit the Board's resolution to the DPRK, to continue to pursue urgently all efforts with the aim of DPRK coming into full compliance with its safeguards obligations, and to report again to the Board of Governors as a matter of urgency; and
9. ***Decides*** to remain seized of the matter.

#### Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group

#### **Joint Statement by the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group**

Washington, D.C. – 7 January 2003

"The delegations of the United States of America, the Republic of Korea, and Japan, headed respectively by Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James A. Kelly, Deputy Foreign Minister Lee Tae-Sik, and Director-General of Asian and Oceanian Affairs Mitoji Yabunaka, held this year's first Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) meeting, in Washington, D.C., on January 7, 2003.

The three delegations called upon North Korea to eliminate its nuclear weapons program, which constitutes a violation of its international commitments. They reiterated their intention to pursue a peaceful and diplomatic resolution of the issue. They stressed that North Korea's relations with the entire international community hinge on its taking prompt and verifiable action to completely dismantle its nuclear weapons program and come into full compliance with its international nuclear commitments.

The three delegations expressed serious concern over the recent steps taken by North Korea to lift its nuclear freeze and called upon North Korea to undo these measures and not take any precipitous action. The three delegations expressed strong support for the resolution adopted on January 6 by the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors, which calls upon North Korea to cooperate urgently and fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency to comply with its Safeguards Agreement under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. They noted that the unanimous passage of the resolution underscores the broad international consensus that the North Korean actions are unacceptable.

The three delegations stressed that there is no security rationale for North Korea to possess nuclear weapons. The U.S. delegation reiterated President Bush's statement that the United States poses no threat and has no intention of invading North Korea. The Republic of Korea and Japanese delegations renewed their strong welcome for the statement. The three delegations reaffirmed the importance of implementation of the Basic Agreement between South and North Korea on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation and the Joint South-North Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, both of which are premised on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Reiterating that North Korea's relations with the international community depend on its verifiably ending its nuclear weapons program, the three delegations expressed their continued support for South-North dialogue and Japan-North Korea dialogue, based on the June 2000 Joint South-North Declaration and the Pyongyang Declaration, respectively. Such dialogues serve as important channels to resolve issues of bilateral concern and to call upon North Korea to quickly and visibly respond to the international community's demands for a denuclearized Korean Peninsula, thereby contributing to regional peace and stability. The U.S. delegation explained that the United States is willing to talk to North Korea about how it will meet its obligations to the international community. However, the U.S. delegation stressed that the United States will not provide quid pro quo to North Korea to live up to its existing obligations.

The three delegations stressed that elimination of nuclear weapons programs by North Korea would provide an opportunity to return to a better path leading toward improved relations with the international community, thereby securing peace, prosperity, and security for all the countries of Northeast Asia.

Finally, the three delegations reaffirmed that continued close consultations and coordination among the three countries remain vital in addressing this very serious issue. They agreed to hold the next round of trilateral consultations in the near future to further coordinate their respective policies toward North Korea."

**North Korean statement on withdrawal from nuclear pact**

Friday January 10, 2003

"A dangerous situation where our nation's sovereignty and our state's security are being seriously violated is prevailing on the Korean peninsula due to the US vicious hostile policy toward the DPRK.

The United States instigated the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to adopt another 'resolution' against the DPRK on January 6 in the wake of a similar 'resolution' made on November 29 2002.

Under its manipulation, the IAEA in those 'resolutions' termed the DPRK 'a criminal' and demanded it scrap what the US called a 'nuclear programme' at once by a verifiable way in disregard of the nature of the nuclear issue, a product of the US hostile policy toward the DPRK, and its unique status in which it declared suspension of the effectuation of its withdrawal from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Following the adoption of the latest 'resolution', the IAEA director general issued an ultimatum that the agency would bring the matter to the UN security council to apply sanctions against the DPRK unless it implements the 'resolution' in a few weeks.

This clearly proves that the IAEA still remains a servant and a spokesman for the US, and the NPT is being used as a tool for implementing the US hostile policy towards the DPRK aimed to disarm it and destroy its system by force.

A particular mention should be made of the fact that the IAEA in the recent 'resolution' kept mum about the US which has grossly violated the NPT and the DPRK-US Agreed Framework, but urged the DPRK, the victim, to unconditionally accept the US demand for disarmament and forfeit its right to self-defence, and the agency was praised by the US for 'saying all what the US wanted to do'.

This glaringly reveals the falsehood and hypocrisy of the signboard of impartiality the IAEA put up.

The DPRK government vehemently rejects and denounces this 'resolution' of the IAEA, considering it as a grave encroachment upon our country's sovereignty and the dignity of the nation.

It is none other than the US which wrecks peace and security on the Korean peninsula and drives the situation there to an extremely dangerous phase.

After the appearance of the Bush administration, the United States listed the DPRK as part of an 'axis of evil', adopting it as a national policy to oppose its system, and singled it out as a target of pre-emptive nuclear attack, openly declaring a nuclear war.

Systematically violating the DPRK-US Agreed Framework, the US brought up another 'nuclear suspicion' and stopped the supply of heavy oil, reducing the AF to a dead document.

It also answered the DPRK's sincere proposal for the conclusion of the DPRK-US non-aggression treaty and its patient efforts for negotiations with such threats as 'blockade' and 'military' punishment' and with such an arrogant attitude as blustering that it may talk but negotiations are impossible.

The US went so far to instigate the IAEA to internationalise its moves to stifle the DPRK, putting its declaration of a war into practice.

This has eliminated the last possibility of solving the nuclear issue of the Korean peninsula in a peaceful and fair way.

It was due to such nuclear war moves of the US against the DPRK and the partiality of the IAEA that the DPRK was compelled to declare its withdrawal from the NPT in March 1993 when a touch-and-go situation was created on the Korean peninsula.

As it has become clear once again that the US persistently seeks to stifle the DPRK at any cost and the IAEA is used as a tool for executing the US hostile policy towards the DPRK, we can no longer remain bound to the NPT, allowing the country's security and the dignity of our nation to be infringed upon.

Under the grave situation where our state's supreme interests are most seriously threatened, the DPRK government adopts the following decisions to protect the sovereignty of the country and the nation and their right to existence and dignity:

Firstly, the DPRK government declares an automatic and immediate effectuation of its withdrawal from the NPT, on which 'it unilaterally announced a moratorium as long as it deemed necessary' according to the June 11 1993 DPRK-US joint statement, now that the US has unilaterally abandoned its commitments to stop nuclear threat and renounce hostility towards the DPRK in line with the same statement.

Secondly, it declares that the DPRK withdrawing from the NPT is totally free from the binding force of the Safeguards Accord with the IAEA under its Article 3.

The withdrawal from the NPT is a legitimate self-defensive measure taken against the US moves to stifle the DPRK and the unreasonable behaviour of the IAEA following the US. "Though we pull out of the NPT, we

have no intention to produce nuclear weapons and our nuclear activities at this stage will be confined only to peaceful purposes such as the production of electricity.

If the US drops its hostile policy to stifle the DPRK and stops its nuclear threat to the DPRK, the DPRK may prove through a separate verification between the DPRK and the US that it does not make any nuclear weapon.

The United States and the IAEA will never evade their responsibilities for compelling the DPRK to withdraw from the NPT, by ignoring the DPRK'S last efforts to seek a peaceful settlement of the nuclear issue through negotiations.”

#### Congressional Research Service

Het rapport ‘North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program’ (16 pagina’s), een Issue Brief voor het Amerikaanse Congress, geschreven Larry A. Nicksch van de Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division van de Congressional Research Service is te vinden op: <http://fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/IB91141.pdf>

## **STRATEGISCHE DOCTRINE**

Zie voor informatie hierover: [www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/doctrine/index.html](http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/doctrine/index.html)

## **BIOLOGISCHE WAPENS**

Zie voor informatie hierover: [www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/bw/index.html](http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/bw/index.html)

## **CHEMISCHE WAPENS**

Zie voor informatie hierover: [www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/cw/index.html](http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/cw/index.html)

## **DRAAGSYSTEMEN**

[Federation of American Scientists](#)

([www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/missile/overview.html](http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/missile/overview.html))

### **North Korea**

While the No-dong missile has been deployed in North Korea, Iran and Pakistan, to date there is no public evidence to suggest that either Taep'o-dong-1 or -2, North Korea's only strategic ballistic missiles, have been deployed or are being prepared for deployment. However, this does not preclude the possibility that the Taep'o-dong type ballistic missile could be deployed in limited numbers at some future point. What remains in doubt is whether these launch vehicles were intended to be used as strategic weapons at all. The configuration of the missiles suggests that they were designed for use not as weapons, but simply for space flight. Furthermore, the inability of the launch infrastructure to support anything other than limited operations under non-winter weather conditions indicates that North Korea has not seriously contemplated deploying the Taep'o-dong as an offensive weapon system. This brings into serious question whether more has been read into this program that can be legitimately justified.

Both North Korea and Iran seem to be using the "building block approach," by developing space boosters that could be reengineered and deployed as ballistic missiles. This approach could allow North Korea and Iran to possess a Limited Range ICBM within the next five or ten years, while retaining the option to develop a Full Range ICBM, without initially committing to such a course. In general, the performance attributed to the various missile systems appear to far exceed the performance that would be seen under real-world conditions while carrying a legitimate strategic lethal payload mass, which would not be sufficient to reach the continental United States. However, they present a legitimate lethal threat to the Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and much of Africa.

It remains to be seen what these missiles are aimed at in terms of both strategy and geopolitical policy. It seems that the building block approach is intended allow these countries to develop the technological and managerial infrastructure of their scientific and industrial base that they do not have now, but which are necessary for the development of a Full Range ICBM in the next 10-15 years. Furthermore, recent strategic arms reductions and the collapse of the former Soviet Union have made available to countries like North Korea and Iran a pool of highly technically skilled individuals that can help to make that leap possible. Ongoing strategic arms reduction discussions should take into account the employment of these personnel in an effort to prevent them from contributing to the further spread of strategic missile technology simply by attempting to continue their life's work.

For many years, there has been a lack of understanding of the origin of the North Korean strategic ballistic missile program. Equally absent from public discussion about the Missile Technology Control Regime is the assistance that Iran has provided to the North Korean strategic ballistic missile program and North Korea's contribution to Iran's strategic ballistic missile program. Understanding the historical context of the relationship between Iran and North Korea will enhance the understanding of this potential strategic threat to the world. Understanding the impact of the Gorbachev era Soviet missile technology transfer to North Korea because of strategic arms reductions and its meaning to the Missile Technology Control regime (MTCR) and its impact globally can not be understated. This understanding is essential because of its implications in strategic arms control. In order to understand the true strategic threat requires a reasonable technical understanding of strategic systems and their historical and technical heritage. What follows is a discussion of what can be gleaned from the public intelligence on these various strategic issues.

## **NEDERLANDS BELEID**

**Het aanknopen van diplomatieke betrekkingen met de Democratische Volksrepubliek Korea (Noord-Korea)**

Brief van de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken aan de Tweede Kamer

23 januari 2001

Tijdens de ASEM-top van 19 en 20 oktober 2000 in Seoel besloten een aantal EU-lidstaten, waaronder Nederland, in te gaan op het verzoek van de Democratische Volksrepubliek Korea (Noord-Korea) om diplomatieke betrekkingen aan te knopen met dat land (zie mijn brief DAO-1029 d.d. 6 november 2000). Directe aanleiding vormde de in juni 2000 in gang gezette verbetering in de betrekkingen tussen Zuid- en Noord-Korea. De ministerraad heeft op 10 november jl. ingestemd met dit besluit.

Op 20 december 2000 en 15 januari 2001 zijn in Den Haag op het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken besprekingen gevoerd tussen Nederland en Noord-Korea. Deze onderhandelingen werden in nauwe afstemming met EU-partners voorbereid.

Nederland heeft tijdens de besprekingen de hoop uitgesproken dat de diplomatieke betrekkingen en de daaruit voortvloeiende contacten de integratie van Noord-Korea in de internationale rechtsorde en de wereldeconomie zullen helpen bevorderen. Van Nederlandse zijde is bij deze gelegenheid aangegeven het diplomatieke kanaal o.a te willen benutten om over een aantal punten van zorg van gedachten te wisselen, te weten raket- en nucleaire proliferatie, de veiligheidsproblematiek op het Koreaanse schiereiland, de zorgelijke situatie van de mensenrechten, de beperkte toegang van hulporganisaties tot noodgebieden en het uitblijven van politieke en economische hervormingen. De Noord-Koreaanse delegatie heeft hiermee ingestemd.

Noord-Koreaanse zijde zegde voorts haar medewerking toe inzake twee bilaterale kwesties. Het betreft hier een Nederlands verzoek om opheldering over het lot van vijf ongeborgene gevallen uit de Koreaanse oorlog en de kwestie van de uitstaande commerciële schuld van Noord-Korea van 44 miljoen gulden, daterend uit de jaren zeventig.

Op 15 januari jl. is door beide partijen een Memorandum van Overeenkomst getekend. Hierin is vastgelegd dat de betrekkingen zullen worden behartigd door medeaccreditatie op ambassadeursniveau. Nederland zal zijn ambassadeur in Seoel medeaccrediteren in Pyongyang, Noord-Korea zijn ambassadeur in Stockholm in Den Haag. De modaliteiten van accreditatie kunnen met wederzijds goedvinden worden gewijzigd.

De opening van een Nederlandse ambassade te Pyongyang is op dit moment niet aan de orde. De keuze voor Seoel als plaats van medeaccreditatie is politiek: hiermee wil Nederland benadrukken dat de beslissing om diplomatieke betrekkingen aan te knopen is genomen ter ondersteuning en bevordering van het proces van toenadering en ontspanning op het Koreaanse schiereiland. Bovendien heeft de Nederlandse ambassade te Seoel de beste toegang tot informatie over de ontwikkelingen in Noord-Korea.

Noord-Korea heeft overigens ook ingestemd met medeaccreditatie van een diplomaat in Peking, dit om de praktische bezwaren die nu nog aan medeaccreditatie vanuit Seoel kleven te omzeilen. Vanuit Peking is, in tegenstelling tot vanuit Seoel, direct luchtverkeer mogelijk met Pyongyang, terwijl er in die stad ook een Noord-Koreaanse vertegenwoordiging is gevestigd.

Ministeries van Buitenlandse Zaken en van Defensie

**Missile Defense**

Brief van de Ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken en van Defensie aan de Tweede Kamer

5 juli 2001

[...]

**Noord-Korea** heeft het meest uitgebreide rakettenarsenaal en is een belangrijke bron van proliferatie van raketten, raketonderdelen en -technologie. De raketprogramma's van andere risicolanden zijn voor een belangrijk deel hierop gebaseerd. In 1998 lanceerde het land een drietrapsraket die 5600 km. verder in de Stille Oceaan landde (waarschijnlijk een mislukte ruimtelancering). Dit feit gaf de NMD-discussie in de VS een extra duw in de rug. Er wordt vanuit gegaan dat Noord-Korea beschikt over een uitgebreid arsenaal chemische wapens en in elk geval de ingrediënten voor een kernwapen. Noord-Korea weigert reeds sinds vele jaren inspecties door het IAEA van zijn nucleaire installaties toe te staan, ondanks diplomatieke druk. Op

diverse wijzen tracht de internationale gemeenschap druk op Noord-Korea te houden om het land te bewegen wederom IAEA-inspectie toe te staan en een eind te maken aan de proliferatie van raketten en rakettechnologie, alsmede de eigen programma's op het gebied van ballistische raketten en massavernietigingswapens te stoppen.

Sinds 1994 is een tussen de VS en Noord-Korea afgesloten Agreed Framework van toepassing, waarbinnen Noord-Korea afziet van verdere ontwikkeling van een in aanbouw zijnde zwaarwater kernreactor in ruil voor levering van olie en bouw van een tweetal lichtwaterreactoren voor civiel gebruik (die minder proliferatiegevoelig zijn). Ondermeer via de Korean Energy Development Organisation (KEDO), waaraan ook de EU deelneemt, wordt uitvoering gegeven aan het Agreed Framework. De nieuwe Amerikaanse regering heeft het beleid t.a.v. Noord-Korea in de afgelopen maanden aan een evaluatie onderworpen en de uitkomst daarvan lijkt te zijn dat de besprekingen tussen de VS en Noord-Korea weer zullen worden hervat. Wel heeft de VS aangegeven dat een zwaar accent zal worden gelegd op verificatie van eventueel te maken en gemaakte afspraken. De EU heeft eerder dit jaar besprekingen met Noord-Korea gevoerd, waarbij door President Kim Jung-II is gesteld dat Noord-Korea zich zal houden aan het eigen moratorium op rakettesten, maar dat het om economische redenen niet kan afzien van export van raketten en rakettechnologie.

[...]

#### Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

#### **Antwoord van de heer Van Aartsen, Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, op vragen van het lid Koenders over Transatlantische Betrekkingen**

19 maart 2002

[...] Noord-Korea heeft een uitgebreid rakettenarsenaal en is een belangrijke bron van proliferatie van raketten, raketonderdelen en -technologie. De raketprogramma's van andere risicolanden zijn voor een belangrijk deel hierop gebaseerd. Er wordt vanuit gegaan dat Noord-Korea beschikt over een groot arsenaal chemische wapens en over ingrediënten voor kernwapens.

De internationale gemeenschap tracht Noord-Korea te bewegen wederom IAEA-inspecties toe te staan en een eind te maken aan de proliferatie van raketten en de eigen programma's op het gebied van ballistische raketten en massavernietigingswapens.

Tussen de VS en Noord-Korea is sinds 1994 het Agreed Framework van toepassing, waarbinnen Noord-Korea afziet van verdere ontwikkeling van een zwaarwater kernreactor in ruil voor de levering van olie en de bouw van een tweetal lichtwaterreactoren voor civiel gebruik (die minder proliferatiegevoelig zijn). Ondermeer via de "Korean Energy Development Organisation" (KEDO), waaraan ook de EU deelneemt, wordt uitvoering gegeven aan het "Agreed Framework". De Amerikaanse regering heeft het beleid t.a.v. Noord-Korea vorig jaar geëvalueerd. De VS legt een zwaar accent op verificatie van eventueel te maken en gemaakte afspraken. De VS heeft herhaaldelijk aangegeven het toenaderingsbeleid van Zuid-Korea richting Noord Korea te steunen, laatstelijk nog tijdens het bezoek van President Bush aan Seoel. De VS is nog altijd bereid om een dialoog met Noord-Korea te starten.

Ook door de EU en EU-landen zijn besprekingen met Noord-Korea gevoerd, waarbij door President Kim Jung-II is gesteld dat Noord-Korea zich zal houden aan het eigen moratorium op rakettesten, maar dat het om economische redenen niet kan afzien van export van raketten en rakettechnologie. Binnen de EU bestaat consensus over het feit dat de deur moet worden open gehouden door middel van een kritische dialoog, waarbij met name de onderwerpen non-proliferatie en mensenrechten aan de orde worden gesteld. De EU-rol dient ook ter ondersteuning van de Zuid-Koreaanse "sunshine" politiek. Zuid-Korea geeft bij herhaling aan dat het contact tussen de EU en Noord-Korea van belang is om het uitgangspunt van deze politiek, toenadering tussen Noord- en Zuid-Korea, te verwezenlijken. [...]

#### Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

#### **Landenoverzicht Noord-Korea**

Mei 2002

#### **[...] 3.6 Buitenlands beleid en veiligheidsbeleid**

Noord-Korea was het enige communistische land dat redelijk neutraal wist te blijven tijdens het Chinees-Russische conflict, waardoor het van beide landen hulp ontving. De band met de Sovjet-Unie bleef behouden

tot 1990, maar met de Russische Federatie worden nauwelijks betrekkingen onderhouden. Met zijn bezoek (per trein) aan Rusland in de zomer van 2001 heeft Kim Jong-il getracht de banden met Rusland weer aan te halen. Behalve publiciteit heeft deze trip echter niet veel opgeleverd. China is de belangrijkste bondgenoot, geldschieter en handelspartner. China dringt aan op geleidelijke economische hervormingen naar Chinees model, maar koestert weinig illusies over de bereidheid (of mogelijkheid) daartoe van het Noord-Koreaanse bewind. China onderhoudt inmiddels in de praktijk veel betere banden met Zuid-Korea, maar verleent het Noorden in het belang van de stabiliteit op het schiereiland grote hoeveelheden voedselhulp en andere steun. Noord-Korea heeft nog altijd het vijfde leger ter wereld (ca. 1,1 miljoen man) en besteedt 20-25% van het BNP aan defensie.

De houding van Noord-Korea ten opzichte van Zuid-Korea werd de afgelopen decennia gekenmerkt door gewelddadige incidenten en infiltratiepogingen van Noord-Koreaanse zijde. Er bestaan geen diplomatieke betrekkingen tussen de twee landen, maar sinds 1988 neemt de handel toe. De laatste jaren heeft Zuid-Korea voedselhulp verleend en sinds december 1997 wordt opnieuw onderhandeld over een definitieve vredesregeling, waar ook China en de VS aan deelnemen (Vierpartijen-overleg). Dit overleg ligt inmiddels weer stil. In juni 2000 vond in Pyongyang de eerste ontmoeting plaats tussen de leiders van Noord- en Zuid-Korea. Na deze historische ontmoeting heeft een aantal ministeriële bijeenkomsten plaatsgevonden. Op beperkte schaal hebben familieherenigingsontmoetingen plaats gevonden. Toen de Bush administratie minder verzoeningsgezind leek dan President Clinton, heeft Noord-Korea een pas op de plaats gemaakt met de toenadering tot het Zuiden, waar het Amerikaanse leger nog steeds met zo'n 37.000 man gestationeerd is. Eerst in september 2001 vond weer een ministeriële ontmoeting plaats tussen Noord- en Zuid Korea. De toen afgesproken uitwisselingen zijn echter door Noord-Korea weer afgelast. Als excuus werd aangevoerd de verhoogde staat van paraatheid die de regering in Seoul uitriep na de aanslagen van 11 september; deze situatie werd in december weer opgeheven. De tweede ontmoeting in november jl. heeft geen enkel resultaat opgeleverd. In april 2002 bracht een afgezant van de Zuid-Koreaanse president een bezoek aan Pyongyang en had daar ook een ontmoeting met President Kim Jong-il. Dit resulteerde in een aantal nieuwe familieherenigingsbijeenkomsten. Een geplande bijeenkomst van de South North Economic Cooperation Commission begin mei werd door Pyongyang te elfder ure afgezegd. Van Noordkoreaanse zijde wordt steeds geen datum vastgesteld voor het in juni 2000 toegezegde tegenbezoek van Kim Jong-il aan Zuid-Korea.

De Verenigde Staten en Noord-Korea onderhouden geen diplomatieke betrekkingen, contacten lopen via de respectievelijke vertegenwoordigingen bij de VN in New York. Gezien de verdenkingen tegen Noord-Korea als terrorismeland handhaaft de VS een handels- en investeringsboycot. In ruil voor een voorlopig moratorium op proeven met lange-afstandsraketten werden deze sancties eind 1999 verlicht, terwijl in oktober 2000 ook de stagnerende besprekingen over veiligheidsaangelegenheden met de VS weer werden vlotgetrokken. Na het aantreden van de Bush administratie kwam de relatie tussen de VS en Noord-Korea wederom onder grote druk, versterkt door de 11 september aanslagen. President Bush deed openlijk uitspraken Noord-Korea en zijn leider niet te vertrouwen. Dit werd versterkt door de inhoud van de State of the Union (januari 2002) waarin Bush Noord-Korea plaatste in de zgn. Axis of Evil, dat wil zeggen een land dat zelf terrorisme steunt en/of raketten en bijbehoren technologie verkoopt aan landen die zich met terrorisme bezig houden, en bovendien beschikt over massa vernietigingswapens. De retoriek over en weer tussen de twee landen neemt in hevigheid toe. Eind april 2002 heeft Pyongyang Washington laten weten dat een Amerikaanse afgezant welkom is voor nieuwe verkennende besprekingen. In dat kader is een bezoek van Ambassadeur Pritchard in voorbereiding.

In 1994 werd een raamwerkovereenkomst met de VS gesloten, met als doel het stoppen van het Noord-Koreaanse nucleaire wapenprogramma, in ruil voor de bouw van twee lichtwaterreactoren en brandstoflevering door de VS. De zogeheten Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation (KEDO), waarvan naast de VS ook Zuid-Korea, Japan en de EU lid zijn, is belast met de uitvoering van de overeenkomst. Het KEDO project heeft reeds aanzienlijke vertraging opgelopen. Het uitlekken in maart 2002 van het Amerikaanse Nuclear Posture Review, waarin Noord-Korea wordt genoemd als een van de zeven landen, waar een aanval met nucleaire wapens tot de mogelijkheden behoort, had tot gevolg dat Noord-Korea de samenwerking in KEDO-verband opschortte. Inmiddels zijn de contacten weer herstelt.

Noord-Korea is lid van de VN en een groot aantal VN-organisaties en -instellingen. Het gebruikt deze fora tot dusverre voornamelijk om vijandige uitlatingen te doen in de richting van zijn vijanden, maar sinds 1995 ook steeds meer voor verzoeken om voedselhulp. In 2000 dienden Noord- en Zuid-Korea voor het eerst in de geschiedenis een gezamenlijke resolutie in, waarin steun werd gevraagd voor het ontspannings- en toenaderingsproces op het schiereiland. In een poging internationale erkenning en daarmee financiële steun te vergaren tracht Noord-Korea met zoveel mogelijk landen diplomatieke betrekkingen aan te knopen. Eind 1999 werden diplomatieke betrekkingen aangeknoopt met Italië. In 2000 zijn ook de besprekingen met Japan over normalisering van de betrekkingen weer hervat.



In een poging het proces van toenadering en integratie van Noord-Korea in de internationale rechtsorde te ondersteunen heeft een aantal EU-lidstaten w.o. Nederland in oktober 2000 besloten, onderhandelingen aan te gaan over diplomatieke betrekkingen met Noord-Korea. De diplomatieke betrekkingen met het VK werden in december 2000 een feit. Nederland, België, Luxemburg, Spanje en Duitsland zijn in de loop van 2001 gevolgd. Zowel de EU als afzonderlijke lidstaten hebben de afgelopen jaren bijgedragen aan de voedselhulpverlening. Ook zijn de EU-lidstaten via Euratom lid van de KEDO. Sinds 1998 vindt er incidenteel (enkele malen per jaar op verschillende niveaus) een politieke dialoog plaats tussen de EU en Noord-Korea.

#### **4 Nederlandse betrekkingen/beleid**

##### **4.1 Betrekkingen met Nederland**

Nederland is begin 2001 diplomatieke betrekkingen met Noord-Korea aangegaan. Hr.Ms. Ambassadeur in Seoul is medegeaccrediteerd in Pyongyang. De Noord-Koreaanse Ambassadeur met vestigingsplaats Bern is medegeaccrediteerd in Nederland. [...]

# NIEUWS

CNN

## **U.S.: North Korea admits nuke program**

From Andrea Koppel and John King - CNN Washington Bureau  
15 October 2002

WASHINGTON (CNN) --North Korea has revealed to the United States that it has a secret and active nuclear weapons program begun years after it promised to never again to pursue such a course, the White House said late Wednesday.

One senior administration official said Pyongyang made the acknowledgment only after it was confronted with evidence that it has a uranium-based program and enough plutonium for at least two nuclear weapons.

The North's admission prompted urgent consultations among the United States, Japan and South Korea -- the three nations that North Korea had promised under the so-called "agreed framework."

The diplomatic term describes the 1994 agreement under which North Korea said it would no longer seek to develop nuclear weapons.

In exchange, the United States and others agreed to help build two light water nuclear reactors to replace the plutonium-producing reactors Pyongyang was using, The Associated Press reported.

The reactors were being financed mostly by South Korea and Japan. Construction of the reactors began just two months ago.

The agreement also called for inspections to verify that the terms were being adhered to, but so far Pyongyang has blocked all attempts to make such inspections.

North Korea confirmed U.S. suspicions earlier this month during a high-level U.S. visit to Pyongyang, led by James Kelly, assistant secretary of state for Asian affairs.

The senior official said the revelation came in a meeting between Kelly and a top North Korean official, Kang Suk Ju, described as the equivalent of North Korean leader Kim Jong Il's right-hand man. These were the first such high level discussions between the two nations in two years.

The official said Kelly told Kang that the United States knew the country had a secret nuclear weapons program using "different technology" from that used prior to 1994, and that North Korea had saved enough plutonium for at least two nuclear weapons.

The North Korean official then shocked Kelly when he looked at him and said "something to the effect of, 'Your president called us a member of the axis of evil. ... Your troops are deployed on the Korean peninsula. ... Of course, we have a nuclear program,'" according to the senior administration source, who was briefed on the meeting.

"They are in material breach of the agreed framework," said White House spokesman Sean McCormack.

"We seek a peaceful resolution of this situation," McCormack said, according to the AP. "Everyone in the region has a stake in this issue and no peaceful nation wants to see a nuclear-armed North Korea."

"The United States and our allies call on North Korea to comply with its commitments under the nonproliferation treaty and to eliminate its nuclear weapons program in a verifiable manner," he said.

Following North Korea's admission, McCormack said a series of internal administration meetings about how to respond were held, culminating in a National Security Council meeting on the issue Tuesday.

President Bush is scheduled to meet jointly with the prime ministers of Japan and South Korea later this month at the annual Asian Pacific economic summit.

The development means the United States must end efforts to improve relations with North Korea, said State Department spokesman Richard Boucher.

"The United States was prepared to offer economic and political steps to improve the lives of the North Korean people, provided the North were dramatically to alter its behavior across a range of issues, including its weapons of mass destruction programs, development and export of ballistic missiles, threats to its neighbors, support for terrorism, and the deplorable treatment of the North Korean people," Boucher said in a statement.

"In light of our concerns about the North's nuclear weapons program, however, we are unable to pursue this approach."

Another senior administration official said the United States has told North Korea it had "violated" the agreed framework and that the agreement was now "nullified."

Boucher said Pyongyang also has violated the Nonproliferation Treaty, its International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards agreement, and the Joint North-South Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

North Korea told U.S. officials it was no longer bound by the anti-nuclear agreement, U.S. officials who spoke on the condition of anonymity told the AP.

A CIA report in January said that during the second half of last year, North Korea "continued its attempts [to] procure technology worldwide that could have applications in its nuclear program," the AP reported.

"We assess that North Korea has produced enough plutonium for at least one, and possibly two, nuclear weapons," the report said.

Another senior U.S. official told CNN that Washington received intelligence "back over the summer months" indicating that North Korea had a nuclear weapons program involving the use of highly enriched uranium.

The intelligence, the official said, indicated the program was launched in the late 1990s -- several years after North Korea signed the agreement with the United States, Japan and South Korea.

The official said that when Kelly confronted the top North Korean official with information about the nuclear weapons program on October 4, the North Koreans were "belligerent" but did not dispute the U.S. claim and "showed not a hint of remorse."

The administration had already shared some of its intelligence with key congressional committees.

In his State of the Union address earlier this year, Bush referred to North Korea as a member of the "axis of evil," along with Iraq and Iran -- a statement rejected by Pyongyang.

Previously, U.S. fears over North Korea centered on its sale of ballistic missile technology to other countries, including Iran and Syria.

In August 1998, North Korea launched a rocket that flew over Japan. The launch prompted Japan to start work on an anti-missile shield, and the United States agreed to cooperate with the project.

At first, U.S. intelligence agencies told lawmakers in private briefings the North Koreans fired a three-stage ballistic missile. Analysts later concluded the rocket was a failed satellite launch, as North Korea reported at the time.

After months of tension with South Korea, the North resumed high-level talks in August that restarted stalled reconciliation efforts on the Korean peninsula -- divided by the most heavily armed border in the world, the AP reported.

The Koreas were divided following World War II and continued that way at the end of the inconclusive Korean War from 1950 to 1953. The United States still stations about 37,000 troops in South Korea as a deterrent against North Korea, according to the AP.

## White House

### White House Says U.S. Will Work with Allies on North Korea Nuclear Issue

By Wendy S. Ross - Washington File White House Correspondent

18 October 2002

Washington -- White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer October 18 refused comment on a front page report in the New York Times that says United States intelligence officials have concluded that Pakistan was a major supplier of critical equipment for North Korea's newly revealed clandestine nuclear weapons program.

Talking with reporters October 18 on Air Force One as they accompanied President Bush on a domestic trip, Fleischer said "I'm not going to comment specifically about that report. But let me give you this information to be helpful. Since September 11th, we've developed a very different relationship with many of the countries on whom North Korea traditionally relies for technology, economic and diplomatic support. These countries want good and improved relations with the United States, and they have no interest in a nuclearized North Korea. We also have close allies to whom North Korea is turning in desperation for economic health. These nations also want a good relationship with the United States. They, too, don't have an interest in a nuclearized peninsula.

We have alliances that we will work with, through, to talk about these issues and about how to deal with any threats to the region. North Korea depends on outside help to sustain its collapsing economic system and to feed its people. North Korea has an interest to make certain that the regional neighbors don't view North Korean actions with alarm.

So taken together, we have an opportunity to begin to address this problem with an international coalition and we're going to work with our allies and friends and partners on it."

The United States, Fleischer pointed out, "is committed to anti-proliferation and we're going to work hard to make that the case in all regions of the world."

State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher, at his daily press briefing October 18, also refused to comment on news reports about countries alleged to have supplied equipment and technology that helped North Korea develop weapons of mass destruction.

Boucher said he was "not in a position to comment on those (reports) in any fashion, because they attempt to directly define what's in our intelligence reports, and we all know that that's not something we do."

He too said that since September 11th "we've had a lot of support around the world (and a) very different relationship with many of the countries on whom North Korea's traditionally relied for technology, economic support and diplomatic support."

Asked about ongoing meetings in Asia that two high State Department officials are currently holding, Boucher said: "Undersecretary (John) Bolton and Assistant Secretary (James) Kelly are, as you know, on a trip to consult with friends and allies in the region on North Korea's nuclear programs and the international response. The talks they've had in Beijing have been very useful and productive. We've had a long history of cooperation with China on Korean peninsula issues, and both sides intend to continue that.

We think the Chinese government shares our concern about the possible introduction of nuclear weapons into the Korean peninsula. We hope to proceed on the basis of that shared concerns, and we will continue our consultations with China."

Boucher pointed out that President Bush "will be meeting with the Chinese president next week" in Texas.

According to news reports, North Korea admitted two weeks ago to Kelly that it had been violating the 1994 "Agreed Framework" between the United States and North Korea, under which North Korea was to halt all nuclear weapons development, and the United States was to organize an international consortium to finance and construct two nuclear power plants in North Korea and to supply 500,000 metric tons of heavy fuel oil per year while they were being built.

## US State Department

### **Powell and NSC Advisor Rice distinguish between Iraqi, North Korean cases**

By Thomas Eichler - Washington File Staff Writer

20 October 2002

Washington -- A new resolution on disarming Iraq will be presented to the United Nations Security Council "early this week," Secretary of State Colin Powell said Sunday October 20.

Speaking on NBC's Meet the Press, Powell said any resolution on the issue must document Iraqi violations of U.N. resolutions, must establish a "strong new inspection regime" and must talk about the consequences of noncompliance. "If Saddam once again frustrates the inspection regime and makes it clear that he is not going to cooperate, I think that is a matter of the utmost gravity. And the President has said clearly that if in that instance the United Nations will not act, then the United States, with other like-minded nations, will act," Powell said.

Asked whether the United States would press for regime change in Iraq if inspections proceed, Powell said "All we are interested in is getting rid of those weapons of mass destruction. We think the Iraqi people would be a lot better off with a different leader, a different regime, but the principal offense here are weapons of mass destruction, and that's what this resolution is working on. ... If the inspectors do their job and we can satisfy the world community that they are disarmed, that's one path. If we can't satisfy the world community that they are disarmed, that takes us down another path."

Discussing North Korea's recent admission that it is working to build nuclear weapons, Powell pointed out that the North Koreans said they considered the 1994 "Agreed Framework" between North Korea and the United States "nullified." Powell said "When we have an agreement between two parties and one says it's nullified, then it's hard to see what you do with such an agreement." Powell added that this is not just a U.S.-North Korean issue, but also is an issue for Japan, South Korea, China, Russia and many other nations.

Asked whether economic assistance to North Korea would be cut off as a consequence, Powell said "We are now looking at what should be the consequences of their action and we will act step by step after we have had a chance to fully consult with our friends and allies."

Powell pointed out that there will be an opportunity to do this in coming days at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meetings in Mexico, where President Bush will meet with the leaders of Russia, China, South Korea and others.

Asked on ABC's This Week program whether the United States would continue to provide 500,000 tons of fuel oil per year to North Korea as called for under the Agreed Framework, Powell said "We are looking at all of the things that rest on the Agreed Framework to see what is in our interest to keep doing, what is in our interest not to keep doing. We also have to remember that there is a great deal of stored plutonium in a facility on Yongbyon that is monitored by the IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Administration or Agency, as well as Department of Energy employees, and we don't want to see that suddenly become unwatched. So we have to be very careful and move with a certain deliberateness here and in consultation with our friends and allies."

Asked whether there are plans to deal with North Korean weapons in the way being proposed for dealing with those of Iraq, including an invasion if necessary, Powell said "We have no military plans on the table right now for such an invasion of North Korea. They are not identical situations; they are quite different. Saddam Hussein has used weapons of mass destruction against his neighbors. Despite inspections, despite all the containment efforts we have made, he has not moved away from that policy.

"North Korea is a slightly different situation. It's a broken economy without access to resources, the way Saddam Hussein has access to resources. We have different levers we can use with North Korea, quite different than the levers available to us with respect to Iraq." Powell acknowledged that North Korea is "a lot stronger militarily" than is Iraq, but he said North Korea "is sitting on a very rotten base with respect to its economy."

National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, appearing on CBS' Face the Nation, also was asked to compare the Korean and Iraqi situations. "[T]he situations are different," she said, "and we don't want to have a cookie cutter foreign policy here where we assume that the circumstances are always the same. The cases are both very dangerous, and we're concerned about both. But in Iraq, you have a country with which we have tried everything -- 11 years after he [Saddam Hussein] lost a war of aggression in 1991, signed on to a whole bunch of obligations that he has routinely flaunted, where he has thrown out the inspection mechanism that was made available to get to a cease-fire, where he has used ... weapons of mass destruction against his own population and against his neighbors, and where the international community has tried sanctions and limited military force and everything else. Iraq is in a class by itself.

With North Korea, we think we have a chance to make a diplomatic effort work because the North Koreans, unlike the Iraqis who have oil revenues to fuel their programs, the North Koreans have been signaling to everybody that they're in deep economic trouble, that they need to open up to the international economy, they need investment. We think that's a lever that we can use."

#### Washington Post

#### **For North Korea, U.S. Is Violator of Accords**

Mind-Set Helps Explain Pyongyang's Actions

By Doug Struck

Washington Post Foreign Service

Monday, October 21, 2002; Page A18

SEOUL -- This is the view from the other side: North Korea believes the United States has repeatedly broken agreements, harbors ideas of attacking it and inexplicably refuses to even talk to a government that desperately wants better ties.

The mind-set, revealed in North Korea's own statements and studied by specialists on North Korea, perhaps seems incongruous in the United States. But it helps explain what seems like puzzling and irrational behavior by the government in Pyongyang.

Last week, Washington revealed that North Korea had acknowledged it has a program to develop fuel for a nuclear weapon, a brazen violation of a 1994 pact with the United States and other agreements. The news created a diplomatic storm, revived echoes of the near-war in 1994 over the same issue, and may stop cold the movement by the isolated country to get on a better footing with other nations.

According to James A. Kelly, the State Department envoy who conducted the Bush administration's first and short-lived talks in Pyongyang this month, North Korea initially bristled at his accusations that it had violated the 1994 agreement.

North Korea has long seen the United States as the chief violator of the pact. The heart of the agreement -- from North Korea's perspective -- was a promise by the United States to end hostile relations and normalize diplomatic and economic ties.

For years, North Korea has complained bitterly that Washington failed to deliver on that promise. The accusation, while self-serving, has some merit, as is conceded even by officials in the international consortium created under the pact.

"The internal logic of the agreement was that there had to be progress in terms of improved relations," said Charles Kartman, executive director of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), which was set up under the 1994 agreement to build power plants in North Korea.

But instead relations have deteriorated, particularly in the last two years, Kartman said in an interview in New York earlier this year. With that backdrop, North Korea complained that the agreement had failed because of Washington's neglect.

Additionally, the KEDO consortium had agreed under the pact to construct two light-water reactor power plants, from which weapons-grade fuel is difficult to extract, in return for North Korea's promise to suspend production of plutonium at its aging Soviet-built plants.

The first plant was supposed to be delivered in 2003, but is still at least six years from completion because of political controversy over the project in Washington and impediments thrown up by North Korea. The shared responsibility for that delay has not stopped North Korean officials from angrily charging that U.S. breach of promises helped create a drastic energy crisis in the country. They have repeated the charge often -- notwithstanding Washington's delivery of 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil annually under the pact. Frequently, the charge has been accompanied by a warning that North Korea would have to resume producing nuclear power.

North Korea's resumption of work on a nuclear weapon also is consistent with its long-held belief that it is in danger from the United States -- and has no one else on whom to rely for protection.

While the United States sees North Korea as the belligerent threat -- at least to stability in northeast Asia, if not to the United States itself -- North Korea sees just the opposite. It regards the United States as a hostile superpower looking for an opportunity to be rid of the North Korean entity.

North Korea "believes its system and sovereignty are threatened by the United States," said Kartman, who dealt with North Korea during the Clinton administration. "In my negotiations with them, the term 'strangulation' -- economic strangulation, political strangulation -- came up over and over again."

Veteran experts on North Korea say officials there fervently believe that the United States would take military action against it, if other means failed. It may not be a sophisticated view of U.S. priorities. But from isolated Pyongyang, it is supported by plenty of evidence: The United States fought a war against North Korea in 1950-53 and maintains one of its largest contingents of overseas troops massed and ready on the Korean Demilitarized Zone, facing North Korea. It has spy ships, like the USS Pueblo captured by North Korea in 1968, and satellites trained on North Korea.

And the rhetoric from President Bush and his aides -- casting North Korea as part of an "axis of evil" with Iran and Iraq -- feeds North Korean paranoia. When that rhetoric is coupled with U.S. willingness to send troops to remote places, such as Afghanistan, Iraq and the Balkans, the regime sees every reason to believe it is next on the list.

That view was evidenced by two of the three demands apparently made to Kelly when he traveled to Pyongyang. At a news conference here Saturday, Kelly confirmed that North Korea suggested it would negotiate to give up its nuclear program if the United States guaranteed not to make a preemptive attack on North Korea and agreed to recognize the North Korean government.

The third condition was the signing of a peace treaty with North Korea, a long-held goal of North Korea's founder, Kim Il Sung, and his son, the current leader, Kim Jong Il. The father-son dictators realized that the United States holds the key to their country's economic survival. Both have made entreaties -- though sometimes rough and blustery -- to see if they could reach accommodation with Washington without jeopardizing the personality cult that has kept them in power.

North Korea has long been perplexed that the United States has not responded to those entreaties, and has seen that as further evidence of Washington's hostility.

The Clinton administration, belatedly in its term, began to talk seriously with North Korea, and seemed to make rapid progress. North Korea promised to halt the nuclear program it had then, opened a site for U.S. inspection and froze testing of long-range missiles.

The Bush administration took office highly skeptical of those moves, and officials see North Korean violations as evidence they are right. Defenders of the Clinton-era approach say if Bush had followed through on the progress made by his predecessor, North Korea might not now be pursuing a nuclear weapon.

North Korea's actions may be viewed either way, according to Peter Hayes, executive director of the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development, a research organization in Berkeley, Calif. "Did North Korea undertake the [uranium enrichment] in order . . . to use it to force the United States to engage it again after two years of diplomatic neglect?" he said. Or was it "a clandestine attempt to maintain their ultimate

strategic nuclear option in the face of the deteriorating conventional military balance in the Korean Peninsula?"

Japanese analyst Toshimitsu Shigemura, a professor of international relations at Takushoku University, said he believes North Korea was again trying to get the United States to talk.

"North Korea admitted to the program because it wants the United States to come to the negotiating table and set a path to improve relations," he said. "But I think this is a miscalculation. Bush will not come."

Washington Post

### **Powell, Rice Say Withholding N. Korea Information Was Not Political**

By Michael A. Fletcher

Washington Post Staff Writer

Monday, October 21, 2002; Page A18

Two of the Bush administration's top foreign policy officials yesterday vigorously refuted charges that the administration withheld North Korea's admission of a nuclear weapons program from key congressional Democrats to ensure passage of its resolution authorizing war with Iraq.

"Why would we have withheld it because of that?" Secretary of State Colin L. Powell said on "Fox News Sunday." "I mean, I think, if anything, it reinforces our need to respond to these kinds of challenges. And so I think it is not an accurate charge."

National security adviser Condoleezza Rice said that the administration held back news of North Korea's stunning admission only long enough to allow President Bush to receive recommendations from his advisers on the matter. Meanwhile, she said, members of Congress on both sides of the aisle had been receiving briefings for months about U.S. intelligence reports that North Korea had resumed its nuclear weapons program, in violation of a 1994 agreement with the United States and others.

"Well, it's a peculiar notion that the moment that you find out something like this, you need to make it public before the president has had a chance to review his options," Rice said on CBS's "Face the Nation." "There were members of Congress who were briefed prior to this going public. . . . And there were a number of congressional committees and staff that had been briefed over a longer period of time about our suspicions of a highly-enriched uranium program in North Korea."

Late last week, Democrats on Capitol Hill criticized the 12-day gap between the admission by North Korean officials -- made during a meeting with Assistant Secretary of State James A. Kelly -- and the administration's public disclosure. During that time, Congress passed the Iraq resolution, which Bush signed just hours before the administration confirmed the developments in North Korea during a conference call with reporters.

President Bush has refrained from comment on the North Korea developments since news of the admission broke last week. But yesterday Powell and Rice said the administration is pursuing a deliberate, multilateral strategy that includes some of North Korea's closest neighbors -- South Korea, China, Japan and Russia -- to address the budding crisis.

Not only are those countries more directly threatened than the United States by a nuclear-armed North Korea, administration officials said, but also ongoing international efforts to monitor North Korea's stockpiles of plutonium, which can be refined for use in nuclear weapons, must not be disrupted. Also, they said, North Korea's pressing economic needs offer some promising points of diplomatic leverage.

"This is an opportunity for the international community to stand up together and to say to the North Koreans, 'If you have any hope of breaking out of your isolation, your economic isolation, your political isolation, that hope is going to be dashed by continuing to pursue illegal nuclear weapons programs,'" Rice said.

The administration's relatively restrained response to North Korea's acknowledgement that it is pursuing a nuclear weapons program is seen by some critics as inconsistent, given the dire terms it uses to describe the threat posed by Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, who has chemical and biological weapons but is believed to be years away from developing a nuclear bomb.

Speaking on "Face the Nation," Sen. Bob Graham (D-Fla.), chairman of the Intelligence Committee, said the administration may be going too far to play down the threat posed by North Korea.

"If you put the two, North Korea and Iraq, on the scales and ask the question, which today is the greater threat to the people of the United States of America, I would answer the question North Korea," he said. "And I think that needs to be part of the rebalancing of our foreign policy priorities."

New York Times

## **Bush Sees Korean Nuclear Effort as Different From Iraq's**

By Elisabeth Bumiller

22 October 2002

WASHINGTON, Oct. 21 — President Bush said today that the North Korean leader, Kim Jong Il, had to disarm his nation "for the sake of peace," but indicated that he saw a significant difference between North Korea's development of nuclear weapons and Iraq's pursuit of them.

In his first public remarks about North Korea since the White House announced last week that the country was conducting a covert nuclear weapons program, Mr. Bush said he would use diplomatic pressure, not threats of military action, to try to persuade North Korea to dismantle its nuclear efforts.

"It is a troubling discovery, and it's a discovery that we intend to work with our friends to deal with," he told reporters in the Oval Office after a meeting with the NATO secretary general, Lord Robertson. "I believe we can do it peacefully. I look forward to working with people to encourage them that we must convince Kim Jong Il to disarm for the sake of peace."

In contrast, Mr. Bush said he was threatening military action against President Saddam Hussein of Iraq because his case was "unique" in that he had gassed his own people and "thumbed his nose" at United Nations resolutions for more than a decade.

The president's remarks reflected recent comments by Secretary of State Colin L. Powell and Condoleezza Rice, the national security adviser, that Iraq poses a greater threat to the United States, even if it does not yet have nuclear weapons, because of its record of using chemical weapons and its hatred of the United States and its allies.

Nonetheless, Mr. Bush said that he viewed North Korea's admission "very seriously" and that he would work with the leaders of China, Japan, South Korea and Russia at an economic summit meeting of Pacific nations this weekend in Los Cabos, Mexico, to exert pressure on Mr. Kim.

The No. 2 official in North Korea made a public overture to the United States today, saying he was willing to negotiate over the country's nuclear weapons program "if the United States is willing to withdraw its hostile policy toward the North." American officials said they were uncertain how to respond to the overture by Kim Yong Nam, the country's nominal head of state. Mr. Kim made the offer during a meeting in Pyongyang, the North's capital, with a South Korean delegation.

For now, the administration remains embroiled in an internal debate over how and even if the United States should negotiate with North Korea. Hard-liners in the administration argue that the North should be required to dismantle its nuclear program before any talks can begin, but some State Department officials say negotiations will be necessary before the North can be induced to move. The administration is at the same time under growing pressure from Asian allies, which are urging that talks should begin.

A 1994 arms control accord between the United States, its allies and North Korea that might have served as a framework for talks is for all practical purposes dead, and has been ever since the North Koreans admitted to the United States early this month that they were conducting a secret nuclear program. At the same time, North Korea said it had "nullified" the 1994 accord, which provided Western energy aid in exchange for the North's promise to freeze the development of nuclear weapons. Today, senior administration officials said that because the North Koreans had walked away from the accord, the United States had no intention of honoring it.

Similarly, the European Union, which is helping finance the construction of two nuclear reactors in North Korea to generate electricity, promised under the accord, said today that it would almost certainly terminate support of the program.

"It is difficult in present circumstances to see how we can continue with our contributions unless the North Koreans make clear pretty rapidly that they are going to stop their attempts to develop nuclear weapons," Christopher Patten, the European Union's commissioner for external relations, said after a meeting with European foreign ministers.

In Moscow today, John R. Bolton, the under secretary of state for arms control, turned over a dossier of American intelligence on the North's clandestine project. Some American officials have suggested that Russian companies have been among the North's suppliers, though they indicated that the Russians provided less crucial technology than did Pakistan.



After the meeting, the deputy Russian foreign minister, Georgi Mamedov, appeared to put the blame for the showdown with North Korea, at least in part, on the administration's new doctrine of military pre-emption and its inclusion of North Korea as part of an "axis of evil."

"We think that such statements may aggravate the situation and don't facilitate constructive solution of the nonproliferation issues," Mr. Mamedov said.

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung

### **Ein Spiel auf Zeit**

Seoul und Tokio stellen auf zähe Verhandlungen mit Nordkorea ein / Von Anne Schneppen

22. Oktober 2002

TOKIO, 21. Oktober. Nordkorea übt sich in alter Taktik: Eine Gesprächsrunde wird genutzt, um Gesprächsbereitschaft zu signalisieren. Gewonnen wird dabei höchstens ein bißchen Zeit. Während der achten innerkoreanischen Verhandlungen auf Ministerebene in Pjöngjang habe die nordkoreanische Führung die Bereitschaft erkennen lassen, Besorgnisse über ihr Atomwaffenprogramm durch Dialog zu beseitigen, berichteten am Montag südkoreanische Delegationsteilnehmer. Viel Verhandlungsspielraum zeichnet sich jedoch nicht ab. Die Regierungen in Washington, Tokio und Seoul dringen auf eine sofortige Aufgabe des Atomwaffenprogramms.

Die "jüngste Situation" werde ernsthaft geprüft, ließ der zweite Mann des totalitären Regimes, Kim Jong-nam, wissen. "Sollten die Vereinigten Staaten gewillt sein, sich von ihrer ‚feindlichen Politik‘ gegenüber Nordkorea zurückzuziehen, wäre auch der Norden bereit, Sicherheitsbedenken im Dialog auszuräumen." Dies war die erste - öffentlich gewordene - Reaktion aus dem nordkoreanischen Regime, seit die amerikanische Regierung bekanntgeben ließ, Nordkorea habe eingestanden, entgegen den Vereinbarungen aus dem Jahr 1994 ein Atomwaffenprogramm zu unterhalten. Wie so oft blieben die Äußerungen vieldeutig: Die Formulierung "feindliche Politik" durch einen nordkoreanischen Machthaber könnte auch auf die Forderung abzielen, Amerika solle seine 37 000 Soldaten aus Südkorea abziehen. Mit diesem Begehren hatte Pjöngjang schon einige vorangegangene Verhandlungen scheitern lassen.

Vor dem Beginn der innerkoreanischen Gespräche hatte Seoul schon darauf hingewiesen, daß weitere gemeinsame Erörterungen über Familientreffen oder Wirtschaftshilfe wenig ergiebig sein würden, sollte Nordkorea nicht auf die Bedenken wegen des Atomwaffenprogramms eingehen. Darauf reagierte die nordkoreanische Seite zunächst nicht, es hieß nur, man habe den südkoreanischen Unterhändlern "zugehört". Nun hat Kim Jong-nam vage reagiert - und Bedingungen gestellt.

Weniger vage sind derzeit die Formulierungen des amerikanischen Unterhändlers James Kelly. Er forderte ein "sofortiges und sichtbares Ende" des nordkoreanischen Atomprogramms. In Peking, Seoul und in den vergangenen beiden Tagen in Tokio versuchte Kelly, die amerikanische Politik gegenüber Nordkorea abzustimmen. Amerika wolle die Zukunft des Kedo-Projekts in enger Abstimmung mit seinen Verbündeten prüfen, eine Entscheidung, das Projekt aufzukündigen, sei noch nicht gefallen, berichteten japanische Regierungsvertreter.

Was wird aus dem Kedo-Projekt?

Im Rahmen der Kedo-Vereinbarungen sollte Nordkorea zwei Leichtwasser-Atomkraftwerke bekommen, nachdem das Land sich verpflichtet hatte, auf ein eigenes Atomprogramm zu verzichten. Das Projekt wird hauptsächlich von Südkorea und Japan, aber auch mit Beiträgen der Vereinigten Staaten und der Europäischen Union finanziert. Kelly war am Sonntag schon mit dem japanischen Kabinettssekretär Fukuda zusammengetroffen und hatte nach Berichten japanischer Medien einen vorläufigen Baustopp für Kedo erwogen. Am Montag sprach Kelly mit Außenministerin Kawaguchi und Verteidigungsminister Ishiba.

Ohne nordkoreanische Zusagen, das Atomprogramm einzustellen, sei die Aufnahme diplomatischer Beziehungen mit Pjöngjang "unmöglich", sagte der japanische Ministerpräsident Koizumi. Sein Vorgänger Mori wertete den Vertragsbruch Pjöngjangs als abermaligen Beleg dafür, daß dem Regime nicht zu trauen sei. Japan und Nordkorea wollen am 29. Oktober in Kuala Lumpur mit Normalisierungsgesprächen beginnen, doch nach der Atomwaffen-Erkenntnis und den eingestandenen Entführungen ist ohnehin nicht mit einem schnellen Austausch von Botschaftern zu rechnen. Tokio stellt sich auf einen langen Prozeß ein, in enger Abstimmung mit Washington und Seoul. Nach Koizumis Alleingang nach Pjöngjang will die japanische Regierung keine Mißverständnisse aufkommen lassen: Kellys zweiter "Informationsbesuch" innerhalb von

zwei Wochen wurde wohlwollend aufgenommen, auch als Zeichen kooperativer Nähe zum wichtigsten Verbündeten. Der weiche und gegenüber Nordkorea oft versöhnliche Präsident Kim Dae-jung ließ am Montag keinen Zweifel an Südkoreas Bedingungen. Kim forderte den sofortigen Stopp des nordkoreanischen Atomwaffenprogramms und rief zu Wachsamkeit auf.

Mit kleinen Indizien geben Tokio und Seoul derzeit zu erkennen, daß sie prompte Ergebnisse wünschen, sich aber auf lange und zähe Verhandlungen einstellen. Fast beschwichtigend klingt eine Vermutung aus dem Verteidigungsministerium in Seoul: Nordkoreas angereichertes Uran reiche derzeit wahrscheinlich nicht aus, um eine Atombombe herzustellen, hieß es im Verteidigungsausschuß des Parlaments. Nicht nur das Regime in Pjöngjang versucht der Brisanz mit einem Spiel auf Zeit zu begegnen.

## Nautilus

### **"Pyongyang's new strategy of 'Frank Admission'"**

By Jekuk Chang, Ph.D. - 24 October 2002

Nautilus Institute, Berkeley CA - [www.nautilus.org](http://www.nautilus.org)

North Korea has once again stunned the world, this time by suddenly admitting that it has been conducting a secret nuclear weapons program, despite having signed the 1994 Geneva Framework Agreement with the United States. Pyongyang's new strategy of 'frank admission' and Pyongyang's confession of its wrongdoings to visiting US Assistant Secretary, James Kelly, should be viewed as part of a newly adopted strategy of "frank admission" of past wrongs. North Korea surprised the world when it took the opportunity during Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's visit to Pyongyang in September, not only to candidly acknowledge that it had abducted Japanese nationals, but also to inform the world that eight of them had already died. "The Dear Leader," Kim Jong Il, even apologized to Prime Minister Koizumi for what had happened, and promised that it would never happen again. He went on to blame his subordinates, saying that they had committed the crimes without his knowledge.

Despite the rumors, exactly how Kim Jong Il came to make the unprecedented decision to confess is unknown, and will likely remain that way for some time. However, what is clear is that it was indeed a bold decision, and one which could prove very risky for both Kim and his country, as it could bring about his political downfall. Although many analysts are of the view that no faction exists within the ruling clique in North Korea that could topple Kim, his humiliating apology to the "imperialist" Japanese must have caused some frustration within the various power groups. Kim may have thought that there was a greater risk in doing nothing about the worsening economic situation, than in admitting the abductions and apologizing to the Japanese. Nevertheless, Kim's actions imply strongly that he is serious about establishing relations with Japan by clearing away this old stumbling block between the two countries.

Pyongyang's recent admission of its secret nuclear program could pose a similar threat to Kim Jong's North Korea, this time by inducing Washington to regard Pyongyang as it does Iraqi. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the North Korean side had carefully studied the possible effects of their continued denial on future negotiations with the United States.

Apparently, Kim Jong Il decided to put the regime's survival at risk by revealing the secret program, in the hope that Washington was less likely to slam the door on negotiations if they made a frank admission now, than if the truth were to be revealed later, especially during the negotiation process. Hence, it may be wrong to believe that this sudden about-face is another form of the brinkmanship that was utilized extensively during North Korea's negotiations with the Clinton administration. Rather, it has to be viewed as an effort to build up North Korea's credibility with the United States.

Nevertheless, the North Koreans haven't played all their cards just yet; unlike Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi, US Assistant Secretary Kelly received no apology from the North Korean for any past wrongdoing, neither did Pyongyang promise to suspend its nuclear program, and nor was there any mention of receiving IAEA inspectors. More than likely they intend to make the apology and to undertake the complete termination of the secret nuclear program at some strategic point during the negotiation process.

### **Stronger Case for the Hawks**

Behind the sadness and seriousness of North Korea's recent admissions of guilt lies the reality that their sudden frankness weakens the positions of those who have been advocating engagement with the North Koreans. In the case of South Korea, as soon as the secret nuclear weapons program was made known,

President Kim Dae Jung's Sunshine Policy came in for heavy criticism from the conservatives, further weakening an already lame-duck government. As for Prime Minister Koizumi, his initiatives to normalize relations with North Korea are likely to be seriously challenged both at home and in the United States. Needless to say, the current policy of differentiating between North Korea and Iraq in order to resolve problems associated with "The Axis of Evil" will also be affected. The hawks in Washington now have a stronger case than those who seek dialogue with Pyongyang, as worries about Pyongyang developing weapons of mass destruction have proven to be justified. Indeed, Washington has every reason to view Pyongyang with a great deal of skepticism.

Hence the burden of proof lies squarely with North Korea. Having failed to honor even the first cornerstone agreement to be established between Pyongyang and Washington, simply confessing past wrongdoings and listing new promises is bound to not work this time. Pyongyang will have to demonstrate that it understands the seriousness of dishonoring this agreement, and it will have to provide proof positive that it has given up its ambition of becoming a nuclear power if it is to convince Washington and the conservatives in Japan and South Korea that it is willing to make some "changes" to its relations with the United States and Japan.

Furthermore, while President Kim Dae Jung continues to lose power and influence, Kim Jong Il cannot expect any psychological support from that quarter. Hence the situation for Kim Jong Il is certainly the most difficult he has experienced since coming to power. It may even be the most precarious position North Korea has found itself in throughout its history. Any slight miscalculation could lead to an instant crisis.

#### Contradiction between North Korea's 'Frankness Strategy' and its Negative Image

The most important factor in the negotiation process with Pyongyang is how to handle the contradiction between North Korea's recent 'frankness' and its overwhelmingly negative image. Pyongyang is probably feeling rather annoyed by the extremely negative reactions it is receiving from the Japanese public, despite the Great Leader's unprecedented admission and his apology on the abduction issue. Certainly its frustration after its admission to Mr. Kelly concerning the nuclear program has been well documented in its official media. Pyongyang appears to feel hard-done-by, believing that it has done what it has been asked to do, only to receive more intensified criticism.

Certainly, the negotiation environment for Pyongyang is deteriorating significantly, as the hawks in Seoul-Tokyo-Washington continue to gain the high ground. The United States' demands of Pyongyang in the negotiation process will undoubtedly be harsher and tougher in the future, and it will definitely require concrete and verifiable evidence of North Korea's willingness to concede on issues of concern. In fact what Washington is asking for now amounts to the complete surrender of all of Pyongyang's remaining negotiation cards. However, if Washington does not allow Pyongyang any breathing space at this point, a crisis is inevitable.

#### The Choices Available to Seoul-Tokyo-Washington

The time has come for Seoul-Tokyo-Washington to make a fundamental policy decision: Do they still want to keep Kim Jong Il as a player, or do they want to give up playing Kim's game entirely?

If they choose the former, the bottom line is they will have to give Kim Jong Il one more chance to play his part by giving him some room to move during the negotiation process. In other words, Seoul-Tokyo-Washington will have to "support" Kim's efforts to lead a nuclear-free North Korea. For this to happen, North Korea will have to provide tangible evidence, and in a timely manner, that proves it is prepared to give up its nuclear ambition, if it has one.

If the latter is chosen, if the three decide not to risk any further deception by refusing to deal with Kim Jong Il, they must be prepared for the total collapse of North Korea, which will undoubtedly cause major problems in the region, none of which I want to reiterate in this paper because they have been fully elaborated on elsewhere. The real challenge to Seoul-Tokyo-Washington, however, may be whether the three parties can even agree on a grand policy of what to do with Pyongyang, as each has different, immediate interests in mind.

Pyongyang now has the burden of proof. It has to convince the world that the reason behind its recent frankness is its sincere wish to establish relations with Japan and the United States. To achieve this, it must show that it is prepared to give up its nuclear aspirations and make major concessions on other issues of concern. At the same time, Washington must be prepared to give Pyongyang some breathing space during the negotiation process if it hopes to achieve its ultimate objectives involving North Korea.

## North Korea as the Ninth Nuclear Power?

by Victor Gilinsky - 24 October 2002  
Nautilus Institute, Berkeley CA – [www.nautilus.org](http://www.nautilus.org)

It would help if we knew a bit more. As Congressman Markey observed, we are entitled to know at least what our government told the North Koreans. What does our government think the DPRK has, or will have, in the way of enrichment capacity? What exactly did the North say in response? In the absence of more information the following is a kind of horseback reaction to the sketchy and sometimes inconsistent newspaper accounts. Why did the North admit having a secret enrichment program? I think there is a clue in our confused and weak reaction. Our national security establishment is occupied with a possible war against Iraq and has shown a marked inability to multitask. This was a good time to slip us the news softly, to let us know that we are dealing with a nuclear weapons country, and to do so without risking a violent US reaction. It served the North's security interests, provided opportunities for further blackmail (for slowing down or freezing some part of the program). And it must have appeared not to risk too much. The DPRK must have given up expecting to get the LWRs that KEDO is building. The Bush administration's seriousness about inspection made it difficult any longer to expect that the inspection provision of the Agreed Framework would be finessed. Or to expect that the United States would export the necessary US-manufactured reactor parts to the DPRK.

Beyond that, the Japanese Prime Minister visited the DPRK in September, after learning from the United States about the North's nuclear weapons activities, and he still talked to them about providing large amounts of Japanese assistance. That must have left an impression in the DPRK of Western and Japanese weakness on the nuclear weapons issue. The latest (October 22) KCNA release reflects a view that the international tide has turned against the United States in its efforts to force nuclear disarmament on Iraq and North Korea. The DPRK sends out multiple messages to its audiences—threats to instill fear that the North may lash out, and softer messages to suggest they will be reasonable if we just give them some respect. You have to give the North high marks for playing a weak hand expertly (as they did in 1994).

We have to assume the DPRK has at least one or two bombs. This has been implicit since the early 1990s in the conclusion that they had illicitly separated enough plutonium for such weapons. That after all was the reason for postponing the IAEA inspections required for joining the NPT. Can anyone believe that they would not let their weapons scientists turn the stuff to bomb use? Or that they would then disarm themselves before the IAEA inspectors arrived? (Or even reveal that they had perpetrated a gigantic hoax, in the unlikely case that was true?) And yet we collectively suspended our critical faculties and pretended that we had a process that was going to resolve all this by providing them with, of all things, nuclear power reactors. (The provision of these was predicated on getting around US nonproliferation law—a circumstance not calculated to increase respect for the law, or the NPT, or DPRK respect for the United States.)

One lesson is that we have to stop basing policy on wishful thinking. We cannot assume that they might just have "primitive" bombs as reported in the press. This is not 1945. Lots of technology that had to be invented in Los Alamos is now easily available. A Pakistani scientist told me that getting their enrichment plants working was difficult but making bombs was relatively easy—he said he hoped countries wouldn't find out just how easy.

We should assume the DPRK bombs are effective and powerful. It would also not be surprising if the Pakistanis helped them over the difficulties in enrichment in exchange for help on missiles. A. Q. Khan, who ran the Pakistani enrichment enterprise and one of the Pakistani missile programs, appears to have been actively involved with the North Koreans.

This much is clear. We are at a critical point in dealing with North Korean nuclear weapons. This puts us at a critical point in enforcing the NPT, something we have never done before. One might say, we are at a grim point. Unfortunately, these issues have not had the focus in the government than they deserve. They have been pushed aside by the single-minded focus on Iraq. The North Koreans have done what we accuse Iraq of aiming to do. The North also poses a much more tougher and complex problem. Are we going to attempt to enforce the Treaty as best we can? If not, it will become a nullity? In which case, what does this say about all the US government activities devoted to, or justified by, nonproliferation? A Secretary of Defense of years past said he could replace all the nonproliferation analysts and policymakers in and out of government (whom he didn't regard as serious people) with just two staffers—one to count the new nuclear countries and the other to wring his hands. Is that where we are headed?

Which is not to say it is clear what to do. But to start, the administration should stop treating the North Korean issue as an annoyance on the way to war with Iraq, and should stop downplaying its importance in public. The issue needs serious, competent top level attention, which it hasn't always gotten—one of the problems is that the

political people have not always understood the technical facts. We can't do it alone-we have to continue working with our South Korean and Japanese allies, and with China. Bringing them around is not an easy matter because South Korea and Japan are prone to hope for the best. And US clumsiness has made them uncomfortable.

There are some positions we should take immediately. As of yesterday the newspaper reported that no one had told KEDO that the new situation affects the LWR project. Someone should tell them that as far as the United States is concerned the game is over. We will no longer support any transfer of nuclear technology to North Korea. Beyond that, the "maximum international pressure" Secretary Kelley speaks is essential. I wouldn't expect that it will have much of an impact on the DPRK in the short term, but it will have a useful educational effect around the world and will announce our seriousness.

And we will have to talk to the North. It is going to be tough. This time we can't just kick the can down the road by rewarding repeat violation of the NPT and out agreement. It is difficult at this stage to see the outline of something that will work. The kind of nuclear disarmament and permanent intrusive inspection arrangement that would satisfy us is one that would be seen in the North as regime threatening. We may have to wait them out. And, depending on how they proceed, we may have to go beyond that.

Looking way down the road, if Korea unifies, does it inherit North Korean nuclear weapons? And what will be the effect on Japan? Will there be a belt of nuclear state right across Asia? The combination of sovereign nation states and nuclear weapons spells disaster in the long term. The NPT was an attempt to avoid that eventuality. It is flawed but necessary. We have to find a way to make it work. That means enforcing it.

## BBC News

### **North Korea admits nuclear arsenal**

17 November 2002

North Korea has said for the first time that it has nuclear weapons.

A commentary broadcast on state radio said North Korea had developed "powerful military counter-measures, including nuclear weapons" to cope with what it called mounting nuclear threats from the United States.

Last month, Washington announced that North Korea had admitted to having a programme for producing highly-enriched uranium - a key ingredient in nuclear weapons.

But this is the first time the communist state has made such an acknowledgement.

A foreign ministry statement in October said only that the country was "entitled" to have nuclear weapons.

President George Bush has repeatedly called on Pyongyang to eliminate its nuclear programme, saying it is the only way the country can have a viable future.

The BBC's Charles Scanlon says state media often contains hostile rhetoric and it is not clear how literally the broadcast - which was not attributed - is meant to be taken.

He says for years North Korea has tried to keep the world guessing about its nuclear capabilities.

### **Pyongyang's demands**

Sunday's broadcast accused Washington of "slandering and injuring" North Korea.

America's "reckless manoeuvres", it said, were threatening the country's right to existence and sovereignty.

"Under these circumstances we cannot sit idle with our arms folded," the radio said.

It also repeated Pyongyang's demands that the US must sign a non-aggression pact, insisting it was the only way to resolve the nuclear issue.

The timing of the broadcast fits in with a pattern of North Korean "confession", according to Michael Yahuda, professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science.

He told BBC News Online, it appeared they wanted to clear the way for talks.

"The US is threatening and, by responding, Pyongyang is sending out a message: 'We have nuclear weapons as well, so let's find a way to negotiation'," he said.

### **Aid stopped**

The US defence secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, said last month that North Korea might have one or two nuclear weapons.

Earlier this week, the US, South Korea, the European Union and Japan agreed to halt fuel aid to North Korea until Pyongyang moved to dismantle the programme.

Under a 1994 accord, North Korea agreed to freeze its nuclear programme in return for 500,000 tonnes of fuel oil a year in aid.

But Washington considers that Pyongyang nullified the 1994 pact when it reportedly admitted to a US envoy that it was trying to build nuclear weapons.

#### US State Department

##### **Amb. Baker Defends Allied Approach to North Korea**

Envoy praises calm, deliberate approach by Japan, So. Korea, U.S.

2 December 2002

U.S. Ambassador to Japan Howard Baker praised what he said was a calm and deliberate approach by Japan, South Korea and the United States to North Korea's recent revelations about its nuclear weapons program.

Speaking at the Japan National Press Club in Tokyo December 2, Baker hailed Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's visit to North Korea and his "attempt to forge peace with this most difficult of neighbors."

Baker noted Pyongyang's admission that it had for some years been in breach of many of its international commitments by embarking on a program to produce highly enriched uranium in order to build nuclear weapons.

North Korea's acknowledgement of its nuclear weapons program was all the more shocking in view of "generous diplomatic overtures" from South Korea and Japan as well as the "massive amounts of humanitarian food aid" provided by the United States through the UN World Food Program and continued assistance through the Agreed Framework, Baker said.

The United States, Japan and the Republic of Korea responded "quickly and firmly with a unified policy toward the DPRK (Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea)," he said.

Baker cited President Bush's November 15 observation that the three nations are "united in our desire for a peaceful solution to this situation" and "united in our resolve that the only option for addressing this situation is for North Korea to completely and visibly eliminate its nuclear weapons program."

Baker said the troika has "acted calmly, slowly and deliberately, and I think with good effect. It appears to me that North Korea is not now asserting its nuclear capability quite so enthusiastically as it did a little while ago, so perhaps it is having an effect. But it's the unity and boldness of action by the United States, South Korea and Japan that I believe is having an effect on the attitude in North Korea."

But he added: "Whether that turns out to be a solution remains to be seen. ... It has been made clear by my government that we are perfectly willing to have conversations and negotiations with North Korea, but only after there is the certain and visible and confirmable beginning of the dismantling of their nuclear capability."

Baker emphasized that President Bush "has made no threatening gestures to North Korea." The U.S. response has been to North Korea's assertion that it has a uranium enrichment facility, in violation of its several undertakings under the agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Framework Agreement and others, he said.

"But once again, how that finally resolves is very much up to North Korea," the ambassador said. "The United States is steadfast in its resolve, but the United States is not anxious to have a conflict with North Korea or anyone else."

Baker also said the Japanese Diet's passage of legislation allowing its country to participate in the war against terrorism was a bold move. So too, he said, was Japan's insistence that Iraq comply with the U.N. resolutions calling on Iraq to immediately, unconditionally and actively cooperate with U.N. monitoring, verification and inspection commissions.

#### Channel News Asia

##### **China and Russia urge North Korea to drop nuclear programme**

2 december 2002

Russia and China have urged North Korea to normalise ties with Washington and drop its nuclear weapons programme.

The appeal was the highlight of talks between visiting Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Jiang Zemin as both Beijing and Moscow seek to warm up to Washington.

And eager to assess China's changing leadership, Mr Putin also met separately with Vice-President Hu Jintao. The two presidents issued a joint declaration which strongly backed reconciliation between North and South Korea and the revival of ties with Washington and Tokyo.

Analysts said this was the strongest call for detente on the Korean peninsula, by North Korea's closest allies. On Iraq, both China and Russia, which are members of the UN Security Council, made it clear that any military strikes should be backed by the UN Security Council.

Observers say while both Russia and China have supported the US-led campaign against terrorism and pursued relationships with NATO, they feel there's still scope for both sides to display solidarity in world affairs.

The Russian President said he wanted to drive home the point that Russia, which spans Europe and Asia, is not solely focused on the West.

So he hopes his visit will further strengthen ties with China after the leadership change in Beijing.

Besides increasing bilateral trade, and boost security in a region, China and Russia have also discussed ways to tackle separatist threats from its ethnic minorities.

For its part, Beijing will seek to assure Moscow that China's rise as a booming economic and strategic power poses no real threat to its neighbours and the region.

Bilateral trade is still modest right now, with China chalking up a record US\$10.6 billion in trade last year with Russia.

But that's a fraction of China's trade with partners such as Japan and the United States.

## IAEA

### **Statement by the IAEA Director General on DPRK**

4 December 2002

The Director General has received a reply dated 2 December from the Foreign Minister of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) to Mr. ElBaradei's letter of 29 November conveying the resolution adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors on 29 November.

The DPRK rejects the resolution in familiar terms, attributing the nuclear crisis in the Korean Peninsula to a hostile policy towards it (the DPRK).

The letter does not respond directly to the resolution's request that the DPRK clarify reports of its having an undeclared uranium enrichment programme, nor does it respond to the Director General's invitation of 18 October for high-level talks in Vienna or the DPRK.

Dr. ElBaradei reiterates his "deep concern" about the situation, his readiness to discuss all related matters with the DPRK, and his determination to implement the IAEA safeguards agreement with the DPRK fully, and as soon as possible.

The IAEA and the DPRK continue to have meetings at a working level. A meeting between the IAEA safeguards inspectors and DPRK counterparts is under way this week in DPRK related to the Agency's role in implementing the Agreed Framework "freeze" on certain DPRK nuclear facilities – a freeze which continues to be monitored.

## Guardian

### **North Korea restarts nuclear programme**

Simon Jeffery - Thursday December 12, 2002

North Korea today announced it is to reactivate a nuclear programme frozen under a 1994 deal with the United States.

In a move certain to escalate tensions between the two capitals, Pyongyang said it was to resume use of its old Soviet-designed reactors after a US-led oil embargo imposed last month left it with an electricity shortage.

The state-run KCNA news agency quoted a foreign ministry spokesman saying that the "prevailing situation" had compelled the government to lift its freeze on the facilities.

Before North Korea made its deal with the US, the UN's nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency, had suspected that spent fuel from the plutonium-based reactors was being siphoned off into a weapons programme.

Under the terms of the agreement to avert a feared war on the Korean peninsula, the US was to help North Korea build two modern light-water reactors it could not use for weapons manufacture in return for Pyongyang shutting down its plutonium programme.

But the deal fell apart as North Korea said the promised US aid had not materialised and, in October this year, admitted to a Washington official that it had developed a uranium-based nuclear programme.

The US said that violated a nuclear arms control clause in the agreement and imposed the oil embargo.

Tension between the US and North Korea - which has been building since the US president, George Bush, put it at the eastern end of his "axis of evil" - increased substantially with the disclosure of the uranium programme and the embargo. Earlier this week, a joint US-Spanish team intercepted a ship in the Arabian sea carrying North Korean Scud missiles to Yemen.

The US says North Korea is the world's worst proliferator of missiles and missile technology. Its customers have also included Libya, Iran, Syria, Pakistan and Egypt.

Experts believe that even without the uranium programme North Korea still has enough reprocessed plutonium for five nuclear weapons.

The country is often suspected of using its nuclear programme to bargain with the US, and the foreign ministry spokesman today left open the possibility that dialogue could end the stand off.

"Our principled stand is that the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula should be resolved peacefully," the spokesman said. "It's totally up to the United States whether we will freeze our nuclear facilities again."

But the prospect that North Korea might reactivate its plutonium-based nuclear programme had long been feared by US and South Korean officials.

"We can only speculate that yesterday's incident and North Korea's electricity shortage in the winter propelled North Korea to make a response," said Kim Sung-han of the state-run Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security in Seoul.

At the height of the confrontation over North Korea's plutonium programme in 1994, a North Korean negotiator threatened to turn Seoul into "a sea of fire".

## White House

### **White House Regrets North Korea's Decision On Nuclear Facility**

12 December 2002

The White House says it regrets North Korea's decision to reactivate a controversial nuclear power plant that U.S. officials say is capable of producing weapons-grade material.

"The statement that North Korea made, that it plans to resume the operation and construction of its nuclear facilities, is regrettable," White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer told reporters December 12.

"The announcement flies in the face of international consensus that the North Korean regime must fulfill all its commitments, and in particular, dismantle its nuclear weapons program," Fleischer said.

"We seek a peaceful resolution to the situation that North Korea has created. As the president said, we have no intentions of invading North Korea. The international community has made it clear that North Korea's relations with the outside world hinge on the elimination of its nuclear weapons program. The next step is for North Korea to dismantle its nuclear weapons program in a visible and verifiable manner. We will consult with friends and allies regarding an appropriate response to this latest move by the North Korean regime.

"Finally, the United States has always been open to dialogue in principle, and was prepared for a comprehensive approach to improving U.S.-North Korean relations before the disclosure of North Korea's clandestine uranium enrichment program. However, the United States will not enter into dialogue in response to threats or broken commitments, and we will not bargain or offer inducements for North Korea to live up to the treaties and agreements it has signed," the press secretary said.

Under a 1994 agreement North Korea pledged to freeze its nuclear weapons program in exchange for shipments of oil and other energy aid.

U.S. officials say North Korea acknowledged in October that it had a secret program to enrich uranium in violation of that agreement.

## White House

### **Press briefing by Ari Fleischer**

13 December 2002

[...] Regarding North Korea and its weapons program, President Kim "emphasized that North Korea statements on unfreezing its nuclear program are unacceptable," Fleischer said. "The two leaders agreed to



continue seeking a peaceful resolution" of that situation, "while not allowing business as usual to continue with North Korea," Fleischer said.

The phone call between Kim and Bush came the day after North Korea said it would restart a small nuclear reactor and resume building two larger reactors shut down under the 1994 Agreed Framework.

U.S. officials say reactors can be used to build atomic bombs. North Korean officials say they are for generating electricity needed now since the U.S.-led Korean Peninsula Development Organization (KEDO) last month suspended oil shipments to North Korea following North Korea's admission in early October of having a secret uranium-enrichment program.

Fleischer said President Bush "will not engage in allowing North Korea to violate its agreements and then have the world come rushing to North Korea to say, 'How can we help you?'"

"The president wants to work with the international community and our allies in a peaceful way, and through diplomacy, to help the North Koreans to recognize that their best future, and the best way they have to feed their own people and to advance as one of the world's most backward economies, in which the people of North Korea have suffered mightily, is to join the international and the world community so they can have a way forward," Fleischer said.

In a related development, he said the Bush administration views "as a serious matter" North Korea's recent actions in requesting that the International Atomic Energy Administration (IAEA) remove the cameras and seals that had been put in place by the international community to keep an eye on some of North Korea's programs.

"And we hope that North Korea will reconsider their request to the international community to remove this equipment," Fleischer said. "But I want to reiterate that we will continue to work with the international community to seek a peaceful resolution to the situation in North Korea. And this is a situation that North Korea has created by pursuing a nuclear weapons program."

Asked why U.S. policy toward North Korea is different than its policy toward Iraq, Fleischer responded:

"Because the situation in Iraq involves somebody who has used force in the past to attack and invade his neighbors. That is not the history of North Korea for the last 50 years. And so it's not exactly analogous. The world cannot just be treated as a photocopy machine where policies in one part of the world need to be identically copied for another. It's a much more complicated endeavor than that. And so the president will continue to work in concert with our allies." [...]

## Guardian

### **Election delivers anti-war message to Washington hardliners**

John Gittings - Friday 20 December 2002

South Korea's choice of president shows that voters are more worried by US sabre-rattling than any potential threat posed by the North.

On the eve of the election, Richard Perle, chairman of the Pentagon's defence advisory panel, warned Seoul that a war against the North might be necessary.

Earlier this week, the US persuaded Japan to suspend further economic aid to the North until it halted its nuclear weapons programme.

The harder line taken after President Bush came to power has blighted the Korean peace process for nearly two years and was exemplified by Mr Bush's speech naming Pyongyang as part of the "axis of evil".

Some analysts believe this allowed hardliners in the North to slow the peace process almost to a halt.

US hostility, they argue, has created a vicious circle in which North Korea resorts to the "nuclear card" to win more diplomatic leverage.

The victorious Roh Moo-hyun has made the most of voters' anxieties that isolating the North could provoke a new crisis. He has also made the most of resentment caused by the perceived refusal of the US to let Koreans set their own pace.

"We don't want to become spectators again," he told voters this week. "In the old days we were not able to solve our problems ourselves. Now it is different."

Older Korean voters were more likely to be swayed towards Mr Lee by North Korea's often bizarre displays of belligerence. The younger generation is more likely to agree with the outgoing president, Kim Dae-jung, that there is no alternative to continuing the dialogue.

Mr Roh also benefited from a rising tide of anti-American feeling sparked by a recent accident in which two Korean girls were killed by a US armoured vehicle.

The American soldiers involved were acquitted by a US military tribunal, offering a blunt reminder of the privileges still enjoyed by the former occupying power.

The effect was to make the tough anti-Pyongyang statements of Mr Roh's rival, Lee Hoi-chang, sound like softness towards Washington.

The US, which is still technically at war with the North, maintains 37,000 troops in the South. Although it withdrew its nuclear weapons from the South a decade ago, the North continues to be a target.

In 1994 the US concurred with the deal known as the "agreed framework" in which the North would drop its nuclear programme in return for the supply of oil and construction of two light-water reactors for peaceful purposes. The programme has been seriously delayed, allowing Pyongyang to accuse the US of bad faith.

In October the North acknowledged that it had maintained a covert nuclear programme. After US pressure, fuel oil exports to the North agreed under the 1994 deal have been suspended.

### Pyongyang Times

#### **DPRK to lift N-freeze**

22 December 2002

"The DPRK is compelled to immediately start putting aside the seals and monitoring cameras from the frozen nuclear facilities and to place them on normal operation for power generation," announced the KCNA in its December 22 press release.

Giving a detailed explanation to the current situation that urged it to do it, it said:

As was clarified, the DPRK government on December 12 published the decision to lift the freeze on nuclear facilities, a measure that had been taken on condition that it would be supplied with 500,000 tons of fuel oil on a year-to-year basis pursuant to the DPRK-US Agreed Framework, and to restart operation and construction of nuclear facilities needed for power generation, in response to the US grave violation of the AF with the suspension of heavy oil supply to the DPRK from December.

The DPRK government made clear, when announcing the decision, that the US should be held wholly responsible for the present situation, for the current action for nuclear defreeze resulted from the US unilateral withdrawal from its obligation of fuel oil supply to make up for the power loss on the part of the DPRK, and has been watching the US approach to the decision with high self-control.

The US, however, failed to show a positive response to Pyongyang's persevering efforts to settle the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula in a peaceful way. Instead, it persistently claims about "the DPRK's abandonment of nuclear programme before the resumption of bilateral negotiations", seeking to put increasing international pressure on the latter.

Meanwhile, the DPRK government notified the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of its decision, affirming that it is an ad hoc measure to protect its right to subsistence and sovereignty from US threat, as the issue is not subject to any agreement or safeguards agreement with the IAEA but to the agreements with the US. Pyongyang urged the IAEA on two occasions to immediately remove seals and monitors, to which the latter made no positive response by delaying the work with the presentation of a working-level contact. The current developments compelled the DPRK government to take a practical action to fill up a vacuum in power generation.

### Reuters

#### **U.S. and allies push to stop North Korea's nuclear move**

23 December 2002 - By Paul Eckert

SEOUL (Reuters) - South Korea's president and president-elect discussed North Korea's nuclear brinkmanship on Monday as the United States said it would neither bargain nor negotiate under duress with the reclusive communist state.

Little emerged from the meeting between President Kim Dae-jung and his successor, Roh Moo-hyun, who was elected on Thursday and takes over in February.

South Korean media said the two men, who both favour constructive engagement with the North, confirmed that they sought a peaceful resolution to a crisis a leading U.S. lawmaker described as a greater threat than Iraq.

Kim's spokeswoman, Park Sun-sook, told reporters the talks "centred on the North Korean nuclear issue" and ties with the United States, Japan, China, Russia and the European Union, all countries working with Washington to defuse the crisis.

But both sides declined to offer detailed comment on the talks, the first of several meetings planned during the leadership transition. Roh also received "factual briefings" from Kim's top security advisers, a presidential aide said.

North Korea, a country President George W. Bush lumped with Iraq and Iran in an "axis of evil", said at the weekend it had begun removing U.N. monitoring equipment at a nuclear reactor capable of yielding weapons-grade plutonium.

South Korean shares fell more than two percent on Monday to close at their lowest level in a month. Traders blamed North Korea's nuclear announcement and worry about war in Iraq.

U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell telephoned China, South Korea, Russia, Japan and other allies over the weekend. On Sunday, South Korea voiced "deep regret" at the North's move and vowed to work with allies to defuse a crisis.

U.S. State Department spokesman Lou Finton said Washington, which accuses Iraq of possessing secret weapons of mass destruction and has threatened it with war if it does not come clean, expected North Korea to respect international commitments it had made.

"We will not bargain or offer inducements for North Korea to live up to the treaties and agreements it has signed," Finton said. "Let me underscore the United States will not enter into dialogue in response to threats or broken commitments."

8,000 fuel rods

A U.N. watchdog said North Korea had broken seals on about 8,000 spent fuel rods at Yongbyon, a reactor at the centre of an earlier crisis defused by a 1994 oil-for nuclear compliance deal.

"As the spent fuel contains a significant amount of plutonium, North Korea's action is of great non-proliferation concern," said Mohamed ElBaradei, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Australia, one of the few Western nations to have diplomatic ties with North Korea, weighed in with strong words of its own.

"(North Korea's) actions will be met by firm international resolve," Foreign Minister Alexander Downer said, urging the North to step back and cooperate fully with the IAEA.

In Pyongyang, new British Ambassador David Slinn said he paid a courtesy call on North Korean Foreign Minister Paek Nam-sun, but he declined to discuss the contents of the meeting.

In Washington, the outgoing chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Democrat Joseph Biden, told "Fox News Sunday" the North Korea threat was greater than Iraq.

"This is a greater danger immediately to U.S. interests at this very moment, in my view, than Saddam Hussein is," he said.

Impoverished North Korea, short of food and fuel oil, accuses Washington and its allies of triggering the crisis.

Its official Korean Central News Agency said seals and monitoring cameras were being removed "from the frozen nuclear facilities for their normal operation to produce electricity".

Under the 1994 agreement with the United States, North Korea froze its reactors in exchange for shipments of oil and the construction of proliferation-proof reactors.

The United States, South Korea, Japan and the European Union halted oil supplies after Washington said the North had acknowledged defying the 1994 agreement and other international commitments with a programme to develop highly enriched uranium.

On Monday, Pyongyang said nothing new about the reactors, but reiterated its demand for a non-aggression pact with Washington.

"If the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula is to be settled properly, the U.S. should stop posing a nuclear threat to (North Korea) and accept (our) proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression treaty between the two countries," said the North's ruling party newspaper, the Rodong Sinmun.

South Korean commentators said Pyongyang appeared to be testing Roh and trying to exploit divisions on North Korea between Seoul and Washington.

Also on Monday, working level military officials from the two Koreas met to confirm plans to open a cross-border road next week for South Korean tourists to visit the Mount Kumgang resort just over the border in eastern North Korea.

## **Rumsfeld gets tough on North Korea**

John Gittings in Hong Kong and Suzanne Goldenberg in Washington - Tuesday December 24, 2002

Donald Rumsfeld, the US defence secretary, yesterday warned North Korea that America could fight and win two regional conflicts. He advised Pyongyang not to become "emboldened" by the US administration's immediate focus on Iraq.

"We are capable of fighting two major regional conflicts. We're capable of winning decisively in one and swiftly defeating in the case of the other, and let there be no doubt about it," Mr Rumsfeld said.

His comments came amid desperate diplomatic efforts to head off the growing Korean crisis.

The UN has confirmed that North Korea has carried out its threat to remove UN seals and dismantle monitoring cameras at a laboratory used to produce weapons-grade plutonium.

A spokesman for the International Atomic Energy Agency said: "There is not any legitimate purpose for the facility other than separating plutonium from spent fuel."

Senator Joseph Biden, the outgoing chairman of the Senate foreign relations committee, warned that North Korea's plan to restart a programme for plutonium extraction could allow it to produce bombs "within months".

Mr Biden said the crisis was "a greater danger immediately to US interests \_ than Saddam Hussein".

While the rhetoric sharpened, Mr Rumsfeld insisted that Washington would pursue a diplomatic strategy against North Korea for the moment, as that crisis was still at a relatively early stage.

Pyongyang has issued a series of threats, including one to "destroy the earth" if the US resorted to nuclear war against it. South Korea's president, Kim Dae-jung, and the president-elect, Roh Moo-hyun, sought to calm the mood by saying they wanted a peaceful resolution.

While Russia expressed concern at the North's weekend announcement, the deputy foreign minister warned the US not to aggravate the crisis.

But the US state department yesterday rejected Pyongyang's insistence that the crisis can be solved if the US signs a treaty of non-aggression. "We will not bargain or offer inducements for North Korea to live up to the treaties and agreements it has signed," a spokesman said.

US intelligence sources were quoted by the BBC as saying they believe "North Korea may already have a small number of nuclear bombs and the material to make a few more".

The North Korean media has given Bush administration hardliners all the material they may want.

The communist party's newspaper, the Workers' Daily, declared that "the army and people of the DPRK are fully ready to mercilessly strike the bulwark of US imperialist aggressors" - implying that they could hit targets in the US.

## Independent

### **Seoul appeals to China over North Korea**

By Phil Reeves, Asia Correspondent - 29 December 2002

South Korea is to make a new attempt to defuse the escalating North Korean crisis by turning to the North's traditional friends – Russia and China – in the hope that they will persuade the renegade state to end moves to restart its nuclear plants.

As the international community pondered Pyongyang's latest defiant move – the decision to throw out UN inspectors monitoring its giant Yongbyon nuclear complex – the South Korean Foreign Ministry said it would send envoys to Beijing and Moscow to enlist help in seeking a peaceful solution.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said that its inspectors will fly out early on Tuesday, depriving it of its last means of determining whether the North Koreans are trying to make nuclear weapons, as its neighbours and the Americans fear. The IAEA's director-general, Mohamed ElBaradei, called the expulsions a "dangerous precedent", set by a "country in defiance of its international obligations".

North Korea declared on Friday that the inspectors would be expelled and that it would also restart a reprocessing laboratory – a plant which the US says can extract plutonium for nuclear bombs.

If the expulsions go ahead, it will mark a new low in Pyongyang's confrontation with Washington, which seems to have been floundering over how to react.

The Americans appear to have been wrong-footed by the speed of events, as challenges have come in rapid succession from North Korea. These began after the US cut deliveries of fuel oil last month, after discovering that the North Koreans had a secret uranium-enriching project – a blatant breach of a 1994 agreement to freeze

its nuclear activities. Since then, Pyongyang has announced plans to fire up an atomic reactor and reactivate other nuclear projects; it has cut IAEA surveillance equipment; and begun moving in fuel rods.

The US has yet to find a means of easily explaining away the striking difference between President Bush's treatment of North Korea and the moves towards war with Iraq – an inconsistency which it fears may be exploited by allies opposed to its approach to Iraq. Anxious to keep the focus on Saddam Hussein, the Americans say they are not contemplating military force against North Korea, and are looking for diplomacy to save the day.

But the US insists there will be no direct negotiations until the country stops trying to make nuclear weapons and has refrozen its nuclear programme. North Korea's economic isolation limits its leverage – trade is minuscule – although there are indications that Washington is applying pressure by holding back food aid, a charge it denies.

The Washington Post reported yesterday that, if North Korea does not back down, the Bush administration intends to refer the issue to the UN Security Council in the hope of applying further pressure on the government of Kim Jong Il. But US officials are thought to be concerned that this could give leverage to countries critical of its strategy towards Baghdad.

Yesterday, the hostile words and the freezing-up of relations continued. North Korea blamed the US for suspending the opening of the first cross-border road between the two Koreas: they had planned to open it on New Year's Eve, allowing South Koreans to go to a mountain resort in the North. But military negotiators on both sides failed to agree on terms of passage through the Demilitarized Zone, the heavily fortified buffer area that separates the two countries.

#### US State Department

#### **Powell: U.S., Allies Keeping Diplomatic Channels to North Korea Open**

(Patience and pressure, not force, will resolve issue, secretary says)

29 December 2002

Washington -- The United States will remain patient and consult closely with friends and allies to resolve the challenge posed by North Korea's violation of nuclear accords it had previously agreed to abide by, says Secretary of State Colin Powell.

Secretary Powell, who made the rounds of five Sunday television news shows on December 29, said that North Korea had created a serious situation by expelling nuclear inspectors and restarting the Yongbyon plutonium facility. But he added that the situation does not constitute a crisis and stressed that the U.S. does not feel that force is either necessary or appropriate at the present time.

"We are going to be patient," Powell said on CBS's Face the Nation. "We are going to continue to apply pressure. We are going to consult with our friends and allies and we are going to hope that common sense will ultimately prevail. We are going to keep channels open in case that there are messages coming from North Korea. We want to communicate with North Korea and wait for an opening to solve this diplomatically."

On ABC's This Week, Powell said: "We have to keep in mind the concerns and interests of our allies in the region. The South Koreans are our friends. We want to stay in touch with them. We want to consult with them. We want to discuss with them the way forward. And that's the same situation with the Japanese, the Russians, the Chinese, the European Union, and the United Nations. This is the time for the international community to come together."

North Korea's actions are serving only to isolate the regime further, Powell noted, cutting off promising international initiatives to aid the North Korean people and economy.

"It is a tragedy for the people of North Korea when the entire world stands ready to help them," Powell said on NBC's Meet the Press. "The Japanese, the South Koreans, others have come to their own conclusion that until North Korea does something about this problem, it is hard to make the case that they should assist North Korea with the kind of assistance North Korea really needs."

Moreover, Powell noted in several interviews, the Chinese have said clearly they want a denuclearized Korean Peninsula, most recently when President Jiang Zemin met with President Bush at his ranch in Crawford, Texas.

In every interview -- [NBC's Meet the Press](#), [CBS's Face the Nation](#), [ABC's This Week](#), [CNN's Late Edition](#), and [Fox News Sunday](#) -- Powell stressed that the United States has no hostile intent toward North Korea. "Nobody's going to attack North Korea," Powell said on ABC's This Week. "We have no plans to attack North Korea. We've said it repeatedly. The President has said it repeatedly."

Secretary Powell pointed out that, previously, the United States had been engaged in direct, diplomatic talks with North Korea. Powell recalled his meeting with the North Korean foreign minister in Brunei in July 2002. "We had a pleasant conversation," Powell said on NBC. "I told him that the United States wanted to engage with North Korea, we wanted to help them, we wanted to help their people, but we had to deal with these issues of proliferation and weapons of mass destruction."

Shortly thereafter, Powell said, Assistant Secretary James Kelly presented North Korean authorities with evidence that they were violating the Agreed Framework of 1994 to cap their nuclear program -- a violation that the North Koreans then publicly acknowledged. With international attention focused on the Yongbyon plutonium facility, Powell observed, "they were creating an enriched uranium capability elsewhere in the country."

Now they have decided to kick out international nuclear inspectors from Yongbyon, Powell said, and restart the reactor to produce more plutonium. "So these are two acts of misbehavior on the part of the North Korean regime," Powell said on CNN.

There must be no reward for such behavior, Powell warned, either by the United States or the international community. "We have made it clear to the North Koreans that there are ways to communicate," Powell told CNN's Wolf Blitzer. "But we will not enter a negotiation where they sit there and say, 'What will you pay us for our misbehavior? How will you appease our misbehavior this time?'"

Powell said that Assistant Secretary Kelly will be going to South Korea shortly for consultations. The U.S. is also awaiting an official report by the International Atomic Energy Agency on North Korea's actions.

On Fox News Sunday, Powell said, "I am very pleased that the entire international community has come together on this issue to say to North Korea you're moving in the wrong direction, this is not the right thing to do, and you'd be better off cooperating with the international community to find a way forward to end this uranium enrichment program that we have discovered, and also to put the plutonium program at Yongbyon back under international supervision."

### Weekend Australian

#### **US sanction push to punish Kim**

By Stephen Lunn, Tokyo correspondent, John Keren, and AFP – December 30, 2002

Washington will push for economic sanctions against North Korea, which yesterday warned confrontation was inevitable in the face of opposition to its move to restart a nuclear power plant the UN's nuclear watchdog says could be used to produce weapons-grade plutonium.

White House officials said yesterday that US President George W. Bush's strategy, coined "tailored containment", will see Washington work with the International Atomic Energy Agency to request the UN Security Council impose economic sanctions on Pyongyang for breaching the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. As part of the strategy, the US will also seek to intercept North Korea's arms exports to restrict Pyongyang's access to desperately needed revenue.

A commentary in North Korea's *Rodong Sinmun* newspaper, the mouthpiece of the ruling communist party, warned yesterday: "Inevitable is the confrontation with the imperialists as long as they do not abandon (their) aggressive and predatory nature."

It added: "The imperialist reactionaries are seriously mistaken if they think they would bring the Korean people, who regard independence as their life and soul, to their knees with pressure."

The crisis over North Korea's nuclear ambitions escalated rapidly at the weekend after North Korea on Friday ordered IAEA inspectors to leave the country by tomorrow.

The deadline came after North Korea refused to respond to a letter sent by IAEA director Mohamed ElBaradei asking for the expulsion to be reversed and for monitors to be allowed to remain at Yongbyon.

North Korea said on December 12 it was restarting a 5-megawatt facility at Yongbyon because it needed electricity after the US cut off oil shipments last month.

But the IAEA accuses North Korea of moving fresh nuclear fuel rods to the research reactor, which is said to be capable of producing plutonium.

As diplomatic pressure mounted on North Korea yesterday, Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer disclosed he had spoken with US Secretary of State Colin Powell on Saturday night in an effort to ensure those with an interest in pressing North Korea to desist from its nuclear program co-ordinate their effort.

Australia is "obviously playing a fairly intense diplomatic role at this stage and has been discussing the situation intensely with the Americans and regional partners (including Japan and South Korea)" Mr Downer said last night.

"We need to make sure we have a co-ordinated approach as an international community." He said Australia was deeply concerned about the North Korean move to expel IAEA inspectors.

"Inevitably now this will go to the United Nations Security Council and . . . there is clearly a prima facie breach now of North Korea's obligations," Mr Downer said.

But he said he believed China and Russia were the countries that could exert the most influence.

South Korea yesterday sent high-level envoys to Beijing and Moscow for talks on how to ease the escalating crisis. Japan's Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi is meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin on January 10 in Moscow to discuss the situation.

South Korea and Japan are the two countries most in the firing line if the North Korean situation deteriorates into armed conflict. They plan to meet with the US early in January to co-ordinate policies.

Washington's new policy of economic strangulation has its dangers. Eight years ago similar talk of UN-imposed sanctions saw North Korea proclaim such action would be considered a "declaration of war".

The escalating tension at the time led to a 1994 deal with the Clinton administration for shipments of fuel oil to North Korea and the construction of two civilian nuclear power plants in exchange for Pyongyang shutting down its nuclear weapons program. But in October this year, North Korea admitted to covertly carrying on with the program. The US suspects that North Korea already has at least three nuclear bombs.

Guardian

### **Vow to isolate North Korea annoys allies in South**

Jonathan Watts in Tokyo and Julian Borger in Washington - Tuesday December 31, 2002

The Bush administration came under fire from one of the US's staunchest allies yesterday when the South Korean president Kim Dae-jung warned that US efforts to isolate North Korea economically were doomed to failure.

Since the North admitted the existence of an illegal uranium enrichment programme in October, it has pursued a policy of nuclear brinkmanship aimed at driving a wedge between Seoul and Washington.

The US wants to pursue a policy of "tailored containment", which would politically and economically isolate the North until it scraps its nuclear programme.

Yesterday the secretary of state, Colin Powell, said the US navy was ready to intercept North Korean vessels, raising the prospect of sanctions and a possible blockade to halt the North's lucrative missile trade.

A Bush administration spokesman warned that North Korea would pay "a serious price" for violating international treaties on non-proliferation.

But at the weekend, Mr Powell said that the US had dropped the Clinton administration's policy of explicitly threatening an attack if North Korea resumed production of nuclear weapons. "We're not saying what we might or might not do," he added.

President Kim, who won the Nobel Peace Prize for his "Sunshine Policy" of engagement with the reclusive North, said yesterday that escalating tension would not induce Pyongyang to make concessions. "Pressure and isolation have never been successful with communist countries," he told his cabinet, citing the example of Cuba.

Mr Kim leaves office in February, but his successor, Roh Moo-hyun, has vowed to continue to try to lure the North out of its isolation with aid and dialogue.

Seoul has the most to lose in any conflict as the South Korean capital is within range of North Korea's artillery, which could fire biological or chemical weapons. Fears of war helped push shares on the Seoul stock exchange down by 30 points (about 5%) yesterday.

North Korea kept up the heat yesterday by hinting that it may withdraw from the global nuclear arms control treaty in response to what it described as the US's violation of a 1994 deal to provide energy in return for the scrapping of Pyongyang's plutonium programme.

It has already restarted operations at its Yongbyon nuclear facility and is soon expected to expel international inspectors, which will give it the freedom to reprocess plutonium for nuclear weapons within months.

Pyongyang wants a non-aggression pact with Washington, which effectively means the removal of US troops from the Korean peninsula.

Guardian

### **Expelled UN inspectors leave N Korea**

Simon Jeffery and agencies - Tuesday December 31, 2002

Expelled UN nuclear inspectors today left North Korea, giving it the opportunity to resume a mothballed plutonium programme.

The inspectors arrived in China as one of North Korea's senior officials blamed the US for Pyongyang being unable to fulfil its obligations under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

Pak Ui Chun, North Korea's ambassador to Moscow, said Washington had itself violated the pact by "threatening us with a preventative nuclear strike", the Russian Interfax news agency reported.

"In these circumstances, we also cannot fulfil the non-proliferation treaty, the basic clause of which is the obligation of nuclear states not to use the nuclear weapon against states which do not possess it," he said. The non-proliferation treaty, which North Korea signed in 1985, is designed to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and technology. Pyongyang said at the weekend that it might withdraw from the pact, a move that would deepen concern over its nuclear intentions.

It previously pulled out of the treaty in 1993 to stop inspectors visiting its Yongbyon nuclear facilities, precipitating an international crisis that ended 18 months later when Pyongyang made a deal with the Clinton administration to freeze work at the plant in return for energy sources.

It was feared that plutonium siphoned off from the reactor could be used in a nuclear weapons programme. But UN inspectors subsequently placed at Yongbyon to make sure it would not be reactivated today arrived in Beijing.

The two monitors - a Lebanese man and a Chinese woman - emerged from the arrival hall at Beijing airport after flying in from Pyongyang. They refused to discuss the North Korean situation, saying they were on their way to the headquarters of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the UN's nuclear watchdog, in Vienna. North Korea ordered the expulsion of the two UN monitors on Friday. In recent weeks, it has also cut UN seals and impeded surveillance equipment at the reactor and its spent fuel pond after it announced it would reactivate the mothballed plant to produce electricity because Washington had halted promised energy sources.

An oil embargo was imposed by the US last month after a North Korean official admitted in October that his country had been covertly developing nuclear weapons using enriched uranium.

With the departure of the inspectors, satellites are the only available tools to monitor the isolated state's nuclear programme, a South Korea foreign ministry official said today.

Seoul has expressed alarm at the developments, but insists dialogue is the only way to resolve the problem peacefully. President-elect Roh Moo-hyun has requested that the US consult South Korea, a close ally, before formulating a new approach in its policy to Pyongyang.

"Success or failure of a US policy toward North Korea isn't too big a deal to the American people, but it is a life-or-death matter for South Koreans," he said. "Therefore, any US move should fully consider South Korea's opinion."

Withdrawal from the non-proliferation treaty would mean Pyongyang is intent on raising pressure on the US to negotiate over energy sources. But leaving the treaty could be a largely symbolic gesture, as US officials believe North Korea already has one or two nuclear bombs.

#### White House

#### **Bush Says North Korean Situation "Will be Resolved Peacefully"**

2 January 2003

President Bush, in remarks to reporters at his Texas ranch January 2, said he believes "the situation with North Korea will be resolved peacefully ... it's a diplomatic issue, not a military issue."

The United States government, Bush said, is working "with friends and allies in the region to explain clearly to North Korea it's not in their nation's interest to develop and proliferate weapons of mass destruction."

"We are in constant contact with the Japanese and the South Koreans and the Chinese and the Russians," he said.

Bush said the decision in 2002 to end fuel oil shipments to North Korea that were being provided under the 1994 Agreed Framework "was a joint decision. It was not a U.S. decision, it was jointly made with the South Koreans and the Japanese and the European Union, for that matter.

"It's important for the American people to remember the history of Kim Jong-il. He created some international tension and the United States of America went and signed an agreement with him. And the agreement was that we'd provide -- along with others -- we'd provide fuel oil and help and in return, he would not enrich uranium.



"But it turns out he was enriching uranium. And we blew the whistle on the fact that he was in violation of the '94 agreement. And the parties to that agreement came together and said, well, in return for him making that decision, in terms of him abrogating the agreement there will be a consequence. And that's where we stand right now.

"So the parties have come together. There has been a joint declaration of intent. And we will continue working to resolve the situation." [...]

#### US State Department

##### **North Korea's Neighbors Want End to Its Nuclear Arms Program**

3 January 2003

The United States is not alone in its concern over communist North Korea's nuclear weapons programs, according to State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher.

In a January 3 briefing at the State Department, Boucher noted that South Korea, Japan, Russia and China also wanted to see "an end to North Korea's nuclear weapons programs, uranium enrichment programs."

Boucher told reporters that it was important that Pyongyang understand that there must be "a verifiable dismantlement of these programs."

He said the United States would be consulting with its allies Japan and the Republic of Korea on how to achieve a peaceful resolution to the situation the following week when representatives from Seoul and Tokyo arrive in the United States for a trilateral meeting to coordinate policy regarding North Korea.

In response to a reporter's question regarding Pyongyang's call for a non-aggression pact between the communist regime and the United States, Boucher said the issue was not one of non-aggression.

"The issue is whether North Korea will verifiably dismantle these nuclear enrichment programs, or this nuclear enrichment program," Boucher said.

Both President Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell, he observed, "have said on a number of occasions that we have no intention to invade North Korea, we have no hostile intent towards Pyongyang, and we are seeking, like others, a peaceful and diplomatic resolution to the nuclear issues."

However, Boucher added, the United States has made it clear that the Bush administration is not going "to enter into negotiations in response to threats or broken commitments and we are not going to bargain or offer inducements to North Korea to live up to the treaties and agreements that it has signed."

In the January 2 State Department briefing Boucher said the United States would continue to provide food aid for the North Korean people, and that the Bush administration doesn't intend "to curtail food for political reasons.

"The United States has been the largest donor of food aid to the programs that supply food to the North Korean people," Boucher said, "We would expect to continue to supply food for those programs."

When the United States has its new budget, he went on, "we'll consider what the amounts might be in the coming year."

He also said the United States is concerned about the monitoring of shipments of food aid to the communist regime. "Any food we provide, we would want to be able to work with the World Food Program and the North Koreans to make sure it gets to the people who deserve it and who need it," said Boucher, "And we've asked questions about the monitoring of food aid that have not been responded to by the North Koreans."

#### The Guardian

##### **Seoul prepares solution to nuclear crisis**

Go back to square one, North Korea and US told

Jonathan Watts in Tokyo - Saturday January 4, 2003

South Korea will ask North Korea and the US to make compromises to resolve their dispute over the North's nuclear weapons programme.

Its incoming president, Roh Moo-hyun, is drawing up proposals for a diplomatic solution which will be put to the North at talks due in the middle of the month.

Yesterday Pyongyang offered to enter unconditional talks to resolve the crisis, which Seoul read as a cry for help. Washington refuses direct talks until the North scraps its nuclear weapons programme.

President George Bush said yesterday that the US remained in close touch with its allies South Korea and Japan in the pursuit of a diplomatic solution, but his tone was anything but conciliatory.

"It's important for the American people to remember the history of [the North Korean leader] Kim Jong-il," he said.

"One of the reasons why the people are starving is because the leader of North Korea hasn't seen to it that their economy is strong or that they be fed."

Seoul's frustration with Washington's hard line has become increasingly apparent. Yesterday it continued its diplomatic efforts by sending an envoy to Moscow to seek the support of President Vladimir Putin, who has closer relations with Kim Jong-il than any other world leader.

It has already sought China's support.

Lim Chae-jung, the head of the presidential transition team in Seoul, said in an interview yesterday: "We are working on a mediation proposal that asks for a concession from both... George Bush and the North Korean leader."

The South Korean media report that the plan aims to put the clock back to the situation of last summer, when the North appeared ready to take a series of steps out of its historic isolation.

Pyongyang will be asked to close the Yongbyon nuclear plant, which it reopened last month, and promise not to pursue a uranium enrichment programme.

In return the US will be requested to guarantee North Korea's security. It is envisaged that the guarantee should be in the form of a letter which would not require ratification by Congress.

The North Korean ambassador to China, Choe Jin-su, said yesterday that a "non-aggression" pact with Washington would resolve the crisis.

"If the United States legally assures us of security by concluding a non-aggression treaty, the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula will be settled." But his country had been pushed into a corner, he said.

"While talking about the peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue, the United States also rejects dialogue.

"We all the time tried to seek dialogue."

Washington will hold talks with South Korea and Japan on Monday and Tuesday to discuss their next move and the future of the 1994 Agreed Framework.

That was the deal that ended the last nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula, by which the North undertook to scrap its nuclear weapons programme in return for annual shipments of 500,000 tonnes of oil and the construction of two light-water nuclear power reactors.

In Seoul the unification ministry said: "The North must be very weak to request negotiations. They don't want to fight a war."

#### Channel News Asia

#### **Koizumi vows to continue efforts to resolve N Korea nuclear row**

6 January 2003

In his much-anticipated first speech of the new year, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi has vowed to continue his efforts to push North Korea to halt its nuclear weapons programme.

"I think that this problem cannot be resolved just between Japan and North Korea. We must do it in cooperation with the USA, South Korea, aid-donating countries and the international community. We must have a unified resolved voice. I am not overly optimistic but I think that somehow we can stick to the path of normalising Japan-North Korea relations," Mr Koizumi told a news conference.

He also stressed the importance of China and Russia in using their influence over North Korea.

Mr Koizumi said he would discuss the Pyongyang nuclear issue with Russian President Vladimir Putin when he visits Moscow later this week.

He urged North Korea to stand by nuclear policy commitments made under a declaration at a historic summit last September.

The prime minister was referring to a document he and North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il signed in Pyongyang.

It called on North Korea to obey international agreements, move towards a comprehensive solution to its nuclear ambitions and freeze missile tests.

## US State Department

### **Excerpt: U.S. Remains Willing to Talk, Awaits N. Korean Response**

8 January 2003

State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher said the United States remains willing to talk to North Korea about how that country can comply with its obligations to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), but was waiting for Pyongyang to respond to the possibility of such a discussion.

Speaking at the State Department press briefing January 8, Boucher declined to speculate "how, when or where" such a discussion might be held.

He added that Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly would visit the Asian region January 12-19 to discuss global, regional, and bilateral issues of concern, including North Korea and the fight against terrorism. Kelley intends to visit the Republic of Korea, China, Singapore, Indonesia, and Japan.

Also, John R. Bolton, under secretary of State for arms control and international security, will travel to China, South Korea and Japan later in January.

## IAEA

### **IAEA Director General calls on North Korea to reverse its decision on NPT withdrawal**

Vienna - 10 January 2003

IAEA Director General, Mohamed ElBaradei, said today that the decision by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was "a continuation of a policy of defiance and was counterproductive to ongoing efforts to achieve peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula."

Dr. El Baradei added that, "the NPT, with its 188 States Parties, is the cornerstone of the international community's efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons. A challenge to the integrity of that Treaty may constitute a threat to international peace and security."

"I strongly urge the DPRK to reverse its decision and to seek instead a diplomatic solution," Dr. ElBaradei said. "This is the only way to address the DPRK's security and other concerns."

He reminded the DPRK of the international community's readiness to engage the DPRK in a dialogue toward a peaceful settlement once the DPRK had shown signs of readiness to come into compliance with its international non-proliferation obligations, but not under the threat of nuclear blackmail.

Dr. ElBaradei noted that under Article 10 of the NPT, a decision to withdraw can only be effected after three months. He expressed the hope that, as a matter of urgency, the international community and the DPRK through dialogue would arrive at an agreed and peaceful solution.

## White House

### **White House: North Korea's Withdrawal from NPT of "Serious Concern"**

By Wendy Ross – 10 January 2003

Washington -- The Bush administration views "as a matter of serious concern" North Korea's announcement that it is withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (NPT) Treaty, and wants a peaceful, multilateral solution to the problem, White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer told reporters January 10.

President Bush "has made the decision to pursue this matter in a diplomatic fashion," Fleischer said, "in a very steady and steely manner."

"The United States' message is clear and it's a message that is echoed around the world: that North Korea needs to comply with its international obligations. And that is something that we have said we will talk to North Korea about," Fleischer said. "That's a message that they need to understand and they need to act upon."

North Korea's decision to withdraw from the treaty, Fleischer pointed out, has already been condemned by France and Britain and has drawn statements "of very serious concern" from Australia, Japan, and Russia.

"This is not an action North Korea has taken vis-a-vis the United States, this is an action that North Korea has taken vis-a-vis the world. The world stands united, North Korea stands isolated," Fleischer said.

President Bush and China's President Jiang Zemin discussed developments on the Korean peninsula in a 15-minute phone conversation January 10, the press secretary reported.

They both agreed, he said, that North Korea's announcement "was of concern to the entire international community" and Bush "told President Jiang that he views this as an issue that binds the United States in a common purpose with China and other nations around the world."

Bush repeated that the United States has no hostile intentions toward North Korea and seeks "a peaceful, multilateral solution to the problems created by Pyongyang's actions," Fleischer said.

"President Jiang reiterated China's commitment to a non-nuclear Korean peninsula," and the two presidents agreed to continue to work together to help ensure the peace and stability of the Korean peninsula," Fleischer said.

Earlier in the day, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Richard Lugar (Republican-Indiana) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Mohamed ElBaradei -- in a news conference following a meeting at the Capitol -- said that if North Korea takes the first step to resume the dialogue with the United States "there is light at the end of the tunnel."

Asked about this, Fleischer responded, "There is a light at the end of the tunnel, and that begins with North Korea's immediately dismantling its nuclear weapons programs and coming into compliance with its obligations around the world. The ball is in North Korea's court. And it's important when the ball is in your court not to move backward with it. "And so we hope that North Korea will move forward and take the actions to dismantle its weapons programs and come into compliance."

North Korea "is a nation that has had a pattern of acting out of line with international agreements and then seeking to be rewarded by the rest of the world. And the president's approach to this matter will remain a diplomatic approach, a matter of steady and steely diplomacy," Fleischer said.

"When you look at the history of North Korea and its dealings with multiple nations around the world, their approach is, the worse they act, the more they get. And that's an approach that this administration will not be a party to," Fleischer said.

Asked if North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT is viewed by the Bush administration as a serious escalation of the situation, Fleischer said "given the fact that North Korea had already acknowledged that it was violating the very treaty that it had signed up to, it comes as no surprise, frankly, that they've made this announcement. Nevertheless, it is disappointing."

And Vice President Dick Cheney said in a Washington speech January 10, "While not unexpected, given North Korea's recent behavior," the announcement by North Korea "is of serious concern to North Korea's neighbors and to the entire international community. Their actions threaten to undermine decades of nonproliferation efforts and only further isolate the regime.

"North Korea's relations with the entire international community depend on their taking prompt and verifiable action to completely dismantle their nuclear weapons program."

In a related development, North Korean diplomats met in New Mexico for a second day with Governor Bill Richardson, who was U.S. ambassador to the United Nations in the first term of former President Bill Clinton. According to news reports, Richardson said the talks were going well. They held a working lunch and were to resume talks in the evening. A final round could be held January 11, the news reports said. Fleischer, asked to comment on those talks, said he assumes Richardson will be reporting directly to the State Department.

## US State Department

### **Powell Says North Korean Disrespect for NPT Must Be Dealt With**

10 January 2002

Secretary of State Colin Powell January 10 condemned North Korea's announced intention to withdraw from the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), but also expressed his desire "to continue to search for a solution."

"The Non-Proliferation Treaty is an important international agreement," Powell told reporters at the State Department, "and this kind of disrespect for such an agreement cannot go undealt with."

The current diplomatic impasse is the result of North Korea's failure to comply with international obligations under the NPT regime and its failure to adhere to the 1994 Agreed Framework between North Korea and the United States, the secretary said, and not by any action taken by the international community or the United States.

Powell delivered his remarks following a January 10 meeting with Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in which ElBaradei briefed the secretary on proliferation issues relating to North Korea and Iraq. ElBaradei said North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT "is a very serious issue," because the NPT remains a cornerstone of nuclear arms control. He said "a country cannot just

walk out without ramification, because challenging the integrity of the non-proliferation regime is a matter that can affect international peace and security." The North Koreans must come to realize, he said, "that it is only through compliance and not ... defiance that they will be able to move forward with their needs -- security and otherwise."

While willing to give diplomacy time to succeed, the IAEA Director General also warned that if it does not succeed, the matter will have to be referred to the United Nations Security Council in "a matter of weeks." The invitation to North Korea to cooperate is not open-ended, ElBaradei added.

Powell was asked by a reporter if the situation with North Korea had reached a crisis point. "Characterize it in any way you wish," he replied, "I think it's a very serious situation. The one thing I will say is that we're not going to be intimidated. We're not going to be put into a panic situation." The United States intends to continue consulting with its friends and allies, he said, in an effort to reach a diplomatic solution.

The secretary was also asked about information he had received about the January 9-10 meeting in Santa Fe, New Mexico, between Governor Bill Richardson and representatives of the North Korean government. Powell said he had spoken by telephone with the former energy secretary and U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, and that Richardson would call again at the conclusion of his meetings with the North Koreans to give a full report. [...]

### The Observer

#### **North Korea threatens to resume missile tests**

Pyongyang has escalated the stand-off with the US by resuming tests of weapons which could reach California

Jonathan Watts in Tokyo, Jane Burgermeister in Vienna, Ed Vulliamy in New York – 12 January 2003

North Korea issued a terrifying new threat yesterday to resume test launches of missiles capable of reaching Alaska, Hawaii and, possibly, the Western seaboard of the United States.

Coming a day after the North became the first country to pull out of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, the test plan represents a dangerous escalation of the three-month long crisis by bringing Pyongyang closer to the development of nuclear weapons that can be delivered into the heartlands of its greatest enemy.

North Korean ambassador to China, Choe Jin-su, blamed Washington for invalidating deals made by the North, including a 1999 moratorium on missiles tests.

'Because all agreements have been nullified by the United States side, we believe we cannot go along with the self-imposed missile moratorium any longer,' Choe told a press conference in Beijing. 'The development, test, deployment and export of our missiles entirely belong to our sovereignty.'

The missile warning raises the stakes in a nuclear standoff in which the United States increasingly appears to have lost the initiative since cutting off part of the Pyongyang's oil supplies and ordering the seizure of a ship carrying North Korea missiles to Yemen last December.

Although Friday's withdrawal from the treaty shocked the world, it represented a diplomatic rather than a military escalation of the crisis. More missiles tests, on the other hand, would pose far more of a strategic threat.

The latest warning is likely to send a chill across the Pacific and, in particular, alarm Japan, which suffered a panic in August 1998 when the North launched a prototype two-stage missile over its territory.

That rocket, the taepo-dong, is believed to have the range to reach Alaska and Hawaii. Analysts believe the North is now developing intercontinental missiles that could hit Los Angeles and San Francisco.

CIA reports suggest that the North has already squirreled away enough plutonium to build two bombs, but this may not be the biggest threat. According to Japanese defence agency officials, Pyongyang does not yet have the miniaturisation technology to mount a heavy nuclear warhead on these missiles, but the North could deliver other weapons of mass destruction from its extensive stockpiles of deadly chemical and biological agents.

Having kicked out international inspectors and restarted a plutonium-producing reactor at the Yongbyon plant, the North has also cleared the way for the development of more atomic bombs within months.

Its withdrawal from the non-proliferation treaty raises the possibility that the regime could sell any plutonium or uranium arms which it develops on the open market either to rogue regimes or terrorist groups such as Osama Bin Laden's al-Qaeda.

North Korea said yesterday that its plutonium-producing nuclear reactor at Yongbyon would be on-stream in two weeks' time and, more ominously, made it clear that a reprocessing plant - which could process spent fuel rods for nuclear weapons - was also ready for operation.

Pyongyang's ambassador to the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency, Kim Gwang Sop, said the North was entitled to nuclear weapons if it was being threatened by nuclear weapons.

'We are a member of the United Nations and yet we are branded a part of an axis of evil, and are singled out by the US as a target for pre-emptive nuclear attack,' said Kim Gwang-sop, who added that he was 'very afraid' of the deteriorating situation.

So far, however, the North is insisting that it will only use the Yongbyon plant to generate energy and offset the loss of oil supplies from the US, believed to account for about 8 per cent of the country's electricity output.

Although sources in Pyongyang say the North Korean capital is regularly plunged into near darkness caused by the lack of power, Pyongyang's claim is seen as disingenuous because the 5KW reactor at Yongbyon is too small to make a significant difference and it will take several months before it can be fired up again.

Diplomats in the South believe that the North has ratcheted up the tension to strengthen its hand in negotiations aimed at securing Pyongyang's long-stated goal of a non-aggression treaty with Washington that would guarantee the survival of Kim Jong-il's regime.

The US reacted with further harsh condemnation at the brazen challenge to both international nuclear testing arrangements, and the non-proliferation treaty.

But yesterday both Vice-President Dick Cheney and Secretary of State Colin Powell avoided remarks about the potential consequences of North Korea's actions. In conversation, their aides were reluctant to coin the crisis in terms of a showdown, which is particularly surprising in the case of Cheney, usually a leading hawk on the issue. 'There can be no room for tolerance or negotiation,' said one aide, 'but the situation has to be managed.'

A spokesman for the State Department in Washington said the US was 'freshly alarmed' by the new threat, which intelligence sources believe could lead to the production of a warhead 'within weeks rather than months'.

But, in contrast to its position of all-out confrontation with Iraq, the US administration is trying to find ways of defusing a crisis that could have it fighting on two international fronts.

'It won't be a negotiation', promised White House spokesman Ari Fleischer, accusing the North Koreans of unilaterally 'walking out' on international nuclear agreements. But the White House also urges 'steady steely diplomacy' in the face of North Korea's latest threat.

Cheney said on Friday that the Koreans were 'taking advantage' of a situation when the attention of the UN 'is right now focused very much on the Middle East and on the situation in Iraq'.

In a typically unorthodox move, the North has sent envoys to New Mexico governor Bill Richardson - a former US ambassador - to convey their position to the United States. The North has also set a date for ministerial-level talks with South Korea on 21 January.

Emphasising that Pyongyang was ready to bargain, Choe said the next move depended on the US. 'Whatever we do in the future depends on the United States. If the United States fails to change its attitude, this issue may be complicated.'

Guardian

### **Bush does u-turn in effort to end Korea crisis**

Suzanne Goldenberg in Washington and Jonathan Watts in Tokyo  
Wednesday January 15, 2003

President George Bush offered food and energy aid to North Korea yesterday as an incentive to dismantle its nuclear weapons programme.

The promise is a u-turn in the Bush administration's hardline approach which had ruled out any negotiations to reward Pyongyang's "nuclear blackmail".

It ends three months of stonewalling from the Bush administration after the North's admission that it was pursuing a clandestine uranium enrichment programme in defiance of international agreements.

The offer came on a day when North Korea threatened another escalation in the crisis, warning it would exercise new "options" and resume testing long-range missiles.

Mr Bush said yesterday he was open to reviving an aid package for North Korea he had been discussing with the Secretary of State, Colin Powell, before Pyongyang provoked the crisis last October by admitting its weapons programme.

"We expect this issue to be resolved peacefully," Mr Bush told reporters. "If they so choose to do so - their choice - then I will reconsider whether or not we'll start the bold initiative that I talked to Secretary Powell about."

The president offered no details on the aid that could be forthcoming. In recent weeks, World Food Programme officials have warned that hundreds of thousands in the North could go hungry this winter because of a shortfall in international donations.

The promise of a review of energy aid goes to the heart of the North's grievances with Washington - that it failed to fulfil promises to build power reactors to compensate Pyongyang for shutting down its nuclear programme in 1994.

The abrupt change in policy arrives at a time when conservative commentators in Washington had condemned the administration's approach as ill-conceived.

There were fears that the deepening crisis in Asia would complicate Washington's objective of an early war against Iraq.

The reversal of US policy was flagged on Monday when a spokesman for Mr Bush said that Washington was prepared to hold "technical" talks with junior North Korean officials as a prelude to more serious negotiations. The White House also welcomed an offer yesterday from Pyongyang's nominal ally, China, to host such talks. The apparent softening of Washington's stance coincided with a flurry of diplomatic initiatives to ease the crisis.

Russia announced that it would send an envoy to Pyongyang, Beijing and Washington to seek a solution.

"In the last few days certain hopeful steps and statements have emerged which I would say look to return the situation to what it was before the current crisis," said the Russian defence minister, Sergei Ivanov.

Pyongyang has maintained a willingness to negotiate. Yesterday, it welcomed a delegation of Australian diplomats to discuss the standoff and a UN ambassador to review the impact of the US and Japan halting food aid.

But it also issued a warning that it was prepared for a further escalation. "If the US responds to the DPRK's recent exercise of its option with new sanctions, it will exercise the second and third corresponding options," commented the Rodong Sinmun, the North's leading state newspaper.

## Washington Post

### **Koreas Set Dates for High-Level Talks**

By Hans Gremiel - Associated Press Writer

Wednesday, January 15, 2003; 8:25 AM

PANMUNJOM, Korea — North and South Korea set dates for high-level talks on Wednesday, boosting the diplomatic drive for a peaceful solution to a nuclear dispute despite signs the North has increased military patrols near its border with the South.

South Korea accepted the North's proposal to hold the talks on Jan. 21-24, a week later than suggested by South Korea, said Kim Jung-ro, a spokesman at the South's Unification Ministry.

South Korean officials have said they would use the talks to persuade North Korea to give up its nuclear ambitions.

The Koreas have held eight rounds of Cabinet-level talks since a historic summit of their leaders in 2000.

The announcement that the two Koreas would hold a round of Cabinet-level meetings later this month was matched by hopeful comments by U.S. envoy James Kelly, who said before meetings in Beijing he was "reassured" by efforts to persuade the North to give up its nuclear weapons development.

The reclusive regime in Pyongyang, however, kept up its drumbeat of anti-American invective through the state-run media, blaming nuclear proliferation on the United States and accusing Washington of using its weapons to threaten and blackmail other nations.

Tensions on the peninsula have been rising since North Korea admitted in October to having a secret nuclear program. Last week the communist regime announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and threatened to begin testing missiles again.

South Korean officials have said they would use all inter-Korean contacts to persuade North Korea to give up its nuclear ambitions. The upcoming talks would be the ninth round the two countries have had since a North-South summit in June 2000 and the first since October.

While the North has maintained its antagonistic stance against the United States, it has not made any alarming moves on the ground.

The U.S. military has spotted increased patrols by North Korean soldiers over the past week in one area of the Demilitarized Zone dividing the Korean Peninsula, said Lt. Col. Matthew Margotta, who commands a combined battalion of U.S. and South Korean soldiers.

But the moves in the 2½-mile-wide, 156-mile-long DMZ were "not alarming, just unusual," and were probably "triggered by a heightening of tensions," Margotta said.

The North Koreans have also occupied a guard tower in the DMZ that hadn't been used in years, he said.

In a speech Wednesday at the Yongsan command headquarters for U.S. troops in South Korea, President-elect Roh Moo-hyun called the U.S.-South Korean alliance the "driving force" for security in the region.

"We can never accept North Korea's nuclear weapons program," Roh said, calling for an international diplomatic effort to defuse the standoff. "The South Korean-U.S. alliance should be the basis for this effort," he said.

The United States keeps 37,000 troops based in South Korea, and the accidental killing of two teenage girls by American GIs driving a military vehicle has increased calls that the force be scaled down.

In Beijing, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly went into talks at the Chinese Foreign Ministry saying he was optimistic about international efforts to peacefully resolve the confrontation.

China has offered to host negotiations between the United States and North Korea.

"I'm very reassured," said Kelly, who arrived from Seoul on Tuesday night. "We have to keep talking with each other to make sure that things are done in the best possible way."

On Wednesday, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohamed ElBaradei, urged Russia to become involved in the diplomatic efforts, saying Moscow could play a "vital role."

North Korea has been issuing daily diatribes against the United States through its state-run media. On Wednesday, Pyongyang's KCNA news agency rejected international concern over its nuclear programs and said nuclear proliferation was started by the United States.

"In 1945, the U.S. produced three A-bombs and tested one of them in its mainland and dropped the other two on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, inflicting nuclear holocaust on the Japanese for the first time in human history," the dispatch said.

The United States and other countries are now trying to shift the blame to North Korea and pressuring it to rejoin the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, said the report, monitored in Seoul.

As part of its efforts, Washington has taken a more conciliatory approach.

President Bush said on Tuesday that he would consider reviving a proposal offering substantial economic benefits for North Korea if it agrees to dismantle its nuclear weapons facilities.

The administration had been prepared to make such an offer last year but withdrew it after learning that the North Koreans had initiated a uranium-based nuclear weapons program.

In talks earlier this week in Seoul, Kelly indicated the United States might help North Korea meet its energy needs if the nuclear issue is resolved.



## COMMENTAAR EN VRAGEN

De huidige crisis rondom Noord-Korea is niet de eerste, zoals blijkt uit de documenten in deze uitgave. De vorige confrontatie in 1994 werd opgelost doordat de Amerikaanse regering van president Clinton een hoge afgezant, voormalig president Carter, stuurde om te onderhandelen. De afspraken die daar uitkwamen (het 'DPRK-US Agreed Framework') vormde de basis voor een proces dat moest uitmonden in een alternatieve energiebron voor de Noordkoreaanse regering en het afzien van dat land van de mogelijkheid om kernwapens te ontwikkelen. Er waren diverse vertragingen in het uitvoeren van dat verdrag, met name in de bouw van twee kernreactoren waarmee geen verrijkt uranium kon worden geproduceerd en de leverantie van olie als alternatieve energiebron.

Onder de regering Bush trad vanaf 2001 een snelle verslechtering van de relaties op, die uitmondde in de 'State of the Union', de toespraak van Bush van januari 2002, waar Noord Korea samen met Irak en Iran werden gedefinieerd als een 'axis of evil'. Ondanks inspanningen van zowel de Europese Unie als Zuid-Korea, die geen heil zagen in een confrontatiepolitiek, verslechterde de economische situatie van Noord-Korea zodanig dat de regering van Kim Jong Il zijn toevlucht nam tot een oude tactiek: het dreigen met de ontwikkeling van kernwapens en draagsystemen die de VS konden bereiken. Dat dreigement werd kracht bijgezet op 10 januari 2003 toen de Noordkoreaanse regering uit het Non-Proliferatie Verdrag stapte. Aangezien ze dat in 1994 al had afgekondigd volgens de regels in het verdrag (een waarschuwingstermijn van drie maanden) zag ze dit als voltooiing van het al eerder op gang gezette maar volgens Noord Korea geschorst proces. Overigens heeft de Noordkoreaanse regering verklaart dat ze geen kernwapens zullen produceren.

De diplomatieke gevolgen zijn echter zwaarwegend: de NPV is een belangrijke verdedigingslijn tegen de proliferatie van nucleaire wapens en de technologie om die wapens te maken. Zoals we al in eerdere afleveringen van F&R aantoonde wordt dit verdrag door de officiële kernwapenstaten, de Verenigde Staten voorop, uitsluitend geïnterpreteerd als een mechanisme om de verspreiding van kernwapens naar andere landen te verhinderen. De garanties en beloftes voor nucleaire ontwapening van dezelfde kernwapenstaten, die ook herhaaldelijk zijn gedaan de afgelopen jaren tijdens opeenvolgende conferenties en in resoluties aangenomen in de Verenigde Naties, zijn aan het zicht onttrokken. De immense nucleaire wapenvoorraden van de kernwapenstaten, die nog steeds duizenden kernkoppen omvatten, spelen geen rol in de publiciteit: de VS alleen heeft 7000 strategische kernwapens.

Als de belangrijkste kernmogendheid maakte de VS bovendien in 2002 een beleid bekend dat vasthoudt aan die kernwapens en een strategie om ze als eerste te gebruiken, waarmee internationale verdragen voor wapenbeheersing systematisch worden afgebroken.

Tegen die achtergrond is de afbeelding van Irak en Noord Korea als gevaarlijke boevenstaten bijzonder wrang. Zoals uit de documenten en rapporten in deze publicatie blijkt hebben zowel de Europese Unie en Zuid-Korea gepleit voor een proces van diplomatieke interactie, niet confrontatie, met Noord-Korea. Dat alternatief voor de Amerikaanse confrontatiepolitiek is van belang en zou moeten worden voortgezet.

### Vragen

1. Wat is de positie van de Nederlandse regering in de huidige crisis?
2. Welke stappen worden door Nederland en/of de EU ondernomen om tot een diplomatieke oplossing van de crisis te komen?

## KRONIEK 2003

20 januari-28 maart	Conference on Disarmament, Geneve
21-23 januari	EU Commissie buitenlandse zaken, mensenrechten, gemeenschappelijke veiligheid en defensiebeleid, Brussel
22 januari	Tweede Kamerverkiezingen in Nederland
27-28 januari	EU Commissie buitenlandse zaken, mensenrechten, gemeenschappelijke veiligheid en defensiebeleid, Brussel
28 januari	Laatste dag verkiezingsreces
6-7 februari	Jaarlijkse Munich Security Conference
18-19 februari	EU Commissie buitenlandse zaken, mensenrechten, gemeenschappelijke veiligheid en defensiebeleid, Brussel
20-21 februari	OVSE Parlementaire Assemblée winterbijeenkomst in Wenen
28 februari-9 maart	NPT PrepCom, Geneve
11 maart	Provinciale Statenverkiezingen in Nederland
17-19 maart	EU Commissie buitenlandse zaken, mensenrechten, gemeenschappelijke veiligheid en defensiebeleid, Brussel
24-25 maart	EU Commissie buitenlandse zaken, mensenrechten, gemeenschappelijke veiligheid en defensiebeleid, Brussel
28-30 april	EU Commissie buitenlandse zaken, mensenrechten, gemeenschappelijke veiligheid en defensiebeleid, Brussel
12-16 mei	8 <sup>e</sup> Sessie van de OPCW Conference of the States Parties, Den Haag
20-22 mei	EU Commissie buitenlandse zaken, mensenrechten, gemeenschappelijke veiligheid en defensiebeleid, Brussel
24-28 mei	NAVO Parlementaire Assemblée in Praag
30 mei	Gezamenlijke EU-G8 bijeenkomst, Sint Petersburg
1-2 juni	G8-bijeenkomst in Evain-les-Bains (ovb)
2-4 juni	WEU Assemblée, Parijs
10-11 juni	EU Commissie buitenlandse zaken, mensenrechten, gemeenschappelijke veiligheid en defensiebeleid, Brussel
12-27 juni	Conference on Disarmament, Geneve
16-17 juni	EU Commissie buitenlandse zaken, mensenrechten, gemeenschappelijke veiligheid en defensiebeleid, Brussel
5-9 juli	12 <sup>e</sup> OVSE Parlementaire Assemblée in Rotterdam
7-8 juli	EU Commissie buitenlandse zaken, mensenrechten, gemeenschappelijke veiligheid en defensiebeleid, Brussel
11 juli-24 augustus	Reces Europees Parlement
15-19 september	IAEA General Conference in Wenen
28 augustus-10 sept	Conference on Disarmament, Geneve
7-11 november	NAVO Parlementaire Assemblée in Orlando
10-14 november	BWC States Parties bijeenkomst, Geneve
1-3 december	WEU Assemblée, Parijs

## FACTS AND REPORTS

Eerder verschenen in de reeks PENN – NL Facts and Reports:

1. US unilateralism – official foreign comments  
Citaten van internationale politici en diplomaten over het Amerikaans unilateralisme.
2. Veiligheidsvraagstukken en de verkiezingen – standpunten van de politieke partijen  
Relevante delen van de partijprogramma's van de Nederlandse politieke partijen, plus citaten van politici op het terrein van oorlog en vrede.
3. Transatlantic relations – recent developments  
Overzicht van recente ontwikkelingen in de transatlantische betrekkingen, met name binnen de NAVO, mede naar aanleiding van uitspraken in de State of the Union.
4. Ontwikkelingen betreffende kernwapens en de Nederlandse politiek – briefing paper  
Periodiek overzicht van ontwikkelingen rond kernwapens in de internationale en nationale politiek, met uitgebreide hoeveelheid bijlagen.
5. Nucleaire vraagstukken – standpunten van de Nederlandse regering en de Tweede Kamer  
Overzicht april 2001 – april 2002
6. Crisis in de OPCW – de verwijdering van directeur-generaal Bustani  
Documenten en artikelen over het ontslag van directeur-generaal Bustani van het OPCW
7. Prepcom van het NPV – nucleaire ontwapening stopt  
Verklaringen en rapporten van staten en ngo's tijdens de Prepcom van het NPV
8. Verdrag van Moskou – détente tussen Rusland en Verenigde Staten  
Informatie over het Verdrag van Moskou, ontwikkelingen daaromheen en commentaar erop
9. Joint Strike Fighter – achtergrondberichten  
De belangrijkste achtergrondberichten over de vervanging van de F16 uit de Nederlandse pers.
10. Konfrontatie in Zuid-Azië – de kernwapenwedloop tussen India en Pakistan  
Basisgegevens over de nucleaire strijdkrachten en doctrines van India en Pakistan, Nederlandse wapenexport en wapenexportbeleid en een oproep om een nucleair treffen te voorkomen
11. Massavernietigingswapens in het Midden-Oosten (1) – Egypte, Israël, Syrië  
Basisinformatie over de proliferatie van nucleaire, biologische en chemische wapens in Egypte, Israël en Syrië en verklaringen van de Nederlandse regering hierover
12. Amerikaans unilateralisme II – officiële reacties  
Citaten van internationale politici, diplomaten en NGO's over het Amerikaans unilateralisme.
13. Aanval op Irak – de kwestie van de massavernietigingswapens; feiten, documenten en overwegingen
14. Aanval op Irak (2) – recente ontwikkelingen
15. Documenten First Committee Verenigde Naties 2002 – resoluties, verklaringen, rapporten
16. De NAVO-top in Praag – documenten
17. Aanval op Irak (3) – het inspectieregime
18. Internationaal veiligheidsbeleid Verenigde Staten – officiële documenten en reacties van de Nederlandse regering
19. Veiligheidsvraagstukken en de verkiezingen (2) – standpunten van de politieke partijen  
Een update voor de verkiezingen van 22 januari 2003

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