



# Werkgroep Eurobom

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## FACTS AND REPORTS

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### **IRAAKSE MASSAVERNIETIGINGSWAPENS**

De beweringen

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## Citaten Nederlandse Regering en Tweede Kamer

**Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken:** “Het is niet aan de regering om een oordeel uit te spreken over uitspraken van leden van de Amerikaanse regering over de redenen die in de VS hebben geleid tot militair ingrijpen. De regering heeft gezien de reële dreiging die uitging van bezit door Irak van massavernietigingswapens zelf vanaf het eerste begin militair ingrijpen niet willen uitsluiten, na aflopen van het VN-traject als ‘ultimum remedium’, om een einde te maken aan de inbreuken van Irak op de verplichtingen die dit land door de Veiligheidsraad waren opgelegd. Nadat de regering tot het oordeel was gekomen dat Irak bovendien inbreuk maakte op zijn verplichtingen in termen van VR-resolutie 1441, door namelijk na te laten door actieve medewerking met de VN-inspecteurs de laatste kans te grijpen om de wereldgemeenschap te overtuigen dat het zijn arsenaal aan massavernietigingswapens had ontmanteld, is daaruit het besluit gevolgd om aan militair ingrijpen politieke steun te verlenen.”

(Beantwoording Kamervragen Koenders, DVB/NN-193/03, 6 juni 2003)

## Citaten Amerikaanse en Britse regering

**Foreign Secretary Jack Straw:** “Now will we go on to find further evidence? Yes, I believe that we will but on your other question about did Saddam destroy some of this evidence, yes he almost certainly did do. And my own opinion about this is that he unquestionably had these weapons systems but that he'd also asserted and lied to the international community that he hadn't got them and I believe that there was therefore a pretty substantial effort being put in, in the run up to military action, to disperse, to hide a lot of this stuff and to deceive the international community even after military action was over. So will the search reveal things? Yes I think it will. Will the search be difficult? Also yes.”

(Interview on BBC Breakfast, 1 June 2003)

**Colin Powell, Secretary of State:** “Well, there are smoking guns all over. Remember, Iraq has weapons of mass destruction. We found them in 1991. The inspectors found them when they went in. We destroyed some of their weapons of mass destruction in 1991. They have weapons of mass destruction, they've had them, they used them against Iran. That is not disputable. They used weapons of mass destruction against their own people. We know that they threw the inspectors out in 1998 rather than let the inspectors find more weapons of mass destruction.

(Interview with Canale 5, Rome, 2 June 2003)

**Prime Minister Tony Blair:** “I stand absolutely 100% behind the evidence, based on intelligence, that we presented to people, and let me just make one or two things clear. Firstly the idea that we doctored intelligence reports in order to invent some notion about a 45 minute capability of delivering weapons of mass destruction, the idea that we doctored such intelligence is completely and totally false. Every single piece of intelligence that we presented was cleared very properly by the Joint Intelligence Committee. Secondly, the idea, as apparently Clare Short is saying, that I made some secret agreement with George Bush back last September that we would invade Iraq in any event at a particular time, is also completely and totally untrue. What I have explained to people is that we are 5 or 6 weeks after the end of the conflict, the first priority has been to re-establish the basic humanitarian services for people in Iraq. In relation to weapons of mass destruction, there is an international survey group that is going in, actually starting its work this week. They will be interviewing scientists and experts, they will be investigating the sites. When we accumulate that evidence properly we will give it to people. And I simply say to you that the British intelligence services are amongst the best and finest in the world, and the idea that Saddam Hussein has for 12 years been obstructing the UN weapons and inspectors, has been engaged in this huge battle with the international community, when all the way along he had actually destroyed these weapons, is completely absurd. So I simply ask people to just have a little patience. There is a process in place, it will take some time to carry out, but when we get the results of it we will put it before people.”

(Press availability, Evian, 2 June 2003)

**Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz:** “The notion that the war was ever about oil is a complete piece of nonsense. If the United States had been interested in Iraq's oil, it would have been very simple 12 years ago or any time in the last 12 years to simply do a deal with Saddam Hussein. We probably could have had any kind of preferred customer status we wanted if we'd been simply willing to drop our real concerns. Our real concerns focused on the threat posed by that country -- not only its weapons of mass destruction, but also its support for terrorism and, most importantly, the link between those two things. [...] We -- as the whole world knows -- have in fact found some significant evidence to confirm exactly what Secretary Powell said when he spoke to the United Nations about the development of mobile biological weapons production facilities that would seem to confirm fairly precisely the information we received from several defectors, one in particular who described the program in some detail. But I wouldn't suggest we've gotten to the bottom of the whole story yet.”  
(Media Availability at the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, 3 June 2003)

**President George W. Bush:** “We recently found two mobile biological weapons facilities which were capable of producing biological agents. This is a man who spent decades hiding tools of mass murder. He knew the inspectors were looking for them. You know better than me he's got a big country in which to hide them. We're on the look. We'll reveal the truth.  
But one thing is certain: no terrorist network will gain weapons of mass destruction from the Iraqi regime, because the Iraqi regime is no more.”  
(Remarks to the troops, Camp As Sayliyah, Qatar, 5 June 2003)

**Ari Fleischer, White House Press Secretary:** “No, I think the facts on the ground show that in the United States' conduct of the war we had good reason to worry about Iraq's possession of weapons of mass destruction, particularly when you found Iraqi troops with chemical weapons protection gear of their own, when they had atropine, which is used to inoculate against the effects of a chemical attack.”  
(White House daily briefing, 9 June 2003)

**President George W. Bush:** “I mean, Iraq had a weapons program. Intelligence throughout the decade showed they had a weapons program. I am absolutely convinced with time we'll find out that they did have a weapons program.”  
(Remarks by the President, White House, 9 June 2003)

**Donald Rumsfeld, Defense Secretary:** “Iraq is a country the size of France. A weapon of mass destruction might be the size of this podium. Finding something the size of this podium in a country the size of France is not something you can do in either a day or a month. But obviously Iraq today is no longer the threat to either the region or to the world that it was when Saddam Hussein was in power.”  
(Joint press conference with Portuguese Minister Paolo Portas, 10 June 2003)

**Colin Powell, Secretary of State:** “[...] the President asked me to make the definitive statement on the view of the United States with respect to weapons of mass destruction, and I did that before the Security Council on the 5th of February. We stand by that statement and we are continuing our work in Iraq with the exploitation of documents, with the interrogation of individuals who may have knowledge of these weapons of mass destruction programs, and with onsite inquiries as well, and more experts are going in. And I think one should be careful about making judgments as to what was hyped or not hyped until the exploitation is finished.”  
(Remarks with Kofi Annan after their meeting, Washington DC, 11 June 2003)

# Nieuwsberichten

CNN

## **Report: UK's WMD source top Iraqi**

5 June 2003

LONDON, England (CNN) --British leaders argued for war against Iraq because their sole source was a member of the Iraqi military service at the time, it was claimed Thursday.

The military figure, who has not been revealed, was a trusted source of information for Britain over a number of years, a senior Whitehall official told London's Financial Times.

He told the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) that Iraq was capable of deploying biological and chemical warheads within 45 minutes. The information was passed on last August to politicians.

The claim, contained in the government's dossier on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, has become the chief test of whether ministers "duped" the British public over the need for war.

UK Prime Minister Tony Blair is under extreme pressure from critics who question the government's reasoning for the war, accusing them of doctoring information to come up with 45-minute capability line.

U.N. inspectors found no evidence before the U.S.-led invasion in March that Iraq had reconstituted its chemical, biological or nuclear weapons programs, chief U.N. inspector Hans Blix said Thursday.

The British government has been accused of relying on information given by an "unreliable" source of the U.S., an Iraqi defector with contacts with the Iraqi opposition movement.

But the FT said: "Whitehall officials in two departments said last night the evidence of the 45-minute capability had come from a serving Iraqi officer with a record for providing reliable data over years."

Defense minister Adam Ingram admitted last month that the 45-minute argument was based on a single source which had not been corroborated.

Intelligence sought to find a second source but was unable to do so, the FT added.

"However, the JIC was prepared to rely on a single source because the official was a senior figure in Mr Hussein's regime, not a defector," the paper said.

Blair told a heated Prime Minister's Question Time Wednesday that accusations of doctoring the dossier was "completely untrue."

"All the allegations that are being made are completely without substance," he told the House of Commons. "It is completely and totally untrue."

He added: "The truth is some people resent the fact it was right to go to conflict and we won the conflict... Iraq is now free and we should be proud of that."

The JIC distributed the information through official channels, making it impossible to argue that the dossier had been "sexed up," the officials added.

Blair has refused calls by the opposition Conservative and Liberal Democrats parties to set up of an independent judicial inquiry into the way the government had presented its intelligence assessment of Saddam's WMD capability.

But a parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee have been asked to carry out an inquiry.

Critics of the government have pointed to the lack of evidence unearthed in Iraq proving Saddam had WMD. Blair said he is still confident the weapons will be found, and has urged more patience.

The U.S. has upped its search team, sending the Iraq Survey Group, made up of 1,400 UK, U.S. and Australian officials to Baghdad.

Der Spiegel

## **ABC-Waffen im Irak**

"Unredliche Aussagen von ganz oben"

8 June 2003

Im Streit um Beweise für irakische Massenvernichtungswaffen hat ein ehemaliger Topbeamter des US-Außenministeriums schwere Vorwürfe gegen die Regierung von George Bush erhoben. Das Weiße Haus habe Geheimdienstinformationen verzerrt und Vermutungen als erwiesene Tatsachen dargestellt.

Washington - "Was mich bedrückt, sind die meiner Meinung nach unredlichen Aussagen von ganz oben darüber, was die Geheimdienste sagten", so Greg Thielmann, der bis September im Büro für Geheimdienste und Forschung des US-Außenministeriums arbeitete. Bis zu seiner Pensionierung leitete er dort die Abteilung für strategische und militärische Angelegenheiten.

Thielmanns Abteilung erhielt alle Informationen der CIA und anderer Geheimdienste über Waffenprogramme in Irak. Diese Informationen habe die Regierung in unzulässiger Weise zugespitzt, sagte Thielmann. "Am weitesten ging die Verzerrung im Bereich der Atomwaffen". Die Beweislage dafür sei sehr viel dürftiger gewesen, als die Regierung vorgegeben habe.

Als Beispiel nannte Thielmann eine Rede von US-Präsident George W. Bush, in der dieser erklärte, Irak habe versucht, Uran aus Afrika zu kaufen. Bush berief sich damals auf europäische Geheimdienste, die Briefe zwischen Irak und Niger abgefangen hätten. Die Briefe wurden inzwischen als Fälschung erkannt. Thielmann zufolge war die Information über den Urankauf aber schon Monate vor Bushs Rede für zweifelhaft erklärt worden. "Ich war sehr erstaunt, dass diese Information der Öffentlichkeit in den USA und der ganzen Welt verkündet wurde", sagte Thielmann.

### **Mutmaßungen als Fakten verkauft**

Dem CIA-Chef George Tenet warf der pensionierte Beamte vor, Vermutungen als Fakten dargestellt zu haben. Tenet teilte im Februar dem Geheimdienstausschuss des Senats mit, Irak besitze noch immer Scud-Raketen aus der Zeit vor dem Golfkrieg von 1991. Tatsächlich sei dies eine bloße Vermutung der Geheimdienste gewesen, weil der Verbleib einiger Raketen aus dem Waffenarsenal Saddam Husseins für sie nicht ersichtlich gewesen sei, sagte Thielmann. Es hätte aber genauso gut sein können, dass sie zerstört wurden.

Thielmann betonte, auch er habe angenommen, dass Irak chemische und vermutlich auch biologische Waffen besitze. Er sei sehr erstaunt, dass die US-Streitkräfte in Irak bisher nicht fündig wurden. "Wir scheinen uns geirrt zu haben", sagte er. "Das hat mich wirklich überrascht."

Erst am Freitag hatte das Pentagon zugegeben, dass es vor dem Krieg keine zuverlässigen Beweise für die Existenz irakischer Chemiewaffen hatte. Der militärische Geheimdienst DIA habe schon im vergangenen September eingeräumt, dass es keinen eindeutigen Beleg dafür gebe. Zu diesem Zeitpunkt hatte Bush aber bereits mit dem Argument der Bedrohung durch Massenvernichtungswaffen für einen Angriff auf Irak geworben.

### BBC News

#### **No 10 admits dossier failings**

8 June 2003

The British Government wrote to the intelligence and security services to admit there were failings in its controversial second dossier on Iraq's weapons, it has emerged.

A Downing Street spokesman said Alastair Campbell, Prime Minister Tony Blair's director of communications, told the agencies "far greater care" would be taken in dealing with anything which might impact on their reputation and work.

February's dossier - the second on Iraq - was widely criticised when it emerged part of it was copied from a 12-year-old thesis by an American student.

The first document to make the case for war, published last September, is being investigated by MPs.

Downing Street has denied Mr Campbell's intervention amounts to an apology.

The minister is under increasing pressure over the way the government made the case for war in Iraq with coalition forces yet to find weapons of mass destruction.

The Conservatives have repeatedly called for an independent inquiry into whether intelligence documents were changed on the orders of Downing Street to strengthen the case for military action.

Meanwhile, intelligence officers are holding a "smoking gun" showing they came under pressure for evidence to use against Iraq in the run-up to the conflict, it is reported.

The Independent on Sunday says intelligence services were so concerned about demands made by Downing Street they kept detailed records of communications with the prime minister's staff.

The Sunday Telegraph reported Mr Campbell wrote a personal letter to Sir Richard Dearlove, chief of the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6).

The paper claims senior intelligence officers were furious the document had been made up of their own information combined with other sources.

In response to the paper's story, a Downing Street spokesman said: "Like many other stories on weapons of mass destruction, this one is totally overblown.

"What happened in the wake of the controversy surrounding the second dossier was that Alastair Campbell spoke to those who had been responsible for its production to demand tighter procedures.

"He also assured the (intelligence) agencies that far greater care would be taken in dealing with anything that might impact on their reputation or their work."

The spokesman added: "Alastair is on excellent terms with the head of the Secret Intelligence Service."

Downing Street said it would not characterise it as a "letter of apology".

But a Conservative Party spokesman said: "We don't need an apology from Alastair Campbell - what we need is an independent inquiry into what was going on in Number 10 over the presentation of intelligence reports."

And Tory leader Iain Duncan Smith told BBC One's Breakfast with Frost programme: "The government's credibility, the prime minister's credibility is on the line because nobody believes what he says anymore.

"The only way to clear that up, and to make sure that our troops and our intelligence services are trusted in the next few years during the reconstruction, is to have an independent inquiry."

Chancellor Gordon Brown insisted that "the evidence and history will prove that Tony Blair made a courageous and the right decision over Iraq".

"I believe that all countries, when we passed the UN resolution... believed that there were and are weapons of mass destruction," he told the programme.

Home Secretary David Blunkett said: "I think it would have been better if we hadn't published that dossier because it was about the background to Iraq - it wasn't about the identification of WMD."

The letter had been "an honest appraisal" by Mr Campbell, but a line should be drawn under the issue, he told BBC's The Politics Show.

The second dossier, entitled Iraq: Its Infrastructure of Concealment, Deception and Intimidation, was distributed to journalists on Mr Blair's trip to Washington to discuss plans for war.

There was a furore when it was revealed parts were lifted from a thesis on the internet.

The Sunday Telegraph claims it was not first cleared by the Joint Intelligence Committee before being published.

That committee approved the first dossier, published in September, which is now subject to an inquiry by the Commons foreign affairs select committee.

The Intelligence and Security Committee is also investigating that report, which the government denies was doctored in order to muster support for war.

A key point of contention in the first dossier was the claim that Iraq could launch a chemical attack in 45 minutes.

Downing Street is standing by the intelligence provided in that report.

## Washington Post

### **Officials Defend Iraq Intelligence**

Rice, Powell Insist Threat Not Inflated

By Walter Pincus – 9 June 2003

The Bush administration's two top foreign policy advisers yesterday said it was the judgment of the U.S. intelligence community that Saddam Hussein possessed chemical and biological weapons and that the president and others did not exaggerate the threat in the months before going to war.

National security adviser Condoleezza Rice described as "revisionist history" recent criticism that senior Bush officials starting with the president may have overstated what was known about Iraq's chemical and biological weapons leading up to the war in March.

"The truth of the matter," Rice said on NBC's "Meet the Press," "is that repeated directors of central intelligence, repeated reports by intelligence agencies around the world, repeated reports by United Nations inspectors asking hard questions of Saddam Hussein, and tremendous efforts by this regime to

conceal and hide what it was doing, clearly give a picture of a regime that had weapons of mass destruction and was determined to conceal them."

She said that Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet believed Iraq had weapons of mass destruction and "the president gets his intelligence from his director of central intelligence." The key judgments of the intelligence community, Rice said on ABC's "This Week," were contained in an October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate that said flatly that "Iraq had weapons of mass destruction" and that Hussein "was continuing to improve his weapons of mass destruction capabilities, that he was hiding these from the world, [and] that there were large, unaccounted-for stockpiles."

Although those judgments of the October report were unequivocal, the backup material in a declassified version of it made public Oct. 4 was less definitive. The backup material said that "accounting and current production capabilities strongly suggest that Iraq maintains a stockpile of chemical agents" and not that it possessed such a stockpile. It also said that Iraq "probably" had concealed items "necessary for continuing its CW [chemical warfare] effort" and was rebuilding dual-use equipment that "could" be diverted to weapons production, not that Baghdad was improving its capabilities.

Rice said Tenet, who had signed off on the October paper, "runs a disciplined process that takes into account the views of different intelligence agencies . . . [and] takes into account differences about this data point or that data point." During one appearance yesterday Rice allowed that it was the "preponderance of evidence" that led to the judgments and that "his programs were active and being reconstituted."

Rice did concede that an inaccurate claim, that Iraq sought to buy uranium in Africa, was included in President Bush's State of the Union message in January. Rice said the White House believed that to be true at the time. But she said the claim, attributed in the speech to the British, was what "the intelligence community said we could say."

When asked about New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof's report in May that some intelligence officials were told in February 2002, almost a year before the president's speech, that the information on the uranium purchase was false, she replied, "Somebody may have known." But she added Iraq tried to buy more uranium and "the important thing . . . [was] the nuclear weapons program did not rest on a document that the British cited."

Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, appearing on the morning talk shows yesterday, also defended the administration's prewar statements and particularly his own speech before the U.N. Security Council on Feb. 5, as representing a "good, solid assessment" of Iraq's weapons programs. And, like Rice, Powell pointed to Tenet saying that Hussein's possession of weapons of mass destruction was "the official judgment of the director of central intelligence who is the one responsible for gathering all this information."

Rice and Powell said they believed the weapons would still turn up as the search in Iraq continues. "I'm sure more evidence and more proof will come forward as we go down the road," Powell said.

Rice said only "a fraction of the [Iraqi] people who were involved" in the weapons programs have been interviewed and "we've always known that the strongest evidence . . . will come from talking to the people who were involved."

Criticism, however, continued yesterday. Sen. Carl M. Levin (D-Mich.), the ranking minority member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said, "There is too much evidence that intelligence was shaded." Levin, who also sits on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, said the possible or probable presence of prohibited weapons in Iraq "was turned into a certainty over and over and over again by the administration."

Levin added that if weapons are not found, "the credibility and reliability of our intelligence is going to be challenged in the future, and it's going to be much more difficult for us to lead the world."

The administration drew support from Rep. Richard A. Gephardt (Mo.), who is running for the Democratic presidential nomination and was a leader in the House when the vote was taken to go to war if necessary. Gephardt pointed out that President Bill Clinton and others in his administration had said during the 1990s that Hussein had weapons of mass destruction.

Even Levin wrote a letter to Clinton in 1998 in which he said he had no doubt Hussein had such weapons. But yesterday Levin said the situation then was different because the U.N. inspectors were not in Iraq, while they were there in March. "We should not have cut those inspections short at that time," Levin said. "We should have allowed those inspections to continue."

In 1998, Clinton decided to tighten the policy of keeping Hussein in isolation by enforcing the "no-fly" zones that prevented him from moving against his neighbors and the Kurdish zones in northern Iraq.

Levin said he expected that Congress would investigate the Iraq intelligence, and Rice said Bush would welcome it. Republican leaders, Levin said, appeared to be resisting the word "investigation, so we'd be happy to call it an inquiry."

The chairman of the Senate intelligence panel, Sen. Pat Roberts (R-Kan.), said that Tenet had agreed to provide "full documentation" of the intelligence material "in regards to Secretary Powell's comments, the president's comments and anybody else's comments."

Roberts also said he wondered what role may have been played by a small unit of analysts set up within the office of Douglas J. Feith, the undersecretary of defense for policy. Their analysis of the Iraqi weapons program went to senior policymakers.

Roberts said he had no evidence that the intelligence was shaded, but he said he has concerns and wants the committee to "do our homework first."

Using a phrase that was associated with the failure to use intelligence correctly and predict the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, Rice described putting together "hundreds and hundreds of dots about the Iraqi program" that led up to "a policy judgment that the president had to make that this was a serious enough threat that it was time to finally do something about this serial abuser of U.N. resolutions. And it is quite clear to me that he was right to do what he did."

Rice confirmed The Washington Post report last week that Vice President Cheney made numerous trips to the CIA, but said it was "simply not true" that it was done to pressure analysts to come around to the administration's viewpoint. "The director of central intelligence has said, and has assured all of us, that he has no evidence or any belief that anybody was pressured at any time to change estimates or to change their assessments," Rice said.

## BBC News

### **"UN team tours Iraq nuclear site"**

9 June 2003

A team from the UN nuclear watchdog is conducting a second day of checks at Iraq's largest nuclear site, Tuwaitha. The seven men from the International Atomic Energy Agency were under close American guard as they carried out their limited assignment in the baking sun.

Their mandate is confined to checking nuclear material against IAEA inventories and securing any nuclear materials lying around, and is not related to nuclear inspection missions undertaken by the IAEA prior to the US-led invasion.

The site was heavily looted for a period during the war, and there has been particular concern about barrels which once stored low-enriched uranium, known as "yellow cake". The barrels were emptied and sold to local people for \$2 each by looters. Many used the barrels to hold drinking water or food, or to wash clothes.

The team spent three hours on Saturday at the Tuwaitha site, which is 50 kilometres (30 miles) south of Baghdad. The visit was agreed after weeks of pleading by the IAEA, which has kept the radiological materials at the site safely under UN seal for 12 years. US soldiers delayed sealing the site even after weeks of looting.

However, members of the UN group - all non-Americans, with expertise ranging from nuclear physics to arms-control analysis - are not authorised to look at issues of health and safety arising from, for example, the misuse of the barrels. They are there solely to verify how much of the 1.8 tonnes of "yellow cake" and 500 tonnes of natural uranium has gone missing.

In preparation for the visit, the Americans ordered villagers to sell back the barrels for \$3 each. The Pentagon says it has so far received about 100 of the 3,000 missing barrels.

The IAEA team is being accompanied at all times by a US weapons body which has already conducted its own checks of the site. It is being transported in a bus driven by a US soldier, and has not been allowed to use neutral UN vehicles.

On Sunday, a Reuters cameraman filming the Tuwaitha visit had his videotape confiscated by US soldiers, who said no media coverage was permitted. The IAEA says it expects the visit to last for about two weeks.



**Bush: 'Absolutely convinced' Iraqi WMD will be found**

Democratic senator says CIA manipulated intelligence

9 June 2003

WASHINGTON (CNN) --Although U.S. search teams in Iraq have so far produced no proof of weapons of mass destruction, President Bush said Monday he remains "absolutely convinced" the evidence will be found.

The president gave brief comments to reporters at a Cabinet meeting hours after a key Democratic senator told CNN he believes the U.S. intelligence community deliberately manipulated intelligence to win support for the war against Iraq.

"Iraq had a weapons program," Bush said. "Intelligence throughout the decade showed they had a weapons program. I am absolutely convinced with time we'll find they did have a weapons program."

While Iraq was permitted to have conventional weapons under U.N. rules, it was clear Bush was referring to the banned weapons of mass destruction -- specifically chemical and biological agents.

Numerous lawmakers, mostly Democrats, have called for an investigation of pre-war intelligence and publicly questioned the veracity of some claims made by members of Bush administration in the months before the United States went to war against Iraq.

Sen. Carl Levin, ranking Democrat on the Armed Services Committee and a member of the Intelligence Committee, told CNN Monday, "I do think there's evidence that the CIA did shade and embellish this information in a number of areas. ...

"We're not sure exactly what all of the facts are at this point. All I am confident of is this: There is significant evidence that the intelligence was shaded in order to support a policy, presumably, of the administration."

CIA Director George Tenet has denied that claim.

The alleged existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq was the central U.S. argument for war.

When asked whether U.S. credibility is at stake in the search for evidence of illicit weapons, Bush replied, "The credibility of this country is based upon our strong desire to make the world more peaceful, and the world is now more peaceful after our decision" to go to war -- a war, he said, that freed the Iraqi people.

Levin, D-Michigan, said he considers it "very likely" that the United States will prove Saddam Hussein did have weapons of mass destruction. But, he said, that is a separate issue from how the Bush administration handled U.S. intelligence on Iraq.

If it was just "a probability or a possibility," rather than a certainty, that Saddam had such weapons, "that's what we should have been told," said Levin. "It seems to me ... there was not certainty about this issue."

Asked for examples, Levin cited claims by Bush advisers that Iraq had imported aluminum tubes as part of a program aimed at building nuclear weapons. The CIA had evidence, he said, that the tubes were meant to serve other, civilian purposes, and there was some "dispute in the intelligence community" over what the tubes were to be used for.

More recently, he said, U.S. officials reported finding vans in Iraq which they said appeared to be part of a biological weapons program. But a "third independent group used by the Department of Defense" determined the vans may not have been part of such an illicit program, Levin said. He argued that the CIA is trying to bury that information.

"We have to be able to rely on intelligence information from the CIA," he said.

While a summary of a September 2002 report from the Defense Intelligence Agency -- the Pentagon's military intelligence wing -- said it had found "no reliable information on whether Iraq is producing and stockpiling chemical weapons," it also said there was intelligence Saddam was dispersing chemical weapons in advance of a possible war.

National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice cautioned against misreading the report or pursuing "revisionist history."

Speaking Sunday to CBS' Face the Nation, she said, "The truth of the matter is that repeated directors of central intelligence, repeated reports by intelligence agencies around the world, repeated reports by U.N. inspectors asking hard questions of Saddam Hussein, and tremendous efforts by this regime to conceal

and hide what it was doing clearly give a picture of a regime that had weapons of mass destruction and was determined to conceal them."

New York Times

### **Committee Criticizes Blair on Iraq Weapons**

10 June 2003

LONDON (AP) -- An influential committee of lawmakers criticized Prime Minister Tony Blair's government Tuesday for publishing a dossier on Iraq's weapons program without first clearing its contents with British intelligence services.

The dossier, which set out evidence about Saddam Hussein's alleged chemical and biological weapons programs, was published early this year. It included material copied from an American student's thesis which was posted on the Internet, causing embarrassment for the government.

The Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee, which oversees the work of Britain's intelligence agencies, said in its annual report that the document had not been endorsed by intelligence chiefs before it was published. It was titled "Iraq: Its Infrastructure of Concealment, Deception and Intimidation."

"We have been assured that systems have now been put in place to ensure that this cannot happen again," the report said.

American and British troops in Iraq have failed to find weapons of mass destruction, after visiting more than 230 suspected sites. The lack of hard evidence has put huge pressure on Washington and London since Saddam's alleged possession of banned weapons was a main U.S. and British justification for invading Iraq.

Another dossier, published in September 2002, also prompted a series of damaging headlines for the British government, amid accusations that it exaggerated the threat posed by Saddam.

That dossier claimed Iraq could fire chemical or biological weapons within 45 minutes of Saddam giving an order to do so. Two parliamentary committees will investigate claims that Blair's office redrafted the document to emphasize the 45 minute readiness, even though intelligence officials allegedly believed the information was unreliable.

Blair has denied that allegation and insisted it was approved.

"The fact is there is not a shred of evidence, absolutely no evidence at all, that we have doctored or manipulated intelligence. That would be absolutely gross if we did so. We have not done so," Blair told a news conference Tuesday.

The committee's annual report backed Blair up.

"The agencies were fully consulted in the production of the (September) dossier, which was assembled by the assessments staff, endorsed by the JIC and issued by the prime minister," it said.

However, the report added it was "impossible at the present moment to make any definitive statements about the role of intelligence and the situation in Iraq. We will report when our inquiries have been completed."

YellowTimes.org

### **Mobile lies**

By Imad Khadduri, former Iraqi nuclear scientist – 10 June 2003

As the swelter of anger bubbles from the machination of misinformation that led to the faltering WMD casus belli for invading Iraq, the retreat and half-baked excuses of Bush, Blair, Cheney, Wolfowitz and Powell further expose the sharp edge of their deceit. Whether it was "intelligence" failure or "flailing" the intelligence, time will soon tell. In the meantime, the fig leaves keep falling.

During CNN's Late Edition with Colin Powell, reported by the Toronto Star on June 9, 2003, Powell claimed that "the two alleged mobile biological weapons labs, which are being studied by allied inspectors now in Iraq, are the same ones he described to the world last Feb. 5 at a U.N. presentation

which was the result of four days and four nights of meetings with the CIA." "I stand behind that presentation," he said.

He further asserted, "I'll give you the killer argument why these vans were exactly what I said they were. I can assure you that if those biological vans were not ... what I said they were on the 5th of February, on the 6th of February Iraq would have hauled those vans out, put them in front of a press conference, given them to U.N. inspectors to try to drive a stake through the heart of my presentation."

Only if the Iraqis knew which vans he was talking about.

In an article published on the same day as Powell's interview, Peter Beaumont and Antony Barnett reported in the Observer that there is mounting indications that these vans were for "balloons, not germs."

The Iraqis concur.

According to the article, "Senior Iraqi officials of the al-Kindi Research, Testing, Development, and Engineering facility in Mosul were shown pictures of the mobile production trailers, and they claimed that the trailers were used to produce hydrogen chemically for artillery weather balloons. Artillery balloons are essentially balloons that are sent up into the atmosphere and relay information on wind direction and speed, allowing more accurate artillery fire. Crucially, these systems need to be mobile. The Observer has discovered that not only did the Iraq military have such a system at one time, but that it was actually sold to them by the British. In 1987, Marconi, now known as AMS, sold the Iraqi army an Artillery Meteorological System or Amets for short."

Other experts who have examined the evidence agree and have cast doubt over the Bush administration's assertions. They argue that the lack of any trace of pathogens found in the fermentation tanks, the use of canvas sides on vehicles where technicians would be working with dangerous germ cultures, and the lack of an autoclave for steam sterilization all provide credence to the Iraqi argument that the labs were merely used for artillery balloons.

In fact, the American experts themselves concede that the van could, at best, serve only one stage of the process for biological weapons production. There would need to be three or four other stages in the process, or other complementary vans, to be able to produce Powell's less than heuristic claim.

Powell is not new to this misinformation game.

In my earlier article, "The demise of the nuclear bomb hoax," published on February 16, 2003, I referred to Geoff Simons' *The Scourging of Iraq* in which "Washington lied persistently and comprehensively to gain the required international support [for the Gulf war]. For example, the U.S. claimed to have satellite pictures showing a massive Iraqi military build-up on the Saudi/ Iraqi border. When sample photographs were later obtained from Soyuz Karta by an enterprising journalist, no such evidence was discernible."

Simons references an article by Maggie O'Kane, published in the *Guardian* on 16 December 1995, which revealed that the enterprising journalist was Jean Heller of the *St. Petersburg Times* in Florida.

Eventually, the U.S. commander -- none other than Colin Powell himself -- admitted that there had been no massing of Iraqi troops. But by then the so-called evidence had served its purpose.

So, was Powell really worried that the Iraqis might "try to drive a stake through the heart of [his] presentation"?

Well, it's never too late.

## Guardian

### **One last warning from the man who made an enemy of Bush**

UN weapons inspector says Iraqi guilt is still not proven – 11 June 2003

Helena Smith – 11 June 2003

It is, even by the standards of understatement for which Hans Blix is now renowned, "something special". It stands where he can see it best - opposite his desk on the 31st floor of the United Nations: a cartoon depicting the balding Swede as a stick of dynamite with President George Bush demonically waving a match over his head.

Given that the drawing also shows Mr Blix delivering one of his equally combustible reports to the UN security council in the run-up to the US-led war against Iraq, the joke is hard to miss. "Have you seen this?" he asks, trying not to chuckle. "It was given to me by my friends in British intelligence. I think it's great."

That the droll chief weapons inspector should draw attention to the cartoon says more about his mood, 20 days before he leaves the post, than anything else. The almost other-worldly New York view that he has feasted on since being pulled out of retirement for the thankless task of heading the United Nations monitoring, verification and inspection commission (Unmovic) is "nice, yes". But, like his fastidiously neat office, he says: "I won't be missing it."

The job has not been that stressful, he says. "It's just that it occupies you entirely. You don't do much else. There's been an advantage to having an old gentleman, like me, with no family around to do it."

It will be with a sense of relief that the genial Mr Blix, 75 this month, returns to the Stockholm apartment he shares with his wife Eva, a former ambassador. "I like New York," he says. "My apartment also has a spectacular view over Manhattan and that has been a blessing. But I also like oriental antique rugs, the theatre, and Eva and I both love cooking."

He sighs wistfully. "My work at the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency, which he headed for 16 years] was absorbing, but it's not the only thing in the world, is it?"

Mr Blix never sought fame. When it came, in the form of a telephone plea from Kofi Annan three years ago, the lifelong civil servant accepted out of a sense of duty. "We were in Patagonia holidaying at the time and I was waiting in line for a bus to take us to the airport when a travel agent came asking for a Mr Blix. She said a Mr Kofi had phoned."

Mr Blix certainly didn't need to accept the job for financial gain. Instead, he agreed to take it for a limited period because there was no one else who was acceptable to Iraq and the west. But with the post came state-sanctioned sniping from both camps. Before he had set foot in Baghdad, Mr Blix was being accused of ineptitude and inefficacy by detractors in Washington who loathed him for being a Clinton appointee.

There were "enemies" dating from his days as a liberal student leader at Uppsala University; enemies in the form of disgruntled ex-employees closely connected to hawks in the US Pentagon; Iraqi enemies who spread rumours about his being "homosexual, and going to Washington to pick up my instructions every two weeks".

There were even media jibes about his talent for inspection lying exclusively with menus at fancy East Side restaurants. But the accusations of "softness", levelled more often than not by senior American officials, were most galling.

"They would say I was too compliant with the Iraqis when in reality [they meant] I was not compliant enough with what the US wanted. I have never criticised the US or UK for lack of sincerity." Mr Blix tried to focus on the reports for his bosses at the UN security council, pointing out that they were always "happy" with him. Even now, he refuses to be explicitly drawn on just what he feels, insisting he is not "frustrated, bitter or betrayed".

But, despite his apparent equanimity, he cannot conceal his anger at the constant vilification by "bastards" who "planted nasty things in the media". "Not that I cared very much," he insists. "It was a bit like a mosquito bite in the evening that is still there in the morning, an irritant."

What riles him most is that Iraq was not disarmed peacefully. He cups his head in his hands. "The lowest point was at the end when we realised it was not going to happen. That was very disappointing. The war cost a lot in destruction and lives."

As to whether Iraq still harbours weapons of mass destruction (WMD), he says he "remains agnostic". Only time will tell - although that is passing by "quite fast and instead of talking about [finding] WMD they're talking about the programmes.

"We know for sure that they did exist ... and we cannot exclude they may find something," he says. "I was always more prudent in my approach. I am a lawyer ... in a court things should be beyond reasonable doubt.

"It's true the Iraqis misbehaved and had no credibility but that doesn't necessarily mean that they were in the wrong. It could have been bad brinkmanship. Saddam could have misjudged and read about the demonstrations in London, Paris, here and thought they won't dare to go after me."

Mr Blix is worried about the future, expressing "nervousness" at the US administration's belief in pre-emptive strikes. "Obviously it raises the need for solid evidence and quality intelligence," he says, adding that intelligence material was treated in "a lighthearted way" by the US and Britain.

He insists the UN has a role, despite it being seen as an "alien power" by some within the US administration who "would not care if it sinks into the East river".

So does he feel that it was worth the personal pain, that he was effective?

"Oh yes," he says without hesitation. "We proved beyond a doubt and under immense pressure that independent, impartial, objective monitoring can be achieved. We were in nobody's pocket. Every day I

get letters from inspectors who would like to work again. We're immensely proud of what Unmovic achieved."

## Guardian

### **US on the defensive over Blix**

Suzanne Goldenberg in Washington – 12 June 2003

The debate over Saddam Hussein's banned arsenal turned to bitter recrimination yesterday with the Bush administration fending off charges of doctoring intelligence and conducting a smear campaign against the UN weapons chief.

At the United Nations, the retiring chief weapons inspector, Hans Blix, appeared to revel in the embarrassment caused to senior US officials by an exclusive Guardian interview in which he complained he was the target of a smear campaign by some sections of the Pentagon.

In Washington, meanwhile, Republicans in the Senate came under fire for resisting Democrats' calls for public hearings to determine whether there had been manipulation of pre-war intelligence on Iraq.

The conjunction of events frustrates Washington's desire to bury questions about its failure to produce any evidence of the deadly arsenal which was the main reason Britain and America went to war. It also raises the disquieting prospect that the controversy could endure into the 2004 elections, denying George Bush the chance to portray the war as the crowning success of his presidency.

In his conversation with the Guardian, Dr Blix lashed out at his detractors in the Pentagon, saying that in the run-up to the war, Washington had put pressure on his inspectors to produce highly critical reports that could bolster its case for war.

Yesterday, the US secretary of state, Colin Powell, and the UN secretary general, Kofi Annan, affirmed their high regard for the departing Swedish diplomat.

"There is no smear campaign I am aware of," Mr Powell said. "I have high regard for Dr Blix. I worked very closely with Dr Blix. I noted the president had confidence in him as well."

Mr Annan said: "He did a good job. He had universal respect for his professionalism."

Mr Powell was forced yesterday to defend charges from Washington that the administration had exaggerated the threat posed by Saddam.

Joe Biden, the senior Democrat on the Senate foreign relations committee, said: "I am not accusing them of cooking the books. I am accusing them of hyping - it's different.

"They took the truth and they embellished it in my view."

In a series of interviews on his clashes with the Pentagon, Dr Blix told ABC's Good Morning America that the US intelligence had proved faulty.

"I agree that the Iraqis are very clever. They have learned, had many years to learn how to hide things," he said. "But nevertheless, most of [the] intelligence has not been solid. Maybe they thought it was solid, but it hasn't led us to the right places."

From his corner, Mr Annan also pointed out that the intelligence supplied to the UN inspectors on suspected sites in Iraq had failed to produce any trace of weapons.

The question that has returned to haunt the Bush administration, however, was whether that intelligence was faulty by design, doctored to help a cabal of rightwing ideologues argue the case for war.

In Washington yesterday, Republican senators closed ranks around the administration, resisting Democrat demands for a full-scale public investigation of intelligence gathering in the months before the war.

Two Senate committees have already begun to review CIA documents estimating Iraq's weapons factories and stockpiles of deadly biological and chemical materials. However, high-ranking Democrats are not content with the closed hearings, and are demanding a more public forum that will explicitly examine the charge of whether intelligence was misused.

The prospect of that has infuriated Republicans, who now control both houses of Congress and therefore the committees that will be overseeing the intelligence review.