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INHOUDSOPGAVE

Inleiding	2
Global Partnership	3
Documenten	3
Nieuwsberichten	10
Proliferation Security Initiative	22
Documenten	22
Nieuwsberichten	33
Commentaar en vragen	54
Kroniek 2003	56
Overzicht facts and reports	57

INLEIDING

Via de F&R wordt U zoveel mogelijk op de hoogte gehouden van de nieuwste ontwikkelingen op het gebied van massavernietigingswapens (MVW). Daaronder worden verstaan nucleaire, chemische, biologische en ook zogenaamde 'vuile' bommen (die bestaan uit een kern van conventionele explosieven met een laag-radioactief omhulsel). MVW spelen een cruciale rol in internationale veiligheidsvraagstukken. Ze worden aangehaald als een bedreiging voor diezelfde internationale veiligheid, maar er is helaas ook sprake van een toenemende vervuiling van het debat. Dat komt door de eenzijdige gerichtheid op de kwestie van 'loose nukes' of liever 'loose weapons of mass destruction' en het gevaar dat deze wapens in de handen van terroristen vallen. Ze zouden vervolgens gebruikt kunnen worden in een grote stad om daar dood en verderf te zaaien. Dit beeld is zeer geschikt om angst onder de bevolking aan te wakkeren. De uitwerking daarvan is ook een soort versimpeling van het MVW gevaar. In de tachtiger jaren protesteerden miljoenen mensen tegen kernwapens, omdat ze terecht het idee hadden dat het bestaan van deze wapens ook het voortbestaan van de mensheid in gevaar bracht. De huidige angst voor een terrorist bewapend met MVW is een soort uitvloeisel daarvan.

Dat is ook de rede dat er brede steun is voor maatregelen om proliferatie van MVW tegen te gaan. De documenten in deze F&R beschrijven de twee belangrijkste internationale processen die daarvoor op gang zijn gezet. Maar er is een gevaarlijke eenzijdigheid aan het *Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction* en vooral het *Proliferation Security Initiative*. In het eerste wordt de kwestie van MVW politiek gereduceerd tot een opruimkwestie die vooral in Rusland speelt. De tweede reduceert de MVW kwestie tot een zaak van contra-proliferatie, en wel tegen staten die door de Amerikaanse regering als 'boevenstaten' worden gedefinieerd. Daarmee wordt een ernstige breuklijn zichtbaar met de bestaande multilaterale verdragen die bedoeld zijn om hetzelfde te bewerkstelligen, maar niet door unilateraal opgelegde dwangmaatregelen. De PSI lijkt veel weg te hebben van een legitimeringsmechanisme voor zulk eenzijdig optreden, waarbij ook internationale wetten in het geding komen.

De landen die aan zo een mechanisme meedoen (Nederland zit daar ook bij) leveren mogelijk een bijdrage aan het ondermijnen van al bestaande afspraken. Om die reden leek het ons belangrijk om met deze uitgave de aandacht op die ontwikkelingen te vestigen. Achterin vindt u verder commentaar en een reeks pertinente vragen.

Redactie Facts and Reports

G-8 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP AGAINST THE SPREAD OF WEAPONS AND MATERIALS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

DOCUMENTEN

G-8 Summit 2002

The G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction Statement by the Group of Eight Leaders

Kananaskis, Canada – 27 June 2002

The attacks of September 11 demonstrated that terrorists are prepared to use any means to cause terror and inflict appalling casualties on innocent people. We commit ourselves to prevent terrorists, or those that harbour them, from acquiring or developing nuclear, chemical, radiological and biological weapons; missiles; and related materials, equipment and technology. We call on all countries to join us in adopting the set of non-proliferation principles we have announced today.

In a major initiative to implement those principles, we have also decided today to launch a new G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. Under this initiative, we will support specific cooperation projects, initially in Russia, to address non-proliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism and nuclear safety issues. Among our priority concerns are the destruction of chemical weapons, the dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines, the disposition of fissile materials and the employment of former weapons scientists. We will commit to raise up to \$20 billion to support such projects over the next ten years. A range of financing options, including the option of bilateral debt for program exchanges, will be available to countries that contribute to this Global Partnership. We have adopted a set of guidelines that will form the basis for the negotiation of specific agreements for new projects, that will apply with immediate effect, to ensure effective and efficient project development, coordination and implementation. We will review over the next year the applicability of the guidelines to existing projects.

Recognizing that this Global Partnership will enhance international security and safety, we invite other countries that are prepared to adopt its common principles and guidelines to enter into discussions with us on participating in and contributing to this initiative. We will review progress on this Global Partnership at our next Summit in 2003.

The G8 Global Partnership: Principles to prevent terrorists, or those that harbour them, from gaining access to weapons or materials of mass destruction

The G8 calls on all countries to join them in commitment to the following six principles to prevent terrorists or those that harbour them from acquiring or developing nuclear, chemical, radiological and biological weapons; missiles; and related materials, equipment and technology.

1. Promote the adoption, universalization, full implementation and, where necessary, strengthening of multilateral treaties and other international instruments whose aim is to prevent the proliferation or illicit acquisition of such items; strengthen the institutions designed to implement these instruments.
2. Develop and maintain appropriate effective measures to account for and secure such items in production, use, storage and domestic and international transport; provide assistance to states lacking sufficient resources to account for and secure these items.
3. Develop and maintain appropriate effective physical protection measures applied to facilities which house such items, including defence in depth; provide assistance to states lacking sufficient resources to protect their facilities.
4. Develop and maintain effective border controls, law enforcement efforts and international cooperation to detect, deter and interdict in cases of illicit trafficking in such items, for example through installation of detection systems, training of customs and law enforcement personnel and cooperation in tracking these items; provide assistance to states lacking sufficient expertise or resources to strengthen their capacity to detect, deter and interdict in cases of illicit trafficking in these items.
5. Develop, review and maintain effective national export and transshipment controls over items on multilateral export control lists, as well as items that are not identified on such lists but which may nevertheless contribute to the development, production or use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and missiles, with particular consideration of end-user, catch-all and brokering aspects; provide assistance to

states lacking the legal and regulatory infrastructure, implementation experience and/or resources to develop their export and transshipment control systems in this regard.

6. Adopt and strengthen efforts to manage and dispose of stocks of fissile materials designated as no longer required for defence purposes, eliminate all chemical weapons, and minimize holdings of dangerous biological pathogens and toxins, based on the recognition that the threat of terrorist acquisition is reduced as the overall quantity of such items is reduced.

The G8 Global Partnership: Guidelines for New or Expanded Cooperation Projects

The G8 will work in partnership, bilaterally and multilaterally, to develop, coordinate, implement and finance, according to their respective means, new or expanded cooperation projects to address (i) non-proliferation, (ii) disarmament, (iii) counter-terrorism and (iv) nuclear safety (including environmental) issues, with a view to enhancing strategic stability, consonant with our international security objectives and in support of the multilateral non-proliferation regimes. Each country has primary responsibility for implementing its non-proliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism and nuclear safety obligations and requirements and commits its full cooperation within the Partnership.

Cooperation projects under this initiative will be decided and implemented, taking into account international obligations and domestic laws of participating partners, within appropriate bilateral and multilateral legal frameworks that should, as necessary, include the following elements:

i. Mutually agreed effective monitoring, auditing and transparency measures and procedures will be required in order to ensure that cooperative activities meet agreed objectives (including irreversibility as necessary), to confirm work performance, to account for the funds expended and to provide for adequate access for donor representatives to work sites;

ii. The projects will be implemented in an environmentally sound manner and will maintain the highest appropriate level of safety;

iii. Clearly defined milestones will be developed for each project, including the option of suspending or terminating a project if the milestones are not met;

iv. The material, equipment, technology, services and expertise provided will be solely for peaceful purposes and, unless otherwise agreed, will be used only for the purposes of implementing the projects and will not be transferred. Adequate measures of physical protection will also be applied to prevent theft or sabotage;

v. All governments will take necessary steps to ensure that the support provided will be considered free technical assistance and will be exempt from taxes, duties, levies and other charges;

vi. Procurement of goods and services will be conducted in accordance with open international practices to the extent possible, consistent with national security requirements;

vii. All governments will take necessary steps to ensure that adequate liability protections from claims related to the cooperation will be provided for donor countries and their personnel and contractors;

viii. Appropriate privileges and immunities will be provided for government donor representatives working on cooperation projects; and

ix. Measures will be put in place to ensure effective protection of sensitive information and intellectual property.

Given the breadth and scope of the activities to be undertaken, the G8 will establish an appropriate mechanism for the annual review of progress under this initiative which may include consultations regarding priorities, identification of project gaps and potential overlap, and assessment of consistency of the cooperation projects with international security obligations and objectives. Specific bilateral and multilateral project implementation will be coordinated subject to arrangements appropriate to that project, including existing mechanisms.

For the purposes of these guidelines, the phrase "new or expanded cooperation projects" is defined as cooperation projects that will be initiated or enhanced on the basis of this Global Partnership. All funds disbursed or released after its announcement would be included in the total of committed resources. A range of financing options, including the option of bilateral debt for program exchanges, will be available to countries that contribute to this Global Partnership.

The Global Partnership's initial geographic focus will be on projects in Russia, which maintains primary responsibility for implementing its obligations and requirements within the Partnership.

In addition, the G8 would be willing to enter into negotiations with any other recipient countries, including those of the Former Soviet Union, prepared to adopt the guidelines, for inclusion in the Partnership.

Recognizing that the Global Partnership is designed to enhance international security and safety, the G8 invites others to contribute to and join in this initiative.

With respect to nuclear safety and security, the partners agreed to establish a new G8 Nuclear Safety and Security Group by the time of our next Summit.

Fact Sheet: G-8 Summit -- Preventing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

27 June 2002

Presidential Action

- The President and other G-8 Leaders agreed today to a new Global Partnership to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction and related materials and technology. The United States has been a driving force behind this initiative.

- The G-8 committed to raise up to \$20 billion over 10 years for this initiative. The United States intends to provide half that total.

- The G-8 also announced a set of key nonproliferation principles. The Partnership turns those principles into concrete action.

G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction: President Bush and his G-8 colleagues agreed today to launch a major new effort to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to terrorists or those who support them. Under the "G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Material of Mass Destruction," the United States, the G-7 and the European Commission have agreed to raise up to \$20 billion for projects pertaining to disarmament, nonproliferation, counterterrorism and nuclear safety, over the next ten years. The United States intends to provide half of the total funding.

The focus of the Global Partnership will initially be on projects in Russia. The initiative will also be open to other states, including other former Soviet states. G-8 members have agreed on basic guidelines for implementing the initiative. The G-8 will establish a senior-level mechanism to coordinate Partnership activities, including monitoring progress and considering project priorities and opportunities.

The Global Partnership will initiate new bilateral and multilateral projects, and enhance existing ones. Donor governments may choose a range of financing options, including exchanges of a portion of Russia's Soviet-era debt for Partnership projects. Only funds disbursed after today's announcement will be included in the Partnership. The G-8 has invited others to join in this endeavor.

G-8 Nonproliferation Principles: The President and his G-8 colleagues also today adopted a set of Principles to prevent terrorists or those who harbor them from acquiring or developing nuclear, chemical, radiological and biological weapons, missiles, and related materials, equipment and technology. The G-8 Leaders call on all states to commit to these Principles.

U.S. Nonproliferation Assistance: The G-8 Global Partnership builds on, and expands, a decade of cooperation between the United States and former Soviet states to reduce and prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, starting with the Cooperative Threat Reduction (Nunn-Lugar) program in FY1992. From FY1992 to FY2002, the United States allocated approximately \$7 billion for this purpose. In the President's FY2003 budget request, he has proposed about \$1 billion in nonproliferation and, threat reduction assistance to former Soviet states -- the highest single-year request ever made for these projects.

Key ongoing U.S. nonproliferation and threat reduction projects in Russia and other former Soviet states, including Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, will be enhanced under the Global Partnership. These include:

- Reducing strategic missiles, bombers, silos and submarines;
- Ending weapons-grade plutonium production;
- Reducing excess weapons-grade plutonium;
- Upgrading storage and transport security for nuclear warheads;
- Upgrading storage security for fissile material;
- Reducing nuclear weapons infrastructure;
- Destroying chemical weapons;
- Eliminating chemical weapons production capability;
- Securing biological pathogens;
- Providing peaceful employment for former weapons scientists;
- Enhancing export controls and border security;
- Improving safety of civil nuclear reactors.

PM statement on G8 summit

1 July 2002

“[...] The events of 11th September proved beyond doubt that terrorists will use any means to attack our countries and our people. We therefore agreed at Kananaskis to launch a new Global Partnership against the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and so help ensure that these deadly materials cannot fall into the hands of terrorist groups. The world's largest stocks of sensitive nuclear and chemical materials are in the countries of the former Soviet Union - above all in Russia. The G8 has agreed collectively to raise up to \$20bn over the next ten years to fund projects under the Global Partnership. Among our priority concerns are the destruction of chemical weapons, the dismantling of decommissioned nuclear submarines, and the employment of former weapons scientists. As part of this programme the UK plans to commit up to \$750m, spread over the next decade. [...]”

G-8 Summit 2003

Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction

G8 Senior Officials Group

Annual report

1-3 June 2003

Our Leaders decided at the Kananaskis Summit to launch a new G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction to prevent terrorists, or those that harbour them, from acquiring or developing weapons of mass destruction. Their Statement set the scope of co-operation projects under this initiative to address non-proliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism and nuclear safety issues. Among the priority concerns they identified the destruction of chemical weapons, the dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines, the disposition of fissile materials and the employment of former weapon scientists. It was agreed to review progress on the Global Partnership at the Evian Summit. The Global Partnership Senior Officials Group, established to review progress of the initiative and to co-ordinate projects, has undertaken an active work plan to implement this initiative, first under the Canadian Chair and then in 2003 under the French Chair. In the first year of Global Partnership activities, the Senior Officials Group can report substantial progress to translate the Global Partnership initiative into concrete projects. At the same time, much work remains to be done, and the Senior Officials Group has outlined a challenging action plan to be accomplished before the next Summit.

The Senior Officials Group's activities over the past year have focused on four objectives: implementation and translation of the guidelines, as necessary, into concrete actions and agreements; initiation and development of concrete projects; financial contributions in conformity with the Kananaskis commitment to raise up to \$20 billion over the next ten years; and outreach activities towards non-G8 countries to expand participation in the Partnership. For each, the objective was to ensure that the Kananaskis promises were being translated into practice. In order to do so, work has been pursued with determination on resolution of outstanding implementation problems, successful negotiation of implementing agreements, development and initiation of concrete projects based on allocated funds, national financial commitments to raise up to \$20 billion over ten years, and inviting third countries to participate in the initiative and contribute to projects under the Partnership.

1. Implementation of Kananaskis guidelines

The Kananaskis Statement defined a set of guidelines that will form the basis for the negotiation of specific agreements governing projects. Implementation of these guidelines has been a primary task of the Senior Officials, and was addressed at each Senior Officials Group meeting. In the course of their discussions, Senior Officials noted the difficulties and obstacles that were hindering the initiation of projects, and have conducted an in-depth review of the outstanding issues related to the negotiation of bilateral and multilateral agreements required for projects falling under the scope of the Global Partnership. We welcome the important progress that has been made on the issue of tax exemption on the basis of high-level political decisions. Several bilateral and multilateral agreements include such provisions. Nonetheless, these agreements have yet to be tested in practice. Full exemption from taxes, duties, levies and other charges is essential for projects to succeed; progress registered in this field is positive and has to be pursued.

Another essential issue for Partners is liability protection. The efficacious implementation of the guideline which states that "adequate liability protection from claims related to the co-operation project to be provided for donors countries, their personnel and contractors" has been discussed extensively by Senior Officials. All Partners agree that adequate liability protections are essential for project implementation, while recognising that the protections differ depending on respective national requirements. Partners reinforced the need to have adequate liability provisions in all bilateral and multilateral frameworks and welcomed progress in this regard. Partners agreed that there should be uniform treatment of donors in this respect.

The guideline regarding "adequate access to work sites" has also been under consideration by Senior Officials. The new proposal to simplify access to sites by reducing prior notification delay from 45 to 30 days through a procedure of annual lists has been considered as an improvement on past practice though still judged insufficient by some Partners. It should be evaluated over the next year.

Other guidelines such as monitoring, auditing and accountancy of funds, or the implementation of projects in an environmentally sound manner, and establishment of project milestones have not been raised as presenting problems. Some of these guidelines have been satisfactorily translated into bilateral agreements. However, the Senior Officials will duly address such issues as they may arise during the implementation of projects.

The Senior Officials have also noted in their discussions the importance of the guidelines concerning the assurance that "the material, equipment, technology, services and expertise provided will be solely for peaceful purposes" and "appropriate privileges and immunities will be provided for government donor representatives".

After one year, Senior Officials can report some progress regarding the implementation of the guidelines and welcome Russian efforts in that respect. They recognise that, given the importance of practical implementation of guidelines for engagement of new projects, sustained and broadened efforts in this field are necessary.

2. Partners report on the state of advancement of co-operation projects, and specific projects for new co-operation

A number of specific co-operation projects are moving forward into their concrete phase. For example, in the chemical weapons field, the Gorny facility was completed and went into operation, and has already destroyed 400 tonnes of yperite. After the conclusion of an agreement, the construction of the Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility in Kambarka can start in the next months. Construction of the Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility for nerve agents at Schuchye was initiated as well as other related infrastructure projects. They are important milestones in the field of chemical weapons destruction. It is also to be reported that Italy and Russia have recently signed an Additional Protocol related to the Schuchye chemical destruction plant. A new stage in dismantling former nuclear submarines has been reached with the concrete and tangible results for implementation of new projects in Saïda Bay and at Zvezda Shipyard in the Far Eastern Region, as well as the funding of other projects for dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines. Agreement has also been reached on a programme to end Russian production of weapons-grade plutonium and on acceleration of efforts to secure Russian fissile material and nuclear warheads, while significant progress can be noted in the negotiations on international support for Russia's plutonium disposition programmes, including increased pledges and substantial agreement on concepts for effective programme management and oversight. We look forward to completion of these negotiations. The safety and security of biological research facilities is being improved. With respect to employment of former weapons scientists, in addition to the continued efforts in the multilateral International Science and Technology Centre framework, new bilateral engagements have been initiated with former non-conventional weapons production facilities to assist in their reconversion to develop and manufacture commercial products.

The Senior Officials Group has followed closely the developments of bilateral contacts as well as multilateral consultations that preside over engagement of new projects. Additional efforts should be made to identify and start new projects. Partners have had an active programme of experts meeting and exchanges, including visits on the sites and seminars for dealing with concrete technical issues. This was the case for the seminar of experts on ecological problems in nuclear submarines decommissioning held in Vladivostok, and the meeting of submarine experts organised by Russia in Severodvinsk, followed by informal experts meeting on the same subject held by the presidency.

Interested experts in the chemical fields also met in the margins of the Organisation for the Prohibition Chemical Weapons Executive Council sessions to discuss plans of countries to fund projects as well as outstanding needs. The Conference of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Co-operation Initiative hosted by the European Commission in Brussels under EU, US and Canadian Chairmanship also furthered the aims of the Global Partnership by facilitating information exchange, outreach to other countries and co-ordination of projects.

All Partners have engaged in intensive bilateral consultations with Russia to identify fields of co-operation and select specific projects to be carried forward. The Russian side identified lists of specific projects that were presented to individual Partners. These lists were studied in depth by Partners who have responded, others are still in the process of discussion of projects. They have all, while keeping in mind the full scope of the Global Partnership, addressed those priorities identified among others by Leaders in Kananaskis (destruction of chemical weapons, dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines, disposition of fissile materials and employment of former weapons scientists). They have also taken into account the two priorities on which Russia has put special emphasis (destruction of chemical weapons, dismantlement of decommissioned submarines).

Despite all these efforts and active endeavours, Senior Officials note that for practical implementation of projects to progress as fast and as effectively as expected, sustained and broadened efforts will be needed.

3. Financial Commitments

Leaders in Kananaskis committed collectively to raise up to \$20 billion to support Partnership projects over a ten year period. Over the past year, this collective commitment has been translated into firm national commitments of up to: United States - \$10 billion; Germany - €1.5 billion; UK - \$750 million; France - €750 million; Japan - \$200 million; Italy - €1 billion; Canada - Can\$1 billion. The EU has pledged €1 billion and Russia \$2 billion. It is also to be noted that Partners have appropriated in their budgets of FY 2003 adequate funds for this year's projects.

4. Outreach strategy and modalities

Following the Leaders' invitation to other countries prepared to adopt the Kananaskis documents (statement, principles and guidelines) to enter discussions with Partners on participating in and contributing to this initiative, and their commitment to review this question at their next Summit, intense outreach activities have been developed. These activities were driven forward by the Canadian Chair, which sustained its efforts in this direction under the new French Chair. Contacts were made with countries that expressed an interest, and information was given on the content, aims and work of the Global Partnership. Meetings with interested countries were organised in Ottawa. Following bilateral additional consultations, an information meeting, co-chaired by Canada, France and the United States, was held in Paris on 8 April in order to encourage and facilitate potential donors to participate in the Global Partnership. Russia briefed potential donors about possible co-operation projects on the chemical weapons destruction and the dismantlement of decommissioned submarines.

They were informed of the inclusive character of the Partnership and offered the possibility, having endorsed the Kananaskis documents, to make a formal announcement of their interest and their intention to pledge. The Chair indicated that the G8 would be ready to give due recognition to the new donors at the Evian Summit. Potential new donors were also informed of the possibility of having back-to-back meetings of the enlarged Partnership group with the G8 Senior Officials Group meetings until future structures are decided upon. A similar information meeting with interested countries was also organised by the United States in Washington on 25 April.

Although the initial Global Partnership focus was on projects in Russia as stated by the Leaders, the Partnership may extend to other recipient countries, including in particular those of the Former Soviet Union, prepared to adopt the Kananaskis documents. The Leaders stated the G8 willingness to enter in negotiations with such countries. In that respect, an official application was presented by the Ukraine.

After discussion in the Senior Officials Group, it has answered positively, in principle, while recalling that the Partnership was still in its initial phase and thus focused on Russian projects. The Chair has expressed its readiness to enter into preliminary discussions with interested recipients willing to adhere to the Kananaskis documents in order to prepare for their future inclusion in the Partnership.

Some partners are already pursuing relevant projects in former Soviet States outside Russia.

While encouraging the importance of the universal adoption of non-proliferation principles, Senior Officials have been eager to underline the importance of Global Partnership and to publicise its objectives and activities to third countries as well as the United Nations, the European Union, the Non Proliferation Treaty Prepcom and others. In this respect, Senior Officials welcome the EU plan to organise an inter-parliamentary conference on Global Partnership in November 2003. This conference, to be held in Strasbourg on 21 November 2003, is fully supported by the G8 Partners and Chair, and the future EU Presidency, who view the event as an important step to provide information on the Global Partnership to parliamentarians whose support for funding the initiative will be essential over the ten-year period.

Senior Officials reviewing their activities over the year since Kananaskis note the progress achieved in implementing guidelines, the advancement of new projects, financial commitments and outreach activities,

while recognising that in all these fields, further work has to be done. All of the Kananaskis documents thus remain under Senior Officials Group consideration and review, as part of a global ongoing process in order to yield substantive results.

G-8 Summit 2003

Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction

A G8 Action Plan

June 2003

The Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, which we launched last year at the Kananaskis Summit, has made significant progress over the past year toward realising the objective of preventing terrorists, or those who harbour them, from acquiring or developing nuclear, chemical, radiological, and biological weapons; missiles; and related materials, equipment, and technology.

With our determined commitment, significant progress has been made:

- Substantial sums have already been pledged by Partners towards their Kananaskis commitment to raise up to \$20 billion over ten years;
- The Russian government has made welcomed decisions to ensure implementation of guidelines, in particular full exemption of assistance from taxation, duties and other charges. Other guidelines have also been intensively addressed;
- The recent conclusion of the Multilateral Nuclear Environment Programme for the Russian Federation has demonstrated substantial progress in translating the Global Partnership initiative into concrete actions;
- All Partners have actively engaged in determining co-operation projects to be undertaken, and some significant projects have already been launched or expanded, in accordance with our priorities identified in Kananaskis;
- Outreach activities have been undertaken to invite and facilitate non-G8 countries to participate and contribute, as a result of which Finland, Norway, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland have indicated their interest in joining the Global Partnership as donors.

We commit ourselves to an active programme to continue the implementation of the initiative and to achieve substantial progress by the next Summit. Our goals are:

- To pursue the universal adoption of the non-proliferation principles;
- To reach our Kananaskis commitment of raising up to \$20 billion over ten years through contributions from new donors or additional pledges from Partners;
- To significantly expand project activities, building upon preparatory work to establish implementing frameworks and to develop plans for project activities, as well as to sustain steady progress in projects already underway. We will continue to review progress in initiation and implementation of projects over the coming year, and to oversee co-ordination of projects, in order to review priorities, avoid gaps and overlaps, and assess consistency of projects with international security objectives, in accordance with our priorities;
- To resolve all outstanding implementation challenges and to review the implementation of all guidelines in practice, keeping in mind the need for uniform treatment of Partners, reflecting our co-operative approach;
- To expand participation in the Global Partnership to interested non-G8 donor countries that are willing to adopt the Kananaskis documents. While still focusing on projects in Russia, we mandate the Chair to enter into preliminary discussions with new or current recipient countries including those of the former Soviet Union that are prepared to adopt the Kananaskis documents, as the Ukraine has already done;
- To inform other organisations, parliamentary representatives, and publics of the importance of the Global Partnership.

US State Department

The Netherlands Participation In The Global Partnership

Statement by Philip T. Reeker, Deputy Spokesman

11 June 2003

The United States warmly welcomes the decision of the Netherlands to participate in the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. Foreign Minister Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has conveyed in a letter to Deputy Secretary Armitage that the Netherlands will join the Partnership, and we look forward to cooperation on this initiative. The Netherlands has been strongly interested in nonproliferation issues, and is currently involved in cooperation in the nuclear field as well as chemical weapons destruction.

The Global Partnership Initiative, launched by President Bush and other G-8 leaders at the Kananaskis Summit of 2002, represents a significant undertaking by the international community to prevent terrorists or those that harbor them from acquiring or developing weapons of mass destruction. The Leaders committed to raise up to \$20 billion over ten years for cooperative projects in the fields of nonproliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism and nuclear safety, initially focused on Russia. At the Evian Summit June 1-2, Leaders reviewed progress during the first year of the Partnership, and welcomed the participation of Finland, Norway, Poland, Sweden, and Switzerland.

NIEUWSBERICHTEN

Monterey Institute of International Studies

The 10 plus 10 over 10 Initiative: A Promising Start, But Little Substance So Far

Authors: Cristina Chuen, Michael Jasinski, and Tim Meyer – 12 August 2002

On June 27, 2002, the G8 (the seven major industrial countries: France, the United States, Britain, Germany, Japan, Italy, and Canada, also known as the G7, plus Russia) issued a statement outlining a new initiative, entitled the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. It committed the G7 to raising up to \$20 billion over the next 10 years to fund nonproliferation projects, principally in Russia but also in other nations. The so-called "10 plus 10 over 10" initiative, agreed to at the G8 summit in Kananaskis, Canada, calls for the United States to contribute \$10 billion, and the other original G-7 nations a combined \$10 billion.

Despite the size of the numbers and the fanfare accompanying the announcement, it is unclear how much new money has actually been pledged. The \$10 billion to be contributed by the United States is largely comprised of funds needed to carry out existing programs at current levels; on the other hand, it does represent a new commitment to continue programs for the next ten years. The agreement allows nations to count monies slated for use but not yet disbursed, and even has a provision for contributions from non-G8 countries should the European nations and Japan fail to produce \$10 billion. In addition to questions about funding, the short duration of the summit precluded agreements on more than the general principles of the plan, although, as explained below, this in itself represented important progress in some respects. The partnership was a U.S. concept that required intense lobbying by the American delegation. The final agreement required last-minute negotiations about the program's implementation in Russia and issues of taxation, liability, access, and privileges and immunities.¹

Nevertheless, the new initiative could prove a useful tool for expanding nonproliferation assistance to Russia. The G-7 nations are now on record as financially supporting this cause, while the United States promised to continue funding nonproliferation work for an additional ten years. If subsequent negotiations can work out mechanisms for implementing this initiative -- a big if -- the Global Partnership will be an important step towards undoing the lethal Cold War legacy inherited by the former Soviet states.

The Global Partnership

In the G8 joint statement, the group pledged to work toward stemming the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction (WMD) by assisting Russia and other countries in their efforts to address nonproliferation problems. The joint statement contains a pledge to raise up to \$20 billion (\$10 billion by the United States and \$10 billion by other G8 members, apart from Russia). The specifics of the financing of the initiative remain to be decided, and may include bilateral debt exchanges for nonproliferation (explained below), as well as direct assistance. Although Russia is to be the primary recipient of the assistance, other states will also be eligible to participate. The joint statement outlines a number of important guidelines for projects that are to be carried out under the partnership. These guidelines include:

Mutually agreed effective monitoring, auditing and transparency measures and procedures will be required in order to ensure that cooperative activities meet agreed objectives (including irreversibility as necessary), to

confirm work performance, to account for the funds expended and to provide for adequate access for donor representatives to work sites;

1. The projects will be implemented in an environmentally sound manner and will maintain the highest appropriate level of safety;
2. Clearly defined milestones will be developed for each project, including the option of suspending or terminating a project if the milestones are not met;
3. The material, equipment, technology, services and expertise provided will be solely for peaceful purposes and, unless otherwise agreed, will be used only for the purposes of implementing the projects and will not be transferred. Adequate measures of physical protection will also be applied to prevent theft or sabotage;
4. All governments will take necessary steps to ensure that the support provided will be considered free technical assistance and will be exempt from taxes, duties, levies and other charges;
5. Procurement of goods and services will be conducted in accordance with open international practices to the extent possible, consistent with national security requirements;
6. All governments will take necessary steps to ensure that adequate liability protections from claims related to the cooperation will be provided for donor countries and their personnel and contractors;
7. Appropriate privileges and immunities will be provided for government donor representatives working on cooperation projects; and
8. Measures will be put in place to ensure effective protection of sensitive information and intellectual property.

The statement also provides for the establishment of procedures to conduct annual reviews of project progress, consultations on priorities, project gaps, and overlaps, other coordinating measures, and the reporting of findings to G8 governments.²

At a briefing on June 27, 2002, a senior Bush administration official stated that each participating country would select projects on which it would participate, conduct independent negotiations with Russia, and proceed with their implementation.³ U.S.-Russian negotiations regarding the Global Partnership are already in the planning stages, and were discussed by Undersecretary of State John Bolton and Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Mamedov during preparatory talks for the late September meeting of the U.S.-Russian advisory committee on strategic security.⁴ Italian diplomats have reportedly begun discussions with Russia on implementation of the G8 pledge as well, most recently in a July 16 meeting between Georgiy Mamedov and Giancarlo Aragona, director of the Department of Multilateral Political Issues and Human Rights at the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁵

In addition to the discussion of global nonproliferation projects, the G8 statement included a commitment to six "principles to prevent terrorists, or those that harbor them, from gaining access to weapons or materials of mass destruction." The first principle, to "promote the adoption, universalization, full implementation and, where necessary, strengthening of multilateral treaties and other international instruments whose aim is to prevent the proliferation or illicit acquisition of such items [and to] strengthen the institutions designed to implement these instruments." The endorsement of this principle by the Bush administration is particularly significant, since many of its previous actions have been viewed by critics as undermining such treaties as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and Biological Weapons Convention. The other five Global Partnership principles reflect pledges to maintain effective physical protection, accounting, border control, and export control measures with regard to WMD materials, as well as a promise to strengthen management of WMD materials, minimizing the stocks of nuclear and biological materials and eliminating all chemical weapons.⁶

Russian Participation and Reactions

The Russian government reaction to the Global Partnership initiative has been positive.⁷ However, while Russian statements have reflected agreement with the general principles of the G-8 statement, they point out that the difficult task of negotiating the specifics of liability, transparency, and other issues in each aid program agreement remains. Nonetheless, Russia's Kananaskis commitment is a significant step forward, as it had heretofore refused to accept the terms included in the joint statement during on-going negotiations on a multilateral environmental aid agreement, known as the Multilateral Environmental Nuclear Program in the Russian Federation (MNEPR) agreement, and in negotiations on a trilateral U.S.-Russia-Norway aid agreement.⁸ Putin's support of the G8 partnership aims should provide additional impetus toward progress in further negotiations.

During a press conference on June 27, 2002, President Putin gave an indication of the Russian government's nonproliferation priorities. While asserting that Russian nuclear weapons pose no proliferation threat, only an environmental one, Putin identified chemical weapons elimination and disposal of non-strategic nuclear

submarines as two of the most important problems facing Russia today. He noted that Russia itself is committed to working on these issues, but welcomes the financial support of the G8 partners.⁹

Some Russian observers speculated that the G8 summit statement was mainly political in nature, and noted that previous assistance commitments have been considerably larger than actual funding received. Further, they pointed out that assistance commitments similar to those declared at Kananaskis were made at the May 2002 NATO summit in Rome, where Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi stated that the European Union would provide \$10 billion in nonproliferation assistance to the former Soviet states over 10 years, and U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell made a similar promise.¹⁰

Some Russian politicians critical of Putin's foreign policy course, such as Communist Party leader Gennadiy Zyuganov and General Leonid Ivashov, vice president of the Academy of Geopolitical Sciences, predictably criticized the G8 initiative as highlighting Russia's weakness, threatening to undermine Russia's defense capabilities, and preventing Russia from establishing itself as a counterweight to unilateralist U.S. foreign policy. Others, however, praised the initiative and the formal recognition of Russia as a full member of the G8 as a victory for Putin.¹¹

Several Russian experts predicted that implementation of the 10 plus 10 over 10 program would run into considerable difficulties, due to the conflict between the donor countries' insistence on maintaining close supervision of the projects and the Russian government's desire to protect sensitive information.¹²

U.S. Contribution

Of the G8 countries, the United States has been the undisputed leader in organizing and implementing nonproliferation assistance programs. Beginning in the early 1990s, the U.S. government initiated a series of projects under the CTR program addressing the problems of arms control treaty implementation, nuclear weapon and materials security, export controls, strategic nuclear submarine elimination, weapon scientist "brain drain," and many others. Between 1992 and 2002, the United States allocated approximately \$7 billion for nonproliferation projects in Russia and other former Soviet republics.¹³ U.S. government agencies have developed effective guidelines for ensuring project accountability and transparency, guidelines which have been incorporated into the G8 joint statement on global partnership.

The Bush administration requested \$957 million (which includes \$428 million for Department of Defense programs, \$420 million for Department of Energy programs, and \$109 million for State Department programs) in nonproliferation assistance to the former Soviet republics in its FY 2003 budget request. This figure compares favorably with the \$760 million requested by the administration for FY 2002, although it is less than the total FY 2002 figure of \$1,014 million, which included supplemental funds approved by Congress after the events of September 11, 2001.¹⁴ The United States appears set to meet its 10-year \$10 billion commitment if it continues to fund nonproliferation assistance projects for the newly independent states (NIS) at the current rate. Although the long-term commitment to continue to assist the former Soviet states is new, this funding level may actually represent a decrease in funding of particular programs. It in no way meets the needs identified by a top-level, bipartisan commission, known as the Baker-Cutler Commission, which issued a report in January 2001 calling for the United States to spend \$30 billion on nonproliferation efforts in Russia over the next eight to ten years.¹⁵

Other Countries' Contributions

Other members of the G8 have also begun to commit funding, although few particulars as to financing details or specific programs are available. Reports on the G8 meeting suggest that the initiative for the partnership belonged to the United States, which pursued the nonproliferation issue with considerably greater energy than the issue of aid to Africa, the designated main topic of the Kananaskis meeting. Possibly due to the lack of extensive prior consultations on the matter and the apparently unexpected emergence of nonproliferation as one of the key issues on the summit agenda, Germany was the only G8 country other than the United States that was eager to commit to funding new nonproliferation assistance programs. Moreover, in contrast to the United States, most G8 countries would have to significantly increase their spending for such programs in order to meet the \$10 billion figure. Between 1992 and 2001, the European Commission and individual European Union countries spent approximately 550 million Euro (about \$468 million as of June 2001) on nonproliferation projects in Russia and other former Soviet republics.¹⁶ This amount does not include substantial E.U. and Japanese assistance in the nuclear safety sector.

The G8 initiative was received very positively by the German media, which emphasized the environmental aspects of the program, and the possible benefits for German industrial concerns that would be involved. Germany also was, next to the United States, one of the first countries to pledge assistance, committing itself to \$1.5 billion.¹⁷ It also supported the initiative at the summit. While Germany had principally been promoting economic debt exchanges (an exchange of debt cancellation for stock in Russian companies) before the

summit, according to the *Berliner Zeitung* German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder had also discussed the idea of applying a debt exchange mechanism to nonproliferation funding with President Putin in December 2001.¹⁸ Other reports suggest Germany is cool to the idea of funding its assistance via debt exchange. Germany favors assistance projects that will utilize its expertise in nuclear material storage and transportation, such as moving naval reactors from Gremikha into temporary storage at Sayda Bay, low- and medium-level radioactive waste storage at Novaya Zemlya, plutonium reactor shut-down at Krasnoyarsk, and improving the safety of nuclear transports.¹⁹ Germany has been assisting Russia in eliminating its chemical weapon arsenals, and is conducting talks on new programs in this area.²⁰

Although Canada was disappointed with the results of the summit, the Canadian government indicated its willingness to commit \$1 billion Canadian (about US\$600-650 million) over 10 years for the G8 Global Partnership Program.²¹ Canada will reportedly also offer technical support for nonproliferation activities.²² The pledge was made without consulting parliament. No public debate has yet taken place in Canada on the partnership, due to the unexpectedness with which the announcement was made.²³ Thus, Canada has yet to make an official funding announcement.²⁴

Great Britain was also surprised by the change of agenda away from Africa. However, on July 1, Prime Minister Tony Blair said that Great Britain would provide up to \$750 million over the next 10 years.²⁵ The British funding, based on current and planned future assistance, will include support for the disposal of weapons-grade plutonium, destruction of chemical weapons, defueling and dismantlement of nuclear-powered submarines, decommissioning of nuclear reactors, materials control and accountancy (MC&A) assistance, nuclear safety work, physical protection of nuclear materials, provision of non-weapons employment to personnel in closed nuclear cities, and alleviation of the social and economic impacts of nuclear plant closures, in addition to British participation in European Union programs. However, this work requires a legal framework, an issue raised at the G8 summit. The United Kingdom is a party to the stalled MNEPR negotiations, and is also in talks with Russia on a bilateral agreement to allow substantive project work in northwest Russia to commence. The British have already concluded a legal framework agreement with Russia to cover the destruction of chemical weapons stocks.²⁶

According to the Japanese press, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi pledged \$200 million for the initiative, although intense U.S. lobbying was reportedly required to secure Japan's endorsement of the partnership.²⁷ A Japanese Foreign Ministry source suggests that currently Japan is ready to spend \$250 million on nonproliferation in the former Soviet Union. Of this sum, \$150 million is money that was previously pledged but not yet expended, while \$100 is new money likely to be earmarked for an international plutonium disposition project and the BN-600 fast neutron reactor at the Beloyarsk nuclear power plant, which is being converted to dispose of plutonium by burning mixed-oxide, or MOX, fuel fabricated from weapons-origin plutonium.²⁸ One Japanese official complained that the Global Partnership figure of \$20 billion was arrived at in an arbitrary manner, and that the manner in which the funds were to be spent remained unspecified, while other officials questioned President Bush's eagerness to provide Russia with this assistance.²⁹ However, Japan may find itself unwilling to provide more funding if problems with existing Japanese projects are not resolved. Koizumi is dissatisfied with Russia's level of cooperation on ongoing nonproliferation projects funded by Japan, while the Japanese Diet has also voiced its opposition to the foreign assistance programs. While Japan originally assigned 25 billion yen (approximately \$208 million) to these projects, 16.5 billion yen worth of projects are yet to be implemented due to Russia's unwillingness to disclose certain information and other reasons.³⁰ In July 2002, Japan dispatched auditors to Russia and Kazakhstan to ascertain the causes of delays in implementation of nonproliferation projects. Only one Japanese-funded project (the Landysh processing facility for low-level liquid radioactive waste from nuclear submarines, for which 4.2 billion yen were allocated) has been completed, although with great delays.³¹ Japanese officials have reportedly insisted on not spending additional funds on Russian nonproliferation projects until Russia establishes an effective system for administering them. Public revelations of problems with Russian assistance programs have had a negative effect on Japanese public support of the programs.³² Much of the \$200 million pledge, therefore, appears to represent previously allocated but not yet spent funds, rather than new funding.

France and Italy have yet to make any public commitments of funds for the Global Partnership. However, Italy expects to make a decision by September.³³ To date, French aid to Russia has been subsumed under the country's AIDA ("Aide au démantèlement," or dismantlement assistance) program. Between 1992 and 1996, France committed \$57.1 million to this effort, and has since maintained that commitment at similar levels. Beginning in 1993, France has also been involved in studies aimed at adapting Russian nuclear plants to the use of mixed-oxide, or MOX, fuel.³⁴ In addition, France has pledged about \$60 million for plutonium disposition, and participates in the European Union's 1999 Joint Action on Nonproliferation in Russia program, under which a chemical weapons elimination facility in Gorniy is being constructed.

In addition to bilateral programs, the European Commission has committed 1 billion Euros.³⁵ European countries that are not members of the G8 have been invited to make contributions to the Global Partnership, in addition to bilateral, European Union, and other multinational programs.³⁶ European countries are quite likely to engage in multilateral efforts, using such programs and organizations as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) (Germany, in particular, wants to use the EBRD as the venue for providing nonproliferation assistance), Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS), and the European Nuclear Cities Initiative (ENCI) that was formally launched in April 2001.³⁷ The latter program has been proposed to complement existing nonproliferation programs, improve nonproliferation cooperation between European countries and Russia, introduce new approaches for converting Russian nuclear cities to non-military efforts, and facilitate the involvement of nuclear cities in commercial endeavors. The European Commission has created an International Working Group (IWG) in order to pursue ENCI objectives and coordinate different countries' efforts.³⁸

Global Partnership Programs

Nonproliferation projects under the partnership will continue to address the concerns that are the subject of existing programs. In addition, partnership projects may expand into areas thus far not addressed by existing assistance projects. One of the leading proponents of nonproliferation assistance to the former Soviet states, Senator Richard Lugar, has proposed expanding assistance to cover cruise missile-armed and general-purpose nuclear-powered submarine elimination and dismantling tactical nuclear weapons.³⁹ Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations committee, Secretary of State Powell also voiced support for expanding nonproliferation assistance to cover tactical nuclear weapons and chemical weapons.⁴⁰ However, new moneys must be found if this is to occur.

In many respects these areas correspond closely to the nonproliferation priorities identified by President Putin, namely chemical weapon and non-strategic nuclear submarine elimination. Nonproliferation projects addressing these issues probably have a high likelihood of success, despite difficulties in chemical weapons elimination programs to date. The process of dismantling nuclear submarines, in addition, has already been perfected and can easily be expanded from strategic submarines to include new classes of submarines. However, other issues identified by Senator Lugar and Secretary Powell are likely to experience considerable difficulties. The Russian tactical nuclear weapon stockpile, for instance, which at present time remains outside existing formal arms control regimes, lacks transparency, while the U.S. concern with Russian tactical nuclear weapons runs counter to President Putin's position that Russian nuclear weapons do not pose a proliferation threat and are well guarded.⁴¹

Debt Relief Initiatives

The G8 joint statement on the global partnership on nonproliferation has raised the profile of the concept of exchanging Russian foreign debt for nonproliferation program financing. The inclusion of this provision in the joint statement raises the possibility that not all of the funding for the initiative will come in the form of budget allocations.⁴²

The concept of exchanging Russian debt is not new and has been discussed in various forums in recent years. It was, for example, suggested in June 2001 by representatives of the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and Landau Network-Centro Volta, and has since been discussed at ENCI-related IWG meetings.⁴³ The German government, which holds the lion's share of Russian debt, has also promoted debt exchange.⁴⁴ The idea may have gained greater popularity within the Bush administration following President Putin's visit to the United States in November 2001, during which he reportedly expressed concern about the debt burden facing the Russian Federation.⁴⁵

Indeed, the Russian government has been concerned that servicing its foreign debt might require up to 40 percent of its budget in the near future. In 2003, the peak year for Russian debt payments, Russia will be required to return nearly \$18 billion to its creditors. Only a relatively small proportion of Russia's \$71.5 billion debt is held by the United States. Of the \$3.8 billion owed to the United States, over \$2 billion is Soviet-era debt. Germany, by comparison, is owed \$26 billion, Italy \$6.4 billion, and other European states a total of \$35 billion.⁴⁶ The distribution of Russian foreign debt suggests debt forgiveness might be particularly attractive to the European members of G8.

The concept of debt for nonproliferation exchange envisions a mechanism for applying forgiven debts toward the funding of nonproliferation projects, and is similar to "debt for environment" swaps implemented in other countries. The Russian government has developed two competing proposals for implementing debt exchange. Under the terms of the first proposal, the debt would be exchanged for shares in Russian enterprises. Under the second proposal, debt would be exchanged for nonproliferation funding.⁴⁷ The Russian Ministry of Atomic

Energy has estimated that the cost of defense conversion and job creation efforts in the 10 nuclear cities may reach \$500 million, and the debt swap project could provide funding for such efforts.⁴⁸

The debt exchange concept has also found support in the United States. The Security Assistance Act of 2001 (S.1803) Subtitle B (Russian Federation Debt Reduction for Nonproliferation Act of 2001) contained language authorizing the U.S. government to exchange \$100 million of Soviet-era debt in FY 2002 and \$200 million of Soviet-era debt in FY 2003, and to establish a "Russian Nonproliferation Investment Facility" at the Department of Treasury.⁴⁹

On July 25, 2002, the U.S. House of Representatives International Relations Committee held a hearing on discussing the possibility of using Russian debt cancellation as a means of financing nonproliferation assistance programs.⁵⁰ Representatives Adam Schiff and Ellen Tauscher are among the co-sponsors of the Russian Federation Debt Reduction for Nonproliferation Act (HR. 3836) of 2002 (the companion to S.1803, discussed above). This legislation, which was introduced several months before the Kananaskis G8 summit, was modeled after earlier debt swaps for environmental efforts, and would replace the debt with new Russian obligations, to be defined through a nonproliferation investment agreement and to result in the creation of a nonproliferation fund. The Russian government would also be required to provide nonproliferation commitments and transparency measures. The U.S. government would have the authority to approve nonproliferation programs. The programs would incorporate many of the features of current U.S. nonproliferation programs, including U.S. audits, Russian tax exemptions, and ceilings on the proportion of funds to be spent outside of Russia. The bill will also authorize the U.S. government to encourage other creditor states to pursue similar policies.⁵¹

Conclusion

While the Global Partnership initiative has yet to result in significant new nonproliferation assistance funding, it could prove to be a landmark in dealing with WMD issues in the former Soviet Union. It is not clear how or whether the \$10 billion promised by Europe and Japan will be raised, but the initiative has clearly rejuvenated efforts to procure funding for the elimination and safeguarding of WMD weapons and sites. Since there is as yet no administrative organ to implement projects, and no specificity with regard to project recipients, much work remains to be done. The initiative is, nevertheless, the best hope for pushing through legal framework agreements that have stymied the provision of promised funding in the past.

Issues for Future Research

Before more detailed agreements on the Global Partnership are concluded, the G8 countries need to determine the most effective way to address particular nonproliferation concerns. The diversity of nonproliferation needs, from weapons elimination to the physical protection of radioactive waste storage facilities, demands a variety of approaches. Although the Kananaskis G8 statement included several overarching guidelines, liability, transparency, access and the like, the details underlying these concepts have yet to be negotiated. The G8 might therefore consider the possibility of moving forward on certain projects by expanding programs under existing agreements (for instance, subsuming new submarine dismantlement programs under the CTR agreement). Other projects might be best handled bilaterally. Management of programs via a general fund implies the oversight of eight nations (or more, if additional nations contribute). For some programs, the flexibility of a single donor, and the attention a single donating state might provide, could make more sense. Programs should also take advantage of the variety of donor nations, which have different priorities, transparency and access requirements, resources, and relations with Russia.

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Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation John Wolf Provides Details on G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction

Interviewed by Leonard Spector – 11 September 2002

On August 28, Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation John Wolf spoke with Leonard Spector, Deputy Director of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, regarding the agreement reached at the June 26-27 Kananaskis G-8 Summit to launch a Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. The interview provided important new information about the background and substance of the initiative. A transcript of the interview appears below.

CNS: *What did you find to be the most important accomplishments at the summit in terms of nonproliferation and the Global Partnership?*

WOLF: It was very important that the leaders themselves endorsed this initiative, that our other G-7 partners and Russia have agreed that they will help make up 10 of the \$20 billion, and that we have a shared vision of a genuine partnership. I think it is also important that the Partnership will not focus only on Russia or the former Soviet Union, but has possibilities to expand beyond that starting point.

This is going to begin with Russia because that is where our biggest, highest priority problems are. But as we look around the world and look at ways that we can deal with dangerous materials wherever they are, there is a great deal of utility in having a G-8 concept in place that we can employ rapidly, as we go forward.

CNS: *So hypothetically, if there were a need, let's say, for modern nuclear power plant security in India or Pakistan or to help with management of fissile materials in such a country, that mechanism might be used?*

WOLF: Well, I do not think that your hypothetical is what I would foresee, but if there were radioactive sources, other dangerous materials, including chemicals or biological agents, that need safe storage, we would want to find a way to respond quickly with any needed resources. This would augment the work that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is doing on nuclear safety and nuclear terrorism, and that of other relevant international organizations.

CNS: *Which programs are likely to get earliest attention through the Partnership?*

WOLF: All of those listed at the end of the White House press release are potential recipients of funds under the Partnership.¹ Out of the starting gate, plutonium disposition, chemical weapons destruction, to name just two, ought to be the first things commanding our time and attention, because if you look at the 34 tons of plutonium that will be eliminated that is a source of enormous concern. We all worried about the 48 kilos of highly enriched uranium that we moved to Russia last week from Yugoslavia, and rightly so. But just compare that to 34 tons of weapons material that we will be eliminating under the Plutonium Disposition program and you will appreciate how important that program is. Another priority for us will be to shut-down the plutonium production reactors in Russia.

CNS: *Looking at the overall G-8 statement, is it the "Principles," would you say, that were the leading edge accomplishment or the Guidelines? How would you read those?*

WOLF: I think they are both important. The Principles set the framework for international cooperation, but frankly, unless Russia is prepared to implement the Guidelines, then this thing's going to be stillborn. And, not only for new projects, but also for a number of projects that are already underway. I have in mind the submarine destruction initiative that the Japanese have been supporting, but not moving on, because of problems that match the Guidelines, and also Plutonium Disposition, where we have on-going negotiations with Russia over some of the Guideline issues that need to be resolved for our funding to move ahead and for additional G-8 money to be provided.

CNS: *If you read the Guidelines closely, they're framed in somewhat loose language, phrases like, "new projects will be decided taking into account international obligations and domestic laws of the participating partners and appropriate bilateral and multilateral frameworks that should, as necessary, include the following elements..." So, while the phrasing of the Guidelines, standing alone, is clear about Russia's obligations, it seems to me that this preamble gives Russia quite a bit of flexibility.*

WOLF: Let me just see if I can rephrase what I just said. If Russia doesn't go along with the Guidelines, and find a way to conform its national laws as necessary to those Guidelines, then these projects aren't going to go forward and they're going to be kicking \$20 billion off the table.

CNS: *Let's look at the Kananaskis meeting, itself. Press accounts have suggested that Africa, rather than nonproliferation, was going to be the lead issue at the Summit. In fact, as of May, I believe, a report of a Sherpas meeting said that Africa was the leading matter. When did the changeover take place to bring the Global Partnership to the fore?*

WOLF: There were a lot of things discussed during the two days of the Summit. If newspapers chose to put the headlines on our activities regarding the Global Partnership, that was their decision. This is not inconsistent with the international cooperation that has developed since September 11th on an enhanced new effort to deal with the problems of proliferation, which the press has followed closely.

CNS: *But I think the State Department and the White House presentations of the Summit itself also gave the Global Partnership the lead. It's not just the press. So this took precedence, did it not?*

WOLF: No. If I'm not mistaken, on the second day, there was substantial discussion of Africa. It's just a matter of where people chose to focus.

CNS: *I heard there was quite a bit of last minute negotiations dealing with the Guidelines.*

WOLF: It wasn't last minute, it was continuous.

CNS: *But you didn't arrive on the scene with everything in hand?*

WOLF: No.

CNS: *So there was still work to be done?*

WOLF: Right. There were huge holes and part of that had to do with, somewhat, the inconsistency of various Russian pronouncements. This had been discussed in a number of places and, depending on whom the interlocutor was from Russia, we sometimes received differing views on what was and was not acceptable to Russia. In the end, President Putin's stamp on this says that this is where Russia is.

CNS: *So that was considered a significant step forward -- to have a leader to embrace these principles?*

WOLF: Not just one leader, but the eight leaders have embraced the Guidelines, and I hope that's a clear message. We're having a meeting at the end of September where senior officials will sit down now to develop the Guidelines and the budget criteria further, as well as to look at some of the questions of funding that were left open.

CNS: *Was it taxation and liability in particular that the Russians were holding out on? Privileges of immunity? What were the major stumbling blocks?*

WOLF: Yes. The Guidelines were the stumbling blocks.

CNS: *All of them?*

WOLF: Taxation, liability were two, but the Guidelines were not agreed before Kananaskis.

CNS: *Had the Principles been agreed to?*

WOLF: In response to the September 11th terrorist attack and increased concerns about WMD proliferation, the G-8 Nonproliferation Experts Group (NPEG) developed a set of practical steps intended to counter the terrorist threat from WMD and missiles. At their Summit in Whistler, foreign ministers approved and referred these principles to leaders. At Kananaskis, leaders considered and released the principles.

CNS: *This was a phrase that former Senator Nunn and Senator Lugar had put forward.² Was it a deliberate echo of ideas that had already been suggested by them or was it something that was generated internal to the Administration?*

WOLF: I'm not sure whether the first person that suggested that title in the G-8 discussions had the senators in mind, but it reflects G-8 consensus that this is a global problem and that we need to share in developing the solutions.

CNS: *The phrasing now says "up to \$20 billion," so there's a bit of wiggle room there rather than a firm commitment to the full amount.*

WOLF: Right.

CNS: *Is the dollar amount one of the unresolved issues coming from the summit?*

WOLF: Yes, that's still a subject for discussion.

CNS: *But even the target?*

WOLF: Well, the target's \$20 billion. What we would still like to see "10 plus 10 over 10." Our 10 plus their 10 over the next 10 years.

CNS: *But what you implied was that getting that nailed down, even as a target, was...*

WOLF: That was part of the discussion right up and through the meeting.

CNS: *And how did you arrive at the \$10 billion plus \$10 billion? Was this a sense of where the United States was going and that we wanted to see some matching from the other side?*

WOLF: Right. And that's where, if I had anything to critique in regard to your article from the other day [referring to the CNS Website Research Story of the Week for the week of August 12, 2002³], it was the idea that somehow we're getting a free ride and we're asking everyone else to contribute. The implication that ours isn't new money would run afoul of a lot of Congressional concerns, because each year for us is a new adventure with the Congress, in terms of getting appropriations.

We don't have \$10 billion; we have an intention to seek those funds over the next 10 years. It's all new money. It's not necessarily new projects and our expectation is that the Europeans and the Japanese and others would contribute a matching amount. The Russians should never be in a position of thinking that we owe them money or that they are somehow entitled to a certain amount from us. They aren't entitled to anything, unless they cooperate.

CNS: *Let me go back to an initiative in the Clinton Administration. This was the \$100 million initiative that came up after the economic troubles of the summer of 1998. At that point, the strategy was that there was a greater danger in this area of proliferation because of the new economic conditions, and there was also a desire to just put more money into the Russian economy at a time when there was a crisis. That package assumed a working level of anticipated budget requests into the future and then, on top of that, put in \$100 million for new projects and new initiatives. It sounds to me as if the approach the Bush Administration contemplates is a pledge to continue the existing level of budgetary request and that's the commitment the Administration is making.*

WOLF: Right. To continue the augmented level of our Fiscal Year 2003 request, since we had a major ratcheting up between '02 and '03 in our requested levels. Looking back to last year, if you go request against request, our original request for FY '02, which we were being skewered for last summer, as the Russia Review was going ahead, was \$800 million, but our new level of request is roughly \$1 billion. And we anticipate approximately \$10 billion in requested funds over the next 10 years.

CNS: *The way these Guidelines and these arrangements are set up, it appears that the \$10 billion could also be a ceiling, since we've only pledged to match what the others do. You really haven't pledged to do \$1 billion a year for 10 years. You've pledged only to put up as much as the other G-6 parties would.*

WOLF: We think that the programs we fund in Russia and the former Soviet Union are in our interest and there are good reasons why we fund those programs. But neither Russia nor our partners should ever be in a position of assuming that we will do all of these things irrespective of their commitments, including Russia's commitments. And I'm not talking simply about cooperation on the Guidelines issue, but also their own financial contribution, because, if you look at it, the Russia of 2002 is financially quite different than the Russia of 1998. They have 50-something billion dollars in the bank.

CNS: *So when we talk about the \$10 billion non-U.S. contribution, you are anticipating some contribution from Russia as part of this?*

WOLF: Yes.

CNS: *And also the EC, which is not strictly a part of the G-8?*

WOLF: The \$10 billion, indeed the Global Partnership, is designed to include others beyond the G-8.

CNS: *Are there any new projects that are contemplated? I think Senators Domenici and Lugar have proposed accelerated blend-down of high enriched uranium, to pick-up the pace of the blend-down. Another possibility would be ending the extraction of plutonium from civilian nuclear power plant fuel. Are there any new initiatives of that kind in store, or are you right now more "steady-as-you-go?"*

WOLF: We're going to talk about the projects, among other things, and where we might go with this, at the meeting in September.

CNS: *And at that meeting there will be a discussion of U.S. programs? I mean you already have your budget request in, so you have a vision of what you are going to be doing in the coming year. So that sounds as though you will be looking for characterizations from the other parties as to what they're going to be doing during that period.*

WOLF: Right. Some have signaled that it might simply be a need to see a reenergizing of projects that have been stalled for a long time.

CNS: *Again, as I read this, any money that is spent henceforth counts toward our \$10 billion and their \$10 billion.*

WOLF: I don't think it would be good to simply look at this as a two-entry bookkeeping accounting exercise. What we're basically saying is that there's an international interest, among the States, the G-8 countries and Russia, in moving forward in a cooperative way to eliminate a variety of threats to all of our national security, whether it is in increased material protection, plutonium disposition, different kinds of blend-down, or chemical weapons destruction. Perhaps for some, it may be nuclear submarine destruction, for some it may be things related to reactor safety. So there will be a variety of opportunities under discussion. What we have seen in the decade of the '90s is that we were doing multiples of what the rest of the world was doing combined. The good news in the Global Partnership is that the rest of the world is saying, "We understand we need to do more, too," and that's what we think it should be. We think they should be able to do about \$10 billion worth, instead of whatever it was -- a little over \$500 million from Europe -- over the last 10 years.

CNS: *And the take-away from the Summit was an expectation that this is going to unfold and the Partnership declaration wasn't just a throwaway declaration to get the Americans off their backs?*

WOLF: We're having a meeting on the 26th of September and we expect to move things forward.

CNS: *What about the new Nuclear Safety and Security Group? Is that going to replace the G-8 Nonproliferation Experts Group, the NPEG?*

WOLF: There is a G-8 Nonproliferation Experts Group and a G-7 Nuclear Safety Group as well. There are two different groups.

CNS: *I noticed that it only deals with nuclear safety and security, but the initiative deals with biological weapons, chemical weapons, radiological sources...*

WOLF: This new G-8 Group will cover the civil nuclear safety issues currently dealt with by the G-7 Nuclear Safety Working Group (NSWG), and consider radiological concerns and physical security issues at nuclear power plants.

CNS: *So this will replace the nuclear group?*

WOLF: There is a G-7 Nuclear Safety Group. At Kananaskis, leaders recommended that this group be a G-8 group. The details have yet to be worked out.

CNS: *So the nonproliferation group will cover a larger set of issues.*

WOLF: The G-8 Nonproliferation Experts Group already addresses the range of WMD and missile nonproliferation issues. At Kananaskis, leaders recommended that a mechanism be established to coordinate cooperation for the Global Partnership in order to avoid duplication and overlap and to resolve implementation problems as they arise.

CNS: *Is there any thought about a centralized nonproliferation fund that would be administered jointly by the G-8 in some fashion?*

WOLF: No.

CNS: *I don't know how much you can say on the following, but Secretary Bolton has taken very strong positions on certain issues. I'm not sure that he's been observed to speak forcefully on nonproliferation assistance programs for the NIS, but my impression was that he was a fairly active player, in fact was leading at the Summit. Is this the case?*

WOLF: He was the pivotal person.

CNS: *It sounds to me as if when you take on that responsibility, you must be embracing these programs with some enthusiasm.*

WOLF: Absolutely. He's an enthusiastic supporter of these. Like I say, the CTR [Comprehensive Threat Reduction] programs we do in Russia and the former Soviet Union are programs that are abundantly in the U.S. national interest. We had a review of them in 2001; the President endorsed them. We are determined to

move forward. We think our friends and allies ought to be similarly engaged in terms of dealing with some of these threat reduction-type programs. They benefit our allies just like they benefit Russia or us. They are of international importance, and we think our friends and allies need to pony up and they haven't ponied up particularly up to now. In the decade of the 90s, that may have been understood, because they were dealing with economic security issues, more than we were. But the economic stabilization of Russia and the former Soviet Union is a less critical issue now. That war has been largely won. Nonproliferation issues and threat-reduction issues are still a decade or more ahead of us.

CNS: Are you an enthusiast of debt relief or debt swaps? Does that have appeal or is that too complicated?

WOLF: I think different countries will approach the funding stream differently. It is our vision that a debt program could be part of the program, but there is no universal buy-in. It's a national decision.

CNS: Has any country spoken enthusiastically about it?

WOLF: We are looking at it very actively.

CNS: We have about \$3 billion in debt, I think; that is not so large.

WOLF: This may or may not be the way we go.

CNS: Well, I would say that covers a lot of the waterfront for us. The next thing we will be watching for is the meeting in September and perhaps we can interact with your office after that takes place and provide additional information on it to our readers. I imagine there will be statements and press releases about that event, too.

WOLF: Oh, I don't know about that. It depends how much meeting of the minds there is. If there are a lot of pledges on the table... I read in your Research Story of the Week that the UK was going to put up \$750 million; Germany at one point \$1.5 billion-something; Japan a paltry \$200 million; Canada \$600-650 million, depending where the Canadian dollar is. This will be good news.

CNS: That's based on press reports from those countries, so we're hoping that we're hearing it right.

Let me ask about the multilateral and trilateral environmental clean up agreements to address submarine and spent sub fuel in Russia's north. Do these have a better chance of moving forward because Russia has pledged to deal with some of the outstanding issues through the G-8 Guidelines?

WOLF: The sub-reactor program? This is mostly a Northern European-led initiative. But that's the kind of thing I'm talking about. To get countries moving forward, the Russians are going to have to do something to make sure that their treatment of the projects corresponds to the Guidelines, because all of the countries involved in the Partnership have said that these are *sine qua non's* for successful implementation.

CNS: This has been a very informative exchange. Thank you for taking the time to provide this valuable background on the Global Partnership.

PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE

DOCUMENTEN

White House

Remarks by the President to the People of Poland

Wawal Royal Castle, Krakow, Poland – 31 May 2003

[...] The greatest threat to peace is the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. And we must work together to stop proliferation. The countries of the G8 committed last year to aiding Russia and others in securing and eliminating deadly weapons that remain from the Soviet era. I welcome Poland's decision to join this effort. And I call on America's G8 partners to follow through on their financial commitments so that we can stop proliferation at one of its sources. When weapons of mass destruction or their components are in transit, we must have the means and authority to seize them. So today I announce a new effort to fight proliferation called the Proliferation Security Initiative. The United States and a number of our close allies, including Poland, have begun working on new agreements to search planes and ships carrying suspect cargo and to seize illegal weapons or missile technologies. Over time, we will extend this partnership as broadly as possible to keep the world's most destructive weapons away from our shores and out of the hands of our common enemies. [...]

White House

Press Background Briefing By Senior Administration Official

Aboard Air Force One en route St. Petersburg, Russia - 31 May 2003

Q: Do you have time to talk a little bit about the nuts and bolts of the counterproliferation initiative?

Senior Administration Official: It's an initiative -- it's an initiative which is starting with a series of consultations with close allies and others. We've approached already the United Kingdom, Spain, Poland, Australia, and a number of other countries about this. The President mentioned only Poland because we were in Poland -- but, in fact, these countries I've mentioned have expressed an interest in being part of this.

Now, what the "this" is, is a series of efforts to develop legal and actual capabilities to stop the proliferation of dangerous technologies and materials, and aimed at expanding interdiction efforts. I will tell you what our inspiration was for this initiative, and it's sort of the origin of our thinking. You may remember some months ago a Spanish vessel stopped in a very dangerous operation, a very difficult operation -- stopped an unflagged vessel that was found to be carrying Scud missiles for North Korea. It was a courageous action by the Spanish navy, by the Spanish frigate. It was successful. And in the end we discovered, as you'll recall, that we'd lacked the legal authority to hold the cargo and the cargo was sent on.

That was not the favorite moment of many people who worked on this issue. And it was as a result of this that the administration started thinking about ways to develop new capabilities and groups of countries willing to develop legal tools and pool resources to actually prevent proliferation from occurring.

We plan to get together with our close allies, with countries that I named and with others, because we want -- the more countries you have in an effort like this, the better -- in a multilateral way and working with countries individually to develop the tools we need so that we can succeed in stopping such shipments in the future. So we're going to be talking in the next two weeks, and working rather intensely. So this is an initiative that is being developed, and we will be working on it in the weeks and months ahead.

Q: You said you need new legal authority, and who do you go to get that?

Senior Administration Official: We may need -- countries may have to develop their own national authorities to do these sorts of things, and our lawyers are looking at different kinds of authorities that may be needed. I'm not a lawyer. I know that we're looking -- each country has to -- we will want to discuss with countries authorities that they think they need, authorities that they already have, and then we'll decide what we need to do.

Q: Because that case was in international waters.

Senior Administration Official: I know. And so one of the things we need to do with the countries that are interested is to decide what authorities we need for actions inside territorial waters, inside national airspace, at

ports, in the air, to get things done. So this is -- that's a very good question, and we need to work with all of these countries to determine what we need to do.

Q: -- go back to the U.N.?

Senior Administration Official: We'll see -- we will see what we need to do in a serious way to get the authorities we need. And those are the kinds of questions we'll be asking. This is a serious initiative to deal with a serious problem, and it has a real world aspect. I mean, there's nothing more real than shipping this kind of stuff and stopping it. It's not a wonk problem, if I can use the term; it's a real world problem and one which we're serious about.

Q: Are you expecting any decisions tomorrow after they talk and have their news briefing? Or are they just going to talk about Iran and the nuclear thing, or is there something going to be decided?

Senior Administration Official: I think they're going to talk about it. We'll see how the discussions go. This is a tough issue for the Russians, and if you follow the Russian public statements carefully, you will see that sometimes they're very forward-leaning publicly and acknowledging the depth of the problem; sometimes they're at pains to stress that it's not their fault. And I'm choosing my words carefully.

So given that record, I want to see as much progress as we can get. But this is going to take -- we've been at this with the Russians and I think we'll continue to go after this with the Russians.

Q: Will the President make a specific request of Putin?

Senior Administration Official: I don't want to get into the specifics other than talk about the topic.

Q: How long ago did you approach these initial members of the new initiative?

Senior Administration Official: Within the last couple of weeks. Within the last couple of weeks -- that's all. So it's fairly new. And we got -- the response we got from the British, the Spanish, the Poles, and some others was extremely positive. The reaction by -- if I could characterize it is: this sounds really interesting; we would love to be a part of this. The Spanish added a few things: this is great, we know exactly why you want to do this; boy, do we want to be part of this.

Q: Now, is it a coincidence that the countries that you cited were all principal allies in the war?

Senior Administration Official: Those are countries we went to, but we are not limiting ourselves. We are not bounded by that. I want to emphasize that -- we are not limiting ourselves and using -- a country's position on Iraq is not going to keep us from working with that country. Not at all.

Q: But that is why we went to them first?

Senior Administration Official: Well, we're going to a lot -- we're going to other countries. Without -- I don't want to name any countries unless I am sure that they have responded favorably. And so --

Q: That's one of the issues --

Senior Administration Official: It would not be accurate to say that we are only going to countries who were very supportive on Iraq. But I don't want to go further because I don't want to characterize the position of countries who may not want to have their positions characterized.

Q: Who is in charge of this initiative?

Senior Administration Official: Who's in charge? Within the administration? Oh, it's very much an interagency product of -- State, Defense, NSC have all been working -- and I stress working in complete harmony, by the way.

Q: Where does the buck stop? Who's the coordinator of that interagency --

Senior Administration Official: This is a presidential initiative. He's announced it, so people working -- Dr. Rice and people working on her staff have been very active. But State Department has been involved at every -- and Defense have been involved at every stage. I would say there's a very effective interagency troika of people running this, and they have -- when I say this is an interagency, I mean that, and it has been a very productive period of policymaking and a launch.

US House of Representatives

U.S. Efforts to Stop the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction

John R. Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security

Testimony before the House International Relations Committee

Washington, DC - June 4, 2003

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, for the opportunity to appear before you today. Last week in Poland, President Bush said that the greatest threat to peace is the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and announced a new effort to fight proliferation. I am here today to discuss America's battle against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and our new approach to this threat.

I will summarize my prepared statement, which I ask be included in the record, and would be pleased to answer any questions the Committee may have.

On May 31 in Krakow, Poland, President Bush announced a new effort to combat weapons of mass destruction (WMD), called the Proliferation Security Initiative. Our goal is to work with other concerned states to develop new means to disrupt the proliferation trade at sea, in the air, and on land. The initiative reflects the need for a more dynamic, proactive approach to the global proliferation problem. It envisions partnerships of states working in concert, employing their national capabilities to develop a broad range of legal, diplomatic, economic, military and other tools to interdict threatening shipments of WMD- and missile-related equipment and technologies. To jumpstart this initiative, we have begun working with several close friends and allies to expand our ability to stop and seize suspected WMD transfers. Over time, we will extend this partnership as broadly as possible to keep the world's most destructive weapons away from our shores and out of the hands of our enemies.

We aim ultimately not just to prevent the spread of WMD, but also to eliminate or "roll back" such weapons from rogue states and terrorist groups that already possess them or are close to doing so. While we stress peaceful and diplomatic solutions to the proliferation threat, as President Bush has said repeatedly, we rule out no options. To do so would give the proliferators a safe haven they do not deserve, and pose a risk to our innocent civilian populations and those of our friends and allies.

Principles of nonproliferation are known and formally accepted around the world. But, they are too often ignored and flagrantly violated by determined states that view WMD as integral to their survival and international influence. Many of these states are nearly immune to conventional diplomatic dialogue. While we pursue diplomatic dialogue wherever possible, the United States and its allies must be willing to deploy more robust techniques, such as (1) economic sanctions; (2) interdiction and seizure, as I outlined earlier; and (3) as the case of Iraq demonstrates, preemptive military force where required. The pursuit of WMD and ballistic missile delivery systems cannot be cost free. Proliferators -- and especially states still deliberating whether to seek WMD -- must understand that they will pay a high price for their efforts. In short, if the language of persuasion fails, these states must see and feel the logic of adverse consequences. Moreover, the logic of adverse consequences must fall not only on the states aspiring to possess these weapons, but on the states supplying them as well.

The Axis of Evil

In **Iraq**, coalition forces acted to enforce UN Security Council resolutions and have assumed the responsibility of disarming Iraq -- an Iraq that both actively pursued weapons of mass destruction and harbored terrorists on the most-wanted lists. As part of the Coalition effort to establish an Iraq that is at peace with itself and its neighbors, and that poses no threat to international peace and security, we will make sure that the Iraq disarmament effort is comprehensive, and that the international community and the Iraqi people are assured that Iraq's capacity for weapons of mass destruction has been eliminated. The Coalition is committed to conducting disarmament in a methodical manner. With the passage of UN Security Council resolution 1483, the shape and scope of any future UN role regarding Iraq's WMD programs, in this new context, remain under consideration.

Saddam Hussein's Iraq had a robust program to develop all types of weapons of mass destruction -- nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and the capability to deliver them. CIA determined in its recent *Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Weapons* that Iraq continued its efforts to develop a nuclear bomb, and could have produced one within one year if it had been able to acquire weapons-grade fissile material abroad. CIA also determined that Iraq had biological weapons (BW) and chemical weapons (CW) programs. UNMOVIC concurred with this assessment and maintained that Iraq had not been forthcoming about its weapons programs and retained the ability for large-scale production of BW and CW weapons. UNMOVIC concluded that Iraq did not destroy about 10,000 liters of anthrax. UNMOVIC also reported that Iraq never accounted for an estimated 6,000 missing CW munitions. Although we have not yet found Iraq's cache of CW weapons, the plethora of chemical weapons suits we have found indicated that these weapons must have been there -- and in abundance. But more important, we have put an end to Saddam's capacity to produce and reacquire these weapons. That capability -- the potential Saddam had to restock his chemical, biological or nuclear weapons caches using his army of trained scientists -- coupled with Saddam's demonstrated willingness to use these weapons posed a real threat to the civilized world.

The clearest example of Iraq's WMD program we have found so far has been the mobile BW laboratories. CIA and DIA recently released an unclassified white paper on the labs that explained why biological weapons production was the only logical use of these labs. The CIA/DIA case is compelling and carefully deals with alternate uses and the cover stories Iraq devised to prevent UN inspectors from discerning the actual purpose

of the mobile labs. As you know, the mobile BW labs were one of the examples of Iraq's WMD programs that Secretary Powell described in his speech to the UN Security Council.

The range of Iraq's Al-Samoud and Al-Fatah missiles violated UN Security Council resolution 687's limitation of 150 kilometers. CIA believes that Iraq was also developing longer range missiles. As you know, Iraq fired a handful of its missiles at Kuwait when the war began and would have fired more if our forces had not quickly neutralized these weapons. U.S. forces also found tactical rockets with warheads especially designed for CW delivery, though they were not filled with chemical agent.

The biggest threat that we now face from Iraq's defunct WMD program is from the scientists and technicians who developed these weapons. We are very concerned that other rogue states or terrorist organizations will hire and offer refuge to these WMD experts, and we are taking steps to prevent this expertise from finding its way to other WMD programs. Planning also is now also underway in the inter-agency for an effort to redirect Iraqi scientists and other WMD personnel to full-time civilian employment once the exploitation phase is over. This effort will provide WMD personnel an alternative to emigration and give the U.S. a means to keep tabs on their whereabouts in Iraq.

We are devoting substantial resources toward ensuring Iraq's full disarmament. We have developed a comprehensive approach to identifying, assessing and eliminating Iraq's WMD program and delivery systems, and to ensuring productive, peaceful employment for Iraq's scientists and technicians. This effort is based on three initial activities: first, interviewing and obtaining cooperation from key Iraqi personnel; second, accessing, assessing and exploiting a number of sensitive sites; and third, obtaining and exploiting documents, computer hard-drives, etc. As part of this effort, Coalition forces have secured the facilities that house Iraq's natural and low-enriched uranium. The United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are finalizing plans to send a 7-person IAEA team to Iraq under the protection and auspices of Coalition forces to conduct a Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) safeguards inspection of the storage area near Tuwaita. That site is under IAEA safeguards pursuant to Iraq's safeguards agreement with the IAEA. We anticipate the arrival of an IAEA team in Iraq on June 6.

A crucial part of our effort to locate Iraqi WMD is the Iraq Survey Group (ISG). The ISG is a significant expansion of our hunt for Iraqi WMD. It will be composed of some 1,400 people from the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom. Knowledgeable WMD experts will search for banned weapons in Iraq and debrief Iraqi scientists. The ISG has an analytic center in Qatar, but is headquartered in Baghdad. It also is supported by the DIA Iraq Fusion Center at the Defense Intelligence Agency's Headquarters.

The ISG is an unprecedented intelligence collection effort. Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Steve Cambone has done a masterful job creating it and I am confident that under his leadership the ISG will enable us to find and eliminate Iraq's WMD programs. I am proud to announce that Paula DeSutter, the Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance, is working closely with Steve's team and that her talented staff will help the ISG verify the existence of Iraq's WMD program.

We are also trying to learn more about proliferation networks, both in Iraq and abroad, in support of our broad nonproliferation objectives. This will assist us in identifying front companies and individuals that may be involved in these networks.

The hard lessons learned by Iraq must resonate with other proliferating countries. Those countries should heed that thwarting international obligations and standards -- by seeking weapons of mass destruction -- is not in their national interests and will not be tolerated by the international community.

On **Iran**, we have seen for some time indications of a clandestine program to develop nuclear weapons. The United States and its allies expressed concern at the Evian G-8 Summit about Iran's covert nuclear weapons program, stating that "we will not ignore proliferation implications of Iran's advanced nuclear program" and that "we offer our strongest support to comprehensive IAEA examination of this country's nuclear program." The world has put Iran on notice that it must stop pursuing nuclear weapons.

We now know that Iran is developing a uranium mine, a uranium conversion facility, a massive uranium enrichment facility designed to house tens of thousands of centrifuges, and a heavy water production plant. This costly infrastructure would support the production of both highly enriched uranium and plutonium for nuclear weapons. While Iran claims that its nuclear program is peaceful and transparent, we are convinced it is otherwise.

One unmistakable indicator of military intent is the secrecy and lack of transparency surrounding Iran's nuclear activities. Iran did not disclose its uranium enrichment facility, or its heavy water production facility to the IAEA until construction was so far along that an opposition group made them public. Iran has a long history of denying the IAEA full access to its nuclear program, and continues to refuse to accept the IAEA strengthened safeguards Additional Protocol, despite calls by IAEA Director General ElBaradei and many others to do so. Iran's failure to accept the Additional Protocol, which would give the IAEA increased access

to investigate undeclared nuclear activities and facilities, exposes Iran's claims of "transparency" as clearly false.

Another troublesome indicator of the true nature of the Iranian nuclear program is that the cover stories put forward for the development of a nuclear fuel cycle and for individual facilities are simply not credible. For example, Iran is making an enormous investment in facilities to mine, process, and enrich uranium, and says it needs to make its own reactor fuel because it cannot count on foreign supplies. But for the next decade Iran will have at most a single power reactor, and Russia has committed itself to supply all the fuel for the lifetime of that reactor. In addition, Iran does not have enough indigenous uranium resources to fuel even one reactor over its lifetime. So we are being asked to believe that Iran is building uranium enrichment capacity to make fuel for reactors that do not exist from uranium Iran does not have.

Iran would have us believe it is building a massive uranium enrichment facility without having tested centrifuge machines, and building a heavy water production plant with no evident use for the product. The more credible explanation is that Iran is building the infrastructure to produce highly enriched uranium in centrifuges and plutonium in a heavy water moderated reactor.

Finally, there is Iran's claim that it is building massive and expensive nuclear fuel cycle facilities to meet future electricity needs, while preserving oil and gas for export. In fact, Iran's uranium reserves are miniscule, accounting for less than one percent of its vast oil reserves and even larger gas reserves. A glance at a chart of the energy content of Iran's oil, gas, and uranium resources shows that there is absolutely no possibility for Iran's indigenous uranium to have any appreciable effect on Iran's ability to export oil and gas. Iran's gas reserves are the second largest in the world, and the industry estimates that Iran today flares enough gas to generate electricity equivalent to the output of four Bushehr reactors, as shown on the second chart.

The conclusion is inescapable that Iran is pursuing its "civil" nuclear energy program not for peaceful and economic purposes but as a front for developing the capability to produce nuclear materials for nuclear weapons.

Iran is a party to the NPT, and has a full-scope safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Following the revelation of Iran's construction of nuclear facilities, IAEA Director General ElBaradei visited Iran this year, found sophisticated uranium enrichment centrifuges, and raised questions in his March report to the IAEA Board of Governors. IAEA inspection teams have subsequently returned to Iran. We doubt Iran would have built such a large enrichment plant and other nuclear facilities without first conducting experiments that in turn would raise questions about Iran's sincerity in meeting its safeguards obligations to the IAEA. Iran's safeguards agreement with the IAEA requires reporting of nuclear materials and experiments using nuclear materials. If not reported to the IAEA, testing of centrifuges with uranium, for example, or experiments involving Iran's research reactor would conflict with Iran's safeguards obligations. We look forward to Director General ElBaradei's report on what his teams have found in Iran to the next meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors in June.

Despite all Iran has done, it is not too late to halt and reverse Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons. The United States is using all diplomatic tools to this end. We have focused special attention on Russia, the supplier of the Bushehr reactor. Following sustained high-level exchanges, Russia shares our concern about Iran's nuclear activities, joins us in supporting the IAEA's ongoing inspections, and wants Director General ElBaradei to make a full and unbiased report to the Board of Governors on what his inspectors in Iran have found. My Russian colleague, Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov, made these points publicly on May 27.

In Vienna, we are providing support to the IAEA to facilitate a rigorous examination of Iran's nuclear facilities by IAEA inspectors. If the IAEA finds that Iran's nuclear activities are not in compliance with its safeguards obligations, the case would be compelling that the international community should oppose uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing capabilities in Iran and halt all nuclear cooperation with Iran.

The danger that Iran poses with its clandestine nuclear weapons program is compounded by Iran's pursuit of an advanced and self-sufficient chemical weapons infrastructure, its active quest for biological warfare capabilities, and its long-range ballistic missile program. Despite being a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), it is widely known that Iran has stockpiled blister, blood and choking CW agents, and possesses the bombs and artillery shells to deliver them. It continues to seek chemicals, production technology, training, and expertise from Chinese entities that could further Tehran's efforts at achieving an indigenous capability to produce nerve agents, which Iran previously has manufactured. The United States also believes that Iran probably has produced BW agents and likely maintains an offensive BW program, in violation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), to which it is Party. Foreign dual-use biotechnical materials, equipment, and expertise -- primarily, but not exclusively, from Russia -- continue to feature prominently in Iran's procurement efforts. While such materials do have legitimate uses, Iran's biological weapons program could also benefit from them. It is likely that Iran has capabilities to produce small quantities of biological weapons agents, but has a limited ability to weaponize them. Furthermore,

ballistic missile-related cooperation from entities in the former Soviet Union, North Korea, and China over the years has helped Iran move toward its goal of becoming self-sufficient in the production of ballistic missiles. Such assistance includes equipment, technology, and expertise. Iran, already producing Scud short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), is in the late stages of developing the Shahab medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) and is pursuing longer-range missiles.

Vigorous implementation of our sanctions policy is a key part of our Iran nonproliferation effort. We have sanctioned entities in China and Moldova for assistance to the Iranian missile program, as well as entities in Iran itself.

We cannot let Iran, a leading sponsor of international terrorism, acquire the most destructive weapons and the means to deliver them to Europe, most of central Asia and the Middle East -- or further.

North Korea's nuclear weapons ambitions also present a grave threat to regional and global security and a major challenge to the international nonproliferation regime. At the recent Evian G-8 Summit, the United States and its allies approved this unequivocal language on Pyongyang's covert nuclear weapons program:

North Korea's uranium enrichment and plutonium programs and its failure to comply with its IAEA safeguards agreement undermine the nonproliferation regime and are a clear breach of North Korea's international obligations. We strongly urge North Korea to visibly, verifiably, and irreversibly dismantle any nuclear weapons programs, a fundamental step to facilitate a comprehensive and peaceful solution.

Not only are we dealing with a country that has repeatedly violated its international nonproliferation obligations, but we also face the prospect that North Korea could produce and then export fissile material or weapons to rogue states or terrorists. This is a danger that cannot be ignored.

By the mid-1990s, the U.S. intelligence community assessed that North Korea had one, possibly two, nuclear weapons. Since Pyongyang acknowledged in October 2002 that it was pursuing a covert uranium enrichment program, it has rejected international calls for it to reverse course and has taken escalatory actions in further violation of its international nuclear nonproliferation commitments. To summarize, North Korea in late December 2002 lifted its freeze at the Yongbyon plutonium production facilities -- a freeze that had been required under the 1994 Agreed Framework -- and expelled IAEA inspectors. On January 10, 2003, North Korea announced that it was withdrawing from the NPT. Despite a February 12, 2003 finding by the IAEA Board of Governors that North Korea was in further non-compliance with its safeguards obligations and a report of this finding to the UN Security Council, North Korea restarted the 5 megawatt reactor at Yongbyon. North Korea claims that the reactor is for electricity generation, but we are confident that the reactor will also produce plutonium for North Korea's nuclear weapons program. The electricity the reactor generates is roughly equal to that needed for its operation, belying the notion that it will generate electricity of any useful proportion. The reactor's real utility to North Korea is that it produces spent fuel, which contains plutonium that can be recovered through reprocessing and used for nuclear weapons. North Korea asserts that it has nearly completed reprocessing the 8,000 spent fuel rods stored at Yongbyon. We are concerned that North Korea may decide or has decided to begin reprocessing. The North could produce enough additional plutonium for as many as six nuclear weapons in several months. We have made clear to North Korea that reprocessing would be a serious escalatory step in the wrong direction.

While all options remain on the table, the United States has made clear repeatedly and at the highest levels that we seek a peaceful, diplomatic end to North Korea's nuclear weapons program. We insist on addressing the challenge multilaterally with all countries concerned, including Japan and the Republic of Korea, playing an integral role.

Trilateral talks between the United States, China, and North Korea from April 23-25 in Beijing allowed all sides to make their views known. North Korean officials made several troubling statements at the talks. In addition to assertions about reprocessing, they also told us unequivocally on the margins of the talks that they have nuclear weapons. They further threatened to demonstrate this fact, or even transfer nuclear weapons. While they said there is a way to move forward and gave us a proposal, Secretary of State Powell has already indicated that it is a proposal that is not going to take us in the direction we need to go. The proposal simply restated North Korea's previous demands. These sentiments were recently echoed by the Foreign Minister of South Korea, who noted there was nothing new in the proposal.

North Korea's claims and threats will not intimidate the United States. We are not going to pay for the elimination of North Korea's nuclear weapons program -- a program the North should never have begun in the first place. North Korea's statements are evidence that it continues to try to intimidate -- even blackmail -- the international community into giving into its demands. We reject these statements, and particularly the intent behind them, in the strongest possible terms. We continue to insist that North Korea must terminate its nuclear weapons program completely, verifiably, and irreversibly. And there will be no inducements to get them to do so. Giving into nuclear blackmail will only encourage this behavior, not only in North Korea, but also in nuclear aspirants around the world. North Korea must understand that its efforts to pressure the United States

and the international community into meeting its demands will not bear fruit. Indeed, resolution of the problem North Korea has created by its own pursuit of nuclear weapons can only come through verified elimination of its nuclear weapons program.

North Korea must end its indigenous missile program and missile exports. North Korea possesses Scud and No-Dong missiles and is developing the Taepo-Dong 2. North Korea is by far the most aggressive proliferator of missiles and related technologies to countries of concern. These sales are one of the North's major sources of hard currency, which in turn allow continued missile development and production. Additionally, the United States believes North Korea has a dedicated, national-level effort to achieve a biological weapons capability in violation of the BWC. North Korea also has a sizeable stockpile of chemical agents and weapons, which it can employ with a variety of means. North Korea is not a State Party to the CWC.

If North Korea verifiably and irreversibly terminates its nuclear weapons program, the United States is willing to reconsider discussing its "bold approach." Assistance would be provided to North Korea through the "bold approach" if the North addresses concerns about its WMD and missile program and exports as well as other issues, including its conventional force disposition, narcotics trafficking, human rights, and its continued sponsorship of terrorism outside its borders. In the meantime, we urge North Korea to refrain from further escalatory steps that will only bring more harm to its own national interests and will further its isolation from the international community.

Beyond the Axis of Evil

We have long been concerned about **Libya's** longstanding efforts to pursue nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and ballistic missiles. Following the suspension of UN sanctions in 1999, Libya resumed its efforts to enhance and expand its efforts to obtain WMD and ballistic missile-related equipment, technology, and expertise from foreign sources.

Allow me to briefly review the facts. Libyan President Muammar Qaddafi has unambiguously asserted that Arab countries have the right to pursue nuclear weapons. Among its WMD programs, Libya's chemical warfare effort is the most advanced. Libya is not a State Party to the CWC and continues to pursue an indigenous CW production capability. It remains heavily dependent on foreign suppliers for precursor chemicals, expertise and CW-related equipment. Following the suspension of UN sanctions, Libya reestablished contacts with foreign sources abroad, primarily in Western Europe. Libya has acceded to the BWC, but continues a biological weapons program. It has not advanced beyond the research and development stage, although it may be capable of producing small quantities of biological agent. It needs foreign assistance and technical expertise -- again, made more possible with the suspension of UN sanctions -- to help use available dual-use materials. Regarding missiles, outside assistance is critical and Libya continues its efforts to obtain ballistic missile equipment and technology. Libya's current capability probably remains limited to Scud B SRBMs, but with continued foreign assistance, it may achieve a MRBM capability or extended-range Scud capability.

Libya must understand that improved relations with the United States means forgoing its WMD and missile programs. We are urging the closest possible scrutiny by potential suppliers and the strictest possible enforcement of export controls to prevent sensitive transfers to Libya.

We seek also to disrupt Syria's WMD and missile-related procurement efforts. As we have informed Congress, we are looking at Syria's nuclear program with growing concern and continue to monitor it for any signs of nuclear weapons intent. Although it has never used chemical agents in a conflict, Syria has maintained a chemical weapons program for many years. It has a stockpile of the nerve agent sarin and is engaged in research and development of the more toxic and persistent nerve agents. Damascus is currently dependent on foreign sources for key elements of its chemical warfare program, including precursor chemicals and key production equipment. Syria is not a State Party to the CWC.

We know that Syria is pursuing the development of biological weapons. Due to its limited biotechnical infrastructure, it is unlikely that Syria has produced effective biological weapons agents or weapons at this point. Syria has signed but not ratified the BWC.

On missiles, Syria has a combined total of several hundred Scud B, Scud C and SS-21 SRBMs, and is believed to have chemical warheads available for a portion of its Scud missile force. Damascus is pursuing both solid- and liquid-propellant missile programs and relies extensively on foreign assistance in these endeavors. North Korean entities have been involved in aiding Syria's ballistic missile development. All of Syria's missiles are mobile and can reach much of Israel and large portions of Iraq, Jordan, and Turkey from launch sites well within the country. Syria's development and acquisition of more capable missiles, coupled with its interests in WMD, exacerbates an already volatile situation in the Middle East.

Although **Cuba** has ratified the BWC, we believe it has at least a limited, developmental offensive biological warfare research-and-development effort. Cuba has provided dual-use biotechnology to rogue states, which

could support their BW programs. Furthermore, the biotechnology industry is a top national priority and is characterized by dual-use, sophisticated equipment, modern facilities, generous funding, and highly trained personnel.

We are also working with **Sudan** to reconcile concerns we have voiced in the past about their attempts to seek capabilities from abroad to research chemical weapons production. Sudan acceded to the CWC in 1999, but is not a State Party to the BWC. Sudan does not have a nuclear weapons program, but we are concerned that Sudan may seek a ballistic missile capability in the future.

A “Forward” Policy on Proliferation

Our frontlines in our nonproliferation strategy need to extend beyond the immediate states of concern to the trade routes and entities that are engaged in supplying the countries of greatest proliferation concern. In support of this “forward” policy of nonproliferation, we are employing a number of tools to thwart and counter countries’ weapons of mass destruction and missile programs, including sanctions, interdiction, and credible export controls. Most of these states are still dependent on outside suppliers and expertise. Thus, we can slow down and even stop their weapons development plans by employing a policy that seeks to disrupt their procurement attempts.

Proliferating states and entities are employing increasingly sophisticated and aggressive measures to obtain WMD or missile-related equipment, materials, and technologies. They rely heavily on the use of front companies and illicit arms brokers in their quest for arms, equipment, sensitive technology and dual-use goods for their WMD programs. These front companies and brokers are expert at concealing the intended destination of an item and in making an illicit export appear legitimate – in essence hiding the export in the open. Proliferators take other measures to circumvent national export controls, such as falsifying documentation, providing false end-user information, and finding the paths of least resistance for shipping an illicit commodity. If there is a loophole in a law or a weak border point, those responsible for rogue states’ WMD programs will try to exploit it. All too often they succeed.

Economic penalties or sanctions are an essential tool in a comprehensive nonproliferation strategy. The imposition or even the mere threat of sanctions can be a powerful lever for changing behavior, as few countries wish to be labeled publicly as irresponsible. Sanctions not only increase the costs to suppliers but also encourage foreign governments to take steps to adopt more responsible nonproliferation practices and ensure that entities within their borders do not contribute to WMD programs.

This Administration imposed sanctions 34 times last year, and has already imposed 12 sanctions this year, with a dozen more in progress on which we will soon be consulting Congress. Compare that with the average number of sanctions passed per year during the last Administration -- 8 -- and you will see that this Administration is very serious about using sanctions as a nonproliferation tool. We have imposed measures under the Iran Nonproliferation Act, the Iran-Iraq Act, the Chemical and Biological Weapons Sanctions Law, the Missile Sanctions Law, and Executive Order 12938. Last month on May 9, the United States imposed nonproliferation penalties pursuant to E.O. 12938 on the Chinese entity, North China Industries Corporation (NORINCO), and the Iranian entity, Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group. Penalties were imposed because the United States Government determined that these entities contributed materially to the efforts of Iran to use, acquire, design, develop, produce or stockpile missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. The same day, the United States also imposed sanctions on the Moldovan entity Cuanta S.A. and its director, Mikhail Pavlovich Vladov, for missile-related cooperation with Iran.

Our perspective on sanctions is clear and simple. Companies around the world have a choice: trade in WMD materials with proliferators, or trade with the United States, but not both. Where national controls fail, and when companies make the wrong choice, there will be consequences. U.S. law requires it and we are committed to enforcing these laws to their fullest extent.

For example, the most recent report submitted to the Congress pursuant to the Iran Nonproliferation Act illustrates our efforts to utilize U.S. statutory authorities to the fullest extent to advance our nonproliferation goals. For the first time, the State Department is reviewing every known transfer to Iran -- not only of those items controlled under U.S. export regimes, but also of those items that have the potential to make a material contribution to WMD or missiles.

Interdiction efforts are also key to a comprehensive nonproliferation strategy. Interdiction involves identifying an imminent shipment or transfer, and working to impede and turn back the shipment. As the President noted in his National Strategy to Combat WMD, we must enhance the capabilities of our military, intelligence, technical, and law enforcement communities to prevent the movement of WMD materials, technology, and expertise to hostile states and terrorist organizations.

On May 31 in Krakow, the President announced the Proliferation Security Initiative. We are in the early stages of discussing with several close friends and allies the President’s initiative to expand interdiction efforts

related to WMD- or missile-related shipments to and from countries of proliferation concern. A robust interdiction effort requires cooperation with like-minded countries -- those who are leaders in nonproliferation as well as those who may have a direct relationship with proliferation activities. Properly planned and executed, interception of critical technologies while en route can prevent hostile states and non-state actors from acquiring these dangerous capabilities. At a minimum, interdiction can lengthen the time that proliferators will need to acquire new weapons capabilities, increase the cost, and demonstrate our resolve to combat proliferation.

The *So San* episode in December of last year illustrates that proliferators are vulnerable to having their shipments interdicted by the U.S. and our allies. In the last two months, interception of aluminum tubes likely bound for North Korea's nuclear weapons program and a French and German combined effort to intercept sodium cyanide likely bound for North Korea's chemical weapons program are examples of recent interdiction successes. Although indirectly related to North Korea's WMD program, the seizure of the *Pong Su* last month as it tried to deliver heroin off the coast of Australia is another example of the importance of interdiction efforts. Criminal efforts by the North Koreans to obtain hard currency should be of no surprise. As we close off proliferation networks, we inevitably will intercept related criminal activity and overlapping smuggling rings. Targeting and exploiting the vulnerabilities of proliferators and their criminal networks will require coordinated efforts across the spectrum of diplomatic, intelligence, law enforcement, and military interests. Congressional support and commitment to resources for these efforts will be essential.

As one step in an effort to plug the holes in national export controls, we are encouraging and assisting countries around the world to enact more stringent export control laws, put in place effective licensing procedures and practices, and to back them up with effective enforcement mechanisms. Each of these three parts must be effective in order for an export control regime to be credible. For example, while tightening export controls will benefit our nonproliferation efforts, changes in law are meaningless without rigorous enforcement. We frequently hear statements that countries are tightening their export controls, but proof of that is in the marketplace, where sensitive goods and technologies continue to be sold without being subject to scrutiny, prosecution or penalty.

We continue efforts with like-minded states in the multilateral export control regimes -- the Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Australia Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement -- to exchange information about attempts by rogue states to acquire controlled technologies, and to assess whether additional items should be added to control lists. These regimes have each undertaken efforts to address the possibility that individuals or terrorist groups may seek controlled commodities for small-scale but lethal WMD projects. While the export control regimes are an important tool in stemming the proliferation of sensitive technology and materials from advanced nations across the globe, trade between countries of proliferation concern is increasing and outside the control of these regimes. We also are urging suppliers in each of the regimes to exercise maximum vigilance toward efforts by proliferators to procure items that may not be controlled by the multilateral export control regimes, but nevertheless would assist countries in becoming self-sufficient in the production of WMD and their means of delivery. For example, as part of an effort to impede North Korea's procurement attempts, at the December 2002 Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Extraordinary Plenary meeting, lists were distributed identifying items that, while not NSG-controlled, would nonetheless be useful in the North's reprocessing or enrichment programs. We are working with nuclear supplier regimes to tighten controls over nuclear exports to Iran, and to raise awareness of potential suppliers to Iran's aggressive clandestine procurement efforts. Such information exchange is important to our ability to thwart the acquisitive aims of rogue states and terrorists. We must ensure that companies are not exporting sensitive items to proliferators, to brokers acting on behalf of proliferators, or to agents arranging exports through third countries

Ministry of Foreign Affairs Australia

Australia to Host Meeting on Weapons of Mass Destruction

Media release FA76 – 26 June 2003

Australia will host the second meeting of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a coalition of countries aiming to develop practical ways to prevent the global spread of weapons of mass destruction.

The meeting in Brisbane on 9-10 July will build on the outcomes of the first meeting held in Madrid on 12 June attended by Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America.

The group recognises the need to build a broad and effective partnership of States prepared to play a part in impeding the international traffic in weapons of mass destruction and missiles.

The mainstay for stopping the spread of these weapons remains the global system of international treaties, export control regimes and other tools built up over several decades of multilateral negotiations.

The reality is some States cheat on their obligations or resist joining these international regimes. The Australian Government is deeply concerned that such behaviour by maverick States, especially when coupled with terrorism, exposes the world to the use of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons with terrible consequences.

Participants in the Proliferation Security Initiative have recognised that new thinking is needed and practical measures must be developed to raise the barriers to the menace of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The Initiative is global in nature and while it is not directed at any one country, it is relevant to the Government's concerns about North Korea including its declared nuclear weapons program.

The Proliferation Security Initiative participants aim to send a clear message to proliferators that trafficking in WMD-related items will not be tolerated.

Australia's chairing of this key meeting reflects our strong contribution to non-proliferation and international security.

Commons Hansard

Column 317W-318W

2 July 2003

Madrid Initiative

Mr. Jenkin: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a statement on the Madrid Initiative agreed in Madrid in June 2003; what role the (a) Royal Navy and (b) the RAF will play in implementing the Madrid Initiative; and what countries are participants. [122684]

Mr. Hoon: The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) aims to reinforce the international effort against the trafficking in Weapons of Mass Destruction and related technology, with the goal of helping prevent these weapons falling into the wrong hands, such as countries of proliferation concern and terrorists. The United Kingdom strongly supports the aims of the PSI, and participated in a meeting on 12 June in Madrid. The initiative is at a very early stage, and no decisions have yet been taken on the involvement, if any, of armed forces. Any contribution by the Armed Forces of the UK would be consistent with their obligations under international law. The countries that attended the meeting in Madrid were: the US, the UK, Australia, Japan, Italy, France, Germany, Poland, Portugal, Spain and the Netherlands.

[...]

Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Beantwoording Kamervragen Van Bommel (SP)

DVB/NN-219/03 – 7 juli 2003

Graag bied ik u hierbij de antwoorden aan op de schriftelijke vragen gesteld door het lid Van Bommel over een mogelijk plan inzake een zeeblokkade betreffende Noord-Korea. Deze vragen werden ingezonden op 24 juni 2003 met kenmerk 2020313720.

De Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken

Mr. J.G. de Hoop Scheffer

Antwoord van de heer De Hoop Scheffer, Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, op vragen van het lid Van Bommel (SP) over een mogelijk plan inzake een zeeblokkade betreffende Noord-Korea.

Vraag 1

Wat houdt het plan in om Noord-Korea's illegale handel in nucleair materiaal en drugs aan te pakken? Is drugs een apart doel, zoals de pers vermeldt en op grond waarvan is daartoe besloten?¹

Vraag 2

Stemt de Nederlandse regering in met een zeeblokkade van Noord-Korea?

Vraag 3

Wat is de juridische basis voor een zeeblokkade?

Vraag 4

Welke parlementaire controleprocedure acht de regering van toepassing?

Vraag 5

Is overwogen een dergelijk voornemen via de Verenigde Naties of de EU te organiseren? Zo neen, waarom niet?

Vraag 6

Op welke wijze is Nederland bij de uitvoering van dit plan betrokken? Betreft deze betrokkenheid ook militaire middelen?

Vraag 7

Hoe is de groep van elf landen die dit plan uitvoeren totstandgekomen?

Vraag 8

Welke diplomatieke vertegenwoordigers hebben tot deze overeenkomst besloten?

Antwoord

De berichtgeving in de kranten, waarnaar wordt verwezen, heeft betrekking op een recent non-proliferatie initiatief. Dit zgn. *Proliferation Security Initiative* (PSI) werd op 31 mei 2003 door de Amerikaanse President Bush aangekondigd. Het PSI richt zich tegen de handel in massavernietigingswapens (nucleaire, chemische, biologische en radiologische wapens) en hun overbrengingsmiddelen (ballistische raketten), alsmede daarvoor bestemde materialen en technologieën. Doel van het PSI is de betere benutting van bestaande non-proliferatie instrumenten (internationale verdragen, nationale wetgeving, exportcontroles) en de verbetering van internationale samenwerking bij het opsporen en tegenhouden van dergelijke proliferatiegevoelige transporten.

Achtergrond van dit initiatief is zorg over de proliferatie van massavernietigingswapens en hun overbrengingsmiddelen als bedreiging voor de nationale en internationale veiligheid. De regering is op uitnodiging van de Verenigde Staten betrokken bij de besprekingen over dit initiatief. Behalve Nederland zijn ook Australië, Duitsland, Frankrijk, Italië, Japan, Polen, Portugal, Spanje en het Verenigd Koninkrijk in eerste instantie door de Verenigde Staten hierbij betrokken. Een eerste verkennende bijeenkomst vond plaats in Madrid op 12 juni 2003; een vervolgbijeenkomst is voorzien voor 9 en 10 juli in Brisbane/Australië. De discussie bevindt zich nog in een oriënteringsfase waarbij de regering zich vanzelfsprekend ook laat leiden door het internationaal- en nationaalrechtelijke kader. Drugs is niet als apart doel aan de orde. Evenmin is sprake van een zeeblokkade op Noord-Korea.

1. Sp'its, 18 juni jl., "Elf landen pakken Noord-Korea aan"; Parool, 19 juni jl., "Blokade N-Korea bepleit".

Proliferation Security Initiative

Chairman's Statement

Brisbane Meeting, 9-10 July 2003

The participants in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) meeting in Brisbane on 9-10 July reiterated their strong political support for the initiative, and underscored that the PSI is a global initiative with global reach. They agreed to move quickly on direct, practical measures to impede the trafficking in weapons of mass destruction (WMD), missiles and related items.

This was the second meeting of the eleven PSI countries. The first meeting was in Madrid on 12 June. Participants are Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the UK and the US.

The Madrid meeting was unanimous on the need to take active measures to stop the flow of WMD, missiles and related items to and from proliferators. This reflected the international alarm at the growing trade in WMD, missiles and related items, including the risk that these might fall into the hands of terrorists.

Under Australian chairmanship, the Brisbane meeting built on the results from the Madrid meeting and moved forward in translating the collective political commitment of PSI members into practical measures.

The Brisbane meeting focused on defining actions necessary to collectively or individually interdict shipments of WMD or missiles and related items at sea, in the air or on land. Participants emphasised their willingness to

take robust and creative steps now to prevent trafficking in such items, while reiterating that actions taken would be consistent with existing domestic and international legal frameworks.

The Brisbane meeting made good progress in considering interdiction modalities, particularly in the information sharing and operational arenas. Participants emphasised that effective information sharing is vital to interdiction, and agreed to strengthen and improve capabilities for the exchange of information and analysis between participants as a basis for cooperative action to impede WMD and missile trade. Participants acknowledged that although interdiction efforts have been under way for some time, there is a need to further develop and enhance the capabilities of PSI nations to conduct actual air, ground and maritime interdiction operations in partnership against WMD and delivery systems. To that end, they agreed in principle to the concept of a series of interdiction training exercises, utilising both military and civilian assets as appropriate, and that such exercises should take place as soon as practicable.

Participants agreed on the importance of building a broad and effective partnership of countries prepared to play a part in disrupting and stopping the trafficking in WMD, missiles and related items. They agreed effective implementation of the PSI will require the active involvement of countries around the world. As the PSI moves forward, they aim to involve all countries that have the will and ability to take action to address this menace. It also will be crucial to involve countries that are key flag, coastal or transit states, and others that are used by proliferators in their WMD and missile trafficking efforts.

Participants underlined that the spread of weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery, and related materials and equipment is a serious threat to national, regional and global security. Participants expressed concern that WMD and missiles are increasingly being acquired by states of concern which reject international standards against the acquisition, use and proliferation of such weapons.

PSI participants considered the question of states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. They referred to the relevant statements of the G-8 Evian summit on 1-3 June and the EU-US Joint Statement on the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction of 25 June which addressed countries of proliferation concern and non-state actors with particular reference to North Korea and Iran.

The Brisbane meeting strongly supported the strengthening of the existing framework of national laws and export controls, multilateral treaties and other tools which remain the international community's main means for preventing the spread of WMD and missiles. They emphasised that the increasingly aggressive and sophisticated efforts by proliferators to circumvent or thwart existing non-proliferation norms, and to profit from the trade of WMD and missiles or related items, requires new and stronger enforcement action by law-abiding nations. The PSI was therefore welcomed as a necessary and innovative approach to the problem of countries which cheat on their international obligations, refuse to join existing regimes or do not follow international norms, and for non-state actors seeking to acquire WMD.

Participants acknowledged that the PSI is a fast-track initiative that will require continued interaction among experts and policy makers in the days and weeks ahead, and agreed to a next high-level meeting in early September.

NIEUWSBERICHTEN

EUObserver

French surprised by new US weapons' initiative

Lucia Kubosova - 2 June 2003

Against a backcloth of resumed relations between the US and France at the G8 summit in Evian, the US initiative to fight the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction produced yet another source of tension among world leaders.

The French host of the summit - President Jacques Chirac - who had intended to focus the agenda mainly on developing countries and environment issues, asked for time to study the latest US proposal. The plan suggests special measures to prevent nuclear, chemical and biological weapons from falling into the hands of terrorists.

Although it is not expected that the so called 'Proliferation Security Initiative' will produce a major row among the countries, it appeared to have taken the French by surprise.

Mr Chirac's spokesman said the idea was "worth studying", but questioned the legal authority and functioning of such measures, according to The Times.

The package should include more stringent controls on radioactive materials that could be used to produce "dirty bombs," as well as the monitoring of ships and aeroplanes suspected of carrying such materials. It will also propose spending an extra 750 million dollars to help Russia to dismantle its nuclear facilities during the next 10 years. Among the proposals is that former Soviet scientists should get a hand in finding alternative employment, so that they would not start working for terrorist cells.

The action plan is expected to be on the agenda at the final day of the G8 summit as well. It has already been supported by countries at the core of the US-led coalition in the Iraqi war: the UK, Australia, Spain and Poland.

Around 30,000 protesters turned out to the march between Geneva and the French town of Annemasse, the closest they could get to the summit in Evian on Sunday. The march proceeded peacefully until protesters began to return to the Swiss city, when a small number of violent demonstrators clashed with security forces. Officers fired tear gas at a crowd of about 1,000 protesters and water cannon were also brought forward but not used, reports Neue Zürcher Zeitung.

SHAPE

News Summary & Analysis

2 June 2003

[...]

TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS

The U.S. and its allies during the Operation Iraqi Freedom launched on Sunday an initiative to curb the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, in a move set to become a test of the transatlantic relationship, writes the Financial Times, June 1. President Bush, notes the newspaper, injected a surprise element in what had been expected to be an informal discussion on weapons of mass destruction at the summit in France where leaders of the world's biggest industrialized nations met. The daily, observing that the move came as a strong warning to North Korea to give up its nuclear ambitions, reported that some British officials said there is large consensus within the Group of Eight industrialized countries about the need to agree on "action plan" on Monday to combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction. President Bush's so-called Proliferation Security Initiative plan, argues the daily, appeared to have taken France by surprise and it looked set to test the willingness of France and Germany to work with Washington. The Bush administration, notes the newspaper, is now openly reviewing the future of its relationship with its traditional allies in continental Europe. In a related article The Independent speculates that three days in Europe have merely confirmed in public how the U.S. intends to deal with France, Russia and Germany. With Russia President Bush apparently decided to forgive, if not necessarily to forget, based on Moscow's support in the war on terrorism, and its increasing alignment with the West, while Germany's opposition will not be forgotten: there will not be bilateral session in Evian and no invitation for the German Chancellor to the White House. With France, the resentment goes deeper still, since Paris not only opposed the U.S. policy on Iraq, but marshaled that opposition on the Security Council and beyond. Therefore, asserts the daily, the process of reconciliation between the two countries will take some time.

[...]

Global Security Newswire

U.S. Response I: Bush Proposes New Initiative to Block Suspect Cargo Shipments

By Mike Nartker – 2 June 2003

U.S. President George W. Bush proposed Saturday a new international effort to help block illegal shipments of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile technologies.

The United States has already begun contacting a number of countries, such as Poland, on the development of new legal agreements authorizing the search of planes and ships carrying suspect cargo, Bush said during a press conference in Krakow, Poland. Legal agreements developed through the Proliferation Security Initiative would also provide authority to seize illegal shipments of WMD- or missile-related components if discovered.

"When weapons of mass destruction or their components are in transit, we must have the means and authority to seize them," Bush said.

The issue of the legality of stopping and seizing suspect cargo was dramatically demonstrated late last year when a joint U.S.-Spanish effort briefly seized a North Korean ship carrying at least a dozen disassembled Scud ballistic missiles to Yemen.

Bush said he would work to continue to add new members to the initiative. "We will extend this partnership as broadly as possible to keep the world's most destructive weapons away from our shores and out of the hands of our common enemies," he said.

The initiative is likely to be a topic of discussion during a one-on-one meeting between Bush and French President Jacques Chirac scheduled for today during the Group of Eight summit in Evian, France, according to Chirac spokeswoman Catharine Colonna. While France is not opposed to consideration of the issue, one concern is the legal basis for the stopping and seizure of WMD- and missile-related technologies, Colonna said during a press conference. She added that the planned initiative could also be included in a larger nonproliferation system.

Washington Times

U.S. asks aid barring arms from rogue states

By Nicholas Kravlev – 5 June 2003

The Bush administration is seeking agreements with its allies to seize suspected arms shipments from proliferators and rogue states such as North Korea before they reach their destination, U.S. officials said yesterday.

"Our goal is to work with other concerned states to develop new means to disrupt the proliferation trade at sea, in the air and on land," John Bolton, undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, told Congress.

"To jump-start this initiative, we have begun working with several close friends and allies to expand our ability to stop and seize suspected [weapons of mass destruction] transfers," Mr. Bolton said.

President Bush first outlined the policy, known as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), during his visit to Poland over the weekend. The effort includes stepping up economic sanctions and enhancing global export controls.

Mr. Bolton explained the initiative in testimony before the House International Relations Committee yesterday.

"Over time, we will extend this partnership as broadly as possible to keep the world's most destructive weapons away from our shores and out of the hands of our enemies," he said. The initiative, officials said, is a direct response to a December incident in which the United States and Spain seized a North Korean missile shipment for Yemen but had to let it go because no rules had been broken.

Mr. Bolton warned yesterday that the administration's ultimate goal is "not just to prevent the spread" of illicit arms, "but also to eliminate or roll back such weapons from rogue states and terrorist groups that already possess them or are close to doing so," as it did in Iraq.

Five countries — Britain, Spain, Australia, Japan and Poland — have so far acknowledged publicly that they have discussed the PSI with the United States, although U.S. officials said many more have been approached.

"All of them are generally supportive of the concept and the need to look at creative and proactive measures to stop the proliferation of weapons and missiles," a State Department official said.

Arms-control analysts noted that the list of nations backing the plan resembles the "coalition of the willing" that stood by the United States during the war in Iraq.

"The initiative is worth pursuing, but it should not be a substitute for more effective nonproliferation efforts on part of the administration, including diplomatic engagement," said Daryl Kimball, executive director of the nonprofit Arms Control Association.

"The problems with North Korea and Iran stem from past nuclear cooperation they have had with other countries," he said. "It's regional security problems that drive those states to pursue nuclear and other weapons, we shouldn't ignore diplomatic and legal efforts."

Although the administration's strategy to combat weapons of mass destruction, which was released last year, outlined basic nonproliferation objectives, the PSI is the first concrete effort to change the existing international rules.

If Washington's proposals receive international support, it would be able to confiscate deliveries, preventing them from reaching their intended recipient.

In the event that shipments are being transported by air, the plane carrying them would be denied overflight rights by countries that are part of the PSI, the State Department official said.

The aircraft could also be grounded when they stop to refuel, or even "escorted down" if they refuse to land, the official added.

"At a minimum, interdiction can lengthen the time that proliferators will need to acquire new weapons capabilities, increase the cost and demonstrate our resolve to combat proliferation," Mr. Bolton said.

He cited two recent incidents with weapons-related materials apparently destined for North Korea.

"In the last two months, interception of aluminum tubes likely bound for North Korea's nuclear weapons program, and a French and German combined effort to intercept sodium cyanide likely bound for North Korea's chemical weapons program are examples of recent interdiction successes."

Global Security Newswire

International Response: Officials Discussing Ways to Stop WMD Shipments

12 June 2003

Eleven nations, including the United States, are scheduled to meet in Madrid today to discuss modifying international law to make it easier for authorities to board and seize cargo vessels suspected of transporting WMD materials.

The meeting is the first, informal gathering of "a small group of like-minded countries" to discuss the "Proliferation Security Initiative" that U.S. President George W. Bush proposed late last month, a senior U.S. State Department official said yesterday. The United States hopes the meeting will help improve intelligence sharing between countries to better block shipments of weapons and nuclear material, the official said.

The new measures are being pursued because countries that don't belong to nonproliferation agreements, such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, do not violate any laws if they transfer weapons technology, said Jon Wolfsthal of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

For example, Spanish soldiers stopped a North Korean ship in December that was transporting ballistic missiles to Yemen, but the shipment was allowed to proceed after authorities determined that the sale was not illegal.

One purpose of today's meeting is to discuss whether new international law is needed to grant the authority to block transfers of weapons that are not banned under international law, diplomats said. Without legal authority, the seizure of a ship or airplane could be seen as an act of war, according to the *Los Angeles Times*.

"We want to talk about our mutual understanding of the rules of the road, what the permissible bases for interdiction are," the State Department official said.

Under international maritime law, countries can board a suspect ship with the permission of the country under whose flag the ship is sailing, or board ships that are flying no flag, the official said.

"One thing we're going to explore is whether those authorities need to be supplemented," the official said

AFP

DPRK faces 11-nation campaign to stop arms smuggling

17 June 2003

A group of 11 nations has endorsed a US-Australian plan to crack down on North Korea's illicit trade in nuclear material and narcotics, Australian officials said. Diplomats meeting in Madrid last week endorsed the initiative under which ships suspected of being involved in the illegal trade will be stopped and aircraft forced down.

"North Korea must understand that it does have to cease these activities and abandon altogether its nuclear programs," Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer warned.

The so-called "Madrid initiative", endorsed by Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Spain as well as Australia and the United States, will be discussed further when their representatives meet again next month at a location yet to be decided. It follows a meeting in Tokyo last week at which Japan, Australia and the United States discussed measures to halt North Korea's illicit trade.

A South Korean newspaper reported this week that North Korea had been exporting missiles to Iran aboard cargo aircraft ever since a weapons-laden ship was intercepted en route to Yemen in December. The United States has spotted Iranian cargo aircraft leaving North Korea's Sunan airport on six occasions since April, the JoongAng newspaper said, quoting US and South Korean intelligence sources.

Downer told the national parliament here Monday that the 11 countries had strongly endorsed a range of new practical and imaginative measures to constrain the trade in weapons of mass destruction and missiles. The Proliferation Security Initiative would target all states involved in illegal trading in weapons of mass destruction or materials used in their production, Downer said.

"It is not North Korea specific, but of course it is directly relevant to measures that are being taken or at least considered in relation to trying to stop the movement of weapons of mass destruction related materials in and out of North Korea," he said.

Although more work had to be done to develop the plan, it could include the searching of transport plans and vessels and tightening of relevant domestic and international laws. He said Australia was not about to launch a blockade of North Korea, but it is looking at practical cooperation with key countries to deny North Korea further access to materials for making weapons of mass destruction and to deny it access to markets.

Australia's concerns were raised when its special forces seized a North Korean freighter used to ferry a large consignment of heroin into Australia last month. Its crew of about 30 are now in custody facing charges of drug smuggling.

Parool

Blokkade N-Korea bepleit

19 juni 2003

AMSTERDAM - De Britse minister van defensie Geoff Hoon heeft gisteren opgeroepen tot een blokkade van Noord-Korea. Schepen en vliegtuigen moeten worden onderzocht op de aanwezigheid van materiaal dat kan worden gebruikt in massavernietigingswapens, zei hij. Het Witte Huis liet weten dat een blokkade snel kan worden georganiseerd.

In een verklaring via het staatspersbureau KCNA waarschuwde het regime in Pyongyang gisteren dat het zich gedwongen voelt zijn nucleaire inspanningen op te voeren, naarmate de druk uit de VS toeneemt. De Amerikaanse minister van Buitenlandse Zaken Colin Powell zei gisteren dat er 'voor de Verenigde Staten geen zaak van grotere urgentie bestaat dan het Noord-Koreaanse nucleaire wapenprogramma'.

Noord-Korea heeft op zijn beurt bedreigd dat een blokkade of sancties zullen worden beschouwd als een oorlogsverklaring. In mei hebben elf landen, waaronder Nederland, in Madrid in principe ingestemd met een nautische blokkade van Noord-Korea. Volgende maand wordt de onderneming praktisch uitgewerkt op een vergadering van de elf.

Het Witte Huis heeft gisteren gezegd dat zo'n blokkade spoedig kan worden georganiseerd. De Amerikanen beschikken over grote vlootverbanden in Oost-Azië met thuisbases in Yokohama, Singapore, Guam en Pearl Harbor.

Ook het vlieg- en zeeverkeer naar Iran wil de Amerikaanse regering gaan controleren, zo liet het Witte Huis weten. Gisteren heeft president George W. Bush gewaarschuwd dat de Verenigde Staten de vervaardiging van een nucleair wapen in Iran niet zullen toestaan. "Iran is gevaarlijk met nucleaire wapens."

Bush gebruikte dezelfde formulering '-de VS zullen niet toestaan'- vorige maand over het nucleaire programma van Noord-Korea. Sedertdien zijn de Amerikanen bezig het land verder te isoleren en een blokkade te organiseren.

Council on Foreign Relations

WMD - U.S. Interdiction

Updated: 26 June 2003

Is the new U.S. interdiction policy to stop WMD trafficking legal?

Yes and no. It is legal for the United States and other willing nations to stop and search foreign ships suspected of carrying weapons of mass destruction (WMD) within their territorial waters, which extend 12 miles from their shorelines. But legally interdicting ships sailing in international or hostile waters will likely require some modifications to current international law, legal experts say.

What is the new U.S. policy?

The Proliferation Security Initiative, announced by President Bush May 31 in Krakow, Poland, encourages countries to take an aggressive approach toward tracking and seizing WMD in transit at sea, in the air, and on

land. The policy is specifically aimed at preventing “countries of proliferation concern”—such as North Korea and Iran—from importing and exporting WMD and missile-related materials.

Why is the United States pushing for interdiction now?

Since Sept. 11, keeping WMD out of the hands of terrorists and nations that might provide them to terrorists has been a core objective of U.S. foreign policy. Most pressing is the stalemate with North Korea, which has announced that it has a nuclear program and may already have nuclear weapons. Exporting missiles is an important source of revenue for North Korea, and the United States also fears Pyongyang could export WMD. Interdiction, says the Bush administration, would be one way to crack down on this trade.

Can interdiction stop WMD trafficking?

No interdiction campaign against a hostile nation is foolproof, most experts say. Monitoring all of a suspect nation’s land, air, and sea borders is a formidable task. Chemical and biological weapons materials can be difficult to detect, and the relatively small amounts of fissile material needed for a basic nuclear weapon—a grapefruit-size ball of plutonium could be enough, says the Brookings Institution’s Michael Levi—is easily concealed in a radiation-proof container. As a result, some experts say, relying too heavily on an interdiction policy could be dangerous.

How does the Bush administration respond to this concern?

Officials say that they consider the interdiction measures part of a wider strategy to stop proliferation that will include diplomacy, sanctions, and—when necessary—preemptive military action. “At a minimum, interdiction can lengthen the time that proliferators will need to acquire new weapons capabilities, increase the cost, and demonstrate our resolve to combat proliferation,” said John Bolton, undersecretary of State for arms control and international security, in testimony before Congress June 4.

Do other nations support the U.S. interdiction policy?

The idea appeared to be favorably received at the Group of Eight (G-8) meeting held June 1-3 in Evian, France. As part of an effort to reduce the “dirty bomb” threat, the G-8 countries—the United States, Britain, Italy, Japan, France, Canada, Germany, and Russia—agreed to improve export controls and tighten security of radioactive materials, according to a White House press statement. Dirty bombs are conventional weapons that disperse radioactive material.

On June 12, mid-level officials from Poland, Portugal, the Netherlands, Australia, Spain, and all of the G-8 countries except Russia met in Madrid to further discuss the initiative. No reporters attended the meeting; Australian officials identified the participants, according to press reports.

What will it take for the policy to be effective?

The more countries that participate in the interdiction effort, the more successful it will be, proliferation experts say. If only “willing” nations participate, smugglers can move the weapons through nations that do not take part. A new United Nations Security Council resolution cracking down on proliferation would broaden both the legitimacy and the effectiveness of the plan, experts say.

When can nations legally search foreign ships?

All nations are allowed to authorize their law-enforcement officials to stop and search ships sailing inside their territorial waters, according to Ambassador Richard N. Gardner, an international law professor at Columbia University and a former ambassador to Spain and Italy. Nations can also stop suspect planes crossing their air space and any other vehicles transiting their territory.

When is it illegal to stop them?

Under international maritime law, it is generally illegal to stop and search foreign ships sailing in international waters. Nations can, however, board suspect ships with the permission of the country under whose flag the ship is sailing, or board stateless ships flying no flag, international lawyers say. It is illegal, in general, to enforce laws within the territory of another nation without that nation’s permission.

Can countries legally ship nuclear materials?

Yes. Countries that have not signed the 1970 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) can legally ship nuclear material under international law, experts say. This includes India, Pakistan, and Israel—and probably North Korea, whose recent withdrawal from the treaty has not yet been formally accepted by the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA). In addition, all NPT signatories are permitted to develop nuclear power for peaceful purposes and can import and export nuclear materials if they allow monitoring by the IAEA.

Can other WMD-related materials be shipped legally?

Many chemical and biological weapons use “dual-use” components that are generally legal to import for peaceful purposes, experts say. (Dual-use materials have benign as well as dangerous applications.) To stop all potential WMD materials from entering Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War, the Security Council passed a resolution that barred the import of thousands of dual-use items.

Are there domestic laws covering WMD shipments?

Each country has its own set of laws that govern what it may import and export; some nation's laws are stricter than others. In addition, groups of nations have gotten together to attempt to strengthen laws to prevent WMD proliferation. These groups include the **Nuclear Suppliers Group**, the **Missile Technology Control Regime**, and the **Australia Group**.

Is the United States trying to modify international interdiction law?

The first stage of the Proliferation Security Initiative calls on "like-minded" countries to toughen their domestic laws related to WMD and enforce them more aggressively within their own territory. The United States has not yet announced if it will press for changes in international law to stop trafficking in international waters or if it will attempt to use existing law to justify its actions. Some experts say the best way to insure the legality of interdictions and limit objections to the policy would be to pass a Security Council resolution endorsing the U.S. initiative.

What are some criticisms of the interdiction policy?

Some nonproliferation experts say that the U.S. approach to fighting the spread of WMD is unbalanced. For example, the United States, among other countries, still hasn't approved a protocol to the 1975 Biological Weapons Convention to set up an inspections campaign to enforce the treaty. "A lot of us were very disappointed by that," says James Clay Moltz, Associate Director of the Monterey Institute of International Studies' Center for Nonproliferation Studies. "The idea is to now do something" to fight the spread of biological weapons, he says. The United States has also declined to ratify a protocol to the NPT to toughen nuclear weapons inspections. "Interdiction should be a last, or near to last, line of defense," says Jonathan B. Tucker, a senior fellow at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and on leave from the Monterey Institute.

Has there been a recent example of interdiction in international waters?

Yes. In December, U.S. intelligence discovered that a North Korean ship, the *So San*, was carrying a hidden cargo of Scud missiles to Yemen. But because the North Korean short-range missiles are not banned under international law, the Spanish authorities who intercepted the ship at the behest of the United States had to let it proceed. Bush administration officials have said they would like to tighten up the law in these sorts of cases.

Could interdiction be considered an act of war?

Yes, and for this reason it is a provocative policy, Tucker says. North Korea's official daily *Rodong Sinmun* has already charged that the interdiction initiative is part of a premeditated U.S. war plan. North Korea, the daily wrote, would take "an immediate physical retaliatory step against the United States once it judges that its sovereignty is infringed upon by Washington's blockade operation." Under international law, a blockade is considered an act of war, Gardner says.

Would an interdiction campaign against North Korea be like an embargo?

Proponents argue the action against North Korea would be a "selective interdiction" only of ships and aircraft suspected of carrying the questionable materials, not an embargo. But critics say that the policy will not be effective because it will upset the North Koreans without bringing real security to the United States. Brookings' Michael Levi says the Bush administration appears "to be trying to walk a fine line, seeking to avoid the concessions necessary for a diplomatic solution, the risks involved in a military attack, and the dangers of doing nothing. But it is chasing a dangerous fantasy."

Washington Times

Rice tells Europe to follow the lead of U.S. on nukes

By Nicholas Kralev – 27 June 2003

The Bush administration yesterday urged its European allies not to "put a check" on American power but to stand firmly with the United States in its effort to rid the world of weapons of mass destruction and other modern ills.

National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice warned the Europeans that only a united front in pressuring rogue states like Iran and North Korea to abandon their nuclear ambitions would help to avoid military confrontation.

"We don't ever want to have to deal with the proliferation issue again the way we dealt with Iraq," Miss Rice said at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. "If you don't want a made-in-America solution, then let's find out how to resolve the North Korean case and the Iranian case."

Addressing an audience that has often expressed distaste for the administration's policy of pre-emption, she offered assurances that Europe has nothing to fear from a "unipolar" world, in which the United States is the only superpower.

"Why would anyone who shares the values of freedom seek to put a check on those values?" Miss Rice asked, adding that Europe and democracies around the globe should follow Washington's lead instead of trying to balance it with competing policies. A text of the speech was released by the White House.

She dismissed a vision of "multipolarity" advanced by French President Jacques Chirac and others, calling it "a theory of rivalry, of competing interests," which "only the enemies of freedom would cheer."

"We have tried this before," she said. "It led to the Great War, which cascaded into the Good War, which gave way to the Cold War. Today, this theory of rivalry threatens to divert us from meeting the great tasks before us."

Mr. Chirac spoke about multipolarity during the Iraq debate earlier this year when France tried to prevent the United States from going to war. He threatened to block any resolution at the United Nations authorizing the use of force, causing Washington to invade Iraq with only British and limited Australian help.

Apparently concerned about U.S. dominance, Paris insists that all major decisions affecting international order be taken by the U.N. Security Council, where it has a veto.

At the annual summit this month of the Group of Eight — the world's leading industrial nations and Russia — in the French town of Evian, Mr. Chirac invited leaders from a dozen developing and other nonmember states, in a symbolic demonstration of his multipolar vision.

Even before September 11, the Bush administration was often accused abroad of being unilateral and allergic to multinational treaties, ignoring the views of other countries and bullying them into obliging the superpower. But Miss Rice said the United States should not be feared and opposed just because of its unparalleled might. She argued that other nations can put their mark on history by joining forces with Washington to battle terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and other post-Cold War security threats.

"Power in the service of freedom is to be welcomed, and powers that share a commitment to freedom can and must make common cause against freedom's enemies," she said. "This is not a description of a unipolar world."

Quoting the administration's National Security Strategy, Mr. Bush's adviser said: "There is little lasting consequence that the United States can accomplish in the world without the sustained cooperation of allies and friends."

As an example of an effort that requires extensive international cooperation, Miss Rice pointed to the recent White House Proliferation Security Initiative, which aims at seizing weapons shipments on the high seas and in the air. The effort, whose targets are North Korea, Iran and other hostile states, has been joined by 10 allied nations.

"I don't think we can speculate about where an interdiction initiative should lead, but it's extremely important that countries like North Korea recognize that if they are going to flaunt their international obligations, there will be a cost for it," Miss Rice said.

"The North Koreans have to be stopped and the world has to stop them. How far it will go, I think none of us can predict."

As for Iran, which Washington has accused of developing a nuclear weapons program, she called again for a united effort to make that country accept tougher inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

"The United States cannot face up to this alone," Miss Rice said. "This is something the international community must do."

She joined the chorus of U.S. and European officials who have been insisting that, however deep the divisions over the war in Iraq might have been, the two sides of the Atlantic are still united by a "confluence of common interests and common values."

But in a challenge to those who think the Bush administration has sacrificed too many civil liberties in its effort to protect the homeland after September 11, Miss Rice said: "We have learned the hard way that our values and our security cannot be separated."

The Australian

US 'free' to tackle N Korea

By Greg Sheridan and John Kerin - July 09, 2003

THE Bush administration will push Australia today to accept its hardline view that there is already enough legal authority to intercept North Korean vessels suspected of trafficking weapons of mass destruction, missiles or illegal drugs.

Australian officials are taking a more cautious approach into talks in Brisbane today and tomorrow at the Proliferation Security Initiative conference attended by 11 nations willing to try to stop North Korea selling WMDs.

The US Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, John Bolton, told *The Australian* yesterday the US believed it already had several classes of authority to act against North Korean smugglers.

These included cases when:

- North Korean ships did not display a nation's flag, making them, effectively, pirate ships.
- The ships used a flag of convenience and the nation whose flag they used gave the US or its allies permission to board the ship.
- There was a general right of self-defence if there was a serious belief that the North Korean vessels were carrying material for use in WMDs.

The Australian position up until now has been that there is no authority on the high seas to impose a general interdiction regime.

Australia is expected to want to continue exploring legal options, including getting the UN Security Council to change international law to allow interception of ships on the high seas, which under present laws would be considered piracy.

The PSI, which includes the US, Spain, Portugal, The Netherlands, Japan, Britain, Australia, France, Germany, Italy and Poland, met in Spain for the first time last month to find ways to crack down on rogue states that trade in nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

It is likely the tougher US view will prevail. However, Mr Bolton has signalled he wants the Brisbane talks to quickly lead to agreed "operational" plans to intercept North Korean chartered ships or force down commercial aircraft.

He said that President George W. Bush had instructed his officials dealing with North Korea to put an end to the nation's nuclear program, but to do so peacefully.

North Korea is believed to earn between \$US1 billion (\$1.47 billion) and \$US2 billion a year from smuggling missiles and illegal drugs, and organised crime activity in Japan. This money finances its nuclear program.

The Brisbane talks are expected to include contingency plans for intercepting ships and planes and the provision of training and equipment to identify and handle seized nuclear material.

"We don't want to signal our hand too much, but we need to do two things (at the meeting in Brisbane)," a Foreign Affairs Department official said yesterday.

"We need to have a much better (intelligence) basis for sharing timely and accurate information if you're going to intercept a ship (or aircraft).

"Secondly, we . . . need to be able to make sure that our military are capable . . . if the (Australian) Government decided it wanted such interdiction to take place."

Discussions would not be restricted to smuggling and theft by sea, he said.

"Every country has the right to control its own airspace . . . If you know that a plane from North Korea is flying over intervening countries and they choose to exercise their rights, then it is possible to deny them airspace."

Mr Bolton also hailed Australia as the US's closest ally, saying Australia, unlike some US allies, shared with Washington the "threat perception" arising out of terrorism and WMDs.

"I don't think countries act out of altruism," he said. "Australia itself has made its decisions about what is in its national interests. The harder question is why some other countries don't understand the threats."

Reuters

Eleven countries agree to prevent weapons trade

By Jane Breusch – 10 July 2003

BRISBANE (Reuters) - Eleven industrialised nations agreed on Thursday to hold military exercises aimed at halting trade in weapons of mass destruction by intercepting ships and aircraft.

The United States said the consensus at the meeting gave it the authority to launch such interceptions immediately.

Speaking after a two-day meeting of officials representing the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), U.S. official John Bolton said Washington believed it had the authority to intercept vessels and aircraft in international waters and airspace.

"We are prepared to undertake interdictions right now and, if that opportunity arises, if we had actionable intelligence and it was appropriate, we would do it now," Bolton, undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, told reporters.

"We have ample authority...I think there is broad agreement within the group of 11 that we have that authority," Bolton said.

The Brisbane meeting follows an initial meeting of officials from the U.S.-led security initiative in Madrid on June. Participants have said it is not specifically aimed at missile-exporter North Korea, which is in a stand-off with the United States over its nuclear weapons programme, but could also target other countries such as Iran.

Australian foreign department deputy secretary Paul O'Sullivan said military and civilian exercises would be held in various parts of the world, including the Pacific, Indian and Mediterranean Oceans, possibly as soon as September.

In addition to the exercises, the group would also look at ways of strengthening intelligence and information sharing and would focus on expanding its membership.

Bolton said the Brisbane meeting focused on how to strengthen the legal and operational capacity of countries to intercept vessels and aircraft suspected of carrying material for weapons of mass destruction, drugs or counterfeit money.

"There was an acceptance (at the meeting) that what we see now in North Korea is a highly dangerous and very provocative set of behaviours," O'Sullivan said.

North Korea has dismissed U.S. criticism of its missile exports as interference in its internal affairs.

It was possible that a United Nations Security Council resolution could be sought to add further weight, Bolton said.

Australia says current U.N. treaties banning the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are not enough because they are not being enforced by the world body.

Besides the United States, Britain and Australia, other nations attending the meeting in Brisbane were France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Spain.

Australia is one of few countries with diplomatic ties with reclusive and impoverished North Korea, which Washington says is generating much-needed cash by missile sales and contraband.

ABC

Proliferation Security Initiative discusses interdiction of North Korean ships

PM – Thursday - 10 July 2003

MARK COLVIN: The 11 nation Brisbane meeting of the Proliferation Security Initiative has just finished, with all the countries involved agreeing to take part in exercises to practice stopping ships and planes thought to be carrying banned weapons.

From Brisbane Gerald Tooth reports.

GERALD TOOTH: Australia was asked to host the second meeting of the eleven nation proliferation Security Initiative at short notice and was keen to talk up the significance of the outcome this afternoon.

Head of the Australian delegation Paul O'Sullivan says that despite a lack of agreement to line up with America's commitment to immediately start interdicting ships on the high seas significant progress has been made.

PAUL O'SULLIVAN: I think the point is that you can't ask a disparate group of countries with disparate capabilities to do things tomorrow morning. You need to have appropriate training and planning mechanisms in place and this was seen as a very appropriate first step to commence that activity.

GERALD TOOTH: How far have we actually got on how we will stop North Korean ships on the high seas?

PAUL O'SULLIVAN: I don't think the debate is necessarily about how we will do it, the debate is can we have enough information about the proliferation activities that are going on in a timely way? That's been perhaps our biggest challenge and that's been what we're trying to address.

GERALD TOOTH: So we're not interested in stopping ships?

PAUL O'SULLIVAN: It's not a question of not being interested in stopping ships. There are ways in which you can intervene, and points at which you can intervene, what those points are and how they are done are matters for governments to decide at the time.

We need to have mechanisms in place to offer those options to governments and that's exactly what this meeting was about and that's what it's started to do.

GERALD TOOTH: Paul O'Sullivan says Australia could be part of naval exercises practicing interdiction as early as September.

PAUL O'SULLIVAN: It will be in the period, some time around about or after the next meeting, which is in September. So I suppose we would be aiming to see what can be done in the September-October-November period, that sort of time frame. That's a matter for ministers to determine, that's not a matter for me.

GERALD TOOTH: John Bolton headed the US delegation. He says the US is more than happy with where the meeting ended up.

JOHN BOLTON: From our perspective, what we're trying to do is make this an effective, long term operation. We are prepared, as the United States, to undertake interdictions right now and if that opportunity arises as it did in the case of the Sosan, the vessel that was going from North Korea to Yemen, we would, if we had actionable intelligence that it was appropriate, we would do it now.

Now, the point of the proliferation security initiative is to get this group of like-minded countries to have the capacity to do it on a global basis and that adds to everybody's capability.

But one has to acknowledge that there are a lot of issues to talk about and a lot of operational steps that need planning, training and exercises, so, as I said the goal here today was to move from the political declaration that we achieved in Madrid, to move in a operational direction and we did that.

GERALD TOOTH: John Bolton was also full of praise for Australia agreeing to host the meeting in the first place.

JOHN BOLTON: I think we have as positive a view of the bi-lateral relationship now as it's possible to have. We were very grateful that Australia was willing to host this meeting. This is a big undertaking on short notice.

But we also thought that it was important because it shows that by coming to this part of the world, it shows that the PSI is a global initiative and that the WMD proliferation threat is a global threat.

MARK COLVIN: The US Deputy Under-Secretary of State on arms control, John Bolton, ending that report from Gerald Tooth.

Reuters

Eleven countries agree to prevent weapons trade

By Jane Breusch – 10 July 2003

BRISBANE (Reuters) - Eleven industrialised nations agreed on Thursday to hold military exercises aimed at halting trade in weapons of mass destruction by intercepting ships and aircraft.

The United States said the consensus at the meeting gave it the authority to launch such interceptions immediately.

Speaking after a two-day meeting of officials representing the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), U.S. official John Bolton said Washington believed it had the authority to intercept vessels and aircraft in international waters and airspace.

"We are prepared to undertake interdictions right now and, if that opportunity arises, if we had actionable intelligence and it was appropriate, we would do it now," Bolton, undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, told reporters.

"We have ample authority...I think there is broad agreement within the group of 11 that we have that authority," Bolton said.

The Brisbane meeting follows an initial meeting of officials from the U.S.-led security initiative in Madrid on June. Participants have said it is not specifically aimed at missile-exporter North Korea, which is in a stand-off with the United States over its nuclear weapons programme, but could also target other countries such as Iran.

Australian foreign department deputy secretary Paul O'Sullivan said military and civilian exercises would be held in various parts of the world, including the Pacific, Indian and Mediterranean Oceans, possibly as soon as September.

In addition to the exercises, the group would also look at ways of strengthening intelligence and information sharing and would focus on expanding its membership.

Bolton said the Brisbane meeting focused on how to strengthen the legal and operational capacity of countries to intercept vessels and aircraft suspected of carrying material for weapons of mass destruction, drugs or counterfeit money.

"There was an acceptance (at the meeting) that what we see now in North Korea is a highly dangerous and very provocative set of behaviours," O'Sullivan said.

North Korea has dismissed U.S. criticism of its missile exports as interference in its internal affairs.

It was possible that a United Nations Security Council resolution could be sought to add further weight, Bolton said.

Australia says current U.N. treaties banning the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are not enough because they are not being enforced by the world body.

Besides the United States, Britain and Australia, other nations attending the meeting in Brisbane were France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Spain.

Australia is one of few countries with diplomatic ties with reclusive and impoverished North Korea, which Washington says is generating much-needed cash by missile sales and contraband.

News.com.au

Fear US will push N Korea

By John Kerin – 10 July 2003

Japan has expressed concern an aggressive US-led plan to intercept North Korean ships and aircraft suspected of trafficking in weapons of mass destruction in international waters could spook Pyongyang into triggering a conflict.

While South Korea has also declined to join the newly formed 11-country proliferation security initiative because it shares a land border with North Korea and is concerned at the hard line being taken by the US.

It is understood Japan is worried that negotiations involving the key group in Brisbane have become too bogged down in confronting North Korea's weapons of mass destruction when the strategy is supposed to be about tackling all trade, including such nations as Iran, Syria and Cuba.

Japanese government sources want the 11 countries involved in the Brisbane meeting to strike a balance between clamping down on the trade without provoking a military reaction from North Korea.

Officials are looking at how to crack down on rogue states that trade in nuclear, chemical or biological weapons.

The latest rift was created after US Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, John Bolton, told The Australian on Tuesday that the Bush administration believed there was already legal authority to enable the military forces of the Proliferation Security Initiative countries to intercept North Korean vessels on the high seas.

This included cases where North Korean ships did not display a nation's flag (effectively making them pirate ships), the nation whose flag they used gave permission for interception and seizure, and under the international right of self defence.

Mr Bolton said he wanted the Brisbane meeting to endorse operational proposals to intercept ships and force down aircraft.

But other countries, including Australia, believe a UN Security Council resolution or an international convention would be required to allow interception on the high seas which, under present law, would be considered piracy.

Foreign Minister Alexander Downer flagged the idea of proliferation countries seeking a convention but suggested the interception of ships on the high seas was a long way off.

"I don't expect a new convention to come out of this meeting, but it's possible that a new convention could be developed in time ... no decision has been made on that but it is a possibility."

Mr Downer said it was more likely in the short-term that PSI countries would explore all legal avenues to crack down on the trade within their territorial waters using weapons control regimes and tightening export controls. Mr Downer said John Howard would meet with South Korean and Japanese officials next week, where he would discuss the latest developments in the initiative.

Mr Downer said he did not believe the South Koreans had concerns about the initiative.

Labor's foreign affairs spokesman, Kevin Rudd, said it was irresponsible for Mr Downer to be speculating about the interception of North Korean ships and aircraft.

People's Daily

No Legal Grounds for Stopping N. Korean Ships

12 July 2003

An 11-nation meeting on stopping the trafficking of weapons of mass destruction (WDM) on Wednesday and Thursday in Brisbane, Australia, has pinpointed new targets to shoot at.

The 11 nations at the meeting included the United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain and Australia.

The gathering was a follow-up to a June meeting in Madrid where the 11 nations endorsed an initiative under which ships suspected of being involved in the illegal trade of weapons will be detained and aircraft grounded.

The initiative is US President George W. Bush's latest attempt to create a multilateral setting - other than the United Nations (UN) - to prevent countries such as Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) from importing or exporting nuclear materials, ballistic missiles or other technologies of mass destruction.

The setting is part of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) the Bush administration put forward when the US president visited Poland in May.

Though no timetable for launching the initiative emerged from the meeting, the message it sent is dangerous.

The initiative is aimed at setting up "some other structure outside the formal system" as PSI Chairman Paul O'Sullivan said. Stopping the proliferation of WMDs is a global issue, and counts on joint efforts from the international community.

The US-led initiative sneered at the UN and international law by sidestepping the organization. The UN is expected to serve as a centre to harmonize the actions of nations and provide an efficient forum for negotiating on complex issues.

Stopping a ship and seizing its cargo in international waters will still require the consent of the country where the vessel is registered. The legal situations under which stopping and searching ships are well-defined: Either the interdiction is justified under a UN Security Council resolution, the ship is suspected of piracy, the ship is not flying a flag, or the ship is within a nation's 12 nautical mile territorial sea zone.

The PSI seems to indicate that interdictions would be systematic and could extend to the high seas. Such interdictions raise legal concerns, because in those bodies of water the traditional right to the freedom of navigation is to be respected by all countries under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Interdiction is seen as an alternative to economic sanctions. However, the DPRK considers the interdiction of its ships and planes as acts of war.

Armed conflicts are possible if the legally-controversial detention and searching of vessels occur.

But the United States seems to be determined.

John Bolton, US undersecretary for arms control and international security, who is also the country's delegation leader to the Brisbane meeting, expected a maritime exercise could take place soon after another meeting on the PSI in September.

The UN and international law are being put at stake again, while the case for the war against Iraq is falling apart.

The Age

Howard talks tough on North Korea

By Annabel Crabb – 14 July 2003

Prime Minister John Howard has left open the option of going to war against North Korea, saying a planned international operation to intercept its vessels could be a precursor to "other action" against the rogue state.

As he left Australia yesterday for a visit to Japan, the Philippines and South Korea, Mr Howard said he was "very worried" about the threat posed by North Korea. Discussions about the communist state will form a large part of his trip.

Mr Howard insisted he had not given up on a diplomatic solution, but he said Australia's decision to become involved in the interdiction of North Korean vessels was a signal of engagement in the issue.

"We are, at the moment, going to take part in interdiction exercises. We obviously keep open what options we might pursue after that," he told the ABC's Asia Pacific Focus program.

And Mr Howard acknowledged for the first time that the interdiction project - which it will undertake with 10 other countries as part of an agreement reached last week in Brisbane - could serve as a bridging exercise to military conflict.

"Well, they're exercises to give people practice at interdiction, rather than straight military," he said.

"Not necessarily, but obviously, if those exercises are valuable, then if some time down the track some other kind of action were required, then people would be better prepared, but we hope it's not necessary."

Opposition foreign affairs spokesman Kevin Rudd accused the Prime Minister of engaging in "fast and loose talk".

"We're a small country, we're in the region. Let's be measured and calm about this," he told the Ten Network.

"I've long argued that (North Korea) represents a greater threat to regional and national security than Iraq ever did.

"But having said that, we need to make sure that the measures we implement here don't make the problem worse but in fact reduce the threat from North Korea and the threat of proliferation."

Mr Howard said he did not believe military action was inevitable, and he would never work on the assumption that diplomatic efforts would fail.

"But, at the same time, we have to communicate to the North Koreans that the world's concerns are not going to disappear unless and until there's a proper response by North Korea to those concerns," he said.

Last week's agreement to pursue interdiction against North Korean ships suspected of carrying weapons was forged at a Brisbane meeting at which the US, Britain, France, Spain, Germany, Poland, Canada, Japan, Portugal and the Netherlands were represented, as well as Australia.

Mr Howard said on his departure yesterday that he was still anxious to have China involved. The US also seeks Chinese involvement, and refuses to deal with North Korea unilaterally.

Further moves to crack down on North Korea's illicit trade are expected this week when Mr Howard and Japan's Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi meet in Tokyo over Pyongyang's nuclear program.

Ahead of the Wednesday meeting, Japanese officials have reportedly predicted the two prime ministers will conclude an agreement aimed at tackling the illicit trade in weapons, drugs and counterfeit currency.

In April a North Korean ship offloaded 50 kilograms of heroin off Victoria's coast at Lorne, sparking a diplomatic row. A further 70 kilograms were found in May.

Japan's biggest daily, Yomiuri, reported yesterday that the agreement would beef up the export control system in the Asia-Pacific rim region, with increased customs inspections of cargoes linked to North Korea.

The latest moves come amid further confirmation that North Korea has begun reprocessing some of the 8000 spent nuclear fuel rods at its Yongbyon nuclear facility. According to the reports, the US has detected krypton 85, a byproduct of the reprocessing, in the air in the vicinity of Yongbyon. North Korea claims it has reprocessed all the rods. The reports, carried by US and Japanese media, did not specify how air samples were obtained.

The 8000 rods could produce enough plutonium to make six to 12 nuclear weapons.

Monterey Institute of International Studies

Proliferation Security Initiative to Stem Flow of WMD Matériel

by Rebecca Weiner – 16 July 2003

The United States' recently launched Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), the latest element in the Bush administration's emerging strategy of pre-emption to combat proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, is moving forward "at light speed," according to U.S. Under Secretary of State John Bolton.¹ First announced by President Bush on May 31, 2003, in an address from the Wawel Royal Castle in Krakow, Poland, the new initiative envisions "partnerships of states working in concert, employing their national capabilities to develop a broad range of legal, diplomatic, economic, military and other tools to interdict threatening shipments of WMD and missile-related equipment and technologies" via air, land, and sea, Bolton elaborated in testimony to the House Committee on International Relations on June 4, 2003.² Since the Wawel Castle speech, there have been two formal meetings of the international coalition, the first on June 12 in Madrid, Spain, and the second on July 9-10 in Brisbane, Australia.

Initially comprising 11 countries--Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States--the international coalition is focused on pre-emptive interdiction, seeking to allow ships, aircraft, and vehicles suspected of carrying WMD-related matériel to and from countries of "proliferation concern" (in particular, North Korea and Iran) to be detained and searched as soon as they enter member countries' territory, territorial waters, or airspace. It will also encourage member countries to deny overflight rights to suspicious aircraft or ground them when they stop to refuel.³ The United States has also proposed that non-complying aircraft be "escorted down" to be searched, although Australia in particular has expressed reservations about extending the effort this far.⁴

The initiative originates in part from the Bush administration's frustrating experience in December 2002, when Spain, alerted by a U.S. tip, seized a shipment of 15 Scud missiles headed from North Korea to Yemen.⁵ The United States allowed the ship to continue after the Bush administration determined that it lacked the authority under international law to detain the vessel and after Yemen assured the U.S. government that the missiles would be used for defensive purposes, only.⁶ To avoid similar setbacks in the future, the new Proliferation

Security Initiative will be based primarily on the "inventive use of national laws," rather than an attempt to re-write existing international law, which prohibits stopping vessels on the high seas or grounding aircraft in international airspace.⁷ Extending the agreement into international waters or airspace would require a U.N. Security Council Resolution or an international convention, many countries say, an added complication that coalition members are attempting to avoid at this early stage.

And while the coalition's first meeting in Madrid focused on assessing existing national authorities and export control regimes under which the new initiative could operate,⁸ the United States is already pushing for a more comprehensive and robust strategy. The *New York Times* quoted a top White House national security official as claiming, "We're going to use every rule available.... No one has ever tried to marry the ability we have to track these shipments with the existing national authorities that are out there."⁹ This attitude is beginning to ruffle feathers among the coalition members as well as its targets. Bolton stirred controversy when he stated after the meeting that "there is broad agreement within the group that we have [the] authority" to begin interdictions on the high seas and in international airspace. The United States feels it has such authorization in three cases, according to the newspaper *The Australian*: when ships do not display a nation's flag, they effectively become pirate ships that can be seized; when the ships use a "flag of convenience" and the nation chosen gives the United States or its allies permission, the ships can be stopped and searched; finally, Bolton told the paper, there is a "general right of self-defense" given a serious belief that the vessels carry WMD matériel.¹⁰ The International Maritime Organization stated that review of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation is underway.¹¹

Despite these friction points, the meeting was characterized by consensus. While the group did not go so far as to set a timetable for interdiction operations, it did pledge to share intelligence on arms trafficking as well as initiate a series of air and sea training exercises in the Mediterranean Sea, the Indian ocean, and the Pacific ocean, to begin as early as September, that will utilize "both military and civilian assets."¹²

That the PSI is largely directed at North Korea was made clear in a recent press release issued by Alexander Downer, Australia's Foreign Affairs Minister, who explained that although "the initiative is global in nature and while it is not directed at any one country, it is relevant to the government's concerns about North Korea, including its declared nuclear weapons programme."¹³ Downer averred that while "the mainstay for stopping the spread of these weapons remains the global system of international treaties, export control regimes and other tools built up over several decades of multilateral negotiations, ...the reality is that some states cheat on their obligations or resist joining these international regimes."¹⁴

North Korea has not taken the news lightly, describing the initiative as a "brigandish naval blockade" akin to "terrorism in the sea and a gross violation of international law."¹⁵ The official daily *Rodong Sinmun* proclaimed, "nobody can vouch that this blockade operation will not lead to such a serious development as an all-out war." The daily also threatened Japan directly for its recent efforts to step up inspections of visiting North Korean ships, accusing Japan of involvement in the "U.S. policy to isolate and stifle" North Korea.¹⁶ Bolton's response was that the interdiction strategy is "not only legitimate, it's necessary self-defense."¹⁷

North Korea is not alone in expressing concerns over the new plan; a representative of the Australian activist group Just Peace protested just prior to the meeting that "Our government seems prepared to join the US in vigilante attacks on the high seas," continuing, "if these plans continue, we shall be seeing Australian troops committed not to the defense of Australia, but rather to international kangaroo court justice."¹⁸ Japan and South Korea have also expressed apprehensions that the hard line being taken by the United States could provoke North Korea. In particular, Japan is concerned that the PSI has become overly preoccupied with North Korea, while it was intended to encompass all trade in WMD matériel, including countries like Iran, Syria, and Cuba.¹⁹

A constellation of recent events demonstrates international commitment to the effort. In April 2003, just prior to the formal announcement of the PSI, French authorities, acting on a tip from the German government, ordered the captain of a French ship to unload a suspicious container when the vessel reached an Egyptian port. The cargo originated from a German company in Hamburg and included 22 metric tons of aluminum tubes (key components of high-speed centrifuges used to manufacture highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons). The German government had denied an export license for the shipment, which was purportedly directed to a Chinese aeronautics company, because German officials believed the company was a North Korean front.²⁰ In his June 4 testimony, Under Secretary Bolton also cited a combined French and German effort to intercept sodium cyanide "likely bound for North Korea's chemical weapons program," as an example of successful interdiction efforts.

In a parallel effort intended to deprive North Korea of hard currency needed for the purchase of missile and WMD material, Australian authorities discovered 50 kilograms of heroin on a North Korean owned ship in April and have charged members of the crew with aiding and abetting the import of an illegal product. And in early June 2003, over 1,000 Japanese police officers, customs officials, and shipping regulators submitted a

ferry line--suspected of trafficking hard currency to North Korea--to aggressive safety inspections and customs examinations, resulting in immediate suspension of the service.²¹

The PSI has been lauded on both sides of the Atlantic as an encouraging sign of the Bush administration's reinvigorated commitment to multilateralism, as well as a positive step toward preventing future instances of the type of disunity that "plagued the international community during the run up to the war in Iraq."²² Yet the deeper the initiative delves into issues of international law, the harder the coalition is likely to press for U.N. approval and support--an eventuality the United States is not entirely sanguine to face. More important still, the success of the PSI depends in large part not only on whether and how the logistical, legal, and economic issues are resolved, but on broad-based participation, including, experts say, that of China and Russia.

1. Agence-France Presse, July 10, 2003.; 2. Testimony of John R. Bolton to the Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, June 4, 2003 (www.house.gov/international_relations/108/); 3. Nicholas Krlev, "U.S. Seeks Asian Aid for Ship Searches," *The Washington Times*, June 17, 2003.; 4. Don Woolford, "New coalition to target terror weapons," *AAP Newsfeed*, July 8, 2003.; 5. "Spain: U.S. Apologize over Scud Ship", CNN website; (<http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/east/12/12/missile.ship/>); 6. "Bush Aims for International Agreement on Plane and Ship Searches," *Morning Star*, June 2, 2003.; 7. David E. Sanger, "Cracking Down on the Terror-Arms Trade," *The New York Times*, June 15, 2003.; 8. "Meeting Chairman's Statement," Press Release, Proliferation Security Initiative, Madrid, June 12, 2003 (provided by the U.S. Department of State); 9. Sanger, "Cracking Down on the Terror-Arms Trade."; 10. Greg Sheridan, "US 'free' to tackle N Korea," *The Australian*, July 9, 2003.; 11. Michael Evans, "US plans to seize suspects at will," *The Times*, July 11, 2003.; 12. Agence France Presse, July 10, 2003.; 13. "Australia to host forum on mass destruction weapons 9-10 July," *BBC Monitoring International Reports*, June 26, 2003.; 14. Ibid.; 15. Samantha Maiden, *The Advertiser*, July 14, 2003.; 16. Krlev, *The Washington Times*, June 17, 2003.; 17. *Deutsche-Presse Agentur*, July 10, 2003.; 18. Nikki Todd, "Activists hit out at PSI plans to stop weapons trade," *AAP Newsfeed*, July 9, 2003.; 19. John Kerin, "Fear US will push N Korea into fight," *The Australian*, July 10, 2003.; 20. "Germany Intercepts Suspect Nuclear-Related Shipment to N. Korea," Agence France Presse, April 26, 2003.; 21. Sanger, "Cracking Down on the Terror-Arms Trade."; 22. Andrew Beatty, "EU/US to use all means against weapons proliferation," *EUObserver.com*, June 26, 2003.

Asahi Shimbun

Japan, others move forward to hinder WMD smuggling

18 July 2003

Japan basically is in agreement with a U.S. initiative to involve 11 nations in a global crackdown on the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), say government officials.

Under the proposal, participating nations would implement existing domestic laws to prevent smuggling WMD and related materials out of suspect countries as well as stopping passage of prohibited items through their territorial waters and air space.

Officials said they are in basic agreement with the proposal put before the 11 nations taking part in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). A second round of talks was held July 9-10 in Brisbane, Australia.

Because North Korea is a target of the PSI, Japanese government officials plan to lobby Asian neighbors, especially China and South Korea, to support the initiative.

At the first PSI meeting held June 12 in Madrid, Washington proposed prevention of illegal exports of WMD and related materials by air or sea; the prevention of passage of WMD through territorial airspace and waters; and the interdiction of suspected ships on the open seas.

Because a number of nations expressed reservations about interdiction in international waters, that element was dropped from the U.S. proposal at the July meeting.

John Bolton, undersecretary of state in charge of arms control and international security, asked the other 10 nations at the Australia meeting for cooperation within the limits of existing domestic laws.

Since there is no strong opposition to the two remaining elements of the U.S. proposal, a September meeting scheduled for Paris is expected to approve a joint document centered on those two points.

Japanese officials said current laws would allow participation in the initiative. The Japan Coast Guard is expected to take part in joint training exercises set for September. Other measures expected to be implemented are the gathering and sharing of information about suspected smuggling ships and bolstering ship inspections in Japanese territorial waters.

The 11 nations in the PSI are Japan, the United States, Australia, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain and Britain.(IHT/Asahi: July 18,2003)

Korea Crisis - Blockade / Proliferation Security Initiative

23 July 2003

One potential military option to contain the risks that North Korea might transfer some of its nuclear material to another state or party would be the establishment of a blockade around North Korea that would intercept vessels coming in and out of the DPRK. This option first came to light in mid-to-late April following a failed attempt at talks between the US and North Korea.

Nicknamed "Cuba Lite" for its similarities to the 1962 quarantine of Cuba during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The strategy would be to selectively blockade some North Korean ships rather than applying a full blockade which the North Koreans might consider an act of war.

Intelligence resources would be used to determine what each ship was carrying and naval vessels would be dispatched to interdict those cargo vessels believed to be carrying nuclear materials. An unnamed senior Pentagon advisor was quoted in the Daily Telegraph on April 27, 2003 as saying that the US had "the ability to track anything going in or out of North Korean waters."

This strategy would employ similar tactics as was used in the December 9, 2002 boarding of a North Korean vessel off the Arabian Peninsula that was transporting Scud missiles to Yemen. The vessel, the Sosan, was tracked by US intelligence from the time it left North Korea and was boarded by the Spanish Navy.

An April 2003 raid by the Royal Australian Navy of a North Korean ship, the Pongsu (or Pong Su), believed to have been involved with narcotics is also being looked at as a potential model that could be drawn upon. On April 16 aerial surveillance of the Pong Su began with the task alternating between the RAAF using Hercules and Orion aircraft and Coastwatch. The freighter headed east through Bass Strait and on Thursday (April 17) turned north and headed up the Australian coast.

Civil police launches intercepted but had been unable to board the ship because of heavy seas. The Police approached the ADF; the Navy was tasked to assist.

HMAS Stuart was surged from port after some hasty repair work. In the Tasman Sea on April 19 the Stuart identified the Pong Su on radar and then shadowed out of sight over the horizon as she headed north. In the early morning hours of April 20, 2003 the HMAS Stuart radioed the Pong Su to prepare to be boarded; Special Air Service troops roped onto the ship from a helicopter and also boarded the ship using RHIBs. The troops confined the 30-member crew in the ship's galley and café. Pong Su was taken to Garden Island, declared a Federal Police crime scene and subjected to a thorough search by civilian authorities. The vessel was found to be carrying 100lbs of heroin and another 165lb was found on shore nearby, roughly \$80 million of product.

In a further step to reduce the possibility of escalation the United States might also opt to have boarding parties and interdictions carried out by coalition naval forces rather than with US vessels.

On May 31, 2003 at a speech given just prior to the G8 summit President Bush announced the establishment of the Proliferation Security Initiative which would result in the creation of international agreements and partnerships that would allow the US and its allies to search planes and ships carrying suspect cargo and seize illegal weapons or missile technologies.

The Proliferation Security Initiative reflects the need for a more dynamic, active approach to the global proliferation problem. It envisions partnerships of states working in concert, employing their national capabilities to develop a broad range of legal, diplomatic, economic, military and other tools to interdict threatening shipments of WMD and missile-related equipment and technologies.

Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer confirmed in parliament that the meeting had agreed on "new and imaginative measures" that would include "the searching of transport planes and vessels and tightening of relevant domestic and international law. ... We are looking at practical cooperation with key countries to deny North Korea access or further access to weapons of mass destruction material and to deny access to markets as well," he said.

To jump-start this initiative, the US began working with several close allies to expand its ability to stop and seize suspected WMD transfers. Over time, the US will extend this partnership as broadly as possible to keep the world's most destructive weapons away from its shores and out of the hands of its enemies. The US aims ultimately not just to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction, but also to eliminate or roll back such weapons from rogue states and terrorist groups that already possess them or are close to doing so.

On June 4, 2003, during testimony before Congress, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John R. Bolton announced that the United States had, within the previous two months, intercepted aluminum tubes likely bound for North Korea's nuclear weapons program and a French and

German combined effort had intercepted sodium cyanide likely bound for North Korea's chemical weapons program are examples of recent interdiction successes.

Subsequent statements from the Administration indicated that there would be few announcements regarding seizures and boardings. Not disclosing the existence of these operations minimizes controversy and maximizes flexibility as the US and its allies would be free of public pressure.

In June 2003, Japan changed its policy in regard to the ferries operating from North Korea. Nearly 2,000 inspectors went to the port of Niigata to check for customs and immigration violations, infectious diseases, and safety violations on the North Korean vessel *Man Gyong Bong-92*. North Korea responded by immediately ceasing all ferries traveling between the two countries and cancelled a port visit by an unnamed vessel believed to be involved in espionage. The Japanese policy appears to be part of a large US strategy to involve regional actors in policing North Korean exports.

The Japanese Transport Minister, Chikage Ogi, stated that Japan intends to inspect all North Korean vessels at ports in Japan. On June 11 the 298 ton freighter *Namsan 3* was detained at Maizuru and at the Otaru port in Hokkaido the 178-ton *Daehungrason-2*, carrying crabs, was also detained.

This shift in policy comes as the United States has withdrawn several dozen fighters and bombers from South Korea and Guam, including F-117s, B-52s, B-1Bs and F-15Es, indicating that the administration opted to not pursue air strikes.

On June 15, 2003 eleven nations agreed a version of the Proliferation Security Initiative, called the Madrid Initiative for the city where the agreement was reached. The Madrid Initiative was endorsed by Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain and Australia. The initiative proposed strategies for intercepting cargos suspected of containing chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, or missile components. The US has announced an increase in surveillance in the area in addition to increased interdiction by Japan, South Korea, and Australia.

On June 17, 2003 at the ASEAN meeting at Phnom Penh, Cambodia Secretary of State Colin Powell promoted the concepts of the Madrid Initiative arguing that North Korean trafficking of narcotics and other illicit materials must be curbed. The ASEAN Regional Forum released a joint-statement that highlighted the problems associated with maritime smuggling, though the statement did not specifically mention North Korea or WMD it is thought that North Korea is a target of the initiative.

In response to the policy initiative the DPRK released a statement threatening violent action and an escalation in the crisis between it and the United States if it felt that the blockade was going to far or infringed upon North Korea's sovereignty.

On July 23, 2003 a USA Today report indicated that the United States had reached an agreement with Japan, Australia, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, the Netherlands, Bulgaria, and Spain to intercept North Korean ships suspected of carrying narcotics or weapons materials.

Establishing a blockade or undertaking a series of inspections and other interdictions does present a number of issues. First, there are questions concerning the legality of undertaking searches and seizures in international waters. North Korea is not a signatory of any treaty that requires states to not produce drugs or to prevent the transport of narcotics.

The Department of Defense is authorized to provide support to law enforcement agencies and military personnel with counter drug responsibilities. DOD provides training, upgrades equipment and maintains a series of intelligence initiatives both in terms of collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence among law enforcement, military and intelligence services, command and control systems that allow allies to communicate that information real-time as well as the ability to assist them with minor infrastructure. It is not clear however whether or not these justifications are sufficient to meet the requirements of international law.

An additional problem relates to the effectiveness of a blockade or naval interdiction. Trying to interdict WMD may prove as difficult as interdicting narcotics. While US sensor capabilities are substantial it is likely that some North Korean shipments will penetrate the blockade.

Conducting a comprehensive blockade of North Korea will require a number of ships. As of mid-June the United States had two carrier strike groups and one amphibious ready group in the Asia-Pacific region consisting of roughly 20 ships. Excluding the aircraft carriers and the Amphibious Ready Group there are two Ticonderoga class cruisers, three Arleigh Burke class guided missile destroyers (two of which are Flight I's thus do not have embarked helicopter detachments), two Spruance class destroyers, and four Oliver Hazard Perry guided missile frigates. [This does not include the ships at Pearl Harbor.]

The Kitty Hawk and elements of its strike group returned to Yokosuka in early May and has since begun an extended period of maintenance making the Kitty Hawk unavailable until sometime in November at the earliest. The readiness of the rest of the strike group is difficult to determine as some ships have undoubtedly begun yard periods while others have not.

The USS Carl Vinson and an element of its strike group are currently deployed to insure a credible deterrent while the Kitty Hawk was deployed supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom and while it undergoes repairs. During its deployment the Carl Vinson has conducted operations in multiple areas in the Pacific including off the coast of South Korea. While it might conduct operations in the South Pacific elements of its strike group can be retasked for maritime interdiction operations.

While a blockade would also extend to North Korean aircraft and would involve the grounding of DPRK aircraft at airports while they were refueling.

Chosun Ilbo

Washington's Proliferation Czar Due Here

by Gwon Gyeong-bok – 25 July 2003

The U.S. under secretary of state for arms control and international security, John Bolton, will visit Seoul next Tuesday through Thursday to exchange intelligence with Korean officials regarding the nuclear standoff.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade said Friday that Bolton will also discuss the organization of the Washington-led proliferation security initiative, to which 11 countries have already joined.

Bolton will meet with National Security Adviser Ra Jong-yil, Foreign Minister Yoon Young-kwan and Defense Minister Cho Yung-kil to talk about Pyongyang's claim to have completed the reprocessing of spent fuel rods, the progress of the proliferation security initiative and the cooperation of Northeast Asian countries. But Bolton will reportedly avoid mention of Seoul's participation in the security initiative.

Associated Press

US official in Beijing for security talks

28 July 2003 - Beijing

American Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton has arrived in Beijing for Sino-US security talks.

"I'm here for regular consultations with the government. We're going to cover a variety of issues, including the proliferation security initiative announced by President Bush in May," Bolton said.

Bolton is scheduled to hold talks today with China's Deputy Foreign Minister Zhang Yesui on strategic security issues, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and disarmament.

Before the start of his talks, Bolton said he also planned to discuss security concerns over North Korea and Iran with his Chinese counterparts.

He is also scheduled to visit South Korea and Japan.

JoongAng Daily

U.S., Seoul sidestep issue of UN in North

By Kim Young-Sae – 1 August 2003

[...] Mr. Bolton also discussed with [Korean Foreign Minister] Mr. Yoon the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative. The Foreign Ministry's director general for international organizations, Oh Joon, said Seoul had not been invited to join the group, which is trying to devise ways of stopping trade in missiles and mass weapons and its funding.

Seoul has been discreet in discussing the subject, balancing a sense of being left out against the complications its membership would bring to North-South relations. Mr. Oh said Seoul supports the principle of ending that trade, but reserved judgment on the methods the group is eyeing.

Mr. Bolton also repeated his assessment that a resumption of talks with the North is not near, officials said. He said, according to officials here, that he expected counterproposals from the North, which would require more U.S. consultations with its allies. [...]

Press conference with Under Secretary of State John Bolton

US Embassy Auditorium – Tokyo – 1 August 2003

[...] QUESTION: James Sims with Dow Jones. Just a couple of questions. One is on the PSI initiative. What sort of discussions did you have with the Japanese regarding this and what sort of role might they play? Also has there been any progress on the UN Security Council Resolution?

U/S BOLTON: Security Council Resolution on which subject?

QUESTION: On North Korea.

U/S BOLTON: On the Proliferation Security Initiative we had very extensive discussions today as I think all of you probably know, Japan has been a participant in the PSI negotiations from the outset - one of the 11 member nations. They participated in Madrid and Brisbane and of course will be in Paris in the first weekend in September when our next plenary meetings will take place. I think Japan's participation and everything that I learned today about their views of PSI as it evolves has been extremely positive and their role as a founding member and active participant in our discussions is quite important.

One of the first things that we said in Madrid was that PSI was a global effort with global reach and I want to underline that because although in this part of the world, perhaps understandably, a lot of the attention has been devoted to PSI activities in connection with North Korea -- and that is quite important -- PSI's something that involves the worldwide threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. I think the test of PSI is it's operational capability. This is not an ongoing seminar on non-proliferation issues. This is a group of 11 nations that have committed themselves to the interdiction of international shipments of WMD production facilities and their components. The purpose of our various discussions in which Japan has actively and constructively participated is to move from the declaration of intention that President Bush made in Krakow, Poland on May 31 and that we followed through in Madrid to operational capabilities. Japan's role there has been extremely important.

In terms of the Security Council as we said several times, the role of the Security Council, obviously charged by the UN Charter with preservation of international peace and security, gives it an important role in the North Korean matter and in other proliferation questions. How exactly the council functions in that regard obviously depends on the pace of events and other forums including the possibility now of true multilateral negotiations in the Beijing track. I think, given the close cooperation we've had with China, that we are going to see how events in the Beijing track proceed. This is -- not to repeat my conversations with your colleagues in Seoul yesterday -- this is something I think on which the government of the Republic of Korea, the GOJ and the government of the United States see pretty much eye-to-eye. [...]

Global Security Newswire

International Response: U.S. Delays Call for South Korea to Join Proliferation Security Initiative

6 August 2003

A rough draft of a speech given yesterday by Gen. Leon LaPorte, the top U.S. commander in South Korea, included a call for Seoul to join an international effort to intercept shipments of WMD-related cargo, but the general left out that section when he delivered the speech, according to the *Korea Times*.

“The navy of the future must join in the effort to interdict WMD (weapons of mass destruction) delivery,” said the draft of LaPorte’s speech, which was prepared for the eighth International Sea Powers Symposium, hosted by the South Korean Navy.

LaPorte did not mention that South Korea should join the Proliferation Security Initiative, however, when he actually gave the speech, according to the *Korea Times*. Lee Ferguson, a spokeswoman for U.S. Forces Korea, said the rough draft of the speech had been provided to reporters by mistake.

A South Korean official said no decision has been made yet on South Korea joining the initiative.

“Nothing has been decided on South Korea’s participation in the PSI so far, as the meeting itself has not yet progressed to a stage where it can court new members,” the official said.

The official also said that South Korea may be asked to join the initiative during the next meeting of PSI members, scheduled to be held next month in Paris (Seo Soo-min, *Korea Times*, Aug. 6).

U.S. plans joint sea exercise as signal to North Korea on arms program

Steven R. Weisman – 18 August 2003

WASHINGTON - The Bush administration, while preparing for talks soon with North Korea, is also stepping up military pressure with plans for a joint naval exercise next month to train for interdicting arms and other materials going to and from the North.

Administration officials and Asian diplomats said that the exercise would be carried out in the Coral Sea off northeastern Australia in September and that it was described as directed at no one country. A principal intention, however, is to send a sharp signal to North Korea to dismantle its nuclear weapons program, they said.

The next round of talks with North Korea is scheduled for Aug. 27 in Beijing, with six nations participating. The United States has been working with its allies to present a set of items, from economic benefits to security guarantees, if the regime in Pyongyang were to agree to shut down its program verifiably and irreversibly. At the same time, since December - when Spanish warships stopped a North Korean ship carrying Scud missiles to Yemen and then released it when Yemen protested - the United States has accelerated efforts with Japan, South Korea and nine other countries to interdict ships doing business with the North.

"We are not saying which countries are being targeted, because it would not be politically wise," an Asian diplomat said, referring to the September naval exercise. "But the American government believes that one of the reasons why North Korea has agreed to the six-party talks in Beijing is that they are feeling the pinch."

An American official said the Coral Sea exercise would include ships and helicopters practicing the "non-permissive boarding" of ships suspected of carrying drugs, missile components, nuclear materials and other items that the United States says are being imported or sold by North Korea.

Some diplomats are known to worry that such exercises might be seen as provocative by the North Korean government and perhaps by China and Russia, which oppose confrontational tactics toward the North. But administration officials said it was essential for the United States to have a more aggressive policy preventing North Korea from obtaining materials for its nuclear program or selling missile parts, drugs or other contraband to get hard currency to buy weapons. The naval exercise "has not surfaced as much of a factor" in negotiations with North Korea, an administration official said, adding, "We are taking these steps to protect our own societies." A Pentagon official said planning for the Coral Sea exercise was not completed. It was not clear which countries, beyond Australia and the United States, would participate with ships. Japan was said to be ready to send a ship if the event could be formally characterized as a "police exercise" and not a military exercise. The Japanese Constitution limits its military to self-defense.

The exercises are part of a program announced by President George W. Bush and leaders of other countries this summer as the Proliferation Security Initiative, with 11 nations participating: the United States, Britain, Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Spain.

Under a separate program, the DPRK Illicit Activities Initiative, there has been a quiet crackdown by many countries against the narcotics trade, counterfeiting, money laundering and other efforts by the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, the official name of North Korea, to earn hard currency.

Recent actions under this initiative included the seizure of a North Korean freighter in April off Brisbane by the Australian authorities on suspicion of smuggling heroin and Japanese efforts to shut down a large trading company involved in illicit trade with North Korea. Organized-crime syndicates in Japan have long been believed to be involved in sending cash to North Korea, in many cases generated at pinball casinos that are popular throughout Japan. Early this month, the Taiwan authorities boarded a North Korean freighter on a customs violation and seized barrels of phosphorus pentasulfide, a lethal material that the United States said could be used to make chemical weapons.

An administration official said the interdiction exercise would "piggyback" on a long-planned naval exercise, Exercise Crocodile. A Pentagon official said that exercise would run concurrently but not as part of the interdiction exercise, which he described as in its "embryonic stages." The Bush administration's efforts to squeeze North Korea by applying interdiction and seizure techniques were outlined in a statement by the United States and its allies in Poland in July. Under Secretary of State John Bolton told Congress that the goal was to develop "new means to disrupt the proliferation trade at sea, in the air and on land."

COMMENTAAR EN VRAGEN

Een centraal axioma van het Amerikaanse veiligheidsbeleid is dat het tegengaan van de proliferatie van massavernietigingswapens afzonderlijke maatregelen en afspraken behoeft, die niet afhankelijk mogen zijn van multilaterale instituties. Dat is de belangrijkste reden dat de VS een eigen koers heeft uitgezet in veiligheidsvraagstukken, en alleen af en toe coalities van bereidwilligen inschakelt. Dit heeft vergaande politieke gevolgen, die niet noodzakelijkerwijs gunstig zijn voor de VS.

Een goed voorbeeld van zo een ontwikkeling is het proces rond het Non-Proliferatie Verdrag. Het NPV wordt al jarenlang in de Amerikaanse politieke verhoudingen uitgelegd als een methode om proliferatie van kernwapens tegen te gaan. Dat wil zeggen de inhoud van de oorspronkelijke afspraak, dat de kernwapenstaten nucleair zouden ontwapenen in ruil voor het permanent afzien van de aanschaf van kernwapentechnologie door het grootste deel van de wereld, is in die interpretatie volledig verdwenen. In feite wordt het NPV gezien als onderdeel van een meeromvattend contraproliferatie beleid.

Vanaf 1970, toen het Non-Proliferatie Verdrag in werking werd gesteld, is de proliferatie van kernwapentechnologie op zijn minst sterk afgeremd, zo niet gestopt. De nucleaire ontwapening heeft echter niet zo een vlucht genomen, hoewel de aantallen kernwapens sterk zijn verminderd (van 55.863 kernkoppen wereldwijd in 1990 toen de Berlijnse Muur viel naar 20.190 kernkoppen in 2002 - aldus de telling van het Natural Resources Defense Council, Washington DC). De kernwapenstaten blijven desalniettemin vasthouden aan kernwapens, evenals het Atlantische bondgenootschap, de NAVO, die het eventueel gebruik ervan heeft vastgelegd in haar nucleaire doctrine. Intussen zijn er in ieder geval drie kernwapenstaten met inzetbare kernwapen systemen bij gekomen (Israël, India en Pakistan), plus twee waarvan vermoed kan worden dat ze een begin hebben gemaakt met het aanleggen van een kernwapenstrijdmacht (Noord Korea en Iran).

De eerste methode van de VS om deze ontwikkelingen tegen te gaan liep via de G-8, de acht meest geïndustrialiseerde landen. Op de vergadering van de G-8 in Canada in 2002 werd besloten tot de uitgave van 20 miljard dollar over een periode van 10 jaar. Dit geld zou gebruikt worden om de duizenden tonnen grondstoffen en wapensystemen die het gevolg waren van de productie van massavernietigingswapens in de landen van de voormalige Sovjet Unie, op te ruimen. Deze afspraak is nogmaals bevestigd in juni 2003 in Zwitserland.

In het eerste deel van deze F&R worden de documenten samengebracht waarin de aard van dit plan wordt uiteengezet. Dit G-8 plan, de *G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction*, ontwikkelde zich verder in nauwe samenwerking met de Russische regering. Nederland sloot zich op 11 juni ook aan bij het initiatief, dat door de VS sterk gestimuleerd werd met het oog op mogelijke financiële steun uit de EU en elders. In essentie gaat het om een opruimproject, om de immense hoeveelheid gevaarlijke rommel uit de Koude Oorlog op te ruimen. Rusland werkt er aan mee, omdat het zelf niet de middelen heeft om haar arsenalen op te ruimen. De buurlanden werken er aan mee omdat ze een groot gevaar zien in het voortbestaan van de voorraden. Gevolg is echter dat het multilaterale karakter van de ontwapening sterk wordt vernauwd, naar de kwestie van het opruimen van overtolige voorraden massavernietigingswapens, terwijl tegelijkertijd wordt vastgehouden aan strijdkrachten bewapend met massavernietigingswapens. Uiteraard kan niemand redelijkerwijs tegen de bestaande G-8 afspraken zijn, maar het geeft te denken als dit programma systematies gebruikt wordt als de bijdrage van de kernwapenstaten aan nucleaire ontwapening, ter vervanging van de multilaterale internationale verplichtingen. Het is onze stellige indruk dat dit programma inderdaad zo een uitwerking heeft.

De VS heeft nog een tweede project opgezet en gestimuleerd, namelijk de Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Hieraan doen volgens de laatste berichten 11 landen mee: VS, VK, Australië, Frankrijk, Duitsland, Italië, Japan, Nederland, Portugal, Spanje, Polen. Volgens eerdere bekendmakingen deed ook eerst Canada mee.

Dit plan heeft veel verdergaande ambities: namelijk het in de kiem smoren van de verspreiding van massavernietigingswapens door het onderscheppen van technologie geschikt voor de bouw en ontwikkeling daarvan, eventueel in internationale wateren. Dit plan is opmerkelijk omdat er al een aantal redelijk breed gesteunde afspraken bestaan over het tegengaan van de proliferatie van WMD technologie, waaronder de *Nuclear Suppliers Group*, de *Missile Technology Control Regime*, en de *Australia Group*.

De VS nam het openbare initiatief voor de 'Proliferation Security Initiative' in mei, toen president Bush er tijdens een toespraak in Polen voor pleitte. Dit markeerde het begin van een aantal bijeenkomsten en interviews waarin de mogelijkheid besproken werd om de verdergaande actieplannen toe te passen in het geval van Noord Korea. Ondanks de openbare zorg over het schenden van internationale wetten die onder andere in het vraag en antwoord stuk van de Amerikaanse Council on Foreign Relations (in deze F&R

opgenomen) tot uiting komt, werd dit proces deze zomer met maximale snelheid voortgezet. Na bijeenkomsten in Spanje en Australië zou volgens de Amerikaanse onderminister Bolton een derde bijeenkomst worden belegd in het eerste weekend van september, dus omstreeks 5-7 september. Deze haast wordt verklaarbaar in het kader van de lopende crisis rondom Noord-Korea. In de laatste week van augustus wordt er in China een zes-landen conferentie gehouden (waaronder Noord Korea) waar onderhandeld zal worden onder welke voorwaarden dat land zal afzien van de kernwapens die ze vermoedelijk heeft. Mocht die conferentie mislukken, dan valt te verwachten dat de PSI conferentie maatregelen zal nemen die in de lijn liggen van de plannen die besproken zijn. Dat kan ook inhouden het onderscheppen van Noordkoreaanse schepen in internationale wateren. Dit komt gevaarlijk in de buurt van piraterij, een daad die voor Noord Korea een casus belli zou zijn. Aangezien de VS de initiatiefnemer is van dit plan, lijkt het redelijk om verdergaande stappen in het kader van het PSI te verwachten, ook als andere instituties er niet mee instemmen. Een andere aanwijzing daarvoor zijn de plannen om een internationale vlootoefening te houden in de wateren bij Noord-Korea. In haar oorlog tegen Irak heeft de Amerikaanse regering al haar bereidheid getoond om desnoods unilateraal een oorlog te voeren.

Gezien het feit dat Nederland deel uitmaakt van het PSI is het zaak dat alle afspraken in PSI verband bekend worden gemaakt zodat ze in de Kamer en de publieke opinie besproken kunnen worden. De antwoorden op de vragen van kamerlid Van Bommel aangaande de relatie tussen de PSI en de eventuele confrontatie met Noord Korea (zie elders in deze uitgave) waren hoogst onbevredigend. Daarom zijn de volgende vragen relevant:

1. Wat is er afgesproken in de afgelopen PSI conferenties in Spanje en Australië?
2. Wat staat er op de agenda in Parijs?
3. Is er een vorm van besluitvorming in het PSI? Zo ja, hoe werkt die?
4. Wat is de positie van Canada ten aanzien van het PSI?
5. Doet Zuid Korea mee aan PSI? Zo niet, waarom niet?
6. Doet Nederland mee aan de vlootoefening in september bij Korea? (NYT 180803)
7. Zijn er landen die bezwaar hebben aangetekend of kritiek hebben doorgegeven over de opzet van PSI?

KRONIEK 2003

11 juli-24 augustus	Reces Europees Parlement
28 juli-10 sept	Conference on Disarmament, Geneve
19-22 augustus	VN Conferentie inzake 'Arms control, multilateral disarmament and their future, Osaka
26-27 augustus	Six-way meeting on North Korea's nuclear ambitions, Beijing
2-5 september	CTBT Article XIV Conference, Wenen
1 ^e weekend september	Proliferation Security Initiative meeting – Paris
15-19 september	IAEA Board of Governors Meeting in Wenen
22-26 september	CTBTO Advisory Group, Wenen
8-9 oktober	Informele bijeenkomst NAVO Ministers van Defensie, Colorado
16-17 oktober	Europese Raad, Brussel
7-11 november	NAVO Parlementaire Assemblée in Orlando
10-14 november	BWC States Parties bijeenkomst, Geneve
10-14 november	CTBT PrepCom, 21 st Session, Wenen
10-14 november	OPCW States Parties bijeenkomst, Den Haag
17-18 november	EU Commissie buitenlandse zaken, mensenrechten, gemeenschappelijke veiligheid en defensiebeleid, Brussel
1-3 december	WEU Assemblée, Parijs
7 december	Parlementsverkiezingen Rusland
12-13 december	Europese Raad, Brussel

FACTS AND REPORTS

Eerder verschenen in de reeks PENN – NL Facts and Reports:

1. US unilateralism – official foreign comments
Citaten van internationale politici en diplomaten over het Amerikaans unilateralisme.
2. Veiligheidsvraagstukken en de verkiezingen – standpunten van de politieke partijen
Relevante delen van de partijprogramma's van de Nederlandse politieke partijen, plus citaten van politici op het terrein van oorlog en vrede.
3. Transatlantic relations – recent developments
Overzicht van recente ontwikkelingen in de transatlantische betrekkingen, met name binnen de NAVO, mede naar aanleiding van uitspraken in de State of the Union.
4. Ontwikkelingen betreffende kernwapens en de Nederlandse politiek – briefing paper
Periodiek overzicht van ontwikkelingen rond kernwapens in de internationale en nationale politiek, met uitgebreide hoeveelheid bijlagen.
5. Nucleaire vraagstukken – standpunten van de Nederlandse regering en de Tweede Kamer
Overzicht april 2001 – april 2002
6. Crisis in de OPCW – de verwijdering van directeur-generaal Bustani
Documenten en artikelen over het ontslag van directeur-generaal Bustani van het OPCW
7. Prepcom van het NPV – nucleaire ontwapening stopt
Verklaringen en rapporten van staten en ngo's tijdens de Prepcom van het NPV
8. Verdrag van Moskou – détente tussen Rusland en Verenigde Staten
Informatie over het Verdrag van Moskou, ontwikkelingen daaromheen en commentaar erop
9. Joint Strike Fighter – achtergrondberichten
De belangrijkste achtergrondberichten over de vervanging van de F16 uit de Nederlandse pers.
10. Konfrontatie in Zuid-Azië – de kernwapenwedloop tussen India en Pakistan
Basisgegevens over de nucleaire strijdkrachten en doctrines van India en Pakistan, Nederlandse wapenexport en wapenexportbeleid en een oproep om een nucleair treffen te voorkomen
11. Massavernietigingswapens in het Midden-Oosten (1) – Egypte, Israël, Syrië
Basisinformatie over de proliferatie van nucleaire, biologische en chemische wapens in Egypte, Israël en Syrië en verklaringen van de Nederlandse regering hierover
12. Amerikaans unilateralisme II – officiële reacties
Citaten van internationale politici, diplomaten en NGO's over het Amerikaans unilateralisme.
13. Aanval op Irak – de kwestie van de massavernietigingswapens; feiten, documenten en overwegingen
14. Aanval op Irak (2) – recente ontwikkelingen
15. Documenten First Committee Verenigde Naties 2002 – resoluties, verklaringen, rapporten
16. De NAVO-top in Praag – documenten
17. Aanval op Irak (3) – het inspectieregim
18. Internationaal veiligheidsbeleid Verenigde Staten – officiële documenten en reacties van de Nederlandse regering
19. Veiligheidsvraagstukken en de verkiezingen (2) – standpunten van de politieke partijen
Een update voor de verkiezingen van 22 januari 2003
20. Korea, de tweede crisis
21. Aanval op Irak (4) – de aanloop
22. Aanval op Irak (5) – vooravond van de aanval
23. De andere crises
Informatie over het Amerikaans nucleair beleid, missile defense, de Conference on Disarmament en de recente ontwikkelingen rond Noord-Korea, Iran en India en Pakistan.
24. Aanval op Irak (6) – de slachtoffers
25. Nucleaire vraagstukken (2) – standpunten van de Nederlandse regering en de Tweede Kamer en recent nieuws nucleair beleid Verenigde Staten
Overzicht april 2002 – mei 2003
26. Teststopverdrag Artikel XIV Conferentie – de kwestie van de Amerikaanse minikernwapens

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