Werkgroep Eurobom

PENN/Netherlands MPI/Netherlands

FACTS AND REPORTS

Oktober 2003 – No. 30

INHOUDSOPGAVE

INLEIDING

In dit nummer van F&R hebben we een aantal documenten samengebracht over de aard en omvang van een aantal bewapeningsprogramma's van Iran. We hebben een groot aantal krantartikelen niet kunnen gebruiken in de gedrukte versie – deze zullen wel te vinden zijn in de langere electronische versie op ons website www.eurobomb.nl.
De indeling spreekt vanzelf: we behandelen achtereenvolgens de technische aspecten van nucleaire, chemische, biologische wapens en daarna raketten en ondersteunende technologie. Afzonderlijk hebben we een reeks documenten en knipsels verzameld die met het beleid aangaande Iran te maken hebben, van de meeste relevante instanties en regeringen: de IAEA, VS, Rusland, EU en Nederland zelf. Hoewel dit geen alomvattend compendium is denken we dat de lezer toch een goede indicatie krijgt van de technische en politieke stand van zaken.

Redactie F&R

NUCLEAIRE WAPENS

DOCUMENTEN

Federation of American Scientists

Nuclear Weapons
(http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/nuke/index.html) - Updated 4 August 2003

Recent Developments:
There are ongoing investigations by the International Atomic Energy Association concerning Iran's compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. At the end of August 2003, the IAEA stated in a confidential report leaked to the media that trace elements of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) were found in an Iranian nuclear facility. In June of 2003, a IAEA Director General report stated that Iran had not met the obligations required of it by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

Background:
Iran's nuclear program began in the Shah's era, including a plan to build 20 nuclear power reactors. Two power reactors in Bushehr, on the coast of the Persian Gulf, were started but remained unfinished when they were bombed and damaged by the Iraqis during the Iran-Iraq war. Following the revolution in 1979, all nuclear activity was suspended, though subsequently work was resumed on a somewhat more modest scale. Current plans extend to the construction of 15 power reactors and two research reactors. Research and development efforts also were conducted by the Shah's regime on fissile material production, although these efforts were halted during the Iranian revolution and the Iran-Iraq war.
Iran ratified the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1970, and since February 1992 has allowed the IAEA to inspect its nuclear facilities.
It is generally believed that Iran's efforts are focused on uranium enrichment, though there are some indications of work on a parallel plutonium effort. Iran claims it is trying to establish a complete nuclear fuel cycle to support a civilian energy program, but this same fuel cycle would be applicable to a nuclear weapons development program. Iran appears to have spread their nuclear activities around a number of sites to reduce the risk of detection or attack.

Sources and Resources

- Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency, June 2003.
- New Report Cites Traces of Uranium at Iran Plant , New York Times, August 27th, 2003.
- Latest Developments in the Nuclear Program of Iran, presentation by France, NSC 2003 (as published by the *Los Angeles Times*, August 4, 2003)
- Iran Closes In on Ability to Build a Nuclear Bomb by Douglas Frantz, *Los Angeles Times*, August 4, 2003
- Rogue or Rational State?: A Nuclear Armed Iran and US Counterproliferation Strategy Richard M. Perry; Matthew R. Schwonek (Faculty Advisor) *Air Command and Staff College* 1997 -- Are the mad mullahs in charge driving Iran toward a course of global terrorism with an "Islamic Bomb"? Or, is the nuclear course within Iran a well thought out process, carefully calculated to maximize strategic leverage in order to gain and maintain regional hegemony?
- Proliferation: Threat and Response - 1997
- Iran: Headed for a National Deterrent? Exploring U.S. Missile Defense Requirements in 2010: What Are the Policy and Technology Challenges? Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis April 1997
- THE ECONOMIC AND ECOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT OF IRANIAN-RUSSIAN NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY TRADE
- IRAN *Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, 1998* Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: Spotlight shifts to Iran DAVID ALBRIGHT and MARK HIBBSBulletin of the Atomic Scientists March 1992
- An Iranian bomb? by DAVID ALBRIGHT Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists - July/August 1995
- AN ASSESSMENT OF IRAN'S NUCLEAR FACILITIES by Greg J. Gerardi and Maryam Aharinejad The Nonproliferation Review: Spring-Summer 1995, Volume 2 - Number 3
- AIPAC [American Israel Public Affairs Committee] Iran: A Future Nuclear Power?
- IRANIAN-RUSSIAN NUCLEAR TRADE - CASE NUMBER: 163 Trade Environment Database [TED] School of International Service at American University
- THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION USCENTCOM
- Israeli Report on Nuclear Targeting Priorities JPRS-TAC-95-004-L - 13 January 1995

- Iran's Nuclear Program: Myth and Reality by Kenneth R. Timmerman USPID - atti del VI convegno di Castiglioncello [1995]
- C.I.A. Says an Iranian A-Bomb Can't Be Ruled Out By JAMES RISEN WITH JUDITH MILLER The New York Times (17 January 2000)

Federation of American Scientists

Bijgewerkt tot april 2000

Nuclear Weapons

Iran's nuclear program began in the Shah's era, including a plan to build 20 nuclear power reactors. Two power reactors in Bushehr, on the coast of the Persian Gulf, were started but remained unfinished when they were bombed and damaged by the Iraqis during the Iran-Iraq war. Following the revolution in 1979, all nuclear activity was suspended, though subsequently work was resumed on a somewhat more modest scale. Current plans extend to the construction of 15 power reactors and two research reactors. Research and development efforts also were conducted by the Shah's regime on fissile material production, although these efforts were halted during the Iranian revolution and the Iran-Iraq war.

Iran ratified the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1970, and since February 1992 has allowed the IAEA to inspect any of its nuclear facilities. No IAEA inspections have revealed Tehran's violations of the NPT.

Since its defeat in the Iran-Iraq War, Tehran has redoubled its efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles. In addition to Iran's legitimate efforts to develop its nuclear power-generation industry, it is believed to be operating a parallel clandestine nuclear weapons program. Iran appears to be following a policy of complying with the NPT and building its nuclear power program in such a way that if the appropriate political decision is made, know-how gained in the peaceful sphere (specialists and equipment) could be used to create nuclear weapons.

Iran does not currently have nuclear weapons, and Iranians officials generally deny that they are engaged in developing a military nuclear capability. However, in a February 1987 address to Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, President Ali Khamene'i stated:

"Regarding atomic energy, we need it now... Our nation has always been threatened from outside. The least we can do to face this danger is to let our enemies know that we can defend ourselves. Therefore, every step you take here is in defense of your country and your evolution. With this in mind, you should work hard and at great speed."

Unclassified assessments based on Iran's known nuclear infrastructure reflect a technology and production base inadequate to the task of producing nuclear weapons for many years. In April 1984, West German intelligence sources leaked reports to the press that Iran's clandestine nuclear weapons program was so far advanced that it would be capable of producing a bomb "within two years" butthese reports turned out to be greatly exaggerated.

The present condition of industrial potential is such that without outside help, Iran is unable to organize production of weapons-grade nuclear materials. Iran is trying to acquire fissile material to support development of nuclear weapons, and is attempting to develop the capability to produce both plutonium and highly enriched uranium.

In an attempt to shorten the timeline to a weapon, Iran has launched a parallel effort to purchase fissile material, mainly from sources in the former Soviet Union. There are no convincing reports of any illegal deliveries of nuclear raw materials or nuclear fuel to Iran. Persistent media reports dating back to 1991 concerning four nuclear warheads which Tehran supposedly bought from Kazakhstan remain unconfirmed.

It is generally believed that Iran's efforts are focused on uranium enrichment, though there are some indications of work on a parallel plutonium effort. Iran claims it is trying to establish a complete nuclear fuel cycle to support a civilian energy program, but this same fuel cycle would be applicable to a nuclear weapons development program. Iran appears to have spread their nuclear activities around a number of sites to reduce the risk of detection or attack.

Iran continues to aggressively pursue nuclear technology from both Western and Eastern sources. Russia and China are providing assistance in developing nuclear energy capabilities. Since the early 1990's Iranians has been purchasing dual-use nuclear equipment from Europe, China, Russia and third world countries. Some of this equipment could be used to enrich uranium which could be used for nuclear weapon development. Iran has also made extensive efforts in training nuclear personnel in Iran itself and in western universities.

Israel and the United States believed in 1992 that Iran would attain a military nuclear capability within eight to 10 years. In 1995 ACDA Director John Holum testified that Iran could have the bomb by 2003, though by

1997 he testified that Iran could have the bomb by 2005-2007. . In the mid-1990's the view of the United States government was that Iran was implementing a military nuclear program that could achieve a weapons capability within five years, that is, by the year 2000. As of 1998 the estimate of the US Central Command was that Iranian efforts could result in the development of a nuclear device by the middle of the next decade, that is, by the year 2005.
In January 2000, marking a significant departure from previous assessments, the Central Intelligence Agency concluded that Iran might now be able to make a nuclear weapon. This evaluation was not based on evidence that Iran's efforts had achieved a breakthrough, but rather on the fact that the United States cannot track with great certainty increased efforts by Iran to acquire nuclear materials and technology. Analysts at other intelligence agencies believed that Iran's efforts were still moving slowly.
Tehran's international debt exceeds $30 billion, although oil price increases in 1996 may have relieved the pressure at least temporarily. Despite severe economic distress, Iran's use of limited funds to procure new conventional weapons and develop weapons of mass destruction reveals a commitment to achieve Gulf preeminence. Russia, China, and North Korea support the effort by selling T-72 tanks, Kilo-class submarines, and ballistic missiles. Purchases of submarines and modern missile patrol boats, combined with reinforcement of the southern Arabian Gulf islands, bolster the Iranian navy's ability to interdict strategic sea-lines-of-communication and impose its control over these critical shipping passages. In the early 1990s it appeared that Iran planned to invest considerable resources in military procurement, including establishment of a new and larger air force, a new armored corps, and a revamped artillery corps. What actually happened was far below the predictions. Air force modernization with new Russian planes has taken place in modest numbers. The acquisition of several hundred new tanks has left Iran in an inferior position relative to Iraq.
The economic situation in Iran has constrained the funding of military improvements generally, and may have constrained Iran's nuclear weapons plans. American counter-proliferation efforts have also limited Iran's options. The US has imposed sanctions prohibiting trade and investment in Iran. Tehran has attempted to portray US containment efforts as unjust, in an attempt to convince European or Asian suppliers to relax export restrictions on key technologies. Foreign suppliers have been discouraged by the risk of sanctions or political embarrassment because of US-led containment efforts.

BERICHTEN

CNN

Iran invites West to build N-plants
31 May 2003

TEHRAN, Iran (AP) --Iran's foreign minister invited Western countries to join Russia in building new nuclear plants in Iran and pledged to sign extra nuclear nonproliferation treaties if Tehran gets access to the latest atomic technologies.
Kamal Kharrazi spoke Friday at a press conference in the Iranian capital after Russia's atomic energy minister urged the United States join Moscow in building a nuclear power plant in Iran.
Washington has raised concerns that Iran is trying to develop a nuclear arms program. Tehran says it wants to build atomic plants to generate electricity.
Russia is building a light-water reactor in Iran's southern port of Bushehr, which America claims could help Tehran acquire a nuclear bomb.
Iran envisions building a nuclear program generating 6,000 megawatts of electricity by 2020. Iranian officials have said the Bushehr plant, due for completion during the first half of next year, will produce 1,000-megawatts.
"Russia has helped us a lot to build the Bushehr nuclear power plant to produce electricity ... (and) Western countries can also participate in tenders we are planning to offer for the construction of more nuclear plants," Kharrazi told reporters.
Iran's nuclear program has been a major source of U.S.-Russian friction since Moscow signed a 1995 contract with Tehran to build the Bushehr reactor.
The issue was expected to figure high on the agenda of this weekend's St. Petersburg summit between President Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Earlier Friday in Moscow, Russian Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev also said other nations, including the United States, could have the opportunity to participate in the construction at Bushehr.

"There is enough room for everyone," Rumyantsev said, according to the ITAR-Tass news agency. "We have made this proposal to our American colleagues several times during discussions on the expert level and they have been saying they need to think about it."
The spokesman for the State Department's Middle East bureau was not available for comment.
Moscow -- eager to mend ties with the United States after a fallout over Iraq -- recently signaled that it shares some U.S. concerns over Iran's nuclear program. Top Russian officials have urged Tehran to sign an additional agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency to ensure it would not develop nuclear arms.
Kharrazi said Friday that Iran would sign additional protocols only if it is given access to advanced nuclear technologies available to fellow signatories of pacts like the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
"If sanctions are lifted and we are allowed access to nuclear technology, we are fully prepared to sign any new additional protocol," he told reporters.
Washington imposed sanctions on Iran banning the sale of dual-use technology after the 1979 takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran by militant students amid the Islamic revolution.
Other Western nations also refuse to sell dual-use or nuclear technology to Iran.
The United States also has given credence to a report by the opposition National Council of Resistance of Iran that the Tehran government has built a uranium enrichment plant for bomb materials.
Iran has said it is building such a plant at the central city of Natanz, but it claims the plant will not be capable of making weapons grade material.
The head of the U.N. International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohamed ElBaradei, visited the plant in February and is to issue a report next month. Washington wants the agency to declare Iran in violation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

Washington Post

Iran Says It Imported Uranium in 1991
Associated Press – 9 June 2003

TEHRAN -- Iran acknowledged today that it failed to inform U.N. authorities that it had imported a small quantity of uranium 12 years ago, but said that failure did not violate the international nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Gholamreza Aghazadeh, Iran's nuclear energy chief, also urged the International Atomic Energy Agency to widely publish the report it released to member nations last week on Iran's nuclear program.
The Bush administration has accused Iran of seeking to build a nuclear bomb and wants the U.N. agency to declare it in violation of the treaty. Iran says its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes.
Aghazadeh said on state-run television that the IAEA report did not support U.S. claims that Iran was violating international atomic protocols. On Friday, a diplomat from an IAEA member state said the report indicated Iran had imported some nuclear material and processed it without declaring it to the agency.

Middle East Times

Iran nuclear debate hots up
13 June 2003

US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said on Wednesday Iran was fast approaching a point where it may have nuclear weapons, although it did not appear to have any at present.
"The intelligence community in the United States and around the world currently assess that Iran does not have nuclear weapons," he told a meeting of students.
"The assessment is that they do have a very active program and are likely to have nuclear weapons in a relatively short period of time," he said.
Earlier in the week, Iran said it did not believe it should report all of its nuclear activities to the International Atomic Energy Agency, which has accused Iran of not honoring its nuclear safeguards agreement.
Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi rejected US accusations on Monday, saying Iran had informed IAEA about importing uranium for peaceful purposes 12 years ago and notification demonstrated Tehran's goodwill toward the agency.

Asefi said the IAEA has not been able to raise a single specific issue against Tehran for 12 years. He said that also demonstrates Iran has been forthright and has lived up to its UN commitments.
He also noted a scheduled visit by IAEA inspectors, which he said showed the "sincere cooperation of the Islamic Republic".
But on Tuesday, a Japanese newspaper reported that Iranian experts on nuclear issues secretly visited North Korea this year, possibly to ask North Korean officials for advice on how to handle international inspectors.
The conservative Sankei Shimbun claimed that Iranian experts made three visits to North Korea between March and May, quoting what it described as "a Korean peninsula source", who was not named in the report.
The visits "may have been intended to ask North Korea for know-how on how to act when accepting inspectors", the paper quoted the source as saying. "Cooperation on nuclear development may also have been discussed," the source added.
Iran has so far maintained that its nuclear ambitions are limited to producing electricity.
Sankei Shimbun also said North Korea may receive, or may already have received, funds from Iran.
In Pyongyang's most explicit public acknowledgment to date that it was seeking to build nuclear weapons, it said on Monday it wanted them so it could cut its huge conventional forces and divert funds into its economy.

Tehran Times

Rowhani: WMD Has No Place in Iranian Defense Strategy
15 June 2003

TEHRAN -- Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Hassan Rowhani said on Saturday that weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has no place in Iran's defense strategy.
In a meeting with special Advisor to the Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Okamoto, Rowhani said that Iran would do its best to convince the world public that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes and will prove that it does not want WMD.
He said that Iran honors the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as an international convention and is keen on consultations with Japan about the technology it needs in this sector.
Rowhani said that the NPT bans proliferation of nuclear arms, but, at the same time underscores the need to provide member states with the technology to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
The United States has blocked the transfer of nuclear technology to Iran under various pretexts.
The denial of the right of member states to access technology to utilize nuclear energy is taking place in violation of the NPT, he declared.
He said that before the victory of the Islamic Revolution, the United States had given a proposal to set up power plants in Iran to generate 20,000 megawatts of electricity and the other Western states had signed an agreement to provide Iran with technology to produce 8,000 megawatts of electricity.
Iran has no ambitious plan in this sector and decided to build power plants to generate about 6,000 megawatts electricity from nuclear energy, he said adding that all Iranian activities are taking place under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
On the international campaign against terrorism, Rowhani said that all nations should proceed with the campaign without any discrimination.
He said that the United States is responsible for creating the al-Qaeda terrorist network in Afghanistan and its reorganization in the area.
"The way it deals with the Iraq-based terrorist Mojahedeen Khalq Organization (MKO), is in violation of the international campaign against terrorism," Rowhani said.
On distinction between terrorists and those fighting to liberate their occupied territories in Palestine, he said that the campaign of all the nations who took part in World War II to repulse Nazi occupation had been recognized as legitimate and acceptable by the international community.
He said that the Islamic Republic of Iran favors a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction and calls on the United Nations and the powerful member states to take decisions on destroying Israeli WMD.
Rowhani voiced Iran's concern about humanitarian situation in Iraq and said that there is lack of security and that the interim administration being exercised by the United States in Iraq is provocative and humiliating for the Iraqi people.
He extended Iran's full support for restoring Iraqi security and proceeding with reconstruction of the country and said that Iran would provide Iraq with humanitarian assistance and encourage the Iraqi people to form a democratic government in the country.

For his part, Okamoto said that Japan regards Iran as a highly important country and is keen on developing economic cooperation with Tehran.
He said Tokyo is willing to help Iran to set up small industries.
He said that Japan meets 40 percent of its electricity needs from nuclear energy.
Okamoto said that Iran's transparent approach toward its nuclear program will remove the misunderstandings.
He said that Japan has urged Israel to sign the NPT.
On the Middle East, he said that Japan regards the 'roadmap' as the fundamental step forward to peace in the Middle East and calls for implementation of all the UN resolutions on Palestine.
Okamoto said that Japan believes that Iraq's territorial integrity must be maintained and that a democratic government should be established in Iraq. He added that Japan is in favor of Iran playing an active role in Iraq.
He said that Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi is interested in developing Tehran-Tokyo cooperation.

BBC News

Iran rebuffs foreign pressure
16 June 2003

Iran has made a "vigorous protest" over what it calls American "interference" in its internal affairs.
Student protests have been continuing for almost a week, and US President George W Bush said they were "the beginnings of people expressing themselves toward a free Iran".
The Iranian foreign ministry also rejected European Union plans to call on Iran to sign up urgently and unconditionally to an additional protocol to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
EU foreign ministers are expected to make the call at a meeting in Luxembourg later on Monday.
The foreign ministry in Tehran had already attacked the US for "flagrant interference in Iran's internal affairs".
But it has now sent a formal protest to Washington, via the Swiss embassy in Tehran, AFP reports.
Correspondents say the EU call, while stopping short of backing American accusations running an illicit nuclear weapons programme, is likely to be linked to the progress of continuing trade negotiations with Iran.
"We have not yet received any official demand," said foreign ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi, according to AFP.
"We will not accept any preconditions in our negotiations."

Nuclear 'right'
The EU is calling for a protocol providing for tougher, short-notice inspections of suspected nuclear sites.
Some EU countries want trade talks with Iran halted, but a majority believe the EU should keep the door open to dialogue, as a means of obtaining greater transparency on nuclear issues and more progress on human rights and political reforms in Iran.
Former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who is still powerful in the government, said on Sunday that Iran's foreign policy was "purely defensive" with "no policy of aggression in the Islamic Republic".
"It is our right to benefit from atomic energy," he said.

Iranian 'failings'
Iran's nuclear activities will come under further scrutiny at a meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, which will hear a report likely to be critical of Iran's nuclear programme.
The report was leaked to the media last week.
In his opening statement to the board of governors, the IAEA's Director General, Mohammed ElBaradei, is expected to report preliminary findings that Iran failed to meet its obligations to:
- Account for nuclear material
- Report its subsequent processing and use
- Declare facilities where the material is stored and processed

Tehran has denied the allegations contained in the IAEA document, insisting it wants to use nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes and not to develop nuclear weapons.
But it has so far declined to sign agreements that would allow tougher international inspections of its nuclear facilities.
The BBC's Bethany Bell says the IAEA is likely to increase the pressure on Tehran to do so.
Iran has allowed the IAEA to inspect its nuclear reactor at Bushehr, which has almost been completed with Russian help.

But the agency says that Iran failed to report other facilities, and the importing of some uranium in 1991.
Iranian officials say this is a misunderstanding.
Iran forms part of what the United States calls the "axis of evil".
Washington is already using the report to back up its accusations that Iran is secretly pursuing nuclear weapons - only one of the elements in the worsening relations between the two countries.

Tehran Times

Iran Has No Plans for Producing nuclear arms: Kharrazi
16 June 2003

TEHRAN – Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi said on Sunday that the Islamic Republic of Iran has no unannounced plan for producing nuclear arms.
In a meeting with the special advisor to the Japanese prime minister Yukio Okamato, Kharrazi said all the Iranian nuclear programs are transparent and open to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
Okamato for his part described Iran as a very important country in the region and expressed his country's willingness to expand relations with Tehran in all fields.
He said Iran has a very influential role for the establishment of security in the region and it has a very constructive role for solving problems in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Tehran Times

Iran Has No Nuclear Arms Program: Karrazi
17 June 2003

TEHRAN -- Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi said on Sunday that Iran has no nuclear arms program.
In a meeting with special advisor to the Japanese prime minister Yukio Okamoto, Kharrazi said that the Islamic Republic of Iran is against nuclear arms in line with the Islamic ethics.
Kharrazi said Iran has put all its nuclear program under supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and has no undeclared atomic program.
Kharrazi and Okamoto reviewed expansion of mutual relations and studied avenues to foster and deepen mutual ties.
Underlining the need for establishment of a democratic government in Iraq, he called for collective measures of the world community to help form a stable government there as quickly as possible, IRNA reported.
Referring to the resistance of Palestinians to atrocities of the Zionists, he described the repressive policies of Ariel Sharon and ignoring the Palestinian's rights as main obstacles to resolving their problem.
Yukio Okamoto, for his part, described the Islamic Republic of Iran as a very important country and voiced his country's willingness to broaden all-out ties with the country.
Iran plays a very effective role in restoring peace and security in the region and its positive cooperation in resolving crisis in Iraq and Afghanistan is very constructive and useful, he said.

Tehran Times

President Khatami: Iran Seeks a Middle East Free From WMD
17 June 2003

TEHRAN -- President Mohammad Khatami said on Monday that Iran seeks the Middle East to become free from weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
In a meeting with President Imamali Rahmanov, President Khatami said that international relations should be based on mutual respect.
President Khatami called for international cooperation to strengthen the status of the United Nations which has been undermined by the United States.
Khatami pointed to the cultural and historical amity between the two nations and said that the Tajik president's visit to Iran indicates national resolve from the two sides to develop bilateral, regional and international cooperation.

He said that Iran favors co-existence and non-interference in the domestic affairs of neighboring countries as well as detente and confidence-building with other states.
On the transport networks linking Iran to Tajikistan and Afghanistan, he said that the networks also include a link between the east and west of the world and a route for trade.
Elaborating on Iranian policy toward Afghanistan, President Khatami said that the international campaign against terrorism would be effective with cooperation of the entire international community adding that Tehran and Dushanbe had positive cooperation in this respect both in the past and in future.
On Iraq, President Khatami hoped that the Iraqi people could establish their own government.
The president underlined the need to establish a lasting peace in the Middle East by restoring the rights of the Palestinians.
President Rahmanov called for implementation of the agreements already reached between the two countries.
He said that economic cooperation would serve to strengthen political relations between the two countries and also would contribute to regional cooperation.
President Rahmanov expressed concern about resumption of poppy cultivation in Afghanistan and drug trafficking originating from that country and called for collective measures to fight drug trafficking.
He said that Tajikistan has concerns about peace in Afghanistan adding that situation in Afghanistan has impacts on the stability of the region.
Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi and Minister of Agriculture Jihad Mahmoud Hojjati were also present in the meeting.
President Rahmanov heading a delegation arrived in Tehran on Monday morning. He is expected to take part in a summit of three states of Iran, Tajikistan and Afghanistan during his three-day stay in Tehran.

Tehran Times

Iran Says It Did Not Fail to Abide by Nuclear Agreements
19 June 2003

TEHRAN (Mehr News Agency) - Iran said Wednesday it has not failed to abide by international agreements on reporting to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with regard to the nuclear materials used in its nuclear programs.
"The Islamic Republic of Iran has fulfilled it obligations under all provisions of the NPT (the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty)," the Iranian representative to the IAEA, Ali Salehi, told a high level meeting at the IAEA.
The IAEA is studying a report prepared by its director general, Mohamed ElBaradei, that said: Iran has failed to meet its obligations under its (NPT) Safeguards Agreement.
Salehi told the agency's 35-nation board of governors the report "could have been crafted in a more partial, fair and balanced manner".
The "awkward directives issued at certain influential capitals on the form, the content and the final conclusion and judgment of the report," Salehi said, alluding to the United States that pressured the IAEA to report Iran's violation of the IAEA agreements. U.S. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said the United States wanted the IAEA board "to express their concerns about the nuclear program."
Iran is a signatory to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the global pact aimed at halting the spread of nuclear weapons.
"Iran has fulfilled its obligations under all provisions of the NPT," he said, adding, nuclear weapons is not on the agenda of Iran's security doctrine. Salehi said: "Iran considers the acquiring, development and use of nuclear weapons inhuman, immoral and against its very basic principles."
"The language of force and threat will be futile," he said, referring to the final report on Iran which may be released on Thursday.
Iranian Atomic Energy Organization Spokesman Seyed Khalil Mousavi told the Mehr News Agency on Tuesday that the Islamic Republic of Iran has not failed to report its nuclear activities to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). "Contrary to the IAEA Director General Mohammad ElBradei's comments, Iran has not failed to fulfill its commitments in reporting to the IAEA," he said. "It is a clear issue."
"As our country's representative in the IAEA has announced, there is no disagreement between the two sides, there is only some misinterpretation of the text of the agreement," Mousavi said.
Coming under pressure from U.S. disinformation campaign, the IAEA urged Iran to sign an additional protocol to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The Islamic Republic maintains that it has every right to benefit from atomic energy and that it is not following a policy of aggression.
Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi has said that Iran will sign the additional protocols provided the other NPT members fulfill their commitments and provide it with the necessary technology for its nuclear programs which are solely for peaceful purposes. Salehi said: "The crux of the report in front of us deals only with a small amount of 0.13 effective kilogram of natural uranium that we imported in 1991."
"My country declared the material to the agency and it is now under its full safeguards," said.

Tehran Times

Iran Has Right to Acquire Advanced Nuclear Technology: Khatami
19 June 2003

TEHRAN -- President Mohammad Khatami here Wednesday strongly defended Iran's right to acquire 'advanced nuclear technology', while he fended off politically-motivated and 'groundless accusations and pressures' on the Islamic Republic, IRNA reported.
The president also renewed Tehran's readiness for cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), but also the country's demand that IAEA help Iran acquire the nuclear energy know-how.
"The International Atomic Energy Agency is obliged to prepare for Iran's acquisition of nuclear know-how according to the treaty which we have signed," he told reporters after signing an agreement for transit cooperation between Iran, Tajikistan and Afghanistan.
Iran, which is party to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, is blaming the UN's nuclear watchdog agency for the sanctions which the Islamic Republic says has kept the country from acquiring the nuclear energy technology.
"We have no problem on cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency and have always announced that we reserve the right to acquire the advanced nuclear technology.
"We also hope that members (of NPT) will help Iran with cheaper and more convenient acquisition of the nuclear know-how," Khatami said.
"The Islamic Republic of Iran has always cooperated with the International Atomic Energy Agency and it will continue its cooperation in order to make issues transparent and dispel certain charges," the president added.
IAEA has been called on Iran to sign an Additional Protocol to the Non-Proliferation Treaty which paves the way for impromptu visit of the country's nuclear plants by UN inspectors.
Khatami repeated Iran's condition that it wanted the sanctions removed if the nuclear watchdog wanted Tehran to sign the protocol.
"We do not seek any privilege for joining this protocol. Our demand is because of being a signatory of NPT according to which all members of the treaty have the right to be provided with the nuclear technology," he said.
"According to this treaty, countries with the nuclear knowledge are obliged to help other signatories acquire this know-how. But not only were we not provided with the help, but we were treated unjustly through sanctions," he added. Khatami reiterated Iran's disposition that it does not seek to acquire atomic weapons. "We believe that having atomic arms does not bring security," he said, adding, "We have always been and still are among the messengers for the region to be devoid of nuclear weapons."
The Iranian president pointed to the Zionist Israeli regime's nuclear warheads and its efforts for producing atomic weapons and said, "Israel today, which has about 400 nuclear warheads, is a threat to the (Middle East) region. "These warheads are enough to annihilate the earth and we consider proliferation of these arms as dangerous," Khatami added.
Washington claims that Iran intends to use its nuclear energy programs as a cover to build weapons of mass destruction. Iran says its nuclear program is transparent and peaceful, aimed at producing 7,000 megawatts of electricity in the next 20 years when the country's oil and gas reserves become overstretched.
On Tuesday, 158 MPs sent a letter to President Mohammad Khatami to back the government's 'principled and legitimate policy for peaceful use of nuclear energy' and condemn international pressure on Tehran over its nuclear energy program.
"The Islamic Republic of Iran, as a messenger of peace and stability in the world, has always been a vigorous defendant of disarmament of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in the world as well as the region," they said.
The letter came as the UN's nuclear watchdog agency discussed Iran's nuclear energy programs at its 35-member Board of Governors in Vienna on Wednesday.

In recent weeks, Iran has invited world countries, including the U.S., to participate in the country's nuclear energy programs so as to verify the 'peaceful' nature of the Islamic Republic's facilities.

Los Angeles Times

Iran Closes In on Ability to Build a Nuclear Bomb
Douglas Frantz – 4 August 2003

Tehran`s reactor program masks strides toward weapons capability, a Times investigation finds. France warns against exports to Islamic Republic
After more than a decade of working behind layers of front companies and in hidden laboratories, Iran appears to be in the late stages of developing the capacity to build a nuclear bomb.
Iran insists that like many countries it is only building commercial nuclear reactors to generate electricity for homes and factories. "Iran`s efforts in the field of nuclear technology are focused on civilian application and nothing else," President Mohammad Khatami said on state television in February. "This is the legitimate right of the Iranian people."
But a three-month investigation by The Times - drawing on previously secret reports, international officials, independent experts, Iranian exiles and intelligence sources in Europe and the Middle East - uncovered strong evidence that Iran`s commercial program masks a plan to become the world`s next nuclear power. The country has been engaged in a pattern of clandestine activity that has concealed weapons work from international inspectors. Technology and scientists from Russia, China, North Korea and Pakistan have propelled Iran`s nuclear program much closer to producing a bomb than Iraq ever was.
No one is certain when Iran might produce its first atomic weapon. Some experts said two or three years; others believe the government has probably not given a final go-ahead. But it is clear that Iran is moving purposefully and rapidly toward acquiring the capability.

Among the findings:
- A confidential report prepared by the French government in May concluded that Iran is surprisingly close to having enriched uranium or plutonium for a bomb. The French warned other governments to exercise "the most serious vigilance on their exports to Iran and Iranian front companies," according to a copy of the report provided by a foreign intelligence service.
- Samples of uranium taken by U.N. inspectors in Iran in June tested positive for enrichment levels high enough to be consistent with an attempt to build a nuclear weapon, according to a foreign intelligence officer and an American diplomat. The Reuters news service first reported the possibility that the material was weapons-grade last month.
- Iran is concealing several weapons research laboratories and evidence of past activity at a plant disguised as a watch-making factory in a Tehran suburb. In June, U.N. inspectors were refused access to two large rooms and barred from testing samples at the factory, called the Kalaye Electric Co.
- Tehran secretly imported 1.8 tons of nuclear material from China in 1991 and processed some of it to manufacture uranium metal, which would be of no use in Iran`s commercial program but would be integral to weapons production.
- As early as 1989, Pakistani generals offered to sell Iran nuclear weapons technology. Abdul Qadeer Khan, a Pakistani nuclear scientist regarded by the United States as a purveyor of nuclear secrets, has helped Iran for years. "Pakistan`s role was bigger from the beginning than we thought," said a Middle Eastern intelligence official.
- North Korean military scientists recently were monitored entering Iranian nuclear facilities. They are assisting in the design of a nuclear warhead, according to people inside Iran and foreign intelligence officials. So many North Koreans are working on nuclear and missile projects in Iran that a resort on the Caspian coast is set aside for their exclusive use.
- Russian scientists, sometimes traveling to Iran under false identities and working without their government`s approval, are helping to complete a special reactor that could produce weapons-grade plutonium. Moscow insists that it is providing only commercial technology for the civilian reactor under construction near the Persian Gulf port of Bushehr, an assertion disputed by Washington.
- In recent months, Iran has approached European companies to buy devices that can manipulate large volumes of radioactive material, technology to forge uranium metal and plutonium and switches that could trigger a nuclear weapon. European intelligence sources said Tehran`s shopping list was a strong indication that Iran has moved to the late stages of weapons development.

Regional Impact

A nuclear-armed Iran would present the United States with a difficult political and military equation. Iran would be the first avowed enemy of Israel to possess a nuclear bomb. It also has been labeled by the Bush administration as a state sponsor of international terrorism.

Iranian nuclear weapons could shift the balance of power in the region, where Washington is trying to establish pro-American governments in Afghanistan and Iraq. Both of those nations border Iran and are places where Tehran wants to exert influence that could conflict with U.S. intentions, particularly in Iraq.

The Bush administration, which partly justified its war against Iraq by stressing concerns that Saddam Hussein had revived his nuclear weapons program, calls a nuclear-armed Iran unacceptable. At his news conference Wednesday, President Bush said he hopes international pressure will convince the Iranians that "development of a nuclear weapon is not in their interests," but he added that "all options remain on the table."

Foreign intelligence officials told The Times that the Central Intelligence Agency, which has long contended that Iran is building a bomb, has briefed them on a contingency plan for U.S. air and missile attacks against Iranian nuclear installations. "It would be foolish not to present the commander in chief with all of the options, including that one," said one of the officials.

A CIA spokeswoman declined to confirm or deny that such a plan has been drafted. "We wouldn`t talk about anything like that," she said.

There is precedent for such a strike. Israeli fighter-bombers destroyed a French-built nuclear reactor outside Baghdad in 1981 shortly before it was to go online. The attack set back Iraq`s nuclear program and drove it underground.

Taking out Iran`s nuclear infrastructure would prove tougher, said Israeli military planners and outside analysts. For one thing, the facilities are spread around the country and small installations are still secret. At least one key facility is being built to withstand conventional airstrikes.

Contacts between Washington and Tehran are very limited, and analysts said U.S. decision-making is still dominated by a distrust of Iran rooted in the taking of American hostages during the Islamic Revolution in 1979 and an ideological aversion to negotiating with a regime regarded as extremist.

"The administration does not have a strategy because there is a fight in the administration over whether you should even deal with this government in Iran," said George Perkovich, a nuclear weapons expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington.

Inspections` Challenge

For now, the Bush administration is pinning much of its hopes of containing Iranian nuclear ambitions on the same international inspection apparatus that it blames for failing to locate weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.

So far, the U.N.-affiliated International Atomic Energy Agency, based here in Vienna, has preferred negotiation to confrontation with Iran.

In a June 16 report to the 35 countries represented on the agency`s board, its director-general, Mohamed ElBaradei, criticized Iran for concealing many of its nuclear activities. But he resisted U.S. pressure to declare Iran in violation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which was created in 1968 to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.

Inspections are continuing along with Iranian roadblocks to a thorough examination, according to officials monitoring the progress. Still, IAEA officials hope to have a clearer picture of Iran`s nuclear program by Sept. 8, when a follow-up report to the board is due.

The Iranian Foreign Ministry did not respond to telephone requests for interviews or to written questions for this article. Iran said last year that it plans to build six civilian reactors to generate electricity for its fast-growing population of 65 million. Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi has said that allegations that Iran is concealing a weapons program are "poisonous and disdainful rumors" spread by the United States.

Iran`s civilian nuclear energy program started in 1974 and was interrupted by the Islamic Revolution. It got back on track in 1995, when Russia signed an $800-million contract to complete the commercial reactor at Bushehr, which is scheduled to come online next year.

Russia also promised to sell Iran the uranium fuel to power the reactor. But Iran maintains that it wants to develop its own nuclear fuel-making capability, a position that has roused international suspicions.

Typically, nations with civilian nuclear programs buy fuel from the countries that export the reactors because the fuel-making process is complicated and expensive. In the most common way to make the fuel, uranium ore is converted to a gas and pumped into centrifuges, where rotors spinning at twice the speed of sound separate isotopes. The process concentrates, or "enriches," the uranium to the point that fission can be sustained in a reactor, which pumps out heat to drive electrical turbines.

The same enrichment process can concentrate fissionable uranium at greater levels to produce material for a bomb.
Countries that try to enrich their own uranium or manufacture plutonium in special reactors are immediately suspected of trying to join the elite nuclear arms club. Israel, India and Pakistan developed their own plants for producing fissile material for bombs under the guise of commercial reactors.
Iran agreed not to produce nuclear weapons when it signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1970, which opened the door for it to acquire civilian reactors. The treaty does not prohibit Iran from producing or possessing enriched uranium but requires it to submit its nuclear facilities to international monitoring to ensure that materials are not diverted to weapons use.
Iran has permitted inspections of its declared commercial nuclear facilities. But last year, an Iranian exile group pinpointed a secret underground enrichment plant outside Natanz, a small mountain town about 200 miles south of Tehran known for its bracing climate and fruit orchards.
In December, the Institute for Science and International Security, a small think tank in Washington, published satellite photos of Natanz from the archives of a commercial firm, DigitalGlobe. The photos showed large-scale construction inside the perimeter of a security fence. Among the buildings were a pilot centrifuge plant and two underground halls big enough for tens of thousands of centrifuges, the institute said.
Pressure mounted to allow international monitors into Natanz, and senior IAEA officials visited the plant in February. They found 160 assembled centrifuges and components for 1,000 more. Moreover, the equipment was to be housed in bunkers 75 feet deep, with walls 8 feet thick.
The level of centrifuge development at Natanz already reflects thousands of hours of testing and advanced technological work, experts said. By comparison, Iraq had tested a single centrifuge for about 100 hours when IAEA inspectors began dismantling Baghdad`s nuclear weapons program after the 1991 Persian Gulf War.
"They are way ahead of where Iraq was in 1991," said a U.N. official who is familiar with both programs.
Once it is up and running, Natanz could make enough material for a bomb within a year and eventually enough for three to five bombs a year, experts said.

Nuclear Neighbors
The Iranian exile group also revealed a secret site near Arak, a city of 400,000 in western Iran known as a historic center for weaving fine Persian carpets. Under international pressure, Iran conceded in February that it plans to build a special type of reactor there that will generate plutonium for research. Plutonium is the radioactive material at the heart of some of the most powerful nuclear bombs.
The disclosures cast previous Iranian government statements in a new light.
Hashemi Rafsanjani, head of an influential government council and president of Iran from 1989 to 1997, gave a speech on Dec. 14, 2001, that has been interpreted widely as both a signal that Iran wants nuclear weapons and a threat to use them against Israel. Describing the establishment of the Jewish state as the worst event in history, Rafsanjani warned, "In due time the Islamic world will have a military nuclear device, and then the strategy of the West would reach a dead end, since one bomb is enough to destroy all Israel."
Rafsanjani has since stepped back in his rhetoric, noting in a sermon on Friday that "because of religious and moral beliefs and commitments that the Koran has created for us, we cannot and will not pursue such weapons that destroy humanity."
On July 20, Iran unveiled a missile based on a North Korean design that brings Israel within range and hailed the event as an important step in protecting the Palestinians. Experts said the new missile could be armed with a small nuclear warhead, and Iran is developing a version that will carry a heavier payload.
"Today our people and our armed forces are ready to defend their goals anywhere," Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran`s supreme leader, said in a ceremony unveiling the missile.
Many outside experts as well as Iranians say that even reformers linked to Iranian President Khatami believe that Iran needs a deterrent against its nuclear neighbors - Israel, Russia and Pakistan - and possibly against the United States.
"These weapons would guarantee the territorial integrity and national security of Iran," Nasser Hadian, a professor at Tehran University who is aligned with the reformers, said in a telephone interview from New York, where he is teaching at Columbia University. "We feel that we cannot possibly rely on the world to provide security for us, and this is felt by all the factions."
At a symposium in Rome in early July, ElBaradei told the audience that stopping the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons depends greatly on eliminating the incentives for states to possess them. "It is instructive that the majority of the suspected efforts to acquire WMD are to be found in the Middle East, a hotbed of instability for over half a century," he said.

A senior U.N. official said he is not sure that Iran is developing a bomb. But the different fates of Iraq and North Korea, the other members of what Bush called the "axis of evil," demonstrate why countries out of favor with the United States might want a nuclear weapon, he added.
Iraq did not have a bomb and was easily invaded, he said, while North Korea claims to have a bomb and is trying to use it as a bargaining chip with the U.S. for security assurances and possibly increased aid. "If a regime has the feeling that it is not on the right wavelength with the United States, its position is to have a nuclear weapon," he said.
Iran faces numerous technological obstacles before it can produce a nuclear bomb, according to intelligence officials and independent experts. Once those problems are solved or close to being solved, some experts said they expect Iran to withdraw from the nonproliferation treaty, as North Korea did, and close its doors to IAEA inspectors.
"They have made the decision to develop a breakout capability, which will give them the option to leave the treaty in the future and complete a nuclear weapon within six months or a year," said Gary Samore, director of nonproliferation programs at London`s International Institute for Strategic Studies and a former Clinton administration security official. "I think the program is probably unstoppable through diplomatic means."

Others disagree
"I don`t believe they have passed the point of no return," said Perkovich, the nuclear weapons expert at the Carnegie Endowment. "We should try to reverse Iran`s direction by providing better, low-cost options to fuel the Bushehr electricity plant and by easing the security concerns that make Iranians, reformers and hard-liners, interested in getting a bomb."
Diplomacy has proved an imperfect solution in the past. The Clinton administration persuaded China not to sell nuclear items to Iran in the mid-1990s. Administration officials later used sanctions and negotiations to convince Russia to curb technology transfers to Iran`s civilian program that U.S. intelligence believed were being diverted to weapons work.
But Russia is committed to the Bushehr reactor, which generates 20,000 jobs for its beleaguered nuclear industry. The project also allows hundreds of Iranians to train in Russia, raising concerns within the intelligence community that knowledge and hardware for weapons work will slip through.
Officials in Moscow, outside experts and foreign intelligence officials said economics are driving continuing Russian assistance to the Iranian weapons program and that it is probably occurring without government approval. They said thousands of Russian physicists, mathematicians and other scientists are unemployed or paid a pittance at home, pushing them to sell their expertise elsewhere.
"Russian scientists are freelancing, leading to a leakage of expertise, and you can`t control that," said Bobo Lo, a former Australian diplomat and associate fellow at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London. "That`s where it gets really messy with the Iranians."

Multiple Sites
"Iran has made tremendous progress during the last two years, and according to our estimates it could reach a technical capability to create a nuclear device by 2006," said Anton Khlopkov, a nuclear expert at Moscow`s Center for Policy Studies in Russia. "The problem is neither Russia nor the U.S. nor the IAEA had a clear understanding about real Iranian achievements in the nuclear field."
U.S. Secretary of State Colin L. Powell echoed the sentiment in March, saying on a CNN program, "It shows you how a determined nation that has the intent to develop a nuclear weapon can keep that development process secret from inspectors and outsiders, if they really are determined to do it."
Plants as large as Natanz are not necessary to build a bomb. Once the technology is developed, as few as 500 centrifuges can enrich enough uranium for a small weapon, experts said. Hiding that number would be easy, said an IAEA official, which is why intelligence officials are concerned about several smaller, still-secret plants throughout Iran.
For example, officers from two foreign intelligence agencies said weapons research is being conducted at a plant outside Kashan. One of the intelligence officials said the plant was involved in nuclear fuel production in two large halls constructed 25 feet underground.
The National Council of Resistance of Iran, the Paris-based exile group that revealed the Natanz and Arak sites, said in July that it had pinpointed two more weapons research locations in a rural area called Hashtgerd about 25 miles northwest of Tehran. The group is the political arm of the Moujahedeen Khalq, which is listed by the U.S. State Department as a terrorist group, but independent experts said its information from inside Iran has often been accurate. IAEA inspectors` requests to visit the Hashtgerd sites have been refused by Iranian authorities.

This spring, after considerable pressure from the IAEA, Iran reluctantly allowed inspectors to visit a nondescript cluster of two warehouses and smaller buildings tucked into an alley in the Tehran suburb of Ab-Ali. The place, called the Kalaye Electric Co., claimed to be a watch factory, but Iran conceded it had been an assembly point for centrifuges.
When the IAEA team arrived in March, they were refused access to the plant. A second trip in May was slightly more successful - inspectors entered the buildings, but two large rooms were declared off limits, according to new information from U.N. officials.
On June 7, inspectors returned to Iran for four days of probes at various sites. This time authorities refused to let them near Kalaye, U.N. officials said. They also were barred from using sophisticated testing equipment the team had brought from Vienna.
Such tests could detect a particle of enriched uranium within a huge radius and determine whether its concentration exceeded the 2%-to-5% level generally used in civilian reactor fuel. One IAEA official compared the ability of a swipe to detect enriched particles to finding a four-leaf clover in a field of clover 6 miles long, 9 miles wide and 150 feet deep.
But during their trip in June, IAEA inspectors took samples from an undisclosed location in Iran that tested positive for enriched uranium at a level that could be used in weapons, according to diplomatic and intelligence sources. IAEA officials refused to comment on the report.

Chinese Uranium Ore
Officials from two foreign intelligence services said Iranian scientists used nuclear material from a secret shipment from China to help enrich uranium at Kalaye and elsewhere.
China had long denied rumors about transferring nuclear materials to Iran. Early this year, U.N. officials said in interviews, the Chinese admitted selling Iran 1.8 tons of uranium ore and chemical forms of uranium used in the enrichment process in 1991.
Faced with a letter describing China`s admission, Iranian authorities acknowledged receipt of the material, said the officials. At the same time, Iran said some of the chemicals were used at Tehran`s Jabr ibn Hayan laboratory to make uranium metal, which has no use in Iran`s commercial program but is a key part of a nuclear weapon.
In addition to China and Russia, Pakistan and North Korea have played central roles in Iran`s nuclear program, according to foreign intelligence officers and confidential reports prepared by the French government and a Middle Eastern intelligence service.
North Korean technicians worked for years helping Iran develop the Shahab-3 missile, unveiled last month in Tehran. A foreign intelligence official and a former Iranian intelligence officer said the Koreans are now working on a longer-range Shahab-4 and providing assistance on designs for a nuclear warhead.
The foreign intelligence official said high-ranking North Korean military personnel have been seen at some of Iran`s nuclear installations. A hotel is reserved for North Koreans in Tehran and a resort on the Caspian Sea coast northwest of Tehran has been set aside for their use, according to one of the sources and a U.N. official.
The centrifuges seen by IAEA officials at Natanz in February were based on a Pakistani design, according to intelligence officials. The design and other new evidence point to Pakistan as a bigger supplier of nuclear weapons technology to Iran than initially thought, said foreign intelligence officers, Iranian exiles and independent experts.
While U.S. intelligence is aware of Pakistan`s help to Iran, the Bush administration has not pushed the issue with Islamabad because of Pakistan`s role as an ally in the battle against the Al Qaeda terrorist network and Afghanistan`s Taliban, outside experts and foreign intelligence officials said.

Signs of Pakistani Aid
The most convincing sign of Pakistan`s role in Iran comes from what several people described as the long involvement in Iran of Khan, the scientist regarded as the father of Pakistan`s nuclear bomb.
The CIA concluded in a top-secret analysis last year that Khan shared critical technology on centrifuges and weapons-test data with North Korea in the late 1990s. The agency tracked at least 13 visits by Khan to North Korea over a span of several years, according to a January article in the New Yorker magazine.
Two former Iranian officials and American and foreign intelligence officials said Khan travels frequently to Tehran to share his expertise. Most recently, two of these people said, he has worked as a troubleshooter to iron out problems with the centrifuges and with weapons design.
Ali Akbar Omid Mehr, who was in charge of Pakistani affairs at Iran`s Foreign Ministry in 1989 and 1990, said he came across Khan as he prepared what is known as a "green book" detailing contacts between Tehran and Islamabad.

"I saw that Mr. A. Q. Khan had been given a villa near the Caspian Sea for his help to Iran," Mehr said in an interview in Denmark, where he and his family live under assumed names since he defected in late 1995.
His account of the villa was supported by other Iranian exiles.
Khan might have played a role in a previously undisclosed offer from Pakistani military commanders to sell nuclear weapons technology to Iran in 1989, two former senior Pakistani officials said in separate interviews describing the episode.
According to their accounts, soon after Rafsanjani`s election as president of Iran in 1989, he took Benazir Bhutto, then prime minister of Pakistan, aside at a reception in Tehran and told her about the proposal from her generals.
Rafsanjani was commander of Tehran`s armed forces at the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988, and one of his goals as president was to reestablish his country as a regional power. He told Bhutto that the Pakistani generals wanted to transfer the technology secretly, on a military-to-military basis, but he wanted her to approve the transaction, the former Pakistani officials said.
Earlier that year, Bhutto had appeared before the U.S. Congress and promised that Pakistan would not export nuclear technology. Bhutto often bucked the generals, and the two officials said she blocked the transfer - at least until she was ousted in 1996.
Current Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf said in an interview with The Times that his country never provided nuclear assistance to Iran, before or after he took office in a military coup in October 1999. "Zero," the general insisted. "Never worked - even before - never worked with Iran. This is the first time this has been raised, ever."
Pressured by the United States, Musharraf removed Khan as head of Pakistan`s nuclear program nearly two years ago. Since then, Musharraf said, Khan has been retired and his travel is not monitored.
Other intelligence officials and governments disputed Musharraf`s denial.
"There are convincing indications about the origin of the technology - it is of Pakistani type - but Iran undoubtedly controls the manufacturing process of centrifuges and seems even able to improve it," said the French government report on Iran`s nuclear program, which was delivered in May to the Nuclear Suppliers Group, an organization of governments with nuclear programs.
A growing body of evidence suggests that Iran is simultaneously pursuing another way to produce material for a bomb.
This alternative is a heavy-water reactor, which could breed weapons-grade plutonium. In the initial stage of the program, Iran is building a plant to distill heavy water near the Qareh Chay River, about 35 miles from Arak. Heavy water, which is processed to contain elevated concentrations of deuterium, allows the reactor to operate with natural uranium as its fuel and produce plutonium.
This type of reactor is used in some places to generate electricity, but it is better known as a means of producing plutonium for weapons that bypasses uranium enrichment and its many technical obstacles. As a result, the presence of a heavy-water reactor is often regarded as a sign that a country is trying to develop a weapon.
American spy satellites had detected construction at Natanz before its existence was made public last year. But the work near Arak had remained secret because the plant under construction looked like any other distillery or similar factory, according to intelligence officials and U.N. authorities.
After exiles revealed Arak`s existence, Gholamreza Aghazadeh, the president of Iran`s atomic energy organization, informed the IAEA that the planned reactor was strictly meant for research and producing radioisotopes for medical use.
To many experts, however, the project raises another red flag. "For Iran, there is no justification whatsoever to have a heavy-water plant," said Samore of the International Institute for Strategic Studies.
Echoing him, a senior U.N. official said, "The heavy-water plant sticks out like a sore thumb."
Iran first tried to buy heavy-water reactors as turnkey projects from China and India in the mid-1990s, according to a previously undisclosed dossier prepared by a foreign intelligence agency and provided to The Times. Blocked on that front by the United States, according to former U.S. officials, Iran decided to build its own and turned to two Russian institutes.
The United States learned of the cooperation through telephone intercepts and imposed sanctions on the Russian institutes in 1999. The sanctions remain in effect, but officials with foreign intelligence agencies and the CIA said there is evidence that Russian scientists are still providing expertise for the project.
Khlopkov, the Russian nuclear expert, said he thinks it is unlikely that Russian scientists are helping Iran with any of its weapons programs. Still, he said, the recent disclosures about the Iranian program surprised Moscow and might cause Russia to cancel a second planned reactor unless Iran agrees to stricter international inspections of its nuclear facilities.

"Industrial Scale

Despite Iran`s progress, most experts said it is unlikely to develop a weapon without more outside help, particularly in procuring specialty technology. That is why some said they were alarmed by Iran`s recent attempts to buy critical dual-use technology, which has military and civilian applications.

In November, German authorities blocked an attempt by businessmen allegedly working on behalf of Iran to acquire high-voltage switches that could be used for both breaking up kidney stones and triggering a nuclear weapon.

French authorities reported that French firms with nuclear expertise have received a rising number of inquiries from suspected Iranian front companies for goods with military uses.

In a previously undisclosed incident, French authorities recently stopped a French company from selling 28 specialized remote manipulators for nuclear facilities to a company in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, that the authorities said was a front for Iran`s nuclear program.

Because the manipulators were designed to handle heavy volumes of radioactive material, intelligence authorities suspected they were destined for a plant in which uranium or plutonium would be reprocessed on a large scale.

"Such intent is indicative of a willingness to move from a laboratory scale to an industrial scale," said a European intelligence official who is familiar with details of the attempt.

The pattern of attempted purchases and the discovery of previously secret nuclear installations led the French government to conclude in May that Iran is using its civilian nuclear program to conceal a military program.

"Iran appears ready to develop nuclear weapons within a few years," said the French report to the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

Bulletin of Atomic Scientists

Iran, player or rogue?

The deadline is now. Will Iran come clean about its nuclear doings?

By David Albright & Corey Hinderstein – September/October 2003

Iran has been secretly developing the capability to make nuclear weapons—in particular, developing the wherewithal to produce separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU).

Since they first learned of Iran's secret activities last year, officials of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have been concerned that Iran has been violating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and they have struggled to convince the country to make its nuclear activities more transparent. Citing Iran's failure to disclose various nuclear materials, facilities, and activities, on June 19 a "Chairwoman's Statement" summing up the meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors criticized Iran for its failure to fulfill its safeguards obligations under the NPT.

Worries about Iranian nuclear activities were heightened in early July after Iran conducted a successful test of the Shahab-3 missile, which can carry a 2,200-pound payload as far as 1,500 kilometers. The timing of Iran's announcement about the Shahab-3 and the size of its payload suggest that the missile is intended to carry a nuclear warhead.

Although the IAEA acknowledged that Iran has taken some cooperative steps since its facilities at Natanz were first revealed a year ago, it called upon Iran to take additional steps, including answering additional questions about alleged undeclared uranium enrichment activities, uranium conversion work, and programs involving heavy water.

As for whether Iran will comply, Mohammed El Baradei, the IAEA's director general, said after the board meeting, "the jury is still out." He expressed the hope that by the next IAEA Board of Governors meeting in September, the agency would be in a "much better position to make a judgment" about it.

The board wants Iran to "promptly and unconditionally" implement an additional protocol to its safeguards agreement. Unless the protocol is implemented, the IAEA said in a safeguards implementation report, it will have limited ability to provide credible assurances that Iran's nuclear program does not include a secret nuclear weapons component.

In an unusual move, the chair's statement encouraged Iran to delay introducing nuclear material into the Natanz pilot uranium enrichment plant, calling the delay a "confidence-building measure."

Although the statement did not call on Iran to end the program, there is growing support for the view that acceptance of the protocol may not be enough to resolve the nuclear issue. Iran may need to abandon or sharply limit its construction or operation of facilities that can be used to produce separated plutonium or

HEU. Unless it is stopped, Iran will eventually be able to rapidly break out of the NPT, creating an even more dangerous situation in the Middle East.

Iran's reaction

Iran's immediate reaction was to reject the notion that it had a nuclear weapons program. It intends, Iranian officials said, to install some 7,000 megawatts of nuclear electrical generating capacity over the next 20 years, which will require a substantial investment in a wide range of peaceful nuclear activities. Iran described its level of transparency as typical, and reiterated that it had been cooperating fully with the IAEA and would continue to do so.

Iran rejected the request to implement the additional protocol without a quid pro quo. On June 29, Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi told the Associated Press, "When Iran signs the protocol, others should take positive steps," including providing nuclear assistance. Iranian officials want additional power reactors, or at least a U.S. commitment to stop its attempts to block Iran's acquisition of nuclear power reactors from Russia or elsewhere. Some Iranian officials have implied that more reactors may not be enough, that Iran wants access to all peaceful technology, including sensitive fuel-cycle facilities like enrichment plants and plutonium separation facilities.

In late February, Gholam Reza Aghazadeh, the head of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization (IAEO), told the *Boston Globe's* Elizabeth Neuffer that Iran wanted Germany to fulfill its prior obligation to provide low-enriched uranium fuel, part of the deal when Germany was building the Bushehr power reactor. Germany decided over a decade ago not to finish the reactor, but Aghazadeh complained that Iran now has to pay to get the fuel from Russia.

Truth and consequences

Although the United States did not succeed in its attempt to convince other nations that Iran had violated the NPT sufficiently to warrant a harsh international response, the chair's June statement represents a dramatic international rejection of Iran's demand to receive something in return for signing the protocol. Most nations resisted taking action based on the U.S. evidence, which they viewed as circumstantial. They were particularly hesitant given the widespread skepticism about U.S. intelligence information about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. But the United States did manage to gain support for putting additional pressure on Iran to be fully transparent, with an implicit deadline of the September board of governors meeting.

Russia, Japan, and the European Union have historically rejected the U.S. policy of isolating Iran, choosing engagement instead. But they are now all firm in demanding that Iran sign the protocol and fully answer the IAEA's questions.

Before the recent crisis, the EU had a policy of engagement with Iran known as "conditional dialogue," which aimed at improving trade and cooperation, provided Iran made improvements in the areas of nonproliferation, terrorism, and cooperation with the Middle East peace process. However, EU foreign ministers emphasized in a statement on June 16 that Iran must cooperate fully with the IAEA and "implement urgently and unconditionally" the additional protocol, declaring that trade talks and the nuclear issue were "interdependent." British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw traveled to Tehran in late June with a message that unless Iran implements the protocol unconditionally and quickly, "confidence will not be improved, and the international community will be profoundly reluctant to lift the sanctions."

Russia has been Iran's main nuclear supplier, selling Iran the $800 million Bushehr reactor, which is scheduled for completion in 2005. Russia is expected to start sending fuel for the first loading in mid-2004, after it has obtained an agreement from Iran to send spent fuel back to Russia. Russia, embarrassed by all the revelations of secret nuclear activities, has also urged Iran to be more transparent.

In May and June, President Vladimir Putin was reported to have told the United States and Britain that Russia would not provide fuel for Bushehr unless Iran implemented the safeguards protocol. Although subsequent messages from senior Russian officials appeared to contradict Putin's statement, the overall message from Russia is that Iran must be significantly more transparent.

One Western official pointed out that Russia could hesitate to finalize its spent fuel agreement with Iran, and without it, not send fuel for Bushehr. Or, he said, Russia could delay the shipments, permitting it to exert pressure on Iran without formally conditioning the completion of Bushehr on Iran signing the protocol.

Japan is also putting pressure on Iran. Senior foreign ministry officials visited Tehran in mid-July to convey the message. Media reports did not indicate any significant breakthroughs. Japan has so far resisted U.S. pressure to link Iran's signing of the protocol with its current negotiations with Iran to develop the large Azadegan oil field in southwest Iran. Japan fears that if it makes such a linkage, Russia or China will win the contract instead, undermining Japan's objective of securing long-term oil supplies. Still, lack of progress on transparency may lead Japan to slow down negotiations or take other actions.

Although U.S. efforts did not convince its allies to cut off economic or nuclear assistance, if Iran refuses to address the IAEA's concerns by the end of summer, in September the board of governors may refer the issue to the U.N. Security Council. The Security Council could then decide to impose economic sanctions. Many states would feel compelled to reduce trade with Iran or halt joint energy projects.

The latest safeguards report

At the heart of the current dispute is the IAEA's report on Iran's implementation of safeguards, issued publicly in June 2003. The IAEA describes a series of developments and concerns that were the basis of the board's finding that Iran had failed to meet its obligations. This report also provides the most detailed publicly available information about Iran's extensive nuclear activities.

Iran has built significant parts of its nuclear program in secret over the last decade. Aghazadeh has said that Iran accelerated its uranium enrichment and heavy-water production programs in about 1998.

Iran revealed many of its activities to the IAEA only after they were revealed publicly in the last half of 2002, and the IAEA suspects that Iran may have additional undeclared nuclear activities or facilities. As a result, the inspectors have asked Iran for considerably more information and access than they normally do without a protocol in effect. But they have not yet asked formally to make a "special inspection" at any site, preferring to seek voluntary cooperation instead.

Gas centrifuges

The most important unresolved issue centers on Iran's gas centrifuge uranium enrichment program, which El Baradei characterized as "sophisticated" when he visited Natanz in February. Following that visit, the IAEA asked for details about the program.

The IAEA has been trying to understand the centrifuge program's history—the experiments Iran conducted to prove its centrifuges, and the sources of its technology, including foreign procurement. Iran has provided written information, permitted inspectors wide access at the Natanz facilities, and allowed the IAEA to take environmental samples at Natanz and other centrifuge-related locations. These samples are critical to modern inspections because they can detect minute traces of enriched uranium and plutonium. The results of the environmental samples were not available by the June board meeting, but on July 18 and 19 the media reported that an environmental sample taken at Natanz in the winter or spring contained traces of enriched uranium. The enriched uranium was probably brought to the site inadvertently on equipment or tools from elsewhere, perhaps from an overseas supplier or from an undeclared Iranian facility. Other samples from Natanz have also been found to contain enriched uranium. Results from other sites have shown no enriched uranium.

Iran had told the IAEA it had not enriched any uranium, despite having installed a large number of centrifuges in a cascade at the Natanz pilot plant. Normally, a program would operate single-centrifuge "test stands" that would enrich small amounts of uranium to test and optimize centrifuge designs. Iran declared that although it began research and development about five years ago, it depended on extensive modeling and simulation, including tests of centrifuge rotors with and without inert gases. These tests were conducted at several locations, including Amir Khabir University and the IAEO in Tehran, without using any nuclear material. Iran said it intended to start single-machine tests with uranium at the Natanz pilot plant this summer.

This approach is very unusual, and the IAEA doubts that Iran could be so far along in the development process without enriching any uranium. Absent considerably more detail—possibly including the extent of information and expertise gained from abroad—the IAEA will have a difficult time accepting Iran's statement.

Based on open source information about possible enrichment activities at the Kalaya Electric Company in Tehran, the IAEA asked to visit it in February and take environmental samples to determine if any enriched uranium was produced at the site. Iran responded that the facility is a watch factory, but that it also makes certain centrifuge components. It initially denied the inspectors' requests, claiming that it did not have to allow access until it implemented the protocol.

Iran subsequently reconsidered and allowed the IAEA limited access in March and full access in May, but it refused to permit environmental sampling. Iran still refused to allow sampling during El Baradei's visit in July.

In March, the IAEA was denied access to two rooms or workshops. A senior Western official interviewed in late March worried that Iran had denied access to allow time to clear out any evidence of uranium enrichment. He suspected that the rooms had held centrifuges, perhaps in a cascade, and had enriched uranium. According to U.S. media and experts quoting Bush administration officials, satellite images showed trucks going in and out of the site, implying that the rooms had been sanitized. The images, however, were inconclusive upon close scrutiny, according to a member of the media who asked senior officials about them. Because of all the

suspicions, environmental sampling may be the only way to determine conclusively whether the site has enriched uranium.

The IAEA has asked to visit additional sites, some of which were selected based on information provided in May by the National Council of Resistance of Iran, an opposition group. The group identified two sites west of Tehran that it said were related to small-scale gas centrifuge development work, which, when finished, could serve as alternative locations for cascades. According to a senior Western official, two of the people listed by the opposition group as involved at these sites are known to be involved in Iran's gas centrifuge program. Commercial satellite images show that at least one of the sites has extensive physical security.

Iran has told the IAEA that the sites are related to its nuclear organization, but are involved in agricultural and medical work—a description at odds with the high security seen at the sites. By mid-July, the inspectors had not visited or obtained sufficient information to make any judgments about their purpose.

Questions have also been raised about the uranium conversion facility that Iran is building at Esfahan. This plant is designed to make large quantities of uranium hexafluoride in addition to uranium dioxide and uranium tetrafluoride. Iran claims not to have operated any laboratory or pilot facilities before building this major plant. Because learning to make uranium hexafluoride, the feedstock for a gas centrifuge plant, is not easy, some believe that Iran must have an undeclared pilot plant or have operated one in the past.

Additional issues

The safeguards report laid out other developments that contributed to the board's finding that Iran failed to meet its safeguards obligations. These include:

An undeclared uranium import. In response to an IAEA request, Iran recently acknowledged that in 1991 it received from China 1,000 kilograms of natural uranium hexafluoride, 400 kilograms of uranium tetrafluoride, and 400 kilograms of uranium dioxide. This material was stored at the previously undeclared Jabr Ibn Hayam Multipurpose Laboratories (JHL), located at the Tehran Research Center.

Iran said it did not have to report the import of a relatively small amount of natural uranium. The IAEA, however, said reporting was required for the material, its subsequent processing, and the locations where it was received, processed, and stored. Iran had provided none of this information until the IAEA asked for it. To make matters worse, China provided the IAEA with information about its export only after repeated inquiries.

Undeclared uranium metal production. Iran stated that it converted almost all of the uranium tetrafluoride into uranium metal at JHL. The production of uranium metal is unusual and can indicate a nuclear weapons effort that uses metallic forms of natural uranium or highly enriched uranium. The IAEA has asked Iran about its planned use for the material. Iranian officials have stated that the purpose of the uranium metal is as shielding against radiation in containers that store irradiated fuel or materials. Such a use is suspect, however, because the uranium metal appears too refined for shielding material.

Natural uranium target production. Iran said that it had used some of the uranium oxide to make targets for irradiation in the Tehran research reactor. The targets were then sent to another Tehran facility to separate iodine 131 in a lead-shielded cell. Such an activity is legitimate; iodine is useful in medical and civilian research applications, and the Iranians involved in this work have published their results in open technical reports.

The question is whether plutonium was also separated from these targets, or whether other undeclared targets were produced, irradiated, and processed to obtain separated plutonium. Such activities would allow Iran to learn to separate plutonium, a necessary step in using plutonium in nuclear weapons.

Missing uranium hexafluoride. Iran stated that it did not process any of its imported uranium hexafluoride, and specifically, that it did not use any in gas centrifuge testing. However, nearly 2 kilograms are missing from the storage cylinders. Iran claimed that the material had leaked out of the cylinders more than a year earlier.

The IAEA is still investigating this claim. A small centrifuge testing program would be expected to use about 10–15 kilograms of uranium hexafluoride, but it could get by on 1–2 kilograms. And the fact that Iran used much of its imported uranium dioxide and tetrafluoride makes it harder to accept the possibility that it did not use any of the hexafluoride.

A heavy-water reactor. In May, Iran told the IAEA for the first time that it intended to build a 40-megawatt-thermal heavy-water reactor at Arak. This is the site of the heavy-water production facility whose existence was first revealed publicly by an Iranian opposition group in August 2002. According to a senior Western official, reactor construction is expected to start next year. Iran also announced that it intends to begin building a fuel-fabrication plant for the reactor at Esfahan later this year.

Iran has said that this reactor is part of a long-term program to manufacture heavy-water power reactors. But long before any such plan might be realized, the reactor at Arak would produce 8–10 kilograms of plutonium annually, or enough for about two nuclear weapons each year. Before it could use any of the plutonium in a

nuclear weapon, however, it would first have to separate the plutonium from the irradiated fuel. Although Iran is not reported to have stated that it has conducted any plutonium separation activities, the irradiation and processing of natural uranium targets increases suspicion that Iran is researching plutonium separation.

The Natanz enrichment plant

The IAEA report includes new information about Iran's gas centrifuge program at Natanz. This site houses a pilot gas centrifuge plant and a much larger, production-scale centrifuge facility.

The pilot plant is slated to hold about 1,000 centrifuges by the end of 2003. In February, it had about 160 centrifuges operating without uranium. Iran said it planned to introduce uranium in June. Despite the board's request, Iran introduced uranium into single test centrifuges soon after the board meeting. Initially, at least, Iran planned to use another safeguarded source of uranium hexafluoride in these early tests—a small stock that has been maintained under safeguards, acquired years ago from a European country.

The imminent operation of this plant alarmed the board of governors and led to the request that Iran delay the use of uranium. The IAEA had not had sufficient time to implement a safeguards plan for this important facility, another reason why it asked for a delay.

According to senior Western officials, the current Iranian centrifuge has a separative capacity, or ability to enrich uranium, of about 2 separative work units (swu) per year, per centrifuge. Media reports of significantly higher capacities are erroneous, according to these knowledgeable officials.

Because the centrifuge uses an aluminum rotor with a diameter of about 100 millimeters, this capacity would be consistent with a supercritical, optimized aluminum-rotor machine of the "G2-type." Gernot Zippe was involved in building this type of machine in Germany in the late 1960s and early 1970s. It is composed of two almost 50-centimeter-long aluminum rotor tubes connected by a bellows.

Media reports state that Iran got design assistance from Pakistan or from individual Pakistanis more than a decade ago. Iran's centrifuge design is similar to the type that Pakistan obtained secretly in the mid-1970s from Urenco facilities in the Netherlands. The G2 and its predecessor G1-type aluminum machines, developed by Zippe and his colleagues, were not very efficient. Zippe's G1-type machine had a capacity of about 0.6 swu per year, implying an output of 1.2 swu per year for the G2 design. Iran is believed to have optimized or otherwise increased capacity to about 2 swu per year.

Although the pilot plant is relatively small, it could produce as much as 10–12 kilograms of weapon-grade uranium a year, depending on the "tails assay" (the fraction of uranium 235 remaining in the waste) and the manner in which the centrifuges are organized into cascades. Because centrifuges are flexible, even if the cascades are arranged to produce only low-enriched uranium, weapon-grade uranium can be produced by "batch recycling" the end product back into the feed point of the cascade until the desired level of enrichment is reached. Thus, by the end of 2005, this plant could produce 15–20 kilograms of weapon-grade uranium, enough for a nuclear weapon.

According to the IAEA safeguards report, Iran plans to start installing centrifuges in the main enrichment halls of the Natanz facility in 2005, after testing and confirming its centrifuge design in the pilot plant. Eventually, these cascade halls will hold 50,000 centrifuges, according to the report. No project completion date was provided, but indications are that it would take five to 10 years to install this number of centrifuges.

Separative capacity of later centrifuges would probably increase, but Iran may not succeed in installing all 50,000. In any case, based on the current plan, we project that the Natanz facility will eventually have a capacity of at least 100,000 swu per year. This is roughly the capacity to provide annual reloads of one Bushehr reactor, but far short of the enriched uranium needed to provide fuel for all the nuclear power reactors Iran plans to build over the next 20 years.

The same capacity would be sufficient to produce about 500 kilograms of weapon-grade uranium annually. At 15–20 kilograms per weapon, that would be enough for roughly 25–30 nuclear weapons per year.

If Iran operated Natanz to make low-enriched uranium fuel until it decided to make weapon-grade uranium, it would be able to rapidly enrich the low-enriched material to weapon-grade. For example, if Natanz was operating at full capacity and recycled low-enriched uranium (5 percent uranium 235) as "feed," the facility could produce enough weapon-grade uranium for a nuclear weapon in a few days.

What should be done

In the worst case, Iran could have a nuclear weapon by the end of 2005. Under many scenarios, it could obtain and significantly expand its nuclear arsenal in the second half of the decade by producing both HEU and plutonium. Although some would argue that a solution to the Iranian nuclear problem can be delayed, the longer the wait for a solution, the more extensive Iran's program will become and the harder, politically, for Iran to reverse itself.

The international community is justified in demanding that Iran become fully transparent as soon as possible. No one can dispute Iran's growing capabilities to make nuclear weapons. Certainly, increased nuclear transparency, including answering the questions raised by the IAEA in its June safeguards report and implementing the protocol, is both important and necessary. In addition, Iran's implementation of the protocol would severely complicate any effort to conduct clandestine nuclear fuel-cycle activities and could act as a deterrent against significant clandestine activities.

Toward those goals, El Baradei met in Tehran with senior Iranian officials on July 9. He was armed with results from IAEA environmental sampling of various locations in Iran.

Although Iranian officials promised cooperation and reported positively about their meetings with El Baradei, he left without gaining a commitment from Iran to sign the protocol or to resolve the remaining safeguards issues. Senior safeguards officials who remained were also unsuccessful in achieving any major breakthroughs and returned to Vienna earlier than scheduled.

Nonetheless, the IAEA received a pledge from the senior leadership of the Iranian government that it would reach a decision by the end of July on whether it would agree to the IAEA's proposed actions and a schedule for resolving each major safeguards issue. These issues center on Iran's uranium enrichment activities, allegations of undeclared enrichment of uranium, the ability to take environmental samples at Kalaya Electric and elsewhere, the role of uranium metal in Iran's nuclear fuel cycle, and its heavy-water production and reactor programs. The IAEA needs Iran's full and prompt cooperation so that it can finish its work and send a positive report to the board of governors in late August.

The IAEA has also told Iran that it must sign and at least provisionally implement the protocol soon.

If Iran does not meet the IAEA's conditions, the board of governors will be under intense pressure to send the issue to the U.N. Security Council. That step could result in the imposition of punitive measures, including economic sanctions by key nations or the Security Council. These actions might well lead Iran to reconsider and accept the IAEA's conditions.

But assuming Iran agrees to all of the IAEA's major conditions—which remains highly uncertain at the time of this writing—the controversy will not be over. The protocol is unlikely to be sufficient by itself to stop an emerging Iranian nuclear threat that could manifest itself if Iran renounced the NPT at some point in the future and began rapidly acquiring nuclear weapons. Because of the complex and dangerous security situation in the Middle East, an Iran perpetually on the brink of building nuclear weapons, even with advanced safeguards, poses too great a threat to regional and international security. Such a situation is likely to provoke its neighbors to seek nuclear weapons or improve their existing arsenals, significantly increase their conventional armaments, or obtain chemical or biological weapons. Predicting the outcome of such buildups is very difficult.

Iran cannot be expected to cancel its fuel-cycle programs unconditionally, though. Many nations would oppose any demand that it do so, and Iran can argue that having such facilities, if they are fully inspected, is completely legal under the NPT.

Coercive, unilateral options are undesirable and could be counterproductive, regardless of Iran's choices. Military strikes against nuclear sites are unlikely to succeed, given the dispersed and advanced nature of the Iranian program. Such strikes would only serve to accelerate and expand Iran's efforts to obtain a nuclear arsenal. In addition, a strategy of regime change may be unsuccessful, or could easily lead to a new government that also seeks nuclear weapons. The United States should decouple any proposed solution to the nuclear problem from regime change efforts and preventive military strikes.

The United States, in cooperation with its allies—particularly the EU, Japan, and Russia—needs to develop a set of incentives to entice Iran away from developing nuclear weapons capabilities. There are a wide variety of items that could be put into an incentive package—lifting economic sanctions, high-tech assistance, assurances of a nuclear fuel supply for the Bushehr nuclear reactor, and other energy or economic assistance.

Iran's motivations for seeking nuclear weapons should be taken into account. Discussions should be considerably easier now, given the downfall of the regime of Saddam Hussein. Such discussions could contribute to achieving a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction. International efforts should focus on both preventing countries in the region from obtaining nuclear weapons capabilities, and seeking ways to eliminate such capabilities where they already exist. Inevitably, restraints on Israel's nuclear capabilities make sense.

To achieve such a goal, the United States and its allies should seek to restart the Middle East regional arms control discussions that have been moribund since the mid-1990s. These discussions may have a greater chance of success with the inclusion of Iran and Iraq, two countries excluded from earlier talks.

Behind these inducements, the United States, the EU, Russia, and Japan must be willing to exert concerted and tough diplomatic and economic pressure on Iran. Former Defense Secretary William Perry has called such efforts "coercive diplomacy" in the context of North Korea, but a similar strategy can be applied to Iran. Perry

was quoted in a July 15, 2003 *Washington Post* article: "You have to offer something, but you have to have an iron fist behind your offer."
With the protocol in place, a package of economic and political incentives, and reduced tensions with the United States and its neighbors, Iran would have no need or excuse to maintain a nuclear weapons capability. Because Iran has many motives to reduce its international isolation, it would have a difficult time resisting such a package.

David Albright is the president of the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) in Washington, D.C. Corey Hinderstein is a senior analyst at ISIS.

Tehran Times

Iran Will Not Give Up Uranium Enrichment for Peaceful Purposes: Kharrazi
27 September 2003

NEW YORK - Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi said on Wednesday that Iran would not give up its uranium enrichment program, insisting it was purely for civilian purposes.
"It's a matter of national pride to have this capability, this technology, especially when it's produced domestically. This does not mean that producing (nuclear) weapons will be on our agenda," he told a business and security forum in New York.
"The capability is the important thing, that we can produce enriched uranium," Kharrazi added.
Kharrazi denied that Iran has the technology to produce nuclear weapons.
"No, we do not have the technology to produce nuclear weapons. We have the technology to enrich uranium. There is a difference between having the technology to enrich uranium needed for power plant as fuel and the technology to actually make a bomb." He added.
Tehran is willing to negotiate on stricter inspections with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) "but the problem is the Americans believe (that) is not enough," he said. Asked if Iran would consider abandoning its nuclear activities, Kharrazi said: "No. No way. No reason."
The IAEA, under U.S. pressure, has raised concerns about Iran's nuclear aims and given Tehran until the end of October to prove it is pursuing peaceful nuclear energy.
The agency has also urged Tehran to sign and implement an Additional Protocol of the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty which would allow snap inspections of any suspected site.
French President Jacques Chirac, in an interview with USA Today, said if Iran "agrees to all the necessary controls" he would back Tehran's development of a civilian nuclear program.
But if not, Chirac said he would support a U.S. push to take the issue to the UN Security Council where sanctions might be imposed. Kharrazi said that with an annual growth rate approaching 8 percent, Iran is using up its reserves and "we need to diversify our sources of energy."
Foreign Minister Kharrazi told The Washington Post on Thursday that Iran would be willing to work with the United States on a number of issues, including its nuclear activities, if Washington changes its attitude towards Iran for the better.
"We don't have anything to hide because we do not have a program for producing nuclear weapons. Therefore, we are ready to be quite transparent. But we cannot let others deny our rights," he added.
Kharrazi also told The New York Times he was puzzled by Washington's attitude toward Iran, saying it was "contrary to their own interests." He said that after the U.S.-led war in April to topple Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, the U.S. administration abruptly stopped seeking cooperation with Iran.
U.S. President George W. Bush, in January 2002 included Iran in a triad of countries he branded the "axis of evil" -- North Korea and Iraq were the other two.
Kharrazi said Iran wanted to turn around its relation with Washington. "When it is decided to mend relations, we are serious about that," he said. "But the problem is there is no room for that now. The environment does not allow it because Americans are always trying to suspect us, always tried to humiliate us and pressure us. "But if they change their minds, if they change their approach and bring in a new environment for cooperation, we would be ready to work with Americans and cooperate," he added
Kharrazi said Washington did not appreciate Iran's help in the U.S.-led war to oust from Afghanistan the Al Qaeda militant group, blamed for the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks.
He said improved ties would depend on "reciprocal" cooperation and renewed Iran's call for Washington to release $10 billion in frozen Iranian assets and lift U.S. sanctions.

The Bush administration's "mindset ... has to be corrected. Iran is an anchor of stability in that region. Why do they have this mindset toward Iran which is very negative?" he asked. Kharrazi called the U.S. occupation of Iraq a "mistake (which) if left uncorrected may contribute to undermining the moderate mainstream in the Islamic world."

"The ouster of Saddam (Hussein) was a welcome development, but the situation in Iraq and the whole region could be much worse if the U.S. chooses to stay the current course," He also added.

CHEMISCHE WAPENS

DOCUMENTEN

Federation of American Scientists

(www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/cw/index.html)

Chemical Weapons

Iran is currently able to employ chemical weapons, and Iran is progressing in its development of a large self-supporting CW infrastructure. Iran ratified the new Chemical Weapons Convention , under which it will be obligated to eliminate its chemical program over a period of years. Nevertheless, it continues to upgrade and expand its chemical warfare production infrastructure and munitions arsenal. The magnitude of this effort suggests that the Iranian leadership intends to maintain a robust CW capability.

The Iranian chemical weapons production program dates to early in the Iran-Iraq war. Iran used chemical agents to respond to Iraqi chemical attacks on several occasions during that war. Since the early 1990s, it has put a high priority on its chemical weapons program because of its inability to respond in kind to Iraq's chemical attacks and the discovery of substantial Iraqi efforts with advanced agents, such as the highly persistent nerve agent VX.

Iran manufactures weapons for blister, blood, and choking agents; it is also believed to be conducting research on nerve agents. Iran's stockpile of chemical weapons is believed to include nerve and blister agents. Iran is estimated to have an inventory of several thousand tons of various agents, including sulfur mustard, phosgene, and cyanide agents. Its production capacity is estimated at as much as 1000 tons a year, with major production facilities located at Damghan, 300 kms east of Tehran. Iran is working on developing a self-sufficient CW production capacity that includes more effective nerve agents. Along with shell and bomb delivery systems, Iran may also be producing CW warheads for its Scud missile systems.

With extensive foreign assistance, Tehran is obtaining technology, chemical agent precursors, production equipment, and entire production plants. Although Iran is making a concerted effort to attain an independent production capability for all aspects of its chemical weapons program, it remains dependent on foreign sources for chemical warfare-related technologies. China is an important supplier of technologies and equipment for Iran's chemical warfare program. Therefore, Chinese supply policies will be key to whether Tehran attains its long-term goal of independent production for these weapons.

In the future, as Iran becomes more self-sufficient at producing chemical agents, there is a potential that it will become a supplier to other states trying to develop CW capabilities. Iran supplied Libya with chemical agents in 1987.

BIOLOGISCHE WAPENS

DOCUMENTEN

Federation of American Scientists

(www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/cw/index.html)

Biological Weapons
Iran is believed to have begun offensive biological warfare research during the Iran-Iraq War. The intensity of these efforts has probably increased because of the 1995 revelations about the scale of Iraqi efforts prior to the Gulf War. The relative low cost of developing these weapons may be another motivating factor.
Iran has ratified the Biological Weapons Convention.
Iran's biological warfare program is now believed to generally be in the advanced research and development phase. Iran has qualified, highly trained scientists and considerable expertise with pharmaceuticals. It also possesses the commercial and military infrastructure needed to produce basic biological warfare agents and may have produced pilot quantities of usable agent. Iran is judged to be able to support an independent BW program with little foreign assistance (although some foreign BW expertise, especially from Russia, is flowing to Iran). It is reported that the country has collocated a BW lab near its CW production facilities at Damghan. The Iranians have considerable expertise with pharmaceuticals, as well as the commercial and military infrastructure needed to produce basic biological warfare agents. Iran also can make some of the hardware needed to manufacture agents.
Iran has most likely investigated both toxins and live organisms as BW agents, produced some agents, and probably weaponized a small quantity of its production. It is possible that Iran has developed a small BW arsenal that could be delivered by a variety of systems. While only small quantities of usable agent may exist now, within 10 years, Iran's military forces may be able to deliver biological agents effectively.

BERICHTEN

Washington Post

Iran Said to Be Producing Bioweapons
Opposition Group Names Anthrax as First of Six Pathogens in Intensive Effort
By Joby Warrick – 15 May 2003

Iran has begun production of weaponized anthrax and is actively working with at least five other pathogens, including smallpox, in a drive to build an arsenal of biological weapons, according to an opposition group that previously exposed a secret nuclear enrichment program in the country.
The group, Mujaheddin-e Khalq, citing informants inside the Iranian government, says the anthrax weapons are the first fruits of a program begun secretly in 2001 to triple the size of Iran's biowarfare program. The push for new biological weapons was launched in parallel with a more ambitious campaign to build massive nuclear facilities capable of producing components for nuclear bombs, said officials of the National Council of Resistance of Iran, the political arm of the Mujaheddin, which seeks the overthrow of the Iranian government.
"We can say with certainty that the Iranian regime now has the capability of mass production of biological material for weapons use," Alireza Jafarzadeh, the council's U.S. representative, said in an interview. The group has scheduled a news conference today in Washington to release more details.
Although many weapons experts believe Iran maintains at least a rudimentary biological weapons program, few details are known. The CIA, in an unclassified report released this year, said Iran "probably" maintains an offensive biological weapons program and likely "has capabilities to produce small quantities" of biological agents.
The opposition group's claims, if true, would suggest that Iran's pursuit of biological weapons is more aggressive than previously believed.
The Mujaheddin-e Khalq, also known as the People's Mujaheddin, is listed by the State Department as a terrorist group, though weapons experts and intelligence officials say many of the group's past claims about Iranian weapons programs have been largely reliable. The group first exposed a massive nuclear facility built

near the town of Natanz to make enriched uranium, which can be used for commercial nuclear power plants or to make nuclear weapons.
In recent weeks, the Mujaheddin has been fighting for survival after some of its Iraq-based military camps came under attack by U.S. forces during the war. Although the Mujaheddin claimed neutrality in the U.S.-led campaign against Iraq, the Bush administration decided to bomb Mujaheddin bases in an apparent attempt to thaw relations with Iran. Later, the U.S. Central Command arranged a cease-fire that allowed the group to keep many of its weapons and maintain its camps. But then the Bush administration decided to actively seek its surrender.
Mujaheddin officials said the timing of the release of their report on Iran's biowarfare program was unrelated to their problems with the U.S. government. Jafarzadeh, the spokesman, said the Mujaheddin had been gathering information about the program for months and had received critical new details from inside the Iranian government within the past few days.
The expansion of Iran's biological weapons program was spelled out in a four-page document called the "Comprehensive National Microbial Defense Plan," which was approved by Iran's Supreme National Security Council in 2001, Jafarzadeh said. The plan called for a tripling of the country's bioweapons production capacity by 2003, and divided responsibilities across a network of research facilities linked to Iran's armed forces or Revolutionary Guard.
A single director coordinates the activities of five government agencies involved in the program and reports directly to Iranian President Mohammad Khatami, the officials said. Among the key facilities are the Center for Genetic Biotechnology and Engineering Research, located at Malek Ashtar University in northern Tehran, and new bioresearch facilities attached to Tehran's Imam Hussein University and the Shaheed Maysami complex west of the capital, the officials said.
While Iran in the past has relied on foreign suppliers for advanced equipment such as industrial fermenters for growing pathogens, the country now can produce nearly all the critical parts, the officials said. Jafarzadeh said Iran's biological, chemical and nuclear programs have all progressed rapidly under the leadership of Khatami, a man regarded in the West as a moderate and reformer.
Among the pathogens being weaponized under the plan are anthrax, aflatoxin, typhus, smallpox, plague and cholera, Jafarzadeh said. Mujaheddin officials were unable to produce hard evidence to support the claim, but they described specific research facilities and named individual scientists who were placed in charge of the effort. Jafarzadeh said experts were recruited from several countries, including North Korea, Russia, China and India, to assist the effort.
"The report about smallpox was very carefully assessed and verified," Jafarzadeh said.
No nation is known to have produced smallpox weapons other than the Soviet Union, which destroyed its stocks in the early 1990s. Although various reports have suggested that other nations experimented with smallpox -- most notably North Korea and Iraq -- the claims have never been verified.
Weapons experts reacted cautiously to the group's claims, especially the report about smallpox. But several said the group's description of Iran's bioweapons program seemed plausible.
"It can't be dismissed out of hand," said William Potter, director of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. "There is no doubt the Iranians have been very interested in such weapons. We know they left their calling cards at various institutes in the former Soviet Union seeking to recruit experts in the field."
David Albright, a nuclear weapons expert and former member of a U.N. nuclear weapons inspection team in Iraq, said he could not verify the claims but said the group provided solid leads in the past. "Often their information is correct, in part because they have reliable human sources well placed in the Iranian government," Albright said. "And they release information that you can check -- information that is actionable."

Reuters

Iran Denies Has Banned Weapons or Shelters Al Qaeda
By Parinoosh Arami – 16 May 2003

TEHRAN (Reuters) - Iranian government officials strongly denied on Friday that Iran was producing weapons of mass destruction or was sheltering members of Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda network.
A senior government official denied allegations by an exile opposition group, the National Council of Resistance of Iran, that Tehran had biological weapons armed with anthrax, smallpox and typhoid.

"I strongly deny that we have biological weapons because we do not need any banned weapons," the official, who asked not to be identified, told Reuters.
President Bush has dubbed Iran part of an "axis of evil" and accused the Tehran government of sponsoring terrorism and developing nuclear arms.
Bush's national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, reiterated U.S. criticism of Iran on Wednesday, accusing it of being one of the world's leading "sponsors of terror."
She said the United States had raised alarms about Iran's nuclear weapons programs and also believed it allowed al Qaeda to operate from its territory.
Iran's Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi rejected those accusations on Friday as "baseless."
"The Islamic Republic of Iran, based on its own principles, is very serious and resolved to combat terrorism and its nuclear programs are very transparent and peaceful," Asefi was quoted by the official IRNA news agency as saying.
The agency also said Asefi rejected U.S. accusations that leaders of al Qaeda were living in Iran. The United States blames the group for the September 11, 2001 attacks in New York and Washington.
The National Council of Resistance of Iran, the political wing of the People's Mujahideen Organisation, provided a list of names and places at a Washington news conference on Thursday where it said biological weapons were being produced.
The group, which previously exposed the existence of Iran's Natanz uranium enrichment facility the United States says is part of a nuclear weapons program, did not provide any evidence to back up its new claims on biological weapons, but said its information came from Iranian government sources.
The Iraq-based Iranian rebel group started surrendering to the U.S. military last week under a deal that effectively ends it operations as a fighting force.
"The Mujahideen are making these accusations against Iran because of the recent U.S. pressure on them," the Iranian official who declined to be identified said on Friday.
Iran insists its ambitious nuclear program is purely for the peaceful generation of electricity.
A U.S.-led war launched in March against Iran's western neighbor, Iraq, toppled the government of Saddam Hussein. Washington had accused Baghdad of developing banned weapons of mass destruction.

RAKETTEN EN ONDERSTEUNENDE TECHNOLOGIE

DOCUMENTEN

Federation of American Scientists

(www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/missile/index.html)

Missiles

Name	Stages	Propellant	Range (km)	IOC	Inventory	Type	Body Diameter (m)	Comments
Shahab-1	1	liquid	285-330	1995	250-300	Scud-B	0.885	
Shahab-2	1	liquid	500-700	--	200-450	Scud-C	0.885	
Samid	1	liquid?	--	--	--	--	--	A small ballistic missile based on a reduced Scud design
Shahab-3 Zelzal-3	1	liquid	1,000-1,350-1,500	1999	--	MRBM	1.3	Also flown by North Korea (No-dong) and Pakistan (Ghauri II).
Shahab-3D Zelzal-3D	2	liquid,solid	1,500+	2001	--	MRBM	1.3	Also flown by North Korea (No-dong) and Pakistan (Ghauri II).
IRIS Zelzal-3D	2	liquid,solid	1,500+	2001	--	MRBM	1.3	Also flown by North Korea (No-dong) and Pakistan (Ghauri II).
Shahab-4	3	liquid,solid	1,800-2,000	--	--	MRBM	1.65	Indigenously developed system with similar performance to the Soviet SS-4.
IRSL-X-2	3	liquid,solid	2,200-2,672 or 2,200-2,896	--	--	M/IRBM	1.3	Satellite launch variant of the Shahab-4. Indigenously derived version of North Korea's NKSL-1.
Shahab-5 IRSL-X-3/Kosar IRIS	2,3	liquid,solid	3,500-3,750 (2 stage)	--	--	LRICBM	2.2	Indigenously developed system with similar performance to

			4,000-4,300 (3 stage)					the Soviet SS-5. May also flown by North Korea (Taep'o-dong-2).
Shahab-6 IRSL-X-4/Kosar	3	liquid,solid	5,470-5,500 or 5,632-6,200 6,200-6,700 > 8,000	--	--	LRICBM LRICBM LRICBM FRICBM	2.2	Satellite launch variant of the Shahab-5. Indigenously derived version of North Korea's NKSL-X-2. The claimed range probably exceeds what is technically feasible. It most likely is similar in performance to the Soviet SS-5 (4,000-4,300).

NOTES:
SRBM - Short Range Ballistic Missile < 1,000 km
MRBM - Medium Range Ballistic Missile 1,000-2,500 km
IRBM - Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile 2,500-3,500 km
LRICBM - Limited Range Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 3,500-8,000 km
FRICBM - Full Range Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 8,000-12,000 km

Many of the ranges suggested for the yet-to-fly missile systems are based on mathematical models relying on what little data has been made public. Typically, these studies put out by the intelligence community over-estimate the performance of the actual missile systems. These studies do, however, give a range of possibilities as to what to look for once they are flown. In addition, none of the above listed strategic systems achieve true FRICBM capability. They fall far short of that kind of performance. Those strategic systems are based on MRBM & IRBM technology. In order to achieve FRICBM capability, clustering these systems would be required (in a method similar to that used by the Soviets on the R-7/SS-6 ICBM) or an entirely new system design would have to be developed. Clustering these systems very difficult or impossible because of their design characteristics. As of this writing, there is no indication that such new long term development exists, but this does not mean that it will not appear in the future. Only the United States, Russia and China have missiles with this range capability.

Short Range/Solid Propellant Missile Programs
Iran's solid propellant tactical ballistic and guided missile program has been around for many years because of the Iran Iraq war, but has more recently benefited from some Russian and a great deal of Chinese assistance. This technology transfer has allowed Iran to develop a new indigenous solid propellant rocket industry located 175 km east of Tehran within the Sanam, based Industrial Group, department 140 and it predecessor organizations. This is one of the major industrial groups in charge of the Solid propellant ballistic missile programs. The Sanam Industrial Group further developed the existing industrial infrastructure and had its personnel trained to modern state of the art technological standards for that industry to the extent possible. In total it has allowed Iran to develop as many as 30-40 or more different solid propellant rocket motors into full or as parts of missiles systems although some are still under development. This does take into account the space launch vehicle program/strategic ballistic missile program solid motors used as second or third stages' on those launchers as well as the artillery, anti-armor, tactical, SAM, cruise missile, AAM, ASM, and other related solid motors. Presumably some of these space program related solid motors were supplied by China and or reworked by Iran's developing missile industry for their own use. Those Chinese motors can be readily identified from public literature on then from China. This also assumes that China may have supplied North

Korea the solid motor technology that was used as Taep'o-dong-1's third stage in its first attempted satellite launch.
The Washington Times, documented China's contribution to the Iranian solid propellant rocket program on June 17, 1997 with the following basic information. The NP-110 short-range, 450 mm, diameter solid propellant missile has a stated range of 105 miles or 168.95 kilometers. The report says China supplied X-ray equipment, which is used to check the solid propellant casting to make sure it is cured correctly, as well as other required solid propellant production capability.
Contribution by Russia, through MTCR violations, of technology transfer to Iran's solid propellant rocket program infrastructure through an educational process were documented by The Washington Times in its February 23, 1998 issue. The article certainly gave suggested indications of duplicity on the part of the Russian, Federal Security Service (FSB) cooperation with Baltic State Technical University in St. Petersburg. The University previously called Military Mechanical Institute Imeni Ustinov and its director Yuri P. Savelyev were implicated for providing technical pyrotechnics education to Iran's Solid propellant missile industry.
The U.S Government would subsequently issue sanctions through the United Stated, Department of State against the Baltic State Technical University and its director Yuri P. Savelyev for violations of the MTCR. Many of the other existing sanctions were at that time lifted from Russian entities previously sanctioned. They were working on the NP-110 missile also known as the Fatch (Victorious-110) first launched successfully on May 31, 2001 with a range of 105 miles or 168.95 kilometers. Technically this is probably legal under the MTCR range limits.
Some indications of China's support of the Iranian, solid propellant rocket program was published in the June 16, 1998 issue of The Washington Times. Iran had carried out a "purchase of telemetry equipment" from China for missile flight test monitoring. In addition "China Great Wall Industries" provided an entire "Telemetry infrastructure" for the Shahab-3 MRBM and Shahab-4 IRBM based on No-dong. Moreover it is clear that China helped in the NP-110 short-range tactical solid propellant missile with a 105 mile (168.95 km) range.
Successful completion of the development of the NP-110 was confirmed in The Washington Times, May 31, 2001 article "Successfully tested the homebuilt Fateh-110 (Victorious -110)". This is a part of the 105 mile range NP-110 Surface to surface missile program started in 1997 that is based on solid propellant technology acquired from China and Russia.
It was reported in the Middle East Newsline of October 17, 2001 that Iran would appear to be attempting to develop a solid propellant equivalent capability Shahab-3 class MRBM with similar performance requirements based on assistance from the Chinese like was done in Pakistan. It is suggest that the Chinese will supply a different guidance system for this project. Some sources claim that the Russians are helping a solid-fuel design team at the Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group in Teheran develop a 2,800-mile (4,505.2 kilometers) missile, capable of reaching London and Paris, and a 6,300-mile [10,000 km] range missile that could strike cities in the eastern United States. These reports are poorly documented and would appear to be highly speculative.

Federation of American Scientists

Shahab-3 / Zelzal-3
Last uipdate: 13 May 2003

The Iranian Shahab-3 ballistic missile means Meteor-3 or Shooting Star-3 in Farsi [alternatively designated Zelzal (Earthquake)] is derived from the 1,300-1,500 kilometer range North Korean No-dong missile. The Shahab-3 reportedly has a range of between 1,300 and 1,500 kilometers and is capable of carrying a 1,000-760 kilogram warhead.
Design Heritage
The No-Dong ballistic missile was developed by the North Korean's with Soviet Gorbachev era technical participation along with Chinese contributions and Iranian financial assistance. The former Soviet Union's technology transfer contribution is circumstantially strongly suspected as having come from the Acad. V. P. Makeyev OKB Design Bureau developers of the Soviet era Scud-B, and its follow on SLBM's. The 9D21/S-2.___ Isayev OKB Scud-B engine was already in the North Korean's possession. While the Isayev OKB, S-2.713 rocket engine design used on the Soviet SS-N-Shahab-4 SLBM is also thought to have been a part of this technology transfer. This was directly the results of strategic arms reduction treaties creating

unemployment in a large Cadre of technically qualified personnel in the Makeyev OKB's essentially cancelled liquid propellant SLBM programs of the Former Soviet Union. This was because no other form of employment was successfully offered to them. That highly modified Isayev OKB, S-2.713M rocket engine design strongly reflects its Scud-B design heritage but represents an entirely new liquid propellant rocket engine far beyond the growth potential of the modified Scud-B and C class engines for application to the No-Dong. That No-Dong engine also reflects modern Soviet rocket engine start up design technology such as the solid charge starter to spin up the turbo-pump, instead of start up propellant tanks, and the pyrotechnics used to open the propellant flow and to cut it off. It also reflects the typical on off rocket engine design philosophy used by the Soviets. All Soviet era SLBM's owe their design heritage to the Scud-A and Scud-B tactical ballistic missiles.

China's contribution to the No-Dong project came from the joint North Korean/Chinese project conducted between 1976-78, the cancelled DF-61 missile, essentially a Scud-C capability ballistic missile with a range of 600 km. carrying a 1,000 kg warhead that also featured a strap-down guidance system. Iran in fact decided to totally rework the North Korean No-Dong design to their liking with Russian and now Chinese help but they have yet to successfully indigenously produce the whole vehicle to North Korea's standards.

Build Up and flight Test Analysis

Iran was slated to receive the first shipment of the missiles late in 1993. However it was suggested that the delivery was halted due to American pressure on North Korea. According to some reports, as of 1995 Iran had not received the missiles. However Israeli press reports in 1996 cited intelligence reports which claimed that at least a dozen No-Dong missiles had been delivered to Iran from North Korea. But General Peay, USCINCCENT, claimed during a spring 1996 interview that attempts by Iran to buy No-Dong missile from North Korea had failed for financial reasons. The Washington Times, on September 11, 1997 reported that Iran had received from China's, Great Wall Industries Corporation, "guidance, and Solid propellant motor technology" as well as general missile testing technology. The Shahab-3 and Shahab-4 programs appear to be getting considerable assistance from China and Russia. (1) For the first time publicly the Shahab-3 and Shahab-4 missile programs were identified in this article. Shahab-3 is said to have a range of 930 miles (1,496 km.) while the Shahab-4 is credited with 1,20 miles (1,995 km.) the prototype of which was expected to be only 2-3 years away. (1)

This was followed on October 18, 1997 in The Washington Times, with the information that "Iran is just three years (2000) from fielding the first of two versions of the North Korean, No-Dong missile called the Shahab-3 and Shahab-4". (2) However, active Iranian development of this missile continued. According to mid-1997 Israeli reports, at the rate of current development, the project will be completed and operational within two years -- by the end of 1999.

On 15 December 1997 satellite reconnaissance of the Shahid Hemat Industrial Group research facility, just south of Tehran, Iran detected the heat signature of an engine static test firing for this new missile. The test was either the sixth or eighth conducted in 1997, depending on conflicting interpretations of available intelligence. It is believed that Iran may have purchased up to 10 of these No-Dong missiles from North Korea. Iran's missile design bureau organizations for their Shahab-3 missile are made up of the Shahid Hemat Industrial Group (SHIG) and the Shahid Bagheri Indusral Group (SBIG).

It was further revealed by the Washington Times on June 16, 1998 that Iran had purchased "telemetry equipment" from China for missile test monitoring "China Great Wall Industries" provided an entire "Telemetry infrastructure" for the Shahab-3 and Shahab-4 MRBM based on No-Dong. China was also said to have helped in the Iranian NP-110 short-range tactical solid propellant missile project with a 105 miles (168.95 km) range. (3) The CIA predicts that the first test flight of the Shahab-3 would occur in 1998, while the DIA predicted a first flight test would occur in 1999. The tests of the missile engines, according to US intelligence, used monitoring equipment supplied by Russian sources.

On July 22,1998 Iran conducted the first flight test of the Shahab-3 MRBM missile based on No-Dong. The following information was revealed about this test in the Washington Times, on July 24, 1998, "The missile exploded 100 seconds after launch ---- after traveled about 620 miles (997.58 km. down range) over a missile test (range) site in Northern Iran. --- It is uncertain whether that was an accidental explosion or they terminated the flight after achieving what they had to do or because of other reasons." (4) This certainly indicates that the flight was not a total failure but at least a partial success. The Washington Post added it would take one or two years before the Shahab-3 MRBM would be deployed and that, "One government expert described it as "a flight-test for technical purposes" in which the dummy warhead exploded before hitting the ground well down (the test) range." (5)

No-dong / Shahab-3 Range to Payload/Throwweight Trade-offs					
Stages	Payload		Range		Country
	kg	Pounds	km	Miles	
One-Stage	1,158	2,553	1,350	839	Iran
	760	1,676	1,500	932	PakistanOfficial figures

The missile was launched at 06:00 from a firing range about 100 miles southeast of At (Qom?) Two or three American early warning and SIGINT signal intelligence satellites detected this first launch of the Shahab-3 ballistic missile. After launch the missile flew approximately 100 seconds to the southeast. The rocket exploded or was deliberately detonated about 100 seconds into the 110 seconds burn of the single stage, either because of engine steering vanes disintegration failure or instrumentation/guidance failure which may have caused the premature warhead detonation. There is also the possibility that the Iranian's, were satisfied with its Shahab-3 rockets performance, and had decided to detonate it by remote control. However this is highly questionable as a missile testing procedure. Almost certainly the missile had gone out of control and was deliberately destroyed. The flight ended near the time the fuel on the single stage missile would have been exhausted at 110 seconds from start up, at which point in an operational flight, the warhead would normally separate from the missile and fly to its target.

Due to the missile's mid-air explosion, which was picked up by American satellites, it was initially believed that the test was at least a partial failure. However, following careful examination of the initial technical data, some experts reportedly concluded that the test was in fact successful. They were wrong. The US Government expected that there would be additional tests, and that several more tests would be required before Iran was confident of the abilities of the missile. The Washington Times also suggest that the CIA knew that the flight would be in 1998 and also knew of the flight being prepared "first test was imminent" . (6) It was to be a modified No-Dong missile.

In passing it is interesting to note that Pakistan flew its direct copy No-Dong missile (Ghauri-II) on April 6, 1998 some three months before Iran's Shahab-3. The question is why and what does this imply? It would seem to imply that Iran reworked the North Korean No-Dong design while Pakistan bought the whole package missile and its (TEL) Transport Erector Launcher and its simpler mobile support equipment. Iran apparently not only reworked the No-Dong design but also developed its own Mercedes Benz based (TEL) and its extensive separate mobile support equipment but has also probably done the same reworking the two Taep'o-dong launch vehicle designs.

On February 7, 1999 Iran's Defense Minister Ali Shamkani said the following as documented in The Washington Times on March 2,1999 "confirmed that the Shahab-3 is now in production, and that no further flight test are needed." . (7)

Florida Today stated that Iran's defense minister Ali Shamkhani's had said, "The Shahab-3 missile is the last military missile Iran will produce,--- We have no plans for another war missile." (8)

By March 1999, fifteen Shahab-3 missiles would have been produced domestically by Iran based on the Defense Ministers comments after the July 22, 1998 flight test. Reuters, on September 19, 1999 noted that Tehran "struts missile Zelzal which took 4.5 years to develop." (9)

The Washington Times, on September 22, 1999 quoted the Air Intelligence Agency, National Air Intelligence Center of Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio report entitled "Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat." Which discussed several issues related to the Iranian missile programs. Those quoted comments from the NAIC publication were as follows:

"Iran is working on the development of at least two medium-range ballistic missiles, The Shahab-3 and Shahab-4 (10)

On February 9, 2000, The Washington Times revealed the following details on North Korea's acquired help from Iran. "North Korea recently sold Iran a dozen medium range ballistic missile engines" ---- (in November 1999)

"The (12) engines arrived in Iran on Nov. 21, after they were spotted being loaded aboard an Iran Air Boeing 747 cargo jet that left Suinan International Airfield about 12 miles north of-----Pyongyang" . These are the same engines used in No-Dong". (11)

Quoting from "Mr. Robert Walpole National Intelligence officer for Strategic and nuclear programs from Congressional testimony in the Washington Times of February 10, 2000 "Those engines are critical to the Taep'o-dong Program,-----of the North Korean's Long-range missile. And they would be critical to the Shahab-3 program and any extensions of the Shahab-3 program".
b--------" The CIA analysis also said North Korea has not stopped developing its Taep'o-dong long-range missile----". (12) The CIA considered the No-Dong derived Shahab-3 to be operational as of February 2000.
According to Jane's Defence Weekly, of March 22, 2000, suggest that "Iran on Feb. 20, 2000 carried out an operational test on a Shahab-3 missile in country. ---- It was launched from a TEL from a new base of the IRGC at Mushhad. The Shahab-3 used a inertial guidance system with a CEP Circular error probability of 3 km." (13)
It remains unclear how accurate this report is based on subsequent events in the Iran's ballistic missile program development. This appears to actually have been a vehicle engine static test firing to test the vehicle systems and engine operation integration.
Additionally it would also appear that a cluster of Shahab-3 class engine was static tested during February 2000 in Iran but only the subsequent history seems to confirm this event. This is separate from the North Korean engine static test firings and from the subsequent launch pad Taep'o-dong-2 first stage systems integration vertical static test firing conducted during the week of June 26th through July 2, 2001.
Iran successfully conducted a full end to end flight test of a Shahab-3 on 15 July 2000. Following the test, the Iranian Defense Ministry told Iranian State television that the Islamic Republic had no intention of using its missiles to attack other countries. This launch appeared to have been quite successful. This launch vehicle probably utilized one of the engines purchased from North Korea instead of a domestically produced engine.
Iran carried out a second flight test of the Shahab-3 as noted in a Reuters news reports, in The Washington Times, July 16, 2000, on July 15, 2000 test which achieved a velocity of 4,320 mph (1,931.04 M/sec.) with a 1 ton warhead. (14)
Another flight test of the Shahab-3 was predicted by the Washington Times on Sept 8, 2000, --- "delayed from the previous week "---. ---"test expected later this month" ---.(15)
Iran then conducted a further third test launch of Shahab-3 or 3D on September 21, 2000, but the missile apparently failed or exploded shortly after liftoff.
On Sept 21, 2000 the Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran Radio-1, stated the following, "The first Shahab-3D missile using liquid and solid fuel, was successfully test-fired on the first day of the Holy Defense Week. Announcing the news the Minister of Defense and armed forces logistic said: The missile was built and tested for the purpose of gaining the necessary technology in order to enter the design and production stage of Satellite guidance systems. Vice-Admiral Shamkhani added: The Shahab-3D missile has no military use and only for achieving the preliminary stage of new non-military operations." (16)
The Associated Press further stated, "Iran has successfully test-fired its first solid-liquid fueled missile, which the Defense Minister said was part of a program for launching satellites, ----" (17)
The Washington Times on September 22, 2000 added that the Iranian had tested the Shahab-3D, MRBM for a third time, but "the rocket exploded shortly after liftoff, U. S. Intelligence officials said." " Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani told the official IRNA News Agency that the test of the Shahab-3D-----". The Iranian spokesman went on to say that the missile was "solid and liquid fueled" and will be used only for launching communications satellites and not warheads." (18)
Jane's Intelligence Review, in its November 2000 issue stated the following "The Sept. 21, 2000 flight test was a failure according to U. S. officials. It was flown from near the city of Semnan ." (19)
On September 21, 2000 during testimony before the U.S. Senate Mr. Walpole National Intelligence officer for Strategic and nuclear programs discussed the Shahab-3D first launch.
Mr. Walpole " Iran's Defense minister announced the Shahab-4, originally calling it a more capable ballistic missile than the Shahab-3, but later categorizing it as a space launch vehicle with no military applications. ----
---
Sen. Cochran,
"As we have said in open session before, Iran procured No-Dong and then sought Russian assistance to modify that into the Shahab-3, which is a little different approach than Pakistan used to get the Ghauri, which is also a No-Dong. They did not mind trying to change it. They just decided to change its name and buy them outright." (20)
The Shahab-3D test was detected by US space sensors, and announced by an Iranian government spokesman in Tehran. Although Iran claimed the test-launch was a success, US officials said the Shahab-3D exploded shortly after launching. Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani stated that the test of a "Shahab-3D" was conducted in connection with the anniversary of the start of the war with Iraq, which began in 1980 and ended in 1988. The Iranian spokesman said the missile was "liquid and solid-fueled" and would be used for launching

communications satellites and not warheads. Iranian sources characterized the missile as being "liquid and solid fueled" but it is known that the Shahab-3 missile consisted of a single liquid propellant first stage. If a smaller solid propellant second stage were added to the Warhead or as a payload boost stage then this would be perhaps the first appearance of the "IRIS" launch vehicle. The IRIS launch vehicle is a Iranian space program related derivation of the Shahab-3 ballistic missile. A launch vehicle of this configuration is ideal as a vertical probe sounding rocket but would almost certainly not be capable of launching a satellite of appreciable mass or capability unless it were intended to be a second and third stage of a larger launch vehicle. However, it would finally give the Shahab-3 missile the range required to cover all of Israel.

Early in 2001 it appeared Iran was preparing for another flight test of the Shahab-3 missile as noted in the January 12, 2001, The Washington Times. "Iran is preparing to conduct another flight test soon-----" full range " flight test gauged a failure on Sept 21, 2000 but it was successful on its second flight test. (21)

More North Korean produced No-Dong class storable liquid propellant rocket engines were apparently shipped to Iran in spite of being held up by a financial disagreement that had delayed the shipment, according to the Washington Times of April 27, 2001. " New shipments of North Korean missile components and technology ----". The article went on to state that the latest shipment of missile parts and their associated documentation was shipped in late February 2000 from North Korea's Sunan international airport which is north of Pyongyang. (22)

This second shipment was apparently delivered to Iran after April 2001. Presumably this latest shipment to Iran from North Korea was flown over China with its permission as was done previously for other shipments.

It was reported in the Middle East Newsline of October 17, 2001 that Iran has placed the domestically produced Shahab-3 MRBM into "serial production" earlier in 2001. (23) It goes on to say that they can produce about "20 missiles a year" domestically with the purchased North Korean No-Dong engines. (23) It suggest that Iran continues to have problems in the production of it own copies of the No-Dong engine.

Of greater significance it would appear according the Middle East Newsline that Iran is attempting to develop a solid propellant equivalent capability Shahab-3 class missile with similar performance requirements based on assistance from the Chinese like was done in Pakistan. It suggest that the Chinese will supply a different guidance system for this project. (23)

There have been only a few test firings of the No-Dong missile and its direct copy Pakistan's, Ghauri-II and improved Iranian Shahab-3 descendants.

Excepted No-Dong Derivative Flight Test to Date:

1. The first known flight test of No-Dong occurred in North Korea on May 29 or 30th 1993. Based on the long known historical record from the U.S. Intelligence experience of failing to detect first flight test of various countries ballistic missiles it can be said that this may not have been the only flight test of No-Dong prior to this date.
2. The second known flight test was of the No-Dong renamed Ghauri-II in Pakistan on April 6,1998.
3. The third flight test of a Iranian domestically produced No-Dong reworked by Iran was the Shahab-3 launched on 22, July, 1998. It failed at 100 Sec. into its flight after it was launch from south east of Tehran, Iran at (possibly Qom) where previous test of the Scud-C had been launched.
4. The fourth test was a second Ghauri-II launched in Pakistan on April 14, 1999.
5. The fifth flight test of the Shahab-3 using a North Korean produced engine took place from Mushhad on July 15, 2000 was very successful apparently clearing the way for its operational field deployed.
6. The sixth flight test from Semnam of a derivative Shahab-3 was the first flight test of the Shahab-3D on Sept. 21, 2000. It appeared to have failed shortly after launch. This could have been the initial flight test of the IRIS space launch vehicle but that is uncertain. If it was an IRIS launch then the program has suffered a potential program set back for Iran.

Developing Nations and Warhead Dynamic Performance

Recently, it was suggested that the developing nations missile program warheads would be tumbling about their center of gravity during re-entry, which would then make it difficult to identify. This was because they were not being spun-up along their longitudinal axis prior to re-entry through the atmosphere.

A warhead is much like a bullet fired from a rifle barrel. If the barrel is grooved to spin up the bullet along its longitudinal axis it tends to fly through the atmosphere to its target more smoothly and accurately. If the barrel is not built with this capability, the bullet tumbles uncontrollably about its center of gravity throughout its flight in the atmosphere to its target. This tumbling reduces the accuracy of the projectile.

This kind of missile warhead tumbling was noted in the ballistic flights of Iraqi's Scud-B, Scud-C/Al-Hussein, Scud-D/Al-Abbas ballistic missiles during the Gulf War. In this particular case all of the warheads remained attached to the Scud derived rocket bodies. The length of the Scud-C and D missile bodies and the failure to spin up either the missile with its warhead or separate the warhead after missile spin up made them extremely unstable and in accurate during re-entry to their target.

Today this is not the case with North Korean derived warhead technology. North Korea successfully demonstrated payload spin up with its Taep'o-dong-1/Paeutsan-1, solid motor third stage and satellite during that satellite launch attempt. This can plainly be seen in the publicly available North Korean videos released to the press on the Paeutusan-1 launch. Both the solid motor stage and the attached satellite are seen in the video rotating along the centerline longitudinal axis of the two elements. When you think about it technically applying basic Junior high school physics it had to be that way to perform its mission. The only way the stage and satellite combination could be stabilized was to spin them up along the centerline longitudinally axis in order to properly position the third stage solid motor for the orbital insertion burn which is confirmed by the video. While the combination payload rotates about its center of gravity that solid motor has to be precisely positioned and fired in order to place itself in Earth orbit. If it is positioned left or right or up or down from that centerline firing position the payload will be de-orbit by the burn. The Paeutusan-1 solid propellant third stage both demonstrated a near full duration burn and the spin up of the stage and satellite along its longitudinal axis. However, the third stage solid motor ruptured, de-orbiting the satellite, almost immediately after achieving orbital velocity. For further information see the North Korean Taep'o-dong-1/NKSL-1 web site.

Therefore, it would be correct to assume that besides North Korea's, No-Dong (first stage of Taep'o-dong-1), both Pakistan's Ghauri-II and Iran's Shahab-3 all benefit from this spin-up technology. The Shahab-3/Ghauri-II both apparently spin up the single booster stage and warhead combination starting at about 10 seconds before the termination of the powered flight at 110 seconds. At this point after 110 seconds of powered flight the warhead is then separated from the booster stage to fly on a re-entry trajectory that remains stable to its target. With the addition of GPS targeting the warhead accuracy is greatly enhanced. There are still many in the analytical community that question, perhaps correctly, this suggested accuracy of 190 meters, over the excepted 3 kilometers CEP. There can be no doubt that this spin-up technology does improve the accuracy of these warheads over the previously demonstrated poor ballistic capability. Since the warheads are not tumbling it in fact enhances the interceptor sensor signature identification capability verses that of a tumbling warheads signature.

Equally revealing is the fact that this is the area where the Iranian Shahab-3 has repeatedly failed in flight test. If the steering vanes are not equally positioned correctly or are defective in any way the missile and warhead combination would tumble about its center of gravity out of control destroying the missile. The resulting tumbling warhead whether attached to the remaining missile body or not would in all probability be destroyed during its re-entry. It is known that Iran has and continues to suffer from a steering vain quality control problem for its Shahab-3 ballistic missile that the Germans during WW-II solved and that the United States and former Soviet Union were able to easily resolve with out using specialized coating.

It is reported in the Middle East Newsline from a study by the Washington, D.C., Institute of Near East Policy, suggesting that both Iran and Iraq are having considerable trouble adapting nuclear warheads because of their size to their existing MRBMs, Shahab-3 of Iran, the Scud-C's and Scud-D's of Iraq. The report goes further suggest that they may choose to develop aircraft based delivery systems. (24) It is known that Iran has been developing a unmanned cruise missile capability through the use of the existing aircraft available for this potential weapons system as reported in Aviation Week & Space Technology some years ago.

SSMs - NODONG-1

Warhead type	HE, CHEM (thickened VX)
Range (km)	1,300-1,500
CEP	3-4,000 m 90m (w/GPS guidance)
Reaction time (min)	60
Maximum road speed	70 km/h
Maximum road range	550 km

Technical Details

Range (km) 1,350-1,500

CEP (m)	190 (Previously thought to be several thousand meters)
Diam. (m)	1.32-1.35
Height (m)	15.852-16
Launch Weight Mass (kg)	15,852-16,250
Stage Mass (kg)	15,092
Dry Weight Mass (kg)	1,780-2,180
Thrust (Kg f)	Effective: 26,051 (-709) Actual: 26,760-26,600
Burn time (sec.)	110
Isp. (sec.)	Effective: 226 - SL due to vains steering drag loss of 45 sec. Actual: 230 Vac.: 264
Thrust Chamb.	1
Fuel	TM-185 20% Gasoline 80% Kerosene
Oxidizer	AK-27I 27% N_2O_4 73% HNO_3 Iodium Inhibitor
Propellant Mass (kg)	12,912
Warhead (kg)	760-987-1,158
Type	MRBM

Sources and Methods

1. Gertz, Bill, "Missiles In Iran of Concern To State," The Washington Times, 11, Sept. 1997, pp. 1 & .A14.
2. Gertz, Bill, "House, seeks sanctions on Russia for Iran arms," The Washington Times, 18, Oct. 1997, pp. A4.
3. Gertz, Bill, "China assists Iran, Libya on Missiles," The Washington Times, 16, June 1998, pp. A1 & A14.
4. Gertz, Bill & Sieff, Martin, "Iran's missile test alarms Clinton," The Washington Times, 24, July 1998, pp. A1 & A13.
5. Pincus, Walter, "Iran may soon gain missile capability," The Washington Post, 24, July 1998, p.?
6. Gertz, Bill, "Iran tests medium - range missile," The Washington Times, 23, July 1998.
7. Hackett, James, "Growing missile threat from Iran," The Washington Times, 2, March 1999, pp. A13.
8. "Iran says missile for satellite launching," Florida Today on line, AP Tehran, Iran, 8, February 1999.
9. "Iran Revolutionary Guards build new missile," Reuters, 19, Sept. 1999.
10. Gertz, Bill, "Tehran increases range on missiles," The Washington Times, 22, Sept. 1999 pp.?
11. Gertz, Bill, "N. Korea sells Iran missile engines," The Washington Times, 9, Feb. 2000, pA1.
12. Gertz, Bill, "Critical " N. Korean missile parts seen aiding Iran's Program, The Washington Times, 10, Feb. 2000, p.A3.
13. Rodan, Steve, "Iran now able to deploy Shahab-3," Jane's Defence Weekly, 22, March 22, 2000, p. ?
14. "Iran tests upgraded missile able to hit Israel", Reuters news reports, The Washington Times, 16, July 2000, p. C3.
15. Gertz, Bill, "Iran set for another flight test of missile," The Washington Times, 8, Sept. 2000, pp. 1 & A20.
16. "Iran: Shahab-3 "non-military" missile successfully test-fired," Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran Radio-1, 21, Sept. 2000.
17. "Iran test-fires missile," AP article, 22, Sept. 2000,
18. Gertz, Bill, "Iran's missile test fails after takeoff," The Washington Times, 22, Sept. 2000, p. A5.
19. Koch, Andrew, "Third Iranian Shahab test "a fizzle"," Jane's Intelligence Review, Nov. 2000, p. 5.
20. Iran's Ballistic Missile and Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs, Hearing before the International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services Subcommittee of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, September 21, 2000.

21. Gertz Bill, & Scarborough, Rowan, "Shahab-3 test set," (Inside the Ring), The Washington Times, January 12, 2001, p. A8.
22. Gertz, Bill & Scarborough, Rowan, "North Korea-Iran spat," Inside the Ring, The Washington Times, April 27, 2001, p. A9
23. Rodan, Steve, "Iran Begins Serial Production of Shahab-3", Middle East Newsline, Oct. 17, 2001.
24. " Iran, Iraq Unable To Weaponize Missiles", Middle East Newsline, October 16, 2001.

Global Security

Shahab-3/Zelzal-3
Last update: 20 July 2003

The Iranian Shahab-3 [alternatively designated *Zelzal* (Earthquake)] missile is said to be a derivative of the 1,000-1,300 kilometer range North Korean Nodong-1. The Shahab-3 will reportedly have a range of between 1,300 and 1,500 kilometers and be capable of carrying a 750-1,000 kilogram warhead. The Nodong missile was developed by North Korea with Iranian financial assistance. Iran was slated to received the first shipment of the missiles late in 1993. However the delivery was halted due to American pressure on North Korea. According to some reports, as of 1995 Iran had not received the missiles. However Israeli press reports in 1996 cited an intelligence reports which claimed at least a dozen No-dong missiles have been delivered to Iran from North Korea. But General Peay, USCINCCENT, claimed during a Spring 1996 interview that attempts by Iran to buy Nodongs from North Korea had failed for financial reasons.
However, active Iranian development of this missile continues. According to mid-1997 Israeli reports, at the rate of current development, the project will be completed and operational within two years -- by the end of 1999. On 15 December 1997 satellite reconnaissance of the Shahid Hemat Industrial Group research facility, just south of Tehran, detected the heat signature of an engine test for this new missile. The test was either the sixth or eighth conducted in 1997, depending on conflicting interpretations of available intelligence. The CIA predicts a first test flight in 1998, while the DIA predicted a first flight test in 1999. The tests of the missile engines, according to US intelligence, used monitoring equipment supplied by NPO Trud.
On 22 July 1998 Iran conducted its first flight test of this ballistic missile, which ended about two minutes into flight. The missile was launched at 06:00 from a firing range about 100 miles southeast of At launch, the missile was detected by two or three American satellites. After launch the missile flew approximately two minutes to the south-east. The rocket exploded or was detonated about 100 seconds into the flight, either because of a mishap or because the Iranians, satisfied with its performance, detonated it by remote control. The flight ended near the time the fuel on the missile would have been exhausted, at which point in an operational flight, the warhead would normally separate from the missile and fly to its target. Due to the missile's mid-air explosion, which was picked up by American satellites, it was initially believed that the test was at least a partial failure. However, following careful examination of the initial technical data, some experts reportedly concluded that the test was in fact successful.
It is believed that Iran may have purchased up to 10 of these NoDong missiles from North Korea.
The US Government expected that there would be additional tests, and that several more tests would be required before Iran was confident of the abilities of the missile. There have been only four test firings of the Nodong missile and its improved Pakistani and Iranian descendants. The first test in North Korea was on 22 May 1993. The second was in Pakistan in April 1998, the third was the Shihab-3 in Iran on 22 July 1998, and the last test was in Pakistan on 14 April 1999. As of early 2000, no additional flight tests had taken place in Iran, or elsewhere.
Iran successfully tested a Shahab-3 on 15 July 2000. Following the test, the Iranian Defense Ministry told Iranian State television that the Islamic Republic had no intention of using its missiles to attack other countries.
Iran conducted a third test launch on 21 September 2000, but the missile apparently exploded shortly after liftoff. The Shahab-3 test was detected by US space sensors, and announced by an Iranian government spokesman in Tehran. Although Iran claimed the test-firing was a success, US officials said the Shahab-3D exploded shortly after launching. Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani stated that the test of a "Shahab-3D" was conducted in connection with the anniversary of the start of the war with Iraq, which began in 1980 and ended in 1988. The Iranian spokesman said the missile was "solid-fueled" and would be used for launching communications satellites and not warheads. Iranian sources characterized the missile as being "solid fueled" but it is believed that the missile consisted of a liquid propellant NoDong first stage with a smaller solid

propellant second stage. A missile of this configuration would almost certainly not be capable of launching a satellite of appreciable mass or capability.
Iran carried out a successful test of the Shahab-3 on 23 May 2002.
Iran conducted an unsuccessful flight test of the Shahab-3 medium-range missile in July 2002. The failed test took place in northern Iran and was at least the fourth [and probably the fifth] flight test of the missile that was said to be ready for deployment before the end of 2002. Recent Shahab-3 tests have had mixed results, with about half the missiles flying successfully and the rest failing.
In May 2002, it was reported that Iran had decided to start production of the Shahab-3 missile, according to Turkish intelligence. The report said that Iran tested the Shihab-3 last month. Iran now plans to produce at least 150 of the missiles, which are capable of delivering a 1.000kg warhead to 1.300 km range. Israeli officials estimated Iran had so far been able to amass an arsenal of at least 20 Shihab-3s.
On 04 July 2002, the Israeli daily newspaper Haaretz reported that Iran had successfully tested the Shahab-3 intermediate-range ballistic missile in previous days. The test was described as the most successful of seven or eight launches over the previous five years.
on July 7, 2003, Iran confirmed that it had conducted a final test on the Shahab-3. The missle has a reported range of 1,300 kilometers, bringing Israel within its reach.
On July 20, 2003, on the occasion of an inspection by the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei, of the exhibit of air force hardware affiliated to the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC), the IRGC formally took delivery of the Shahab-3 long-range missile from the defense ministry.

Aeronautics

Shahab-3/4
Last update: 25 July 2001

Type
Intermediate-range, road mobile, liquid-propellant, single warhead ballistic missiles.

Development
There have been reports from Iran since 1986, of the development of a new intermediate-range ballistic missile and the programme has been given various names including Shahab 3, Shihab 3, Shehob 3 or Zelzal 3. In 1993, it is believed that Iran and North Korea agreed on the joint development of the North Korean No-dong 1 and No-dong 2 single-stage liquid-propellant missiles and that Pakistan probably joined the programme (for the Ghauri 1/2 missiles) at the same time. The No-dong design was based on the Russian 'Scud B' technologies, following the manufacture of 'Scud B' and 'Scud C' variant missiles in North Korea and their subsequent sale to Iran. No-dong and Shahab 3 both appear to be based on a scaled-up design of the 'Scud B' or 'Scud C'. It was reported that Iran would purchase and manufacture a total of 150 No-dong missiles, with full range trials carried out in Iran, because North Korea had difficulty in conducting such trials without overflying Japanese territory. Pressure from several countries in 1994 is reported to have led to North Korea abandoning the Iranian programme. Reports in 1997 suggested that Iran was conducting a series of seven motor tests for a missile programme, and that the missile was called Shahab 3. It is believed that North Korea delivered a small number, probably 5 to 12 missile assemblies, to Iran from 1994 onwards, with four TEL vehicles and that these deliveries stopped and were then restarted in 1997. It is reported that the Shahab 3 development is led by the Aerospace Industries Authority, and that the final assembly and test is being carried out by Hermat Missile Industries in Tehran, with the missile motors and fuel tanks made in a large underground facility at Khojan. A flight test by Pakistan in April 1998, for its intermediate range ballistic missile programme called Hatf 5 or Ghauri 1, which appeared to be similar to both No-dong 1 and Shahab 3, finally produced the evidence of the co-operative programme between the three countries. It seems that the No-dong 1/2 technologies have been transferred to both Iran and Pakistan and that the Shahab 3 and Hatf 5 (Ghauri 1) missiles are similar to each other. The first flight test of Shahab 3 was made in July 1998 and two further missiles were displayed in September 1998. An Israeli report suggested that Iran was developing a nuclear warhead for the Shahab 3 missile, but this remains unconfirmed. In September 2000 a Shahab 3-D was tested, which Iran described as a prototype satellite launch vehicle using solid/liquid propellants. It is assumed that this indicates the first stage was a standard Shahab 3 liquid-propellant motor, with a solid-propellant second stage.

Reports of a further missile development programme, known as Shahab 4, became known in 1997. The initial reports, from Israel, suggested that Shahab 4 was using technologies specifically associated with the former Russian SS-4 'Sandel' (R-12) intermediate-range ballistic missile that had first entered service in 1958. However, this was denied by both Russia and Iran. It seems likely that, following American practice, the design of this now obsolete weapon had been declassified in Russia and made widely available to students and analysts. Pakistan launched a Hatf 6 (Ghauri 2) missile in April 1999, which was a longer version of Ghauri 1 and was reported to have a maximum range of 2,500 km. It is possible that Shahab 4 might be similar to Ghauri 2. The progress on the development of Shahab 4 is unclear, although Israeli reports suggested that the missile could be in service by 2001, there had been no test flights up to July 2001. Iran has suggested that it is designing a satellite launch vehicle and the Shahab 4 might be intended as a stepping stone in the development of such a vehicle. However, as no further details have been given by Iran, it is difficult to arrive at any firm conclusion. There has been a report that Iran is planning to develop a 4,000 km range ballistic missile, such a missile would also be suitable for use as a satellite launch vehicle and reports suggest that this may have the designator Shahab 5 or Shahab 6. It is thought possible that Shahab 5 is based on the North Korean Taep'o-dong 1 missile or SLV design.

Description

From the available reports it is assumed that Shahab 3 is similar in size and shape to the North Korean No-dong 1 missile and is a scaled-up version of the Russian 'Scud B' design. The missile is believed to be 16.0 m long, with a body diameter of 1.32 m and a launch weight of 16,250 kg. The payload is believed to be 1,200 kg, with a separating warhead encased in a re-entry vehicle. The warhead is believed to be HE, submunitions or chemical with a weight of 800 kg, but a nuclear warhead is probably in development. Alternative details are available for this missile, which suggest that the length is 15.2 m, the body diameter 1.25 m, and the launch weight 15,400 kg. The payload weight is 750 kg. At this point in time we do not know which details are correct. The missile has a single-stage liquid-propellant system and it is believed that this uses IRFNA and kerosene, with around 12,300 kg of propellants and a burn time of 100 seconds. A single motor is fed by a turbopump, with graphite vanes in the exhaust nozzles to control the missile during the boost phase. Guidance is inertial, but it is believed that the missile will not be particularly accurate, most probably with a 2,500 m CEP, although some reports suggest a CEP of nearer 4,000 m. An Israeli report suggested that the Shahab 3-D launch in September 2000 used an improved guidance system, following Chinese assistance, with a possible CEP of 250 m. The minimum range is expected to be around 400 km and the maximum range 1,300 km (although one report suggests 1,350 to 1,500 km). Some of the TELs for this missile are probably converted 'Scud B' vehicles, but it is believed that Iran uses several different types for its 'Scud B' and 'Scud C ' missiles, including Russian MAZ 543 TELs, German Mercedes Benz and Japanese Nissan tractor trailer combinations. Reports in September 1998 suggested that Iran may also have converted some IVECO 320-45WTM or Mercedes Benz 3850AS tank transporters as Shahab 3 TEL vehicles.

Shahab 4 has been described as using Russian SS-4 technology, which presumably means that it could be similar in size and shape to the SS-4. If this is true, then Shahab 4 would be 22.8 m long, have a body diameter of 1.65 m and a launch weight of 42,000 kg. The payload weight would be up to 1,600 kg, with a separating re-entry vehicle carrying the warhead. The missile would be a single-stage liquid-propellant type, probably using IRFNI and kerosene with a burn time of 140 seconds. The SS-4 motor was an RD-214, with four fixed motor chambers and steered by graphite vanes in the motor exhausts. The motor was fed by a single turbopump, driven by a hydrogen peroxide gas generator and producing a thrust of 635 kN at sea level. The missile had inertial guidance and a maximum range of 2,000 km. The accuracy of an Iranian version might be between 2,500 and 3,500 m CEP. However, an alternative possibility is that Shahab 4 is simply a longer missile than Shahab 3, with more fuel and oxidant, but using technologies taken from the SS-4 programme to improve the performance. This view is reinforced by the Pakistan launch of Ghauri 2 (Hatf 6) in April 1999, which appeared to be similar in shape to the Ghauri 1 and Shahab 3, but with a range increased to 2,500 km. If this is correct, then a launch of Shahab 4 could be expected soon and this missile will probably be 18.0 m long, with a launch weight of 16,800 kg. An alternative suggestion is that the Shahab 4 missile uses the RD-216 motors of the SS-5 'Skean' (R-14) ballistic missile, which were also used in the SL-8 Cosmos SLV.

Operational status

Development of Shahab 3 probably started in Iran in 1993 and, in 1997, seven motor tests were reported to have been made. The first flight test was made in July 1998 and USA reports suggested that this was not totally successful, however subsequent reports stated that the missile flew for 1,000 km before being destroyed. It is reported that the Chinese provided a complete telemetry set for this test, and that further sets

were delivered later in 1998. The second flight test was made in July 2000, over a range of 850 km according to a US report. A third test was made in September 2000, this time with a Shahab 3-D version, but this flight was unsuccessful according to the US. A report in 1996 suggested that 5 to 12 No-dong type missile assembly sets and motors were delivered to Iran from North Korea. A report in 1997 stated that Iran was negotiating with Libya to sell Shahab 3 missiles or technologies to Libya. Initial production of 12 to 15 missiles is believed to have begun in Iran in 1998, and an in-service date of 1999 was reported. It is believed that the missiles will be stored in underground bunkers at five sites, under the control of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Each of the sites has a launch pad and support facilities. A Shahab 3 motor test, from a TEL vehicle, was reported to have been made at Mashad in February 2000, indicating that the system was now fully road mobile.

The Shahab 4 development programme may have started in 1996, but there have been no confirmed reports that the project is proceeding. A successful motor test was reported in February 1999, following an earlier unsuccessful test in 1998. Iran has made several references to developing a satellite launch vehicle and, if the collaboration with North Korea and possibly Pakistan continues, it is possible that the Shahab 3 and Shahab 4 programmes could contribute to the first stage of a Shahab 5 SLV, probably using the North Korean Taep'o Dong 1 (SLV) as the design.

Contractors

It is believed that the missile has been designed by the Aerospace Industries Authority, Tehran, and built by Hermat Missile Industries, Tehran.

(sources: Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems)

BERICHTEN

BRON & DATUM!!!

European Missile Defence and the Potential Ballistic Missile Risk

LtCol. Cees Wolterbeek – WMD NATO HQ

[…] Defining the potential BM Risk

We assume that a potential European ballistic missile defence system, which covers European NATO territory, does not have to deal with the more sophisticated (IRBM and ICBM) BM systems from Russia, China, Israel and India. However it should be noted that Israel and India are probably "countries of concern" for Russia.

We also assume that such systems, including their warhead separation, re-entry vehicles (RVs), multiple independently targeted RVs (MIRVs) and manoeuvring RV (MARV) technologies, are currently not available in those "countries of concern" that could become a potential risk to European territory. Furthermore, we presume that the above mentioned mature BM producing countries will not export the technologies involved in the above listed systems to such "countries of concern", although in reality that remains to be proven. The export of knowledge through third world students educated at Western and Russian Universities remains a particular cause for concern. However, if in a worse case scenario "countries of concern" acquire IRBMs, and/or land-targeted attack cruise missiles and/or sea-based delivery systems earlier than estimated through procurement; the proposed AMD or TMD system must have the flexibility to enhance its capabilities by modular additions. Another assumption is that "countries of concern" are not yet able to launch BMs from sea based platforms, especially submarines, and that such a potential platform would be easily detected unless capable of launching BMs from the middle of oceans. We should look at the potential capabilities of such countries without too much consideration of their intentions. We will not look at the theoretical option of ballistic missile defence through nuclear deterrence.

Potential BM systems that could currently pose a potential risk to European territory.

The first category that forms a potential risk for Europe is the group of single-stage liquid- propellant SRBMs and MRBMs consisting of the SCUD B, the NODONG and their spin-offs. These are systems that can proliferate and do proliferate this very moment.

The potential SRBM risk consists of SCUD B-type missiles and its spin-offs, like the AL HIJARAH, AL HUSSEYN, AL ABBAS, and the HWASONG 5 and 6.

These are all SRBMs that represent, or are based on, the original SCUD missile and its up-graded versions like, for example, the AL HUSSEYN. They are based on technologies of the sixties. The range is from about

300 to a current maximum designed 900 kms with a payload of 500 kg or more (1000 kg). Its Circular Error Probable (CEP) is about 1km. The number of such BMs in "countries of concern" is estimated to be about a thousand and a half BMs in total. The majority of these SRBMs are somewhat enhanced SCUD versions with a maximum range of about 500km. This category is a potential risk for NATO territory.

The potential MRBM risk consists of the NODONG and its spin-offs like the SHAHAB-3, and GHAURI. A NODONG is a SCUD B on a larger scale and is approximately 15.5 metres in length and about 1,25 metres in diameter. It uses the old SCUD technology and carries a payload of about 1200 kg and its range is currently estimated to be 850 kms, at the most 1300 kms. It is estimated that there are currently not more than 100 BMs of this type in the world, with a production rate of about 2 a month. The reliability of this missile is not well tested, but we assume that it is close to that of modified SCUDs and thus poses a real potential threat.

The potential BM systems that could be a threat to Europe have the following characteristics.

The maximum designed range that you will be able to get out of a single-stage liquid propellant missile based upon the current available modern technology is approximately 3000 kms with a meaningful payload of 1000 kg.

The third category that may become a potential risk for Europe in the future are Multi-stage Ballistic Missile systems.

The way to develop longer-range BM systems in the IRBM and ICBM range is to develop multi-stage systems. Only multi-stage-designed systems are potentially capable of attaining ranges of over 5000 kms. Instead of a booster phase that will reach about 80 kms height for a SCUD, a booster phase will need to reach about 300km height. However outside the well known countries mentioned in paragraph 1, other countries have not yet fully mastered all the necessary technologies that are needed for multi-staging and warhead separation.

The only potential combat system with viability in multi-staging that is produced in a country new to this, is the Indian AGNI system. It is the only multiple-stage missile system, developed outside the US, Russia, China or Europe with a solid potential to longer-range (intermediate and intercontinental), with a 1000 kg payload and without losing too much accuracy by extended range. Its range in tests to date is about 2000 kms with a 1000 kg payload, with a designed 2500 kms range. Versions with a longer designed range will follow and probably succeed, like the AGNI IV (SURYA) that will be tested this year for a range of 5000 kms. Re-entry vehicles with terminal guidance are being developed, and there are negotiations with Russia concerning these techniques that allow for terminal adjustments.

For this reason, it is tempting to project the timelines that are valid for India's BM development programme to the "countries of concern" that are currently involved in the same type of developments. For the AGNI it is estimated that re-entry vehicles with terminal guidance are at least 5 years from meaningful trials and much further from combat readiness. It should be noted that it took India with its broad scientific and industrial base about 20 years to develop a viable system like the AGNI. India did receive substantial help from abroad during that period for its space programme including technology that could be adapted to the AGNI BM programme. Also, China could serve as a realistic model for a possible timeline. It took China, for example, 20 years to produce their 20 ICBMs.

There is currently no missile system in the "countries of concern" that, besides India, would be able to match this system in the near future. The challenges are:

a. Reliable ignition, longer burning times, higher thrusts, higher specific impulse, higher mass ratio and subsequent functioning of all multi-stage large booster engines,

b. Keeping proper balance and direction in the booster phase,

c. Proper separation of the stages,

d. Keeping a meaningful payload and achieving proper warhead separation,

e. Reliable release and re-entry of RVs, development of re-entry heat shield technologies,

f. Subsequent release of WMD bomblets that themselves will have to open at the exact desired height and place.

Nothing must fail in this sequence.

Even the North Korean TAIPODONG (and its assumed Iranian clone KOSAR) is probably close to 10 years behind AGNI technology, although it has showed "Chinese" separation and an uncontrollable third stage in one test in 1998. Only if these Korean multi-stage missiles were developed with extensive help from Russia (to date strongly denied by Russia), could these systems pose a real threat. It is questionable if North Korea is able to produce the necessary reliable larger rocket-engines needed for multi-staging. North Korea also has very limited testing capabilities even compared to India, which will slow down their development process even further. It is conservatively estimated that a viable combat ready system like AGNI will not surface in "countries of concern" within the next ten years, unless a "country of concern" receives substantial technical help from outside, like Pakistan from China.

The conclusion is that no ”country of concern” besides India will possess a viable multi-stage missile within the near future, unless “countries of concern” get substantial outside help from India, China or Russia.

What Missile features will a potential European Missile defence system face in the near future?
Current potential risk.
The current SRBM and MRBM systems like the SCUD and NODONG have an aircraft-like radar signal that is easy to distinguish. These are the BM systems that a European Missile Defence System would have to be able to deal with immediately in a currently potential hypothetical crisis. For real cruise missiles, UAVs and multi-stage BM systems we will have to be ready sometime after 2010, multiple re-entry vehicles will probably take longer to become a potential risk, probably closer to 2020.
Another category that may become a potential risk for Europe are Cruise Missiles (CM) and UAVs.
“Countries of concern” are not yet able to produce viable land attack cruise missiles (LACMs) and UAV systems in this field that are a potential risk for European territory. There are currently only viable Russian European and US land (target) attack cruise missiles available. With some imagination, you can also add Chinese cruise missiles. Do not confuse the relatively simple anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) with the sophisticated land attack cruise missiles. The two main problems to solve in land attack cruise missile development are its vulnerability to air defence that can be countered through very low altitude flights, and guidance and control problems during such very low altitude flights over land. Inertial guidance does not work as the only guidance instrument for such missile, additional sophisticated guidance and adjustment systems are needed. Also, in this case the development of viable CM systems in “countries of concern” will take another 10 years and for its turbojets and navigation equipment outside help will be needed. It took the US, for example, 8 years to find a way to match digital GPS to analogue steering control systems. The only way to shorten this timeline substantially is to procure complete systems in this case. That is why NATO is interested in possible Russian-Indian co-operation in the CM field. The production of viable Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) will be technologically easier, including incorporation of GPS, but countermeasures against UAVs will also be substantially easier than against cruise missiles. However, one problem with UAVs is that they can be smuggled into and launched from the vicinity of the target area .
Any European anti-BM system must be able to deal with the above outlined current potential risk, but must also be able to evaluate to a level that can deal with future threats like CMs, multi-stage BMs and re-entry vehicles.
The currently needed system must be able to detect, identify, track, discriminate and interrogate, intercept and finally destroy any incoming BMs of the SCUD and NODONG families that are considered to be the baseline threat. In theory there are several different methods to achieve this goal. There are three systems available to do this kind of interception. It is good to remember that in case of a 3.500 km range missile you have about 15 minutes to destroy it before it hits its target.

Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies

Iranian missiles: the nature of the threat
Yiftah Shapir - Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies – 9 July 2003

On July 7, Iran announced that it had conducted the final test of its Shehab-3 medium-range ballistic missile. The Iranian announcement confirmed an earlier report in the Israeli media, and the Iranian spokesperson emphasized that the missile test was conducted a few weeks ago and that "there was nothing new in the Israeli reports." The Iranians also stressed that this was the last in a series of systems tests.
The Shehab-3 is a single stage ballistic missile and is based on the technology of the Soviet-built R-17 (Scud-B) ballistic missile. Its estimated range is 1,300 km – just enough to reach targets in Israel – and it can carry a payload of approximately 700 kg. For the time being, the Shehab-3 is thought to carry only conventional warheads but it is probably intended to carry a nuclear warhead if Iran manages to produce one small enough. A chemical or biological warhead is also a possibility.
The Shehab-3 project was started in the mid 1990's, soon after Iran acquired the capability to produce the Scud-B and Scud-C ballistic missiles. As early as 1994, it was assessed that North Korea had transferred prototypes of its No-Dong ballistic missile to Iran. The No-Dong is itself a development of the Scud missile. Like the Scud, it is a single-stage, liquid-fuelled missile, with a single engine – essentially a longer and thicker version of the Scud designed to achieve a range of 1,300 km. The Shehab-3 is thought to be identical to the No-Dong or a further refinement of it. (The Pakistani Ghauri missile also seems to be very similar to the No-Dong, thus, to the Shehab-3.)

Initial ground tests of the Shehab were carried out in 1997 and its first test flight took place in September 1998. Since then, several more tests have been run, but some of them were deemed to be failures. The first public view of the missile came in December 1998, when it was displayed on a mobile launcher in a military parade. In July 2000, the Commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) announced that the organization had formed five new ballistic missile units – apparently to be equipped with Shehab-3 missiles. In late 2001, American and Israeli intelligence sources estimated that Iran had begun serial production of the missile and would be able to produce up to 20 missiles a year.

Israelis have stressed the threat that the Iranian missile program poses to Israel. As far back as 1997, Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai warned that the missiles, coupled with the Iranian nuclear weapon program, constituted a serious danger to Israel. And in 1999, Brigadier General Amos Gilead, head of the military intelligence research department, said that Iran's weapon programs were the gravest threat to Israel's security.

Iranian speakers did not deny that the missile program was meant to counter-balance Israel's threats. For example, Brigadier General Safavi, Commander of the IRGC, said in December 2000 that "Iranian missiles can cause irreparable damage to either Israel or the United States." Nevertheless, the Iranians were quick to add that the missiles were for "defensive purposes."

Iran's missile program is not limited to the Shehab-3 and its engineers are working on longer range missiles, currently dubbed the "Shehab-4" and "Shehab-5." These are designed to achieve the ranges of 2,000 km and 5,000 km, respectively. However, the real significance of such missiles is not so much in their ability to hit more distant targets as in their ability to launch satellites into orbit. An Iranian-made satellite, even the simplest one, is a major goal of the program, if only because of the enormous prestige it would confer on Iran.

Israeli fears of Iran's missile program were apparently a bit premature, although not altogether unfounded. This week's announcement indicates that the missile weapon system was not ready for use until now. And even if the development phase is successfully concluded, Iran must still go through the production and system deployment phases. Notwithstanding Iranian claims that these objectives have also been met, it is reasonable to assume that those announcements are premature and that it might take another 2-3 years before the system is fully operational.

Whatever the case, the rationale behind the whole Iranian ballistic missile program means that Israeli threat assessments are serious. On the other hand, it is also necessary to recall that threats can be perceived from the opposition direction. For example, in his 1997 assessment of the emerging Iranian threat, Defense Minister Mordechai also warned that Israel would strike preemptively if Iran threatened to use its missiles. And Iranian strategists noted as early as 1992 that Israel's acquisition of the F-15I long-range attack aircraft jeopardized Iran's security.

In its present configuration, the Iranian system does not constitute a serious danger to Israel. Even if Iran can launch a small number of conventionally-armed missiles, the damage those missiles could do is comparable to the damage inflicted by the Iraqi "al-Hussayn" missiles fired on Israel in 1991. Of course, the danger would rise exponentially if and when Iran is able to deploy nuclear warheads on its missiles. But in that case, Iran would not only threaten Israel -- the Shehab-3 can cover targets in southern Russia, the Gulf States, Turkey, Pakistan and India, and it would also pose a threat to American interests throughout the region.

Israel's options to counter the threat are limited. A preemptive strike against Iran's missile or nuclear assets is problematic because the targets are too far away, too numerous and dispersed, and too well protected – some of them in deep underground installations. Thus, the remaining Israeli option against a nuclear-armed Iran would be deterrence – perhaps by abandoning the policy of ambiguity in favor of a declared nuclear posture. But since the problem would not be Israel's alone, it is reasonable to expect that the United States will act even before Israel does to make sure that the threat to its interests does not materialize.

Guardian

Iran parades new missiles daubed with threats to wipe Israel off map

Dan De Luce in Tehran – 23 September 2003

Iran yesterday defiantly showed off six of its new ballistic missiles daubed with anti-US and anti-Israel slogans in a move sure to reinforce international concern over the nature of its nuclear programme.

At the climax of a military parade marking the outbreak of the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war, the enormous Shehab-3 missiles were rolled out painted with the messages, "We will crush America under our feet' and "Israel must be wiped off the map."

Iran later announced that it would scale down cooperation with the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency. Ali Akbar Salehim, Tehran's envoy to the IAEA, said on state television that Iran had been allowing

the agency more oversight than required under the nuclear nonproliferation treaty "to show our goodwill and transparency."
The IAEA has imposed a strict deadline, saying Iran must prove it has no nuclear weapons programme by October 31. Its governing board has also demanded that Iran suspend uranium enrichment ac tivity and open its doors to unfettered inspections. If Tehran fails to comply, the UN security council could decide to impose sanctions.
The Shehab-3, which means "meteor" in Farsi, underwent final tests this year and has a range of about 810 miles, putting Israel and US bases in the Gulf within striking distance. It is based on the North Korean No-Dong and Pakistani Ghauri-11 medium-range missiles.
Israel suspects Iran's theocratic leadership may be planning to arm the weapons eventually with nuclear warheads. Yesterday's show of military prowess will do nothing to dispel US and European suspicions that Iran has ambitions to build an atomic bomb.
The parade marked the largest number of Shehab-3 missiles put on public display since the weapons were officially handed over to the hardline revolutionary guard for operation in July.
An announcer called the Shehab-3 a great achievement for the Islamic republic, shouting "God is Great" as trucks towed the weapons past a review stand of military officers and dignitaries. The announcer also said the missiles had an even longer range than previously believed but a defence ministry spokesman later said that it had been a mistake.
President Mohammad Khatami, who watched the parade, said in a speech that Iran faced threats from outside enemies but would not seek to obtain nuclear weapons.
"We are opposed to the spread of weapons of mass destruction and the very existence of atomic weapons," he said.
Mr Khatami's reformist allies in parliament have urged the clerical leadership to agree to snap inspections by the IAEA to defuse mounting international pressure.
But conservative figures have called for expelling UN inspectors and withdrawing from the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.
Iran has denied it has a weapons project and says its nuclear programme is designed to meet growing domestic demand for electricity.
In his speech, Mr Khatami said Iran would insist on its right to scientific development. "We will not renounce our right to become stronger in the domains of science and technology," he said.
The president, who referred to Israel as the "Zionist regime", also accused outside governments of hypocrisy by tolerating Israel's "considerable atomic arsenal".
"Even if we don't give a pretext to the enemy, they will find one," Mr Khatami added.
The parade opened Sacred Defence Week, which commemorates the war with the former Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. The conflict claimed hundreds of thousands of lives and no territory changed hands.

Straits Times

Iran parades missiles in response to N-deadline
24 September 2003

TEHERAN - Iran has made a public display of its mid-range Shooting Star missile for the first time, at a parade marking the 23rd anniversary of its war with Iraq.
Monday's show of force came as international pressure on Iran increased and the International Atomic Energy Agency set a deadline of Oct 31 for Teheran to allow full inspections of the country's nuclear sites.
Sand-coloured Shahab 3, or Shooting Star, missiles were paraded atop their mobile launchers and followed by Iranian-made tanks.
Shooting Star missiles, first tested successfully in 1998, were said to have a range of more than 1,300km - far enough to reach Israel or Turkey.
There are concerns they could be equipped to carry nuclear warheads.
On Monday, the parade commentator put the missiles' range closer to 1,600km, but it was unclear whether the range had really been increased or he was wrong.
'We are opposed to the spread of weapons of mass destruction and the very existence of atomic weapons,' Iranian President Muhammad Khatami told the crowd at a ceremony outside the Shrine of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder of the country's current Islamic government.
'Despite pressure from our enemies, we will pursue our policy of detente but we also insist on becoming stronger.'

Iran, which contends its nuclear programme is for energy and not weapons purposes, has refused to allow more aggressive nuclear inspections.
If the Atomic Energy Agency, an arm of the United Nations, concludes that Iran's nuclear programme is a threat, the country could face economic sanctions.
A senior Iranian official said on Monday the country would scale back its cooperation with the UN nuclear watchdog in response to the agency's Oct 31 deadline. -- New York Times, AP

Missile: nuclear capability

- The Shahab 3, or Shooting Star, missile was first tested successfully in 1998, but it was handed over officially to the military only in July of this year.
- It has been described as having a range of more than 1,300km, enough to reach Israel or Turkey.
- It can reportedly carry a warhead weighing up to 1,300kg.
- There is international concern about whether Iran intends to give the Shooting Star's warhead a nuclear capacity.

INTERNATIONAAL BELEID

IAEA

DOCUMENTEN

IAEA

Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran
Report by the IAEA Director General
6 June 2003 – derestricted at the meeting of the Board of Governors on 19 June 2003)

A. Introduction

1. At the meeting of the Board of Governors on 17 March 2003, the Director General reported on discussions taking place with the Islamic Republic of Iran (hereinafter referred to as Iran) on a number of safeguards issues that needed to be clarified and actions that needed to be taken with regard to the implementation of the Agreement between Iran and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the Safeguards Agreement)[1]. This report provides further information on the nature of the safeguards issues involved and the actions that need to be taken, and describes developments in this regard since March. More general reporting of safeguards implementation in Iran is not addressed in this document, but in the Safeguards Implementation Reports.[2]

B. Recent Developments

2. At the September 2002 regular session of the IAEA General Conference, Vice President of the Islamic Republic of Iran and President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), H.E. Mr. R. Aghazadeh, stated that Iran was "embarking on a long-term plan to construct nuclear power plants with a total capacity of 6000 MW within two decades". He also stated that such a sizeable project entailed "an all out planning, well in advance, in various field of nuclear technology such as fuel cycle, safety and waste management".

3. During the General Conference, the Director General met with the Vice President, and asked that Iran confirm whether it was building a large underground nuclear related facility at Natanz and a heavy water production plant at Arak, as reported in the media in August 2002. The Vice President provided some information on Iran's intentions to develop further its nuclear fuel cycle, and agreed on a visit to the two sites later in 2002 by the Director General, accompanied by safeguards experts, and to a discussion with Iranian authorities during that meeting on Iran's nuclear development plans.

4. The visit to Iran was originally scheduled for October 2002, but finally took place from 21 to 22 February 2003. The Director General was accompanied by the Deputy Director General for Safeguards (DDG-SG) and the Director of the Division of Safeguards Operations (B).

5. During his visit, the Director General was informed by Iran of its uranium enrichment programme, which was described as including two new facilities located at Natanz, namely a pilot fuel enrichment plant (PFEP) nearing completion of construction, and a large commercial-scale fuel enrichment plant (FEP) also under construction. These two facilities were declared to the Agency for the first time during that visit, at which time the Director General was able to visit both of them. Iran also confirmed that the heavy water production plant[3], referred to in paragraph 3 above, was under construction in Arak.

6. During the visit, the Director General was informed that Iran would accept modifications to its Subsidiary Arrangements, as requested by the Board of Governors in 1992[4], which would henceforth require the early provision of design information on new facilities and on modifications to existing facilities, as well as the early provision of information on new locations outside of facilities where nuclear material is customarily used (LOFs). This was confirmed to the Agency in a letter dated 26 February 2003 (see paragraph 15 below).

7. In addition, in response to the Agency's enquiry about certain transfers of nuclear material to Iran, only recently confirmed by the supplier State in response to repeated Agency enquiries, Iran acknowledged the receipt in 1991 of natural uranium, which had not been reported previously to the Agency, in the form of UF6 (1000 kg), UF4 (400 kg) and UO2 (400 kg), which was now being stored at the previously undecla red Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratories (JHL) located at the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre (TNRC). Iran also informed the Agency that it had converted most of the UF4 into uranium metal in 2000 at JHL. This information was subsequently confirmed by Iran in a separate letter to the Agency dated 26 February 2003.

8. During the discussions in Iran in February between DDG-SG and the Iranian authorities, reference was made by the Agency to information in open sources on the possible conduct of enrichment activities at the

workshop of the Kalaye Electric Company in Tehran. The Iranian authorities acknowledged that the workshop had been used for the production of centrifuge components, but stated that there had been no operations in connection with its centrifuge enrichment development programme involving the use of nuclear material, either at the Kalaye Electric Company or at any
other location in Iran. According to the Iranian authorities, all testing had been carried out using simulation studies. While a centrifuge component production facility is not a nuclear facility required to be declared to the Agency under Iran's NPT Safeguards Agreement, Iran was requested, in light of its stated policy of transparency, to permit the Agency to visit the workshop and to take environmental samples there to assist the Agency in verifying Iran's declaration and confirming the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. The request was initially declined. The Iranian authorities told the Agency that Iran considered such visits, and the requested environmental sampling, as being obligatory only when an Additional Protocol was in force. However, they subsequently agreed to permit access to the workshop (to limited parts of the location in March, and to the entire workshop in May), and have recently indicated that they would consider permitting the taking of environmental samples during the visit of the Agency's enrichment experts to Iran scheduled to take place between 7 and 11 June 2003 (see paragraph 11 below).

9. On 26 February 2003, a list of additional questions and requests for clarification was submitted to Iran regarding its centrifuge and laser enrichment programmes and its heavy water programme, and a written reply requested. A written response was received from Iran on 4 June 2003, and its contents will be followed up with the Iranian authorities.

10. In a letter dated 5 May 2003, Iran informed the Agency for the first time of its intention to construct a heavy water research reactor at Arak (the 40 MW(th) Iran Nuclear Research Reactor IR-40). Iran also informed the Agency of its plan to commence construction in 2003 of a fuel manufacturing plant at Esfahan (FMP).

11. During a meeting between the Vice President and the Director General on 5 May 2003, the Director General reiterated the Agency's earlier request for permission to send Agency inspectors to the workshop of the Kalaye Electric Company in Tehran, and to take environmental samples. The Director General also referred to an earlier proposal the Agency had made in April for a group of Agency experts to visit Iran to discuss the centrifuge research and development programme to seek to assess how the current status of the project could have been achieved without using any nuclear material during tests. Iran agreed to consider the proposal for an expert mission, and subsequently agreed that the mission could take place from 7 to 11 June 2003.

C. Implementation of Safeguards

12. Article 8 of Iran's Safeguards Agreement requires Iran to provide the Agency with information "concerning nuclear material subject to safeguards under the Agreement and the features of facilities relevant to safeguarding such material."

13. As provided for in Article 34(c) of the Safeguards Agreement, nuclear material of a composition and purity suitable for fuel fabrication or for being isotopically enriched, and any nuclear material produced at a later stage in the nuclear fuel cycle, is subject to all of the safeguards procedures specified in the Agreement. These procedures include, inter alia, requirements for Iran to report to the Agency changes in the inventory of nuclear material through the submission of inventory change reports (ICRs).[5] Certain inventory changes entail additional reporting requirements. These include the import of nuclear material in quantities in excess of one effective kilogram, which, in accordance with Article 95 of the Safeguards Agreement, requires reporting to the Agency in advance of the import.

14. To enable the Agency to verify the inventory and flow of nuclear material, Iran is also required to provide design information on facilities (as defined in Article 98.I of Iran's Safeguards Agreement), and information on LOFs. Pursuant to Article 42 of Iran's Safeguards Agreement, the time limit for the provision of design information on new nuclear facilities is to be specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, but in any event it is to be provided "as early as possible before nuclear material is introduced into a new facility". Article 49 requires that information on LOFs be provided "on a timely basis".

15. The Subsidiary Arrangements General Part in force with Iran from 1976 to 26 February 2003 included what was, until 1992, standard text which called for provision to the Agency of design information on a new facility no later than 180 days before the introduction of nuclear material into the facility, and the provision of information on a new LOF together with the report relating to the receipt of nuclear material at the LOF. With the acceptance by Iran on 26 February 2003 of the modifications to the Subsidiary Arrangements proposed by the Agency, the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part now requires Iran to inform the Agency of new nuclear facilities and modifications to existing facilities through the provision of preliminary design information as soon as the decision to construct, to authorize construction or to modify has been taken, and to

provide the Agency with further design information as it is developed. Information is to be provided early in the project definition, preliminary design, construction and commissioning phases.

C.1. Imported Nuclear Material

16. The UF6, UF4 and UO2 imported by Iran in 1991 are materials that, as provided for in Article 34(c) of Iran's Safeguards Agreement, are subject to all of the safeguards procedures specified in the Agreement, including, in particular, the requirement to report inventory changes. Therefore, Iran was obliged to have reported the import of the material in question at the time of import. Equally, Iran was obliged to have reported design information as soon as possible before nuclear material was introduced to the receiving facility, and a Facility Attachment concluded for that facility.

17. In its letter of 26 February 2003 confirming its receipt of the material in question, Iran stated that its interpretation of Articles 34(c) and 95 of the Safeguards Agreement had been that no reporting to the Agency was required since the total amount of uranium did not exceed one effective kilogram. However, as indicated in paragraph 13 above, all material referred to in Article 34(c) of the Safeguards Agreement must be reported to the Agency. Article 95 simply imposes an additional requirement, that of advance notification, with respect to imports of material in excess of one effective kilogram.

18. Iran submitted on 15 April 2003 an ICR with regard to the import of the nuclear material, and, on 5 May 2003, preliminary design information for JHL, where most of the material is currently being stored.

C.1.1. Processing of UF6

19. The Iranian authorities have stated that the imported UF6 has not been processed, and specifically that it has not been used in any enrichment, centrifuge or other tests. The one large and two small UF6 cylinders declared as containing the imported UF6 were shown to the Agency in February. The cylinders were made available for Agency verification at JHL in March, at which time, after the Agency inspectors noted that one of the small cylinders was lighter than declared, the State authorities explained that a small amount of the UF6 (1.9 kg) was missing due to leaking valves on the two small cylinders. It was explained during the subsequent inspection in April that the leaks had only been noticed a year before. Final evaluation will be completed when destructive samples have been taken, environmental samples have been analysed, and supporting documentation provided by the operator has been examined.

C.1.2. Processing of UF4

20. Iran has informed the Agency that most of the imported UF4 was converted to uranium metal at JHL. While the equipment for the conversion process has been dismantled and stored in a container (shown to the Agency during the February visit), Iran is now refurbishing that part of the facility as a uranium metal processing laboratory. The uranium metal, together with the remaining UF4 and the related waste, has been presented for Agency verification. Final evaluation will be done when the results of destructive analysis become available, and supporting documentation provided by the facility operator has been examined. The role of uranium metal in Iran's declared nuclear fuel cycle still needs to be fully understood, since neither its light water reactors nor its planned heavy water reactors require uranium metal for fuel.

C.1.3. Processing of UO2

21. During the February 2003 discussions, the Agency was informed by Iran that some of the imported UO2 had been used at JHL for the testing of uranium purification and conversion processes. The experiments involved the dissolution of UO2 with nitric acid, and the use of the resulting uranyl nitrate for testing a pulse column and ammonium uranyl carbonate (AUC) production processes envisioned for the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF), a facility declared to the Agency in 2000 and currently under construction at Esfahan. In April, in response to Agency enquiries, the Iranian authorities informed the Agency that some of the UO2 had also been used for isotope production experiments, including the undeclared irradiation of small amounts of the UO2, at the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). In addition, they informed the Agency that another small amount of UO2 had been used in pellets to test the chemical processes of the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production Facility (MIX Facility). The unused UO2 has been presented for Agency verification at JHL.

22. Most of the UO2 used in the UCF-related experiments has been presented for Agency verification as liquid waste at Esfahan; the remaining waste has been disposed of at a location near Qom and cannot be verified. The whereabouts of the AUC produced during the UCF-related experiments is being discussed. Final evaluation of the accountancy will be completed when the results of destructive analysis become available, and the supporting documentation provided by the facility operator has been examined.

23. With respect to the isotope production experiments, Iran has stated that small amounts of the imported UO2 were prepared for targets at JHL, irradiated at TRR, and sent to a laboratory belonging to the MIX Facility in Tehran for separation of I-131 in a lead-shielded cell. Iran has informed the Agency that the remaining nuclear waste was solidified and eventually transferred to a waste disposal site at Anarak. The operators at TRR and the MIX Facility have provided supporting documentation, which is being examined.

The Agency is still awaiting relevant updated design information for the MIX Facility and TRR. Plans are in place to visit the waste site at Anarak in June.

24. With respect to the UO2 to test the chemical processes of the MIX Facility, the material, including the resulting waste, has been presented for Agency verification at JHL. Final evaluation will be completed when the results of the destructive analysis become available, and supporting documentation provided by the facility operator has been examined.

C.2. Uranium Enrichment Programme

25. During the visit of the Director General in February 2003, the Vice President informed the Agency that over 100 of the approximately 1000 planned centrifuge casings had already been installed at the pilot plant and that the remaining centrifuges would be installed by the end of the year. In addition, he informed the Agency that the commercial scale enrichment facility, which is planned to contain over 50 000 centrifuges, was not scheduled to receive nuclear material in the near future.

26. The Agency has been informed that the pilot enrichment plant is scheduled to start operating in June 2003, initially with single machine tests, and later with increasing numbers of centrifuges. The Iranian authorities have also informed the Agency that the commercial enrichment plant is planned to start accepting centrifuges in early 2005, after the design is confirmed by the tests to be conducted in the pilot enrichment plant. Iran has also stated that the design and research and development work, which had been started about five years ago, were based on extensive modelling and simulation, including tests of centrifuge rotors both with and without inert gas, and that the tests of the rotors, carried out on the premises of the Amir Khabir University and the AEOI in Tehran, were conducted without nuclear material.

27. In May 2003, Iran provided preliminary design information on the enrichment facilities under construction in Natanz, which are being examined by the Agency. Since March 2003, Agency inspectors have visited facilities at Natanz three times to conduct design information verification and to take environmental samples at the pilot enrichment plant. A first series of environmental and destructive analysis samples has been taken at a number of locations. Additional samples are expected to be taken in the near future. Iran has co-operated with the Agency in this regard. The Agency has presented to the Iranian authorities a safeguards approach for the pilot enrichment plant.

28. As indicated above, on 26 February 2003, the Agency forwarded a number of questions regarding Iran's research and development on centrifuges, including the chronology of its enrichment programme, with a view to assessing, inter alia, Iran's declaration that it had been developed without the centrifuges having been tested with UF6 process gas. Similar questions and concerns have been raised by the Agency in relation to the UO2, UF4 and UF6 production at the large scale conversion facility UCF, which is stated to have been constructed without any testing, even on a small scale, of key processes.

29. The Agency is also pursuing enquiries into Iran's laser programme. Iran has acknowledged the existence of a substantial programme on lasers, and Agency inspectors have visited some locations said to have been involved in that programme. However, Iran has stated that no enrichment related laser activities have taken place.

C.3. Heavy Water Programme

30. According to information provided by the Iranian authorities (see Section B above), the Iranian heavy water reactor programme consists of the heavy water production plant currently under construction at Arak; the 40 MW(th) IR-40, construction of which is planned to start at Arak in 2004; and the FMP at Esfahan, construction of which is planned for 2003, commissioning for 2006 and commencement of operation for 2007.

31. The stated purposes of the IR-40, which will use natural UO2 fuel and heavy water (both as a coolant and as a moderator), are reactor research and development, radioisotope production and training. The stated purpose of the FMP is fabrication of fuel assemblies for the IR-40 and for the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP).

D. Findings and Initial Assessment

32. Iran has failed to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material, the subsequent processing and use of that material and the declaration of facilities where the material was stored and processed. These failures, and the actions taken thus far to correct them, can be summarized as follows:

(a) Failure to declare the import of natural uranium in 1991, and its subsequent transfer for further processing. On 15 April 2003, Iran submitted ICRs on the import of the UO2, UF4 and UF6. Iran has still to submit ICRs on the transfer of the material for further processing and use.

(b) Failure to declare the activities involving the subsequent processing and use of the imported natural uranium, including the production and loss of nuclear material, where appropriate, and the production and transfer of waste resulting therefrom. Iran has acknowledged the production of uranium metal, uranyl nitrate,

ammonium uranyl carbonate, UO2 pellets and uranium wastes. Iran must still submit ICRs on these inventory changes.

(c) Failure to declare the facilities where such material (including the waste) was received, stored and processed. On 5 May 2003, Iran provided preliminary design information for the facility JHL. Iran has informed the Agency of the locations where the undeclared processing of the imported natural uranium was conducted (TRR and the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Centre), and provided access to those locations. It has provided the Agency access to the waste storage facility at Esfahan, and has indicated that access would be provided to Anarak, as well as the waste disposal site at Qom.

(d) Failure to provide in a timely manner updated design information for the MIX Facility and for TRR. Iran has agreed to submit updated design information for the two facilities.

(e) Failure to provide in a timely manner information on the waste storage at Esfahan and at Anarak. Iran has informed the Agency of the locations where the waste has been stored or discarded. It has provided the Agency access to the waste storage facility at Esfahan, and has indicated that access will be provided to Anarak.

33. Although the quantities of nuclear material involved have not been large[6], and the material would need further processing before being suitable for use as the fissile material component of a nuclear explosive device, the number of failures by Iran to report the material, facilities and activities in question in a timely manner as it is obliged to do pursuant to its Safeguards Agreement is a matter of concern. While these failures are in the process of being rectified by Iran, the process of verifying the correctness and completeness of the Iranian declarations is still ongoing.

34. The Agency is continuing to pursue the open questions, including through:

(a) The completion of a more thorough expert analysis of the research and development carried out by Iran in the establishment of its enrichment capabilities. This will require the submission by Iran of a complete chronology of its centrifuge and laser enrichment efforts, including, in particular, a description of all research and development activities carried out prior to the construction of the Natanz facilities. As agreed to by Iran, this process will also involve discussions in Iran between Iranian authorities and Agency enrichment experts on Iran's enrichment programme, and visits by the Agency experts to the facilities under construction at Natanz and other relevant locations.

(b) Further follow-up on information regarding allegations about undeclared enrichment of nuclear material, including, in particular, at the Kalaye Electric Company. This will require permission for the Agency to carry out environmental sampling at the workshop located there.

(c) Further enquiries about the role of uranium metal in Iran's nuclear fuel cycle.

(d) Further enquiries about Iran's programme related to the use of heavy water, including heavy water production and heavy water reactor design and construction.

35. The Director General has repeatedly encouraged Iran to conclude an Additional Protocol. Without such protocols in force, the Agency's ability to provide credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear activities is limited. This is particularly the case for States, like Iran, with extensive nuclear activities and advanced fuel cycle technologies. In the view of the Director General, the adherence by Iran to an Additional Protocol would therefore constitute a significant step forward. The Director General will continue to keep the Board informed of developments.

Notes:

1 The Safeguards Agreement, reproduced in document INFCIRC/214, entered into force on 15 May 1974.

2 The Agency has been applying safeguards at a range of facilities in Iran since the mid-1970s pursuant to its Safeguards Agreement. The list of facilities under safeguards is set out in the Annex to this report.

3 Heavy water production facilities are not nuclear facilities under comprehensive NPT safeguards agreements, and are thus not required to be declared to the Agency thereunder.

4 GOV/2552/Att.2/Rev.2; GOV/OR/777, paras. 74-76.

5 Inventory changes, as defined in Article 98.J of Iran's Safeguards Agreement, include, for example, imports, exports, domestic receipts and shipments, production of nuclear material in a reactor, loss of nuclear material due to its transformation into other elements or isotopes as a result of nuclear reactions, accidental losses of nuclear material and the generation of waste from processing which is deemed to be unrecoverable for the time being but which is stored.

6 The total amount of material, approximately 1.8 tonnes, is 0.13 effective kilograms of uranium. This is, however, not insignificant in terms of a State's ability to conduct nuclear research and development activities.

BERICHTEN

ANP

Iran blijft wapeninspecteurs weigeren
2 juni 2003

TEHERAN (ANP) - Iran blijft bij zijn weigering om onaangekondigde wapeninspecties toe te staan. Het land staat onder toenemende druk van de internationale gemeenschap om een extra protocol van het non-proliferatieverdrag te tekenen, dat die inspecties regelt.
De internationale gemeenschap maakt zich zorgen over het wapenarsenaal van Iran. Rusland helpt het land met het bouwen van de eerste kerncentrale in het zuiden van Iran. Maar zelfs Rusland heeft Teheran opgeroepen de inspecteurs toe te laten op verdachte locaties.
,,We tekenen geen enkel internationaal akkoord als het westen zijn verplichtingen volgens het non-proliferatieverdrag niet nakomt. Volgens dat verdrag moet het westen ons helpen met nucleaire technologie voor vreedzame burgerdoeleinden", aldus het ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken.
Teheran heeft maandag geëist dat de VS excuses aan de internationale gemeenschap aanbieden wegens de in het verleden verleende steun aan de terreurgroep al-Qaeda. Ook dat maakte het ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken maandag bekend. De woordvoerder herinnerde aan de jaren '80 toen de VS islamitische groepen en Arabieren financieel hebben geholpen in hun strijd tegen Sovjettroepen in Afghanistan. Daar is het terreurnetwerk van Osama bin Laden ontstaan. De VS beschuldigen nu Iran ervan terreurgroepen te helpen of ze in elk geval niet aan te pakken.

CNN

Source: U.N. nuclear agency faults Iran
Tehran working to fix breach, IAEA expected to report
6 June 2003

(CNN) --The International Atomic Energy Agency is reporting that Iran has failed to meet its obligations under an international nuclear safeguards agreement, a diplomatic source told CNN on Friday.
In a report expected to be released this month, the IAEA says Iran is taking steps to rectify the situation, according to the diplomat, who spoke from Vienna, Austria.
The IAEA is the nuclear watchdog of the United Nations.
"Iran has failed to meet its obligations under its safeguards agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material, the subsequent processing and use of that material and the declaration of facilities where that material was stored and processed," the report says, according to the diplomat, who added that the quantities at issue are not large.
An IAEA spokeswoman had no comment.
Hamid Assefi, a spokesman for the Iranian Foreign Ministry, said Iran has not seen the report and therefore had no response.
Iran is a signatory of the International Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
Senior Bush administration officials have called the report "very helpful" and said they believe it will help convince Russia and other key governments that Iran might be trying to build nuclear weapons and must be stopped.
"It lays out a lot of information about potential violations" of the nonproliferation treaty, a senior official told CNN. "It should set the stage for action in 10 days time by the IAEA."
Bush administration officials have long accused Iran of attempting to develop nuclear weapons. White House spokesman Ari Fleischer said in March that the United States rejects Iran's claim that it is developing nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, such as power plants.
In December 2002, the U.S. State Department said satellite photos reinforced the belief that Iran was "actively working" on a nuclear weapons program.
IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei is to present the report at a meeting of the agency's board of governors June 16, the diplomatic source said.

Washington Post

Iran Denies Violating Arms Treaty
Associated Press – 8 June 2003

TEHRAN -- Iran has not breached an international nuclear nonproliferation agreement, a spokesman for the country's nuclear organization said today.
Khalil Mousavi of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization made the comments as a team of International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors arrived to assess the nation's atomic activities. A report by the U.N. agency claims Iran has not kept promises to safeguard nuclear material.
"We have not violated the NPT," he said, referring to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. "A person who hasn't done anything wrong will not be worried about such allegations."
The United States contends that Iran has a covert nuclear weapons program and wants the IAEA to declare its government in violation of the international treaty.
Iran has said it has no plans to develop nuclear weapons. "Repetition of U.S. allegations will not make it true," Mousavi said.
Iran will study the IAEA report after it officially receives the document and will respond to it when the agency's board meets June 16, Mousavi said.
A diplomat from an IAEA member state said Friday the report indicated Iran had not declared the importing of some nuclear material and its subsequent processing.

CNN

Iran 'didn't report' N-activities
16 June 2003

VIENNA, Austria (CNN) --The chief of the U.N.'s energy watchdog has called on Iran to "provide credible assurances" about its nuclear program after a report criticized Tehran for failing to report on certain materials and activities.
Mohamed ElBaradei, director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, made the call as a report reveals the agency had some concerns "with regard to the correctness and completeness of Iran's declaration to ensure that all nuclear material in Iran has been declared and is under safeguards."
The report was handed to the 35-nation IAEA governing board of diplomats Monday at the beginning of a week-long meeting behind closed doors in Vienna, Austria.
ElBaradei toured Iran's nuclear facilities in February, including Natanz about 200 miles (320 kilometers) south of Tehran. He was reportedly shocked by how much further along the plant had been developed than previously believed. The IAEA has made about six trips since then.
Washington accuses Iran of developing a nuclear arms capability, with some experts predicting Tehran will have a bomb by 2006.
The Iranians deny such a charge and say they want the nuclear material to generate electricity ahead of falling oil supplies.
ElBaradei said there were a number of "open questions" with regard to Iran's nuclear program.
But "corrective actions are being taken in cooperation with the Iranian authorities," the leaked report said.
Intensive inspections would go on, IAEA's spokeswoman Melissa Fleming told CNN Monday. "It is not a final report and we expect more reporting in the future," she added.
One area of outstanding concern was the agency's inability to collect environmental samples at Kalaye Electric Company's site "where allegations about [uranium] enrichment activities exist."
The IAEA also wants Iran to sign an Additional Protocol to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which would give nuclear inspectors unfettered access to facilities without the need for prior notice.
Iran has offered to allow more monitoring in exchange for advanced technology.
Under the treaty, members gain access to technology to build peaceful programs. Iran needs expertise to build advanced reactors.
In a separate move, the European Union is due Monday to demand that Iran accepts "urgency and unconditionally" tougher inspections, linking compliance to a pending trade deal.

Iran considering stricter inspections

Iran said on Monday it was considering accepting the stricter U.N. inspections, but had made no final decision on the subject.

Despite calls from the U.N., the European Union, Russia and the United States, Iran has so far refused to sign the additional protocol.

"We have not yet decided about signing the additional protocol, but we are studying it with a positive view," Iran's Atomic Energy Organization spokesman Khalil Mousavi told Reuters.

Spokesman for Iran's Foreign Ministry, Hamid Reza Asefi, told reporters he hoped the board will not cave into alleged U.S. pressures on its nuclear program.

He said the U.S. had launched "a psychological war" to influence the IAEA so the agency would act according to its wishes.

"We hope the agency will act with diligence understand the situation," said Asefi.

Gholamreza Aghazadeh, Iran's nuclear chief, told The Associated Press: "We want the [IAEA] to end discrimination against us and allow all member states equal access to nuclear technology."

ElBaradei was also expected to brief diplomats on North Korea, which expelled all U.N. inspectors in December, and Iraq, where the IAEA has been investigating reports of looting at the country's main atomic facility.

Iran's nuclear program has been an issue between the U.S. and Russia.

Since 1995, Russia has been helping Iran build a nuclear power plant near Bushehr -- a deal worth at least $800 million to Moscow.

But Russia's stance could be shifting. President Vladimir Putin has given signals that it could be prepared to put more pressure on Tehran, CNN's Moscow Bureau Chief Jill Dougherty reported.

Georgy Mamdedov, Russian deputy foreign minister, told CNN: "I can only assure you of one thing. We are for the strictest possible observance of the NPT Treaty.

"This is the highest priority for us. And this is higher than any material gain from any nuclear contract with any country."

The Russian foreign ministry says: "If the IAEA has questions for Iran, ... Russia will support the agency ... and that will influence Russia's future plans on cooperating with Iran."

Guardian

UN watchdog presses Iran on nuclear inspections

Even Russia now fears Tehran is on the way to an independent ability to make a bomb

Ian Traynor and Dan De Luce – 16 June 2003

Amid growing fears in America, Europe and Russia that Iran could develop an atomic bomb within the next few years, United Nations officials meet today to try to decide how to tackle the threat of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.

The International Atomic Energy Agency is under strong pressure from the United States to accuse Tehran of non-compliance with its obligations under the 1970 nuclear non-proliferation treaty. However, the UN watchdog's 35-strong board is likely to opt for a milder reprimand in order to keep diplomatic channels with Iran open.

A "non-compliance" declaration would entail reporting Iran to the UN security council and could trigger sanctions and isolation. Instead, according to a leaked report to the meeting by the IAEA chief, Mohamed ElBaradei, the meeting will conclude that Iran has "failed in its obligations" to report its nuclear activities to the watchdog.

Washington insists that Iran is engaged in a clandestine nuclear weapons project. Initial scepticism in Europe and Russia about hawkish US claims has given way in recent months to suspicions about Tehran's activities.

The Iranians imported small amounts of uranium from China in 1991. They failed to report this to the Vienna-based IAEA, declined to say what they were doing with the nuclear material and omitted to disclose how and where it was being stored.

At Natanz, 200 miles south of Tehran, the Iranians have built an underground pilot complex of centrifuges for enriching uranium, and plan to build a much bigger system of 5,000 centrifuges which could be operational within two years and which, say US officials and international atomic experts, could lead to an Iranian bomb by 2006.

Dr ElBaradei was the first outsider to be given access to the Natanz operation in February. He was said to be stunned by its sophistication.

"It's clear the Iranians have mastered the [uranium] enrichment technology which puts them in a [nuclear] club of 10," said a well-connected diplomat in Vienna.
UN inspectors flew to Tehran at the weekend, hoping to be able to take samples at Iranian sites. Last week, another team of three IAEA inspectors was barred from taking swabs of environmental samples at the Kalaye electricity plant in Tehran where centrifuge components have been built and tested. The samples would have revealed whether the testing was conducted with nuclear material, in breach of Iran's international obligations. The suspicion is that the Kalaye plant has been used illicitly to enrich a small amount of uranium.
The inspectors, according to a diplomatic source in Vienna, "need access to other places to take samples and to see if they've been playing around with enrichment of nuclear materials that haven't been declared. They say they haven't, but that stretches credibility."
Given the rising international anxiety, the key IAEA demand is that Iran sign up for a more transparent regime of snap inspections, allowing IAEA teams to go anywhere, any time, at 24 hours notice - an operation similar to that performed by the UN arms inspectors in Iraq.
In Brussels today, the European Union will step up the international pressure by linking an EU-Iran trade deal to progress on answering the nuclear questions, and calling on Tehran to agree to the snap inspections "urgently and unconditionally".
Russia, which has traditionally pooh-poohed allegations of an Iranian bomb project, is also now voicing concern. Russia is the sole supplier of nuclear technology and expertise to Iran and is helping to build an atomic power plant at Bushehr in the south. Given its influence, Moscow is in a strong position to persuade the Iranians to accept the snap inspections, say western diplomats.
Despite the international pressure, however, Iran appears determined to press ahead with its ambitious nuclear programme in an attempt to pre-empt any US moves to secure "regime change".

Deterrent
Iran is anxious about growing American military power in the region and Washington's tough rhetoric, and sees the nuclear programme as a possible deterrent.
Sayeed Leylaz, a senior analyst at Sharif University in Tehran, said: "Iraq's experience shows that nothing can stop a US attack if that's what Washington wants. But North Korea's experience shows that maybe one thing can stop the United States - the threat of an atomic bomb."
Iran is also seeking to use the negotiations over snap inspections to get US-led sanctions lifted. Kamal Kharrazi, Tehran's foreign minister, said recently: "If all the sanctions, pressures and restrictions against Iran are lifted and nuclear technology for peaceful purposes is put at its disposal, Iran will sign the [inspections] protocol."
In the meantime, as Washington ratchets up the pressure, Iran believes that agreeing to more elaborate inspections would be tantamount to capitulation. Mr Leylaz said: "The more we withdraw from our plans and the more concessions we offer, the more arrogant the US will be."
The Iranians also argue that they are living in a dangerous region, and point to India's, Pakistan's, and Israel's possession of nuclear arsenals, as well as the former Iraqi regime's clandestine bomb project that was well-advanced until thwarted by the international community.
Unlike North Korea, Iran is not believed to possess nuclear weapons and it has yet to be found in violation of the 1970 non-proliferation treaty, which it has signed.
However, western governments suspect that Iran may have received crucial technical advice for a weapons programme from experts in Pakistan, Russia or other former Soviet states and may no longer require outside assistance.
To allay Washington's concerns, Moscow promised it would provide all the nuclear fuel needed for the Bushehr plant and then transport spent fuel back to Russia to prevent it from being diverted for weapons purposes.
But despite years of negotiations, the agreement on the repatriation of spent fuel is not yet concluded. And to Russia's embarrassment, Iran announced earlier this year that it would mine and enrich its own uranium and manage the entire fuel cycle, including spent nuclear material, meaning it could produce weapons-grade uranium and plutonium.
Tehran says it needs to secure its own fuel supply because it plans to build several new plants over the next 20 years. But arms-control experts argue that even if it does construct more nuclear plants, buying fuel commercially from foreign suppliers is much cheaper and simpler.

CNN

IAEA meets on Iran nuclear program
16 June 2003

VIENNA, Austria --The International Atomic Energy Agency agency is discussing the sensitive issue of Iran's nuclear program at a board of governors meeting in Vienna.
Monday's meeting of the 35-nation board of the U.N. nuclear watchdog comes 10 days after an internal report claiming that Iran failed to honor promises to disclose its use of nuclear material. Some U.S. experts say that Tehran could have a nuclear bomb developed by 2006.
Since 1995, Russia has been helping Iran to build a nuclear power plant near Bushehr -- a deal worth at least $800 million to Moscow.
Both countries deny a nuclear arms program and say it is purely for civilian purposes, to provide light-water reactors for a power plant.
The meeting of the IAEA board, which is expected to last several days, was being held behind closed doors with no news conference scheduled once the session is over.
However, an address Monday by Secretary General Dr Mohamed ElBaradei was being published on the agency's Web site.
ElBaradei is also expected to brief diplomats from the board on North Korea, which expelled all U.N. inspectors in December, and Iraq, where the IAEA is investigating reports of looting at the country's main atomic facility.
The U.S. wants the IAEA to declare Iran in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Under the treaty, the declared nuclear powers of the 1960s -- the United States, China, France, Russia and Britain -- agreed to reduce their arsenals, ensure that nuclear technology was used only for peaceful purposes, and stop the spread of nuclear weapons.
But the treaty has failed to discourage other nations -- such as India and Pakistan -- from developing nuclear weapons. Israel is widely believed to have nuclear arms, though it is unconfirmed. North Korea is also suspected of developing nuclear weapons.
There are also continued worries terrorists might get their hands on nuclear material.
ElBaradei toured Iran's nuclear facilities in February. The visit was intended to ensure that Iran's nuclear program was limited to peaceful, civilian purposes and that the facilities were safe.
His visit included a trip to the incomplete nuclear plant in Natanz, about 200 miles (320 kilometers) south of Tehran.
Diplomatic sources quoted by TIME say he found the plant much further along than previously believed. The sources say work on the plant is "extremely advanced," involves hundreds of gas centrifuges ready to produce enriched uranium and "the parts for a thousand others ready to be assembled."
The IAEA wants Tehran to allow inspectors unfettered access to its facilities without prior notice. Iran has offered to allow more monitoring in exchange for advanced technology.
Under the treaty, members gain access to technology to build peaceful programs. Iran needs expertise to build advanced reactors.
"We want the (IAEA) to end discrimination against us and allow all member states equal access to nuclear technology," Gholamreza Aghazadeh, Iran's nuclear chief, told The Associated Press.
Russia's support for the Iran nuclear program became a major stumbling block in recent U.S.-Russian relations. But now, there are signs coming from Russian President Vladimir Putin that Moscow's position could be shifting, CNN's Moscow Bureau Chief Jill Dougherty reported.
Georgy Mamdedov, Russian deputy foreign minister, told CNN: "I can only assure you of one thing. We are for the strictest possible observance of the NPT Treaty.
"This is the highest priority for us. And this is higher than any material gain from any nuclear contract with any country."
Russia says it will not provide nuclear fuel for the Bushehr plant until Iran signs a new agreement to return spent fuel to Russia -- which it says it is about to do.
The Russian foreign ministry says: "If the IAEA has questions for Iran... Russia will support the agency... and that will influence Russia's future plans on cooperating with Iran."

Guardian

UN watchdog rejects US ultimatum but pushes Tehran to reveal nuclear details
Ian Traynor – 20 June 2003

The UN increased pressure on Iran yesterday to divulge more details of its nuclear programmes in order to establish whether Tehran is engaged in a clandestine quest for a nuclear bomb.
At the end of two days of debate in Vienna, the 35-member board of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the UN's nuclear watchdog, demanded that Iran answer questions on its nuclear policies, and grant greater access to IAEA inspectors.
But the statement by the board and remarks by the IAEA chief, Mohamed ElBaradei, stopped short of American demands for an ultimatum to Iran. On Wednesday President George Bush said for the first time that the US would "not tolerate" Iran's possession of a nuclear bomb.
At the meeting in Vienna, the US, backed by Britain, Canada, and Australia, pushed for a toughly worded resolution condemning Iran and insisted on unconditional and comprehensive inspections of Iran's nuclear facilities by the IAEA.
Such a resolution, which would have been "contentious and divisive" according to diplomats in Vienna, required a majority of the 35 states represented voting in favour. The US could not muster the majority and backed down. Instead Mr ElBaradei issued the statement reflecting the consensus at the meeting.
While calling on Iran to sign an "additional protocol" with the IAEA, which would afford the nuclear inspectors greater rights for snap inspections of suspect sites, the statement was milder than that sought by the US and avoided a split in the IAEA's board.
Washington insists that Iran is engaged in an illicit bomb-making programme. But the IAEA is unconvinced, although it is worried about Iran's failures to keep it posted on key elements in Tehran's nuclear projects.
Iran failed to report the import of a small amount of uranium from China 12 years ago. It has converted a small part of the uranium into uranium metal, which is not needed in civilian nuclear power, but is useful for weapons development. Iran is building a highly ambitious and sophisticated system of tens of thousands of centrifuges which could enrich uranium to the extent needed for a weapon. It is also building a heavy water power plant at Arak that can generate weapons-grade plutonium, but which appears to contradict its declared peaceful nuclear power aims.
Officials have blocked UN inspectors from a Tehran electricity company which has been making and testing centrifuge components, reportedly using enriched uranium to test the machines. The IAEA's statement called on Iran to suspend its plans to enrich uranium at the centrifuge complex until it was clear for what the enriched uranium would be used. The statement said Tehran should "grant the agency all access deemed necessary".
If granted, such access would go beyond the scrutiny that Iran is currently obliged to allow under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.
IAEA officials said their inspections in Iran are a "work in progress" and were worried that a US ultimatum would have jeopardised their chances of maintaining access in Iran.
Diplomatic sources and arms control experts in Vienna believe that Iran is five years away from possessing a nuclear bomb, although a Russian arms control thinktank's analysis last week concluded it could have nuclear-tipped missiles by 2006.
The sources also did not discount the possibility of selective American air strikes on Iran's nuclear facilities, as implied by Mr Bush's assertion that Washington could pre-empt Iran possessing a nuclear bomb.
Any such strike would lead to an international furore. Russia, in particular, would be incensed, since it is the sole supplier of nuclear technology and expertise to Iran and has $800m (£480m) at stake in the nuclear power plant it is building at Bushehr in southern Iran.
Iranian and Russian officials yesterday voiced satisfaction with the results of the Vienna meeting, although the Americans are now pushing for the IAEA to issue a further report on Iran earlier than the scheduled date of September.

CNN

Iran refuses to let IAEA take soil samples
From Kasra Naji – 20 June 2003

TEHRAN, Iran (CNN) --Iran announced Friday that it will not allow inspectors to take environmental samples from suspected nuclear sites despite international pressure to do so.
Gholam Reza Aghazadeh, head of the Iran Atomic Energy Organization, said on state-run television that agreements Iran signed with the International Atomic Energy Agency do not allow the U.N. inspectors to test soil samples.
Earlier this month, Iranian officials refused to allow the IAEA inspectors to take samples from the site of a suspected nuclear facility near the Iranian capital. "If the issue only concerned one site only, we could be less stringent and allow them to do that," he said. "But the problem is there is no end to this, and soon they would be asking to take environmental samples from a dozen sites, and this is not acceptable to us."
Aghazadeh's comment came a day after the IAEA officials urged Iran to grant its inspectors full access, "including taking of environmental samples."
The United States has called on Iran to prove its nuclear plans do not include building weapons. The Bush administration believes Iran is developing a nuclear arms capability and rejects Tehran's insistence that it is developing nuclear facilities to provide electricity.
In his 2002 State of the Union address, President Bush included Iran as part of what he called an "axis of evil," along with Iraq and North Korea. Although Iran signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, many Iranians back a robust nuclear policy, even a nuclear weapons program. They say they do not see why Iran should not be a nuclear power when Pakistan, India and other world powers have nuclear weapons. Israel is also widely believed to have nuclear weapons but has never acknowledged it.
More than 150 members of the Iranian parliament have signed a statement backing the government's nuclear policies and have urged it not to give in to international pressure.
Iran has refused to sign the so-called Additional Protocol, which would allow IAEA inspectors to carry out inspections with little or no notice.

Reuters

Iran Backs Away from Nuclear Row, Vows Cooperation
By Paul Hughes – 21 June 2003

TEHRAN - Iran backed away from confrontation over its nuclear program on Saturday, saying it was ready to cooperate more actively with U.N. inspectors to dispel doubts about the Islamic republic's nuclear ambitions.
"We will definitely try to cooperate more than before with the IAEA and give them the necessary assurances about Iran's activities," the head of Iran's atomic energy program, Gholamreza Aghazadeh, told a news conference in Tehran.
Iran has faced mounting pressure in recent weeks from the International Atomic Energy Agency, the U.N. nuclear watchdog, and the United States over the nature of its nuclear program.
The IAEA reprimanded Iran on Thursday for repeatedly failing to report nuclear material, facilities and activities as required under its safeguards agreement with the agency. It urged Iran to remain "transparent" and accept without delay or conditions more intrusive, short-notice inspections.
Taking a conciliatory line, Aghazadeh said Iran was positive and optimistic about reaching an agreement with the IAEA on an additional protocol the U.N. agency has asked Iran to sign to allow more intrusive nuclear inspections and at short notice.
"We have never said we don't want to sign the Additional Protocol...Our view about the protocol is positive," he said. "Naturally, the way we will choose is the way of cooperation and reaching an acceptable settlement for both sides."
Asked in Jordan about Aghazadeh's latest comments, IAEA chief Mohammed ElBaradei said he would welcome Iran's cooperation. "I have lots of confidence that Iran will understand that it is in its best interest to work with the International Atomic Energy Agency," he told Reuters at an economic meeting.
"The more cooperative they are, the more transparent they are, the more confidence they can create in the international community and the quicker we can resolve the whole nuclear issue in Iran, " he said.

Washington believes Iran is secretly seeking to develop an atomic weapons program and on Friday warned that the United States reserved the right to use military action to stop Tehran making such weapons. Iran says it merely wants to diversify its electricity generation sources and has foresworn nuclear arms.

Question over environmental samples

Aghazadeh told the Tehran news conference Iran was ready to discuss the general issue of environmental samples with the IAEA. But earlier on Saturday, he reiterated Iran's resistance to IAEA requests for permission to take samples at the Kalaye Electric Company in Tehran.

Allowing IAEA inspectors to take samples there would expose Iran to a rash of similar requests, Aghazadeh said. "We've had no problem concerning environmental samples, but we've been telling the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) that this location is a non-nuclear location," Aghazadeh told state television.

Under its current IAEA nuclear safeguards obligations, Tehran is not required to permit environmental sampling at Kalaye since it is not an officially declared nuclear facility.

The United States has stepped up its campaign to force Iran to come clean over its nuclear ambitions, demanding that it abide by the international nuclear non-proliferation treaty and sign the new protocol allowing snap inspections.

John Bolton, U.S. undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, told BBC radio on Friday: "The president has repeatedly said that all options are on the table, but (military action) is not only not our preference, it is far, far from our minds." But when pressed, he said: "It has to be an option."

Domestic tensions

The IAEA's ElBaradei has pressed Iran to permit the U.N. agency to take environmental samples from a Kalaye workshop where parts for uranium-enrichment centrifuges have been built and tested, to confirm Iran did not test its centrifuges with nuclear material without telling the IAEA.

Iran denies live testing of its centrifuges, which experts say would be capable of producing highly-enriched uranium useable in nuclear weapons and could be considered a violation of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Reuters

IAEA Urges More Cooperation from Iran

By Peg Mackey – 22 June 2003

DEAD SEA, Jordan - The head of the U.N.'s nuclear watchdog urged Iran Sunday to cooperate more to ease global concerns about its nuclear program, and said it would take several more months to inspect it fully.

"We have seen some cooperation, but I'd like to see that cooperation accelerated...extended," Mohammed ElBaradei told Reuters in an interview on the sidelines of a World Economic Forum meeting in Jordan.

"It's a good beginning, but I'd like to see more cooperation...Hopefully in the next two to three months we should be able to have a good picture of how things are."

Thursday, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reprimanded Iran for repeatedly failing to report nuclear material, facilities and activities as required under its safeguards agreement with the agency.

It urged Iran to remain "transparent" and accept without delay or conditions more intrusive, short-notice inspections.

Amid mounting international tension over Iran's nuclear program, Tehran said Saturday it was ready to cooperate more actively with U.N. inspectors to dispel doubts about the Islamic republic's nuclear ambitions.

"We still have a lot of questions to ask about the dimension of Iran's nuclear program," ElBaradei said.

"The jury is still out. We are not in a position to come to a definitive conclusion on Iran's program at this stage. I hope Iran will show as much cooperation and transparency as possible, because the more transparency they show, the more confidence we can build in the international community."

ElBaradei said his main concern was to ensure Iran had declared all of its nuclear material and that the program was dedicated to peaceful purposes.

Washington Post

Iran's nuclear deadline

Ultimatum over US suspicion that Tehran is building bomb

Ian Traynor in Vienna, Dan De Luce in Tehran and Ewen MacAskill – 13 September 2003

The worsening international crisis over Iran's suspected nuclear bomb programme escalated last night when the UN set Tehran a deadline of 45 days to come clean on its nuclear activities.

Failure to comply by Iran, whose diplomats walked out of a meeting in Vienna yesterday in protest at the deadline, could lead to the imposition of UN sanctions.

Both the US and Britain suspect the Islamic Republic of secretly seeking to build a nuclear weapon, a charge it denies.

But the International Atomic Energy Authority, the Vienna-based UN organisation, yesterday called on Tehran to suspend all uranium enriched activities after traces of weapons-grade uranium were found at Natanz, a civilian nuclear facility.

Mohammed El Baradei, the IAEA chief, said the deadline and the terms of the resolution sent "a very powerful message to Iran to cooperate fully and immediately".

The crisis brings confrontation between Iran and the US a step nearer. The US has been lobbying the IAEA to take a tough line with Tehran.

Despute still being bogged down in Iraq, President George Bush yesterday signalled that the US was prepared to take action against any country it believed posed a threat to it.

The day after the second anniversary of the attacks on New York and Washington, Mr Bush said: "In this new kind of war, America has followed a new strategy. We are not waiting for further attacks on our citizens. We are striking our enemies before they can strike us again."

If Iran fails to meet the October 31 deadline for complying with the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, the IAEA is almost certain to refer the issue to the UN security council, which could then apply sanctions.

Iran, in turn, has threatened to review its membership of the IAEA.

The US, given the existing instability in Iraq and the Middle East, is likely to settle for sanctions. Mr Bush will be reluctant to engage in military action in the run-up to next year's presidential election.

The crisis is a setback for British diplomacy. The Foreign Office has been courting Tehran since 1997 and is disappointed with Iran's intransigence. There is also, privately, disappointment that Washington has opted for confrontation rather than constructive engagement.

Relations between Iran and Britain have deteriorated sharply recently. It emerged yesterday that the British embassy has been shot at three times in the past month, though only two of the attacks have been made public.

A Foreign Office spokesman said: "We regret the Iranian walk-out [from the IAEA]."

The walkout presents a quandary to the UN's nuclear inspectors. A team is due to go to Iran within 10 days and the resolution, passed without a vote yesterday, obliges Tehran to guarantee unrestricted access to sites the inspectors want to visit.

But the threat to break off cooperation with the agency may mean that the terms of the resolution cannot be met. Iran would then be declared in breach of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and would join North Korea as an international pariah deemed to be building a nuclear bomb.

Western diplomats and IAEA officials expressed confidence yesterday that Iran would not sever links with the UN agency and would allow the inspections to proceed.

The resolution empowers Dr El Baradei to report to the IAEA in November. The US ambassador to the agency, Kenneth Brill, said that meant Iran had been given "one last chance" to prove its nuclear programme was peaceful.

The five-day meeting of the IAEA's board of governors, representing 35 countries, was sorely divided over how to deal with the Iranian dilemma. The compromise resolution, co-authored by Canada, Australia, and Japan and backed by the Americans, asked Iran to suspend all uranium enrichment activities, agree to snap UN inspections, and ordered Tehran to provide copious information to the inspectors by the end of October.

"We reject the ultimatum," said Ali Salehi, the Iranian ambassador, before walking out of the session. "My delegation wishes to have no part in this process or in this resolution."

While as recently as six months ago, the Americans were relatively isolated in pushing for tough action against the Iranians over the nuclear suspicions, the wealth of troubling evidence un earthed in recent months by the inspectors has produced a groundswell of support for the American position, including within the IAEA itself, and in distinct contrast to the rows over Iraq and whether Saddam Hussein had a clandestine nuclear weapons project.

Senior western diplomats and IAEA insiders say the suspect Iranian programme is much more sophisticated and advanced than anything achieved in Iraq, and believe that declaring Iran in violation of the NPT is warranted now. The Iranians have only recently disclosed that their uranium enrichment projects go back to 1985, rather than 1997 as previously stated to UN inspectors.
The result in Vienna represented a diplomatic disaster for Iran and its efforts to cultivate Europe as a counterweight to US influence.
For six years the reformist government led by President Mohammad Khatami has tried to defuse Washington's bid to isolate Iran by courting Britain and other European states. But European governments grew increasingly frustrated with what they considered Iran's evasive attitude towards the IAEA and its contradictory explanations about its nuclear activities.
More hardline voices in Iran will point to the ultimatum as evidence that Mr Khatami's conciliatory approach has only made the country appear weak. Conservative newspapers have called for Iran to withdraw from the non-proliferation treaty altogether.
Pressure over the nuclear issue could lead the conservative clerical leadership to try to undermine the US occupation in neighbouring Iraq, or to rule out any handover of the al-Qaida suspects it admits are in its custody.

CNN

Uranium find in Iran sparks alarm
26 September 2003

WASHINGTON (CNN) --The United States has condemned Iran after the U.N. nuclear watchdog said it had found traces of arms-grade uranium at a second site in the country.
U.S. President George W. Bush warned late Thursday that Iran faced "universal condemnation," if it continued with a nuclear program.
Inspectors have been in Iran for six months and Tehran has one month to prove to the United Nations it has no secret atomic weapons program.
Bush has already labeled Iran part of an "axis of evil," along with Iraq and North Korea, but Iran insists it is only pursuing its program for peaceful means.
But new traces of enriched uranium found in samples at the Kalaye Electric Co. on the southern outskirts of Tehran, could support a U.S. theory that Iran has been secretly purifying uranium.
Earlier this year, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors found traces of enriched uranium at a plant at Natanz, some 150 miles (250 kilometers) south of the Iranian capital.
The finding prompted concern as the particles had a higher percentage of enriched uranium than is needed for the civilian power program Iran says the plant will serve.
The U.S. president says Iran will be on the agenda during talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin, which start at Camp David on Friday.
Iran has become a thorny issue for the two nations because Russia continues its nuclear cooperation with Iran, helping construct a nuclear reactor that both countries insist is for peaceful purposes.
But observers have expressed doubt and asked why, if Iran has so much oil, it needs nuclear energy.
White House officials say Iran has one last chance to comply with IAEA inspection demands.
"They have an October 31st deadline. At that point, if they fail to meet what the IAEA laid out, then we believe it should be taken to the Security Council," said White House Press Secretary Scott McClellan.
A new U.N. resolution could set the stage for diplomatic and economic sanctions against Iran -- and perhaps even more severe action.
Even as outside pressure mounts, Iran continues to steadfastly deny it is working on a bomb, instead saying the nuclear program is aimed at producing 6,000 megawatts of electricity.
"We have been working very hard to respond to the questions of the IAEA," Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi said Wednesday.
"It is not part of our security doctrine to have nuclear weapons because we do not believe it would bring security to Iran but would cause much more insecurity. We believe the whole region should be free from nuclear weapons."

Guardian

Iran offers up nuclear secrets
7 October 2003

Iran said yesterday it would give the UN nuclear watchdog a list of components imported for enriching uranium, which Washington claims are the heart of a secret atomic weapons programme.
But the country's ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Ali Akbar Salehi, said Tehran, which has been given until October 31 to disprove the claims about its atomic aims, could not say exactly where the parts came from.
"These are items which were not bought officially, they were bought through intermediaries and it is not possible to trace intermediaries," Mr Salehi said.
"We will give them [the IAEA] a list of the items and we will show them where they were stored," he added.
An IAEA team arrived in Tehran late last week for talks and inspections aimed at verifying Iran's claim that its sophisticated nuclear programme is geared to producing electricity not bombs.
Should doubts remain by the next agency board of governors' meeting in November, Iran's case may be sent to the UN security council for possible sanctions.
The IAEA has said that getting to the bottom of Iran's uranium enrichment programme is its top priority.
Tehran has now acknowledged that its operation dates back to 1985, not 1997 as it had initially claimed.
Enriched uranium can be used as fuel for nuclear energy reactors, or as bomb material if highly enriched. Inspectors have found traces of arms-grade enriched uranium at two sites in Iran this year.

US State Department

State Department Voices "Serious Concern" Over Iran's Nuclear Program
U.S. supports rigorous IAEA examination of Iran's nuclear activities
8 May 2003

State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said on May 8 that the United States has "serious concerns" about Iran's active pursuit of nuclear weapons, and it supports a "rigorous examination" of Iran's nuclear activities by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Boucher was speaking to the press at the State Department briefing in Washington.
"Iran now openly admits that it is pursuing a complete nuclear fuel cycle. We completely reject Iran's claim that it's doing this for peaceful purposes," Boucher said. "Our concern is about the potential acquisition of nuclear weapons by a state that's a known supporter of terrorism."
"There is no justification for a state that's rich in oil and gas like Iran to build hugely expensive nuclear fuel cycle facilities. Iran flares off more gas annually than the equivalent energy its desired reactors would produce. States with peaceful nuclear energy programs have nothing to hide, and Iran did its best to hide all of these nuclear fuel cycle activities," Boucher said.
"The United States has made clear to the International Atomic Energy Agency, to other governments and to the public that we strongly support a rigorous examination of Iran's nuclear activities," Boucher said. "We look forward to a full report at the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors meeting in June, report to be presented by Director General ElBaradei then."

US State Department

Taken Question from May 8, 2003 Daily Press Briefing
9 May 2003

Iranian Nuclear Facilities: Arak and Natanz

Question: Did the Iranian government admit to having a heavy water reactor? If so, when? Have we confirmed reports of a uranium enrichment facility at Natanz and a heavy water reactor at Arak?
Answer: Iran has acknowledged both the heavy water production plant at Arak and the uranium enrichment facility at Natanz, but did so only after their existence was disclosed to the press in August 2002 by an Iranian opposition group.
Aside from a small IAEA-safeguarded "zero-power" research reactor located at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center, Iran has no known heavy water reactor and no need for an indigenous source of heavy water. Iran's only nuclear power reactor expected to become operational within the next decade is the light-water reactor under construction with Russian help at Bushehr. This raises serious questions about Iran's intentions in constructing an industrial-scale heavy water production plant at Arak. Heavy-water moderated reactors are better suited for plutonium production than are light water reactors. We believe Iran's true intent is to develop the capability to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons, using both the plutonium route (supported ultimately by a heavy-water research reactor) and the highly enriched uranium route (supported by a gas centrifuge enrichment plant).
Iran has also confirmed to the IAEA that it is constructing a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facility near the town of Natanz. Although Iran initially delayed the visit, IAEA Director General ElBaradei visited the Natanz site in late February and found what appeared to be a "sophisticated" centrifuge uranium enrichment program. We are deeply concerned at Iran's efforts to build that facility clandestinely, and believe there is no logical reason for Iran to pursue uranium enrichment other than to support a weapons capability, especially in light of Russia's pledge to provide all the fuel for the lifetime of the Bushehr reactor. The IAEA is undertaking a rigorous examination of Iran's nuclear activities, and we look forward to hearing from Dr. ElBaradei at the June Board of Governors meeting as to the results to date of that examination.

US State Department

Russia Should Suspend Nuclear Cooperation With Iran
Ambassador Vershbow says Russia should wait until IAEA protocol is signed
23 September 2003

U.S. Ambassador to Russia Alexander Vershbow said September 19 that Iran is "a critical test case" for the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and hopes that Russia will suspend its cooperation with Tehran's nuclear program until Iran fully cooperates with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
Addressing the Second Moscow International Non-proliferation Conference, Vershbow said the United States hopes "Russia will freeze construction at the Bushehr nuclear power plant [in Iran] and refuse to deliver fuel for it until Iran agrees to sign the Additional Protocol and cooperates fully with the IAEA in implementing it."
The ambassador cited several instances of Iran's non-cooperation with the IAEA, which he said were inconsistent "with what one would expect from a state that is fully honoring its NPT obligations."
"It would be a devastating blow to international security and to the non-proliferation regime if Iran were to go nuclear, and the United States seeks to work with all of its partners in non-proliferation to ensure that Iran remains within the NPT," he said.

US State Department

Bolton Says Iran Is Developing a Clandestine Nuclear Program
Congressional testimony on U.S. nonproliferation policies after Iraq – 4 June 2003

The top State Department arms control official testified before a Congressional committee June 4 that the United States has seen indications for some time that Iran is developing a clandestine nuclear weapons program.
Iran is developing "a uranium mine, a uranium conversion facility, a massive uranium enrichment facility designed to house tens of thousands of centrifuges, and a heavy water production plant," said John Bolton, under secretary of state for arms control and international security. He said such a facility would support the production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for nuclear weapons.
"While Iran claims that its nuclear program is peaceful and transparent, we are convinced it is otherwise," Bolton said, adding that "One unmistakable indicator of military intent is the secrecy and lack of transparency surrounding Iran's nuclear activities."
Bolton testified at a U.S. House of Representatives International Relations Committee hearing examining U.S. nonproliferation policies in the aftermath of the conflict in Iraq.
"The United States and its allies," he noted, "expressed concern at the Evian G-8 [Group of Eight industrialized nations] Summit about Iran's covert nuclear weapons program, stating that 'we will not ignore proliferation implications of Iran's advanced nuclear program' and that 'we offer our strongest support to comprehensive IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] examination of this country's nuclear program.'"
Bolton said "The world has put Iran on notice that it must stop pursuing nuclear weapons."
[…]

US State Department

U.S. Calls on Iran to Disclose All Aspects of Its Nuclear Program
State Department studying report on program from IAEA – 7 June 2003

State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said the United States is calling on Iran to "disclose all aspects of its nuclear program." Boucher was speaking to the press at the State Department's regular briefing on June 6.
In response to a question about the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) report on Iran, Boucher said the report had been given out to IAEA members, but he declined to describe its contents. The IAEA Board of Governors meeting begins June 16.
"Iran's clandestine nuclear program represents a serious challenge to regional stability, the entire international community and to the global nonproliferation regime," Boucher said.

White House

White House Welcomes IAEA Report on Iran's Nuclear Program
20 June 2003

The White House welcomes the International Atomic Energy Agency's June 6 report on Iran, according to White House spokesman Ari Fleischer, speaking to the press on June 19.
The report, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," is available at www.iaea.org/worldatom/.
Fleischer said the report calls on Iran to take two specific steps: one is to permit the IAEA to take environmental samples at locations inside Iran, and the second is to ratify an additional protocol making assuring the international community of the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear activities.
"The President welcomes this report. It's international reinforcement of the President's message yesterday that the world, broadly speaking, joins together in fighting proliferation and making certain that Iran does not develop nuclear weapons," Fleischer said.
Following are excerpts from White House spokesman Fleischer's June 19 briefing:
(begin transcript)
Q: Do you have any reaction to the IAEA's report on Iran's nuclear efforts? And, secondly, in his comments yesterday what kind of new line was the President trying to draw, in terms of Iran's seeming clandestine efforts to achieve a nuclear weapon?
MR. FLEISCHER: Well, the President welcomes the international community's report about Iranian attempts to develop nuclear weaponry. The report stated that Iran had -- there are a number of past failures by Iran to report material, facilities and activities as required by safeguard applications.
The report noted that the enrichment plan that Iran is under IAEA safeguards, and the board encouraged Iran not to introduce nuclear material at the pilot enrichment plant, as a confidence building measure. And then the board called on Iran to take two specific concrete steps. One is to permit the IAEA to take environmental samples at locations inside Iran. And they also call on Iran to ratify an additional protocol making certain that Iran is acting in a way that provides assurances to the international community of the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear activities.
The board is concerned, the international community is concerned and the President is concerned. The President welcomes this report. It's international reinforcement of the President's message yesterday that the world, broadly speaking, joins together in fighting proliferation and making certain that Iran does not develop nuclear weapons.
Q: Iran rejected those, quickly rejected those requests, though, today, according to the reports just before we left. What next?
MR. FLEISCHER: Well, I've seen mixed commentary on what Iran's reaction has been. Iran did not support the board. All nations of the IAEA supported this; Iran did not. But then Iran has issued statements welcoming this. So I think it remains to be seen what Iran's reaction will be.
But if Iran is not pursuing nuclear weapons, why wouldn't they cooperate fully and completely with the IAEA?
Q: Ari, is there a military option on the table for dealing with Iran?
MR. FLEISCHER: The President wanted to see what the IAEA reported. Clearly, the United States and the international community share the same concerns about Iran. The President's hope is that the future of Iran will be decided by the Iranian people. There is a tremendous young population in Iran that is yearning for a better way of life and a more tolerant way of life. That's where the President is focused.
Q: Will there be more efforts to go to the U.N., to bring this before the Security Council?
MR. FLEISCHER: The IAEA just made its report. I think the world will be very interested in Iranian reaction -- and Iranian reaction will be telling. If the Iranians are pursuing peaceful nuclear energy, as they claim they are, then they have every reason to comply with the IAEA's request, particularly the two specific requests to take the environmental sample and to sign the additional protocol.
So I think the international community will watch Iran's next move.
Q: So is the President still undecided on whether he believes Iran is, in fact, already committed to acquiring a weapon? Or does he – I mean, does he think that Iran has actually made that decision?
MR. FLEISCHER: The President is concerned about Iranian efforts that indicate they want to acquire nuclear weaponry. And as the President said, we -- which is an expression representing the international community -- will not tolerate Iranian development of nuclear weaponry, which is exactly what the IAEA report is all about.

The world's protocols for fighting against proliferation are important and that's why Iran needs to comply. Otherwise, the world will conclude that Iran may be producing nuclear weapons.
Q: Does the U.S. have any sort of leverage going forward? If so, what?
MR. FLEISCHER: I think already the European Union has taken a look at this report and they will make their judgments about ongoing trade with Iran. But proliferation remains a vital issue around the world -- unless the international community is content to let various nations acquire nuclear weapons. The President is not. The international community is not. And this is why the report by the IAEA today is significant.

White House

Iran's Nuclear Program Concerns Bush Administration
White House Report – 18 June 2003

The United States, as well as many nations around the world, have "deep concerns" about Iran's nuclear development program, and they want Iran to adhere to the terms it agreed to when it signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer told reporters June 18.
"The United States, as well as many nations around the world, including Russia, do have deep concerns about Iran's development of nuclear weapons and their attempts to develop nuclear weapons," Fleischer said.
"I think for now the focus remains on making certain that Iran honors its obligations to the international community as a signatory of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. They are a signatory to it, they are covered by the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] safeguards, and they need to comply with it. That's the focus of our policy with Iran right now."
Fleischer questioned why Iran would want to develop nuclear energy for peaceful, civilian purposes when oil and gas is abundant in the country.
"We have great concerns when a nation that is as awash in natural resources, such as Iran's oil and gas, why they would want to develop, as they claim, for peaceful, civilian purposes nuclear energy, when they have abundance of oil and gas and don't need nuclear energy," Fleischer said.
Fleischer also said the United States is concerned after reading the June report from the IAEA. "The report points out that Iran has failed to report certain nuclear materials and activities, and that corrective actions are being taken in cooperation with the Iranian authorities," Fleischer said. The report also explains that work is still ongoing with regard to the correctness and completeness of Iran's declaration to ensure that all nuclear material in Iran has been declared and is under safeguards, according to Fleischer.
Iran's failure to comply with the IAEA to provide access and assurance that safeguards have been met, coupled with the fact that Iran attempts to develop nuclear energy in a country that doesn't need nuclear energy, gives the United States "cause for great concern," Fleischer said.
He said Iran is finding itself under increased international scrutiny as a result of its not answering questions that the international community has asked of it.
"The issue here is, what will Iran do to bring itself into compliance with international organizations? Iran has some serious issues to face up to as the world makes judgments about Iranian intentions."
Later June 18, President Bush was asked about Iran in a question and answer session with reporters at the White House.
Bush said "the international community must come together to make it very clear to Iran that we will not tolerate the construction of a nuclear weapon. Iran would be dangerous if they have a nuclear weapon. I brought this subject up in the G8; we had a good discussion on the subject, with near universal agreement that we all must work together to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon."

BERICHTEN

Guardian

US seeks UN action over Iranian 'weapons'
Staff and agencies – 8 May 2003

Washington is pressing the UN to take action against Iran over its alleged nuclear weapons development programme, it was reported today.

The US has accused Iran of secretly embarking on a programme to enrich uranium at Natanz in southern Iran, which it fears could be used to make nuclear weapons, in contravention of an international treaty.
Diplomatic sources at the UN said the US was specifically seeking a declaration from the board of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that Iran had violated the terms of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, to which it is a signatory.
The UN sources said the US was requesting support from Russia, France, Britain, Germany and other members of the IAEA board, on which representatives of 35 countries sit, ahead of its meeting next month.
The declaration could restrict itself to expressing concern about such a violation, but more seriously it could increase pressure on Tehran to account for its activities by referring the issue to the UN security council.
Such a move would further strain US-Iranian relations, which have grown increasingly fractious since President Bush labelled Iran part of an "axis of evil" last year, for the country's alleged support of terrorism.
More recently, Tehran has said it would not recognise any US-installed government in Baghdad. Washington has signed a truce with the People's Mojahedin, which opposes Tehran's cleric-dominated government, allowing it to keep its weapons although the Iraqi-based group is on the US state department's list of terrorist organisations.
The nature of work at the Natanz site was not known until last year, and the UN diplomats, who spoke separately and on condition of anonymity, said Mohamed ElBaradei, director-general of the Vienna-based IAEA, was taken aback by what he saw on a visit to the facility in February.
"It's a sophisticated uranium-enrichment plant, and they had come a long way," said one source familiar with the findings of the visit and the workings of the agency. "He was struck by the sophistication and the advanced stage of the project."
The diplomat said US officials "want the agency to produce a very critical report" at the IAEA board meeting.
IAEA officials said it was too early to comment on the Iranian nuclear programme and whether Tehran had violated its non-proliferation treaty commitments.
"We are at the moment in the process of conducting inspections in Iran and of doing analysis at IAEA headquarters, and at this point we are reserving judgment about the nature of Iran's nuclear programme," said an IAEA spokeswoman, Melissa Fleming.
Members of the US delegation to the IAEA declined to comment. But a senior western diplomat said other governments would probably be receptive to US overtures for support at the board meeting.
He said he did not expect French, German and Russian displeasure over the US-led invasion of Iraq to blunt international concern about Iran's nuclear programmes.

Guardian

Iranians enriching uranium, US says
Julian Borger and Dan De Luce – 9 May 2003

The Bush administration is calling for the UN's nuclear agency to declare Iran in violation of the non-proliferation treaty amid suspicions that it is secretly enriching uranium.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is due to issue a report next month on Iranian compliance following a visit by its director, Mohamed ElBaradei. If Tehran is found to have misled the IAEA in its claim not to have enriched uranium, it could face sanctions.
The state department was reported yesterday to be lobbying other nations on the IAEA board to produce a guilty verdict.
Washington's alarm was sparked by the discovery of a uranium enrichment plant under construction at Natanz, central Iran. The site, which surprised Dr ElBaradei with its sophistication, includes a pilot plant with 160 functioning centrifuges, used in the enrichment process.
Dr ElBaradei's team saw components for another 1,000 machines. The Iranians are also building an underground site nearby which will be able to house tens of thousands of centrifuges and withstand aerial attack.
Tehran insists that the plant is being built to produce fuel for civilian nuclear reactors but it has so far failed to agree to give the IAEA greater powers to investigate undeclared nuclear activities.
A US official told the New York Times: "It's not just that Iran is speeding up its nuclear plans. It's also that we've only recently learned some things about their programme that have been going on for two years. There's also a lot of hammering from the Israelis for us to take this problem seriously."
The US military's proximity in Iraq will enable it to gather detailed intelligence about Iran's nuclear programme, increasing the possibility of an American military strike against a nuclear facility.

Yesterday, Iran's atomic energy chief told the IAEA that Iran had no clandestine weapons programme and that its activities were "peaceful".

Voice of America News

Powell: US Remains Concerned About Iran's Nuclear Program
15 May 2003

U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell says the United States remains concerned that Iran's nuclear program could be used to develop weapons, but Washington has no plans to take military action against Tehran.
Mr. Powell told a Russian radio station he believes Moscow - which is helping Iran build a nuclear power plant - shares U.S. concerns and that neither the United States or Russia would like to see Iran develop nuclear weapons.
Secretary Powell said Washington will work with the international community to try to convince Tehran not to move in that direction. Moscow and Tehran have said Iran's nuclear program is meant only for peaceful purposes.
When asked whether military action against Iran is being considered, Mr. Powell said the nuclear issue is not a matter for the U.S. armed forces at the moment.

Reuters

U.S. Warns U.N. Agency on Iran Nuclear Program
By Carol Giacomo – 15 May 2003

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The United Nations nuclear watchdog agency would be making a big mistake if it failed to find Iran in serious violation of a key international arms control treaty, a senior U.S. official said on Thursday.
The Bush administration, ahead of an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) meeting next month, is working to convince the agency and countries on its governing board that Iran has an advanced nuclear weapons program that must be stopped.
But diplomats in Vienna said on Thursday that IAEA Executive Director Mohamed ElBaradei is expected to report at the June board meeting that Iran has committed only minor violations of the 1970 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.
"We think there are major violations and that's what the evidence shows, and the overall pattern of Iran's behavior is not consistent with anything other than a nuclear weapons program," said the U.S. official, who spoke on condition of anonymity.
Washington has not been told that ElBaradei will report only minor treaty violations by Iran. But if he does, "it would be a big mistake ... If the director general doesn't follow the evidence it's going to be potentially a major problem," the U.S. official said, without elaborating.

Tough message
It was the latest in a series of tough U.S. messages for the IAEA. In an interview with Reuters on Monday, national security adviser Condoleezza Rice said if IAEA inspectors "find what preliminary suggestions say they found in Iran and, knowing what we know about the programs, then there has to be some consequence for that ... Non-compliance is pretty clear."
The U.S. official said the IAEA staff shares the U.S. view and Washington is continuing to work the issue with ElBaradei and other members of the IAEA board.
ElBaradei, who was appointed to a second four-year term as IAEA chief in September 2001, angered the administration with his handling of arms inspections in Iraq before the U.S.-led war toppled the regime of Saddam Hussein
The United States wants the IAEA board to declare Iran in "material breach" of its treaty obligations. As one of 187 treaty signers, Iran promised to forsake nuclear weapons.
U.S. officials said despite growing international concern about Iran's nuclear program, it is unlikely the IAEA board in June would declare the Islamic republic in non-compliance.

Still, they hope to get approval of a board statement that reflects those concerns and demands that Iranian officials answer questions about "information they haven't supplied, ways they have obstructed IAEA inspectors" and why they have not agreed to stricter IAEA oversight.
U.S. officials are pushing for new IAEA inspections that could reveal more about Iran's nuclear activities and a commitment for the IAEA to take up the issue again at its September board meeting.
While Washington has long accused Iran of pursuing nuclear arms, concern was heightened by revelations from IAEA inspectors who in February visited Iranian facilities, including a uranium enrichment plant at Natanz.
Tehran is now said to be on track to produce enough enriched uranium by 2005 for several nuclear bombs per year.
Iran denies the charges and insists its ambitious nuclear program is purely for the peaceful generation of electricity.

Reuters

U.S. Says Has No Plans for Military Action in Iran
By Jonathan Thatcher – 15 May 2003

MOSCOW (Reuters) - Secretary of State Colin Powell said on Thursday Washington has no plans to take military action to stop Iran's nuclear program, which, Washington says, is a cover to develop nuclear weapons.
Iran, which is building a nuclear power station at Bushehr with Russian help, denies the charge, saying its nuclear energy program is for peaceful purposes.
The United States has been pressing Russia to end support for the program and argues oil-rich Iran, with a population of 66 million people, does not need a nuclear energy programme.
"We are concerned about what Iran is doing (with its nuclear programme)...We believe Russia also has some concerns. We will work with the international community to persuade Iran that they should not move in this direction," Powell told Ekho Moskvy radio station on the last day of a visit to Russia.
"But it's not a matter for the armed forces of the United States at the moment," he added.
A senior State Department official said in recent contacts with Iran, the United States had given assurances it had no intention of overthrowing other governments in the region.

Longtime thorn in relations
The issue has long been a thorn in relations between Washington and Moscow whose budding friendship has more recently been tested by sharp disagreements over Iraq.
And though both sides during Powell's two-day visit were at pains to say that they were again the best of friends, he failed to persuade the Kremlin to back Washington proposals to end United Nations sanctions against Iraq.
A key sticking point is Russia's demand that U.N. inspectors return to Iraq to search for weapons of mass destruction, Washington's key justification for the invasion of Iraq but which have yet to be found.
Other worries for Moscow are the role of the U.N. special representative in Iraq and control its vast oil industry.
Russia is particularly concerned about losing billions of dollars in oil contracts signed with the ousted government of Saddam Hussein. Washington says it is up to the next government in Baghdad to decide what to do with the contracts.
Moscow is also nervous about getting back the $8 billion it is owed by Iraq, though Powell said he was sure that a new Iraq government would take those debt fully into account.
Iraq's foreign debts are estimated at up to $120 billion.
Powell said that, unlike the bitter U.N. debate before the invasion of Iraq, this time there was no talk of a veto of its proposed resolution to end the sanctions against Iraq.
France and Russia had both threatened to veto a U.N. resolution to effectively allow an invasion of Iraq, and in the end the issue never went to a vote.
"I was impressed by the spirit of cooperation shown by President (Vladimir) Putin and Foreign Minister (Igor) Ivanov," he said.
"What we are looking for is a U.N. resolution that everybody can agree to in the Security Council because it is a resolution that will help the Iraqi people."

Powell left later for Bulgaria on the latest leg of a tour of the Middle East and Europe that has been dominated by talks about a Middle East peace plan and Washington's promises to start Iraq's transition from U.S. military occupation to Iraqi civilian government.

Guardian

US accuses Iran of stockpiling chemical arms
Dan De Luce and Oliver Burkeman – 16 May 2003

Iran, already accused by the Bush administration of hiding attempts to build a nuclear bomb, faces fresh allegations about its chemical and biological weapons programmes.
Washington is now accusing Tehran of stockpiling nerve agents and pursuing a chemical weapons programme, while an Iranian resistance group yesterday alleged that Iran has an aggressive bio-weapons effort under way.
"We are most troubled by the activities of Iran, which we believe continues to seek chemicals, production technology, training, and expertise from abroad," a US representative recently told the international chemical weapons watchdog agency in the Hague.
Washington also accused Iran of stockpiling blister, blood and choking agents and some nerve agents, US diplomat Stephen Rademaker said in a statement obtained by the Guardian. The statement was read out to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) at a meeting in the Hague last month.
Iran has vehemently denied the allegations, which are sure to have been raised in recent talks between the two governments in Geneva.
An Iranian resistance group, the Mojahedin Khalq Organisation (MKO), made more drastic accusations about Iran's biological programme, the Washington Post reported yesterday.
Theorganisation, which is listed as a terrorist group by Washington but has allies in the US Congress, alleged that Tehran had started producing weaponised anthrax and was actively working with at least five other pathogens, including smallpox, in a drive to build an arsenal of biological weapons.
The US defence secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, told reporters he had not read the allegations. He said that he would have to "go back and refresh" himself on "the latest assessments" before responding to any claims on Iran's chemical and biological weapons capabilities.
Kenneth Katzman, an expert on Iran and terrorism at the Congressional Research Service in Washington, told the Guardian: "The US government intelligence assessments do say there is an assumption that they have an ability to weaponise basic biological agents like anthrax.
"But I see [the MKO report] as going further in saying that Iran is actively making a stockpile of these weapons."
Analysts say hardline elements of the Iranian leadership may see nuclear or other weapons programmes as a possible deterrent against increasing pressure from the US, which now has troops and bases in countries surrounding Iran from every direction.

Guardian

Pentagon sets sights on a new Tehran regime
UK and state department reject blunt approach
Julian Borger in Washington and Dan De Luce in Tehran – 24 May 2003

The Pentagon has proposed a policy of regime change in Iran, after reports that al-Qaida leaders are coordinating terrorist attacks from Iran.
But the plan is opposed by the US state department and the British government, officials in Washington said yesterday.
The Pentagon plan would involve overt means, such as anti-government broadcasts transmitted to Iran, and covert means, possibly including support for the Iraq-based armed opposition movement Mojahedin Khalq (MEK), even though it is designated a terrorist group by the state department.
The state department and Britain have objected to the plan, saying that it would backfire, undermining the moderates around President Mohamed Khatami.
"A lot is going on on both sides of the Atlantic to take another look at Iran policy," an official said.

The foreign secretary, Jack Straw, has been to Tehran several times and believes that British and European engagement in Iran has paid dividends in moderating Tehran's behaviour towards the west.
But the policy of engagement is likely to come under US pressure in the next few weeks, after the US allegations about al-Qaida and Iran's nuclear weapons programme.
The issue was to be debated at a meeting of President Bush's top national security advisers in the White House on Thursday, according to an official in Washington.
But the meeting was postponed pending Tehran's response to American allegation that it is harbouring a Qaida cell.
Members of the Bush administration have been quoted in the US press as saying that recent terrorist bombings in Saudi Arabia were coordinated by the cell in Iran and that communications about the attack were traced back to the country.
"There's no question but that there have been and are today senior al-Qaida leaders in Iran, and they are busy," the defence secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, said this week.
Among the Qaida leaders alleged to be in Iran is Saif al-Adel, from Egypt.
The Iranian government has denied sheltering al-Qaida, and claims to have deported about 500 al-Qaida suspects in the past two years to other Islamic states.
Iranian officials are also reported to have told UN officials that it had al-Qaida suspects in custody.
Washington is sceptical and is waiting to see if Tehran hands over the suspects before deciding its policy.
Britain is pushing for a coordinated US-European policy towards Tehran.
"We have said very clearly to the Iranian government that harbouring al-Qaida would be entirely unacceptable," the prime minister, Tony Blair, said on Thursday.
"I hope very much that if they are indeed harbouring al-Qaida operatives, that they yield them up."
Iran has repeatedly denied the accusation and called on Washington to share its evidence.
Saeed Pourazizi, an adviser to President Khatami, said on Thursday that Iran had a clear policy of fighting al-Qaida, and accused Washington of pursuing a long-term strategy to put pressure on the government.
"[Al-Qaida] is a terrorist group threatening Iran's interests, its extremist interpretation of Islam contradicts the Islamic democracy Iran is trying to promote," he said.
"There is no commonality of anything between us."
But analysts say hardline elements of Iran's leadership may see al-Qaida as a useful ally against a common foe, the United States, a view not shared by the reformists allied with President Khatami.
Flynt Leverett, a former middle east specialist in President Bush's national security council, said the move towards regime change as a basis for Iran policy was built on a false assumption.
"It's built on the belief that Tehran is a house of cards waiting to be pushed over and if the US is smart enough, it could push the house of cards over, and I think this is not a very prudent way to proceed."

Guardian

Bush may take first step to Tehran regime change
Suzanne Goldenberg – 27 May 2003

Bush administration officials today look set to turn up the heat on Iran at a meeting to consider whether to break off diplomatic contacts as a possible first step to regime change in Tehran.
The gathering was expected to give a wider airing to calls from the Pentagon for destabilising Iran - a course of action so far opposed by the state department, Britain and other governments.
But a steady drip of allegations from Pentagon officials, including the defence secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, about possible links between Iran and al-Qaida, and reports that Iran has intensified its nuclear programme, mean it can no longer be ignored.
In the past few weeks a widening debate on policy towards Tehran, conducted within the administration and in public, has freshened memories of President George Bush's speech in which he listed Iraq, Iran and North Korea as the "axis of evil".
In comments reminiscent of the public discourse on Iraq before the war, US officials have begun to speak of a link between Iran and al-Qaida. They accuse Iran of harbouring the cell that carried out the synchronised bombings in Saudi Arabia this month.
Some of the rhetoric appears aimed at pressing for an Iran more compliant with US interests. The US has called for Iran to work closely with intelligence agencies investigating the Saudi bombings, and to turn over suspects in Iranian custody. But the Iranian representative at the United Nations, Javad Zarif, told ABC television at the weekend that that was unlikely to happen.

Guardian

Iran rebuts US allegations
28 May 2003

Iran today denied US allegations that it had a secret nuclear programme or harboured al-Qaida terrorists, and called for a popularly elected government in Iraq at the earliest opportunity.
The Iranian president, Mohammad Khatami, said today that the Arab world expected an elected government in Iraq to replace the occupying powers.
His comments could be seen as a response to rhetoric from the US secretary of defence, Donald Rumsfeld, who yesterday warned Iran not to support calls for a theocracy in Iraq. Some among Iraq's Shia majority have already called for theocracy much like the one in place in Iran to replace Saddam Hussein's regime.
Mr Rumsfeld said yesterday that the occupying forces in Iraq would not permit some "new form of tyranny" to replace Saddam's Ba'athist government.
"Iran should be on notice that attempts to remake Iraq in Iran's image will be aggressively put down," he said.
In reply to a question, Mr Rumsfeld said the US administration was debating the most effective way to deal with Iran itself - through the hardliners in charge, through the moderate leaders they tolerate or directly with the Iranian people.
Today Mr Khatami told delegates at the opening session of the Organization of the Islamic Conference that the Islamic world should shun terrorism as well as superpower domination. "Our world has suffered from both violent dogmatists and arrogant powers," Mr Khatami said. "On the one side, terrorism and fanaticism have distorted religion and, on the other side, the resort to the use of force, domination and unilateralism have made a mockery of concepts such as freedom and democracy."
"It is incumbent on us, in the name of Islam, to keep a distance from these two frightening faces: terrorism and unilateralism," he added.
The US believes terrorists based in Iran may have played a role in the suicide bombings in the Saudi Arabian capital of Riyadh earlier this month. White House spokesman Ari Fleischer said yesterday that recent arrests by Iranian officials of suspected al-Qaida operatives had not convinced the US that Iran was taking all the steps necessary to fight terrorism.
Mr Asefi responded to the Reuters news agency today: "On the contrary, we believe America is not serious about fighting terrorism. It adopts a double standard policy in confronting them which shows its indecision in dealing with terrorists."
Iran claims that the US has not dealt firmly with the Iraq-based People's Mojahedin militia, a group opposed to Iran's government, despite the fact that it is listed as a terrorist organisation by the US state department.
Today Iran also denied US claims that is developing nuclear weapons in a secret programme. The US based its accusation on claims by an exiled Iranian opposition group, which said yesterday it had learned of two previously undisclosed nuclear sites related to producing enriched uranium, which could be used in bombs.
Iran insists its nuclear programmes are limited to generating electricity. At the OIC meeting, the Iranian foreign minister, Kamal Kharrazi, said the US was not competent to judge his country's nuclear work.
"The IAEA is the only competent body to supervise activities of member states on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons," Mr Kharrazi said.
The IAEA inspected the country in February and is due to issue a report next month.

Guardian

Iran working on nuclear bomb, says Rumsfeld
Suzanne Goldenberg and Jonathan Steele – 12 June 2003

The US defence secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, yesterday tapped into deepening international concern about a clandestine nuclear programme in Iran, warning that Tehran was actively working to develop a bomb.
Mr Rumsfeld's remarks, delivered during a visit to Germany, appeared to be aimed at exerting pressure on Tehran and the UN's nuclear monitoring agency, which meets next week in Vienna to decide how to respond to Iran's failure to honour nuclear safeguards.
His intervention also appeared to advance the next project of Pentagon hawks: regime change in Tehran.

There have been signs that Washington is stepping up international pressure on Tehran and feeding internal unrest. Several dozen protesters were arrested in the capital yesterday after thousands of people took to the streets in the biggest demonstrations against the government this year.
The protests began on Tuesday over plans to privatise some universities, but soon widened as some students carried banners calling for political prisoners to be freed and others demanded that the reformist president, Mohammed Khatami, resign.
Witnesses said the protests turned violent when riot police with batons tried to disperse the demonstrators, beating people who failed to move away quickly enough. Several motorcycles were set on fire and the windows of shops and a state bank were smashed.
High unemployment affecting graduates as well as other sectors of society, plus disap pointment with the pace of the reforms Mr Khatami originally promised six years ago, have led to widespread discontent.
"The intelligence community in the United States and around the world currently assess that Iran does not have nuclear weapons," Mr Rumsfeld said during a visit to the southern German town of Garmisch-Partenkirchen.
"The assessment is that they do have a very active programme and are likely to have nuclear weapons in a relatively short period of time."
The defence secretary went further than experts from the UN's monitoring agency, the international atomic energy agency (IAEA) who visited Iran last week.
However, there has been deepening international alarm about previously undiscovered Iranian nuclear facilities, and its rapid progress in enriching uranium.
The report of the IAEA inspectors, which is to be formally presented next week, faults Iran for failing to declare uranium imported from China in 1991.
Although the quantity of nuclear material was relatively small, Iran has compounded the IAEA's concerns by also failing to account for what happened to the uranium, or even where it was processed.
Mr Rumsfeld also accused Tehran of seeking to infiltrate its clerics into Iraq and undermine the US occupation administration.
"We're going to actively oppose any Iranian influence in that country that attempts to make Iraq an Iran-type model and we'll do it with words to start with and we'll do it energetically," Mr Rumsfeld said. The US backs a number of exile groups, including Reza Pahlavi, the son of the former shah, who uses a satellite TV station in Los Angeles to beam anti-regime views into Iran.
Colin Powell, the US secretary of state, told CNN on Sunday that Washington was working to persuade Iranians to force change from within to make Iran what he called a less troublesome member of the world community.
The US war on Iraq has undoubtedly unsettled Tehran's leaders. President Khatami acknowledged this week that there was a danger Iran could be next.
Fundamentalism and ter rorism would provide "enemies" with an excuse for invasion, the newspaper Entekhab quoted him yesterday as saying in a veiled warning to the hardliners and to Washington.
Student demonstrations at various universities last autumn went on every day for several weeks. At that time the protests remained on campus and did not spill on to the streets.
Many students used the protests to call for power to be taken from Iran's clergy and given to secular leaders.

Guardian

Bush warns Iran on nuclear weapons
American president backs Tehran protests as exiles in EU rage at French raid on mojahedin
Paul Webster – 19 June 2003

President George Bush yesterday told Iranians protesting against the government in Tehran that "America stands squarely by their side", and warned Iran not to develop nuclear weaponry.
The warnings were similar to those issued to Iraq in the build-up to the recent war, although no reference was made to military action.
His comments were made at the White House yesterday as he called for support from other countries for his stance. He gave his clearest encouragement so far to opposition forces in Iran who have been demonstrating during the past week.
"The international community must come together to make it very clear to Iran that we will not tolerate construction of a nuclear weapon," Mr Bush said. "Iran would be dangerous if it had a nuclear weapon."

Mr Bush added that he had raised the subject with other members of the Group of 8 governments at their recent summit in France. "There was near-universal agreement that we all must work together to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon," he said.
In reference to protesters who have challenged the clerical nature of the Iranian government, he saluted "those courageous souls who speak out for freedom in Iran". He said: "They need to know America stands squarely by their side."
In Vienna, US representatives accused Iran of repeated "violations and evasions" of an agreement with inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency.
"If Iran's intentions are peaceful, why did it engage in a long-term pattern of safeguards violations and evasions regarding a number of its nuclear activities?" Kenneth Brill, the American ambassador to the UN in Vienna, asked the IAEA.
The US is pushing the agency to pass a binding resolution permitting more intrusive and short-term inspections. Iran insists its nuclear programme is for the peaceful generation of electric power.
Mr Bush's comments came as Iranian exiles in Europe set themselves alight in protest against a mass roundup in France of members of an Iran ian opposition group, the Iranian Marxist Mojahedin People's Movement.
A woman died last night after setting herself alight in Paris outside the headquarters of the DST, France's internal intelligence organisation, which coordinated the raid. Three hours earlier, another Iranian woman was severely burned after pouring petrol over herself and lighting it. An Iranian living in Germany also set himself ablaze at the Paris protest.
Another woman last night set herself alight outside the French embassy in Knightsbridge, London. She was taken to hospital where her condition was described as serious. On Monday, an Iranian student set also set himself on fire outside the embassy.
The dramatic protests came after more than 160 Iranian exiles were arrested during raids by 1,300 police officers on 13 sites around Paris. The sites included the Mojahedin People's Movement's headquarters at Auvers-sur-Oise. Among those arrested were Maryam Radjavi, the wife of the movement's leader, Massoud Radjavi. Last night only 26 were still being held.
Police said computer software had also been seized.
The raid was carried out on the orders of Paris's chief anti-terrorist judge, Jean-Louis Bruguière. The DST's head, Pierre de Bousquet de Florian, said the movement had been planning attacks on Iranian diplomatic missions around Europe, but not in France.

Washington Post

Bush Steps Up Pressure on Iran Over Nuclear Plans
By Glenn Kessler – 26 September 2003

President Bush turned the screws on Iran yesterday, saying the Islamic republic faces "universal condemnation if they continue with a nuclear weapons program."
Iran has insisted its nuclear program is only for peaceful energy purposes. But the Bush administration earlier this month succeeded in persuading the International Atomic Energy Agency to demand that Iran provide an explanation of its nuclear program by Oct. 31.
The president said he raised his concerns about Iran's nuclear program this week with world leaders attending the U.N. General Assembly.
"I'll tell you, the response was very positive," Bush told reporters. "People understand the danger of the Iranians having a nuclear weapons program."
Bush added that he planned to raise the issue with Russian President Vladimir Putin, who is arriving at Camp David today for two days of talks. Russia is helping to build a nuclear reactor in Iran, and U.S. officials are concerned that the Russian help is aiding Iran in a possible weapons program.
Bush's remarks were made on the same day that the Iranian foreign minister, in an interview published in The Washington Post, signaled a willingness to cooperate on the nuclear issue. "We don't have anything to hide because we do not have a program for producing nuclear weapons," said Kamal Kharrazi. "Therefore, we are ready to be quite transparent."
Asked about Kharrazi's comments, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell said, "I can be nothing but pleased if that's what they intend to be and if that's what they actually do."
Meanwhile, diplomats reported yesterday that U.N. atomic experts have found traces of weapons-grade uranium at a second site in Iran. Experts for the IAEA, which earlier had discovered the substance at a plant in Natanz, found the substance at Kalay-e Electric Co., just west of Tehran.

A source familiar with the Sept. 18 report from the inspectors said the samples found at Kalay-e Electric were consistent with those found at Natanz.

David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security, said the discovery could bolster the Iranian contention that the enriched uranium must have come into the country on imported components, since the materials were assembled in Kalay-e and then shipped to Natanz. But he noted the Iranians had changed their story about the components, having earlier said they were produced in Iran without foreign assistance.

"It would have been very shocking if they had not found HEU [highly enriched uranium] there," Albright said. "But Iran has to prove its point that it did not enrich uranium at all."

White House spokesman Scott McClellan said the discovery was "part of a long-standing pattern of evasions and deception to disguise the true nature and purpose of Iran's nuclear activities."

In a breakfast meeting with reporters in New York yesterday, Kharrazi said the U.S. campaign is causing tensions within the Iranian government, with reformist President Mohammad Khatami "under pressure to pull out of the NPT," the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. He suggested the debate could give the upper hand to conservative clerics, saying Khatami is "in the middle of two sides of pressure. You could imagine what could be the result of that."

But, Kharrazi added, the Iranian supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, "believes it [a nuclear bomb] is *haram*, it is forbidden. We do not think having a bomb would create security for us. It would create more problems."

RUSLAND

BERICHTEN

Tehran Times

Russia Tells U.S. Officials Nuclear Coop With Iran Will Continue
12 April 2003

MOSCOW -- Russia's Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev has played down U.S. fears that Russian construction of a nuclear power plant in Iran may trigger proliferation and made it clear that Moscow would continue its nuclear cooperation with Iran.
According to ITAR-TASS news agency, Rumyantsev said he assured U.S. officials that "everything will be done in strict compliance with international norms and agreements".
The Russian atomic energy minister met U.S. Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton in Washington Thursday, IRNA reported.
"We tried to remove American officials' fears that Russian construction of a nuclear power plant in Iran may trigger proliferation (of weapons of mass destruction)," ITAR-TASS cited Rumyantsev as saying.
"Therefore, our information on cooperation with Iran was apprehended with understanding that we do not violate any international commitments," the minister said.
Washington has whipped up its anti-Iran rhetoric after President Mohammad Khatami made public Tehran's plans for a complete nuclear fuel cycle.
The announcement came shortly after U.S. officials were cited late last year as alleging that American satellites had spotted two sites in Arak and Natanz which suggested they could be used for making nuclear weapons. Washington suspects Tehran's plans, arguing, "Iran's costly pursuit of a complete nuclear fuel cycle only makes sense if it's in support of a nuclear weapons program."
U.S. says Iran's nuclear programs, while the country sits on some of the biggest oil and gas reserves of the world, are questionable.
Iran says it wants the programs as part of the country's bid to generate 6,000 megawatts of electricity to cope with the rising energy demand in the 65-million-nation in the next 20 years, while its gas and oil reserves are becoming overstretched.
A delegation from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in February inspected the gas centrifuge in central Natanz.

Miami Herald

Putin Agrees Iran Poses Nuclear Threat
Barry Schweid – 15 May 2003

SOFIA, Bulgaria - Edging closer to the Bush administration's view, Russian President Vladimir Putin is registering concern about Iran's nuclear weapons ambitions and there will be further discussion of the issue when Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov holds talks in Washington next week, a senior U.S. official said.
Putin and Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov did not get into specifics in talks with Powell in Moscow on Wednesday, but it was apparent to the U.S. side that findings by the International Atomic Energy Agency that Iran has a vigorous weapons program was getting through to the Russians.
The Russians made clear they, too, are concerned about nuclear activity in Iran and they do not want a nuclear-armed Iran in the neighborhood, the official said Thursday.
The issue is on the agenda for President Bush's visit to St. Petersburg June 1 for talks with Putin. The Russian president is trying to establish a positive basis for the talks, said the official on condition of anonymity.
The Russian defense minister is to hold talks in Washington May 21-22.
Powell flew Thursday to Bulgaria's capital to thank the Eastern European country for its support in the war with Iraq. The stop also marks the 100th anniversary of establishment of diplomatic relations between Bulgaria and the United States.
Putin tried to move past the U.S.-Russian split over the Iraq war and edged closer to the Bush administration over technology sales to Iran.

But the two sides did not settle their disagreement over lifting U.N. sanctions against Iraq. Secretary of State Colin Powell said they had not resolved the issue of weapons searches, and Foreign Minister Ivanov stressed Russia's insistence on a "legal basis" for governmental transition in Baghdad.
Powell signaled, however, that the Bush administration was considering a compromise with the Russians on sanctions. Russia has supported only a suspension of the economic sanctions. Powell said eliminating them was preferable, "but we will look at the idea of initially suspending sanctions."
But on a flight from Sofia to Berlin, Powell expressed a tougher line.
"We are going for lifting the sanctions," he said. "We want to get 15 to 0 in the Security Council. I think a lift is achievable."
Determined to set a positive agenda for Bush's visit, Powell met with Putin at the Kremlin and three times with Ivanov, in addition to having dinner with the foreign minister.
"We could congratulate each other," Putin said as the Russian Duma, or lower house of parliament, approved a pact with the United States to cut long-range nuclear warheads by two-thirds over the next 10 years. It was ratified by the U.S. Senate in March.
Putin went on to declare "we have had a lot of arguments recently concerning the Iraq problem, but we have successfully overcome these differences," referring to Russia's objections to the war with Iraq.
The split did not shake the "basic foundation of our bilateral relationship," he said.
Powell acknowledged disagreements in the recent past, "especially with respect to Iraq, but now, I think, we have the opportunity to move forward and all of us join together to help the Iraqi people to a better life."
Still, while the United States wants an unconditional lifting of penalties against Iraq, the Russians want only a suspension as well as a continuation of U.N. weapons searches.
Ivanov said the priority now "is to create a legal basis for a broad international involvement in postwar rehabilitation" of Iraq. This appeared to reflect Moscow's position favoring a prominent role for the United Nations in rebuilding Iraq after the U.S.-led war topple Saddam Hussein's government.
At an economic conference in Moscow, Deputy Foreign Minister Yuri Fedotov said the U.S. resolution that would lift sanctions immediately and phase out the oil-for-food program is "a very difficult resolution for us."
Russia's objective, he said, is to "bring to a minimum our economic losses and political losses from this resolution."
Russia "proceeds from the assumption that all approved contracts must be fulfilled or compensated in an appropriate way," Fedotov said. He placed the value of Russian contracts with Iraq at $4 billion.
Putin called his meeting with Powell "a good opportunity to check our watches" before he sees Bush in June. He said the Duma's ratification of the arms accord was an accomplishment for both countries.
But ahead of that meeting, Russian technology sales to Iran pose a potential snarl. The Russians are resisting ending the sales despite urgent appeals by Washington, which argues that the technology significantly aids Iran's nuclear weapons aspirations. The standoff is preventing resolution of the most contentious dispute in the U.S.-Russian relationship.
Without elaboration, Powell said, "We have come a little closer as to how we should deal with our concerns."
On the U.N. resolution, Russia wants assurances that Iraq's alleged banned weapons - the main reason Bush gave for going to war - are not being hidden, before Moscow will support removing the sanctions. Also in dispute is the role of U.N. weapons inspectors. The Bush administration sees no further use for them and is resorting to its own specialists to continue its search.

Guardian

Russia invites US to build Iran's nuclear reactor
Nick Paton Walsh in St Petersburg and Dan de Luce in Tehran – 31 May 2003

Russia tried to ease tensions with the US over Iran yesterday, by offering to let America share in the construction of a nuclear reactor.
The facility, in the Gulf port of Bushehr, is being built by Russia but the US fears it could become a platform for Iran's nuclear weapons programme.
Yesterday's offer appeared deigned to reassure the US that Moscow's nuclear assistance to Iran is transparent.
The offer by Russia's minister for atomic energy, Alexander Rumyantsev, followed a week of negotiation between Washington and Moscow. Neither side wanted to spoil this weekend's meeting between George Bush and Vladimir Putin - their first since the Iraq war.
Mr Rumyantsev said the project had "enough places for everyone", and added that Iran's nuclear programme of six reactors could have wider international involvement.

"We have made this proposal to our American colleagues several times and they have been saying they need to think about it," Mr Rumyantsev said.
The US is unlikely to help Iran, which it has branded as part of the "axis of evil" and accused of sponsoring terrorism. Washington fears the fuel used in the reactor could be used to make an atomic bomb.
The American embassy in Moscow declined to comment but a diplomat said recently that Russia shared US concerns over Iran's nuclear ambitions.
US officials also declared a small victory in the dispute by saying Moscow had agreed not to supply the fuel until Tehran agreed to "intrusive" inspections of its facilities. This was somewhat contradicted by Russia's atomic energy ministry, which said the fuel would be delivered later this year.
Donald Rumsfeld, the US defence secretary, wants "regime change" in Iran to be official US policy but he is meeting resistance.
For Iran's clerical leaders, inviting Americans to build the reactor would be seen as capitulating to Washington.
But Kamal Kharrazi, Iran's foreign minister, said yesterday: "Russians or westerners who want to be involved can come."
Tehran has so far refused to sign up to "go-anywhere" inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency unless sanctions on dual-use technology are lifted.
Russian officials are split on the issue. The foreign ministry's desire to ease US concerns clashes with the atomic energy ministry's need for the deal.

BBC News

Russia 'halting Iran nuclear help'
2 June 2003

Russia is to stop exporting nuclear material to Iran following its refusal to sign up to an international protocol, a senior British official has said.
The official said President Vladimir Putin had announced to other leaders at the G8 summit in France that his country would halt "all nuclear exports" until Iran signed up to tougher nuclear inspections.
It follows a decision by the G8 leaders to issue a joint statement describing weapons of mass destruction as the "pre-eminent threat" to international security.
The statement also calls on North Korea to dismantle "visibly, verifiably and irreversibly" its nuclear weapons programme.
On Sunday, Russia - Iran's main partner in its nuclear power programme - added its voice to those calling on Tehran to sign an additional protocol to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.
That would permit tougher international inspections, giving the Iranians a chance to prove they were not trying to produce nuclear weapons.

Counter-offensive
But Iran refused to agree to this.
An Iranian foreign ministry spokesman, Hamid-Reza Asefi, said Iran would not sign any new protocols until international sanctions were dropped and it was given the technology to develop atomic energy for peaceful purposes.
Mr Asefi said Iran was allowed such technology under the non-proliferation treaty it had already signed.
He said American contractors should help build Iran's nuclear power stations if they really were concerned about Iranian intentions - an offer immediately rejected by US officials.
Iran had appeared to be confident of Russian support to finish its nuclear reactor at Bushehr - the facility at the centre of American concerns - following Mr Putin's meeting with US President George W Bush in St Petersburg.

Iran Daily

Putin defends nuclear ties with Iran
2 June 2003

Saint Petersburg, Russia – Russia and the United States made only limited headway Sunday over Iran as President Vladimir Putin firmly defended his nuclear cooperation with the country during talks with US counterpart George W. Bush.
The otherwise feel-good informal summit between Bush and Putin in the Russian leader's native city was their first direct meeting since a bitter falling-out over the war against Iraq, AFP reported.
The two leaders later told a joint press conference that they made some progress in their dispute over Iran and Putin stressed that Moscow was as concerned as Washington about Tehran's nuclear program.
"The positions of Russia and the US on the issue are much closer than they seem. We do not need to be convinced of the fact that there should be no proliferation of weapons of mass destruction," Putin said. "President Bush and I have a full understanding on this."
But moments later Putin defended Russia's decision to build Iran's first nuclear reactor -- a project that was first launched by Germany some two decades ago but then abandoned under pressure from the United States.
"On Iran, we are against the pretext of using the nuclear program as a lever in unfair business competition against us," said Putin, before quickly adding that Moscow would work with Washington "in order to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction everywhere, including Iran."
Bush, for his part, said cautiously that both sides were 'concerned' about Iran's nuclear ambitions.
"Russia and the United States have mutual concerns about the advanced Iranian nuclear program. I appreciate Vladimir Putin's understanding of the issue and his willingness to work with me and others to solve this potential problem," the US president added.
Moscow added an unexpected twist to the dispute on Friday, when the country's atomic energy minister invited the United States to join Russia in Bushehr's construction.

CNN

Russia will send nuke fuel to Iran
6 June 2003

MOSCOW, Russia (Reuters) --Russia, contradicting British Prime Minister Tony Blair, said on Thursday it would supply Iran with fuel for a nuclear reactor.
The shipment would not be dependent on whether Tehran signed an additional inspection agreement with the U.N. nuclear watchdog.
But foreign ministry spokesman Alexander Yakovenko said supplies for the unfinished reactor depended on securing a separate bilateral deal with Iran to send spent fuel back to Russia for reprocessing.
He suggested uncertainty could have arisen from confusion over the two documents.
Yakovenko said Iran's reluctance to sign the so-called additional protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), providing for short-notice inspections of nuclear facilities, was not of itself a bar to Russia sending fuel to Iran.
"Not signing this protocol will not be an obstacle for cooperation with Iran. Why? Because the IAEA has no objections against Iran on this," Yakovenko told Reuters. But he said agreement on spent fuel was vital.
"Until we get guarantees that we will get our fuel back, we will not export anything," he said. "People have got confused, because there are two protocols and some people have interpreted this in a different way."
An official of the IAEA, the U.N.'s nuclear watchdog, said the Iran-Russia agreement on the return of spent fuel was based on a former Soviet policy of always taking back spent nuclear fuel provided to Soviet satellite states, such as Bulgaria.
The policy was designed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons or the diversion of weapons-grade material across the communist world and the IAEA believes the policy was effective.
Blair told Britain's parliament on Wednesday he had received assurances from Russian President Vladimir Putin at the G8 summit of industrialized countries that Moscow would provide no fuel for Iran's plant until the IAEA protocol was signed.
Putin told reporters at the summit that Russia would pursue plans to help build the plant at Bushehr. He made no mention of any suspension of equipment or supplies.

But he also said the Bushehr plant had to meet all requirements of the IAEA, which will present a report on the Iranian nuclear program later this month.
U.S. officials question why oil-and gas-rich Iran is interested in building Bushehr and accuse Tehran of trying to develop nuclear weapons. Washington has repeatedly asked Moscow to stop helping build the station.
The issue of spent fuel is important as arms-grade plutonium, a main ingredient in a nuclear device, can be extracted from reprocessed spent fuel.

No proof
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Mamedov said in an interview in Friday'e edition of daily Vremya Novostei that there was no proof Iran was developing nuclear weapons.
"I stress here that the IAEA has so far not noted any violations of the non-proliferation treaty by Iran," he said.
"There are specific technical issues here. But we will discuss them not on the orders of the Americans but because they are of concern to us," Mamedov added.
Iran's ambassador to Russia, Gholamreza Shafei, said on Thursday the bilateral deal on repatriating spent fuel had already been drafted and Tehran was ready to sign.
"It would appear what Blair meant was the addition to the main contract between Iran and Russia," he told reporters, referring to a 10-year contract signed in 1995.
In London, a spokesman for Blair said the prime minister stood by what he had told parliament.
Construction of the reactor is to be completed later this year, with the plant due to come on stream next year. Russia has yet to send any fuel to Iran.

Washington Post

Russians Pressure Iran on Weapons
By Peter Baker – 5 June 2003

MOSCOW -- Russian officials signaled today that they are turning up the pressure on Iran not to develop nuclear weapons, while they continue to promote construction of a civilian nuclear power plant in the Islamic republic.
President Vladimir Putin's government, in an effort to ease U.S. concerns, recently has pushed the Tehran government to guarantee that it has no secret weapons program and to accept more robust international inspections. Russian officials also vowed not to ship nuclear fuel to Iran without a written commitment that Iran will return the spent fuel, which could be used for bombs.
U.S. officials said they were encouraged by these steps, after having tried in vain for years to persuade the Russian government to drop its nuclear cooperation with Iran. The extent of Russian willingness to push Iranian officials remained unclear.
Putin's top economics adviser, Andrei Illarionov, suggested today that further work on the nuclear plant would hinge on Iranian acceptance of additional inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency, the U.N. watchdog agency. That would be "the best way to remove all questions and suspicions," he told Russian reporters at a news conference. "When the IAEA concludes that Iran does not have any military nuclear program, Russia will be able to restore normal ties with this country."
British Prime Minister Tony Blair said Putin had made a similar pledge at this week's Group of Eight summit in France. In a report to Parliament, Blair noted a G-8 statement calling for a more rigorous inspections regime in Iran and said Putin "made clear that in the meantime Russia would suspend its exports of nuclear fuel to Iran," Reuters reported from London.
Yet in an interview in Moscow today, Russian Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev said there was "no link" between Iran's agreement to submit to tougher IAEA oversight and the work on the unfinished 1,000-megawatt, light-water civilian reactor at the Persian Gulf port of Bushehr. No nuclear fuel has been sent to Iran yet, he said, and none will be sent until a spent-fuel agreement is signed. But he said that the fuel shipments do not depend on Iran's response to the inspections proposal.
"Iran has not violated anything," Rumyantsev said in the interview with Western correspondents. "It has not stepped even a microscopic distance outside of the Non-Proliferation Treaty which it signed. So all the accusations about Iran are purely emotional."
The Bushehr plant has been a point of contention in U.S.-Russian relations for years, with successive administrations in Washington expressing alarm that any nuclear cooperation with the Islamic government in Iran could enhance Iran's ability to develop weapons of mass destruction. Officials here have dismissed U.S.

suspicions as unfounded and are holding fast to an $800 million project that represents significant income for the cash-strapped country.
Rumyantsev also minimized concern over two nuclear-related facilities revealed last year by an Iranian opposition group, saying the Tehran government readily acknowledged the sites afterward. Iranian authorities allowed IAEA inspectors in February to visit a pilot uranium-enrichment plant at Natanz, 200 miles southeast of Tehran. Rumyantsev said the plant contains about 200 centrifuges for fuel enrichment, but added that inspectors reported no violations of international rules. Iran also confirmed that it has a heavy-water production facility at Arak, about 200 miles to the southwest, but Rumyantsev said the facility could be used for a future civilian reactor.
Rumyantsev and other officials have sought in recent days to make concessions to reassure the Bush administration. After meeting with President Bush in St. Petersburg over the weekend, Putin said that "the positions of Russia and the United States on the issue are closer than they seem." At the subsequent G-8 summit, Putin signed the statement warning Iran against trying to develop nuclear weapons.
A U.S. diplomat said last weekend that Russian and U.S. officials had moved closer on the issue. While the government had not committed to dropping the plant construction, the diplomat said, "we think it would be wise for Russia to go slow in support for the Bushehr project" until Iran signs a protocol on additional inspections.

BBC News

Putin refuses to cut Iran link
22 June 2003

Russian President Vladimir Putin has said that Russia would continue to help Iran develop its nuclear programme despite Washington's objections.
Mr Putin was speaking in an exclusive interview with the BBC One's Breakfast with Frost. "We won't let the issue of nuclear proliferation be used to stop Russian companies dealing with Iran," he said, adding that Russia, too, had some questions regarding Iran's nuclear energy programme.
Russia is helping Iran to build an $800m nuclear reactor in the south-western port of Bushehr.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) - the United Nations nuclear watchdog - has called on Iran to allow stricter inspections of its nuclear facilities. US President George W Bush urged the world last Thursday to warn Tehran against developing nuclear weapons.
Mr Putin is due to travel to Britain this week in the first state visit by a Russian leader since 1874.
Economic issue?
The Russian leader framed the issue of Russia's relations with Iran as an economic one - and said companies from other countries were trying to secure economic advantages in the country. "We know that some Western European companies closely co-operate with Iran in that sphere and supply it with equipment that is of dual use, to say the least," Mr Putin said. "We shall develop our relations on nuclear issues - not only with Iran but with other countries too - depending on how open they are to that established and respected international organisation [IAEA] whose experts we all trust," the Russian leader added.
Last Friday, President Putin said he had been assured by his Iranian counterpart, Mohammad Khatami, that Iran had no plans to develop nuclear weapons.
The IAEA has asked Iran to sign an additional protocol to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) "as soon as possible and without conditions". Mr Putin told the BBC that Iran was prepared "to join all agreements and to place all its nuclear programs under control". But it was not clear whether he meant the additional protocol to the NPT which would allow for more intensive and short-notice inspections of Iranian nuclear facilities. IAEA inspection teams are due to return to Iran shortly.
Historic visit
Mr Putin said that Russia's opposition to the war in Iraq had not damaged ties with Britain, saying that his relationship with Prime Minister Tony Blair was open and friendly. "We believe it is possible to tell each other what we actually think rather than what our diplomats advise us to say," he said. But he is scheduled to meet Mr Blair for only 30 minutes on his visit, the BBC's Bridget Kendall says.
Mr Putin told the BBC that Russia will insist that some of the multi-million-dollar contracts Russian oil companies signed with Saddam Hussein's Iraq be honoured. And he said Russia would not be dissuaded from helping Iran with its nuclear programme by US fears that Tehran is trying to develop nuclear weapons.
As in other recent interviews, he refused to be drawn on the question of whether he would run for re-election. His term ends in less than a year.

Guardian

US blacklists Russian arms firm selling to Iran
Nick Paton Walsh – 18 September 2003

The US has accused Russia of selling an advanced weapon to Iran and imposed sanctions on the state company involved.
The action has been taken just days before the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, is due to meet George Bush at the US presidential retreat, Camp David.
Tula KBP, a state-owned company making anti-aircraft and anti-missile devices, has been banned from doing business with the US and US companies for a year for selling the laser-guided Krasnopol M artillery shells to Iran.
Washington classifies Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism, and suspects it of having a nuclear weapons programme, under cover of a civil nuclear energy programme, in which Russian technology may play a part.
Yesterday the US undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, John Bolton, arrived in Moscow to discuss nuclear proliferation.
Russia's project to build an $800m nuclear reactor in Iran is expected to be high on the agenda.
Tula KBP said it had not sold any arms to Iran and that the sanctions were a political move without teeth, since the US was not one of its clients.
Washington has previously accused the company of sending radar equipment to Iraq and missiles to Syria.
In a notice published on Tuesday it said the government had "determined that the government of Russia trans ferred lethal military equipment to countries determined by the secretary of state to be state sponsors of terrorism".
The sanctions have largely been interpreted as a gesture intended to heap pressure upon Moscow to further cool its relations with Tehran.
Normally Washington would impose sanctions on the entire country for such a breach.
But in this instance it has decided not to cancel the millions of dollars aid it gives Russia annually because it regards the disposal of the former Soviet Union army's nuclear arsenal as vital to national security.
Russia has refused to bow to international opposition to a contract with Iran to build a nuclear reactor at Bushehr, despite admitting recently that it shares Washington's concern about nuclear proliferation.
Russia has tried to allay the concern about its transfer of nuclear energy technology to Iran by having Iran return the spent fuel.
The plan appeared to hit an obstacle last week when Tehran demanded payment for the spent fuel.
But on Tuesday the Russian minister for atomic energy, Alexander Rumyantsev, said Iran and Russia had "no contradictions".
No date has yet been set for signing the contract.
An Iranian delegation is expected in Moscow next week to complete matters.
Many argue that the fuel is not the key issue.
A European diplomat said yesterday: "There is concern that the considerable number of Russian engineers living in Iran, and Iranian engineers coming to Russia to learn about nuclear science, might be gaining or trans ferring knowledge that could be accelerating Iran's nuclear weapons programme."
Hundreds of Iranians have been trained at nuclear technology institutes in various parts of Russia.
But Moscow insists that the students are taught only the technical language and the skills needed for peaceful energy plants.
Russian officials said there was no point putting pressure on them.
"It is not the first time America has made such demands, but there is no basis for it," a senior foreign ministry official said.
"In Russia we have very strict export controls. It is difficult to understand what their motivations are."

DOCUMENTEN

EU General Affairs and External Relations Council

2518th Council Meeting – External Relations
Luxembourg, 16 June 2003

[…]
IRAN - Council Conclusions
"1. The Council discussed developments in relations with Iran following its decision to launch negotiations on agreements concerning trade and co-operation and political dialogue.
2. The Council recalled that in deciding to open these negotiations it expected that deepening of economic and commercial relations between the EU and Iran should be matched by similar progress in all other aspects of the EU's relations with Iran. It identified in particular the need for significant positive developments on human rights, non-proliferation, terrorism and the Middle East Peace Process.The Council continues to have significant concerns about these issues, especially in respect of the handling of the recent demonstrations.
3. In particular, the Council has taken note with concern of the Report on implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran submitted by the Director General of IAEA on June 6.
4. The nature of some aspects of Iran's programme raises serious concerns, in particular as regards the closing of the nuclear fuel cycle, especially the uranium centrifuge, announced by President Khatami. The Council stressed the need for Iran to answer timely, fully and adequately all questions raised regarding its nuclear programme. It called on Iran to fully cooperate with the IAEA.
5. The Council called on Iran to conclude and implement urgently and unconditionally an Additional Protocol. This would be a significant step in demonstrating Iran's stated peaceful intentions with regard to its nuclear programme.
6. The Council reiterated its full support to the Director General of IAEA and decided to revert to this issue in the light of the forthcoming debate at the Board of Governors.
7. The Council will continue to follow closely developments on this issue and the other areas of concern. It reiterates that progress in these matters and strengthened dialogue and cooperation are interdependent, essential and mutually reinforcing elements of EU-Iran relations."
[…]

EU General Affairs and External Relations Council

Iran - Council Conclusions
21 July 2003

"1. The Council reconfirmed that progress in economic and political relations with Iran should be evaluated in parallel. More intense economic relations can be achieved only if progress is reached in the four areas of concern, namely human rights, terrorism, non-proliferation and the Middle East Peace Process.
2. The Council expressed increasing concern over the development of the Iranian Nuclear programme and over the proliferation risks implied, in particular as regards closing the nuclear fuel cycle. The Council reiterated its expectation that Iran show full transparency and co-operate fully with IAEA and meet its requests, in particular those referred to in the last Board of Governors meeting. An urgent and unconditional acceptance, signature and implementation of an IAEA Additional Protocol on safeguards is of the utmost importance as it would be considered by the international community as a sign of the Iranian commitment in the field of non-proliferation.
3. The Council decided to review future steps of the co-operation between EU and Iran in September in view of further developments particularly with regard to the second report of IAEA Director General, El Baradei, the IAEA evaluations and the possible conclusions of the Board of Governors of this Agency.
4. The Council expressed deep shock at the violent death of photojournalist Zahra Kazemi. It welcomed the decision by President Khatami to order four cabinet ministers to investigate the case. The Council recalled

Iran's obligations under international law to promptly investigate and prosecute those responsible for the crime.
5. The Council expressed deep concern over the human rights situation in Iran also in the light of the recent arrests of students, journalists and others during recent student demonstrations. The Council called for rapid progress in this field and stressed the importance of close cooperation by Iran with UN human rights mechanisms. It also called for the rapid release of persons detained for having exercised their right to freedom of expression. The Council reaffirmed the need for concrete results in the framework of the current EU-Iran human rights dialogue."

BERICHTEN

BBC News

EU backs Iran nuclear inspections
16 June 2003

European Union foreign ministers have backed urgent calls from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for Iran to allow more stringent inspections of its nuclear energy programme.
In a statement agreed at a meeting in Luxembourg on Monday, they called on Iran to conclude and implement urgently and unconditionally an additional protocol to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty allowing for short-notice inspections of suspected nuclear sites.
BBC correspondent Oana Lungescu says that despite the strong language this is only a warning, though the EU may have to take a firm decision soon.
With Iran in mind, foreign ministers earlier adopted a series of principles on preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction all over the world.
In what is being seen as a significant move, the EU indicates it does not rule out the use of force - but only, the document makes clear, if political dialogue and sanctions have failed, and with the United Nations Security Council playing a central role.
"The acquisition of WMD or related materials by terrorists would represent an additional threat to the international system with potentially uncontrollable consequences," an EU document said.
This is the first time that the EU has included a reference to possible military action against states or terrorist groups which acquire such weapons.
Reuters quoted diplomats as saying that Germany initially tried to oppose the move but was persuaded by France to back it.

'Significant step'
In the statement on Iran, EU ministers expressed "serious concern" over Iran's nuclear activities, urging Iran to co-operate fully with the IAEA.
It added that Iran had to answer any questions about its programme in a timely, full and adequate way.
Iran's implementation of the additional protocol would be "a significant step in demonstrating Iran's stated peaceful intentions with regard to its nuclear programme", it said.
George Papandreou, foreign minister of Greece, the current holder of the EU presidency, said he was in personal contact with IAEA chairman Mohamed ElBaradei and would follow his lead on this matter.
The EU ministers said that improved trade links with Iran should be conditional on Iran's co-operation.
Some EU countries want trade talks with Iran halted, but a majority believe the EU should keep the door open to dialogue, as a means of obtaining greater transparency on nuclear issues and more progress on human rights and political reforms in Iran.
"If there is no progress on the nuclear issue and on human rights," an EU diplomat told the BBC, "it would be difficult to pretend we can do business as usual with Tehran."
The ministers also said the EU was closely following the current protests in Iran, and asked the authorities to refrain from violence.

Guardian

EU intensifies pressure on Iran to accept inspections
Ian Black and Jonathan Steele – 17 June 2003

Iran was put on notice by the EU last night that it must accept tougher inspections of its nuclear programme to convince doubters that it is not developing banned weapons.
With the US ratcheting up pressure on Tehran, EU foreign ministers signalled that there could be no progress on trade and political cooperation if the Iranian leadership did not comply.
The ministers also endorsed a beefed-up approach for dealing with weapons of mass destruction - the legacy of bitter transatlantic divisions over the Iraq war.
Later this week, the EU is to go even further in trying to define its world role by publishing a "security doctrine" at the Salonika summit. That is to be followed by a EU-US summit in Washington, where WMD issues are high on the agenda.
The new WMD strategy is aimed at exploiting the union's political clout and using export controls more effectively. Strikingly, it also allows for the use of force, though only as a last resort and in accordance with the UN charter.
Germany initially tried to have any reference to the use of force removed from the document but relented under pressure from France.
The Europeans stopped short of endorsing the US charge that Iran is secretly building nuclear weapons, but said some aspects of its programme raised "serious concern".
Iran was urged to "urgently and unconditionally" sign and ratify an additional protocol to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Tehran said it was considering accepting more intrusive short-notice inspections but had made no final decision.
The EU, still shaken by months of ructions about Iraq, is strengthening its stance on Iran because of genuine concerns about WMD, terrorism, the Middle East peace process and human rights, but also because it wants to be able to work with the US on what many predict will be the next big international crisis.
Britain does not share Washington's view that isolation is the best way to deal with a Tehran regime characterised by a power struggle between reformists and conservatives.
Jack Straw, the foreign secretary, said: "The UK and EU have a policy of constructive engagement with Iran, but a policy that is open-eyed. We are all very concerned to see progress and particularly for Iran to better cooperate with the IAEA."
One EU official said: "It's not clever to back people up against a wall to the point where they cannot acquiesce in what you're asking to do because it's become a trial of strength. But the Iranians are not going to get the trade deal without a political deal."
As a student protest in Iran continued, more than 250 lecturers and writers called on the country's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, to abandon the principle of being God's representative on earth and to accept that he is accountable to the people.
"Considering individuals to be in the position of a divinity and absolute power... is open polytheism [in contradiction to] almighty God and blatant oppression of the dignity of human beings," they said. "People [and their elected lawmakers] have the right to fully supervise their rulers, criticise them, and remove them from power if they are not satisfied," they added in a statement in the reformist newspaper Yas-e-nou.
The signatories included two aides to President Mohammad Khatami. He has remained silent on the unrest, but his younger brother, a leading reformist MP, said it was an insult to Iranians to suggest the protests were initiated abroad.

Guardian

Europeans fail to end Iranian nuclear crisis
Tehran rejects offer of technology cooperation
Dan De Luce – 20 September 2003

Britain, France and Germany have made an unsuccessful attempt to encourage Iran to comply with the International Atomic Energy Agency rules and curb its nuclear ambitions by offering to share their nuclear technology.
The incentive was intended to persuade Iran to accept tougher nuclear inspections and to halt its uranium enrichment programme.

It was offered despite strong objections by the US, according to a Reuters news agency report yesterday .
Iran's lukewarm reaction served to unite the US and European governments behind the IAEA's tough resolution last week, which requires Iran to prove that it has no-nuclear weapons programme by October 31.
It it fails to do so it make face action by the UN security council action.
The reported behind-the-scenes offer sheds new light on the crisis caused by Iran's nuclear activities.
Tehran's attempt to buy time on the issue has backfired and appears to have paved the way for transatlantic unity.
The Bush administration wants Iran isolated and dismisses Europe's attempts at "constructive engagement" with reformers in the theocratic leadership.
Iran's decision to reject the offer will make it more difficult for the foreign secretary, Jack Straw, and other foreign ministers to defend the benefits of engagement.
Iranian officials told journalists privately in August that England, France and Germany were putting pressure on their government to accept short-notice inspections of Iran's nuclear plants.
But they but did not mention the incentives that were also proposed.
A letter from the three powers said that if Iran agreed to the demands they would offer cooperation on technology. It did not specify what sort of technology,.
But Iran has made it clear that civilian nuclear technology is the only incentive it is interested in.
"Washington did not consider it very helpful at all," a diplomat familiar with the matter said.
The administration was worried that it might divide Europe and the US, talked to "friends and colleagues in Europe" and "attempted to dissuade them from sending the letter," the diplomat told Reuters.
A source said that the joint British, French and German initiative "still stands".
Iran has given conflicting signals about how it will react to the IAEA resolution, but has said it will continue to cooperate with the agency.
But Conservative figures advocate following the North Korean example by withdrawing from the nuclear non-proliferation treaty altogether and ejecting UN inspectors.
"What is wrong with considering this treaty on nuclear energy and pulling out of it?" Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, who heads the supervisory body the Guardian Council, said yesterday at Friday prayers in Tehran.
"North Korea pulled out of it and many countries have never entered it."
While the reformist government, led by President Mohammad Khatami, has said it will consider signing the additional protocol to the treaty which would allow short-notice inspections, Ayatollah Jannati said that would be represent "an extraordinary humiliation".
The final decisions on Iran's nuclear programme are believed to rest with the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and allied senior clerics, not with Mr Khatami's cabinet, whose powers have been systematically curtailed.
The US and European governments suspect that Iran has a clandestine nuclear weapons programme and point to its efforts to enrich uranium, build a heavy water plant, and secure spent nuclear fuel, and to its contradictory accounts of its activities.
Iran says its nuclear programme is designed for peaceful purposes, to meet growing demand for electricity.
As for the IAEA tests which showed enriched uranium at a nuclear site, Iranian officials say the samples came from contaminated components bought on the black market abroad.

NEDERLAND

DOCUMENTEN

[Zie voor eerdere documenten van regering en Tweede Kamer Facts and Reports nummer 25 van mei 2003.]

Ministerie van Economische Zaken

Beantwoording vragen van lid Samson en Koenders over mogelijke historische betrokkenheid van Urenco bij de ontwikkeling van het Iraanse atoomprogramma
1360 – 2 juni 2003

Hierbij zend ik u mede namens de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken de antwoorden op de vragen gesteld door het lid Samson en Koenders (beiden PVDA), die mij werden gestuurd op 8 mei onder nummer 2020311250.

1. Heeft u naast krantenberichten ook op andere wijze kennis genomen van de precieze uitlatingen van de Russische minister Roemjanstev over mogelijke indirecte betrokkenheid van Urenco bij het Iraanse nucleaire programma?
Neen. Mij is echter bekend dat de Heer Neville Chamberlain, Voorzitter van de Board of Directors van de Urenco Groep, naar aanleiding van de berichten in de pers een brief heeft gestuurd aan minister Rumyantsev van Minatom waarin hij de beschuldigingen weerspreekt. Minister Rumyantsev heeft inmiddels hierop schriftelijk gereageerd blij te zijn met het antwoord dat Urenco nooit nucleaire componenten of materiaal aan Iran heeft geleverd. Een copie van beide brieven voeg ik te uwer informatie hierbij.
2. Klopt het dat door het IAEA in Iran ultracentrifuges zijn aangetroffen die identiek zijnaan de centrifuges die door Urenco zijn ontwikkeld?
Het IAEA heeft gemeld dat de in Iran aangetroffen ultracentrifuges gelijkenis vertonen met die van Urenco. Er zijn evenwel geen gegevens bekend ten aanzien van de technische specificaties en eigenschappen van deze centrifuges. Er kan derhalve geen uitspraak worden gedaan over de mate van gelijkenis. Iran zelf zou hebben ontkend dat buitenlandse firma's betrokken zouden zijn bij het Iraanse nucleaire programma maar dat terzake van eigen "know how"gebruik is gemaakt.
3. Klopt het dat het Iraanse regime in het begin van de jaren 70 mede-investeerder was in Urenco? Hoe groot was het aandeel van Iran bij de ontwikkelingen van Urenco? Betrof het ook een aandeel in de Nederlandse tak van Urenco? Wanneer is dit aandeelhouderschap beëindigd?
Iran is nooit als investeerder betrokken geweest bij Urenco.
4
Had Iran via deze investeringen toegang tot informatie over gevoelige technologie? Welke technologie zou op deze wijze in Iraanse handen gevallen kunnen zijn? Acht u het mogelijk dat het huidige Iraanse atoomprogramma inderdaad mede gebaseerd is op Nederlandse verrijkingstechnologie?
Zie het antwoord op vraag 3 wat betreft de eerste twee vragen. Voor wat betreft de slotvraag kan gesteld worden dat er geen enkele aanwijzing is dat het huidige Iraanse nucleaire programma mede gebaseerd is op de Urenco verrijkingstechnologie, welke in Nederland, Duitsland en het Verenigd Koninkrijk is ontwikkeld.

(w.g.) mr. L.J. Brinkhorst
Minister van Economische Zaken

Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Brief van de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken over NAVO ministeriële bijeenkomsten in Madrid
26348 – nr. 7 – 12 juni 2003

[…] NAVO-Rusland Raad
[…] Van Nederlandse zijde werd in aanvulling hierop gewezen op de mogelijkheid van verdere samenwerking op het gebied van de capaciteiten, zoals luchttransport, en op het gebied van non-proliferatie. In dit kader werd er voor gepleit dat Rusland en de NAVO hun positie ten aanzien van Iran nauwer op elkaar af zouden stemmen, hetgeen uiteindelijk zou moeten leiden tot ratificatie door Iran van het additionele IAEA-protocol en tot volledige transparantie inzake de Iraanse nucleaire programma's. […]

Antwoord van de heer De Hoop Scheffer, Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, mede namens de heer Kamp, Minister van Defensie, op vragen van het lid Wilders (VVD) over een mogelijke Iraanse kernbom
DVB/NN-303/03 – 6 oktober 2003

Vraag 1: Deelt u de mening van internationale experts, zoals de voorzitter van het Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) David Albright, dat Iran eind 2005 over een nucleair wapen kan beschikken?[2] Zo nee, waarom niet? Zo ja, acht u dit aanvaardbaar mede in het licht van uw antwoorden op mijn vragen van 8 juli 2003?[1]
Antwoord: De regering beschikt niet over harde bewijzen voor (voorgenomen) productie door Iran van een kernwapen. Desondanks geeft een aantal zaken vooralsnog aanleiding tot nader, serieus onderzoek. Dat geldt met name voor de verrijkingsinstallatie te Natanz waar sporen van hoog verrijkt uranium zijn gevonden en de geplande zwaarwateronderzoeksreactor (met plutoniumopbrengst) te Arak. In dat kader is van belang dat Iran juist een omvangrijk en ambitieus civiel kernenergieplan heeft ontwikkeld via het uraniumtraject. Dit valt af te leiden uit de kerncentrale in aanbouw te Bushehr. Beide ontwikkelingen; het uraniumverrijkingtraject alsook het plutoniumtraject (zwaarwaterreactor), dragen de mogelijkheid in zich dat Iran uiteindelijk komt tot de productie van een nucleair wapen. Afhankelijk van de uiteindelijke omvang van de uraniumverrijkingsinstallatie in Natanz en van de snelheid waarmee deze gerealiseerd zal worden kan niet worden uitgesloten dat Iran in 2005 in staat is genoeg hoogverrijkt uranium te produceren voor een kernwapen. Het spreekt vanzelf dat een dergelijke ontwikkeling de regering grote zorgen baart, zoals onder meer in mijn antwoord op vragen van het lid Wilders van 8 juli 2003 reeds is aangegeven (Vergaderjaar 2002-2003, Aanhangsel, nr. 1673). Alle inspanningen van de Nederlandse regering, onder meer binnen de EU en in IAEA-kader, zijn erop gericht te voorkomen dat Iran een kernwapen zou verwerven.
Vraag 2: Wat is uw oordeel over de opstelling van Iran tegenover de inspecties van het International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)[3]:
A De gebeurtenissen rond de Kalaye Electric Co. Waarvan Iran in eerste instantie zei dat dit een horlogefabriek was? Weigerde Iran in februari 2003 het IAEA toegang? Werd in maart en juni werd een bezoek toegestaan, maar de toegang tot bepaalde vertrekken geweigerd? Werd in juli het IAEA toegang toegestaan, maar het nemen van monsters geweigerd? Gaf op 9 augustus Iran toe dat zijn verrijkingsactiviteiten in Kalaye geconcentreerd waren? Stellen inmiddels bronnen rond het IAEA dat Iran de omgeving van Kalaye 'gereinigd' heeft?
Antwoord: In mijn antwoord op vragen van het lid Wilders van 8 augustus jl. (Vergaderjaar 2002-2003, nr1875) ben ik reeds ingegaan op de situatie met betrekking tot Kalaye Electric Co. In aanvulling hierop kan worden gemeld dat er inmiddels ter plaatse inderdaad verbouwingswerkzaamheden zijn uitgevoerd. Deze werkzaamheden hebben volgens het IAEA mogelijk tot gevolg dat de genomen monsters geen uitsluitsel over eerdere activiteiten op het terrein kunnen geven. Deze werkzaamheden en het feit dat Iran het IAEA lange tijd niet in de gelegenheid heeft gesteld het betrokken bedrijf te bezoeken en monsters te nemen geven reden tot zorg en zijn niet bevorderlijk voor het wekken van vertrouwen.
B De gebeurtenissen rond Natanz. Is in Natanz inmiddels hoog verrijkt uranium gevonden? Stelde Iran op 9 augustus dat dit besmetting is van geïmporteerde onderdelen van centrifuges, waar Iran tot op dat moment volhield geheel zelfstandig aan zijn nucleaire programma te werken? Weigert Iran te zeggen waarvandaan de besmette onderdelen komen?
Antwoord: Voor het antwoord op deze vragen verwijs ik wederom naar mijn antwoord op vragen van het lid Wilders van 8 augustus jl. (Vergaderjaar 2002-2003, nr1875). In het tussentijdse rapport dat Directeur-Generaal ElBaradei op 26 augustus uitbracht wordt gemeld dat Iran het IAEA de benodigde informatie over verkregen onderdelen zal verstrekken, inclusief informatie over de origine van deze onderdelen.
C Het gegeven dat Iran, in strijd met haar verplichtingen de import van 1000 kilo uranium hexafluoride, 400 kilo uranium tetrafluoride en 400 kilo uranium dioxide niet heeft gemeld. Geldt dit ook China, dat daartoe als exporteur ook was verplicht? Erkenden beiden de import respectievelijk export pas na herhaald aandringen van het IAEA?
Antwoord**:** Ik verwijs andermaal naar mijn antwoord op vragen van het lid Wilders van 8 augustus 2003 (Vergaderjaar 2002-2003, nr.1875). In aanvulling daarop zij vermeld dat indien de door Iran inmiddels gedeclareerde importen van nucleair materiaal uit China afkomstig zouden zijn geweest (hetgeen algemeen wordt aangenomen), China in 1991 formeel niet verplicht was deze export te melden, daar het land op dat moment nog geen partij was bij het Non-proliferatieverdrag en geen daaraan gerelateerde waarborgenovereenkomst met het IAEA had, noch deelnam in enig exportcontroleregime.

Vraag 3: Acht u Iran, op basis van u ter beschikking staande gegevens, in overtreding van zijn verplichtingen volgens het non-proliferatieverdrag?
Antwoord: De internationale discussie richt zich momenteel op de vraag of Iran de verplichtingen onder zijn waarborgovereenkomst met het IAEA is nagekomen. Dat is een andere discussie dan de vraag of Iran zijn verplichtingen onder het non-proliferatieverdrag schendt. Volgens artikel 2 van dat verdrag verplichten verdragspartijen zonder kernwapens zich om geen kernwapens of nucleaire explosieven te ontvangen, te bezitten, te produceren, of te verwerven, noch om assistentie te verzoeken of te ontvangen bij de productie van kernwapens of nucleaire explosieven. De regering is weliswaar bezorgd dat een kernwapen het uiteindelijke doel is van het Iraanse nucleaire programma, er zijn echter geen harde bewijzen dat Iran het non-proliferatieverdrag schendt of reeds heeft geschonden.
Vraag 4: Deelt u de mening van bovengenoemde David Albright dat onvoorwaardelijke ondertekening door Iran van een Additioneel Protocol bij het Non-Proliferatieverdrag onvoldoende is om een zich onwikkelende Iraanse nucleaire dreiging te beëindigen omdat een Iran dat zich te allen tijde op korte termijn nucleair kan bewapenen een grote dreiging vormt voor de regionale en internationale veiligheid en dit waarschijnlijk leidt tot een regionale wapenwedloop met ongewisse uitkomst? Wat is uw beleidsreactie daarop?
Vraag 5: Wat zal, mede in het licht van bovenstaande, de opstelling van Nederland zijn in de bestuursraad van het IAEA bij de volgende bijeenkomst ter voorbereiding van de algemene vergadering van 15 tot 19 september 2003? Bent u in verband met deze belangrijke vergadering bereid deze vragen alsmede de vragen van 7 augustus jl. vóór 15 september 2003 te beantwoorden?
Antwoord**:** Wanneer Iran een Additioneel Protocol zou afsluiten dan zou dit in de ogen van Nederland, maar ook in de ogen van de andere leden van de EU en de VS, een eerste stap zijn in de richting van het creëren van het vertrouwen dat noodzakelijk is om tot een oplossing te komen van de huidige situatie. Ondertekening van een Additioneel Protocol is echter niet voldoende om alle zorgen omtrent het Iraanse nucleaire programma weg te nemen. Daarnaast meent de regering dat de internationale gemeenschap het gesprek aan moet gaan met Iran over een vrijwillige beperking van het – vreedzame - nucleaire programma.
In eerste instantie dienen thans alle openstaande vragen over Irans nucleaire programma te worden beantwoord. Binnen de Bestuursraad van het IAEA, die van 8-12 september bijeen was en ondermeer het rapport van ElBaradei over Iran besprak, heeft Nederland aangedrongen op de aanname van een zo krachtig mogelijke resolutie, waarin Iran wordt opgeroepen voor eind oktober volledige medewerking te verlenen aan het IAEA en de openstaande vragen te beantwoorden. Die resolutie is er ook gekomen. Voor de beoordeling van de vraag of Iran zich aan zijn internationale verplichtingen heeft gehouden zal het eindrapport van het IAEA over Iran van groot belang zijn.
1 Deze vragen zijn een aanvulling op eerdere vragen van het lid Wilders, ingezonden 7 augustus jl., vraagnr. 2020315770; 2 Bulletin of the atomic scientists, sept/oct. jl., volume 59, nr. 5, blz.52-58; 3 Zie o.a.: Washington Post, 27 augustus jl. / LA Times, 26 en 27 augustus jl./ Reuters, 27 augustus jl./ Economist, 28 augustus jl.

Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Antwoord van de heer De Hoop Scheffer, minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, mede namens de heer Kamp, minister van Defensie, op vragen van het lid Wilders (VVD) over een Iraanse kernbom en een meer daadkrachtige en serieuze aanpak van de Nederlandse regering en de EU hiertegen.
DVB/NN-323/03 – 6 oktober 2003

Vraag 1: Herinnert u zich uw antwoord op vraag 2 van mijn vorige serie over het betreffende onderwerp, namelijk dat de regering de gewoonte heeft Kamervragen steeds serieus te beantwoorden?[1] Hoe rijmt u dit met het gegeven dat u slechts drie van de veertien vragen (vragen 2, 2d en 3) min of meer volledig beantwoordt?
Antwoord: De regering beantwoordt Kamervragen immer serieus en zo goed en volledig mogelijk. De veertien vragen van het lid Wilders, gesteld op 8 augustus jl. zijn op genoemde wijze beantwoord. Daarbij teken ik tevens aan dat veel vragen betrekking hebben op vertrouwelijke informatie waar de regering met de grootst mogelijke zorgvuldigheid mee om dient te gaan. Tevens is het niet de taak van de regering om elk bericht in de media te bevestigen dan wel te ontkennen. Het beleid van de regering komt tot stand in een zorgvuldige afweging van beschikbare gegevens en in afstemming met partners en bondgenoten. Over dat beleid ben ik te allen tijde bereid de Kamer, binnen de grenzen die door de vertrouwelijkheid van bepaalde informatie worden gesteld, in te lichten.
Vraag 2: Kunt u alsnog de overige vragen beantwoorden?
Antwoord: Ik constateer dat de onderstaande vragen voor een belangrijk deel nieuw zijn ten opzichte van, dan wel substantieel anders geformuleerd zijn dan de vragen van het lid Wilders van 8 augustus 2003, waarop de

regering antwoordde op 3 september 2003 (Vergaderjaar 2002-2003, nr.1875). Voor zover het hieronder nieuwe vragen betreft, zal de regering met inachtneming van het bovenstaande zo goed en volledig mogelijk antwoord geven. Op reeds gestelde en beantwoorde vragen wordt verwezen naar reeds gegeven antwoorden.

Vraag 2.1: Wat is uw oordeel over de door velen, waaronder de Iraanse ex-president Banisadr[2] gedeelde stelling van de Los Angeles Times dat Iran door clandestiene activiteiten al in de laatste fase is om tot de ontwikkeling van een atoombom te komen?[3] Kunt u alsnog aangeven of naar uw oordeel Iran dichtbij de ontwikkeling van een atoombom is?

Antwoord: Ik verwijs naar mijn antwoord op vragen van het lid Wilders van 4 september 2003 (kenmerk 2020316720).

Vraag 2.2a: Wilt u alsnog aangeven of het gevonden hoog verrijkte c.q. 20% of meer verrijkte[4] uranium verrijkt genoeg was voor het maken van een nucleaire bom, zoals in Netwerk werd gesteld?[5] Deelt u de mening dat het feit, dat het IAEA twee verschillende sporen van hoogverrijkt uranium heeft gevonden, de door u vermelde Iraanse claim dat het gaat om materiaal dat in de geleverde centrifuges was achtergebleven, ondermijnt? Wilt u alsnog hierop ingaan?

Antwoord: Wat betreft het eerste deel van uw vraag verwijs ik naar mijn antwoord op vragen van het lid Wilders van 4 september 2003 (kenmerk 2020316720). Wat betreft het tweede deel van uw vraag kan de regering het volgende melden: de Iraanse verklaring voor de aanwezigheid van sporen verrijkt uranium dekt niet de verschillen in verrijking tussen de twee monsters. Hier zal Iran met een nadere verklaring moeten komen die, naar mag worden aangenomen, deel zal uitmaken van de toegezegde opening van zaken rond de herkomst van de centrifuges, waarover ik u berichtte in antwoord op vragen van het lid Wilders van 4 september 2003 (kenmerk 2020316720).

Vraag 2.2b: Wilt u alsnog in gaan op bronnen die stellen dat de Kadaye Electric Co. compleet verbouwd was vóór inspecteurs naar binnen mochten[6] als ook op de bewering van Iraniërs in ballingschap dat Kadaye Electric Co. onderdeel is van een geheim nucleair complex?[7]

Antwoord: Ik verwijs naar mijn antwoord op vragen van het lid Wilders van 8 augustus 2003 (Vergaderjaar 2002-2003, nr 1875) en van 4 september 2003 (kenmerk 2020316720).

Vraag 2.2c: Kunt u alsnog de vraag beantwoorden wanneer en op welke wijze u China op de levering van nucleair materiaal aan Iran heeft aangesproken?

Antwoord: Ik verwijs u naar mijn antwoord op vragen van het lid Wilders van 8 augustus 2003 (Vergaderjaar 2002-2003, nr1875).

Vraag 2.2d: Hoe rijmt u uw antwoord dat het de regering bekend is dat Russische wetenschappers in Iran actief zijn geweest, met de bewering van de Russische nucleaire expert A. Khlopkov[8] dat Russische wetenschappers nog steeds in Iran actief zijn?

Antwoord: Het is mogelijk dat in het kader van de bouw van de kerncentrale in Bushehr ook Russische wetenschappers in Iran aanwezig zijn, maar de regering kan dat niet bevestigen. Mij staan ook geen concrete aanwijzingen ter beschikking dat anderszins Russische wetenschappers in Iran bij het Iraanse nucleaire programma zijn betrokken.

Vraag 2.2f: Hoe verklaart u dat u kennelijk niet op de hoogte bent van het feit dat het SHAHAB-4 programma, door Iran al lang is toegegeven?[9] Kunt u bevestigen dat ook Russische wetenschappers bij de ontwikkeling van de SHAHAB-4 betrokken zijn?[10]

Antwoord: Het SHAHAB-4 programma bevindt zich, voor zover de informatie van de regering strekt, in een initiële fase. Over de omvang en de toekomst van het programma kunnen niet met enige stelligheid uitspraken worden gedaan. De regering staan geen gegevens ter beschikking die wijzen op de betrokkenheid van Russische wetenschappers bij dit project.

Vraag 2.2g: Wilt u alsnog aangeven of Iran het Europese bedrijfsleven heeft benaderd, aangezien dit niet strijdig is met de door u in uw antwoord aangehaalde belangen? Wilt u verder zonder bedrijfsgeheimen te schenden, bijvoorbeeld met een geanonimiseerd overzicht, toch meer inzage geven in de bedrijven die benaderd zijn? Deelt u de mening dat het tenslotte niet om het Europese bedrijfsleven gaat, maar om het vaststellen welke pogingen door Iran zijn gedaan om bepaalde componenten te importeren? Deelt u voorts de mening dat de relevantie van de vaststelling wordt bevestigd door uitspraken van de Iraanse ex-president Banisadr dat Iran dichtbij de ontwikkeling van een Atoombom is als het deze componenten geleverd krijgt?[11]

Antwoord: Iran heeft inderdaad Europese bedrijven benaderd. Voor het overige zij verwezen naar mijn antwoord op vragen van het lid Wilders van 8 augustus 2003 (Vergaderjaar 2002-2003, nr.1875) en van 4 september 2003 (kenmerk 2020316720).

Vraag 2.4: Kunt u alsnog aangeven welke acties u wanneer in bilateraal verband heeft ondernomen en de komende maanden zult gaan ondernemen?

Antwoord: Ik verwijs naar mijn antwoord op vragen van het lid Wilders van 8 augustus 2003 (Vergaderjaar 2002-2003, nr 1875)

Vraag 2.5: Wilt u aangeven of Nederland op de 'NSG 2003 plenary' te Pusan vertegenwoordigd was? Zo neen, waarom niet? Zo ja, door wie en wanneer? Wat was de inhoud van deze bijeenkomst? Heeft Frankrijk hierbij een presentatie gehouden in overeenkomst met genoemd document? Beschikt u over dit document? Zo ja, kunt u alsnog bevestigen dat dit een document van de Franse regering is? Zo neen, wilt u de Franse regering vragen of dit document inderdaad van de Franse regering afkomstig is? Kunt u vervolgens alsnog uw oordeel over dit document alsmede de in dit document opgenomen conclusies geven?
Vraag 2.6: Zie 5.
Antwoord: Nederland is lid van de Nuclear Suppliers Group en was tijdens de plenaire in Pusan uiteraard vertegenwoordigd. De delegatie bestond uit vertegenwoordigers van het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, Economische Zaken en Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksaangelegenheden. De plenaire vergadering van de Nuclear Supplier Group bespreekt de uitvoering van nucleaire exportcontroles. Daarnaast vinden inlichtingenoverleg, expertoverleg over technische aangelegenheden en handhavingsoverleg plaats. De inhoud van deze overleggen is vertrouwelijk. Voor het overige verwijs ik naar mijn antwoord op vragen van het lid Wilders van 8 augustus 2003 (Vergaderjaar 2002-2003, nr.1875)
Vraag 2.7: Betekent uw antwoord dat u in bilateraal verband geen enkele actie heeft ondernomen?
Antwoord: Ik verwijs u naar mijn antwoord op vragen van het lid Wilders van 8 augustus jl. (Vergaderjaar 2002-2003, nr.1875).
Vraag 3: Deelt u de analyse van de Russische nucleaire expert A. Khlopkov dat Iran in 2005 over 5.000 centrifuges kan beschikken, wat voldoende is voor het maken van twee atoombommen per jaar?[12]
Antwoord: Op grond van de mij ter beschikking staande informatie acht ik het mogelijk dat Iran in 2005 over 5.000 of meer centrifuges kan beschikken. Indien er geen effectieve IAEA-verificatie plaats zou vinden van deze installaties is het in beginsel mogelijk om daarmee voldoende hoogverrijkt uranium te produceren voor twee of meer kernwapens per jaar. Vandaar dat het van het grootste belang is dat Iran een Additioneel Protocol met het IAEA afsluit. Ik verwijs u tevens naar mijn antwoord op vragen van het lid Wilders van 4 september 2003 (kenmerk 2020316720).
Vraag 4: Kunt u aangeven waarom de Kamer door de media beter lijkt te worden geïnformeerd dan door de regering?
Antwoord: De regering heeft geen oordeel over de appreciatie door leden van de Staten-Generaal van berichtgeving in de media. Voor het overige verwijs ik naar het antwoord op vraag 1.
Vraag 5: Is er tijdens uw bezoek met de minister-president aan president Bush, op 2 september 2003, gesproken over Iran? Zo neen, waarom niet? Zo ja, wat is besproken en heeft u de president wel volledig geïnformeerd? Hoe groot achten de Verenigde Staten de Iraanse nucleaire dreiging?
Antwoord: Ik verwijs u naar de brief die ik aan de Kamer zond naar aanleiding van het recente bezoek van de Minister-President en mij aan Washington (kenmerk 03-Buza-47). Het is geen geheim dat de Amerikaanse regering, evenals de Nederlandse regering zeer bezorgd is over de Iraanse nucleaire ambities. De VS is er, evenals als Nederland, veel aan gelegen te voorkomen dat Iran zou overgaan tot de ontwikkeling van een kernwapencapaciteit.
Vraag 6: Is het waar dat de ernst van de inhoud van het op 26 augustus 2003 uitgebrachte rapport van directeur-generaal van het IAEA, El Baradei niet overeenstemt met de terughoudende conclusies van dit rapport?
Antwoord: Nee. De Board of Governors van het IAEA, waar Nederland deel van uitmaakt, heeft tijdens de jongstleden bijeenkomst in een met consensus aangenomen resolutie met waardering kennis genomen van het rapport van DG EL Baradei en op basis van de conclusies en aanbevelingen van dat rapport zijn eisen aan Iran ten aanzien van het beantwoorden van de openstaande vragen en onmiddellijke afsluiting van een Additioneel Protocol met het IAEA geformuleerd.
Vraag 7: Wat is uw mening over het oordeel van IAEA-directeur-generaal El Baradei dat de nucleaire installatie in Natanz geschikt is voor de fabricage van atoomwapens?[13]
Antwoord: Zie mijn antwoord op vraag 3.
Vraag 8: Hoe verklaart u dat de installatie in Natanz, ondanks inspecties van het IAEA, tot een jaar geleden onontdekt bleef? Hoe waterdicht maakt dit de inspecties?
Antwoord: Onder de huidige waarborgenovereenkomst van het IAEA met Iran dient dat land zijn nucleaire installaties uiterlijk zes maanden voor ingebruikname te declareren en heeft het IAEA alleen toegang tot dergelijke gedeclareerde installaties. Het mandaat van het IAEA heeft dus geen betrekking op faciliteiten die Iran niet gedeclareerd heeft. Het is daarom niet verwonderlijk dat het IAEA de installatie in Natanz niet heeft ontdekt; men had geen mandaat ernaar te zoeken. Voorts had Iran juridisch beschouwd ook geen verplichting de installatie bij het IAEA aan te melden tot uiterlijk zes maanden voor in gebruikname, dat wil zeggen het invoeren van splijtstoffen in de installatie.

Het is dan ook van het grootste belang, zoals ook eerder aangegeven, dat Iran spoedigst een Additioneel Protocol met het IAEA afsluit, en daarop vooruitlopend op andere wijze zal voorzien in de mogelijkheid voor het Agentschap om te verifiëren of geen activiteiten plaatsvinden die niet gedeclareerd zijn.

1 Beantwoording vragen van het lid Wilders over een Iraanse kernbom, 3 september jl.; 2 Netwerk, 3 september jl.; 3 zie mijn vragen d.d. 1 september jl.; 4 The Economist 28 augustus jl.; 5 Netwerk, 3 september jl.; 6 O.a. LATimes, 27 augustus jl. en Netwerk 3 september jl.; 7 LATimes, 27 augustus jl.; 8 Netwerk, 3 september jl.; 9 Netwerk, 3 september jl.; 10 Netwerk, 3 september jl.; 11 Netwerk, 3 september jl.; 12 Netwerk, 3 september jl.; 13 interview met El Baradei in de Stern, 28 augustus jl.

ALGEMEEN

BERICHTEN

CNN

China, Iran hit by U.S. sanctions
23 May 2003

WASHINGTON (Reuters) --The United States has imposed sanctions on China and Iran for ballistic missile cooperation, which will deprive a large Chinese conglomerate of more than $100 million in annual exports to America over the next two years, according to U.S. documents and officials.
One U.S. official told Reuters the sanctions imposed on North China Industries were believed to be the most severe penalty ever leveled against a Chinese entity. The Iranian company sanctioned was Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group.
"This one is big," the official said Thursday.
The sanctions were disclosed in documents on file with the Federal Register, an official vehicle for reporting new federal regulations and decisions. They took effect on May 9.
"What the Chinese did with Iran is make a specific transfer that made a material contribution to the Iranian ballistic missile program," the official said, declining to be more specific.
The transfer occurred after Beijing in August 2002 promulgated new export control laws advocated for years by the United States as a means of stemming the flow of technology used in weapons of mass destruction.
The sanctions decision came as U.S. relations with China have been improving in many areas and before an expected meeting between President George W. Bush and Chinese President Hu Jintao next month.

China crackdown sought
The Bush administration has intensified its efforts to rally international concern over Iran's nuclear program, which Washington believes is moving quickly toward production of atomic weapons.
"This shows that despite cooperation on a variety of important issues like the war on terrorism and resolving the North Korean nuclear threat ... we still take the proliferation of WMD very seriously," the official said.
"What we're trying to do is to suggest to China that they need to crack down on their companies more," he added.
He said he did not expect the United States to link the sanctions to other issues and policies.
North China Industries, or Norinco, is one of China's largest conglomerates and produces a diverse line of products.
Its Web site lists its main products as vehicles and mechanical products, optical-electronic products, chemical products, explosives and blasting materials, civil firearms and ammunition, light industrial products, firefighting equipment, building materials, metal and nonmetal materials and "special products."
U.S. officials estimated more than $100 million in Norinco products were exported annually to the United States.
Under the sanctions, "whatever Norinco and all of its subsidiaries export to us for two years is banned," the official said.
Iran is already under tough U.S. sanctions, so the new penalties were expected to have minimal impact on Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, believed to be one of Iran's primary ballistic missile production entities.
The Chinese and Iranian companies were sanctioned under a little-used 1998 executive order rather than U.S. nonproliferation laws. Officials said that gave the
administration more flexibility in crafting penalties.
For two years, the two companies are banned from entering into contracts with the U.S. government and from receiving assistance from U.S. agencies, and their exports to the United States are prohibited.

The Observer

Iranian hawks feed on US anger
America in stand-off with Tehran hardliners over nuclear programme
Dan De Luce in Tehran and Jason Burke – 1 June 2003

The blossom has fallen from the trees in the parks of northern Tehran. Soon the snow-capped Elborz mountains will be difficult to see through the haze of heat and exhaust that hangs over the seething capital through the torrid summer months.

This year Iranians will be feeling the heat in more ways than one. Neo-conservatives in the US administration and the fundamentalist clerics ruling Iran are engaged in an escalating war of words that threatens a new conflagration in the Middle East. Despite calls from moderate voices for dialogue, hardliners on both sides appear unwilling to make concessions that could reduce tensions between the two countries.

American hawks claim Iran is close to developing nuclear weapons and is a supporter of terrorist groups including al-Qaeda. The clerics say America is an out-of-control imperialist power bent on a decades-old policy of undermining Iran and, more generally, Islam.

Iran's ruling clerics have been exploiting Washington's belligerent rhetoric to undermine their moderate rivals. State media have been broadcasting calls for loyalty and vigilance from Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran's all-powerful Supreme Leader. He warned reformist politicians last week that their opposition to Iran's theocracy would merely serve Washington's interests and hinted that the Americans would try subversive operations. 'The enemy is determined to confront the people of Iran from within,' said Khamenei.

In Tehran's streets last week young Iranians congregating at ice-cream shops and cafes said they were not worried about a possible US attack, but did admit fears that the police and militia will use the US pressure to justify a crackdown on student activists, women dressed in 'decadent' Western fashions and parties in private homes.

'The [conservatives] saw how easily the Iraqi regime fell and want to tighten their control,' said Majid, a student. 'But they don't understand that the best strategy would be to start listening to the people.'

The strength of support for the reformists is undoubted. Mohammed Khatami, the Iranian President, has won two elections and remains popular in Iran, especially among the young. But some liberals worry that Washington's hawkish policy has weakened the reformists by creating a climate where voicing criticism is harder than ever. A group of university students in the town of Hamedan were severely punished recently for holding a mock referendum on the country's constitution, with two students reportedly injured in beatings.

Analysts say Iran's eventual evolution away from a strict theocracy is inevitable, given the desires of the youthful and expanding population. They say Washington could achieve its aim of 'regime change' more swiftly by toning down its public statements, dealing firmly with the Mujahedin-e Khalq, an armed opposition group of Iranian exiles based in Iraq, and by offering incentives, rather than threats, to persuade Tehran to cooperate on a range of security issues.

But the hawks in the Bush administration believe their tough talk is putting Iran 'back in its box'. 'The most conservative elements on both sides feed off each other, and in a way need each other to justify their ideologies,' said one Iranian analyst.

Iran and the United States appear paralysed by their historical baggage from the Cold War era. Apart from the old Chevrolets and Cadillacs rumbling through Tehran, Iran has had no US presence for 23 years. Nor has it had any formal diplomatic relations. Young Iranians born after the revolution see their own autocratic government, not Washington, as the cause of the country's problems. A majority of the public favour restoring relations with the United States.

After the 11 September attacks, relations between Washington and Tehran seemed poised to improve after Iran offered help to defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan. But Tehran was later accused of tolerating al-Qaeda operatives moving across its borders, and President Bush named Iran as part of an 'axis of evil' and accused Tehran of sponsoring terrorism and manufacturing weapons of mass destruction.

Diplomats say Iran may be protecting a number of al-Qaeda operatives in the belief that, despite the religious divide between the Shia Muslim Iranians and the Sunni al-Qaeda operatives, they both share a common enemy.

The Americans have claimed the masterminds of the bombings in Riyadh last month are in Iran. They have also said that Saif al-Adel, the most senior al-Qaeda figure still at large other than Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, is in Iran.

There are some small signs, however, that even the hardliners are aware of the benefits of a dialogue. The former commander of the Revolutionary Guards, Mohsen Rezaie, recently suggested a rapprochement between the US and Iran when he spoke to American academics at a conference in Athens. Rezaie reportedly said the two countries could reach a strategic partnership that would secure US interests in the region while protecting Iran from any interference in its domestic affairs.

Whether the US steps up its campaign against Iran will be determined in part by the findings of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the UN's nuclear watchdog, which is due to issue a report within six week which will say whether Iran has violated the non-proliferation treaty with its nuclear programme.

If Iran is condemned by theagency, it may be forced to allow inspectors to visit declared and undeclared nuclear sites.
But Washington may still choose to follow a unilateral approach. There are fears that the Pentagon might push for a pre-emptive military strike against Iran's nuclear sites.
Contrary to the assumptions of hawks in Washington, even the most radical Iranian dissidents do not believe their country is on the verge of revolution, though they point to rising dissatisfaction and building social pressures.

Baltimore Sun

Chinese company denies that it aided Iran
Norinco says U.S. claims on missiles 'groundless'
6 June 2003

BEIJING - A major Chinese conglomerate yesterday denied U.S. accusations that it aided Iran's missile program and demanded that Washington lift "groundless and unjustified" penalties imposed on the company.
Washington last month accused China Northern Industries, also known as Norinco, of supplying Iran with unspecified materials or technology that could help in developing long-range missiles capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction.
Its products, which include firearms and firefighting equipment, were banned from U.S. markets for two years.
"The sanctions imposed on Norinco by the U.S. administration are completely groundless and unjustified," the company said in a statement. "We have never assisted any country in developing such missiles. In fact, we do not have such technological capabilities."
Norinco formed in 1980 as a weapons maker and expanded to include manufacturing, construction and hotels. Its Web site says the company operates in more than 10 countries.
The company said it supports Chinese government policies opposing the spread of weapons of mass destruction and obeys laws on the export of missile technology.
Beijing hasn't signed the global treaty on sales of missiles and related technologies but agreed to abide by its restrictions.
"We strongly demand that the U.S. government immediately lift the sanctions against Norinco and its subsidiaries," Norinco's statement said.
U.S. officials have declined to detail what the company allegedly supplied to Iran.
The U.S. government has said Iran is trying to develop a missile capable of reaching a number of NATO countries in Western Europe.
Iran's Shahab 3 missile has an 800-mile range - which could reach Israel and U.S. troops stationed in an area from Turkey to Afghanistan.
China's government denied the accusations against Norinco the day after they were announced May 23. There was no indication yesterday why the company waited so long to respond.

CNN

5 Japanese charged with sales to Iran
12 June 2003

TOKYO, Japan (CNN) --Tokyo police Thursday arrested the president of a Japanese manufacturing company and four employees on charges of exporting equipment to Iran that could be used for missile development, police said.
Police said they believe the company, Seishin Enterprise Co., exported two sets of industrial grinders to Iran in 1999 and 2000 without a license from Japan's trade and industrial ministry.
The police raided the company headquarters and several other locations Thursday.
The grinders -- called "Jetmill" -- are used to pulverize material to super-fine powder and can be used to make solid fuels for missiles.
Japanese law requires companies to secure government permission to export machines that can also be used for military purposes.

Seishin reportedly exported the same machine to North Korea in 1994, but Japanese authorities did not pursue the case because of the statute of limitations.
Both Iran and North Korea are suspected of having active nuclear weapons programs.
President George W. Bush in his 2002 State of the Union address named Iran, North Korea and Iraq as an "axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world."
That label and Bush's pledge to prevent "terrorists and regimes who seek chemical, biological or nuclear weapons from threatening the United States and the world," implied a sharp detour from the diplomatic course that the United States had been on with North Korea and Iran.
However, last month, White House officials said the Bush administration would use diplomacy to resolve matters related to terrorism and nuclear weapons programs in those two nations.

Japan Times

Execs arrested over potentially dangerous exports to Iran
13 June 2003

The president and four managers of a Tokyo-based engineering equipment manufacturer were arrested Thursday on suspicion of illegally exporting to Iran grinding machines that can be used in missile development, police officials said.
According to the Metropolitan Police Department, Haruhiko Ueda, 68, president of Seishin Enterprise Co., allegedly violated the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law by exporting jet mills without permission.
Jet mills are used in manufacturing solid fuel for missiles.
The other suspects were identified as Hitoshi Ito, 54, Akira Kamiya, 41, Toshitaka Matsuda, 42, and Eri Tanemura, 29.
Based on the questioning of those involved and other data obtained, police said the equipment exported to Iran is believed to have actually been used in missile development.
Police also suspect that Seishin Enterprise exported to North Korea in March 1994 equipment that can be used for military purposes. The equipment is believed to have been shipped aboard the North Korean ferry Man Gyong Bong-92. No criminal action has been taken on that allegation, however, as the statute of limitations has expired.
Jet mills can grind material into fine powder using compressed air. They fall under the Missile Technology Control Regime, an international agreement regulating trade of equipment that can have military applications.
Due to concerns that jet mills may be used in research and development of solid fuel for missiles, permission from the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry is needed to export them under the foreign trade control law.
According to police, the suspects allegedly exported two jet mills in May 1999 and November 2000 to a university and a company in Tehran without obtaining permission.
The Tehran company is one of a group of firms engaged in missile development for Iran's military.
Tokyo police have searched Seishin Enterprise's headquarters. They have also searched the homes of and questioned executives.
Following his arrest, Ueda admitted to shipping the machines but denied knowing such exports would violate the law, according to MPD officials.

Guardian

Straw warns against interference in Iran
Tom Happold and agencies – 17 June 2003

The foreign secretary, Jack Straw, today gave Washington's hawks notice that Britain would not back interference in Iran, but also urged the Iranian government to let weapons inspectors investigate suspicions that it is developing nuclear weapons.
Mr Straw told BBC Radio 4's Today programme that the government's approach to Iran was different from the US administration in that "it is one of constructive and conditional engagement with the government of Iran".
Mr Straw's comments come after the US president, George Bush, praised recent anti-government demonstrations in Iran's capital Tehran.

However, Mr Straw also said that EU ministers were prepared to "park" negotiations on a trade agreement with Iran if there was insufficient progress on inspections. Iran has recently refused to sign up to a tougher inspection regime by the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA).
"On this issue of the Iranians' possible nuclear systems, what we have said to the Iranians is 'Look, if it is correct that you have nothing to hide, then you have nothing to fear by the kind of enhanced inspections which now the whole world wishes you to undertake,' he said.
"Iran wants a trade and cooperation agreement which would give much better trade arrangements between Iran and the EU. We have linked that very closely to progress on human rights and, for example, to progress on the kind of weapons inspections which they are going to allow under the International Atomic Energy Authority.
"We had an interim review of progress. It has not been satisfactory. We will look again following negotiations with Iran in the autumn to see how far they have got.
"It is inevitable from Iran's point of view that, if they are not making progress on each of these tracks, on human rights and cooperation with the IAEA as well as progress on the trade negotiations, then it is highly probable that European ministers will decide to have to park the negotiations on the trade and cooperation agreement."
Mr Straw also expressed optimism about the prospects of reform in Iran. "Iran is a country undergoing major demographic transition, because so many of their population, 70% at the latest estimate, is under 30, and that in itself is going to push Iran towards the process of reform and greater liberalisation."
But he stressed that the impetus for reform had to come from within the country.
"Given the long history of Iran, they have to be allowed to sort out their opposition internally, and the thing that would most derail the process towards the establishment of a better democracy in Iran would be suggestions that the opposition there was being orchestrated from the outside, which happily so far it has not been."

Washington Post

Q&A With Iranian Foreign Minister
25 September 2003

Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi, who is in New York to attend the sessions of the U.N. General Assembly, answered questions from The Washington Post in an interview conducted in English Tuesday evening at the Fifth Avenue residence of Iran's ambassador to the United Nations. An edited transcript follows:
[…]
Q(uestion): Can you provide us any indication about how your government intends to respond to the deadline that was announced by the ambassadors at the [International Atomic Energy Agency] in Vienna towards the end of October seeking Iran's agreement to these additional protocols?
A(nswer): Of course we will continue our cooperation with the IAEA because there are outstanding issues between Iran and the agency which has to be clarified. We of course have extended our cooperation with IAEA . . . in recent months. And this has been reflected in the report of the secretary general that Iran has increased its cooperation with the agency, by which I mean giving more access to inspectors of IAEA to visit different sites and even take environmental samples. These are of course further than our current commitments under NPT [nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty] safeguards. But just to make and build up more trust and confidence we decided to do so. And this has been appreciated. Therefore we will continue to cooperate with IAEA. But then the question of additional protocols. First we want to make sure additional protocol are enough. The Americans have stated that the additional protocols may not be enough. Therefore this is a serious question in Iran. Why, if something is not enough, why should we. . . . So first we want to make sure the additional protocol is going to solve the problem.
Q: In the same report, the director general of the IAEA had requested in June that Iran not enrich any uranium plants. And yet even after that request was made, that Iran went ahead and enriched some uranium. There was a statement by Iranian ambassador to the IAEA that, even with signing the additional protocol, Iran wanted to continue building the Natanz plant.
A: Nothing is wrong to have enriched uranium facility provided it is just used for peaceful uses. It is forbidden to enrich uranium for producing nuclear weapons. And we are committed to that because we are a member of the NPT. But this is part of our right to have nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, including enrichment of uranium to produce fuel need for our plants. So nothing is wrong to have enrichment facilities.

Q: But they did specifically request Iran not enrich that uranium
A: Yes, they did have this request. But we had already started the process of preparing the machinery to fit them with uranium UF6 gas [uranium hexafluoride, the gaseous form of the metal, which is used in centrifuges] before they asked us not to do it. It was started two days before they had asked us. . . .
Q: The fear on the part of the United States is that Iran could be under the NPT building a facility that can enrich uranium and then one day announce we're no longer a member of the NPT and we're going to produce this and use this fuel
A: This is a naive argument because the enrichment facility under the safeguard of IAEA, its monitored severely by IAEA people, especially when we accept additional protocol that means IAEA inspectors are free to inspect wherever they wish whenever they want.
Q: The additional protocol is something that you're committed to sign?
A: No, we want to make sure the additional protocol would be enough and would solve the problem. If it is enough and would solve the problem then the ambiguity would be removed from the mind. The question is why are the Americans saying that an additional protocol is not enough. They should be careful and they should yes it is enough and the inspection of IAEA clarified that Iran is going to do something illegal or legal. We don't have anything to hide because we do not have a program for producing nuclear weapons. Therefore, we are ready to be quite transparent. But we cannot let others deny our rights. And part of our right is to be able to enrich uranium to produce fuel needed for our power plants. We don't want to be dependent on outside because we have the knowledge. We have the minds we have the technology. Why should we be dependent on the outside.
Q: Are you close to making a decision about the additional protocol?
A: As soon as this would be clarified we don't mind to proceed.
[…]

Islamic Republic News Agency

Khatami says Iran showing successful cooperation with IAEA (IRNA)
8 October 2003

Tehran, Oct 8, IRNA -- President Mohammad Khatami here on Wednesday said Iran was showing a successful cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), vowing again that Iran would never accept a protocol that could threaten its sovereignty.
"We have never said that we will not sign the additional protocol of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). But we will never accept a commitment that may jeopardize the security and national sovereignty of the
country," Khatami told reporters after the Majlis open session.
This is a condition that other countries have also set. Even the US set its own conditions for signing the NPT protocol. We have a right to det conditions." The Islamic Republic is already a signatory to the NPT.

Tehran Times

Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy Iran's Absolute Right: Greek FM
9 October 2003

ATHENS/TEHRAN (IRNA) -- Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou said Tuesday that peaceful use of nuclear energy in the framework of international regulations is Iran's absolute right.
Papandreou made the comment in a meeting with Iran's Ambassador to Greece Mohammad-Taqi Moayyed at the end of the latter's tenure n Athens.
He noted that Iran like other countries interested in peaceful nuclear activities in the framework of cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has the right to have activities in this field.
He expressed determination of member states of the European Union (EU) to have extensive cooperation with Iran. He added that the EU calls for expansion of ties with Iran and believes Iran's peaceful nuclear activities, like other countries, should be transparent, clear, and free from military objectives and under the supervision of the IAEA.

Der Spiegel

Israel plant Angriff auf iranische Atomanlagen
11. Oktober 2003

Die israelische Regierung unter Ministerpräsident Ariel Scharon ist offenbar bereit, mit gezielten Militärschlägen Teherans Nuklearprogramm auszuschalten. Eine Spezialeinheit des Geheimdienstes Mossad erhielt nach Informationen des Nachrichten-Magazins DER SPIEGEL vor zwei Monaten den Auftrag, entsprechende Angriffspläne auszuarbeiten. Nach den jetzt in Jerusalem vorgelegten Szenarien müsste etwa ein halbes Dutzend Ziele von F-16-Kampfbombern "gleichzeitig sowie vollständig" zerstört werden - eine Aktion, die nach Einschätzung des Mossad zwar heikel, aber "technisch zu bewältigen" ist. Nach Erkenntnissen Israels arbeiten die Iraner an mehreren Orten bereits im Endstadium daran, Uran durch Anreicherung waffenfähig zu machen. Drei atomare Anlagen sollen der internationalen Gemeinschaft bislang völlig unbekannt sein. Experten gehen daher davon aus, dass Teheran das Zusatzprotokoll zum Atomwaffensperrvertrag nicht unterschreiben wird. Bei unangekündigten Besuchen von Vertretern der Internationalen Atomenergiebehörde, so ein israelischer Sicherheitsexperte zum SPIEGEL, müsste Teheran "peinliche Entdeckungen" fürchten.

COMMENTAAR EN VRAGEN

Van de crises gerelateerd aan de proliferatie van massavernietigingswapens die uit de hand kunnen lopen zijn Iran en Noord Korea de gevaarlijkste. Om die reden is het van belang om de argumenten voor het nemen van maatregelen tegen die landen en de context waarin dit proces plaatsvindt zorgvuldig te documenteren.
Voor het 'geval Iran' hebben we hier een aantal bronnen bij elkaar gebracht die erop wijzen dat er inderdaad aanzetten zijn voor de productie van kernwapens en de bijbehorende draagsystemen. Wat dat betreft zijn de vragen van de heer Wilders over de kennis van de regering over deze ontwikkelingen en de opbouw van een nucleair bewapend Iran terecht en dienen zo volledig mogelijk beantwoord te worden. Wat betreft het beleid hebben we echter een aantal opmerkingen en vragen waarop ons inziens een antwoord noodzakelijk is.

- Welke maatregelen (zowel in EU als Nederlands verband) staan de regering voor ogen als de IAEA concludeert dat het onvoldoende informatie heeft gekregen over de exacte stand van zaken met betrekking tot het Iraanse nucleaire programma?
- Welke maatregelen worden voorgesteld als deze zaak in de Veiligheidsraad belandt? Steunt de Nederlandse regering eventuele verdergaande sancties tegen Iran?
- Wat is de aard van de voorgestelde maatregelen?
- Worden er door de Amerikaanse regering voorstellen gedaan om verdergaande maatregelen te ondernemen, eventueel in het kader van het Proliferation Security Initiative (zie F&R 27 hierover)? Te denken valt aan het onderscheppen van internationaal verkeer naar Iran, zoals voorgesteld in PSI verband door onderminister Bolton.
- Ondersteunt de Nederlandse regering zulke verdergaande stappen?
- De Israeliese regering heeft gedreigd zelf unilaterale stappen te ondernemen richting Iran, zoals een militaire aanval op de Iraanse nucleaire faciliteiten (zie het artikel uit Der Spiegel elders in deze F&R). Wat is de positie van de Nederlandse regering mbt zo een dreigement? Wat zou de positie van de Nederlandse regering zijn als de Israeliese regering zo een dreigement zou uitvoeren?
- Aangezien Israël zelf een de facto kernwapenstaat is (zij het niet een ondertekenaar van het Non-proliferatie Verdrag), zullen maatregelen die alleen gericht zijn tegen Iran, bijzonder negatief worden geïnterpreteerd in de Arabische wereld en elders. Bovendien zal Iran informeel de positie innemen dat het Israeliese kernwapenbezit, in combinatie met de Israeliese dreigementen aangaande het preventief aanvallen van landen die het beschouwt als en bedreiging voor haar veiligheid (laatst geïllustreerd door de aanval op Syrië), het illegaal ontwikkelen van kernwapens, of het treffen van voorbereidingen daarvoor, rechtvaardigt. Om deze eenzijdige ontwikkeling te vermijden is het van cruciaal belang Het ligt dus voor de hand om ook maatregelen te nemen tegen Israël. Het doel daarvan zou zijn het bevorderen van de nucleaire ontwapening van Israël, parallel lopend met het speciale inspectieproces dat van Iran geëist wordt.
- Van belang is verder het officiële Amerikaanse beleid om eventueel preventieve aanvallen uit te voeren tegen landen die de VS als een dreiging beschouwt. Dit beleid is in het geval van Irak uitgevoerd, zonder een VN mandaat en zonder steekhoudende bewijzen van het bestaan van Iraakse massavernietigingswapens. Een Amerikaans initiatief om Iran aan te vallen, of goedkeuring aan een Israeliese aanval te geven, kan dus rekenen op grote internationale weerstand.

KRONIEK 2003-2004

29 sept – 3 oktober	Parlementaire Assemblee Europese Raad, Straatsburg
1 oktober	AO VCK Buitenlandse Zaken en Defensie over transatlantische betrekkingen
1 oktober	Bezoek Premier Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali (Pakistan) aan VS, Washington
1-2 oktober	Missile Defensie conferentie, Aspen Institute, Rome
3-4 oktober	Informele bijeenkomst EU Ministers van Defensie, Rome
8-9 oktober	Informele bijeenkomst NAVO Ministers van Defensie, Colorado
9-10 oktober	Bijeenkomst Proliferation Security Initiative, London
13-14 oktober	EU – General Affairs and External Relations Council, Luxemburg
16-17 oktober	Europese Raad, Brussel
20-21 oktober	Bezoek Bush aan Thailand en Filippijnen
20-21 oktober	APEC-leiders bijeenkomst, Bangkok
20-24 oktober	OPCW States Parties bijeenkomst, Den Haag
21-23 oktober	Behandeling begroting Defensie in Tweede Kamer
23-24 oktober	UN Donor Conferentie Irak, Madrid
25 oktober	Burgerinspectie SHAPE, Bergen
29 oktober	EU-India Summit, New Delhi
7 november	Nederland neemt voorzitterschap Raad van Europa over (tot en met 26 mei)
7-11 november	NAVO Parlementaire Assemblee, Orlando
10-14 november	BWC States Parties bijeenkomst, Geneve
10-14 november	CTBT PrepCom, 21st Session, Wenen
17-18 november	EU Commissie buitenlandse zaken, mensenrechten, gemeenschappelijke veiligheid en defensiebeleid, Brussel
17-18 november	EU – General Affairs and External Relations Council, Brussel
18-21 november	Bezoek Bush aan Verenigd Koninkrijk
20-21 november	IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, Wenen
december	Proliferation Security Initiative – Operational experts' meeting, Verenigde Staten
1-2 december	Bijeenkomst NAVO Ministers van Defensie, Brussel
1-2 december	Ministeriële bijeenkomst OVSE, Maastricht
1-3 december	WEU Assemblee, Parijs
1-5 december	CCW States Parties Bijeenkomst, Geneve
2-5 december	Executive Council OPCW, Den Haag
4-5 december	Bijeenkomst NAVO Ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken, Brussel
7 december	Parlementsverkiezingen Rusland
8-9 december	EU – General Affairs and External Relations Council, Brussel
12-13 december	Europese Raad, Brussel
16-18 december	Behandeling begroting Buitenlandse Zaken in Tweede Kamer
januari	Lord Robertson vertrekt als Secretaris-Generaal van de NAVO
1 januari	Ierland neemt voorzitterschap EU over
1 januari	Einde Nederlands voorzitterschap OVSE
21-25 januari	World Economic Forum, Davos
maart	Parlementsverkiezingen Spanje
14 maart	Presidentsverkiezingen Ruslan
april	Parlementsverkiezingen Zuid-Korea
26 april – 7 mei	NPT PrepCom, New York
juni	Verkiezingen Europees Parlement
juni	Parlementsverkiezingen Japan
8-10 juni	G-8 Summit, Sea Island, Georgia
1 juli	Nederland neemt voorzitterschap EU over

FACTS AND REPORTS

Eerder verschenen in de reeks PENN – NL Facts and Reports:

1. US unilateralism – official foreign comments
   Citaten van internationale politici en diplomaten over het Amerikaans unilateralisme.
2. Veiligheidsvraagstukken en de verkiezingen – standpunten van de politieke partijen
   Relevante delen van de partijprogramma's van de Nederlandse politieke partijen, plus citaten van politici op het terrein van oorlog en vrede.
3. Transatlantic relations – recent developments
   Overzicht van recente ontwikkelingen in de transatlantische betrekkingen, met name binnen de NAVO, mede naar aanleiding van uitspraken in de State of the Union.
4. Ontwikkelingen betreffende kernwapens en de Nederlandse politiek – briefing paper
   Periodiek overzicht van ontwikkelingen rond kernwapens in de internationale en nationale politiek, met uitgebreide hoeveelheid bijlagen.
5. Nucleaire vraagstukken – standpunten van de Nederlandse regering en de Tweede Kamer
   Overzicht april 2001 – april 2002
6. Crisis in de OPCW – de verwijdering van directeur-generaal Bustani
   Documenten en artikelen over het ontslag van directeur-generaal Bustani van het OPCW
7. Prepcom van het NPV – nucleaire ontwapening stokt
   Verklaringen en rapporten van staten en ngo's tijdens de Prepcom van het NPV
8. Verdrag van Moskou – détente tussen Rusland en Verenigde Staten
   Informatie over het Verdrag van Moskou, ontwikkelingen daaromheen en commentaar erop
9. Joint Strike Fighter – achtergrondberichten
   De belangrijkste achtergrondberichten over de vervanging van de F16 uit de Nederlandse pers.
10. Konfrontatie in Zuid-Azië – de kernwapenwedloop tussen India en Pakistan
    Basisgegevens over de nucleaire strijdkrachten en doctrines van India en Pakistan, Nederlandse wapenexport en wapenexportbeleid en een oproep om een nucleair treffen te voorkomen
11. Massavernietigingswapens in het Midden-Oosten (1) – Egypte, Israël, Syrië
    Basisinformatie over de proliferatie van nucleaire, biologische en chemische wapens in Egypte, Israël en Syrië en verklaringen van de Nederlandse regering hierover
12. Amerikaans unilateralisme II – officiële reacties
    Citaten van internationale politici, diplomaten en NGO's over het Amerikaans unilateralisme.
13. Aanval op Irak – de kwestie van de massavernietigingswapens; feiten, documenten en overwegingen
14. Aanval op Irak (2) – recente ontwikkelingen
15. Documenten First Committee Verenigde Naties 2002 – resoluties, verklaringen, rapporten
16. De NAVO-top in Praag – documenten
17. Aanval op Irak (3) – het inspectieregiem
18. Internationaal veiligheidsbeleid Verenigde Staten – officiële documenten en reacties van de Nederlandse regering
19. Veiligheidsvraagstukken en de verkiezingen (2) – standpunten van de politieke partijen
    Een update voor de verkiezingen van 22 januari 2003
20. Korea, de tweede crisis
21. Aanval op Irak (4) – de aanloop
22. Aanval op Irak (5) – vooravond van de aanval
23. De andere crises
    Informatie over het Amerikaans nucleair beleid, missile defense, de Conference on Disarmament en de recente ontwikkelingen rond Noord-Korea, Iran en India en Pakistan.
24. Aanval op Irak (6) – de slachtoffers
25. Nucleaire vraagstukken (2) – standpunten van de Nederlandse regering en de Tweede Kamer en recent nieuws nucleair beleid Verenigde Staten
    Overzicht april 2002 – mei 2003
26. Teststopverdrag Artikel XIV Conferentie – de kwestie van de Amerikaanse minikernwapens
27. G-8 en Proliferation Security Initiative – stappen naar unilaterale contra-proliferatie
28. Irak (7) – Nederland en de massavernietigingswapens
29. Proliferatievraagstukken – standpunten van de Nederlandse regering

Deze uitgaven zijn te bestellingen door € 5,- per exemplaar (incl. verzendkosten) over te maken op rekening nummer 7549774 van Stichting AMOK inz Werkgroep Eurobom te Utrecht ovv F&R 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28 of 29.