



### TWEE PROLIFERATIECRISES Iran en Noord-Korea

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## INLEIDING

De kwestie van kernwapen proliferatie wordt steeds belangrijker en wordt veelal onder de publieke aandacht gebracht door te wijzen op het proliferatie gevaar. Daar wordt meestal ook het gevaar van biologische en chemische wapens bij genoemd. Die aandacht is helaas steeds éézijdiger: de mogelijke proliferatie van massavernietigingswapens wordt als op zichzelf staand vraagstuk gepresenteerd, terwijl de kernwapenarsenalen van de kernwapenstaten, zowel de officiële vijf als de andere drie (Israël, India en Pakistan) worden genegeerd of afgedaan als irrelevant. Het is zaak om deze verhoudingen niet te vergeten in het Noord Korea/Iran debat. Deze staten en vele anderen met hen, wijzen immers aan de lopende band op de bestaande kernwapenarsenalen en vragen zich af waarom deze blijven voortbestaan, terwijl de aandacht wordt gevestigd op de ontwapening van de nieuwe proliferatielanden. De aanval op Irak op grond van een fictief arsenaal van massavernietigingswapens is van bijzonder groot belang geweest in deze positiebepaling. Desalniettemin is de mogelijke groei van het aantal landen uitgerust met kernwapens bijzonder zorgwekkend. Daarom besteden we er doorlopend aandacht aan. In dit dossier dus Noord-Korea en Iran, andere ontwikkelingen zoals de Amerikaanse kernwapen technologie en doctrine, evenals het 'Proliferation Security Initiative', komen binnenkort aan de orde. De inhoud van dit nummer is ook op het website [www.eurobomb.nl](http://www.eurobomb.nl) te vinden.

Redactie Facts and Reports

## TOESPRAKEN BOLTON EN BUSH

### US State Department

#### **The New World After Iraq: The Continuing Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction**

John R. Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security

Remarks to the Bruges Group - London, United Kingdom - October 30, 2003

[...] Without question, today's greatest threat to international peace and stability comes from rogue states and terrorist groups that are unrestrained in their choice of weapon and undeterred by conventional means.

Until our Coalition took action last spring, the world faced a serious security threat with Saddam Hussein in power in Iraq. Here was a dictator who, while defying 17 Security Council resolutions, had ambitions to reconstitute his weapons arsenal, had obstructed and deceived international inspectors for twelve years, had used weapons of mass destruction ("WMD") against his own people, had twice invaded neighboring countries, and who had supported, and in some cases even harbored, terrorist groups. The interim report of the Iraq Survey Group shows that, as we suspected, Saddam never disarmed or disclosed as required. Dr. David Kay reports, for instance, that through interviews with Iraqi scientists and officials, the Group discovered "dozens of WMD-related program activities and significant amounts of equipment that Iraq concealed from the United Nations during the inspections that began in late 2002."

Had we not eliminated Saddam's regime, he would have remained, as Condoleezza Rice said earlier this month, "poised in the heart of the Middle East, sitting atop a potentially deadly arsenal of terrible weapons, threatening his neighbors and the world." Some analysts have said that not finding WMD in Iraq -- to date -- proves that Saddam was not an imminent threat, and that, therefore, our Coalition military action was not justified. These criticisms miss the mark that our concern was not the imminence of Saddam's threat, but the very existence of his regime, given its heinous and undeniable record, capabilities and intentions. President Bush specifically and unambiguously addressed this issue in his January, 2003, State of the Union message when he said: "Some have said we must not act until the threat is imminent. Since when have terrorists and tyrants announced their intentions, politely putting us on notice before they strike? If this threat is permitted to fully and suddenly emerge, all actions, all words, and all recriminations would come too late. Trusting in the sanity and restraint of Saddam Hussein is not a strategy, and it is not an option."

Given the right opportunity or incentive, Saddam could have easily transferred these weapons to terrorist groups or other non-state actors for their use against us, with potentially catastrophic results. For such terrorist groups, a weapon of mass destruction is increasingly a weapon of first, not last, resort, which they seek to acquire way they can. State sponsors of terrorism, such as Iran, North Korea, Syria and Libya, are aggressively working to acquire weapons of mass destruction and their missile delivery systems. Here lies a dangerous confluence of nefarious motives, and we must prevent the one from abetting the other. As President Bush told the United Nations last month, "Outlaw regimes that possess nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons -- and the means to deliver them -- would be able to use blackmail and create chaos in entire regions. These weapons could be used by terrorists to bring sudden disaster and suffering on a scale we can scarcely imagine. The deadly combination of outlaw regimes and terror networks and weapons of mass murder is a peril that cannot be ignored or wished away."

We acted in Iraq because we were not willing to trust our security, and the security of our friends and allies, to the supposed restraint and circumspection of a dictator committed to acquiring deadly weapons of mass destruction. Saddam's continued defiance of U.N. resolutions and continued interest in weapons of mass destruction justified Coalition action. The risks of continued inaction were simply too high. As the President said recently, "It's a new kind of war, and America is following a new strategy. We're not waiting for further attacks. We're striking our enemies before they can strike us again."

Saddam's removal from power has unquestionably improved the international security situation. We are working tirelessly with thirty other Coalition partners to allow the Iraqis themselves to build the institutions of liberty and representative government, a peaceful society that no longer diverts its resources away from its citizens and toward the pursuit of WMD. But we face significant challenges in other parts of the world from terrorist-sponsoring regimes that are developing weapons of mass destruction in many forms. Rogue states such as Iran, North Korea, Syria, Libya and Cuba, whose pursuit of weapons of mass destruction makes them hostile to U.S. interests, will learn that their covert programs will not escape either detection or consequences. And while we will pursue diplomatic solutions whenever possible, the United States and its

allies must be willing to deploy more robust techniques, such as the interdiction and seizure of illicit goods, the disruption of procurement networks, sanctions, or other means. If rogue states are not willing to follow the logic of nonproliferation norms, they must be prepared to face the logic of adverse consequences. It is why we repeatedly caution that no option is off the table.

## Iran

Let me turn to the problem of Iran. Although Iran has robust BW, CW and missile programs, tonight I will focus on their nuclear weapons program. Our strategy is to use bilateral and multilateral pressure to end that program, and to secure international consensus against Iran's pursuit of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. To date, two reports by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency ("IAEA") have established that Iran is in violation -- in multiple instances -- of its safeguards obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). While Iran has consistently denied any program to develop nuclear weapons, the large and still-growing number of contradictions, inconsistencies and prevarications in its shifting explanations to the IAEA demonstrate convincingly that Iran is actively concealing a weapons program.

The United States believes that Iran's covert and costly effort to acquire sensitive nuclear capabilities make sense only as part of a nuclear weapons program. Iran is trying to legitimize as "peaceful and transparent" its pursuit of nuclear fuel cycle capabilities that would give it the ability to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. This includes uranium mining and extraction, uranium conversion and enrichment, reactor fuel fabrication, heavy water production, and "management" of spent fuel -- a euphemism for reprocessing spent fuel to recover plutonium. Iran is also benefiting from international nuclear assistance for its reactor project, even while it uses such ostensibly legitimate programs to help conceal its clandestine nuclear work.

For many years, the United States has called for increased international scrutiny of Iran's nuclear program. The member states of the G-8, the European Union, the members of the nuclear supplier regimes, and other multilateral bodies have joined us in expressing the strongest concern over Iran's nuclear activities, and have called on Iran to cooperate more fully to answer all outstanding questions. The IAEA Board's September 12 resolution made these concerns clear, and required that Iran fully satisfy specific criteria by October 31 if it expects to avoid a formal finding of NPT noncompliance by the Board. It is a testimony to the effectiveness of concerted international pressure that Iran has recently been willing to promise to agree to the Additional Protocol, and has provided the IAEA with at least some additional information about its nuclear program, a positive but long-overdue step. It still remains to be seen whether these initiatives will amount to more than mere words, and even if Iran follows through with its promises, many further steps will still be required in order to prove beyond doubt that Iran is forswearing the pursuit of nuclear weapons.

If Iran does not comply with its NPT obligations, the Board of Governors must do its duty and -- based on the facts already reported by the Director General, along with whatever else he reports next month and other information we now have -- find Iran not in compliance with its NPT safeguards obligations. This would trigger a report by the IAEA to the Security Council. If that occurs, we expect the Security Council would then call on Iran to comply with IAEA demands and would use its authority to reinforce the IAEA's efforts.

Iran is a crucial test for the international community and for the credibility and survival of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. If we stand firm together on this crucial issue, I am confident that we can preserve the credibility of the nuclear nonproliferation regime and help bring Iran back into compliance.

## North Korea

With regard to North Korea, President Bush's objective is quite clear: the United States seeks the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear programs. We seek to bring this about, as we have said repeatedly, through diplomatic dialogue in a multilateral framework involving those states with the most direct stakes in the outcome. Other states may yet be involved as appropriate. The North Korean nuclear program is not a bilateral issue between the United States and the DPRK. It is a profound challenge to regional and even global stability, and to the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

By pursuing this course, the President is determined that blackmail and bad behavior on the part of North Korea will not be rewarded. North Korea will not be given inducements to reverse actions it took in violation of its treaty commitments and other international obligations.

During the August six-party talks in Beijing, the United States, China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea emphasized that the Korean Peninsula must be free of nuclear weapons. North Korea further isolated itself by threatening provocative actions such as nuclear tests -- adding to threats it made in April that it might build more nuclear weapons and perhaps even transfer nuclear material or weapons to third parties.

In addition to seeking a solution through multilateral diplomacy, the United States, working with other countries, has taken steps to curtail dangerous and illicit North Korean activities such as drug smuggling, counterfeiting, and trade in WMD and missiles -- activities that finance Kim Jong-il's regime, including its nuclear activities.

We should not forget, however, that -- like Iran -- North Korea's violations of international norms are hardly restricted to its pursuit of nuclear weaponry. Although the DPRK has maintained its September, 1999, self-imposed, long-range missile flight test moratorium, it has remained active in the research, development, testing, deployment, and export of ballistic missiles and related materials, equipment, and technology. During a September, 2002, meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, DPRK President Kim Jong-il stated that North Korea would maintain its missile flight test moratorium through 2003. We are concerned, however, that North Korea may be trying to circumvent its promise by cooperating in testing and development with foreign missile programs.

North Korea has acceded to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), but nonetheless has probably continued a biological warfare capabilities effort that began in the 1960s. Pyongyang's resources include a rudimentary biotechnical infrastructure that could support the production of infectious biological warfare agents such as anthrax, cholera, and plague. North Korea is believed to possess a munitions-production infrastructure that would allow it to weaponize biological agents, and may have biological weapons available for use.

We believe North Korea has had a long-standing chemical weapons program. North Korea's chemical weapons capabilities include the ability to produce bulk quantities of nerve, blister, choking, and blood agents using its sizeable, although aging, chemical industry. We believe it possesses a sizeable stockpile of these agents and weapons, which it could employ should there be renewed fighting on the Korean peninsula.

North Korea's international procurement actions continue. In May, 2003, for example, German authorities intercepted 30 metric tons of the Australia Group-controlled chemical weapons precursor, sodium cyanide, bound for North Korea. In August, 2003, Taiwan authorities off-loaded 158 barrels of the controlled chemical weapons precursor phosphorous pentasulfide, from the North Korean vessel Be Gae Hong. North Korea represents a dangerous mix of repressive dictatorship, pursuit of WMD capabilities, and longstanding ties to international terrorism.

## Syria

As I have recently testified to Congress, we are concerned about Syria's nuclear research and development program and continue to watch for any signs of nuclear weapons activity or foreign assistance that could facilitate a Syrian nuclear weapons capability. We are aware of Syrian efforts to acquire dual-use technologies -- some, through the IAEA Technical Cooperation program -- that could be applied to a nuclear weapons program. In addition, Russia and Syria have approved a draft program on cooperation on civil nuclear power. Broader access to Russian expertise could provide opportunities for Syria to expand its indigenous capabilities, should it decide to pursue nuclear weapons. Syria is a party to the NPT, and has a standard safeguards agreement with the IAEA, but has not yet signed or, to our knowledge, even begun negotiations on the IAEA Additional Protocol. The Additional Protocol is an important tool that, if fully implemented, could strengthen the IAEA's investigative powers to verify compliance with NPT safeguards obligations.

Since the 1970s, Syria has pursued what is now one of the most advanced Arab state chemical weapons capabilities. It has a stockpile of the nerve agent sarin that can be delivered by aircraft or ballistic missiles, and has engaged in the research and development of more toxic and persistent nerve agents such as VX. Syria is fully committed to expanding and improving its CW program, which it believes serves as a deterrent to regional adversaries. It remains heavily dependent on foreign sources for key elements of its chemical warfare program, including precursor chemicals and key production equipment. As a result, Syria will need to continue foreign procurement activities in order to continue its CW program. We believe that Syria is continuing to develop an offensive biological weapons capability as well.

In addition, Syria's failure to secure its border with Iraq to guerrillas and terrorists poses a continuing threat to Coalition forces in Iraq. We have seen Syria take a series of hostile actions toward Coalition forces, such as allowing dual-use and military equipment to flow into Iraq on the eve of and during the war. Syria permitted volunteers to pass into Iraq, volunteers who sought to attack and kill our service members during the war. Although the situation on the Syrian border has improved somewhat in recent weeks, the infiltration of these fighters into Iraq continues to be a significant problem for us, and we call on Syria to stop such traffic from moving across its borders. As Secretary Powell said last month, "I made it clear to the Syrians that to have good relations with the United States and with a liberated Iraq, they should do everything they

could to make sure that the wrong sorts of people are not crossing the border to cause trouble in Iraq." The message that the Bush Administration and the Congress are sending is clear: Syria must immediately change course and change its behavior on all of these fronts, or face the consequences.

#### New Initiatives

To roll back the proliferation activities of the rogue states, and to ensure that any of their WMD progress is not passed on to terrorist groups, the United States is employing a variety of methods, including multilateral agreements, diplomacy, arms control, threat reduction assistance, export control aid, and other means where necessary. Most importantly, we and our partners in the international community must maintain an unvarnished assessment of the proliferators, and disrupt their supply of sensitive goods and technology before it contributes to an increased WMD capability or falls into the hands of terrorists.

In situations where we cannot convince a state to stop proliferant behavior, or where items are shipped despite our best efforts to control them, we also have the option of interdicting shipments to ensure the technology does not fall in to the wrong hands. These interdiction efforts are an important addition to our comprehensive strategy to prevent proliferation. Interdiction involves identifying an imminent shipment or transfer and working to stop it. As the President noted in his National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, we must enhance the capabilities of our military, intelligence, technical, and law enforcement communities to prevent the movement of WMD materials, technology, and expertise to hostile states and terrorist organizations.

**Proliferation Security Initiative:** One of our newest and most promising counterproliferation initiatives, the Proliferation Security Initiative ("PSI"), was announced by President Bush on May 31. An essential component of U.S. counterproliferation strategy is to work with other concerned states to develop new means to disrupt the proliferation trade at sea, in the air, and on land. In this context, the United States and ten other close allies and friends -- Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and the UK -- have worked to develop this new initiative. Our goal is to create a more dynamic, creative, and robust approach to preventing WMD, missiles, and related technologies flowing to and from countries of proliferation concern.

The PSI has been a fast-moving effort, reflecting the urgency attached to establishing a more coordinated and active basis to prevent proliferation. On September 4, after just three months, agreement on and publication of the PSI "Statement of Interdiction Principles" was achieved. The Statement of Interdiction Principles has been shared with countries around the world. The response to the PSI and the Principles has been very positive, with more than 50 countries already indicating they support the PSI and are ready to participate in interdiction efforts. We are moving to establish the practical basis for cooperating on interdictions with such countries.

PSI participants have agreed on a series of ten sea, air, and ground interdiction training exercises to occur into 2004. Australia organized and executed one such exercise last month in the Coral Sea that involved both military and law enforcement assets. Four PSI partners, including the United States, sent vessels to the exercise, and all PSI partners were involved in some capacity. On October 8-9, the United Kingdom hosted the first PSI air interdiction training exercise, designed to explore operational issues associated with the interception of proliferation-related trafficking in the air. And in mid-October, Spain hosted the second maritime interdiction training exercise, this one in the western Mediterranean Sea. This exercise involved concrete contributions from France, Germany, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States, as well as observers from other PSI participant nations. PSI nations have now trained for maritime interdiction operations in both the Mediterranean and the western Pacific Ocean, two areas that are particularly prone to proliferation trafficking. Additional training exercises will be held in the months to come, further improving our ability for interdictions.

As the PSI moves forward, we expect other countries will join in these training opportunities. President Bush has made clear that we hope to involve all countries that have a stake in nonproliferation and who have the will and ability to take necessary action to address this growing threat. Our long-term objective is to create a web of counterproliferation partnerships through which proliferators will have difficulty carrying out their trade in WMD and missile related technology. As the President said last month, "We're determined to keep the world's most destructive weapons away from all our shores, and out of the hands of our common enemies."

It is important to note that our interdiction efforts in PSI are grounded in existing domestic and international authorities. By coordinating our efforts with other countries, we can draw upon an enhanced set of

authorities for interdiction; that is, the sum of our efforts may be more effective than taking action individually.

Properly planned and executed, the interception of critical technologies while en route can prevent hostile states and non-state actors from acquiring these dangerous capabilities. At a minimum, interdiction can lengthen the time that proliferators will need to acquire new weapons capabilities, increase their cost, and demonstrate our resolve to combat proliferation.

**G-8 Global Partnership:** The G-8 Global Partnership Initiative, launched by G-8 Leaders at the June, 2002, Kananaskis Summit, is also an important nonproliferation achievement of this administration. The goal of the Global Partnership Initiative is to raise up to \$20 billion over ten years for nonproliferation, disarmament, and nuclear safety cooperation projects to prevent the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction.

President Bush is committed to raising half of this total. Counting the U.S. contribution, the G-7 countries have pledged a little over \$16 billion to date, and Russia intends to spend about \$2 billion on its priority projects. We hope to see the remaining gap closed by the next G-8 Summit. The G-8 welcomed the participation of six additional countries -- Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland -- this past summer. The initial focus has been on projects in Russia, but we expect the Partnership to recognize additional states of the former Soviet Union as recipients in the coming year, beginning with Ukraine.

As we approach the U.S. G-8 Presidency beginning January 1, improved Russian cooperation regarding project implementation remains a challenge for the success of the Partnership. Securing Russian agreement to support effective verification measures and to provide adequate liability provisions, commensurate with those in the U.S.-Russian Cooperative Threat Reduction umbrella agreement, is essential to moving forward on key nonproliferation projects. Taxation exemption and access to work sites are continuing concerns, as well as Russian delays in concluding implementing arrangements with other donor countries, impeding expenditure of their pledges.

**Dangerous Materials Initiative:** Yet another new initiative, the Dangerous Materials Initiative ("DMI"), responds to the President's call at the U.N. General Assembly last month to secure the most dangerous materials at their source. Through the DMI, the administration will work to identify gaps in the control of dangerous materials worldwide. DMI projects will help regulate, track, secure and safeguard biological, chemical, nuclear and radiological materials, as well as the know-how to make them into weapons of terror and war. To encourage international participation, we will share with our partners a menu of important projects in this area that they might support.

**HEU Minimization:** In the decades after World War II, large quantities of highly enriched uranium ("HEU") were exported to more than 50 countries, primarily by the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Most of this material was used to fuel research reactors, and much of it still remains stored at or near these reactors under security arrangements that vary widely in quality. Since 1978, the United States has been engaged in an expanding effort to minimize international commerce in HEU, to reduce, and if possible eliminate, stockpiles of this weapons-usable material in foreign countries. Where this is not immediately feasible, it aims to improve physical protection at storage sites.

Our current efforts include a number of such programs, several of which involve close cooperation with Russia. These programs assist in the conversion of research reactors from HEU to low enriched uranium, and return U.S.-origin HEU from reactors in up to forty-one countries for permanent disposition in the U.S. The Departments of State and Energy are fully cooperating to advance all of these programs. Our goal is to reduce to an absolute minimum international commerce in and unsecured storage of weapons-usable uranium throughout the world.

## Conclusion

Each of these initiatives moves us closer to a more secure world where we are able not only to prevent the spread of WMD, but also to "roll back" and ultimately eliminate such weapons from the arsenals of rogue states and ensure that the terrorist groups they sponsor do not acquire a shortcut to their deadly designs against us. As President Bush said this month, "After all the action we have taken, after all the progress we have made against terror, there is a temptation to think the danger has passed. The danger hasn't passed....America must not forget the lessons of September 11th." Indeed, that danger is present in a growing number of places, and we must be vigilant in recognizing -- and then confronting -- the emerging threats against our common security.

**Remarks by the President at Whitehall Palace**

Royal Banqueting House – Whitehall Palace

London, England – 19 November 2003

THE PRESIDENT: [...] On September the 11th, 2001, terrorists left their mark of murder on my country, and took the lives of 67 British citizens. With the passing of months and years, it is the natural human desire to resume a quiet life and to put that day behind us, as if waking from a dark dream. The hope that danger has passed is comforting, is understanding, and it is false. The attacks that followed -- on Bali, Jakarta, Casablanca, Bombay, Mombassa, Najaf, Jerusalem, Riyadh, Baghdad, and Istanbul -- were not dreams. They're part of the global campaign by terrorist networks to intimidate and demoralize all who oppose them.

These terrorists target the innocent, and they kill by the thousands. And they would, if they gain the weapons they seek, kill by the millions and not be finished. The greatest threat of our age is nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons in the hands of terrorists, and the dictators who aid them. The evil is in plain sight. The danger only increases with denial. Great responsibilities fall once again to the great democracies. We will face these threats with open eyes, and we will defeat them. (Applause.)

The peace and security of free nations now rests on three pillars: First, international organizations must be equal to the challenges facing our world, from lifting up failing states to opposing proliferation.

Like 11 Presidents before me, I believe in the international institutions and alliances that America helped to form and helps to lead. The United States and Great Britain have labored hard to help make the United Nations what it is supposed to be -- an effective instrument of our collective security. In recent months, we've sought and gained three additional resolutions on Iraq -- Resolutions 1441, 1483 and 1511 -- precisely because the global danger of terror demands a global response. The United Nations has no more compelling advocate than your Prime Minister, who at every turn has championed its ideals and appealed to its authority. He understands, as well, that the credibility of the U.N. depends on a willingness to keep its word and to act when action is required.

America and Great Britain have done, and will do, all in their power to prevent the United Nations from solemnly choosing its own irrelevance and inviting the fate of the League of Nations. It's not enough to meet the dangers of the world with resolutions; we must meet those dangers with resolve.

In this century, as in the last, nations can accomplish more together than apart. For 54 years, America has stood with our partners in NATO, the most effective multilateral institution in history. We're committed to this great democratic alliance, and we believe it must have the will and the capacity to act beyond Europe where threats emerge.

My nation welcomes the growing unity of Europe, and the world needs America and the European Union to work in common purpose for the advance of security and justice. America is cooperating with four other nations to meet the dangers posed by North Korea. America believes the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] must be true to its purpose and hold Iran to its obligations.

Our first choice, and our constant practice, is to work with other responsible governments. We understand, as well, that the success of multilateralism is not measured by adherence to forms alone, the tidiness of the process, but by the results we achieve to keep our nations secure.

The second pillar of peace and security in our world is the willingness of free nations, when the last resort arrives, to restrain aggression and evil by force. There are principled objections to the use of force in every generation, and I credit the good motives behind these views.

Those in authority, however, are not judged only by good motivations. The people have given us the duty to defend them. And that duty sometimes requires the violent restraint of violent men. In some cases, the measured use of force is all that protects us from a chaotic world ruled by force.

Most in the peaceful West have no living memory of that kind of world. Yet in some countries, the memories are recent: The victims of ethnic cleansing in the Balkans, those who survived the rapists and the death squads, have few qualms when NATO applied force to help end those crimes. The women of Afghanistan, imprisoned in their homes and beaten in the streets and executed in public spectacles, did not reproach us for routing the Taliban. The inhabitants of Iraq's Baathist hell, with its lavish palaces and its torture chambers, with its massive statues and its mass graves, do not miss their fugitive dictator. They rejoiced at his fall.

In all these cases, military action was preceded by diplomatic initiatives and negotiations and ultimatums, and final chances until the final moment. In Iraq, year after year, the dictator was given the chance to account for his weapons programs, and end the nightmare for his people. Now the resolutions he defied have been enforced.



And who will say that Iraq was better off when Saddam Hussein was strutting and killing, or that the world was safer when he held power? Who doubts that Afghanistan is a more just society and less dangerous without Mullah Omar playing host to terrorists from around the world. And Europe, too, is plainly better off with Milosevic answering for his crimes, instead of committing more.

It's been said that those who live near a police station find it hard to believe in the triumph of violence, in the same way free peoples might be tempted to take for granted the orderly societies we have come to know. Europe's peaceful unity is one of the great achievements of the last half-century. And because European countries now resolve differences through negotiation and consensus, there's sometimes an assumption that the entire world functions in the same way. But let us never forget how Europe's unity was achieved -- by allied armies of liberation and NATO armies of defense. And let us never forget, beyond Europe's borders, in a world where oppression and violence are very real, liberation is still a moral goal, and freedom and security still need defenders. (Applause.)

The third pillar of security is our commitment to the global expansion of democracy, and the hope and progress it brings, as the alternative to instability and to hatred and terror. We cannot rely exclusively on military power to assure our long-term security. Lasting peace is gained as justice and democracy advance.

In democratic and successful societies, men and women do not swear allegiance to malcontents and murderers; they turn their hearts and labor to building better lives. And democratic governments do not shelter terrorist camps or attack their peaceful neighbors; they honor the aspirations and dignity of their own people. In our conflict with terror and tyranny, we have an unmatched advantage, a power that cannot be resisted, and that is the appeal of freedom to all mankind.

As global powers, both our nations serve the cause of freedom in many ways, in many places. By promoting development, and fighting famine and AIDS and other diseases, we're fulfilling our moral duties, as well as encouraging stability and building a firmer basis for democratic institutions. By working for justice in Burma, in the Sudan and in Zimbabwe, we give hope to suffering people and improve the chances for stability and progress. By extending the reach of trade we foster prosperity and the habits of liberty. And by advancing freedom in the greater Middle East, we help end a cycle of dictatorship and radicalism that brings millions of people to misery and brings danger to our own people. The stakes in that region could not be higher. If the Middle East remains a place where freedom does not flourish, it will remain a place of stagnation and anger and violence for export. And as we saw in the ruins of two towers, no distance on the map will protect our lives and way of life. If the greater Middle East joins the democratic revolution that has reached much of the world, the lives of millions in that region will be bettered, and a trend of conflict and fear will be ended at its source.

The movement of history will not come about quickly. Because of our own democratic development -- the fact that it was gradual and, at times, turbulent -- we must be patient with others. And the Middle East countries have some distance to travel.

Arab scholars speak of a freedom deficit that has separated whole nations from the progress of our time. The essentials of social and material progress -- limited government, equal justice under law, religious and economic liberty, political participation, free press, and respect for the rights of women -- have been scarce across the region. Yet that has begun to change. In an arc of reform from Morocco to Jordan to Qatar, we are seeing elections and new protections for women and the stirring of political pluralism. Many governments are realizing that theocracy and dictatorship do not lead to national greatness; they end in national ruin. They are finding, as others will find, that national progress and dignity are achieved when governments are just and people are free.

The democratic progress we've seen in the Middle East was not imposed from abroad, and neither will the greater progress we hope to see. Freedom, by definition, must be chosen, and defended by those who choose it. Our part, as free nations, is to ally ourselves with reform, wherever it occurs.

Perhaps the most helpful change we can make is to change our own thinking. In the West, there's been a certain skepticism about the capacity or even the desire of Middle Eastern peoples for self-government. We're told that Islam is somehow inconsistent with a democratic culture. Yet more than half of the world's Muslims are today contributing citizens in democratic societies. It is suggested that the poor, in their daily struggles, care little for self-government. Yet the poor, especially, need the power of democracy to defend themselves against corrupt elites.

Peoples of the Middle East share a high civilization, a religion of personal responsibility, and a need for freedom as deep as our own. It is not realism to suppose that one-fifth of humanity is unsuited to liberty; it is pessimism and condescension, and we should have none of it. (Applause.)

We must shake off decades of failed policy in the Middle East. Your nation and mine, in the past, have been willing to make a bargain, to tolerate oppression for the sake of stability. Longstanding ties often led us to

overlook the faults of local elites. Yet this bargain did not bring stability or make us safe. It merely bought time, while problems festered and ideologies of violence took hold.

As recent history has shown, we cannot turn a blind eye to oppression just because the oppression is not in our own backyard. No longer should we think tyranny is benign because it is temporarily convenient. Tyranny is never benign to its victims, and our great democracies should oppose tyranny wherever it is found. (Applause.)

Now we're pursuing a different course, a forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East. We will consistently challenge the enemies of reform and confront the allies of terror. We will expect a higher standard from our friends in the region, and we will meet our responsibilities in Afghanistan and in Iraq by finishing the work of democracy we have begun.

There were good-faith disagreements in your country and mine over the course and timing of military action in Iraq. Whatever has come before, we now have only two options: to keep our word, or to break our word. The failure of democracy in Iraq would throw its people back into misery and turn that country over to terrorists who wish to destroy us. Yet democracy will succeed in Iraq, because our will is firm, our word is good, and the Iraqi people will not surrender their freedom. (Applause.)

Since the liberation of Iraq, we have seen changes that could hardly have been imagined a year ago. A new Iraqi police force protects the people, instead of bullying them. More than 150 Iraqi newspapers are now in circulation, printing what they choose, not what they're ordered. Schools are open with textbooks free of propaganda. Hospitals are functioning and are well-supplied. Iraq has a new currency, the first battalion of a new army, representative local governments, and a Governing Council with an aggressive timetable for national sovereignty. This is substantial progress. And much of it has proceeded faster than similar efforts in Germany and Japan after World War II.

Yet the violence we are seeing in Iraq today is serious. And it comes from Baathist holdouts and Jihadists from other countries, and terrorists drawn to the prospect of innocent bloodshed. It is the nature of terrorism and the cruelty of a few to try to bring grief in the loss to many. The armed forces of both our countries have taken losses, felt deeply by our citizens. Some families now live with a burden of great sorrow. We cannot take the pain away. But these families can know they are not alone. We pray for their strength; we pray for their comfort; and we will never forget the courage of the ones they loved.

The terrorists have a purpose, a strategy to their cruelty. They view the rise of democracy in Iraq as a powerful threat to their ambitions. In this, they are correct. They believe their acts of terror against our coalition, against international aid workers and against innocent Iraqis, will make us recoil and retreat. In this, they are mistaken. (Applause.)

We did not charge hundreds of miles into the heart of Iraq and pay a bitter cost of casualties, and liberate 25 million people, only to retreat before a band of thugs and assassins. (Applause.) We will help the Iraqi people establish a peaceful and democratic country in the heart of the Middle East. And by doing so, we will defend our people from danger.

The forward strategy of freedom must also apply to the Arab-Israeli conflict. It's a difficult period in a part of the world that has known many. Yet, our commitment remains firm. We seek justice and dignity. We seek a viable, independent state for the Palestinian people, who have been betrayed by others for too long. (Applause.) We seek security and recognition for the state of Israel, which has lived in the shadow of random death for too long. (Applause.) These are worthy goals in themselves, and by reaching them we will also remove an occasion and excuse for hatred and violence in the broader Middle East.

Achieving peace in the Holy Land is not just a matter of the shape of a border. As we work on the details of peace, we must look to the heart of the matter, which is the need for a viable Palestinian democracy. Peace will not be achieved by Palestinian rulers who intimidate opposition, who tolerate and profit from corruption and maintain their ties to terrorist groups. These are the methods of the old elites, who time and again had put their own self-interest above the interest of the people they claim to serve. The long-suffering Palestinian people deserve better. They deserve true leaders, capable of creating and governing a Palestinian state.

Even after the setbacks and frustrations of recent months, goodwill and hard effort can bring about a Palestinian state and a secure Israel. Those who would lead a new Palestine should adopt peaceful means to achieve the rights of their people and create the reformed institutions of a stable democracy.

Israel should freeze settlement construction, dismantle unauthorized outposts, end the daily humiliation of the Palestinian people, and not prejudice final negotiations with the placements of walls and fences.

Arab states should end incitement in their own media, cut off public and private funding for terrorism, and establish normal relations with Israel.

Leaders in Europe should withdraw all favor and support from any Palestinian ruler who fails his people and betrays their cause. And Europe's leaders -- and all leaders -- should strongly oppose anti-Semitism, which poisons public debates over the future of the Middle East. (Applause.)

Ladies and gentlemen, we have great objectives before us that make our Atlantic alliance as vital as it has ever been. We will encourage the strength and effectiveness of international institutions. We will use force when necessary in the defense of freedom. And we will raise up an ideal of democracy in every part of the world. On these three pillars we will build the peace and security of all free nations in a time of danger.

So much good has come from our alliance of conviction and might. So much now depends on the strength of this alliance as we go forward. America has always found strong partners in London, leaders of good judgment and blunt counsel and backbone when times are tough. And I have found all those qualities in your current Prime Minister, who has my respect and my deepest thanks. (Applause.)

[...]

## **Verenigde Naties – First Committee Algemene Vergadering**

### Verenigde Naties

Fifty-eighth session - First Committee - Agenda item 70

#### **Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East**

Egypt: draft resolution – 15 October 2003

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolutions 3263 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3474 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/71 of 10 December 1976, 32/82 of 12 December 1977, 33/64 of 14 December 1978, 34/77 of 11 December 1979, 35/147 of 12 December 1980, 36/87 A and B of 9 December 1981, 37/75 of 9 December 1982, 38/64 of 15 December 1983, 39/54 of 12 December 1984, 40/82 of 12 December 1985, 41/48 of 3 December 1986, 42/28 of 30 November 1987, 43/65 of 7 December 1988, 44/108 of 15 December 1989, 45/52 of 4 December 1990, 46/30 of 6 December 1991, 47/48 of 9 December 1992, 48/71 of 16 December 1993, 49/71 of 15 December 1994, 50/66 of 12 December 1995, 51/41 of 10 December 1996, 52/34 of 9 December 1997, 53/74 of 4 December 1998, 54/51 of 1 December 1999, 55/30 of 20 November 2000, 56/21 of 29 November 2001 and 57/55 of 22 November 2002 on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

*Recalling also* the recommendations for the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East consistent with paragraphs 60 to 63, and in particular paragraph 63 (*d*), of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,<sup>1</sup>

*Emphasizing* the basic provisions of the above-mentioned resolutions, which call upon all parties directly concerned to consider taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East and, pending and during the establishment of such a zone, to declare solemnly that they will refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices and from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory by any third party, to agree to place their nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and to declare their support for the establishment of the zone and to deposit such declarations with the Security Council for consideration, as appropriate,

*Reaffirming* the inalienable right of all States to acquire and develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,

*Emphasizing* the need for appropriate measures on the question of the prohibition of military attacks on nuclear facilities,

*Bearing in mind* the consensus reached by the General Assembly since its thirty-fifth session that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would greatly enhance international peace and security,

*Desirous* of building on that consensus so that substantial progress can be made towards establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East,

*Welcoming* all initiatives leading to general and complete disarmament, including in the region of the Middle East, and in particular on the establishment therein of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons,

*Noting* the peace negotiations in the Middle East, which should be of a comprehensive nature and represent an appropriate framework for the peaceful settlement of contentious issues in the region,

*Recognizing* the importance of credible regional security, including the establishment of a mutually verifiable nuclear-weapon-free zone,

*Emphasizing* the essential role of the United Nations in the establishment of a mutually verifiable nuclear-weapon-free zone,

*Having examined* the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 57/55,<sup>2</sup>

1. *Urges* all parties directly concerned to consider seriously taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, and, as a means of promoting this objective, invites the countries concerned to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;<sup>3</sup>

2. *Calls upon* all countries of the region that have not done so, pending the establishment of the zone, to agree to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;

3. *Takes note* of resolution GC(46)/RES/16, adopted on 20 September 2002 by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency at its fortysixth regular session, concerning the application of Agency safeguards in the Middle East;<sup>4</sup>

4. *Notes* the importance of the ongoing bilateral Middle East peace negotiations and the activities of the multilateral Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security in promoting mutual confidence and security in the Middle East, including the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone;

5. *Invites* all countries of the region, pending the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, to declare their support for establishing such a zone, consistent with paragraph 63 (d) of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,<sup>1</sup> and to deposit those declarations with the Security Council;

6. *Also invites* those countries, pending the establishment of the zone, not to develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or permit the stationing on their territories, or territories under their control, of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices;

7. *Invites* the nuclear-weapon States and all other States to render their assistance in the establishment of the zone and at the same time to refrain from any action that runs counter to both the letter and the spirit of the present resolution;

8. *Takes note* of the report of the Secretary-General;<sup>2</sup>

9. *Invites* all parties to consider the appropriate means that may contribute towards the goal of general and complete disarmament and the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the region of the Middle East;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to pursue consultations with the States of the region and other concerned States, in accordance with paragraph 7 of resolution 46/30 and taking into account the evolving situation in the region, and to seek from those States their views on the measures outlined in chapters III and IV of the study annexed to his report of 10 October 1990<sup>5</sup> or other relevant measures, in order to move towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East;

11. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its fifty-ninth session a report on the implementation of the present resolution;

12. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-ninth session the item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East".

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<sup>1</sup> Resolution S-10/2.

<sup>2</sup> A/58/137 (Parts I and II).

<sup>3</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 729, No. 10485.

<sup>4</sup> See International Atomic Energy Agency, *Resolutions and Other Decisions of the General Conference, Forty-sixth Regular Session, 16-20 September 2002* (GC(46)/RES/DEC(2002)).

<sup>5</sup> A/45/435.

**Stemming:** Aangenomen zonder stemming in de First Committee.

Fifty-eighth session - First Committee - Agenda item 76

**The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East**

Egypt:\* draft resolution - 15 October 2003

*The General Assembly,*

*Bearing in mind* its relevant resolutions,

*Taking note* of the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the latest of which is resolution GC(47)/RES/13, adopted on 19 September 2003,<sup>1</sup>

*Cognizant* that the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region of the Middle East would pose a serious threat to international peace and security,

*Mindful* of the immediate need for placing all nuclear facilities in the region of the Middle East under full-scope safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency,

*Recalling* the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on 11 May 1995,<sup>2</sup> in which the Conference urged universal adherence to the Treaty as an urgent priority and called upon all States not yet parties to the Treaty to accede to it at the earliest date, particularly those States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities,

*Recognizing with satisfaction* that, in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Conference undertook to make determined efforts towards the achievement of the goal of universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, called upon those remaining States not parties to the Treaty to accede to it, thereby accepting an international legally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices and to accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all their nuclear activities, and underlined the necessity of universal adherence to the Treaty and of strict compliance by all parties with their obligations under the Treaty,<sup>3</sup>

*Recalling* the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on 11 May 1995,<sup>4</sup> in which the Conference noted with concern the continued existence in the Middle East of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, reaffirmed the importance of the early realization of universal adherence to the Treaty and called upon all States in the Middle East that had not yet done so, without exception, to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible and to place all their nuclear facilities under full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards,

*Noting* that Israel remains the only State in the Middle East that has not yet become party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,<sup>5</sup>

*Concerned* about the threats posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons to the security and stability of the Middle East region,

*Stressing* the importance of taking confidence-building measures, in particular the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, in order to enhance peace and security in the region and to consolidate the global non-proliferation regime,

*Emphasizing* the need for all parties directly concerned to consider seriously taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and, as a means of promoting this objective, inviting the countries concerned to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and, pending the establishment of the zone, to agree to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards,

*Noting* that one hundred and sixty-six States have signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty,<sup>6</sup> including a number of States in the region,

1. *Welcomes* the conclusions on the Middle East of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;<sup>7</sup>

2. *Reaffirms* the importance of Israel's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons<sup>5</sup> and placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East;

3. *Calls upon* that State to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons without further delay and not to develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons, and to renounce possession of nuclear weapons, and to place all its unsafeguarded nuclear facilities under full-scope International Atomic

Energy Agency safeguards as an important confidence-building measure among all States of the region and as a step towards enhancing peace and security;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its fifty-ninth session on the implementation of the present resolution;

5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-ninth session the item entitled "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East".

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\* On behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the League of Arab States.

1/ See International Atomic Energy Agency, *Resolutions and Other Decisions of the General Conference, Forty-seventh Regular Session, 5-19 September 2003* (GC(47)/RES/DEC(2003)).

2/ *1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, Part I* (NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I) and Corr.2), annex, decision 2.

3/ See *2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document*, vol. I (NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II)), part I, section entitled "Article IX".

4/ See *1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, Part I* (NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I) and Corr.2), annex.

5/ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 729, No. 10485.

6/ See resolution 50/245.

7/ See *2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document*, vol. I (NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II)), part I, section entitled "Article VII and the security of non-nuclear-weapon States", para. 16.

**Stemming:** In de First Committee aangenomen met 146 stemmen voor, 3 tegen (Israël, Micronesië, Verenigde Staten) en 10 onthoudingen (Australië, Canada, Ethiopië, India, Kameroen, Papoea Nieuw-Guinea, Ruanda, Tonga, Trinidad en Tobago, Vanuatu).

# IRAN

## DOCUMENTEN

### IAEA

#### **Statement by the Iranian Government and visiting EU Foreign Ministers**

21 October 2003

1. Upon the invitation of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran the foreign ministers of Britain, France and Germany paid a visit to Tehran on October 21, 2003.

The Iranian authorities and the ministers, following extensive consultations, agreed on measures aimed at the settlement of all outstanding IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] issues with regards to the Iranian nuclear programme and at enhancing confidence for peaceful cooperation in the nuclear field.

2. The Iranian authorities reaffirmed that nuclear weapons have no place in Iran's defence doctrine and that its nuclear programme and activities have been exclusively in the peaceful domain. They reiterated Iran's commitment to the nuclear non-proliferation regime and informed the ministers that:

a. The Iranian Government has decided to engage in full co-operation with the IAEA to address and resolve through full transparency all requirements and outstanding issues of the agency and clarify and correct any possible failures and deficiencies within the IAEA

b. To promote confidence with a view to removing existing barriers for co-operation in the nuclear field:

i. having received the necessary clarifications, the Iranian Government has decided to sign the IAEA Additional Protocol and commence ratification procedures. As a confirmation of its good intentions the Iranian Government will continue to co-operate with the agency in accordance with the protocol in advance of its ratification.

ii. while Iran has a right within the nuclear non-proliferation regime to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes it has decided voluntarily to suspend all uranium enrichment and processing activities as defined by the IAEA.

#### **Dialogue**

3. The foreign ministers of Britain, France and Germany welcomed the decisions of the Iranian Government and informed the Iranian authorities that:

a. Their governments recognise the right of Iran to enjoy peaceful use of nuclear energy in accordance with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

b. In their view the Additional Protocol is in no way intended to undermine the sovereignty, national dignity or national security of its state parties.

c. In their view full implementation of Iran's decisions, confirmed by the IAEA's director general, should enable the immediate situation to be resolved by the IAEA board.

d. The three governments believe that this will open the way to a dialogue on a basis for longer term co-operation which will provide all parties with satisfactory assurances relating to Iran's nuclear power generation programme. Once international concerns, including those of the three governments, are fully resolved Iran could expect easier access to modern technology and supplies in a range of areas.

e. They will co-operate with Iran to promote security and stability in the region including the establishment of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations.

### IAEA

#### **Meeting of Dr. Hassan Rohani, Secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, and Dr. ElBaradei, IAEA Director General**

IAEA Headquarters, Vienna - 8 November 2003 – Transcript

#### **Mr. ElBaradei**

Dr. Rohani and I today had a very fruitful meeting. We reviewed progress so far in implementation of safeguards in the Islamic Republic of Iran. I told Dr. Rohani that our report will be issued to the Board in the next few days. That obviously will be a factual and comprehensive report of what we have seen and will take

into account the new policies taken by Iran for full disclosure. We will also say that we have taken many measures but we also have to be done. But I think that is important for you to note that Dr. Rohani told me that next week we will get the letter by Iran for the conclusion of the Additional Protocol which is a positive step. I also was told by Dr. Rohani that next week we will get again a letter indicating Iran agreement to suspend all enrichment related activities and reprocessing activities which is also, as a confidence building measure, which is also quite a positive step. So I think we are moving together to try resolve all remaining issues through cooperation, through verification and hopefully at the November Board we will be able to move the whole issue of implementation of safeguards in Iran forward.

#### **Dr. Rohani**

We had an excellent meeting with Dr. ElBaradei and his colleagues. We reviewed the report of the Director General and the requirements therein from Iran. Our conclusion was that all remaining questions have been answered by Iran. We concluded that when Iran submitted its dossier it has completely disclosed its past activities, proactively cooperating with the Agency. I also informed the Director General that Iran will fulfill the content of the statement in Tehran which we agreed with the three Ministers from European Countries, including the letter of intention for the additional protocol and the question of suspension of enrichment. In our discussion, I underlined two main issues: We underlined the fact that like any other signatory to the NPT, Iran should also be able to enjoy peaceful use of nuclear technology. The second basic point that we underlined was the fact that Iran is determined to make sure that the international community is assured of the peaceful nature of its programme. I also stressed that in the new circumstances, in the new environment of cooperation, it is necessary for the Agency to act on the basis of Article 2 of its Statute and provide technical assistance for Iran.

#### White House

##### **Roundtable interview of the President by British print journalists**

The Oval Office - November 12, 2003

**President Bush:** [...] And having said that, not every situation requires a military response. As a matter of fact, I would hope very few situations would require a military response. Let me talk about Iran. The Iranians must hear from a unified world that it is unacceptable for them to develop a nuclear weapon. And I want to thank -- I thanked Tony, the other day on our video conference we had, for he and his Foreign Minister Straw and the French Foreign Minister and the German Foreign Minister, delivering a message on behalf of all of us that a nuclear weapon is unacceptable. The IAEA, an international organization, as you know, based out of the United Nations, is now very much involved in this issue. The United States position is, is that we appreciate their focus, and we expect there to be a transparent regime inside of Iran. They admitted they had -- were enriching, that they hadn't disclosed their enrichment under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. They had made that admission, which says that we need to be on guard. [...]

#### US State Department

##### **IAEA Report Raises "Serious Concerns" about Iran's Nuclear Activities**

**Rice says international community must hold Iran accountable to IAEA obligations**

13 November 2003

National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice says a report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has raised serious concerns about Iran's nuclear activities.

"I think that the IAEA report raises very serious concerns about what has been going on in Iran and what might be continuing to go on in Iran," Rice said November 13 in response to a question at a press briefing in Washington. "So the international community has an obligation, knowing now what we know about Iran's behavior, past behavior, to make sure that anything that is signed on to with the Iranians takes account of that past, and really insists on performance from the Iranians."

Rice said that although the IAEA found no evidence that Iran has a nuclear weapons program, the international community must insist on "performance" from the Iranians in cooperating with the IAEA.



Following is an excerpt from the transcript of Rice's press briefing, containing her comments about Iran's nuclear program:

(begin excerpt)

Q My question on Iran is, the IAEA turned out this fairly detailed report you're probably seeing now. The Iranian position on this is that it proves that they do not have a nuclear weapons program. I was wondering what conclusions you drew from that and what conclusions you drew from the public CIA report --

DR. RICE: Well, I saw one Iranian statement that it should lay to rest any concerns about what's going on in Iran. I think that's a, shall I say, an overstatement of the case. The IAEA report made clear that the Iranians have been concealing, that they've not been truthful in the past. And I think the issue now is are they going to be truthful in the future? Are they going to come clean about what had been going on in Iran, what is going on in Iran? Are they going to agree to verification measures and protocols that give the international community some confidence, given that they weren't transparent in the past, that they're going to be transparent in the future? I think that the IAEA report raises very serious concerns about what has been going on in Iran and what might be continuing to go on in Iran.

So the international community has an obligation, knowing now what we know about Iran's behavior, past behavior, to make sure that anything that is signed on to with the Iranians takes account of that past, and really insists on performance from the Iranians -- not promises from the Iranians, but performance from the Iranians. And that's the discussion that we're going to have in the IAEA Board of Governors.

But I think the IAEA report was very strong. And while it said that there was no evidence of a nuclear weapons program, they made very -- quite clear that given what they had learned, and given this long history, that it was going to take a while to really understand the full extent of the Iranian program.

(end excerpt)

## United Nations

### **Secretary-General hails Iran's decision on additional protocol**

Press release SG/SM/9009 - 14 November 2003

Following is a statement issued today by the Spokesman for Secretary-General Kofi Annan:

The Secretary-General welcomes the recent decision by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to conclude the Additional Protocol, to act in accordance with its provisions until its entry into force, and to suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities.

He encourages the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Government of Iran and the other governments that have been working with Iran on this matter to continue their efforts in this respect.

## Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

### **Beantwoording verzoek Cie inzake Iran**

DAM-543/03 – 21 november 2003 - Brief van de Minister aan de Tweede Kamer

[...]

Nucleair programma

Over het Iraanse nucleaire programma is de Kamer, behalve in hogergenoemde brief, tevens geïnformeerd in reactie op vragen van het lid Wilders (zie laatstelijk Vergaderjaar 2002-2003, nrs. 648, 1134, en 1875, alsmede Vergaderjaar 2003-2004, nrs. 119 en 120). Ten vervolge, c.q. ter aanvulling hierop moge onderstaande dienen.

Het nucleaire programma van Iran gaat terug tot de tijd van de Sjah. Iran tekende het IAEA Statuut in 1958. In de jaren '60 was het de VS die Iran hielp bij de opbouw van een bescheiden nucleaire infrastructuur voor wetenschappelijke doeleinden. Zo leverde de VS een onderzoeksreactor aan het Tehran Research Centre en zogenaamde "hot cells" voor de behandeling van bestraald nucleair materiaal. Iran ondertekende en ratificeerde het NPV in 1970. In 1974 sloot Iran een akkoord met Frankrijk voor de levering van (licht)verrijkt uranium, dat na 1979 door Frankrijk werd bevroren. Met Siemens werd begin jaren '70 een contract afgesloten voor de bouw van een tweetal lichtwaterkernreactoren in Bushehr. De bouw hiervan werd stopgezet na de revolutie van 1979. De centrales in aanbouw zijn vervolgens tijdens de Iran-Irak oorlog

meerdere malen door Irak gebombardeerd. In 1995 werd een contract tussen Iran en Rusland afgesloten voor de afbouw van de centrale in Bushehr. Contractonderhandelingen tussen Rusland en Iran voor een tweede kerncentrale in Bushehr zijn zeer onlangs gestart.

Deze schets van Irans nucleaire programma is echter maar een deel van het verhaal. Reeds langere tijd waren er aanwijzingen dat Iran naast het zichtbare deel van zijn nucleaire activiteiten ook heimelijke activiteiten ontplooidde op diverse deelgebieden van de nucleaire brandstofcyclus. Die aanwijzingen hadden vooral betrekking op verwervingen en verwervingspogingen in Westerse landen, waaronder Nederland, van technologie en materialen die een nucleaire toepassing zouden kunnen hebben. Daarnaast was de regering reeds langere tijd bezorgd over de samenwerking van Rusland en Iran op nucleair gebied, met name in relatie tot de afbouw van de Bushehr-centrale. Hoewel de centrale zelf niet erg proliferatiegevoelig is, zou de nucleaire samenwerking en gerelateerde kennisoverdracht Iran mogelijkheden bieden deze kennis aan te wenden voor wapengerelateerde activiteiten. De Kamer is de afgelopen jaren ook regelmatig op de hoogte gebracht van de bestaande zorgen omtrent Iran's nucleaire ambities.

Het afgelopen jaar zijn de ontwikkelingen rondom het Iraanse nucleaire programma in een stroomversnelling geraakt. Naar aanleiding van sterke aanwijzingen dat Iran in het geheim bouwde aan nucleaire faciliteiten gaf Iran eind 2002 toe dat het in Natanz werkte aan een gascentrifuge verrijkingsinstallatie en in Arak aan een zwaarwaterproductiefaciliteit (nodig als moderator van een zwaarwaterreactor. Een dergelijke faciliteit kan civiele toepassingen hebben maar is ook bij uitstek geschikt voor de productie van plutonium). Voorts maakte Iran bekend dat het plannen had voor de bouw van een zwaarwaterreactor in Arak, een uraniummetaalconversiefabriek, een uraniumconversiecentrum in Isfahan en een fabriek voor de vervaardiging van nucleaire brandstofstaven (voor gebruik in kerncentrales).

Iran gaf hiermee aan dat het van plan was alle elementen van de nucleaire brandstofcyclus zelf te beheersen, om zodoende voor zijn kernenergieprogramma zelfvoorzienend te zijn. In een redevoering tot de Raad van Bestuur van het IAEA op 6 mei jl. bevestigde de Iraanse Vice-President, Reza Aghazadeh, dat zelfvoorzienendheid op het gebied van nucleaire brandstof een belangrijke doelstelling van het Iraanse nucleaire programma is. In die redevoering presenteerde Aghazadeh ook de economische argumenten voor een Iraans nucleair programma. Volgens de Iraanse regering zou het land in 2020 rond de 100 miljoen inwoners hebben en een netto-importeur van olie kunnen zijn. Ergo de noodzaak voor 6.000-7.000 MW nucleaire energie. Aghazadeh ontkende ten stelligste dat Iran andere dan vreedzame bedoelingen met zijn nucleaire programma had. Hij verdedigde voorts het feit dat Iran de verrijkingsinstallatie in Natanz en de zwaarwaterproductiefaciliteit in Arak niet bij het IAEA had aangemeld op grond van het feit dat het onder zijn waarborgovereenkomst met het IAEA hiertoe niet gehouden was. Dit was formeel juist, maar het onderstreepte voor de meeste landen des te meer de noodzaak van een spoedige ondertekening en toepassing door Iran van het Additionele Protocol bij zijn waarborgovereenkomst. Tegenover westerse regeringsvertegenwoordigers gaf Iran aan dat het, gelet op de binnenlandspolitieke verhoudingen, het Additionele Protocol alleen geratificeerd kon krijgen indien het "wederkerige garanties" zou krijgen in de vorm van stopzetting van anti-Iraanse "propaganda" en van opheffing van restricties op Iraanse toegang tot nucleaire technologie voor vreedzaam gebruik.

Naar aanleiding van onthullingen over het Iraanse nucleaire programma in december 2002 startte het IAEA begin 2003 een diepgravend onderzoek. Een eerste rapport van de Directeur-Generaal van het IAEA, Dr. El Baradei, verscheen op 6 juni 2003. In dat rapport stelde het IAEA dat "Iran has failed to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement" en bestempelde deze schending als "a matter of concern". De geconstateerde schendingen hadden vooral betrekking op het niet aanmelden van de import van natuurlijk uranium, de verwerking en het gebruik van dit natuurlijke uranium en de opslagplaats van het uranium. Het ging op zich om relatief kleine hoeveelheden. Het IAEA stelde in zijn rapport niet dat Iran aan een kernwapenprogramma werkt. Het Agentschap plaatste echter wel vraagtekens bij bepaalde onderdelen van het nucleaire programma die niet noodzakelijk zijn voor een vreedzaam programma, zoals bijvoorbeeld de omzetting van uraniumhexafluoride in uraniummetaal. Het IAEA gaf aan dat er nog verschillende openstaande vragen waren die verder onderzoek noodzakelijk maakten.

Tijdens de vergadering op 16 juni jl. van de Bestuursraad van het IAEA, waar Nederland zitting in heeft, werd naar aanleiding van dit rapport het IAEA opgedragen om een verder grondig onderzoek te verrichten naar het Iraanse nucleaire programma. Daarnaast werd Iran opgeroepen zijn bestaande waarborgovereenkomst met het IAEA uit te breiden, en een Additioneel Protocol af te sluiten, zodat het IAEA onder andere milieumonsters kon nemen om eventuele illegale activiteiten op te sporen.

Op 26 augustus jl. verscheen een tussenrapport van het IAEA. In dat rapport werd onder meer geconstateerd dat Iran op enkele punten de nodige opheldering had verschaft over uitstaande vragen t.a.v. niet-gedeclareerde nucleaire materialen, maar dat essentiële vragen onbeantwoord waren gebleven. Voorts waren

sporen van hoogverrijkt uranium (HEU) aangetroffen in ultracentrifuges in Natanz (waar een ultracentrifugefabriek was gebouwd). De herkomst van dit HEU was nog niet opgehelderd. Er bestond nog steeds onduidelijkheid over de rol die uraniummetaal in het Iraanse kernenergieprogramma speelde of had gespeeld (verrijkt uraniummetaal speelt voor kernenergie eigenlijk geen rol). Ook had het IAEA gevraagd om nadere opheldering over het zwaarwaterreactorproject dat thans de gedetailleerde ontwerpfase was ingegaan. Het IAEA concludeerde in het rapport dat Iran uraniumconversie-activiteiten had uitgevoerd die het had moeten melden, dat verder onderzoek nodig was naar het conversieprogramma dat bij de Kalaye Electric Company was uitgevoerd tussen 1997 en 2003 en dat opheldering was geboden over de herkomst van de HEU-deeltjes die in centrifuges in Natanz waren aangetroffen. Kort voor publicatie van het rapport had Iran toestemming gegeven monsters te nemen in Kalaye Electric Company (waar tot 2002 verrijkgingsgerelateerde activiteiten hadden plaatsgevonden). De uitkomsten ervan waren nog uitstaande. Het IAEA constateerde een toenemende medewerking van Iraanse zijde en merkte op dat de bereidheid van Iran onderhandelingen over een Additioneel Protocol te starten positief was. Tegelijkertijd vermeldde het IAEA dat gevraagde informatie traag werd verstrekt en dat toegang traag werd verleend, alsmede dat sommige verstrekte informatie "anders was dan hetgeen eerder was gezegd". Blijvende en snellere medewerking van Iraanse zijde was nodig voor de spoedige oplossing van de uitstaande vragen. DG El Baradei gaf aan de Bestuursraad over nadere ontwikkelingen in te lichten in november, of eerder indien nodig.

Het rapport bevatte derhalve serieuze aanwijzingen voor niet-naleving door Iran van zijn waarborgenverplichtingen, met name wat betreft zijn uraniumverrijkgingsactiviteiten. Duidelijk werd dat Iran verzuimd had activiteiten te rapporteren en verificatie door het IAEA had tegengewerkt en ook dat het land in meerdere gevallen onwaarheid had gesproken tegenover het IAEA. Dit laatste had ondermeer betrekking op uraniumconversie-experimenten en het testen van centrifuges voor uraniumverrijking in Kalaye. Meest opvallend en ook het meest zorgwekkend was de vondst van hoogverrijkte uraniumdeeltjes in centrifuge-onderdelen. Volgens Iran betrof het verontreinigde centrifugebuizen die in het verleden op de zwarte markt waren aangeschaft. Dit richtte ook de aandacht op de buitenlandse betrokkenheid bij delen van het Iraanse programma (waarbij zij aangetekend dat tot op heden nog niet duidelijk is waar de verontreiniging vandaan komt).

Ondanks alle zorgwekkende feiten van het rapport waren de leden van de Bestuursraad, waaronder Nederland, van mening dat het ingezette spoor van gedegen onderzoek (ondermeer tijdrovend monsteronderzoek) en toenemende medewerking van Iran vervolgd diende te worden en dat de kwestie niet via een zogenaamde "non-compliance"-resolutie naar de Veiligheidsraad verwezen moest worden. In zijn resolutie van 12 september 2003 riep de Bestuursraad vervolgens Iran op versneld met het IAEA mee te werken en volledige openheid te betrachten. Voorts riep de Bestuursraad Iran op zeker te stellen dat er geen nalatigheden ten aanzien van het rapporteren van nucleair materiaal, faciliteiten en activiteiten ingevolge Irans waarborgenovereenkomst meer zouden voorkomen. Ook riep de Bestuursraad Iran op alle uraniumverrijkgings- en (plutonium gerelateerde) opwerkingsactiviteiten op te schorten, in afwachting van de bevestiging door DG IAEA van de door de leden van de Bestuursraad gevraagde verzekering omtrent het vreedzame karakter van Irans nucleaire programma. De Bestuursraad gaf Iran de tijd tot eind oktober 2003 om alle vastgestelde nalatigheden te verhelpen en alle medewerking aan het IAEA te geven om het Agentschap in staat te stellen te verifiëren dat Iran zich houdt aan zijn waarborgenovereenkomst. De Bestuursraad verzocht ten slotte aan Iran het Additioneel Protocol te ondertekenen en te implementeren en per direct reeds te handelen als had het land reeds het Additioneel Protocol geratificeerd. DG El Baradei werd verzocht voor de bijeenkomst van de Bestuursraad van november 2003 te rapporteren op een wijze die de Bestuursraad in staat zou stellen definitieve conclusies te trekken.

Parallel aan het IAEA-traject waren Duitsland, Frankrijk en het Verenigd Koninkrijk een eigen diplomatiek proces begonnen met een gezamenlijke brief van de respectieve ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken aan hun Iraanse collega. Via deze brief trachtten zij het land te bewegen mee te werken met het IAEA, een Additioneel Protocol af te sluiten en verrijkgings- en opwerkingsactiviteiten te staken. Het initiatief van de drie landen leidde op 21 oktober jl. tot een diplomatiek akkoord waarbij Iran aangaf dat het volledig zou samenwerken met het IAEA, een Additioneel Protocol zou afsluiten en ratificeren en zijn verrijkgings- en opwerkingsactiviteiten op zou schorten. De drie Europese landen erkenden het recht van Iran op een vreedzaam nucleair programma en stelden toegang tot technologie in het vooruitzicht, mits de internationaal levende zorgen door Iran voldoende zouden zijn weggenomen, ter vaststelling door het IAEA. Ten slotte zouden de drie landen samenwerken met Iran om regionale veiligheid en stabiliteit te bevorderen, inclusief door totstandkoming van een zone vrij van massavernietigingswapens. De Verenigde Staten verwelkomden het initiatief, doch benadrukte het belang van naleving door Iran van de gedane toezeggingen. De Regering,

evenals de overige Europese partners, ondersteunde het bereikte akkoord als een potentieel goede basis voor een diplomatieke oplossing voor de bestaande situatie.

Het in de IAEA-resolutie van 12 september jl. gevraagde rapport verscheen op 10 november jl.. De resolutie van 12 september was volgens dit rapport zeer nauwgezet uitgevoerd door Iran. Tegelijk maakte het rapport echter duidelijk dat Iran een consistent patroon van misleiding en verzwijging had vertoond. Iran had verschillende keren, en gedurende een langere periode, niet aan zijn verplichtingen krachtens de waarborgovereenkomst voldaan. Zo had Iran verzuimd te rapporteren over het bezit, de bewerking en het gebruik van nucleair materiaal. Ook had Iran verzuimd kenbaar te maken waar de locaties waren waar dergelijk materiaal bewerkt en opgeslagen is. Voorts werd duidelijk dat sinds het laatste rapport van DG El Baradei het IAEA additionele tekortkomingen aan Iraanse zijde had geconstateerd, inclusief het verzwijgen van o.a. het gebruik van geïmporteerd onverrijkt uraniumhexafluoride voor het experimenteren in de centrifuges van Kalaye Electric Company in 1999 en 2002, de import van natuurlijk uranium metaal, de productie van verrijkt uranium en de opwerking van plutonium. Ook had Iran verzuimd plattegronden en modellen te verschaffen voor o.a. de centrifuge-testfaciliteit bij Kalaye Electric Company, de laserlaboratoria bij TNRC (Teheran Nuclear Research Center) en Lashkar Ab'as en Karaj, de faciliteiten bij ENTC (Esfahan Nuclear Research Center) en TNRC en ten slotte de Teheran Research Reactor en de "hot cell" faciliteit waar de plutoniumopwerking had plaatsgevonden. Uit het hele rapport kwam voorts een omvangrijke buitenlandcomponent naar voren. Met name de herkomst van sporen hoogverrijkt uranium (HEU) en laagverrijkt uranium (LEU) werd nog door het IAEA nagetrokken. Het IAEA zou buitenlandse contacten nalopen en rekende daarbij op de volledige samenwerking van de betrokken landen. De belangrijkste conclusie van het IAEA luidde dat Iran in het verleden vele onderdelen van zijn nucleaire programma verborgen had gehouden, hetgeen geresulteerd had in overtredingen van zijn verplichtingen ingevolge zijn waarborgovereenkomst. Volgens het IAEA had Iran inmiddels wel actieve samenwerking verleend en transparantie getoond. Het IAEA had geen harde bewijzen gevonden die aan zouden tonen dat de verzwegen nucleaire materialen en activiteiten verbonden waren aan een kernwapenprogramma. Echter vanwege Irans staat van dienst waren er volgens het IAEA zowel meer tijd als een robuust verificatiesysteem nodig om zeker te stellen dat Irans nucleaire programma uitsluitend vreedzaam was. Een werkend Additioneel Protocol en volledige openheid van Iraanse kant waren voorwaarden hiervoor.

De Bestuursraad van 20 en 21 november jl. zal zich buigen over het rapport en hoe erop te reageren. Ik zal op de uitkomst van deze beraadslagingen mondeling terugkomen tijdens het aanstaande Algemeen Overleg op 26 november a.s.

[...]

## **BERICHTEN**

### Tehran Times

#### **Moscow ready to cooperate with Iran in nuclear sphere**

23 October 2003

Moscow (Itar-Tass) -- Moscow 'is ready to cooperate with Tehran in future, including in the nuclear sphere provided international obligations are strictly observed', said Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov on Wednesday in reply to a request to comment on the latest statements by Iran.

He pointed to the need for ensuring transparency of the Iranian program.

According to the minister, Russia 'has been consistently advocating full transparency of the Iranian nuclear program'.

He noted that this idea 'was again stated by Russian President Vladimir Putin at a meeting with Iranian President Mohammad Khatami'.

"We attach special importance to a requirement that Iran should supply full information on its previous and present programs, join the Additional Protocol to the Agreement on guarantees with the IAEA and suspend work on enriching uranium," the minister said.

"All the above would help to remove the concern of the international community about Iran's nuclear program," he emphasized.

"Russia is ready to cooperate with Tehran in future too, including the nuclear sphere provided international obligations are strictly observed," the minister emphasized.

Secretary of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council Hasan Rowhani said on Tuesday that Tehran would sign the protocol with the IAEA before November 20. As a result, agency expert will be able to conduct inspections of Iranian nuclear projects without preliminary notifications. Iran will suspend work on enriching uranium. However, it will set a date for suspension on its own.

Tehran and Moscow will soon sign a protocol to an agreement on Iran's returning spent fuel from the Bushehr nuclear power plant, Iran's representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Akbar Salehi, said.

## Guardian

### **Iran 'has no nuclear secrets left'**

Reuters – 24 October 2003

Iran yesterday acknowledged having been "discreet" about its nuclear programme in the past but said it had no more secrets after giving the United Nations what it called a full declaration of its nuclear activities.

The head of the UN International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mohamed ElBaradei, said Iran's ambassador to the IAEA, Ali Akbar Salehi, delivered the declaration eight days ahead of an IAEA deadline for Iran to prove it has no secret atomic weapons programme. "I was assured that the report is a comprehensive and accurate declaration," Mr ElBaradei said.

Mr Salehi declined to give any details about the declaration, a stack of papers about 4cm thick. "We have submitted a report that fully discloses our past activities, peaceful activities, in the nuclear field," he said.

The secretive nature of Iran's activities had been a natural response to sanctions.

"The important thing to note is that Iran had to do some of its activities very discreetly because of the sanctions that have been imposed on Iran for the past 25 years," Mr Salehi said, adding that they were "legal activities".

Mr ElBaradei said the IAEA was particularly keen to have details about the origin of uranium enrichment centrifuge parts, which Iran says it bought on the black market and blames for contaminating two sites where the IAEA found traces of bomb-grade uranium.

But Mr Salehi said it may be impossible to trace their origins, as the parts were bought through "intermediaries".

## Tehran Times

### **Iran to Suspend Uranium Enrichment Process: Gov't Spokesman**

28 October 2003

TEHRAN (IRNA) -- Government Spokesman Abdollah Ramezanzadeh here on Monday referred to Iran's suspension of its nuclear enrichment activities in accordance with the recently-issued four-party Tehran declaration and said that it has not yet been materialized.

He added that no definite schedule has so long been set for the measure.

Speaking at his weekly press conference, Ramazanzadeh in response to a question on Iran's reaction to the dissatisfaction of U.S. officials with Tehran Statement, said that Iran's decisions are taken in accordance to its interests and not to convince the American authorities.

"The Americans, Israelis and warmongering parties across the world opposed the statement. Unfortunately, some domestic groups had a similar outlook," he added.

Concerning the domestic opposition and rallies against Tehran's decision to sign the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) additional protocol, he said that it is quite normal to have various outlooks towards national issues, including Iran's nuclear program.

In response to a question on the reaction of the ruling system to the failure of Europeans to fulfill their commitments, he said that given they are bilateral, Iran has a similar standing.

Asked about the names of the arrested Al-Qaeda members submitted to the UN Security Council by Iran, he said that the country's policy is based on campaign against terrorism in all its forms. Turning to the charges brought up against Iran and Syria with respect to unrests in Iraq, he noted, "Our policy is based on promoting regional security in the neighboring states including Afghanistan and Iraq."

Ramezanzadeh said that security in Iraq will be established once the foreign troops leave the country and the Iraqis are allowed to take charge of their internal affairs.

"Given that we don't benefit from unrest in Iraq, we denounce any charges against Iran in this respect," he concluded.

## Tehran Times

### **Tehran Declaration Comprehensive: ElBaradei**

1 November 2003

OTTAWA (Compiled From Dispatches) - Iran's declaration to the International Atomic Energy Agency about its nuclear program looks to be comprehensive, the head of the UN agency said on Thursday.

The IAEA's governing board had set an Oct. 31 deadline for Iran to come clean about the program. Iran gave the IAEA a declaration on Oct. 23 about its nuclear program which is aimed for civilian use.

"I think we are making good progress. Iran has submitted what (it) assured me to be a comprehensive and accurate declaration," IAEA head Mohamed ElBaradei told reporters in Ottawa as carried by Reuters. "I think I could say that at first glance the report is comprehensive but we still have to do a lot of fine-tuning, we still have to do a lot of questioning, and that is why we are there right now and we will continue to be there doing an inspection for quite a few months in fact."

Last week, Iran agreed to freeze uranium enrichment and to sign the Additional Protocol to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, allowing snap inspections of its nuclear sites.

"I will expect that, next week, they will send me a letter requesting they will conclude an additional protocol, which also would be a very positive development," ElBaradei said after talks with Canadian Foreign Minister Bill Graham. A spokeswoman for the Vienna-based IAEA said the declaration contained "a great deal of information addressing key areas of Iran's past nuclear program which IAEA inspectors had raised questions about."

"Whether it provides all the answers has yet to be verified," said Melissa Fleming.

A Vienna-based Western diplomat closely following the IAEA inspections in Iran said he expected Tehran had complied with the agency's demand for information to the extent that it "at least gave some kind of answer" to all the questions raised.

These questions included a full picture of Tehran's uranium enrichment program, nuclear import and export lists and other information.

Elbaradei Stresses Iran's Right for Peaceful Use of nuclear Energy

ElBaradei once again stressed Iran's right to have a peaceful nuclear program.

"According to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), every country has the right to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. This applies also to Iran," ElBaradei said in an interview with the daily 'Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung'.

He welcomed readiness of the European countries to provide Iran with modern nuclear technology, after Teheran has fulfilled Europe's nuclear security guarantees, IRNA reported.

"Frankly speaking, I believe this is probably in the long-term the right way. We also have elsewhere security guarantees that nuclear programs serve only peaceful purposes," ElBaradei added.

Tehran has consented to a voluntary suspension of its uranium enrichment program and signs the additional nuclear safeguards protocol, while in exchange Europe agreed to provide Iran with modern civilian nuclear technology.

## Guardian

### **Iran passes initial UN test over nuclear weapons programme**

Ian Traynor – 1 November 2003

Iran appeared to have passed a stiff international test on its suspected nuclear weapons programme yesterday when the United Nations nuclear watchdog said Tehran had supplied its inspectors with a "comprehensive" record of a project that goes back 20 years.

Last month the UN body, the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency, set Tehran an ultimatum of revealing all about its nuclear projects by yesterday or risk greater isolation and possible sanctions.

Mohammed ElBaradei, the IAEA chief, in Canada yesterday en route to the UN headquarters in New York, sounded optimistic that the Iranians had done enough to escape censure at a crucial IAEA meeting this month in Vienna.

"We are making good progress," Dr ElBaradei said. "At first glance, the report is comprehensive, but we still have to do a lot of fine tuning."

Five UN nuclear inspectors were in Tehran yesterday seeking answers from the Iranian regime about its suspected nuclear bomb programme.

The inspectors have been in Iran since Monday, poring over the Iranian dossier, which runs to several hundred pages, and seeking further clarification on the history of the programme.

They are due back in Vienna this weekend and their findings will inform the report being drafted by Dr ElBaradei on whether Iran has disclosed enough about its nuclear projects and ambitions to avoid being referred to the UN security council - a move that could result in sweeping sanctions being decreed.

Frustrated by months of stonewalling by Iran as inspectors unearthed details that pointed to a secret bomb project, the IAEA last month set Tehran an ultimatum - disclose everything about its nuclear programmes by yesterday or be declared in non-compliance with obligations under the non-proliferation treaty, which it signed in 1970.

The consensus among diplomats in Vienna is that Iran's tactics of incremental disclosure would probably succeed in securing a "non-punitive" verdict from Dr ElBaradei when the 35-strong IAEA board meets in three weeks' time.

Negotiations last week by the foreign secretary, Jack Straw, and his French and German counterparts, secured Iranian pledges on two key factors in the nuclear row, and appear to have defused the crisis for the time being, although Washington insists Iranian actions rather than words will determine what happens next.

The EU troika of foreign ministers went to Iran and secured promises to freeze a uranium enrichment programme and to sign an agreement with the IAEA enabling inspectors to go wherever they choose at short notice.

Diplomats in Vienna said the inspections agreement could be signed at the IAEA meeting, which will begin on November 20. But there was some confusion over suspending uranium enrichment.

UN inspectors have twice found traces of weapons-grade uranium at the underground enrichment facility being built at Natanz in central Iran, and a further trace at a factory in Tehran. The Iranians admit they have not yet frozen enrichment activities.

The EU and US aim to see the Natanz facility dismantled. But this is unlikely. Diplomats say the Iranians could suspend enrichment by halting supply of nuclear materials to the centrifuges at Natanz while still continuing to assemble the tens of thousands of centrifuges needed for a full-scale enrichment project.

The US, with a growing level of support, is convinced Iran is embarked on a calculated nuclear weapons programme.

## CNN

### **Don't push us on nukes, Iran warns**

2 November 2003

TEHRAN, Iran (AP) --Iran's top leader has warned that Tehran will end cooperation with the UN nuclear agency if it makes excessive demands that undermine the country's nuclear program.

Although Iran agreed last month to allow unfettered inspections of its nuclear facilities, hard-liners have pressured the government not to make further concessions.

"If parties to the talks with us or centers of global power come up with excessive demands and we feel that our interests and values are harmed, we won't hesitate to end this trend (of cooperation)," Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said.

"Peaceful nuclear technology is our legitimate right and no country and no organization can deprive us of this right, including the right for production of our own nuclear fuel," Khamenei told a large group of Iran's military brass and government officials after hosting a fast-breaking party. His comments were broadcast by state-run television.

Iran pledged last month to suspend uranium enrichment and sign an additional protocol to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty allowing unfettered inspections of its nuclear facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Iran also handed over to the IAEA a dossier on its nuclear programs, effectively meeting an October 31 deadline to prove its nuclear program is peaceful.

IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei told CNN on Sunday that the agency was in the process of verifying the declaration and said they were making "good and steady progress" with Iran.

If the IAEA decides Iran has not proven its peaceful nuclear intentions, it could refer Iran to the U.N. Security Council, which could impose sanctions.

For now, international pressure on Iran has eased, with focus shifting from Friday's deadline to a November 20 IAEA board of governors meeting.

But the Iranian government has faced growing hard-line pressure not to make further compromises.

On Friday thousands of hard-liners rallied in several cities against the government's decision to cooperate with the IAEA, warning that a signature for the additional protocol will prompt nationwide street protests.

The United States accuses Iran of pursuing nuclear weapons and has pressed for the IAEA to declare Iran in violation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

Washington, though, does not believe Iran has yet made nuclear weapons, citing a lack of fissile material -- either enriched uranium or plutonium. Iranian officials say nuclear weapons have no place in their defense strategy.

### **Won't back down**

"What happened (Iran's decision to cooperate) was correct and a policy to foil the conspiracy hatched by the U.S. and the Zionists," Khamenei said.

Khamenei, who has the final say on all state matters, said he will, however, intervene to stop the Iranian government from making decisions he may consider as inappropriate.

"So far, nothing has been done against our principles. Wherever I feel that a step has been taken against the directions and goals of the establishment, I will stop it," he said.

Khamenei said Iran will not back down on seeking nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and vowed the country will finally produce fuel for its future nuclear reactors.

Iran has said its decision to suspend uranium enrichment will be temporary and Iran will not give up its goal to develop a complete nuclear fuel cycle, from mining its own uranium to enriching the ore, without having to rely on any other country.

### Guardian

#### **UN says Iran produced plutonium**

Ian Traynor – 11 November 2003

Iran said yesterday that it had frozen its uranium enrichment projects in response to pressure from the international community, which fears the programmes could culminate in a nuclear bomb.

The move by Tehran to ward off the threat of UN sanctions came as the director general of the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mohamed ElBaradei, released a report containing fresh revelations about the Iranian nuclear programme.

Reuters reported last night that the IAEA assessment showed Iran acknowledged producing a small amount of plutonium, a material useable in a nuclear bomb. The report also said the country had "acknowledged that 'a limited number of tests using small amounts of [uranium hexafluoride] had been conducted in 1999 and 2002' at the Kalaye electric company", despite earlier denials from Tehran.

The report also said Iran had admitted establishing a laser uranium-enrichment plant that it kept secret from the UN nuclear watchdog. "Given Iran's past pattern of concealment, it will take some time before the agency is able to conclude that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes," Reuters quoted the report as saying.

The IAEA said the nuclear declaration, delivered ahead of an October 31 deadline for Tehran to come clean about its atomic past, made "clear that Iran has failed in a number of instances over an extended period of time to meet its obligations".

Iran sent Dr ElBaradei a letter last night agreeing to sign an "additional protocol" allowing snap UN nuclear inspections. The concessions were announced by Iranian national security chief, Hassan Rohani, during a visit to Moscow.



Russia is Iran's sole nuclear partner and Mr Rohani was rewarded by a declaration from President Vladimir Putin that there were now no "obstacles to cooperating with Iran in the nuclear sphere", despite intense pressure from Washington for Moscow to halt its nuclear assistance to Iran.

"From today we are temporarily suspending our process of uranium enrichment," Mr Rohani said.

An IAEA meeting on November 20 will decide how to proceed on the issue of Iran. The Americans are pushing for the IAEA to declare Iran non-compliant with its obligations under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and to report it to the UN security council, which could decree punitive sanctions.

## Guardian

### **Tehran accused of 18-year cover-up**

Secret report says robust inspections of Iran's nuclear programme are needed to dispel fears of weapons of mass destruction

By Ian Traynor – 12 November 2003

Iran has systematically covered up its nuclear programme for the past two decades and needs "particularly robust" international inspections to dissolve fears it is developing weapons of mass destruction, the UN's atomic energy agency has found.

In a confidential 30-page report on the Iranian nuclear project, delivered to diplomats in Vienna on Monday night and obtained by the Guardian, Mohamed ElBaradei, head of the UN's international atomic energy agency (IAEA), revealed that Iran has extracted weapons-grade plutonium in experiments with uranium, and until recently was building a secret laser uranium enrichment facility, as well as a huge centrifuge enrichment complex.

Dr ElBaradei in effect declared Iran in breach of its international nuclear treaty obligations, a claim that requires the IAEA to report Iran to the UN security council.

But the politics and the diplomacy of the crisis mean that such a referral and the accompanying risk of punitive sanctions being decreed is unlikely to happen yet. The Vienna-based agency and the Europeans want more time to investigate the highly sophisticated and extensive projects under way in Iran.

Tehran has also, albeit only in the past month, moved to defuse the crisis by offering the inspectors access to anything they want to see in Iran and by announcing this week that it has frozen all uranium enrichment and nuclear reprocessing activities.

"Given Iran's past pattern of concealment, it will take some time before the IAEA is able to conclude that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes," Dr ElBaradei reported. He said he could not prove that Iran was engaged in a nuclear bomb project, but the evidence his inspectors had unearthed and Iran's grudging admissions had "given rise to serious concerns".

"The policy of concealment continued until last month," Dr ElBaradei said. That was when the IAEA delivered an ultimatum demanding Iran reveal everything about its nuclear projects by the end of October or face the consequences.

The disclosure about plutonium extraction follows revelations in the summer that traces of bomb-grade uranium had also been found at two facilities in Iran. The amount of plutonium at issue is in micrograms - nowhere near what is needed for a warhead. But experts and diplomats said the key point was that the Iranians were developing the techniques to extract much more plutonium.

"This is unquestionably a bomb programme," said Gary Samore, a nuclear expert and director of studies at the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London.

"The purpose is to develop a weapons material capability. Nothing else makes sense given the scale of the Iranian nuclear power programme."

The accumulation of detail in the report and in two previous assessments from Dr ElBaradei this year paints a staggering picture of a long-term, sophisticated programme running since the mid-80s. Only this year did the rest of the world obtain a glimpse of the Iranian projects.

"Iran has now acknowledged that it has been developing, for 18 years, a uranium centrifuge enrichment programme, and, for 12 years, a laser enrichment programme," the report said.

Four unnamed foreign countries had helped the Iranians with knowhow and equipment. Dr ElBaradei also said his inspectors had not yet resolved the origin of the weapons-grade uranium traces found at a Tehran plant and the Natanz enrichment complex. He insisted that to settle the plethora of open questions about the Iranian programmes, the IAEA would need "a particularly robust verification system," requiring "full transparency and openness on the part of Iran".

The 35-strong IAEA board is to meet in Vienna next week to decide its next moves towards Iran.

### **What the inspectors found**

- Plutonium: manufactured at a Tehran laboratory between 1988 and 1992, despite previous denials from Iran. Very small quantity extracted, not enough for a bomb. But Iranian scientists now know how to manufacture bomb-grade plutonium
- Laser uranium enrichment: Under UN questioning a fortnight ago, Iran admitted it had built a pilot laser enrichment facility at Lashkar Ab'ad, north-west of Tehran, three years ago. Four unnamed countries have been involved in supplying equipment and knowhow for 20 years. The Iranians admit banned experiments there until this year. They say the facility was dismantled in May. Last month UN inspectors' requests to examine equipment and talk to the scientists were "deferred by Iran"
- Uranium metal conversion: uranium metal is most commonly used for nuclear missiles. Earlier discoveries of metal conversion work were explained away by the Iranians as "shielding material". Last month they said the uranium metal was for use in the previously undisclosed laser enrichment project
- The IAEA's previous report disclosed traces found of two types of weapons-grade uranium at the underground centrifuge enrichment plant at Natanz. The IAEA then reported traces of weapons-grade uranium at the Kalaye electric company in Tehran.

### Washington Post

#### **After Report, Iran Acknowledges 'Minor' Breach of Nuclear Pact**

By Glenn Kessler and Joby Warrick – 12 November 2003

Iran acknowledged yesterday that it had failed to comply with international nuclear nonproliferation rules, as documented in a harshly critical report by a U.N. agency. But Tehran asserted that the failures were minimal and rejected suggestions that it was developing nuclear weapons.

"The failures that Iran has been reproached for are minor, and are only on the order of the gram or milligram, while in the past some countries had problems with larger quantities of plutonium," Iran's representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Ali Akbar Salehi, was quoted as saying by state television.

The IAEA's confidential report said Iran manufactured small amounts of enriched uranium and plutonium as part of a nuclear program it operated in secret for 18 years. The report faulted Iran for hiding evidence of its nuclear program from international inspectors and for numerous breaches of its nuclear treaty obligations.

The U.N. nuclear watchdog said it would continue to probe whether Tehran's nuclear program was intended to develop weapons.

While the report said Iran had been misleading the IAEA as recently as last month, Salehi said the "matter is closed" because "these failures correspond to the past [and] corrective measures have been taken." Iran's failures, he said, only concerned "experiments in laboratories which we should have declared to the agency."

Salehi said "a very small quantity of plutonium" resulted as "a secondary effect" of producing medicine for hospitals. The IAEA report said Iran told investigators the experiments were designed to study the nuclear fuel cycle and gain experience in reprocessing.

The State Department and the White House would not comment yesterday on the report -- written for a Nov. 20-21 IAEA board meeting -- because the document had not been officially released. But a State Department spokesman, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said the report reinforced the Bush administration's concerns about Iran's nuclear program. "Iran's nuclear weapons program and its now well-documented pattern of [nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty] safeguards violations are deeply troubling," the spokesman said.

He added that while Iran satisfied lingering questions, "we believe no country should be engaged in nuclear cooperation with Iran." But Russian officials said yesterday that Iran's recent cooperation with international inspectors -- and its willingness to allow unannounced inspections -- should demonstrate that Russia's construction of a nuclear power plant near the Iranian town of Bushehr did not pose a danger.

Indeed, experts said, Iran's willingness to signal cooperation with the IAEA might undercut U.S. efforts to maintain pressure on Iran. Washington could, for example, have the IAEA refer Iran's breaches of the non-proliferation treaty to the U.N. Security Council.

Robert Einhorn, a former assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation, said Iran now faced a "fundamental choice" that would decide not only its nuclear future but its place in the world.

"Which path Iran chooses depends to a great degree on how the international community behaves," said Einhorn, a senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. "It is the job of the United States, Russia and the Europeans to remain united and to make it clear that going down the nuclear path is not the right path."

The Iranian opposition group that exposed Iran's uranium program at Natanz a year ago contends that Iran still has not told the full truth. Alireza Jafarzadeh, a former spokesman for the National Council of Resistance of Iran, an organization that was declared a terrorist group by the Bush administration over the summer, said the Iranian military remained heavily involved in directing the country's nuclear scientists, in contrast with Iran's assurances that the program is strictly peaceful.

CNN

### **IAEA rejects Iran report critique**

13 November 2003

VIENNA, Austria (Reuters) --The U.N. nuclear watchdog rejected criticism of its report on Iran's nuclear programme by a senior U.S. official.

In the first U.S. reaction to a confidential report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Undersecretary of State John Bolton said the agency's conclusion that there was no evidence of a nuclear arms programme was "impossible to believe."

IAEA spokesman Mark Gwozdecky responded: "We stand by the report, but it's confidential and will be considered at next week's (IAEA) board meeting." He declined further comment.

In the report, which was circulated among officials on Monday and obtained by Reuters, the IAEA said Iran had a centrifuge uranium enrichment programme for 18 years and a high-tech laser enrichment programme for 12 years, both of which it kept hidden from the United Nations. ([Full story](#))

The report also said Iran admitted to producing small amounts of plutonium, useable in a bomb and with virtually no civilian uses, and had conducted secret tests of its enrichment centrifuges using nuclear material.

All of these activities could be linked bomb-making.

"To date there is no evidence that (Iran's) previously undeclared nuclear material and activities referred to above were related to a nuclear weapons programme," the IAEA said in the report.

But the agency also made it clear it had yet to declare Iran innocent of U.S. charges it had a secret weapons programme.

"Given Iran's past pattern of concealment, it will take some time before the agency is able to conclude that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes."

The IAEA's 35-member Board of Governors will discuss the report at a November 20-21 meeting.

Washington Post

### **U.S., West Europeans Differ on Iran Nukes**

By George Jahn – 14 November 2003

VIENNA, Austria - As a key U.N. atomic agency meeting approaches, a rift is opening between the United States and Europe over about how far to go in condemning Iran's covert nuclear activities, diplomats said Friday.

Among draft resolutions being drawn up is one by Britain, France and Germany that one diplomat described as a "strongly worded" demand that Iran continue acting on its stated intention to cooperate with the agency.

The United States is hoping for something tougher, such as involvement by the U.N. Security Council.

An International Atomic Energy Agency report leaves no question that Iran covered up past nuclear programs, including enriching uranium and processing small amounts of plutonium. Washington says the report proves Tehran's intent to manufacture weapons.

The document, prepared for a Nov. 20 meeting of the IAEA's board of governors, lists numerous nuclear cover-ups, some over decades, and says they effectively represent Iran's violations of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty by violating safeguards agreements that are part of that treaty.

IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei's report found "no evidence" Tehran tried to make atomic bombs, but said such efforts cannot be ruled out until Iran's previously covert activities are further examined.

The U.S. administration wants Iran declared in violation of the treaty at next week's board meeting - a move that would lead to U.N. Security Council involvement and possible sanctions.

But diplomats who follow the agency told The Associated Press that there is substantial opposition to such a harsh response, with even key U.S. allies leaning toward a resolution that stops short of referring the issue to the Security Council. There is fear that Iran could renege on recent moves to work with the agency if slapped too hard, they said.

The British, French and German draft would urge Tehran to clear up suspicions arising from past covert activities and open current programs to thorough IAEA control. However, it stops short of declaring Iran in noncompliance, meaning the issue will not be kicked up to the Council, said one diplomat, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

He and others emphasized that the draft could be withdrawn, merged with others or substantially changed even before the board starts meeting Thursday

Another diplomat familiar with the U.S. position said Washington still hopes for some kind of Security Council involvement but would settle for Council admonition of Iran that stops far short of sanctions threats.

Canada and Australia are believed to be close to the U.S. position, the diplomat said. While disappointed at the softer stance of the West Europeans, the Americans are willing to accept a compromise resolution "as long as it moves things forward" in reducing the perceived nuclear threat from Iran, he said.

Within recent weeks, Iran has swung from belligerent denial of wrongdoing to acknowledging past "mistakes" in not reporting honestly to the agency. While still maintaining it only wants to generate nuclear power, it has delivered what it says is complete information about past suspect activities.

Last week, it also fulfilled promises made during a visit to Tehran last month by the foreign ministers of Britain, France and Germany by suspending uranium enrichment and formally agreeing to throw open its nuclear programs to thorough agency inspections - both key IAEA demands.

### Washington Post

#### **Europe, U.S. Seek Common Approach to Iran Atom Plans**

By Louis Charbonneau - 16 November 2003

VIENNA (Reuters) - The United States and Europe are inching closer to a deal on a resolution that would criticize Iran's concealment of nuclear research which Washington says was linked to a weapons program, diplomats say.

On Thursday, the International Atomic Energy Agency's Board of Governors meets in Vienna to discuss an IAEA report on Iran's nuclear program, detailing 18 years of failures by Iran to inform the United Nations body of sensitive atomic activities such as uranium enrichment and plutonium production.

The United States, which says Iran's nuclear power program is a front to develop a bomb, is pushing the 35-nation board to pass a resolution declaring that Iran has not complied with its obligations under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and report Tehran's breaches to the U.N. Security Council.

But France, Britain and Germany want to avoid a report to the Council, which would anger Tehran and could lead to the Council imposing economic sanctions. The Europeans are drafting an IAEA board resolution that chides Iran but avoids escalating the issue to U.N. headquarters in New York.

Washington does not have enough support to get a resolution through the board that would bring Iran before the Security Council -- its only allies appear to be Canada, Australia and New Zealand -- but both Europeans and Americans want a compromise that would at least let the board reach a consensus.

Diplomats told Reuters that France suggested noting Iran had violated the NPT, while the board would decide not to notify the Security Council and keep the issue at the IAEA in Vienna.

One Western diplomat who follows IAEA matters closely said the use of wording on "non-compliance" brought the proposal "closer to U.S. thinking on the issue."

The diplomat said there was another possible compromise -- notifying the Security Council of Iran's non-compliance "purely for informational purposes," with no threat of sanctions.

"It's impossible to say how this will all play out," the diplomat said. "It's too early to say what the board will do."

Diplomats said they hoped the Franco-German-British draft would be tabled before Thursday's IAEA board meeting.

## IRAN'S WARNING

Iran, which denies having a secret weapons program, said on Thursday any reference to Iran failing to comply with the NPT would be "unacceptable" and that reporting Iran to the Security Council would be a mistake with "unpredictable consequences."

"Things could very easily get out of control," Iran's ambassador to the IAEA, Ali Akbar Salehi, told Reuters.

Diplomats also said that the idea of a U.S.-European split on the Iran issue had been exaggerated, though they acknowledged that Europe and the United States disagreed on whether engagement or isolation was the best way of dealing with Iran.

On October 21, the foreign ministers of Britain, France and Germany succeeded in convincing Tehran to halt temporarily its uranium enrichment program and accept a tougher regime of short-notice IAEA inspections of its nuclear sites.

This was widely described as proof that Europe's policy of engagement with Iran was superior, but one non-U.S. diplomat said Washington's tough approach deserved much of the credit for forcing Iran to open up its program over the last year.

"Without the U.S. hard line, the international community would never have taken action" after an Iranian opposition group said in August 2002 that Iran was hiding a uranium enrichment plant and other facilities from the IAEA, the diplomat said.

## Reuters

### **EU's Solana Says Iran Honest on Nuclear Program**

By Marie-Louise Moller – 17 November 2003

BRUSSELS (Reuters) - European Union foreign policy chief Javier Solana said Monday that Iran had been honest about its nuclear program and should not be reported to the U.N. Security Council this week for potential sanctions.

His comments contrasted with the public stance of the United States, which says it wants the U.N. nuclear watchdog to declare Tehran has not complied with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and to report it to the Security Council.

Solana also sounded more trusting than the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which said in a report leaked last week that while there was no evidence Iran was developing atomic weapons, it had failed to declare some past nuclear activities.

Solana said it was now up to Tehran to comply with an agreement it reached with three EU foreign ministers last month to halt uranium enrichment and open all its nuclear facilities to intrusive spot checks by U.N. inspectors.

"They have been honest. Let's see if they continue this all the way to the end," he told reporters before talks with Hassan Rohani, secretary of Iran's powerful National Security Council.

Asked if the board of the IAEA should report Tehran to the Security Council for concealing the scope of its nuclear program, which Washington says is a front for efforts to develop a bomb, Solana said he hoped not.

"I think that the decision that will be taken on the 20th will be less than that. It will not be a report to the United Nations, that is my hope. They (Iran) have to clearly manifest that they are doing what they committed to do," Solana said.

## DIFFERENCES WITH WASHINGTON

Rohani, a conservative cleric close to Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, also met the foreign ministers of Britain and France, who along with Germany negotiated last month's deal offering the prospect of sharing technology if Iran ends uranium enrichment and accepts tough spot inspections.

Both sides described the talks as constructive.

Rohani told reporters there were no grounds to take Tehran to the Security Council and he did not expect such a move.

"Iran's dossier on our peaceful nuclear program leaves no justification, no reason for our case to be sent to the Security Council. Therefore I have no concerns whatsoever," Rohani said.

Visiting EU headquarters on the same day as Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom, he said he had also raised "the danger posed by the arsenal of weapons of mass destruction of Israel."

Israel formally denies having atomic weapons but is widely believed by Western governments to be the only Middle East state with a nuclear arsenal.

EU foreign ministers are expected to discuss policy toward Iran with Secretary of State Colin Powell when he visits Brussels Tuesday.

The United States wants the 35-nation IAEA board to pass a resolution declaring Tehran in breach of its obligations under the treaty designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

But EU diplomats played down talk of differences, saying U.S. and European officials were seeking a consensus text.

An EU diplomat said Rohani's talks with British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin and a senior German official covered Iran's longer-term ties with "the wider West" -- code for the United States.

"What we are actively working toward is establishing this as a long-term process...to build further on Iran's relations with the wider West," the diplomat said.

Solana said Brussels and Washington shared the same aim, but the Europeans believed engagement was a better way to make Iran comply rather than threats.

The IAEA said in last week's report that the jury was still out on whether Iran had in the past tried in secret to develop atomic bombs as Washington says.

## Channel News Asia

### **Iran's nuclear programme 'threatens existence of Israel': Mossad chief**

17 November 2003

JERUSALEM : Iran's nuclear program poses the biggest threat to Israel's existence since the country's creation more than five decades ago, the chief of the Mossad overseas intelligence agency warned MPs.

In a rare appearance before the Knesset's foreign affairs and defence committee, Meir Dagan said Iran was now close to the "point of no return" in developing nuclear arms.

The program was "the biggest threat to Israel's existence since its creation" in 1948, he was quoted as saying Monday.

The dire warning comes just three days before the United Nation's nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), is to decide whether to haul the Islamic republic before the UN Security Council for hiding sensitive aspects of its nuclear programme.

During a visit to Washington last week, Israeli Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz also warned that Iran would reach a "point of no return" in its nuclear program within a year unless there were concerted efforts to stop it.

"Concentrated efforts are needed to delay, to stop or to prevent the Iranian nuclear program," he said in a speech.

The IAEA released a report last week accusing Iran of conducting two decades of covert nuclear activities, including plutonium manufacture, although it said there was no evidence as yet that it was trying to build a nuclear bomb.

The Security Council could slap punishing sanctions on Iran.

Since the collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq, Israel has come to regard the Islamic fundamentalist administration in Tehran as its number one enemy.

Iran's former foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati, now a top advisor to supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was quoted as saying last week that the mere existence of Israel is contrary to Tehran's national interests.

Iran refuses to recognise Israel and top officials frequently call for the destruction of the Jewish state. But Tehran denies giving material support to Palestinian militants who have waged a bloody campaign for the past three years against Israeli military occupation in their territories.

During a major military parade on September 22, the Islamic republic showed off six of its Shahab-3 missiles which were decorated with anti-Israeli and anti-US slogans, including one saying Israel should be "wiped off the map".

Israel has warned that the new ballistic missile represents a threat to the whole of the Middle East.

Israel, like the United States, accuses Iran of using a civil atomic energy program as a cover to develop nuclear weapons. It also accuses Iran of giving support to the Lebanese-based militia Hezbollah and Syria.

Israel's army chief of staff General Moshe Yaalon warned at the weekend that more action could be directed against Syria if it "ignores the message" of last month's air strike near Damascus aimed at an alleged Palestinian militant training facility.

He accused Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's regime of allowing Hezbollah to launch attacks against Israel from neighbouring Lebanon.

## Reuters

### **U.S. disputes Solana on Iran nuclear program**

17 November 2003

WASHINGTON, Nov 17 (Reuters) - The United States on Monday disputed a top European Union official's conclusion that Iran has been honest about its nuclear program, which Washington says is designed to make nuclear weapons.

European Union foreign policy chief Javier Solana said on Monday that Iran had been honest and should not be reported to the U.N. Security Council this week for potential sanctions.

"I wouldn't have gone quite as far," U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell said of Solana's remark in Brussels, Belgium.

"The Iranians have provided us a great deal of information. It confirms what the United States has been saying for some time ... -- that the Iranian nuclear development program was for more than just the production of power, that it had an intent to producing a nuclear weapon," Powell added after a meeting with German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer.

The State Department says a report on Iran by the U.N. nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency, was "impossible to believe."

The IAEA board of governors will discuss the report later this week.

Fischer said, "We will discuss it now in a constructive way inside the board of governors ... We are quite positive about the whole atmosphere, but we must be realists."

Powell added: "I don't think this matter is finished. I think we have to remain vigilant."

## Boston Globe

### **Diplomats deadlocked on Iran nuclear program**

US seeks ruling of noncompliance

By Brian Whitmore – 22 November 2003

VIENNA -- After two days of contentious talks, diplomats remained deadlocked yesterday over how to respond to Iran's alleged atomic weapons program with the United States saying the United Nations nuclear watchdog would weaken its credibility if it did not take a tougher stance against Tehran.

Washington is insisting that the International Atomic Energy Agency declare Iran in "noncompliance" of the 1970 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and report to the UN Security Council, which could impose sanctions.

Britain, France, and Germany are pushing a softer line, and are trying to formalize a deal they made with Tehran last month in which Iran would be implicitly forgiven past transgressions if they agree to tougher and more comprehensive inspections and voluntarily suspend the enrichment of uranium that can be used to make nuclear bombs.

The talks over Iran's nuclear weapons program adjourned yesterday to allow diplomats on the 35-member IAEA board of governors to consult with their capitals. They will resume on Wednesday.

Many here view the talks as a precedent-setting case of how the international community will handle future cases of nuclear proliferation.

"Iran's breaches of its obligations have been brazen and systematic," Kenneth Brill, the US ambassador to the UN mission in Vienna, said in a speech to delegates. "How the IAEA deals with the discovery of so much of Iran's hitherto entirely secret nuclear program will be a critical watershed for the global nuclear nonproliferation regime."

Iran admitted in late October that it had failed to report experiments with enriched uranium and reprocessed plutonium to the IAEA, which according to diplomats here is a clear violation of the nonproliferation treaty.

On Oct. 21, the foreign ministers of Germany, France, and Britain won key concessions from Iran, including an agreement to voluntarily suspend uranium enrichment and to allow more stringent, snap IAEA inspections.

Implicit in the agreement, officials here say, was a deal that Iran would neither be declared in noncompliance with the nonproliferation treaty nor reported to the Security Council.

The trans-Atlantic rift broke out publicly in Brussels earlier this week when Secretary of State Colin L. Powell expressed concern that a draft IAEA resolution circulated by Britain, Germany, and France was too weak and failed to declare Iran in violation of the nonproliferation treaty.

Several countries, including Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand, Spain, and the Netherlands, joined Washington in calling for a tougher resolution; and diplomats worked furiously this week to insert tougher language in the draft resolution.

By late Thursday night, diplomats said a deal was in the works that would say the IAEA "strongly deplores Iran's past breaches," but stopped short of sending the matter to the Security Council. But US officials said yesterday the language was not tough enough, and continued to insist that Iran be declared in noncompliance and brought before the council.

US officials argue that if Iran were allowed to get away without a finding of noncompliance, it would set a dangerous precedent.

"The rubber meets the road on the nonproliferation treaty right now at this meeting in Vienna," a US official said. "People are making calculations based on this, people in laboratories."

But Germany, France, and Britain are concerned that punishing Iran when it is beginning to cooperate and come clean on its nuclear program could cause Tehran to cease its new openness, and possibly even withdraw from the nonproliferation treaty.

Iran has been cooperating fully with the IAEA since its Oct. 21 agreement with the three European nations. But Ali Akbar Salehi, Iran's representative to the IAEA, raised the stakes yesterday by suggesting that Tehran would not sign on to a tough new inspections regime if they were declared in noncompliance or reported to the Security Council. A Western diplomat said Iran was "trying to leverage everything they can" to influence the outcome of the talks.

"This is not surprising, but it isn't acceptable," Brill said after yesterday's meeting adjourned.

During yesterday's contentious meeting, Brill also sparred verbally with the IAEA director, Mohamed ElBaradei, over a report in which the agency said there was no evidence that Iran had a nuclear weapons program.

"It will take some time to overcome the damage to the agency's credibility by this highly unfortunate and misleading 'no evidence' turn of phrase," Brill told delegates.

## Guardian

### **Americans attack EU leniency on Iran**

By Ian Traynor – 22 November 2003

The US staged a bitter attack on leading European nations and the UN's nuclear watchdog yesterday over their reluctance to declare Iran in breach of its international nuclear obligations.

At a board meeting of the UN's international atomic energy agency in Vienna, the US ambassador, Kenneth Brill, directly accused Iran of a covert nuclear bomb programme.

He then charged Britain, Germany, and France with declining to name Iran as non-compliant with international treaties even though they agreed privately with the Americans.

Mr Brill lambasted Mohamed ElBaradei, the IAEA chief, for allegedly jeopardising the agency's credibility by stating that there was no evidence of a secret Iranian bomb plot. A furious Dr ElBaradei rejected the US criticism as "disingenuous".

The attack from the Americans highlighted the depth of the transatlantic differences that have surfaced for the first time in months of efforts to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue.

It also reflected US frustration at its failure to get its way at the meeting of the 35-strong IAEA board, and left Iran, for the time being, as the diplomatic winner at the tense conference.

Despite days of haggling over wording of a resolution that should have been tabled on Thursday and then yesterday, diplomats abandoned efforts to come up with a compromise formula that would satisfy the US as well as the resolution drafters, Britain, Germany, and France.

The meeting is to resume next Wednesday in the hope of being presented with a resolution acceptable to all.

But Iran made it plain that the EU troika had promised Tehran that Iran would not be found in non-compliance with its commitments to the IAEA and also made its agreement to intrusive inspection rights by the nuclear agency conditional on a resolution acceptable to Tehran. Despite reports on Thursday, when the



meeting opened, that the Americans and the Europeans were bridging their differences and were close to an agreed response to revelations that Tehran has been concealing its nuclear activities for 18 years, the sides were still far apart yesterday.

The transatlantic rift opened up this week for the first time since the international community started tackling the Iranian crisis last June and despite efforts to bridge the differences at the Blair-Bush summit in London.

While the Americans push for international action against Iran, Britain and the Europeans are prepared to let bygones be bygones provided the Iranians are henceforth on their best behaviour. While Britain was prepared to give Iran the benefit of the doubt over its past transgressions, the Americans insisted that to allow the Iranians to get away with years of "a cynical strategy of denial, delay, and deception" would send all the wrong signals to other countries bent on clandestine efforts at nuclear proliferation.

The British ambassador to the IAEA, Peter Jenkins, said the immediate priority was to take advantage of Iran's "new approach" of disclosing the details of its nuclear programmes and allowing unfettered access for the inspectors.

He voiced no suspicion of a bomb project and said he assumed that a dossier supplied by Iran on its nuclear programmes was complete.

That was in stark contrast to the US ambassador who asserted that no one knew if the Iranian information was complete and correct. "Iran has clearly been in non-compliance with its obligations," said Mr Brill. The recent disclosure by Dr ElBaradei that Iran had extracted plutonium left only one conclusion possible - "the pursuit of nuclear weapons".

The British suggested that any future findings of Iranian failures or non-cooperation with the agency should result in reporting Tehran to the UN security council, a procedure that may entail imposing sanctions on Iran.

The Americans want immediate resort to the security council, although they are said to have accepted there is no consensus for such a step.

The US ambassador described the British and European arguments for a softer line towards Tehran as worrisome. Dr ElBaradei's finding in a report a fortnight ago that there was no evidence of an Iranian bomb programme was "misleading and unfortunate."

He added: "It will take time to overcome the damage caused to the agency's credibility."

## Reuters

### **Diplomats: Iran Nuke Resolution Too Weak for U.S.**

24 November 2003

VIENNA (Reuters) - France, Germany and Britain on Monday circulated a third draft of a U.N. nuclear resolution condemning Iran's 18-year concealment of parts of its atomic program, but diplomats said it was too weak for Washington.

The U.N. International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) 35-member Board of Governors Friday adjourned talks until Wednesday, to give diplomats a chance to revise a resolution drafted by the three European states condemning Iran's concealment of atomic research which could be arms-related.

The new draft, obtained in full by Reuters, calls for IAEA's governing board to "meet immediately to consider all options at its disposal" if the IAEA uncovers any further violations of Tehran's international non-proliferation obligations.

However, Western diplomats told Reuters U.S. negotiators still want a much stronger "trigger clause" that warns Iran clearly that if it has any more atomic secrets it will be reported to the U.N. Security Council for possible sanctions.

The wording of this clause is one of the main sticking points in the negotiations, diplomats said.

The draft also "strongly deplores Iran's past failures and breaches of its obligation to comply with ... its Safeguards Agreement" under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It notes "with the gravest concern that Iran enriched uranium and separated plutonium in undeclared facilities, in the absence of IAEA safeguards."

## **US and EU in deal over Iran nuclear crisis**

By Ian Traynor – 25 November 2003

The US and the three leading EU nations reached a deal last night threatening Iran with instant referral to the UN security council if it is found in further breach of its international nuclear obligations.

After a week of the worst transatlantic row so far over the Iranian nuclear crisis and repeated failed attempts to agree a common formula on how to respond to the issue, a resolution drafted by Britain, Germany and France was presented to the board of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna late last night, a form of words that should be adopted at a board meeting in Vienna tomorrow.

The statement was to have been issued last week, but the board meeting was adjourned last Thursday because of the deep differences between Washington and the Europeans. Frantic efforts to resolve the impasse failed and the meeting was postponed until tomorrow.

While the compromise draft tabled last night omits to mention the UN security council or the key word "non-compliance", it does contain a legalistic formulation that is understood, certainly by the Americans, to trigger automatic referral to the council if there is future evidence of Iranian "wrongdoing." "There could still be a huge dogfight," said a diplomat. "But on future wrongdoing, the board will meet immediately. This is something that everyone has agreed to."

Last night's resolution was the third European attempt to present a form of words that could satisfy the tough US position. The IAEA chief, Mohammed ElBaradei, has found that the Iranians have been in breach of their nuclear obligations for 18 years, enabling the Americans to insist that Tehran should be reported to the security council in New York.

But last month in Tehran the EU troika sought to defuse the crisis by, among other things, assuring the Iranians that they would not be reported to the security council.

The IAEA board has met three times since June to ponder its response to increasingly graphic evidence of an alleged covert nuclear bomb programme in Iran and over the past week the transatlantic gulf over how to react has yawned wide, with Britain siding with the continental Europeans against the Americans.

The compromise in effect lets Iran's bygones be bygones, the European preference, while pledging a quick and tough reaction to any future misconduct, the US demand.

## BERICHTEN

### Bulletin of Atomic Scientists

#### **Israeli nuclear forces, 2002**

By Robert S. Norris – September/October 2002

[...] A senior Israeli defense official confirmed that *Dolphin*-class subs carry modified U.S. Harpoon antiship missiles. Making them nuclearcapable would require an Israelideveloped nuclear warhead and guidance kit for land-attack targets. It is unknown whether the missiles have that modification. [...]

### Der Spiegel

#### **Deutsche U-Boote zu Atomwaffenträgern umgebaut**

11 Oktober 2003

Drastische Verschärfung der Situation im Nahen Osten: Israel hat laut Angaben aus US-Kreisen seine von Deutschland gelieferten U-Boote zu Abschussrampen für Atomraketen ausgebaut. Gleichzeitig lässt die Regierung Scharon Pläne für einen Angriff auf iranische Atomanlagen ausarbeiten.

Tel Aviv - Sie waren als Geschenk der Deutschen an die bedrängten Israelis gedacht: Drei U-Boote der "Delphin"-Klasse versprach Bundeskanzler Helmut Kohl 1991 nach dem Golfkrieg der Regierung in Tel Aviv. Die Kieler Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft bekamen den Bauauftrag, ausgerüstet wurden sie von den Thyssen Nordseewerken. Die Lieferung kostete den Steuerzahler Hunderte von Millionen Mark und blieb stets umstritten.

Nun mehren sich die Hinweise darauf, dass Israel die deutschen U-Boote zu Unterwasserrampen für Atomraketen ausgebaut hat. Nach einem Bericht der US-Zeitung "Los Angeles Times", die sich auf amerikanische und israelische Regierungskreise beruft, haben die Militärs die amerikanischen "Harpoon"-Raketen der Tauchboote mit atomaren Sprengköpfen bestückt.

Sollte sich der Bericht bewahrheiten, werden die Friedensbemühungen im Nahen Osten auf einen Schlag drastisch erschwert. Die Nachricht kommt zu einer Zeit, in der Amerikaner und Israelis mit Macht die Nuklear-Rüstung in der arabischen Welt unterbinden wollen. Fast täglich droht die US-Regierung dem Iran wegen seiner Atompläne.

Nach Recherchen des SPIEGEL erhielt eine Spezialeinheit des Geheimdienstes Mossad kürzlich sogar den Auftrag, Pläne zur Zerstörung iranischer Atomanlagen auszuarbeiten. Danach sehen die in Jerusalem vorgelegten Szenarien vor, dass etwa ein halbes Dutzend Ziele von F-16-Kampfbombern "gleichzeitig sowie vollständig" zerstört werden müssten - eine Aktion, die nach Einschätzung des Mossad zwar heikel, aber "technisch zu bewältigen" ist.

#### **Mini-Atombombe im Sprengkopf**

Schon seit einigen Jahren hatten Rüstungs-Experten vor den Atomplänen der Israelis für ihre U-Boote gewarnt. Eine parlamentarische Anfrage, ob eine Umrüstung für den Nukleareinsatz Grund sei für den Einbau übergroßer 650-Millimeter-Torpedorohre statt der üblichen 533 Millimeter, hatte das deutsche Verteidigungsministerium nur sybillinisch beantwortet: "Die Bundesregierung kann letztlich keine Bestückung ausschließen."

Die Tauchboote können länger als vier Wochen und weiter als 15.000 Kilometer fahren, werden mit zehn Torpedos und "Harpoon"-Marschflugkörpern bestückt. Diese rund 130 Kilometer weit reichenden Anti-Schiffsflugkörper hat, so berichtet die "Los Angeles Times", die israelische Marine offenbar mit Atomsprengköpfen versehen und zum Einsatz gegen Landziele umgerüstet. Nach Expertenmeinung musste sie dafür die Atmowaffe so verkleinern, dass sie in den "Harpoon"-Sprengkopf passt. Weiterhin sei das Steuerungsprogramm, das den Marschflugkörper sonst dicht an der Wasseroberfläche entlangleitet, auf Landbetrieb umgestellt worden.

Seit der Iran Anfang der neunziger Jahre etliche Langstreckenraketen in Stellung gebracht hat, bemüht sich die israelische Armee, ihr Atomwaffen-Arsenal auf See zu verlegen und so aus der Schusslinie seiner Gegner zu bringen. Durch die Umrüstung der zur Jahrtausendwende gelieferten Schwimmkörper ist Israel jetzt als

einziges Land im Nahen Osten in der Lage, Atomwaffen vom Boden, aus der Luft und von See aus einzusetzen.

### **Die Amerikaner sehen und schweigen**

Insgesamt soll Israel 100 bis 200 hoch moderne atomare Waffen besitzen, hat das jedoch offiziell nie zugegeben. Washington akzeptiert diesen Zustand seit 1969 und hat Israel nie unter Druck gesetzt, den internationalen Atomwaffen-Sperrvertrag zu unterzeichnen. "Wir tolerieren Atomwaffen in Israel aus den gleichen Gründen, aus dem wir sie in Großbritannien und Frankreich tolerieren", sagte ein hoher amerikanischer Regierungsbeamter der "Los Angeles Times". "Wir sehen Israel nicht als Bedrohung."

In der Vergangenheit hatte die US-Regierung wiederholt Informationen über das israelische Atomprogramm zurückgehalten, um ihren wichtigsten Verbündeten im Nahen Osten zu schützen. So wurde unter Präsident Bill Clinton der Verkauf detaillierter amerikanischer Satelliten-Aufnahmen verhindert, um keine Informationen über Israels einzigen Atomreaktor in Dimona sowie andere potentielle Ziele preiszugeben.

Arabische Diplomaten und Vertreter der Uno bemängeln, dass die Geheimniskrämerei Israels um seine Nuklearwaffen sowie das Schweigen der USA bei den arabischen Staaten den Wunsch verstärkt hätten, eigene Atomwaffen zu produzieren.

"Das Vorhandensein eines Atomprogramms in der Region, das nicht unter internationaler Aufsicht steht, ermuntert andere Länder dazu, Massenvernichtungswaffen zu entwickeln", sagte Nabil Fahmy, der ägyptische Botschafter in den USA der "Los Angeles Times". Jeder zukünftige Konflikt werde dadurch gefährlicher.

### Associated Press

#### **Experts Dismiss Israel Nuclear Report**

By Peter Enav – 13 October 2003

JERUSALEM - Israeli and foreign defense experts Sunday dismissed a report that Israel had modified submarine-based missiles to carry nuclear warheads, saying such an alteration was technically impossible.

The Los Angeles Times reported in Sunday editions that Israel had modified some of its nuclear warheads to fit U.S.-made Harpoon cruise missiles and upgraded the missiles so they could hit targets on land in addition to maritime ones. The article quoted two U.S. officials and one Israeli official, all speaking on condition of anonymity.

Israel made the modifications in response to Iran's alleged nuclear ambitions, the Times reported. Both the United States and Israel view Iran as an enemy and say it is close to developing nuclear weapons that might be used against Israeli targets.

Former Israeli Deputy Defense Minister Efraim Sneh called the assertion that Israel had made the Harpoon nuclear impossible.

"Anyone with even the slightest understanding of missiles knows that the Harpoon can never be used to carry nuclear warheads," Sneh told Army Radio. "Not even (Israel's) extraordinarily talented engineers and its sophisticated defense industries can transform the Harpoon into a missile capable of doing this. It's simply impossible."

Ted Hooton, editor of Jane's Naval Weapon Systems in London, echoed Sneh's assessment, saying problems with payload weight would put the Harpoon out of balance, limiting its range and accuracy.

"It seems to me that a nuclear weapon, which is extremely dense, would make the Harpoon nose heavy and significantly reduce its range — in any event well below the 90 miles it is designed for," Hooton said.

While Israel has never acknowledged it has nuclear weapons of its own, Israeli and foreign experts believe it possesses 100-200 nuclear devices and has the capability to deliver them via American-made F-15 and F-16 warplanes and the Jericho II missile, based on a prototype Israel developed with France in the 1960s.

The ability to deliver nuclear weapons from submarines would significantly enhance Israel's reported nuclear deterrent, by shielding the launch platform from all but the most sophisticated countermeasures. According to the Times story, Israel would use Dolphin class diesel-powered submarines acquired from Germany to launch the nuclear-armed Harpoon missiles. Israel has three such submarines in its arsenal.

A report Sunday in the German weekly Der Spiegel said Israel had identified six sites where Iran was allegedly developing nuclear weapons, most believed to be inland.

Der Spiegel reported that Israel's Mossad intelligence agency was developing a plan to attack the alleged nuclear weapons sites in Iran. Iran acknowledges that it has a nuclear development program, but says it is designed only to generate electricity.

## Dar al Hayat

### **Mossad Involved In Leaks On Israel's Plan To Attack Iranian Nuclear Plants**

By Asaad Telhami – 16 October 2003

Major Israeli commentators have confirmed that high-ranking Mossad officials are responsible for the proliferation of reports that have appeared over the past two days in a number of foreign newspapers, about Israel's plan to carry out "a decisive preemptive strike" against Iranian nuclear plants, and about modifications operated by the Israeli Navy on American ballistic missiles, allowing them to launch nuclear heads from submarines. The commentators have maintained that the leaks are designed to prompt the international community to exert strong pressure on Tehran to have it cease its nuclear program, which Israel considers as "the biggest threat to its existence." They explained that Israel's army staff prefers to leak information on its nuclear capacity to the foreign media rather than announce it officially, in a bid to avoid having to reveal the nuclear arsenal they own.

According to the Los Angeles Times and the British weekly Observer, which have both American and Israeli sources, Israel has modified some nuclear heads so that they could fit ballistic missiles of the Harpoon type, used on a wider range, and that they would be carried over three "Dolphin" submarines, which run on diesel, which were delivered by Germany in the late 1990s.

London's weekly Observer reported yesterday that American and Israeli officials have admitted that America and Israel were cooperating to spread Harpoon missiles, which come with nuclear warheads in an Israeli fleet of Dolphin submarines, "a fact that gives the only nuclear power in the Middle East the ability to strike any of its neighboring Arab countries." The paper added that this fact was revealed simultaneously with an Israeli declaration saying that those states harboring terrorists are "legitimate targets," which came in response to Syria's announcement of its right to defend itself in case Israel attacked its territories one more time.

According to Israeli officials and others in the Bush administration who were interviewed by the Los Angeles Times, the ability to launch the missiles in the sea allows Israel to target Iran easily in case the Iranians developed their nuclear weapons.

These reports were published at the same time that the German newspaper Der Spiegel reported that the Mossad received months earlier, instructions from Israel's Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to draw a plan for striking six Iranian nuclear sites. Yossi Melman, the Ha'aretz military commentator, believes that this simultaneity is not a coincidence, but falls within Israeli attempts to mount the international public opinion against the Iranian nuclear project and to prevent Iran from reaching the point of no return in producing enriched uranium. He noted that Israel is aware of the fact that the mission is not easy and that it is much more complicated than the attack it made on the nuclear reactor in Iraq two decades ago, considering Iran's attack capacity and the fact that it owns developed missiles and chemical weapons, not to mention that the Iranian leadership would not hesitate to respond to any Israeli attack.

As for Aluf Benn, Ha'aretz political commentator, he wrote that the Mossad's priority mission has become to obstruct the development of the Iranian nuclear armament, and that the organization views the foreign media as an important tool in this effort. Hence, it leaks information to the press, in a bid to mount the international public opinion to exert greater pressure on Iran. Benn mentions that the Washington Post had reported over a year ago that Israel had provided its submarines with nuclear missiles and that it had already tested them.

## Reuters

### **Report: Berlin rejects Israeli request for submarines**

25 November 2003

BERLIN - The German government declined to comment Monday on a magazine report that the country has decided not to export more submarines to Israel for fear they could be armed with nuclear warheads.

Without citing its sources, Germany's Focus weekly magazine reported on Sunday that the government had rejected a request by Israel for two Dolphin submarines after it gave the country three new submarines almost free of charge in the late 1990s.

The magazine said German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and his European Union partners were worried the craft could be armed with nuclear warheads and wanted to stop a potential arms race in the Middle East.

Asked about the report at a regular government news conference, the chief German government spokesman and an Economics Ministry spokeswoman both declined to comment.

Last month, the Los Angeles Times reported that Israel had modified U.S.-made Harpoon cruise missiles so it could launch nuclear warheads from submarines. Israel is regarded as the only nuclear power in the Middle East.

The U.S. State Department and Pentagon declined to comment on the October report, as did an Israeli military spokesman, in line with that nation's policy of refusing to say if it has nuclear weapons.

According to a story posted on the Web site of the LA Times, U.S. officials disclosed the information as a warning to Israel's enemies amid heightened tensions in the region and concern over Iran's atomic program.

The U.S. officials told the newspaper that Israel modified nuclear warheads to fit the widely used Harpoon cruise missile. They would be carried on three diesel-powered submarines delivered by a German builder at the end of the last decade.

# NOORD-KOREA

## DOCUMENTEN

### White House

#### **Joint Statement Between the United States and the Republic of Korea**

20 October 2003

On October 20, 2003, President George W. Bush of the United States of America and President Roh Moo-hyun of the Republic of Korea held a summit meeting in Bangkok, Thailand. At the meeting, the two Presidents noted with satisfaction that there has been smooth progress in building a comprehensive and dynamic alliance relationship between the two countries as declared in the Joint Statement adopted on May 14. In addition, the two Presidents had a broad and sincere exchange of views on various issues between the two countries, including North Korea's nuclear issue, Iraq reconstruction, and the issue of upgrading the U.S.-ROK alliance.

Regarding the U.S. request for the dispatch of additional troops to Iraq, President Roh explained that as a result of conducting a comprehensive review of the overall situation, including the importance of the U.S.-ROK alliance and national interest, the ROK government has decided to dispatch additional troops to Iraq so as to provide assistance for a prompt establishment of peace and reconstruction in Iraq. President Roh stated that the size, type and form of the troops as well as the timing of the dispatch will be decided by taking into account public opinion, the result of the survey teams and the characteristics and capability of the Korean military forces. President Bush expressed respect and gratitude to President Roh for making the principled determination to dispatch troops. President Bush also stated that the ROK's dispatch of troops to Iraq will not only further strengthen the U.S.-ROK alliance and contribute to the reconstruction and stabilization of Iraq, but also will serve as an opportunity to increase the ROK's prestige in the international community.

President Bush and President Roh reconfirmed the principles agreed upon in their summit meeting in May, that they will not tolerate nuclear weapons in North Korea and that they are committed to a peaceful resolution of the issue. The leaders noted the importance of the Six Party talks for achieving the goal of the complete, verifiable and irreversible elimination of North Korea's nuclear weapons programs. The two Presidents shared the view that it is desirable to hold the next round of the talks at an early date and to make concrete progress. President Bush reiterated that the U.S. has no intention of invading North Korea and that the U.S. expects North Korea to end its nuclear weapons ambitions. President Bush explained how security assurances might be provided within the multilateral context, conditioned on North Korea's progress in nuclear dismantlement. President Roh expressed appreciation for President Bush's efforts toward resolving the issue. The two Presidents agreed to study ways and means to seek progress in the next round of the talks. The two Presidents also urged North Korea to respond positively to the other parties' diplomatic efforts and to refrain from any action which would exacerbate the situation.

President Bush and President Roh noted that the strong alliance between the ROK and the U.S. and the presence of US Forces Korea have made great contributions to peace and stability on the Korean peninsula as well as in Northeast Asia. The two Presidents agreed to pursue the relocation of USFK bases in careful consideration of the security environment on the Korean peninsula.

### US State Department

#### **What US Administration officials are saying**

Excerpts from statements made by U.S. Administration officials about North Korea – November 2003

**November 3, 2003**

**State Department Deputy Spokesman Adam Ereli**

#### **Daily Press Briefing**

QUESTION: When Hwang Jeong-Yop was visiting last week, security seemed quite tight around him. I was wondering, in his private meetings with State Department officials, were South Korean security service agents present?

MR. ERELI: I don't believe so. I think that people providing security in this building were Diplomatic Security personnel, as is customary. Yes.

QUESTION: Without -- I mean, I'm sure you're not going to want to talk about exactly what he told you, but you said -- Richard said last week that you wanted to have an opportunity to hear from him, and then perhaps make a judgment.

But was there anything in his meetings in the Administration that caused you to feel differently about your current course with North Korea? Was there anything that made you feel that the situation with North Korea was more urgent than you originally thought it was?

MR. ERELI: Yes, our meetings with this North Korean, as Ambassador Boucher said, helped inform our understanding of the North Korean regime, a regime of which there is very little known, and about which a former insider can provide very useful insights. That was the value of our meetings with him.

As a result of those meetings, we continue to believe that a multilateral diplomatic solution to the problem of a nuclear Korean Peninsula remains the best course and we are committed to moving forward through six-party talks to achieving the complete, verifiable and irreversible end to North Korea's nuclear program.

QUESTION: On North Korea. There is a German member of parliament who has just come out of North Korea and met some senior officials and said a few things about what their position is. Did you see those remarks, and did you see anything new in those remarks? Does it change anything? Perhaps you haven't had a chance to see them.

MR. ERELI: I have not seen those remarks, but I would just reiterate what I just said, which is that our policy and approach remains consistent.

QUESTION: Over the weekend, have you heard anything from Chinese side on the North Korea and China talk last week?

MR. ERELI: I don't have anything to report.

### **November 4, 2003**

#### **State Department Deputy Spokesman Adam Ereli**

#### **Daily Press Briefing**

Q Okay. On North Korea. Do you have an update on the lack of information yesterday on this informal KEDO meeting? It now appears that the U.S. will formally propose to halt all KEDO instead of just suspend, possibly forever?

MR. ERELI: What I can tell you about the KEDO meeting that I couldn't tell you yesterday is that the KEDO Executive Board, consisting of the United States, South Korea, Japan and the EU, began its meeting yesterday afternoon in New York and will conclude later today. The Executive Board is considering the future of the light-water reactor project in North Korea. The United States is being represented by Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Donald Keyser.

I don't have anything specific to report to you on the outcome or procedures of the -- deliberations of the meeting. Obviously, we've made it clear that the KEDO Executive -- it is our position that the KEDO Executive Board should agree to formally stop work on the light-water reactor project. But suspension of that project is a matter for the KEDO Executive Board to decide.

Q Would you remind of us of the thinking about that? That they have not keep their half or their part of the bargain, or what?

MR. ERELI: Yes

Q Well, what's the alternative? The whole premise of the light-water reactor was that it was a substitute for something far more ominous. You don't want to push them back down a road you don't want them to go, do you?

MR. ERELI: No, we want them to -- you know, our focus is on getting verifiable, irreversible and complete end to Korea's nuclear program, and that the context in which the light-water reactor project was decided no longer obtains, given subsequent developments.

Q On that, could you just clarify "stop"? "Stop" is a word that doesn't necessarily mean abandon for all time; it could just mean halt or temporarily suspend. What is your -- do you want them to suspend it? Do you want them to stop it?

MR. ERELI: I'll stick to what I said: to formally stop work on the light-water reactor project.

Q Do you happen to know how far along it is?

MR. ERELI: I asked, actually. And I think there's some -- laying of concrete infrastructure has begun. But I can't get into more -- I don't have more detail than that.

Q Can you just clarify. You say you don't know whether that's a decision that will be taken at this meeting, or you just don't know what the U.S. was going to present at the meeting?

MR. ERELI: No, I don't know what decision will be taken at the meeting.

Q But there will be a decision on this taken at the end of the -- by the end of the meeting?



MR. ERELI: I don't know that either. All I know is that our position is that we think work should formally stop on the project, but that it's -- you know, a board decision -- that is a board decision to make. Whether they will make it today, and if they do, on what terms, that's -- it's too early to say.

Q Can you go a little further on that and say that you are asking the board or that they formally endorse an end to work on the project? Is that what you're arguing in New York yesterday and today?

MR. ERELI: I will restate our position, which is that the KEDO Executive Board should agree to formally stop work on the light-water reactor project....

Q ... What is the up-to-the-minute analysis at the State Department of the likelihood of talks being resumed?

MR. ERELI: Six-party talks?

Q Yeah.

MR. ERELI: The up-to-the-minute analysis at the State Department is that we are hopeful that talks could resume soon. And this is something that we are engaged in with all parties to the talks to facilitate.

**November 5, 2003**

**Secretary of State Colin L. Powell**

**Remarks at the Conference on China-U.S. Relations**

**Texas A & M University and**

**The George Bush School of Government and Public Service**

**College Station, Texas**

North Korea is a vivid example of what we do together and how the United States and China are cooperating and working together in ways that would have been unthinkable just a few years ago. In the case of North Korea and its nuclear weapons ambitions and programs, we are cooperating to send a concerted message to the leadership in Pyongyang that Pyongyang must comply with its international commitments, it must terminate its nuclear weapons programs, promptly, verifiably and irreversibly. We do not wish to see a nuclearized Korean Peninsula.

China hosted and fully participated in the Six Party Talks that were held in Beijing this past August. And China continues to play an important role in trying to bring North Korea into a serious diplomatic process.

In the Six-Party Talks, all of the regional stakeholders including our allies -- Japan and the Republic of Korea, include Russia as well -- are at the table putting our common interests forward.

Many said it wouldn't work. Many said it couldn't be done. Many said that President Bush should abandon the desire for a multi-party arrangement and just talk bilaterally with the North Koreans. They said North Korea would never agree to anything else and that China would not play a role in expanding the dialogue. But they were wrong. China did play a role

In March of this year I met with my Chinese Foreign Minister counterpart, at that time Foreign Minister Tang, and I reinforced President Bush's message that China needed to rise to its responsibilities in dealing with this regional problem. The very next day the Vice Premier, who is here with us today, flew to North Korea and delivered that message, that there would be no alternative to multilateral talks in which all countries of the region would be fully involved, China included. I want to thank the Vice Premier again for the important contribution that he made in bringing those talks about.

A China that works constructively with us in this manner, along with other regional partners such as Japan, the Republic of Korea, Russia, that is a China that inspires confidence in its own people and gains trust from the rest of the world.

As was mentioned earlier in Bangkok just a few weeks ago at the APEC summit, President Bush presented to President Hu his latest ideas on how we could move the negotiations forward with the North Koreans. In this case, then following that meeting, National People's Congress Chairman Mr. Wu went to Pyongyang and discussed it with the North Koreans. He brought back reaffirmation that the North Koreans were interested, in principle, in moving forward once again to Six-Party Talks, where can exchange views, present new ideas. We know what needs to be done. The North Koreans need to stop their program. The North Koreans are looking to us and to the other nations in the region for security assurances. I believe strongly and am confident that a diplomatic solution is possible if we continue with this multi-party set of discussions and all parties come to the table looking for a solution....

Another area where there are concerns and differences has to do with proliferation. We are pleased with China's recent cooperation with us to block the export of chemicals that could have been used in North Korea's weapons programs. The Chinese stopped it. And our very success in that particular case, however, has now set a much higher standard for our cooperation. It is in China's interest and the world's interest for China to enforce vigorously its own export controls and to exercise the most stringent oversight of its companies who are involved in this kind of trade.

**November 6, 2003**

**State Department Deputy Spokesman Adam Erel**

**Daily Press Briefing**

Q ... North Korea now is talking about having a nuclear capability powerful enough to deter any U.S. attack. I guess that's not really surprising since they normally talk about using their weapons aggressively and not just defensively. But do you have any response to this latest bluster? And also, anything to report on the North Korea talks front?

MR. ERELI: I would repeat what we've said at the highest levels of this government, including by the president of the United States most recently in Asia: We have no intention of attacking North Korea.

Q Anything on talks?

MR. ERELI: On talks? Not really. As we said yesterday, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi will be in -- is in town today. He will be meeting with Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Jim Kelly. And he will be meeting with the secretary tomorrow, I believe....

Q According to media reports, DPRK (Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea) said today the stopping of the white-water reactor project would be a total destruction on the agreement reached between DPRK and the United States, and therefore, DPRK would take all necessary measures as a result of that. Is there any reaction from the State Department on this?

MR. ERELI: Yeah. I would say that the reason -- you know, it's important to remember that the reason all of this is happening is because North Korea violated its commitments under the agreed framework. That's what started this whole thing. And under those agreements, North Korea is obligated to allow the safe removal of equipment from the site. KEDO has reminded North Korea of its obligations in this regard, and we expect it to comply.

Q But North Korea said that it would prohibit any move -- sort of prohibit the equipment there on the project to be moved away from North Korea.

MR. ERELI: Right. And, you know, we've made clear that we believe it has an obligation under the agreement to allow the safe removal of that equipment. I wouldn't want to speculate about how KEDO would respond to a refusal to abide by those obligations. It would be up to the KEDO board to determine what actions would be appropriate.

Q Do you have any concern that this would be a barrier for another round of six-party talks? The Chinese vice foreign minister is right now in town. Do you think this issue might be (starting ?) up in the talks?

MR. ERELI: Obviously, the issue of the next round of six-party talks will be something that's discussed. I wouldn't want to speculate on, you know, how one set of -- one set of events affect another. Our point is that the six-party talks are the mechanism that we are pursuing to seek a peaceful end to North Korea's nuclear weapons program. China is actively involved in working to set up another round of those talks, and we support those efforts and will continue to support those efforts.

Q (Off mike) -- might be up to the executive board of KEDO, but could you tell me your position on the sending of Mr. Kartman, executive director, to North Korea to solve this kind of a problem?

MR. ERELI: Again, I think that's a KEDO matter and a KEDO decision....

We're a member of the board, so he would -- he's going to be doing it with the full support -- if he does it, it would be with the support of the board.

**November 7, 2003**

**State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher**

**Daily Press Briefing**

QUESTION: ... Downstairs, Vice Foreign Minister Wang said that preparations have started now on arranging the six-party talks, and Assistant Secretary Kelly said you'd be explaining that....

MR. BOUCHER: All right. We had -- the Secretary had fairly extensive discussions this morning with Vice Foreign Minister Wang. I think the discussions lasted 45 minutes or so....

The -- so the Secretary had fairly extensive discussions today with Vice Foreign Minister Wang about North Korea and about six-party talks. Vice Foreign Minister Wang was in North Korea with Chinese leaders recently and talked about where we stand after those discussions.

The -- I would say that, having discussed this fairly extensively with Vice Foreign Minister Wang, the Secretary is encouraged at the prospect of new talks, encouraged at the possibilities of pursuing this route to reach a peaceful resolution of the problems created by North Korea's nuclear weapons programs.

We are optimistic now that another round can be held, and the Chinese are indeed working on putting that together as a result of their discussions in North Korea and also as a result of the discussions we had with them here.

Vice Foreign Minister Wang met extensively with Assistant Secretary Kelly; he's met with the Secretary; I think he sees our Director of Policy Planning today, Mitchell Reiss, and is also having meetings at the Pentagon. So he will have a full discussion with us here in the United States. We are working with the parties that participate in these talks, including, obviously, the Chinese on how to proceed and what the next round might be able to address.

We discussed with the Chinese today, how to make progress at another round of talks in a way that brings -- how to make progress in the talks towards the goal of ending North Korea's nuclear weapons programs, which have caused so much difficulty and consternation. And in that context, we talked about the President's statement in Bangkok and the willingness of the United States to provide security assurances in a multilateral setting, but also in writing.

QUESTION: But the public statements by North Korea have been pretty belligerent again with regard to the KEDO equipment, and so on; yet, you're saying that we're optimistic now. You make it -- you make it sound like there is definitely something that happened in these meetings with Mr. Wang that made it -- that made you definitely more optimistic.

MR. BOUCHER: Well, he brought us the readout of their discussions with North Korea. And as you know, the Chinese reported while they were in North Korea that the North Koreans had agreed to come back to talks. And so, having discussed the prospect with the Chinese, we feel confident, as they do, that another round can be put together.

QUESTION: And there was some kind of go ahead given by Powell that wasn't -- wasn't there before, that, yes, after -- after hearing this go forward? Because he came out and said, "I only want to make this one point, and that is that we have now started on this six-party talk."

MR. BOUCHER: Yes. The Chinese have been, obviously, working on putting together the next round of six-party talks. They've had the willingness of the United States to pursue this route for some time now. I think you remember during Jim Kelley's visit, last visit to the region -- maybe it wasn't even the last one -- he said in Tokyo, we'd be ready to go at a fairly early time.

So having had, for a long time, United States willingness to go back to six party talks, it appears that during their recent visit they got the willingness of the North Koreans to go back to talks; and now the Chinese are trying to put together another round.

QUESTION: Richard, apart from the North Korean willingness, are there any other elements in this equation that make you confident that another round can be put together? What exactly has changed other than that? Are there any other elements that are falling into place?

MR. BOUCHER: I wouldn't -- no -- I wouldn't describe any particular breakthroughs on substance. We're discussing how to address the substance of a matter which is an end to North Korea's nuclear weapons programs, and in that context how the United States might provide, how the United States and other countries involved -- that's the multilateral group involved -- could provide other with security assurances.

But the point is to get to another round to do that, the parties have to be willing to go there. And the United States has been willing to go, and now it appears the North Koreans are willing to go. All I expressed encouragement and optimism about the actual convening of another round of talks, not yet at the point where I'd predict anything about what we could accomplish at those talks.

QUESTION: The document on -- which contains multilateral security assurances, are you close to drafting such a thing? Is that --

MR. BOUCHER: We did not discuss this in any specific terms today. We have made clear in public our willingness to provide, in a multilateral setting, those kinds of assurances with the others. And so we're working on that, but, no, we're not at the position to unveil anything at this point.

QUESTION: No, I understand. But is it -- is it your intention to actually prepare something in written form, in advance of the next round?

MR. BOUCHER: I'm sure we'll be well prepared in advantage of the next round....

QUESTION: Is the level of the talks going to remain the same, as far as you know?

MR. BOUCHER: I can't say for absolutely sure until the Chinese put it all together, but we have -- that would be our expectation.

QUESTION: At one point, the Chinese -- the North Koreans were believed to want to know what this security assurance would say before they would agree to another round of six-party talks. When the Chinese Vice Foreign Minister went there, did he share with the North Koreans not exactly the wording, as you're still developing it, but the outline of what a security assurance would say in order for them to sign onto it?

MR. BOUCHER: First of all, that's a question for the Chinese. To what extent that was discussed in their discussions, I don't know. Second of all, I'd point out, the President's been public about his attitude, his --

kind of thing that he would be willing -- that he has said and would be willing to say. So I think we've been, in general terms, quite up front about what we're willing to do in such a written document....

QUESTION: North Korea. The talk about the security assurances that you said happening between Chinese Vice Minister and Secretary Powell, is that in the context of the simultaneity which the DPRK has required all along the way?

MR. BOUCHER: Simultaneity is sort of one of the buzzwords, and we're not using it, we don't use it. We've said before that we recognized that these security assurances would be given along with -- in the context of reaching the goal of ending North Korea's nuclear weapons programs. How that process would be coordinated would be something that would have to be worked out.

But it's not really a question so much of these little buzzwords. It's a question of trying to sit down again and look at the substance of ending the North Korean nuclear weapons program and giving them -- allowing them to have from the international community the kind of assurance that makes them feel comfortable as they go through that process....

QUESTION: This week Secretary Powell, when he gave a speech to the Texas forum regarding North Korea, he said, the U.S. would like North Korea to end the nuclear program promptly, irreversibly, and verifiably.... The U.S. is always talking about completely and, you know, irreversibly, and verifiably. So is any change in your policy?

MR. BOUCHER: No. We have always made clear. I think we have used -- you know, you can't string too many adjectives together at one time. So, of the five or six that we use, we generally choose any three at a given moment, so.

QUESTION: Could you repeat these?

MR. BOUCHER: We've used promptly, completely, verifiably, irreversibly, and immediately at the beginning. So no, there's -- there's no change as to which basket we choose on one day, it doesn't negate the ones we chose another day.

**November 12, 2003**

**President George Bush**

**Roundtable Interview with British Print Journalists - The Oval Office**

Let me talk about North Korea, if you don't mind, right quick, to show you, at least, how I think on foreign policy issues. North Korea is a -- had a bilateral relation with the United States. And the leader would insist that the United States come to the table and provide different aid. And he, the leader, would not -- "he," Kim Jong-il, would not develop a nuclear weapon. And so our country agreed to that. It turns out he was developing highly enriched uranium suitable for a nuclear weapon. The thought of Kim Jong-il having a nuclear weapon is very dangerous, and/or the capacity to export a nuclear weapon into the hands of terrorists. By the way, terrorist networks who are willing to kill with car bombs are also willing to kill on a massive scale. The idea of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorist organizations is a dangerous, dangerous thought for the 21st century. And we've got to deal with it.

So I looked at the history and realized that the bilateral relations with Kim Jong-il hadn't worked. There's a real politic here, when somebody says they're going to do something and they don't do it. That should be a warning signal, and it was. So I went and worked with the Chinese and convinced the Chinese through a variety of means of argument that they need to be involved. And they now are involved. They're hosting these talks. So you've got the Chinese and you've got the Americans, and of course, South Korea and Japan, and now Russia, are all involved. So you've got five countries saying the same message to Kim Jong-il: We expect you not to develop a nuclear weapons program.

And my point to you is, is that there are ways to rally constituencies and nations toward a common objective, which is precisely what we're doing. That is exactly what the U.N. tried to do, and others tried to do, and the U.N., as far as Iraq went. It's just at the end, some countries decided that serious consequences meant something other than -- something different than what I thought serious consequences meant, I guess is the best way to put it.

**November 12, 2003**

**John R. Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security**

**Remarks at the American Spectator Dinner**

**"The Continuing Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction"**

**Washington, DC**

Rogue states such as Iran, North Korea, Syria, Libya, and Cuba, whose pursuit of weapons of mass destruction makes them hostile to U.S. interests, will learn that their covert programs will not escape either

detection or consequences. And while we will pursue diplomatic solutions whenever possible, the United States and its allies must be willing to deploy more robust techniques, such as the interdiction and seizure of illicit goods, the disruption of procurement networks, sanctions, or other means. If rogue states are not willing to follow the logic of nonproliferation norms, they must be prepared to face the logic of adverse consequences. It is why we repeatedly caution that no option is off the table....

With regard to North Korea, President Bush's objective is quite clear: the United States seeks the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear programs. We seek to bring this about, as we have said repeatedly, through diplomatic dialogue in a multilateral framework involving those states with the most direct stakes in the outcome. Other states may yet be involved as appropriate. The North Korean nuclear program is not a bilateral issue between the United States and the DPRK. It is a profound challenge to regional and even global stability, and to the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

By pursuing this course, the President is determined that blackmail and bad behavior on the part of North Korea will not be rewarded. North Korea will not be given inducements to reverse actions it took in violation of its treaty commitments and other international obligations.

During the August six-party talks in Beijing, the United States, China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea emphasized that the Korean Peninsula must be free of nuclear weapons. North Korea further isolated itself by threatening provocative actions such as nuclear tests -- adding to threats it made in April that it might build more nuclear weapons and perhaps even transfer nuclear material or weapons to third parties.

We should not forget, however, that -- like Iran -- North Korea's violations of international norms are hardly restricted to its pursuit of nuclear weaponry.

Although the DPRK has maintained its September, 1999, self-imposed, long-range missile flight test moratorium, it has remained active in the research, development, testing, deployment, and export of ballistic missiles and related materials, equipment, and technology. During a September 2002, meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, DPRK President Kim Jong-il stated that North Korea would maintain its missile flight test moratorium through 2003. We are concerned, however, that North Korea may be trying to circumvent its promise by cooperating in testing and development with foreign missile programs.

North Korea probably continued a biological warfare capabilities effort that began in the 1960s. Pyongyang's resources include a rudimentary biotechnical infrastructure that could support the production of infectious biological warfare agents such as anthrax, cholera, and plague. North Korea is believed to possess a munitions-production infrastructure that would allow it to weaponize biological agents, and may have biological weapons available for use.

North Korea's chemical weapons capabilities include the ability to produce bulk quantities of nerve, blister, choking, and blood agents using its sizeable, although aging, chemical industry. We believe it possesses a sizeable stockpile of these agents and weapons, which it could employ should there be renewed fighting on the Korean peninsula.

**November 13, 2003**

**Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld**

**Media Availability En Route to Guam**

Q: They're building nuclear weapons; they have nuclear weapons; they have missiles; they have conventional forces. You're going to basically the last front line in the Cold War. How do you see the threat from North Korea?

Rumsfeld: My understanding is that the process is going to go forward where the President has put it on a diplomatic track. They've had, I believe, one six-power meeting. I suspect there will be another six-power meeting as we go forward, and we'll see what it produces.

Q: Are you worried about North Korea? About the threat?

Rumsfeld: I think people have for 50 years. We've had forces and a U.N. presence on the Korean peninsula as a way to deter and defend and assure that the peninsula is a peaceful one.

## **Bush urges end to North Korea nuclear standoff**

20 October 2003

The US president, George Bush, today urged Asian leaders to support a new plan to end the North Korean nuclear standoff that has cast a shadow over the region for more than a year.

Leaders from 21 nations gathered in the Thai capital, Bangkok, for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (Apec) forum, hoping to reach agreements on tackling terrorism and restarting stalled world trade talks.

Although North Korea was not on the official agenda, Mr Bush raised the issue, and US officials worked behind the scenes to get the matter mentioned in the summit's final declaration.

Hopes of ending the standoff were threatened as South Korea today reported that the North had tested a short-range land-to-ship missile in the Japan sea. Japan said it was trying to verify a similar report.

Mr Bush is promoting a plan in which five nations - the US, China, Russia, Japan and South Korea - would jointly give North Korea written assurances that it would not be attacked in exchange for a promise to dismantle its nuclear programme.

"We have a common goal to make sure that the Korean Peninsula is nuclear weapons free," Mr Bush told the South Korean president, Roh Moo-hyun, at a breakfast meeting. Mr Bush had met the Chinese president, Hu Jintao, yesterday.

Mr Roh supported and praised the US efforts, saying: "This issue is very critical for ... the further progress of Korea."

The US national security adviser, Condoleeza Rice, told reporters that there had not yet been any feedback, either directly or indirectly, from the reclusive communist regime. Nevertheless, Ms Rice said: "Whatever we come up with will be more enduring than what we've had in the past."

In a speech to business leaders, the US secretary of state, Colin Powell, gave no details of how the standoff might be ended, but said: "In the course of the next days and weeks, we will be fleshing out these ideas with our partners ... and pursuing them with the North Koreans."

The nuclear dispute flared a year ago, when US officials said that North Korea had admitted running a secret nuclear programme in violation of international agreements.

Apec leaders also prepared to announce a new crackdown on terrorists and a bid to kick-start trade talks.

In a draft communique seen by the Associated Press, they also promised to more tightly control production of weapons that could be used to down commercial aircraft, but have stopped short of calling for an outright ban.

Apec will also call on the World Trade Organisation to restart talks for a new global commerce deal following the collapse of last month in the Mexican resort of Cancun last month.

Leaders will pledge to be better prepared for any future outbreaks of Sars, other infectious diseases or bio-terrorist attacks, according to the draft declaration.

Mr Bush and his advisers were also using the opportunity to lobby individual nations to contribute troops or money to help stabilise Iraq.

They were hoping that the final summit declaration would mention both Iraqi reconstruction and efforts to resolve the North Korean crisis, even though neither topic was on the official agenda.

US administration officials today said they hoped that the establishment of a separate international agency to oversee the spending of Iraq reconstruction money would help to overcome the reluctance of some nations to contribute.

The UN and the World Bank are expected to come up with details of plans to set up a reconstruction and development fund facility for Iraq at next week's international donors' conference in Madrid.

As summit partners prepared to endorse freer trade, the Malaysian prime minister, Mahathir Mohamad, fired sweeping broadsides at rich nations and multinational companies, saying that poor countries could not compete with rich ones.

"Fair trade can be free, but free trade can be unfair," he said. "That's what we are asking for. Nothing much, really. We are ready to be exploited, but we must be fairly exploited."

Mr Mahathir, who retires at the end of this month, caused an international stir last week when he told a summit of Islamic leaders in Malaysia that "Jews rule the world by proxy" and said that the world's 1.3 billion Muslims should unite with non-violent means for a "final victory."

A White House spokesman, Scott McClellan, branded the comments "hate-filled".

## **US Won't Back Off N.Korea Interdict Plan –Official**

By Carol Giacomo, Diplomatic Correspondent – 20 October 2003

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Despite President Bush's evolving proposal for a security guarantee for North Korea, his administration has no intention of backing off plans to interdict weapons-related shipments by Pyongyang to so-called rogue states, a U.S. official said on Monday.

Neither is there any expectation joint military exercises with U.S. allies South Korea and Japan will be curtailed, he told Reuters.

Those are two reasons Pyongyang may not be comforted enough by the security guarantee proposal to drop its reluctance to attend another round of six-party talks on its nuclear program, U.S. officials and experts said.

In an apparent effort to energize six-party talks on the North Korean nuclear crisis and satisfy allies who say he has dragged his feet on serious engagement, the president discussed a plan for a five-nation security guarantee for Pyongyang during an Asian economic summit in Bangkok on Monday.

U.S. officials in Washington and in Bangkok said the security guarantee was in the formative stages, requiring consultations with Asian partners as well as more discussions within the Bush administration.

"The wording hasn't been decided yet," one official said.

The administration is examining various historical models for security guarantees. "There are different ways a security guarantee could be couched. ... We're at the beginning stages of this," the official said.

North Korea has repeatedly accused the United States of "hostile intent" and insisted it must pursue a nuclear deterrent to protect against an American military attack.

### **Interdiction effort**

U.S. officials expect Pyongyang to interpret any security guarantee as requiring the suspension of the Proliferation Security Initiative, which Washington organized with 10 other nations to interdict on air, land and sea shipments of materials used in nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

North Korea and Iran are prime targets of the initiative because the administration considers them "rogue states" bent on acquiring weapons of mass destruction.

Asked if a security guarantee would mean suspending the interdiction program or U.S. exercises with Japan and South Korea, the U.S. official said: "They would continue. Absolutely."

Bush has rejected the formal nonaggression pact North Korea demanded but said the United States was exploring a possible compromise with its allies in the six-party talks, including China, South Korea, Russia and Japan.

Secretary of State Colin Powell, while ruling out a treaty, has often said a less formal guarantee was possible.

But Bush's comments revived talk of a new round of six-party negotiations.

Some U.S. officials felt too much was read into the remarks. "It was significant that Bush said it in Asia, but this is not a shift in U.S. policy," one official said.

The administration is in general agreement that to revive negotiations and warrant a U.S.-led five-nation security guarantee, North Korea must "do something besides commit to dismantle its nuclear weapons program," the official said.

"They need to take action first, but we have not said they have to do everything (to dismantle the nuclear program) before we would offer" the security guarantee, he added.

That means freezing nuclear activities in a "verifiable manner." But how far the North must go was undecided, he added.

The first round of six-party talks was held in Beijing in August. They ended inconclusively and there is talk of holding another round in November or December.

## Guardian

### **Pyongyang derides US treaty offer**

22 October 2003

Diplomatic tension between the US and North Korea worsened today, after the Pyongyang government dismissed President George Bush's offer of a nuclear treaty as a "laughing matter".

Mr Bush, who is on a five day tour of south-east Asia, called on the communist state to abandon its nuclear weapons programme in return for a written pledge from five countries not to attack.

But this proposal of a "security guarantee" was dismissed out of hand by North Korea, which is demanding a formal treaty that would prevent the US from launching a pre-emptive strike against the isolated country.

"It is a laughing matter and is not worth considering," the official North Korean central broadcasting station said in a dispatch monitored by South Korea's Yonhap news agency.

"We have demanded that the United States drop its hostile policy toward and sign a bilateral non-aggression treaty with us. We have not demanded some kind of security guarantee," the dispatch said.

Despite the setback, Mr Bush said today that he would "stay the course" in his efforts to increase international pressure on North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons ambitions.

"There's going to be a series of these statements that I guess are trying to stand up to the five nations that are now united in convincing North Korea to disarm," Mr Bush said.

"My only reaction is we'll continue to send a very clear message to the North Koreans. The good news is that there's other nations besides America sending the message," he added.

Mr Bush made his proposal at a summit of 21 Asia-Pacific leaders in Bangkok which was dominated by security issues. It would commit the United States, China, Japan, Russia and South Korea to a no-invasion pledge.

Washington said that details of the plan, such as when to offer a security pledge and exactly what North Korea would have to do beforehand, were still being debated.

Mr Bush's overture was a subtle yet significant shift in Washington's approach. The US had earlier insisted that North Korea created the nuclear crisis and must move first to end it.

Pyongyang paid no heed and began taking steps that could give the country several more nuclear bombs in addition to the one or two it already is believed to possess.

Earlier this month, North Korea announced it had completed reprocessing its stash of 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods and began using plutonium extracted from them to build more atomic bombs. Last week, it indicated that it might test a bomb.

In August, talks in Beijing between the United States, China, Russia, Japan and the two Koreas ended without agreement.

A delegation of US politicians hope to meet with North Korea's reclusive leader, Kim Jong Il, and discuss the crisis during a rare visit to Pyongyang next week.

The diplomatic standoff with North Korea has overshadowed Mr Bush's tour of the region to promote the war on terror.

But there were signs that the end of a similar row over nuclear weapons with Iran - which is considered by Washington to be part of the "axis of evil" alongside North Korea - could be in sight.

Mr Bush welcomed Iran's pledge to suspend uranium enrichment and give inspectors unrestricted access to its nuclear facilities, as demanded by the UN atomic watchdog agency. The deal came after a visit to Tehran by a delegation of foreign ministers from Britain, France and Germany yesterday.

"The Iranians, it looks like they're accepting the demands of the free world, and now it's up to them to prove that they've accepted the demands. It's a very positive development," he said.

## Chosun Ilbo

### **U.S. to Propose Removal of NK Nuke Materials**

By Choi Heup – 16 November 2003

TOKYO - The United States will propose that North Korea remove nuclear-related material, such as processed plutonium or unprocessed nuclear fuel, and send it to Third World countries. The proposal is to be made in next month's second round of six-party talks and will be a top priority, Kyodo News and other Japanese media agencies have reported.

As North Korea has reactivated its nuclear activators, despite its promise to freeze its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon under the 1994 Agreed Framework, the United States is planning to propose moving nuclear-related materials from North Korea to Third World countries, in order to end the possibility of nuclear development, Japanese news agencies reported, quoting various sources in the U.S. government.

The materials to be removed will include plutonium, which had been detected before the 1994 agreement, and the handling of the materials will be most likely be done by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Japanese media said.



The United States is planning to present the specific details of the dismantling process in the next six-party talks, but to not demand the direct removal of the materials. The United States will bring up the issue following the third round of six-party talks, but as previous plans to remove nuclear fuel failed in the 1994 agreement, it is still unknown whether the North will agree, the Japanese media reported.

#### Korean Central News Agency

##### **Spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry on Next Round of Six-way Talks**

17 November 2003

Pyongyang, November 16 (KCNA) -- We maintain the invariable stand to seek a negotiated peaceful solution to the nuclear issue between the DPRK and the U.S. after advancing a proposal for a package solution ultimately aimed to denuclearize the Korean peninsula. A spokesman for the DPRK Foreign Ministry said this on Nov. 16, answering the question raised by KCNA as regards the issue of opening the next round of the six-way talks. Only recently, we clarified the constructive stand that we are willing to take into consideration "written assurances of non-aggression" to which President Bush referred instead of the non-aggression treaty which the U.S. finds it hard to accept and we can modify even the phraseology of the principle of simultaneous actions, taking U.S. concerns into account.

As the DPRK declared more than once, it is ready to abandon in practice its nuclear program which the U.S. is concerned about at the phase where its hostile policy is fundamentally dropped and its threat to us removed in practice.

The prospect of solving the nuclear issue between the DPRK and U.S. will depend on whether the U.S. is ready to accept the proposal for a package solution based on the principle of simultaneous actions which commands the support and sympathy of all the participants of the talks.

#### Korea Herald

##### **N.K. wants EU in nuclear talks**

By Seo Hyun-jin – 17 November 2003

North Korea wants the European Union to participate in multilateral talks on the North's nuclear problem currently involving the two Koreas, the United States, China, Japan and Russia, a member of the European Parliament said Saturday.

During a news conference at the Lotte Hotel in Seoul, Glyn Ford said Kim Yong-nam, the second in command in Pyongyang's hierarchy and president of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly, conveyed the message when Ford visited North Korea from Oct. 7-14.

"What is clear is that North Korea would be happy for EU participation," the British official said.

Ford said North Korea believes the EU is "the only global power capable of putting a check" on the United States, which the North has said harbors a hostile policy toward its regime.

He said the EU was willing to contribute to settling the yearlong nuclear dispute between Pyongyang and Washington, but that the size of that contribution would depend on the degree of their involvement in the negotiations.

"I think the days are fast disappearing where people could come to the European Union at the end of the process and say, 'Would you like to make a contribution?'" Ford said.

He said the EU, which has adhered to a policy of "critical engagement" with North Korea, would continue providing the Stalinist regime with humanitarian aid but would not extend economic assistance until the North abandoned its nuclear ambitions.

Ford reaffirmed that an EU delegation would visit Pyongyang next month as part of its efforts to find a peaceful exit to the nuclear standoff.

North Korea and the EU have recently showed signs of re-knitting their ties with a series of exchanges.

British and German parliamentary delegations engaged in recent contacts by making separate visits to North Korea last month.

## **Nukes option by U.S. in Korea**

By Bill Gertz – 17 November 2003

SEOUL - The United States is committed to defending South Korea from an attack by the North and would use nuclear forces if needed, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld told the government here yesterday.

Mr. Rumsfeld, who finishes his first official visit to Asia today, said the U.S. commitment to South Korea includes "the continued provision of a nuclear umbrella" for South Korea, according to a statement issued after joint security talks.

"We understand that weakness can be provocative, that weakness can invite people into doing things that they otherwise might not even consider," Mr. Rumsfeld told a joint news conference with South Korean Defense Minister Cho Young-kil.

The two defense chiefs also discussed transferring some of the 37,000 U.S. troops in South Korea to two areas south of the demilitarized zone.

The tasks carried out by the U.S. forces will be handed over to South Korean troops, including security for the truce area of Panmunjom at the demilitarized zone separating the two Koreas and the development of South Korean antiartillery capabilities.

Mr. Rumsfeld met with South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun and told him that the United States would like Seoul to send "self-sufficient" troops to Iraq that do not need the protection of U.S. combat forces or help with supplies, said a senior defense official at the meeting.

South Korea has said it will send additional troops in the coming months but did not say whether they will be combat troops or humanitarian forces. The dispatch of humanitarian forces would require protection from terrorist attacks and Iraqi insurgents by U.S. or allied troops.

At the annual defense talks, the two sides agreed that North Korea poses a "global threat," the joint statement said.

Mr. Rumsfeld and Mr. Cho share the "grave concern that North Korea's self-acknowledged nuclear-weapons program threatens regional and global security and violates North Korea's commitment to a nuclear-free peninsula."

North Korea has not tested a nuclear device, but the CIA stated in a recent report to Congress that Pyongyang has "validated" atomic weapons design to the point of posing a credible nuclear threat.

North Korea is continuing to develop nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and long-range missiles, and poses a danger of exporting the weapons and technologies, the statement said.

The United States pulled out all of its tactical nuclear weapons, including nuclear land mines, in the early 1990s. It was then that Washington promised to use its nuclear forces, primarily missile-equipped submarines, to counter any atomic threats to South Korea.

However, the explicit restatement of that promise was unusual, and appeared intended to pressure North Korea in upcoming nuclear arms talks and to persuade South Korea not to develop its own atomic weapons.

North Korea's deployment of nuclear arms in the late 1990s shifted the strategic balance on the peninsula in Pyongyang's favor.

The United States' willingness to use nuclear arms to defend South Korea is expected to anger the communist North, which has accused the Bush administration of planning a nuclear attack.

Asked later about the nuclear assurances, Army Gen. Leon LaPorte, commander of U.S. forces in South Korea, said he could not comment on operational plans. "Our concern is to maintain a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula," Gen. LaPorte said in an interview with reporters.

The United States is developing nuclear weapons capable of penetrating deep, rock-hardened bunkers like those housing North Korean weapons, U.S. officials have said.

Both leaders called on North Korea to "completely, verifiably and irreversibly dismantle its nuclear-weapons programs" and halt the testing, development, deployment and export of weapons of mass destruction, missiles and related technologies, the statement said.

North Korea should take the opportunity of the six-party talks to denuclearize, the statement said.

Assistant Secretary of State James A. Kelly is in Tokyo and will visit Seoul later this week. He told reporters that a resumption of six-party talks is expected as early as mid-December.

Mr. Rumsfeld said at the press conference that the 13-year plan to move forces away from the demilitarized zone and consolidate bases over the next several years will strengthen the 50-year-old alliance with South Korea.

The alliance is successful because "we have had the ability to deter and defend and, if necessary, prevail," Mr. Rumsfeld said. "And that has been well understood. I can assure you it will be well understood in the years ahead, and, needless to say, neither of our governments would do anything that would in any way weaken the deterrent and the capability to defend."

Mr. Rumsfeld and South Korean leaders did not discuss cutbacks in the numbers of troops, but a U.S. official quoted Mr. Roh as saying that weapons upgrades and organizational reform make the number of troops less important than in the past. "It is not numbers of things, it is capability to impose lethal power, where needed, when needed, with the greatest flexibility and with the greatest agility," Mr. Rumsfeld said.

Defense officials have said they do not want U.S. military forces to be used as a vulnerable "tripwire" in any initial attack by North Korea's 1.2-million-troop army.

Thousands of U.S. Army forces are deployed in camps spread close to the demilitarized zone and would be quickly overrun by invading North Korean forces or forced to make a difficult withdrawal through the urbanized Seoul area during a conflict.

The two sides were unable to reach an agreement on the relocation of some 700 to 1,000 U.S. troops from the military's Yongsan garrison in Seoul. South Korea does not want the troops in the Seoul area to be moved. The U.S. wants them pulled back to areas around Osan air base, located south of the capital.

## Korea Herald

### **N. Korea seen softening stance to get rewards**

By Seo Hyun-jin – 18 November 2003

The mood is ripening for reconvening six-party talks on North Korea's nuclear threat, with the North softening its stance concerning the yearlong dispute with the United States.

Some officials in Seoul and Washington said the third week of December is the most likely for the two Koreas, the United States, China, Japan and Russia to open their second round of talks in Beijing.

North Korea said Sunday that it is willing to scrap its nuclear development program when the United States abandons what it called a hostile policy toward its Communist regime and discontinues its threats.

Although there were strings attached for the North to end its nuclear ambition, analysts agreed this constituted a positive sign toward defusing the nuclear tension on the Korean Peninsula, following the North's announcements last month of considering a U.S.-suggested written security guarantee and attending the next six-party talks.

"North Korea will try to gain substantial results from the second set of six-party talks by demonstrating flexibility in negotiating with Washington, as the U.S. has also appeared positive regarding the nuclear issue," said Prof. Kim Keun-sik at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies of Kyungnam University. "Pyongyang does not want to let go of this opportunity."

On Sunday, North Korea reconfirmed it would accept a multilateral security guarantee that U.S. President George W. Bush unveiled in October, even though it might fall short of a formal nonaggression treaty which it had obstinately demanded.

It also said it would adjust its position on the expression of "simultaneous actions" in resolving the nuclear standoff, considering U.S. reluctance in agreeing to take measures at the same time with North Korea.

"I think both North Korea and the United States will opt for progress this time, rather than engaging in a tug-of-war to save face," Kim said.

The initial round of the six-way talks in August ended without any tangible agreements because Pyongyang urged Washington to provide a nonaggression pledge as a condition for its nuclear dismantlement while Washington demanded that Pyongyang abandon its nuclear weapons program first.

After the inconclusive talks, the participants made diplomatic efforts to reopen their negotiations, which has resulted in considerable momentum in recent weeks, especially thanks to China's active mediation between North Korea and the United States.

China's parliamentary leader Wu Bangguo visited Pyongyang in late October and induced North Korea's agreement to rejoin the talks. Following this, senior Chinese officials traveled to Washington and other concerned countries to set a schedule and agenda for the next gathering.

"The reason I believe North Korea made it public to abandon its nuclear weapons program is because it received a positive message from China about ways to resolve the issue," said Yoon Hwang, professor at Sunmoon University.

Asked to confirm a recent media report that the impending six-party talks will take place Dec. 17-18, National Security Adviser Ra Jong-yil said, "It is moving in that direction."

A fixed schedule is expected after U.S. Assistance Secretary of State James Kelly winds up his tour of Japan, China and South Korea this week.

Kelly, chief representative to the talks, will arrive in Seoul Wednesday, as the last leg of his three-nation visit.

### China Daily

#### **New 6-party nuke talks expected next month**

18 November 2003

SEOUL: The second round of six-nation talks aimed at ending the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK) nuclear weapons development is expected to take place on December 17 and 18 in Beijing, a senior Republic of Korea (ROK) official said yesterday.

"It has not been officially announced, but the general mood is moving in that direction," National Security Adviser Ra Jong-yil said after ROK media, citing government sources, reported the meeting is planned for those dates. Ra added the nuclear talks will be held in Beijing.

A six-nation conference hosted by China in August ended with participants reiterating their desire for a diplomatic resolution to the standoff.

US Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly said yesterday in Tokyo he hopes follow-up talks can take place in mid-December, "but we do not know for sure."

The US envoy said he spoke yesterday with his Japanese counterpart, Mitoji Yabunaka, about written security assurances that Washington is mulling to break the deadlock with Pyongyang.

### Chosun Ilbo – South Korea

#### **Russian Foreign Minister Vows to Accept Any Form of Proposal to Solve Nuclear Issue**

18 November 2003

Russia will accept any kind of proposal that will help settle North Korea's nuclear standoff, denuclearize the Korean peninsula as well as provide Pyeongyang with a legitimate security guarantee. So said Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov on Monday (local time) after holding negotiations with South Korean Foreign Minister Yoon Young-kwan in Moscow.

The Russian Foreign Minister added no dates have been set for the second round of six-party talks but expressed hopes to resume the nuclear dialogue as soon as possible.

Minister Yoon arrived in Russia on Sunday the first leg of his European tour aimed at boosting bilateral ties and drumming up support for a peaceful resolution to North Korea's nuclear issue.

### Associated Press

#### **Work on N. Korea Nuke Reactors Suspended**

By Soo-Jeong Lee – 22 November 2003

SEOUL, South Korea - South Korea and Japan said Saturday they hope a decision to suspend construction of two nuclear power plants in North Korea won't hinder efforts to persuade the North to dismantle its suspected nuclear weapons programs.

The U.S.-led consortium - which includes both South Korea and Japan, along with the European Union - said Friday it would halt the construction of the light water reactors for a year.

The decision came amid efforts to persuade North Korea to join a second round of talks aimed at persuading Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear ambitions in return for security guarantees.

"I wish that the decision by KEDO won't effect the resumption of six-nation talks," a senior South Korean government official involved in the reactor project said. KEDO stands for the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization.

The first conference in August ended without an agreement on when the United States, the two Koreas, Japan, China and Russia would meet again.

Diplomatic efforts to resume the talks gained speed last month after the North agreed "in principle" to return to the negotiating table.

A Japanese Foreign Ministry spokesman on Saturday said he hoped North Korea would take "the KEDO decision seriously."

"We'd certainly hope to see a positive response from North Korea to dismantle its nuclear weapons development program in an irreversible, complete, and verifiable manner," ministry spokesman Jiro Okuyama said.

"We will have six-party talks coming up and through these exchanges and through North Korea's bilateral contacts with the other countries concerned, we'd like to see a positive response from them," Okuyama said.

The power plants were part of a 1994 deal between the United States and North Korea, under which the communist regime agreed not to develop weapons. But the deal went sour in October 2002, when U.S. officials said North Korea had admitted running a secret nuclear program in violation of international agreements.

The United States and its allies have already cut off free oil shipments to North Korea that were part of the 1994 deal. North Korea retaliated by expelling U.N. nuclear monitors. Last month, it said it was building more atomic bombs besides one or two bombs it already is believed to possess.

North Korea did not immediately react to the one-year suspension, which will begin Dec. 1.

State Department spokesman Adam Ereli said Thursday "there's no future" for the project. But South Korea, Japan and the EU have favored using the prospect of reviving the \$4.6 billion project to persuade North Korea to give up its plans to develop nuclear weapons.

The light-water reactors are the biggest construction project in the North, coveted by the communist state. They are for power-generation, and it's extremely difficult to use them for weapons purposes.

## COMMENTAAR EN VRAGEN

De 'proliferatie crises', Noord-Korea en Iran, kunnen nog steeds uitlopen op een confrontatie. Tussen Noord Korea en de VS worden nog steeds regelmatig dreigementen uitgewisseld (zie bijv de toespraak van onderminister Bolton op 12 november, onder hoofdstuk Noord Korea).

De inzet in Noord Korea en de regio is een mogelijke Amerikaanse 'pre-emptive' strike op Noordkoreaanse nucleaire installaties, en een Noordkoreaanse aanval op Zuid Korea en de daar gelegerde Amerikaanse troepen, eventueel met de inzetbare massavernietigingswapens die ze hebben. Het is geenszins bewezen dat de DRKP op raketten gemonteerde nucleaire systemen heeft. De consensus onder de onafhankelijke deskundigen is dat het gaat om een zeer klein aantal kernwapens, wellicht per bommenwerper inzetbaar. De VS heeft een nucleaire slagkracht die Noord Korea binnen een paar minuten van de aardbodem kan wegvagen. Het is zinvol om die krachtsverhouding in de gaten te houden, zeker als minister Rumsfeld van defensie dreigt met de inzet van kernwapens. (zie Washington Times 17 nov 2003)

Het onmiddellijke gevaar van escalatie is enigszins geweken, voornamelijk door de rol van China die enerzijds druk uitoefent op Noord Korea (die in belangrijke mate afhankelijk is van Chinese hulp) en anderzijds een cruciale concessie die door de regering Bush is gedaan om een vorm van veiligheidsgarantie aan Noord Korea te geven (Guardian 22 okt 2003). Dat laatste is van beslissend belang, nu gebleken is dat Irak geen inzetbare massavernietigingswapens bezat en desalniettemin werd aangevallen. De Noordkoreaanse regering wil echter een non-agressie verdrag in ruil voor controleerbare nucleaire ontwapening. Ze maakt logischerwijs de calculatie dat zij het volgende doelwit is. De meest effectieve rem op escalatie is de Zuidkoreaanse regering, die bijna zoveel zal lijden onder een Amerikaanse aanval op Noord Korea, als dat land zelf. De geplande 'zes-landen' conferentie in december moet uitsluitel geven.

In de IAEA zijn er over Iran vergaande confrontaties geweest, waarbij de verklaring van de Iraanse leider Khamenie op 2 november (CNN) het meest opviel, met daartegenover de opmerkingen van de Amerikaanse onderminister Bolton (30 okt. 2003, zie Algemeen). De Iraanse regering heeft de afgelopen 18 jaren ene nucleair programma ontwikkeld dat de basis kan vormen voor ene kernwapenprogramma. Het non-proliferatie verdrag biedt daar de mogelijkheid toe. De oorspronkelijke kritiek van de antikernenergie beweging op het NPV, dat de expliciete erkenning van het vreedzame gebruik van kernenergie juist de mogelijkheid biedt om onder valse vlag de basis voor kernwapenproductie te leggen, wordt hierdoor dus bewaarheid. Het escalatieproces hier zou worden ingezet door het verplaatsen van de confrontatie van de IAEA naar de Veiligheidsraad, dit wordt ook systematies nagestreefd door de VS. Ingrijpen van de drie belangrijkste EU landen (zie de verklaring van 21 oktober onder hoofdstuk Iran) heeft een voorlopig compromis bewerkstelligd. De interne verhoudingen in Iran zijn in deze van groot belang: ook hier wordt geredeneerd dat de VS zowiezo kan annavallan, zoals ze dat met Irak ded, en dat kernwapens noodzakelijk zijn voor zelfverdediging. Dit laatste is uiteraard strijdig met de Iraanse verplichtingen onder het NPV. De Iraanse regering heeft nu wel ingestemd met het verzwaarde inspectieregiem, een regeling die overigens niet deel uitmaakt van de oorspronkelijke NPV afspraken. Verder is er nu een resolutie in de IAEA aangenomen die de mogelijkheid opent om de zaak alsnog naar de Veiligheidsraad te brengen.

Beide potentiële crises hebben weer een cruciale kwestie naar voren gebracht. Namelijk de tegenstrijdigheid van het Amerikaanse beleid aangaande haar eigen kernwapens aan de ene kant en het bijzonder agressieve unilaterale 'contraprolikeratie' beleid aan de andere kant. De wetgeving die verder onderzoek naar de ontwikkeling van zogenaamde 'mini-kernwapens' mogelijk maakt, het afwijzen van compromis resoluties voor nucleaire ontwapening in de VN zoals die van de Nieuwe Agenda Coalitie (zie F&R 29, bijlagen) en de algemene afkeer van multilaterale verdragen en veiligheidsafspraken maken het optreden van de VS in deze crises bijzonder ongeloofwaardig. De rol van Israël verdient aparte vermelding: in de aanloop naar de Iran confrontatie werden expliciete degeingen richting Iran geuit (zie o.a. de uitspraken van de Mossad directeur zoals gemeld door Channel News Asia, 17 nov.).

Israël heeft het NPV niet ondertekend maar heeft een kernwapenarsenaal dat enkele honderden kernwapens omvat en vermoedelijk verbeterd wordt. De Amerikaanse steun voor Israël maakt het onmogelijk om de VN resoluties die pleiten voor een kernwapenvrije zone in het Midden Oosten ten uitvoer te brengen (zie de resolutie tekst en stemverhoudingen onder het hoofdstuk 'Algemeen' in dit nummer). Om die reden is de bijzondere beperkte aandacht voor de Israeliese kernwapens, vergeleken met de grootschalige aandacht voor de eerste fase van het Iraaanse kernwapenprogramma, hoogst merkwaardig.

## KRONIEK 2003-2004

29 sept – 3 oktober	Parlementaire Assemblée Europese Raad, Straatsburg
1 oktober	AO VCK Buitenlandse Zaken en Defensie over transatlantische betrekkingen
1 oktober	Bezoek Premier Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali (Pakistan) aan VS, Washington
1-2 oktober	Missile Defensie conferentie, Aspen Institute, Rome
3-4 oktober	Informeel bijeenkomst EU Ministers van Defensie, Rome
8-9 oktober	Informeel bijeenkomst NAVO Ministers van Defensie, Colorado
9-10 oktober	Bijeenkomst Proliferation Security Initiative, London
13-14 oktober	EU – General Affairs and External Relations Council, Luxemburg
16-17 oktober	Europese Raad, Brussel
20-21 oktober	Bezoek Bush aan Thailand en Filippijnen
20-21 oktober	APEC-leiders bijeenkomst, Bangkok
20-24 oktober	OPCW States Parties bijeenkomst, Den Haag
21-23 oktober	Behandeling begroting Defensie in Tweede Kamer
23-24 oktober	UN Donor Conferentie Irak, Madrid
25 oktober	Burgerinspectie SHAPE, Bergen
29 oktober	EU-India Summit, New Delhi
7 november	Nederland neemt voorzitterschap Raad van Europa over (tot en met 26 mei)
7-11 november	NAVO Parlementaire Assemblée, Orlando
10-14 november	BWC States Parties bijeenkomst, Geneve
10-14 november	CTBT PrepCom, 21 <sup>st</sup> Session, Wenen
17-18 november	EU Commissie buitenlandse zaken, mensenrechten, gemeenschappelijke veiligheid en defensiebeleid, Brussel
17-18 november	EU – General Affairs and External Relations Council, Brussel
18-21 november	Bezoek Bush aan Verenigd Koninkrijk
18-21 november	Behandeling begroting Buitenlandse Zaken in Tweede Kamer
20-21 november	IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, Wenen
december	Expertmeeting Proliferation Security Initiative, Verenigde Staten
1-2 december	Bijeenkomst NAVO Ministers van Defensie, Brussel
1-2 december	Ministeriële bijeenkomst OVSE, Maastricht
1-3 december	WEU Assemblée, Parijs
1-5 december	CCW States Parties Bijeenkomst, Geneve
2-5 december	Executive Council OPCW, Den Haag
4-5 december	Bijeenkomst NAVO Ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken, Brussel
7 december	Parlementsverkiezingen Rusland
8-9 december	EU – General Affairs and External Relations Council, Brussel
12-13 december	Europese Raad, Brussel
17-18 december	Zeslanden-bijeenkomst over Noord-Korea, Peking (gepland)
januari	Lord Robertson vertrekt als Secretaris-Generaal van de NAVO
1 januari	Ierland neemt voorzitterschap EU over
1 januari	Einde Nederlands voorzitterschap OVSE
1 januari	Verenigde Staten nemen voorzitterschap G8 over
21-25 januari	World Economic Forum, Davos
maart	Parlementsverkiezingen Spanje
14 maart	Presidentsverkiezingen Rusland
april	Parlementsverkiezingen Zuid-Korea
26 april – 7 mei	NPT PrepCom, New York
juni	Verkiezingen Europees Parlement
juni	Parlementsverkiezingen Japan
juni	NAVO-top
8-10 juni	G-8 Summit, Sea Island, Georgia
1 juli	Nederland neemt voorzitterschap EU over

## FACTS AND REPORTS

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Citaten van internationale politici en diplomaten over het Amerikaans unilateralisme.
2. Veiligheidsvraagstukken en de verkiezingen – standpunten van de politieke partijen  
Relevante delen van de partijprogramma's van de Nederlandse politieke partijen, plus citaten van politici op het terrein van oorlog en vrede.
3. Transatlantic relations – recent developments  
Overzicht van recente ontwikkelingen in de transatlantische betrekkingen, met name binnen de NAVO, mede naar aanleiding van uitspraken in de State of the Union.
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13. Aanval op Irak – de kwestie van de massavernietigingswapens; feiten, documenten en overwegingen
14. Aanval op Irak (2) – recente ontwikkelingen
15. Documenten First Committee Verenigde Naties 2002 – resoluties, verklaringen, rapporten
16. De NAVO-top in Praag – documenten
17. Aanval op Irak (3) – het inspectieregiem
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20. Korea, de tweede crisis
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