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BEGROTING BUITENLANDSE ZAKEN PROLIFERATIEVRAAGSTUKKEN

INHOUDSOPGAVE

Inleiding	2
Begroting Buitenlandse Zaken 2004	3
Brieven aan de Kamer	8
Tweede Kamer	13
NAVO	14
NAVO Parlementaire Assemblee	16
EU	18
Proliferation Security Initiative	22
Documenten	22
Berichten	29
Irak – massavernietigingswapens	37
Documenten	37
Berichten	45
Commentaar en vragen	54
Kroniek 2003-2004	56
Overzicht facts and reports	57

INLEIDING

De behandeling van de begroting voor buitenlandse zaken is voor ons aanleiding om verschillende kernwapengerelateerde ontwikkelingen te bekijken. Deze keer hebben we relevante documenten van de NAVO, de NAVO Parlementaire Assemblee en het 'Proliferation Security Initiative' bij elkaar gebracht. Daarnaast ook een praktisch geval, Irak. Zoals bekend ontbreekt nog steeds het bewijs voor de Iraakse massavernietigingswapens. Amerikaanse en Britse parlementariërs hebben vele vragen gesteld aan hun regeringen over de bewijsvoering en hoe die tot stand kwam. Deze vragen en de ontwijkende antwoorden hebben we in deze bundel opgenomen (we komen in een volgend nummer terug op het debat hierover in Nederland). Verhelderend over het Amerikaanse veiligheidsbeleid is het interview met onderminister Bolton (voor 'Arms Control and International Security'), evenals korte ondervragingen van de woordvoerder van het Witte Huis, Scott McClellan en de Britse minister Hoon van defensie. Achterin staan vragen en commentaar nav het Nederlandse beleid. De inhoud van dit nummer staat ook op www.eurobomb.nl.

Redactie

BEGROTING BUITENLANDSE ZAKEN 2004

Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Vaststelling van de begrotingsstaat van het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (V) voor het jaar 2004

nr. 2 – Memorie van toelichting – 16 september 2003

[...]

Beleidsagenda

[...]

Slagvaardigheid

[...]

Ook een uitgebreide NAVO dient slagvaardig te blijven en het hoofd te kunnen bieden aan nieuwe uitdagingen. De komende periode zal de uitvoering ter hand worden genomen van verplichtingen aangaan tijdens de NAVO-Top van Praag van november 2002 voor de capaciteitsversterking. Toen is besloten tot het Prague Capabilities Commitment, waarbij alle bondgenoten zich hebben gecommitteerd de bestaande tekortkomingen op het gebied van militaire capaciteiten aan te pakken. Ook Nederland heeft toegezegd een aantal concrete projecten ter hand te nemen. Wat crisisbeheersingscapaciteiten betreft, heeft Nederland steeds aangedrongen op maximale samenhang en afstemming met het capaciteitenprogramma dat in het kader van het EVDB is opgezet. In Praag hebben NAVO-bondgenoten tevens tot de oprichting van de NATO Response Forcebesloten, een snel inzetbare eenheid, waaraan op rotatiebasis door de NAVO-landen zal worden deelgenomen. De uitwerking van het concept vindt thans plaats. Nederland zal een wezenlijke bijdrage aan de NRF leveren.

De regering streeft naar versterking van het Europees buitenlands- en veiligheidsbeleid. De inzet is erop gericht dat de Unie, ook in gevoelige politieke dossiers, een effectief en slagvaardig beleid formuleert dat zoveel mogelijk met één stem wordt uitgedragen. Daartoe zal dit beleid ook inhoudelijk moeten worden verdiept en verbreed. De opstelling van een Europese veiligheidsstrategie biedt daartoe een belangrijke aanzet. De rol van de Hoge Vertegenwoordiger voor het GBVB kan verder worden versterkt. De verdere praktische uitwerking van het Europese defensiebeleid zal in het kader van de zogenaamde «Berlijn-plus»-afspraken in complementariteit met de NAVO plaatsvinden.

De regering zal zich in uitvoeringsorganisaties van verdragen, exportcontroleregimes, veiligheidspolitieke overlegorganen, inzetten voor een effectieve non-proliferatie van massavernietingswapens(bijvoorbeeld ten aanzien van Iran). Effectieve non-proliferatie vereist allereerst volledige uitvoering van de internationale afspraken en van het toezicht op naleving. Daarnaast is aanvulling en versterking van het bestaande systeem nodig. In toenemende mate zijn de landen die geen of beperkt onderdeel uitmaken van het wereldomspannende stelsel van afspraken en verdragen, onderwerp van zorg en discussie. Nederland is ook bereid landen technische ondersteuning te bieden bij de verbetering van hun exportcontrolesysteem.

[...]

Hoofddoelstelling 1. Internationale ordening

[...]

Beleidsartikel 1 Het bevorderen van internationale ordening

[...]

Geoperationaliseerde doelstelling 12

Vergroten van de nucleaire veiligheid.

De regering zet zich in voor nucleaire veiligheid zowel binnen de Europese Unie als in de aangrenzende landen, met name Rusland.

Na te streven resultaten in 2004

+ Goedkeuring door het Nederlandse parlement van de overeenkomst inzake het Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Programme in Russia (MNEPR).

+ Start van fase 2 van het Lepse Fuel Retrievalproject dat gericht is op de verwijdering van gedeeltelijk beschadigde brandstofstaven uit het schip «Lepse» in de haven van Moermansk.

+ Start door het Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership Fund met de rehabilitatie van de voormalige nucleaire opslagplaats aan de Baai van Andreev op het Kola Schiereiland. Nederland heeft voor de periode 2002–2006 een bijdrage aan dit fonds toegezegd van EUR 10 miljoen ten behoeve van het opruimen van de nucleaire erfenis in de voormalige Sovjet-Unie.

Activiteiten/instrumenten

+ Voorbereiden parlementaire goedkeuring van de MNEPRovereenkomst.

- + Voorzitten van het Lapse Fuel Retrieval -project.
- + Participeren in de vergaderingen van het NDEP-Fonds.

Middelen

+ In 2004 is hiervoor EUR 1 miljoen begroot. Deze middelen worden verantwoord op artikel 13.02 POBB overig.

[...]

Hoofddoelstelling II. Vrede, veiligheid en stabiliteit

[...]

Beleidsartikel 2 Vrede, veiligheid en conflictbeheersing

[...]

Ondanks het feit dat traditionele internationale instellingen als de VN, NAVO, EU en OVSE soms onder druk staan blijft de regering ervan overtuigd dat een effectieve vuist, waar nodig, het beste via internationale en multilaterale samenwerking kan worden gemaakt. De actieve betrokkenheid van de Verenigde Staten is daarbij essentieel. Een van de grote uitdagingen waar vele landen zich dezer dagen voor geplaatst zien, is om te blijven investeren in de effectiviteit van internationale instrumenten en niet terug te vallen op nationale reflexen en sentimenten.

Tijdens het EU voorzitterschap zal Nederland zich dan ook sterk maken om het Europees Veiligheids- en Defensiebeleid met de partners verder vorm en inhoud te geven. Ook de bondgenootschappelijke samenwerking zal door de voorziene uitbreiding en andere ontwikkelingen in 2004 voor nieuwe uitdagingen komen te staan en nieuwe kansen krijgen. De NAVO zal een hoeksteen van ons veiligheidsbeleid blijven vormen. In het jaar na het OVSE-voorzitterschap zal Nederland zich actief blijven inzetten voor de OVSE en de initiatieven, genomen tijdens het voorzitterschap, actief blijven ondersteunen.

Globalisering en technologische ontwikkelingen hebben, naast vele goede kanten, helaas ook geleid tot een toename van nieuwe en andersoortige dreigingen. De proliferatie van massavernietigingswapens is een van de grootste gevaren die de mensheid vandaag de dag bedreigt. Hierop zullen nieuwe antwoorden moeten worden gevonden, onder andere door verdere versterking van de bestaande exportcontrole regimes en andere preventieve maatregelen. Ook op terreinen van wapenexportcontrole en wapenbeheersing, nationaal en in multilateraal kader, wil de regering actief blijven bijdragen, zoals bij de door Nederland geïnitieerde onderhandelingen in Genève over ontplofbare oorlogsresten.

[...]

A. Algemene beleidsdoelstelling

De algemene beleidsdoelstelling van het Nederlandse veiligheidsbeleid is tweeledig:

- het waarborgen van de veiligheid van het Nederlandse en bondgenootschappelijke grondgebied;
- de bevordering van de internationale vrede, veiligheid en stabiliteit en de internationale rechtsorde middels instrumenten van conflictpreventie en crisisbeheersing.

Dit beleid krijgt mede gestalte door samenwerking in een groot aantal internationale fora zoals de Verenigde Naties (VN), de Noord-Atlantische Verdrags Organisatie (NAVO), de Europese Unie (EU), en de Organisatie voor Veiligheid en Samenwerking in Europa (OVSE), alsook in het kader van internationale verdragen en afspraken op het terrein van wapenbeheersing en ontwapening. Daarnaast kan internationaal worden opgetreden in ad-hoc coalities (coalitions of the willing). Deze vorm van internationale samenwerking zal worden voortgezet en, waar nodig, worden versterkt en verbreed. Ook op dit terrein geldt derhalve dat het behalen van de gestelde doelstellingen mede afhankelijk is van andere landen.

[...]

Geoperationaliseerde doelstelling 2

Terugdringen van internationale terrorisme.

Het terugdringen van het internationale terrorisme geschiedt nationaal en in samenwerking met andere landen.

Na te streven resultaten in 2004

- + Versterkte internationale inspanningen gericht op de preventie, bestrijding en beheersing van het internationale terrorisme, in het bijzonder in het kader van de Verenigde Naties, de Europese Unie en de NAVO.
- + Versterkte implementatie van VN-veiligheidsraadresolutie 1373, die staten verplicht maatregelen te nemen tegen terroristische organisaties en organisaties die terroristische activiteiten ondersteunen.
- + Verscherpte EU-maatregelen ter bestrijding van financiering van terrorisme, door verbetering implementatie en uitbreiding werkingssfeer.
- + Versterkte EU-maatregelen ten aanzien van derde landen door middel van het opvoeren van assistentie aan landen, die ernst maken met terrorismebestrijding en door middel van een kritischer opstelling, waar nodig gevolgd door aanvullende maatregelen, ten aanzien van landen die onvoldoende aandacht besteden aan terrorismebestrijding.

+ Versterkte aandacht voor terrorismebestrijding in relaties van de EU met derde landen, bijvoorbeeld door opname van een terrorismeclausule in nieuwe samenwerkingsverdragen.

+ Analyse van dreiging van terrorisme vanuit derde landen.

+ Verbeterde aansluiting tussen EU en NAVO-beleid en nationale implementatie anti-terrorisemaatregelen, met name met het oog op optimale afstemming tussen interne en externe veiligheid.

Activiteiten/instrumenten

+ Bijdragen aan een vergroting van de politiek-militaire effectiviteit en de slagkracht van bestaande internationale fora (waaronder NAVO en EU) en coalities die relevant zijn voor de strijd tegen het internationale terrorisme.

+ Bijdragen aan discussies in het kader van het Counter Terrorism Committee van VNVR-resolutie 1373, waaronder rapportages over nationale maatregelen.

+ Verbetering van effectiviteit van instrumentarium ter bestrijding van terrorismefinanciering.

+ Ondersteuning van EU-programma's voor capaciteitsvergroting van terrorismebestrijding in specifieke landen.

+ Kritische dialoog met derde landen over terrorismebestrijding.

+ Opname van terrorismeclausules in nieuwe samenwerkingsverdragen van de EU.

+ Opstellen dreigingsanalyses met betrekking tot derde landen in NAVO en EU-kader.

+ Actieve deelname aan debat over eventuele additionele nationale maatregelen op het gebied van terrorismebestrijding.

[...]

Geoperationaliseerde doelstelling 4

Verhoogde veiligheid door samenwerking in NAVO kader.

In NAVO-kader zal de aandacht grotendeels uitgaan naar het versterken van de Trans-Atlantische band, de nieuwe taken van het Bondgenootschap en de uitbreiding met zeven landen.

Na te streven resultaten in 2004

+ Afgerond Nederlands ratificatieproces NAVO-uitbreiding.

+ Operationalisering van de NATO Response Force.

+ Versterkte militaire capaciteiten op terreinen waar tekortkomingen bestaan.

+ Verdere versterking van de NAVO-Rusland Raad.

+ Grotere rol NAVO bij crisisbeheersingsoperaties waarbij optreden buiten het verdragsgebied niet langer een beletsel hoeft te vormen.

Activiteiten/instrumenten

+ Om de zeven nieuwe NAVO-leden daadwerkelijk tijdens de NAVO-Top in voorjaar 2004 te kunnen laten toetreden streeft Nederland naar zo spoedig mogelijke afronding (begin 2004) van het nationale ratificatieproces.

+ De NATO Response Force, over het principe waarvan tijdens de NAVO-Top in Praag in november 2002 overeenstemming is bereikt, zal in de loop van 2004 (althans gedeeltelijk) inzetbaar zijn. Daartoe zal zowel in Brussel als nationaal nog een aantal stappen moeten worden gezet. In nauw overleg met Defensie zal een aantal aspecten van die stappen nader worden uitgewerkt. Het betreft met name het uitwerken van de besluitvormingsprocedure, zulks in samenhang met het vereiste van snelle inzetbaarheid, regels over inzetbaarheid en de feitelijke Nederlandse deelname. Deze zullen, waar van toepassing, conform het Nederlandse toetsingskader moeten zijn. Nederlandse inzet in de NAVO en bilateraal behelst een adequate eigen deelname aan de NRF.

+ Tijdens de Top van Praag in november 2002, waar overeenstemming werd bereikt over de Prague Capabilities Commitment(PCC), heeft Nederland een aantal toezeggingen gedaan om de tekortkomingen op het gebied van militaire capaciteiten te verminderen. Afhankelijk van de financiële situatie en de prioriteitenstelling zal bezien worden welke extra inspanning Nederland op het gebied van de PCC kan leveren.

+ Nederland zal zich ten aanzien van de NAVO-Rusland Raad inzetten om implementatie van projecten en studies op concrete deelgebieden te realiseren. Voorbeelden hiervan zijn de lopende programma's voor Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) en Cooperative Airspace Initiative (CAI).

Daarnaast wordt aandacht besteed aan de totstandkoming van een rapport inzake dreigingsanalyses, wapenbeheersing, non-proliferatie en exportcontroles.

+ Bevorderen dat het Bondgenootschap een (ondersteunende) rol kan spelen bij specifieke crisisbeheersingsoperaties.

[...]

Non-proliferatie en wapenbeheersing

De crises rond Irak en Noord-Korea laten de ernstige gevolgen zien die de proliferatie van massavernietigingswapens voor de veiligheid en stabiliteit in de wereld kan hebben. De aanslagen van 11 september 2001 hebben daarnaast aangetoond dat terroristische groeperingen niet zullen terugschrikken grote aantallen slachtoffers te maken; de vrees is gerechtvaardigd dat zij nucleaire, biologische, chemische of radiologische wapens zullen gebruiken indien zij daar de hand op weten te leggen.

De ongecontroleerde verspreiding van grote hoeveelheden, goedkoop verkrijgbare, conventionele wapens veroorzaakt in vele landen in de wereld groot menselijk leed. De problematiek van dergelijke wapens, zoals landmijnen, ontplofbare oorlogsresten en kleine wapens leidt niet alleen tot veel slachtoffers maar verhindert vaak ook de wederopbouw van de economie na afloop van een conflict. Uiteraard is de uiteindelijke beheersing van deze wapens of het terugdringen ervan niet uitsluitend in Nederlandse handen. De regering baseert het beleid mede op bestaande overlegstructuren en op verdragen die de verspreiding van wapens moeten tegengaan, maar wil waar mogelijk ook een voortrekkersrol spelen.

Geoperationaliseerde doelstelling 7

Non-proliferatie en vernietiging van massavernietigingswapens

Effectieve bestrijding van proliferatie van massavernietigingswapens en bevordering van wapenbeheersing en ontwapening kunnen slechts plaatsvinden binnen een krachtig multilateraal systeem dat duidelijke regels stelt en toeziet op de naleving ervan. Het huidige systeem staat onder druk door landen die zich aan de internationale regels onttrekken en de twijfels die dit bij anderen over de multilaterale aanpak als zodanig creëert. De regering zal zich het komend jaar nog krachtiger dan voorheen inzetten voor de versterking van het multilaterale systeem op nonproliferatie-, wapenbeheersings- en ontwapeningsgebied. De actie zal zich allereerst richten op bevordering van universaliteit van verdragen en normen en op effectieve naleving ervan. Richtsnoer daarbij is de non-proliferatiestrategie die de Europese Unie voorjaar 2003 aannam. Het beleid zal gestalte krijgen in diverse fora zoals de VN, het IAEA, de OPCW, de NAVO, de Geneefse Ontwapeningsconferentie en de CTBTO. Daarnaast komt het beleid tot uitdrukking in de aanscherping van nationale en internationale exportcontroles, deelname aan het Proliferation Security Initiative, alsmede in levering van een bijdrage aan daadwerkelijke vernietiging van proliferatiegevoelige wapens en goederen. Zulks is echter niet voldoende; via internationale en bilaterale kanalen zal er tevens toe moeten worden bijgedragen proliferatiegevaarlijke situaties te voorkomen en waar ze reeds zijn opgetreden, terug te dringen. Daartoe zal onder meer de rol van de VN, en met name die van de Veiligheidsraad moeten worden versterkt, maar ook zal de Europese diplomatie krachtadiger moeten worden. Proliferatie-overwegingen dienen integraal onderdeel te vormen van het buitenlandse beleid, ook in Europees verband.

Na te streven resultaten in 2004

- + Versterkte non-proliferatie- en ontwapeningsinstrumenten en politieke herbevestiging van het belang van de verdragen.

- + Krachtige internationale en nationale handhaving van de bestaande richtlijnen van de exportcontroleregimes.

- + Verbeterde bescherming bevolking tegen mogelijk gebruik van nucleaire, biologische, chemische of radiologische middelen.

- + Verminderde voorraden, dan wel veilige opslag oude massavernietigingswapens in Russische Federatie, zoals verdragsmatig bepaald.

Activiteiten/instrumenten

- + Bevordering van betere naleving van afspraken in de ontwapeningsgremia en waar mogelijk ontplooiing van nieuwe initiatieven die een praktische bijdrage kunnen leveren aan non-proliferatie. In de EU, NAVO en in de bilaterale betrekkingen met bepaalde landen zal Nederland het onderwerp non-proliferatie in al haar aspecten hoog op de agenda plaatsen.

- + Integrale uitvoering van het Non-Proliferatieverdrag (NPV), zowel voorkoming als terugdringing van proliferatie van kernwapens.

- + Bevordering van naleving en universaliteit van het Chemische-Wapensverdrag. In dat kader ook inzet voor een financieel gezonde en effectieve Organisatie voor het Verbod op Chemische Wapens (OPCW).

- + Bevordering universaliteit van de Haagse Gedragscode tegen de proliferatie van ballistische raketten (HCOC) en uitwerking van de hierin vastgelegde bepalingen.

- + Bevordering van exportcontroles op NBC-goederen en -technologie in landen die geen lid zijn van de bestaande exportcontroleregimes, zoals de Australië-groep en de Nuclear Supplier Group.

- + Interdepartementaal overleg gericht op de versterking van de Nederlandse uitvoering exportcontroles op NBC-goederen en -technologie.

- + Strategische en systematische inzet van EU-instrumenten in bestrijding proliferatie in risicolanden en crisisgebieden. Via internationale en bilaterale kanalen landen van zorg aanspreken op naleving van

non-proliferatieverplichtingen.

+ Bijdragen aan opzet en uitwerking van civiele protectiemechanismen in EU en NAVO.

+ Deelname aan het «Proliferation Security Initiative».

+ Financieel bijdragen aan de vernietiging van chemische en nucleaire wapens en/of veilige opslag van restmateriaal in de Russische Federatie.

Middelen

+ Contributies aan Internationale Organisaties (OPCW, CTBTO, IAEA) en gerichte bijdragen uit het POBB voor specifieke activiteiten (artikel 2.7).

+ Financiële bijdrage uit het POBB voor vernietiging chemische wapens en nucleaire projecten in de Russische Federatie (artikel 2.7).

[...]

Hoofddoelstelling III. Europese samenwerking

[...]

Het externe beleid van de Europese Unie versterken

Geoperationaliseerde doelstelling 8

Het externe beleid van de Europese Unie versterken.

[...]

Activiteiten/instrumenten

[...]

+ Dialoog met kernpartners buiten de EU, in het bijzonder de VS over terrorisme en massavernietigingswapens.

[...]

Geoperationaliseerde doelstelling 9

Verbeterde relaties van de Europese Unie met derde landen.

[...]

9a. Transatlantische betrekkingen

Een solide en productieve transatlantische relatie is essentieel voor de internationale orde. De transatlantische relatie is echter niet ongeschonden uit de Irak-crisis gekomen.

Na te streven resultaten in 2004

+ Verbeterde afstemming van standpunten op het terrein van internationale veiligheid en beveiliging, stabiliteit en vredeshandhaving, en in het bijzonder de internationale terrorismebestrijding.

+ Verbeterde afstemming van standpunten inzake samenwerking op terreinen van economie, handel en ontwikkelingssamenwerking, met speciale aandacht voor de beheersing van handelsconflicten met de VS.

+ Voortgang bereiken in een nieuw onderhandelingsregime op het gebied van burgerluchtvaart (open skiesverdragen), inclusief het starten van onderhandelingen EU–VS, waarbij een rol op deelreinen voor de Commissie is weggelegd.

Activiteiten/instrumenten

+ Totstandkoming van gezamenlijke analyses en dialoog over de brede veiligheidsagenda.

+ Uitwerking van een public diplomacy beleid EU gericht op VS ten behoeve van beleidsbeïnvloeding van Amerikaanse beleidsmakers in het Congres.

+ Actieve inbreng in Brussel tijdens voorbereiding EU-VS/Canada toppen.

+ Actieve ondersteuning onderhandelingen EU-VS op het gebied van burgerluchtvaart (open skies verdragen), waaronder bijdragen aan totstandkoming van politieke overeenstemming over wijze waarop bilaterale onderhandelingen gevoerd kunnen (blijven) worden.

[...]

Beantwoording schriftelijke vragen over de begroting van het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

BSG-501/03 – 19 november 2003

[...]

Vraag 7

Op welke manier moeten naar het oordeel van de regering de opstelling en inzet van de Nederlandse regering aan de onderhandelingstafels van a) EU en b) NAVO veranderen na de uitbreiding van beide organisaties?

Antwoord

Het aantal kleinere lidstaten van de EU neemt vanaf 2004 aanmerkelijk toe. Het gevolg hiervan kan zijn dat grote lidstaten er in sterkere mate toe zullen neigen toenadering tot kleinere lidstaten te zoeken om tot overeenstemming te komen. Tegelijkertijd moet Nederland, zoals in het verleden en nu, erop zijn gericht om, afhankelijk van het beleidsterrein, steun te zoeken voor standpunten in wisselende coalities. Daartoe worden, met name voor beleidsterreinen waarvoor unanimitéit geldt, zoals het GBVB/EVDB, de contacten met de nieuwe lidstaten worden opgevoerd.

De uitbreiding van de Unie brengt voorts de complicatie met zich mee dat besluitvorming zal plaatsvinden met 25 in plaats van 15 Lidstaten, wat voor Nederland natuurlijk van bijzondere betekenis zal zijn tijdens het a.s. voorzitterschap in de tweede helft van 2004.

Wat de NAVO betreft, is niet voorzien in een veranderde Nederlandse opstelling en inzet na de uitbreiding. De NAVO blijft een op basis van consensus functionerende organisatie. Dit onderstreept voor de regering de noodzaak van verdere opbouw en onderhoud van een bilateraal netwerk, teneinde vroegtijdig de posities van bondgenoten te kennen en te beïnvloeden.

[...]

Vraag 36

Kan de regering met concrete voorbeelden uitleggen wat zij verstaat onder een ‘multilateraal beleid met tanden’?

Vraag 41

Hoe gaat de technische ondersteuning ten aanzien van het exportcontrolesysteem van landen die geen of beperkt onderdeel uitmaken van het wereldomspannende stelsel van afspraken omtrent non-proliferatie eruitzien?

Vraag 42

Welke landen zijn voor de regering ‘onderwerp van zorg en discussie’ als het gaat om nonproliferatie van massavernietigingswapens? Welke concrete ‘aanvulling en versterking van het bestaande systeem’ is volgens de regering nodig en welke voorstellen zal de regering ter zake doen?

Vraag 96

Welke “andere preventieve maatregelen” bedoelt de regering concreet als het gaat om nieuwe antwoorden op het grote gevaar van proliferatie van massavernietigingswapens.

Antwoord

Het multilaterale systeem biedt, bij goed functioneren, de beste mogelijkheden om internationale bedreigingen tegen te gaan. Daartoe is VN-brede normstelling belangrijk, maar tegelijkertijd niet genoeg. Uitvoering van resoluties, verdragen etc. is nodig. Het multilateraal systeem, bijvoorbeeld ten aanzien van non-proliferatie, moet sluitend worden gemaakt. In beginsel biedt een rol van de VN-Veiligheidsraad (bindende uitspraken op grond van Hoofdstuk VII van het VN-Handvest) daarvoor een oplossing. Maar in de praktijk schiet de controle op de naleving van verplichtingen in een aantal gevallen tekort, zonder dat een beroep op de Veiligheidsraad realistisch is. Tegelijkertijd staat de aard van veiligheidsbedreigingen (zoals terrorisme) niet uitsluitend een reactieve benadering toe, zodat naar aanvullende toepassingen moet worden gezocht.

Daarbij kan worden gedacht aan voorstellen zoals het “Proliferation Security Initiative”, bevordering van goede werking van de exportcontroleregimes, strategische en systematische inzet van de instrumenten van de Europese Unie bij de bestrijding van proliferatie en bevordering van de vernietiging van chemische en nucleaire wapens in de Russische Federatie. Het gaat daarbij dus om maatregelen die, binnen de kaders van het nationale en internationale recht, op concrete wijze de verspreiding van massavernietigingswapens en onderdelen daarvoor tegengaan.

Landen van zorg op het gebied van de proliferatie van massavernietigingswapens zijn die landen, ten aanzien waarvan vermoedens dan wel harde aanwijzingen bestaan dat zij op een of andere wijze betrokken zijn bij de

overdracht, verwerving of ontwikkeling van biologische, chemische, radiologische of nucleaire wapens, in strijd met de bestaande verdragen ter zake. Het gaat derhalve om algemene benadering, niet om een omschreven groep van landen.

Technische ondersteuning aan derde landen vindt op verschillende manieren plaats. Nederland heeft bilaterale samenwerkingsprojecten met Slowakije en Roemenië. Bedoeling van deze projecten is beide landen te ondersteunen bij het opzetten van een effectief wapenexportcontrole-beleid mede ter voorbereiding op hun toekomstige lidmaatschap van EU en NAVO. Ook de Europese Commissie en andere lidstaten assisteren EU kandidaat lidstaten, waar nodig, bij nationaal exportcontrolebeleid. De EU zet zich er ook voor in dat de kandidaat Lidstaten toetreden tot bestaande exportcontrole regimes. Daarnaast wordt, in het kader van het EU actieprogramma tegen de proliferatie van massavernietigingswapens, gesproken over een "peer review" van het exportcontrolebeleid in de EU lidstaten en kandidaat lidstaten. Tenslotte spelen de exportcontrole regimes een rol bij het verschaffen van technische informatie over vormgeving en uitvoering van exportcontroles aan landen die geen deel uitmaken van die regimes.

[...]

Vraag 48

Hoe beoordeelt de regering de recentelijk gewijzigde Iraanse opstelling inzake de voortzetting van het Iraanse nucleaire programma.

Antwoord

Het is verheugend dat de eensgezinde opstelling in de Board of Governors van de IAEA en het bezoek van de drie ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken van Duitsland, Frankrijk en het Verenigd Koninkrijk aan Teheran een perspectief heeft helpen openen op een politieke oplossing voor de veiligheidsrisico's samenhangend met het Iraanse nucleaire programma. Dit is een belangrijke eerste stap. De regering hoopt dat de Iraanse regering de nodige verdere stappen zal zetten die een dergelijke oplossing uiteindelijk mogelijk zullen maken.

[...]

Vraag 108

Heeft de regering kennisgenomen van berichten (onder andere in *Trouw* van 23 juli 2003) over wapenleveranties vanuit Trans-Dnjestrië aan terroristische organisaties? Doet Trans-Dnjestrië goede zaken met vrijwel elke belangrijke moslimorganisatie in de wereld? Bestaat bij internationale inlichtingendiensten (waaronder Interpol) het vermoeden dat Trans-Dnjestrië sinds 2001 nucleair materiaal verkoopt, waarmee massavernietigingswapens kunnen worden gemaakt?

Vraag 133

Op welke wijze zal de Nederlandse regering nog tijdens het voorzitterschap van de OVSE, maar ook daarna, de enorme wapenverkoop vanuit Trans-Dnjestrië aan schurkenstaten en terroristen aan de orde stellen met als doel dit aan banden te leggen?

Antwoord

De regering heeft kennisgenomen van het artikel in *Trouw* van 23 juli 2003 met betrekking tot wapenleveranties vanuit Transdnjestrië aan terroristische organisaties. De regering is bezorgd over mogelijke ongecontroleerde handel in wapens en andere militaire goederen vanuit Transdnjestrië. De regering hoopt dat een politieke regeling van het Moldavië-Transdnjestrië-conflict aan de fluïde situatie een einde zal maken.

Voorts beschikt de regering niet over informatie met betrekking tot mogelijke verkoop vanuit Transdnjestrië van nucleair materiaal, met het oog op de productie van massavernietigingswapens. Het Nederlandse OVSE Voorzitterschap zet zich in voor de totstandkoming van een politieke regeling van het Moldavisch/Transdnjestrisk conflict. Dit zal de weg vrijmaken voor het herstel van de rechtsstaat en democratie in de regio Transdnjestrië. Het aanpakken van de grensproblematiek vormt daarbij een belangrijk aandachtsgebied vanwege het gebrek aan effectieve grens- en douane controle langs de uiterst poreuze Moldavisch-Oekraïense grens. Daarnaast zijn in OVSE-verband algemene afspraken gemaakt over de bestrijding van illegale handel in kleine- en lichte wapens. Dit is van belang teneinde te voorkomen dat deze wapens in handen vallen van terroristische organisaties en/of partijen die via de reguliere handel niet aan deze wapens kunnen komen. Nederland speelt een actieve rol bij het verder uitwerken en de implementatie van deze afspraken. Een politieke regeling van het Moldavisch/Transdnjestrisk conflict zal het mogelijk maken geheel Moldavië, met inbegrip van Transdnjestrië, onder deze OVSE-afspraken te brengen.

[...]

Vraag 123

Wat is de Nederlandse visie op de rol van de NAVO? Hoe ziet de Nederlandse regering de hernieuwde taakstelling van de NAVO?

Antwoord

De visie van de Nederlandse regering op de rol van de NAVO is in diverse brieven aan de Kamer uiteengezet. In dit verband kan onder meer verwezen worden naar de brieven die naar de Tweede Kamer zijn verstuurd

naar aanleiding van de NAVO-Top in Praag (TK 28 676, nr. 5) alsmede naar aanleiding van de NAVO ministeriële bijeenkomsten in Reykjavik en Madrid (TK 26 348, nr. 6 en TK 26 348, nr. 7).

Het Bondgenootschap blijft onverminderd gericht op uitvoering van de taken zoals ze zijn beschreven in het Strategisch Concept uit 1999. Het gaat hier om de volgende vijf hoofdtaken: het nastreven van veiligheid door het bevorderen van democratische waarden; het bieden van een transatlantisch forum voor consultaties over veiligheidsbelangen; afschrikking en verdediging tegen dreiging van agressie tegen enige NAVO-lidstaat; bijdragen aan conflictpreventie en crisisbeheer, inclusief crisisbeheersingsoperaties; partnerschap, samenwerking en dialoog met andere landen in het Euro Atlantisch gebied. Nieuw zijn derhalve niet zozeer de taken van de NAVO, als wel dat, met instemming van Nederland, tijdens de NAVO-ministeriële bijeenkomst in Reykjavik (14–15 mei 2002) nadrukkelijk is bepaald dat de NAVO in staat moet zijn het hoofd te bieden aan dreigingen tegen NAVO-strijdkrachten, -bevolking en –grondgebied, ongeacht waar die dreigingen vandaar komen.

[...]

Vraag 125

Deelt de regering de mening dat betere afstemming tussen NAVO en EU (EVDB) noodzakelijk is? Hoe ziet de regering bijvoorbeeld de rol van de NAVO-Raad hierbij? Ondersteunt de regering de noodzaak van een sterkere rol van de Raad en betere samenwerking binnen de Raad? Zo ja, op welke wijze gaat de regering zich hier actief voor inzetten?

Vraag 126

Kan de regering een inhoudelijke toelichting geven op de volgende passage: “De samenwerking tussen EU en NAVO is op dit moment vooral gericht op samenwerking op het gebied van crisisbeheersingsoperaties. Nederland streeft al geruime tijd naar verbreding van de agenda”?

Vraag 128

Welke invloed zullen de recent geuite bezwaren van Amerikaanse zijde over de Europese defensiesamenwerking hebben op de ontwikkeling van het EVDB?

Vraag 131

Hoe kunnen conflicten als die over een mogelijk Europees hoofdkwartier in Tervuren tussen EU/EVDB en de NAVO/VS in de toekomst worden voorkomen?

Antwoord

Enkele jaren geleden is ingezet op een koers die gericht is op samenwerking tussen EU en NAVO. In de brief aan de Tweede Kamer over de toekomst van het EVDB in relatie tot de transatlantische betrekkingen is dat beleid uiteengezet (TK 21501-21502, nr 485).

Dit beleid heeft een stimulans gekregen door de totstandkoming van de regelingen over het gebruik door de EU van NAVO-middelen ("Berlijn-plus"). De samenwerking tussen EU en NAVO moet met kracht worden gehandhaafd. Zij krijgt onder meer gestalte door het inmiddels geïnstitutionaliseerde overleg tussen EU en NAVO, onder meer op het niveau van NAVO Raad en het Politiek en Veiligheidscomité van de EU. Het gaat hierbij niet zozeer om een sterkere rol van de NAVO-Raad, maar om het verder inhoud geven aan het reeds bestaande overleg tussen de relevante EU en NAVO-gremia. De regering zet zich hier voor in met als doel het bewerkstelligen van transparantie, coördinatie en samenwerking tussen beide organisaties en het vermijden van onnodige duplicatie. Door deze benadering kunnen tevens spanningen naar aanleiding van initiatieven als de vorming van een EU operationeel hoofdkwartier in Tervuren – een initiatief dat door Nederland en de meeste EU-lidstaten en NAVO-bondgenoten als onnodige duplicatie wordt gezien - worden vermeden danwel verminderd. Niettegenstaande de door de VS geuite bezwaren met betrekking tot zowel ‘Tervuren’ als ook bepaalde Conventie-artikelen die zullen worden besproken in het kader van de Intergouvernementele Conferentie, blijft de VS voorstander van een verdere ontwikkeling van het EVDB, indien zulks geschiedt in goede harmonie met de NAVO en op basis van de Berlijn-plus afspraken.

Voorts gaat het er ook om de EU-NAVO agenda niet alleen verder te verdiepen - waarbij te denken valt aan verdere samenwerking ten aanzien van de Balkan-regio en op het gebied van militaire capaciteiten- maar ook te verbreden. In dit verband kan worden verwezen naar de hierboven genoemde brief aan uw Kamer. Als onderwerpen voor verbreding van de agenda worden hier genoemd: terrorismebestrijding, het tegengaan van verspreiding van massavernietigingswapens en bescherming van de eigen bevolking tegen nucleaire, biologische en chemische aanvallen. Tevens zijn ontwikkelingen in Afghanistan, de EU veiligheidsstrategie en het NAVO Strategisch Concept goede aanknopingspunten voor verdere dialoog en afstemming tussen EU en NAVO.

[...]

Vraag 135

Wat is het EU beleid ten opzichte van Pakistan en India als het gaat om massavernietigingswapens? Wat is de Nederlandse inzet hierbij?

Antwoord

Binnen de EU wordt momenteel gewerkt aan de uitwerking van het actieplan tegen de proliferatie van massavernietigingswapens dat door de Europese Raad van Thessaloniki werd aangenomen. In het kader van het actieplan is een Common Position uitgewerkt inzake de bevordering van de universaliteit van ondermeer het Non-proliferatieverdrag, waartoe ook India en Pakistan zouden moeten toetreden. Een tweede element van dit plan is het voornemen in alle overeenkomsten tussen de EU en derde landen proliferatieclausules in te voeren. Momenteel wordt door de Commissie een inventarisatie gemaakt van overeenkomsten waarop dergelijke clausules betrekking zou kunnen hebben. Nederland zet daarbij in op een zo helder mogelijke koppeling tussen de voordelen die samenwerking met de EU kan hebben enerzijds en aanvaardbaar gedrag op het gebied van proliferatie van massavernietigingswapens anderzijds. Daarbij kan worden opgemerkt, dat wat India betreft er geen aanwijzingen zijn dat dit land zelf als bron voor proliferatie naar derde landen optreedt.

Vraag 136

Hoe beoordeelt de regering de ontwikkeling van mini-nukes in de VS? Is de ontwikkeling van deze mini-nukes een schending van het Non-Proliferatieverdrag? Welke acties heeft de Nederlandse regering bilateraal dan wel multilateraal genomen om haar bezorgdheid over de ontwikkeling van mini-nukes en de schending van het NPV bij de Amerikaanse regering te uiten?

Antwoord

Zie de beantwoording van vragen van het Lid Karimi over hetzelfde onderwerp (TK 28473, nr 3). In aanvulling daarop kan worden gesteld dat de ontwikkeling van kernwapens door een land dat onder het Non-Proliferatieverdrag de status van kernwapenstaat heeft, als zodanig niet in strijd is met dat verdrag. Niettemin zou de mogelijke ontwikkeling van nieuwe - kleine - kernwapens, en een eventueel daarmee verbonden veranderende nucleaire doctrine, in tegenspraak zijn met de resultaten van de Toetsingsconferenties van het Nonproliferatieverdrag van 1995 en 2000. De regering vindt dat onwenselijk. Zij heeft de regering van de VS van deze zorgen op de hoogte gebracht.

Vraag 137

Is de bescherming van de bevolking tegen NBC- of radiologische middelen thans adequaat?

Antwoord

De coördinatie van de bescherming van de bevolking tegen (het gebruik van) NBC- of radiologische (R) middelen is een verantwoordelijkheid voor de Minister van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties. Op 18 september 2003 is de tweede NBCvoortgangsrapportage aangaande de voorbereiding in Nederland op mogelijke terroristische aanslagen met nucleaire, chemische of biologische middelen aan de Tweede Kamer aangeboden (TK 27925 nr. 99). In deze voortgangsrapportage staan de - in Nederland – genomen maatregelen en de nog lopende beleidsinitiatieven beschreven. Aangezien het nimmer mogelijk zal zijn alle denkbare eventualiteiten af te dekken wordt een groot belang gehecht aan goede internationale afspraken om in ernstige gevallen ook een beroep te kunnen doen op relevante capaciteiten van bevriende landen. Het ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken zet zich er derhalve voor in om binnen de EU en de NAVO verdere afspraken te maken over een internationale *pool* voor beschermingscapaciteit, alsook over de modaliteiten om die capaciteit in te kunnen zetten voor de bescherming van bevolking van EU-leden en NAVO-bondgenoten.

[...]

Vaststelling van de begrotingsstaat van het Ministerie van Defensie (X) voor het jaar 2004; Verslag nota-overleg van 20 oktober 2003 over bezuinigingen op Defensie

29200X – nr. 46 – 4 november 2003

[...] **De heer Timmermans (PvdA):** [...]Is goed gekeken naar de mogelijke sluiting van Volkel? Wat is de moderniteit van de vliegbasis Twenthe vergeleken met de moderniteit van de vliegbasis Volkel? Als de argumentatie is dat Volkel niet kan worden gesloten omdat daar nucleaire wapens zijn opgeborgen, dan is het voor mijn fractie glashelder: de nucleaire wapens hoeven daar niet te blijven, daar is geen enkele reden voor. Als de Amerikanen zo makkelijk POMS-sites kunnen sluiten in Vriezeveen en Brunssum met als argument dat die na het einde van de koude oorlog niet meer noodzakelijk zijn, dan is naar het oordeel van mijn fractie dezelfde argumentatie geldig voor de opslag van kernwapens in Volkel. Dat hoeft dan ook niet meer. [...]

Mevrouw Van Velzen (SP): [...] Wat betreft de luchtmacht wil ik de keuze voor Twenthe uitgelegd krijgen, evenals die met betrekking tot Volkel. Even belangrijk is de vraag wat wij met de kernwapentaak van Volkel doen. De regering geeft terecht prioriteit aan de bestrijding van massavernietigingswapens, maar dan moet er ook naar deze wapens in Nederland worden gekeken. Daarvoor hoeft je geen luchtmachtbasis af te schaffen. Je hoeft ook niet te kiezen voor Twenthe of Volkel. Het lijkt mij wel zinvol deze taak af te schaffen en een replica in het legermuseum in Delft te plaatsen als er zo moeilijk afstand van kan worden gedaan. Dat zou de regering sieren. Is zij bereid om deze kernwapentaak af te stoten, de wapens terug te sturen naar de VS en een replica in Delft neer te leggen? [...]

Mevrouw Van Velzen (SP): [...] Ik neem aan dat mijn vragen over de kernbewapening op Volkel niet schriftelijk worden beantwoord.

Staatssecretaris Van der Knaap: Volgens mij krijgt u daar iedere keer hetzelfde antwoord op. [...]

Mevrouw Van Velzen (SP): [...] Graag wil ik nog een reactie op mijn vraag over kernbewapening op Volkel. Hoewel het misschien hetzelfde is, ik wil het graag nogmaals horen in de hoop dat er eens een keer verandering in dit beleid komt. [...]

Mevrouw Karimi (GroenLinks): [...] Wat de vliegbasis Twenthe betreft, vond ik de redenerend sluitend behalve waar het ging om de keuze voor Twenthe en niet voor Volkel. De minister is er niet op ingegaan of daarbij de stationering van kernwapens in Volkel een rol heeft gespeeld. De minister heeft er geen woord aan vuil gemaakt. Graag krijg ik nog een antwoord hierop. [...]

De heer Herben (LPF): [...] Terecht stelt mevrouw Karimi dat de sluiting van Volkel pas aan de orde is als een Kamermeerderheid besluit om de nucleaire taak van Nederland af te stoten. Aangezien die Kamermeerderheid er naar mijn inzicht niet is, is de discussie over dit onderwerp academisch. [...]

Mevrouw Van Velzen (SP): Mevrouw Karimi heeft terecht gevraagd of de kernwapentaak iets te maken heeft met de keuze om niet Volkel maar Twenthe te sluiten. De heer Herben draait de redenering om. Hij zegt dat Volkel niet dicht kan, omdat er een kernwapentaak is. Dat kan hij toch niet menen? In dat geval raad ik mensen van de vliegbasis Twenthe aan om zo snel mogelijk kernwapens op de basis te leggen. Dan komt het namelijk wel goed. Dat is toch niet de redenering?

De heer Herben (LPF): Het personeel van de vliegbasis Twenthe beslist daar niet over, want dan zou het wel een bommetje hebben overgebracht.

Mevrouw Van Velzen (SP): Je kunt ze zo in Rusland kopen.

De heer Herben (LPF): De contacten die u heeft, heb ik helaas niet. Wij moeten de discussie in juiste volgorde voeren. Op de vliegbasis Volkel zijn Amerikaanse kernwapens opgeslagen. Vroeger was dat een geheim, maar kennelijk is het nu openbaar. Zolang honderden Nederlandse en Amerikaanse militairen betrokken zijn bij de beveiliging ervan, kun je de geluidshindercontouren van Twenthe en Volkel wel vergelijken, maar dat is dan een puur academisch verhaal.

Eerst moet de Kamer de vraag aan de orde stellen of de regering bereid is de kernwapentaak af te stoten. Op dat punt zit ik op dezelfde lijn als mevrouw Karimi. Ik vermoed dat de regering niet bereid is de taak nu af te stoten – de LPF-fractie zal haar daarbij steunen – omdat dat een buitengewoon slecht signaal zou zijn aan de NAVO en de Verenigde Staten. Wij bezuinigen nu sterk op defensie en daarop komt grote kritiek vanuit het bondgenootschap. Het ook nog afstoten van een «kerntaak» zou heel slecht zijn voor het Nederlandse imago in het buitenland. Daarom vind ik de hele discussie academisch. [...]

De heer Bakker (D66): [...] De heer Herben zei terecht dat Volkel ook een kernwapentaak heeft, maar je zou ook in de overweging mee kunnen nemen dat de Amerikanen zich over twee jaar misschien terugtrekken. Laten wij de vrijheid nemen om een reële afweging te maken.

De heer Herben (LPF): Dan moet je eerst weten waar je aan toe bent. Hebt u van de Amerikanen gehoord dat zij die nucleaire wapens gaan terugtrekken of gaat u in het kabinet inbrengen dat u tegen een kernwapentaak bent voor Nederland? In dat geval weten wij waarover wij het hebben, want anders praten wij in de ruimte.

De heer Bakker (D66): Ik vind dat het niet tot onze primaire afweging behoort of de Amerikanen toevallig op Volkel willen blijven. De primaire keuze tussen Twenthe en Volkel moet gemaakt worden op basis van een aantal afwegingen en daarbij staan defensieafwegingen voorop. [...]

Mevrouw Karimi (GL): Kernwapentaken betreffen toch een defensieoverweging?

De heer Bakker (D66): Dat is juist. Laat ik het anders zeggen. Ik vind die kernwapentaak niet zo essentieel en niet op voorhand gebonden aan de lokatie Volkel dat het dus Volkel moet zijn. Er zou dan op een soort onuitgesproken motief vóór Volkel en tégen Twenthe zijn gekozen en vervolgens wordt een hele redenering opgezet die niet op die primaire overweging ingaat. Ik vind dat dit punt boven tafel moet komen en dat wij dat niet onuitgesproken moeten laten. [...]

Minister Kamp: [...] Er is gevraagd of er geheime argumenten zijn met betrekking tot kernwapens. Over kernwapens op Volkel heb ik nog nooit wat gemeld en daar meld ik ook nooit wat over. De redenen daarvoor hebben wij de Kamer al enkele malen uiteengezet. Daar zijn strategische redenen voor. De Kamer weet hoe dat zit. Ik kan wel aangegeven dat die kernwapens bij ons besluit geen enkele rol hebben gespeeld. Er is dus geen geheime agenda. [...]

Tweede Kamer

Voortzetting van de behandeling van het wetsvoorstel Vaststelling van de begrotingsstaat van het Ministerie van Defensie (X) voor het jaar 2004 (29200 X)

Handelingen nr. 14 – blz. 806-841 – 30 oktober 2003

[...] **Mevrouw van Velzen (SP):** [...] Motie,

De Kamer,

gehoord de beraadslaging,

constaterende dat de Nederlandse regering grote prioriteit geeft aan de strijd tegen massavernietigingswapens;

overwegende dat op Nederlands grondgebied Amerikaanse kernwapens zijn opgeslagen;

verzoekt de regering, contact op te nemen met de Amerikaanse regering teneinde een einde te maken aan de aanwezigheid van Amerikaanse kernwapens op Nederlands grondgebied (Volkel) en daarover de Kamer te rapporteren,

en gaat over tot de orde van de dag.

De voorzitter: Deze motie is voorgesteld door het lid Van Velzen. Naar mij blijkt, wordt zij voldoende ondersteund. Zij krijgt nr. 30 (29200-X). [...]

Minister Kamp: Mevrouw Van Velzen heeft een motie ingediend over de Amerikaanse kernwapens. Ik kan haar motie op stuk nr. 30 niet anders dan krachtig ontraden. [...]

Tweede Kamer

Stemmingen in verband met het wetsvoorstel Vaststelling van de begrotingsstaat van het Ministerie van Defensie (X) voor het jaar 2004 (29200 X)

Handelingen nr. 19 – blz. 1179-1181 – 14 november 2003

[...] **De voorzitter:** [...] In stemming komt de motie-Van Velzen (29200-X, nr. 30). Ik constateer dat de aanwezige leden van de fracties van de SP, GroenLinks en de PvdA voor deze motie hebben gestemd en die van de overige fracties ertegen, zodat zij is verworpen. [...]

Nuclear Planning Group

Ministerial Meeting of the Defence Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group held in Brussels on Thursday, 12 June 2003

Final Communiqué

1. The Defence Planning Committee and Nuclear Planning Group of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation met in Ministerial Session in Brussels on 12 June 2003. Our colleagues from the seven countries invited to join the Alliance took part in our discussions in the Defence Planning Committee.

[...]

10. At this, our first meeting as Nuclear Planning Group after the Prague Summit, we reviewed the status of NATO's nuclear forces and addressed related issues and activities. We reaffirmed the principles underpinning NATO's nuclear forces as set out in the Alliance's Strategic Concept. We continue to place great value on the nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO, which provide an essential political and military linkage between the European and the North American members of the Alliance.

11. We welcomed the recent entry into force of the May 2002 Moscow Treaty between the United States and Russia on Strategic Offensive Reductions. We agreed that this Treaty represents an important step in establishing more favourable conditions for actively promoting security and cooperation, and enhancing international stability.

12. The Alliance's goal to enhance global security will continue to be strengthened through our support for arms control and non-proliferation. In this regard, we expressed concern over violations of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime and, in particular, over recent pronouncements by the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea that it had withdrawn from the Treaty and that it was in possession of nuclear weapons. We strongly urged it to dismantle immediately any nuclear weapons programme in a verifiable, transparent and irreversible manner. We urge all nations to continue to work together to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We reaffirmed our determination to contribute to the implementation of the conclusions of the 2000 NPT Review Conference and welcomed the accession of Cuba and East Timor to the Treaty.

13. We welcome the invitation extended to Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia and look forward to meeting them in this forum as full Alliance members. We endorsed a time-phased programme to inform them about Alliance nuclear issues, designed specifically to prepare them to participate effectively in discussions of Alliance nuclear policy when they are members. Given their full support of NATO's Strategic Concept, including the essential role that nuclear forces play in the Alliance's strategy of preservation of peace and prevention of war or any kind of coercion, the new members will strengthen security for all in the Euro-Atlantic area.

14. We noted with satisfaction that, based on our guidance issued in June last year, NATO's dual-capable aircraft posture has been further adapted and readiness requirements for these aircraft have been further relaxed. We welcome the ongoing work of the High Level Group as it continues to discuss deterrence requirements in the new security environment and to provide advice to Ministers as appropriate.

15. We welcomed the agreement with the Russian Federation on a Work Plan for nuclear experts' consultations under the auspices of the NATO-Russia Council. We agree with the plan to focus in the near term on nuclear weapons safety and security, but we also expressed our strong view that the nuclear Confidence and Security Building Measures proposed by NATO in December 2000 should be addressed in these consultations. We look forward to the next practical steps to further implement this important Work Plan.

Nuclear Planning Group

Ministerial Meeting of the Defence Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group held in Brussels on Monday, 1 December 2003

Final Communiqué

1. The Defence Planning Committee and Nuclear Planning Group met in Ministerial Session on 1 December 2003. Our colleagues from the seven countries invited to join the Alliance took part in our discussions in the Defence Planning Committee.

[...]

5. NATO's defence planning processes and the relevant EU processes must result in coherent and mutually reinforcing capability development, not least to support the greatest possible efficiency and cost-effectiveness in our defence spending. In this context, we should vigorously continue to implement those aspects of the Berlin-Plus arrangements relevant to defence planning.

[...]

8. At our Nuclear Planning Group meeting, we reviewed the status of NATO's nuclear forces and the work of the High Level Group. It is a long-standing goal of the Alliance to enhance security and stability at the lowest possible level of forces consistent with its requirements for collective defence and the full range of its missions. In keeping with this goal, we continue to consider deterrence requirements for the 21st century. We reaffirmed the principles underpinning NATO's security objectives as set out in the Alliance's Strategic Concept.

9. The nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO continue to provide an essential political and military link between the European and North American members of the Alliance. They are maintained at readiness levels consistent with the prevailing security environment. We noted with appreciation the continuing contribution made by the United Kingdom's independent nuclear forces to deterrence and the overall security of the Allies, and reaffirmed the value of this capability.

10. We discussed the growing danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and expressed our serious concern over recent acts of non-compliance with obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which may have negative consequences for regional stability and security. We reaffirmed our full commitment to the NPT and to the goal of universal adherence to it. We recognized the NPT as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and reiterated our continuing commitment to all our obligations under this Treaty. We urge all nations to work together to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

11. We reaffirmed the importance of substantial and productive exchanges by nuclear experts under the auspices of the NATO-Russia Council with a view to gaining better mutual understanding, more confidence and thereby increased security. We are encouraged by the progress achieved in these consultations, in particular the prospect of a series of field demonstrations on nuclear weapon safety and security issues.

Resolution 327 on Non-Proliferation in the 21st Century?

(presented by the Science and Technology Committee)

Policy recommendations – November 2003 – Orlando, Florida

The Assembly,

1. Recognising that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is a grave threat to international security in the 21st century;
2. Alarmed by the potential nexus between the emergence of a new type of international terrorism and the proliferation of WMD;
3. Convinced that the events of September 11, 2001 generated international resolve to fight the proliferation of expertise, technologies and materials that can be used by states as well as terrorists to develop WMD;
4. Aware that rapid advances in science and technology, as well as their rapid diffusion in a globally networked world, promote economic and cultural development but also create new vulnerabilities;
5. Extremely concerned that terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda are actively attempting to acquire chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological weapons for use in terrorist attacks;
6. Particularly worried that North Korea is pursuing the development of nuclear weapons and is also believed to possess chemical weapons and an infrastructure that could be used to produce biological weapons;
7. Alarmed by the risks of proliferation presented by Iran's nuclear power programme, and persuaded that Iran must implement the actions specified in the resolution adopted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors on 12 September 2003 and the commitments contained in the agreed statement of 21 October 2003 upon the visit of the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany and the United Kingdom to Iran;
8. Recognising the contribution to nuclear non-proliferation of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, that eliminated nuclear weapons from their soil;
9. Convinced that a wide range of instruments may be employed to counter WMD proliferation: universalisation of multilateral treaties and verification mechanisms; national and internationally co-ordinated export controls; co-operative threat reduction programmes; political and economic levers; interdiction of illegal procurement activities on the basis of international and national law; and, as a last resort, coercive measures in accordance with the United Nations Charter and Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty;
10. Strongly persuaded that to maximise effectiveness in reducing the scope of the threat of WMD, an effective international response requires a co-ordinated transatlantic approach;
11. Welcoming the initiatives adopted by NATO at its 2002 Prague Summit to deter, prevent, counter, and respond to the threat and potential use of WMD;
12. URGES member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
 - a. to strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) by implementing the conclusions of the 1995 NPT Conference as well as the Final Document from the 2000 NPT Review Conference and by making the IAEA Additional Protocol mandatory for members of the NPT;
 - b. to press the de facto nuclear weapon states that remain outside the NPT India, Israel and Pakistan to sign both the NPT and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty;
 - c. to support the Six Party Talks in seeking a diplomatic solution to completely, verifiably and irreversibly eliminate the nuclear weapons programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, placing all North Korean installations and activities under IAEA safeguards, abandoning the North Korean uranium enrichment programme, and suspending all plutonium extraction at the Yongbyon facility;
 - d. to press Iran to continue to co-operate with the IAEA by providing complete information about its nuclear activities, in accordance with the actions specified in the resolution adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors on 12 September 2003 and the commitments contained in the agreed statement of 21 October 2003 upon the visit of the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany and the United Kingdom;
 - e. to encourage the governments of Russia and the United States to implement the Moscow Treaty and to work to ensure the security of their arsenals of tactical nuclear weapons; refrain from expanding their existing arsenals; work towards an agreement regarding further reductions of such weapons; and work together to discourage or prevent the acquisition of such weapons by other nations;

- f. to amend existing international conventions to also include a ban on the possession and use of radiological weapons;
- g. to strengthen the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons by maintaining the principle of independent, transparent and sound management, by promoting universal adherence and effective national implementation and by increasing emphasis on verification of non-compliance, which should include the use of challenge inspections;
- h. to widen the membership of the Biological Weapons Convention and strengthen its obligations – including mechanisms for compliance and verification – national implementation measures, including penal legislation, and control over pathogenic micro-organisms and toxins within the frameworks of the Convention;
- i. to strengthen export control regimes by controlling the transfer of classified information that could be used to manufacture chemical and biological weapons; by restricting access to genetic information on dangerous pathogens while remaining sensitive to legitimate scientific, medical, or other research;
- j. to support the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) as an initiative to develop political commitments and practical co-operation to help impede and stop the flow of WMD, their systems and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of concern;
- k. to implement the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction and to expand co-operative threat reduction initiatives to other countries outside Russia and the Newly Independent States (NIS), for instance by providing assistance to India and Pakistan in protecting their nuclear material; helping China in its WMD interdiction and anti-smuggling efforts; and helping Iraq to secure WMD-related materials;
- l. to expand the 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material to cover nuclear material used in civilian programmes, storage and transport, and civil nuclear facilities;
- m. to provide all the necessary capabilities and resources for NATO's Nuclear, Biological and Chemical defence initiatives, including the deployable NBC analytical laboratory, the NBC response cell, the training and education centre, the NATO vaccine stockpile co-ordination, the disease surveillance team, as well as the multinational NATO NBC Defence Battalion and the NATO WMD Centre.

European Union**Presidency Conclusions**

Thessaloniki – 19-20 June 2003 (Excerpts)

VIII. EXTERNAL RELATIONS, CFSP AND ESDP EU Security Strategy**Iraq**

91. The fall of the government of Saddam Hussein has paved the way for the people of Iraq to enjoy a peaceful, secure and prosperous future.

92. The European Council welcomes the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1483, which demonstrates a new spirit of co-operation within the international community. We believe that it provides the basis for effective international support for the initial stages of Iraq's political transition while ensuring adequate revenues for humanitarian assistance and reconstruction.

93. The European Council welcomes the appointment of Sergio Vieira de Mello as the UN Secretary General's Special Representative for Iraq. It looks forward to an important United Nations contribution to the process leading to the formation, as soon as possible, of a representative Iraqi government, in which the UN can use its unique capacity and experience in post-conflict nation building. It invites the Commission and Member States to support the UN Special Representative in the fulfilment of his mandate.

94. The European Union reiterates its commitment to the development of a prosperous and stable Iraq with a representative government and a thriving civil society with which it can develop mutually beneficial relations. The appointment of an Iraqi interim administration will be an important first step towards this goal.

95. The European Council welcomes the improving humanitarian situation but remains concerned by the continuing challenge to provide security to the civilian population. Law and order is a precondition for the sustainable reconstruction of the country. The European Council notes that certain Member States and Acceding Countries are contributing to creating conditions of stability and security in Iraq following UNSC Resolution 1483.

96. The European Union stands ready to participate in the reconstruction of Iraq within the framework of UNSC Resolution 1483. The European Council invites the Commission and the High Representative to submit proposals for an EU contribution.

97. The European Union will continue its active and substantial involvement in the field of humanitarian relief. It looks forward to the Donor's Consultative Meeting hosted by UNDP in New York on 24 June.

98. We reiterate our call on Iraq's neighbours to support stability in Iraq and in the region and our willingness to contribute through deepening dialogue and co-operation in all fields with the Arab and Islamic worlds.

Iran

99. The European Council discussed developments in relations with Iran. On Iran's nuclear programme, it has taken note of the statement issued yesterday by the Chairperson of the IAEA Board of Governors. It reiterates its full support for the IAEA in its efforts to conduct a comprehensive examination of Iran's nuclear programme. It expresses serious concern at some aspects of the Iranian programme, in particular as regards the closing of the nuclear fuel cycle, especially the uranium centrifuge, announced by president Khatami. The European Council expects Iran to make good its commitment, reaffirmed at yesterday's IAEA meeting, to full transparency. It calls on Iran to be fully cooperative vis-à-vis the IAEA in all its nuclear activities and urgently and unconditionally to sign, ratify and implement an Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement. This would be a significant step towards creating the much-needed confidence.

100. The European Union will continue to monitor closely developments on this and all other areas of concern in its relations with Iran. It stresses in particular the need for significant positive developments on human rights, including the handling of the recent demonstrations, terrorism and the MEPP. It reiterates that progress in these matters and strengthened dialogue and cooperation are interdependent, essential and mutually reinforcing elements of EU-Iran relations.

North Korea

101. The European Council remains seriously concerned at North Korea's nuclear programme and its failure to comply with its IAEA safeguards agreement, which undermine the non-proliferation regime. The Council calls on North Korea to refrain from any action that would further aggravate the problem. It also urges North Korea to visibly, verifiably and irreversibly dismantle its nuclear programme, as a fundamental step to facilitate a comprehensive and peaceful solution, and to return to full compliance with its international non-proliferation obligations. The European Union reaffirms its readiness to contribute to a multilateral diplomatic

solution to the crisis and expresses support for the Peace and Prosperity Policy followed by the Republic of Korea.

[...]

ANNEX II

DECLARATION ON NON PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

1. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means of delivery such as ballistic missiles is a growing threat to international peace and security. A number of states have sought or are seeking to develop such weapons. The risk that terrorists will acquire chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear materials adds a new dimension to this threat.

2. The European Union cannot ignore these dangers. WMD and missile proliferation puts at risk the security of our states, our peoples and our interests around the world. Meeting this challenge must be a central element in the EU external action, including the common foreign and security policy. Our objective is to deter, halt and, where possible, reverse proliferation programmes of concern worldwide.

3. Drawing on the Basic Principles already established, we are committed to further elaborate before the end of the year a coherent EU strategy to address the threat of proliferation, and to continue to develop and implement the EU Action Plan as a matter of priority. Our starting point will be a comprehensive and regularly updated threat analysis. Our approach will be guided by our commitment to uphold and implement the multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and agreements; our support for the multilateral institutions charged respectively with verification and upholding of compliance with these treaties; our commitment to strong national and internationally-coordinated export controls; and our commitment to co-operate with the United States and other partners who share our objectives. We recognise that appropriate steps towards the goal of general and complete disarmament can contribute to furthering non-proliferation objectives; and we are determined to play our part in addressing the problems of regional instability and insecurity and the situations of conflict which lie behind many weapons programmes, recognising that instability does not occur in a vacuum.

4. We have a wide range of instruments available: multilateral treaties and verification mechanisms; national and internationally-coordinated export controls; co-operative threat reduction programmes; political and economic levers; interdiction of illegal procurement activities; and, as a last resort, coercive measures in accordance with the UN Charter. While all are necessary, none is sufficient in itself. We need to strengthen them all, and deploy those which are most effective in each case.

5. The European Union has special strengths and experience to bring to this collective effort. In further implementing our Action Plan, we will focus in particular on:

- universalising further the key disarmament and non-proliferation treaties, agreements and arrangements, and where necessary strengthening them, and in particular the means of ensuring compliance with their provisions. We emphasise that full compliance lies at the core of the co-operative approach to collective security and is a pre-condition for international stability and security;
- enhancing our political, financial and technical support for agencies in charge of verification. In particular, we are determined to bring into force our IAEA Additional Protocols before the end of 2003;
- fostering the role of the UN Security Council, and enhancing its expertise in meeting the challenge of proliferation;
- strengthening export control policies and practices within the European Union and beyond, in co-ordination with Partners;
- strengthening identification, control and interception of illegal shipments, including national criminal sanctions against those who contribute to illicit procurement efforts;
- enhancing the security of proliferation-sensitive materials, equipment and expertise in the European Union against unauthorised access and risks of diversion;
- reinforcing EU co-operative threat reduction programmes with third countries, targeted at support for disarmament, control and security of sensitive materials, facilities and expertise;
- ways to deploy the EU's political, diplomatic and economic influence most effectively in support of our non-proliferation objectives. EU economic cooperation or development assistance with third countries should take account of WMD proliferation concerns;
- setting up a unit within the Council Secretariat, which would function as a monitoring centre, entrusted with the monitoring of the consistent implementation of the Action Plan and the collection of information and intelligence.

6. We request the Council, as a matter of urgency, to take forward this work, on the basis of the Action Plan an drawing on the Basic Principles agreed on 16 June.

Joint Statement: European Council President Konstandinos Simitis, European Commission President Romano Prodi and US President George W. Bush on the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

EU-US Summit -The White House - Washington, DC - June 25, 2003

Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems constitutes a major threat to international peace and security. The threat is compounded by the interest of terrorists in acquiring WMD. This would undermine the foundations of international order. We pledge to use all means available to avert WMD proliferation and the calamities that would follow.

- We will work together to strengthen the international system of treaties and regimes against the spread of WMD. This implies the development of new regimes, as appropriate, and reinforcement of existing regimes. We will pursue the goal of universal membership of relevant multilateral treaties and agreements.

- We will seek to ensure strict implementation and compliance. We are willing to work with all those who respect international non-proliferation norms; we are committed to dealing effectively with those who ignore them or cheat.

- We will support, when necessary, non-routine inspections.

- We recognise that, if necessary, other measures in accordance with international law may be needed to combat proliferation.

- We will work together to deploy our combined political and diplomatic influence most effectively in support of our non-proliferation objectives.

- We will work together to develop further a common assessment of global proliferation threats.

We welcome the statement on non-proliferation by European Union Heads of State and Government at Thessaloniki and the G8 Declaration of the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. We reaffirm our joint commitment to relevant treaties and agreements, in particular the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. We will work together in all areas to stop and reverse proliferation.

In particular:

- We will explore ways to make the International Atomic Energy Agency's Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols a standard for nuclear cooperation and non-proliferation. We urge all States with nuclear facilities or activities to ratify and implement these Agreements and Protocols without delay. Furthermore, on an urgent and exceptional basis, taking account of the increase in the Agency's workload in this area, we will support an adequate increase in the IAEA safeguards budget to ensure the credibility of the IAEA's verification system.

- We will strengthen both export controls on materials and technologies related to WMD and their delivery systems as well as their enforcement and implementation. We believe that national controls should include criminal penalties for the illegal export, transshipment or brokering of weapons of mass destruction, missile delivery systems, and materials or technology for use in WMD or missile programmes. We will work together with like-minded partners to tighten export controls, where necessary providing assistance to create and improve effective, enforceable national export control systems. We agree to introduce catch-all provisions, where appropriate. We will share information so as to identify new patterns of procurement by State and non-State actors. We will seek new methods to stop the proliferation trade to and from countries and entities of proliferation concern.

- We will work together in the framework of the BTWC to strengthen national control over pathogenic micro-organisms and toxins and, in the framework of the CWC, to foster the elimination of all chemical weapons.

- We will strengthen identification, control and interdiction of illegal shipments, including national criminal sanctions against those who contribute to illicit procurement efforts.

- We emphasise the importance of cooperative threat reduction programmes with third countries.

We will cooperate actively to address specific proliferation challenges. In particular:

- We condemn North Korea's nuclear weapons programme and its failure to comply with the IAEA safeguards agreement, which undermine the non-proliferation regime. We call on North Korea to refrain from any action that would further aggravate the problem. We strongly urge North Korea to visibly, verifiably and irreversibly dismantle that programme and to come into full compliance with international non-proliferation obligations, as a fundamental step to facilitate a comprehensive and peaceful solution.

- We express our continuing serious concern at Iran's nuclear programme in particular as regards the pursuit of a full nuclear fuel cycle, as announced by President Khatami. We are troubled by the information in the IAEA's report detailing Iran's failures to meet its safeguards obligations and we fully support ongoing investigation by the IAEA to answer the unresolved questions and concerns identified in that report. Iran must

cooperate fully with the IAEA, remedy all failures and answer all questions. It must also sign and implement an Additional Protocol, without delay or conditions, as a significant first step towards addressing those concerns.

- We remain concerned at the pursuit of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and missiles for their delivery by a number of other States. We will continue to monitor these closely and to exchange information, including with other concerned States.

Proliferation is a threat not only to our security, but also to the wider international system. We call for a halt to proliferation activities in a way that is demonstrable and verifiable. Non-proliferation is a global challenge which requires a multifaceted solution. We need to tackle it individually and collectively - working together and with other partners, including through relevant international institutions, in particular those of the United Nations system.

PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE

DOCUMENTEN

US State Department

State Department Briefing

9 October 2003

[...] QUESTION: Can you tell us anything about John Bolton's talks in London -- PSI meeting?

QUESTION: Well, you have (inaudible).

MR. BOUCHER: Give him a break. He's in London. Okay? (Laughter.)

Under Secretary Bolton is currently in London discussing issues related to the Proliferation Security Initiative. In September, the core group of the Proliferation Security Initiative participants agreed to a statement of interdiction principles. The London meeting now follows on that document as participant countries discuss how to work together to implement those principles.

An essential component of our counter-proliferation strategy is to work with other concerned states to develop new means to disrupt the proliferation trade at sea, in the air and on land. The Proliferation Security Initiative reflects the need for a more dynamic and proactive approach to the global proliferation problem. So they're getting together to continue to move quickly, as this initiative as, on how to implement the principles of interdiction that we have agreed upon. [...]

UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office

The Proliferation Security Initiative serves notice to WMD traffickers

Press release – 10 October 2003

Following the Proliferation Security Initiative Meeting held in London from 8 to 10 October, the Foreign Secretary said today:

'The London meeting of participants in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which concluded today, represents another step towards the Initiative's goal: preventing trafficking in Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and associated technologies.

'As I said at UNGA, the illicit trade in WMD-related materials is a serious threat to international peace and security. It raises the awful spectre of the world's most dangerous and unstable regimes, and its most ruthless terrorists, gaining access to the world's most terrifying and powerful weapons. The Proliferation Security Initiative provides a framework for practical measures to address that danger.

'More than 50 countries from every corner of the globe have already expressed support for the Initiative's aims and scope. I hope that that number will increase. Some want to make a more active contribution. I welcome those offers. This is not a matter of concern to just a few countries or regions of the world but to the entire international community. A global menace requires a collective global response.

'The PSI serves notice to proliferators that the international community is determined to take concrete steps to prevent trafficking in WMD and related technology. The UK will be working with other participants in the coming months to turn the PSI into operational reality.'

Notes for editors

1. The UK was represented at senior official level.
2. The meeting spanned three days. On 8 October, the UK led a table-top air interception exercise, in preparation for a live air interception exercise later in the year. A series of expert meetings were held on 9 October. The main Plenary meeting was held on 10 October. All the meetings, as well as the table-top exercise, were held at Lancaster House, London.
3. The PSI was launched by President Bush during a speech in Krakow on 31 May this year. It is a global initiative with global reach. It was initially driven forward by a core group of 11 countries: Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the UK, and the US. There have been three previous PSI meetings: Madrid (12 June); Brisbane (9-10 July); and Paris (3-4 September).

4. It aims to put into practical effect international commitments such as the G8 Global Partnership agreed at Kananaskis in 2002; the G8 conclusions from the Evian Summit, 1-3 June 2003; and the EU-US Summit on 25 June this year. The aims and scope of the Initiative are set out in a Statement of Principles agreed at the Paris PSI meeting: Proliferation security initiative.
5. More information about the UK's policy towards countering the threat from WMD proliferation can be found in the International Security section of the website.

Proliferation Security Initiative: London, 9-10 October – Chairman's conclusions

10 October 2003

Participants in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) met at Lancaster House, London, on 9-10 October. Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the UK and the US were represented. The meeting was preceded on 8 October by an air interception command post exercise (CPX), organised by the UK.

The London meeting was the fourth meeting of the PSI, consolidating and building on the foundations laid at Madrid (12 June); Brisbane (9-10 July); and Paris (3-4 September).

Outreach

Following the publication of the Statement of Interdiction Principles on 4 September 2003, PSI participants approached other countries to seek their support for the Statement, and their views on how they might contribute to the Initiative.

Participants agreed that the response had been very encouraging. The Initiative had been well received. Over 50 countries had already expressed support for the Statement of Principles.

It was agreed that further co-ordinated outreach work would be needed to broaden international understanding of and co-operation with the Initiative. In this context, further regionally based meetings and activities would be valuable. In this regard the meeting welcomed planned efforts in the Asian region by Japan and Australia. The possibility was discussed of inviting additional participants to specific PSI exercises or other activities, on an ad hoc basis.

Participation

The meeting agreed that the PSI was a global initiative with an inclusive mission. Successful interdiction of trafficking in WMD, their delivery systems and related materials requires the widest possible co-operation between states. Participation in the PSI, which is an activity not an organisation, should be open to any state or international body that accepts the Paris Statement of Principles and makes an effective contribution.

The meeting noted that participation would vary with the activity taking place, and the contribution participants could provide. Some countries had particular experience, assets or expertise relevant to all PSI activities; other countries or organisations could be expected to contribute according to their particular capabilities.

It was noted that a number of countries which had expressed particularly keen interest in participating in future PSI activities and meetings had experience and capabilities which would be of value to the Initiative, and which should be taken into account in future decision making.

Focus of efforts

The Statement of Interdiction Principles, agreed at Paris in September, outlines the scope of the Initiative. It makes clear that 'States or non-state actors of proliferation concern' generally refers to those countries or entities that the PSI participants involved establish should be subject to interdiction activities because they are engaged in proliferation through: (1) efforts to develop or acquire chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems; or (2) transfers (either selling, receiving, or facilitating) of WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials.

Participants agreed that the Initiative aimed to impede and stop trafficking of WMD, their delivery systems and related materials by any state or non-state actor engaged in or supporting WMD proliferation programmes, at any time and in any place.

WMD is a global threat which calls for a global response. Participants looked forward to working with all concerned states on developing the specific measures they were able and willing to take in support of the PSI.

Operational matters

Participants had an initial exchange of views on a possible Boarding Agreement, presented by the US, which could facilitate practical implementation of the Initiative. They agreed that participants should make

comments as rapidly as possible, so that states which are interested can move forward with concluding the agreement.

Participants agreed that future interdiction exercises should build on the successful exercises that have already taken place: an Australian-led maritime interdiction training exercise in the Coral Sea in September, and a UK-led air interception command post exercise in London. Future exercises should seek to integrate civil, military, and law enforcement decision making, as appropriate.

The meeting agreed further steps to plan training exercises that will take place in the coming months:

- Spanish led maritime interdiction training exercise in the Mediterranean, 14-17 October
- French led maritime interdiction training exercise in the Mediterranean, 24-28 November
- Italian led air interception training exercise, 3-4 December
- US led maritime interdiction training exercise in the Arabian Sea, January 2004
- Polish led ground interdiction exercise, early 2004
- Italian led maritime interdiction exercise in the Mediterranean, Spring 2004
- French led air interception exercise, Spring 2004
- German led interdiction exercise, at an international airport, March 2004.

It was noted that there could be lessons to be learnt from NATO's maritime interdiction operations.

Contacts with international organisations

Participants agreed that all relevant fora should be kept informed of significant developments under the Initiative. To this end, the chair of each PSI Plenary meeting should, as appropriate, circulate its conclusions. Recalling the 1992 UN Security Council Presidential Declaration on the proliferation of WMD, the meeting noted the value of securing an expression of support in relevant international fora for greater international co-operation against trafficking in WMD, their delivery systems and related materials.

Future meetings

Concluding, the Plenary Chair noted that the broad direction of the PSI had now been agreed. Plenary meetings might therefore become less frequent. But exercises and expert discussion of specific operational and policy issues under the PSI umbrella would continue, with the broadest possible participation by states committed to PSI Principles and to making effective contributions.

The offer by the United States to host an operational experts' meeting in December was warmly welcomed. A number of countries, beyond the original 11 participants, that support the PSI Principles and have concrete contributions to make to PSI activities will take part in that meeting.

Participants warmly welcomed Portugal's offer to host the next PSI Plenary meeting in early 2004.

United States European Command

Multilateral Maritime Interdiction Exercise Begins

by U.S. Sixth Fleet Public Affairs – 15 October 2003

ROTA, Spain (October 14, 2003) - The guided missile frigate USS Nicholas (FFG 47) and a P-3 surveillance aircraft from Patrol Squadron TEN (VP-10) operating out of Sigonella, Sicily, recently joined naval assets from six other nations to begin SANSO 03, a multilateral maritime interdiction training exercise in the Mediterranean. The four-day exercise, led by Spain, is part of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a collaborative effort to take active measures against trafficking in weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern around the world.

In addition to Spain and the United States, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and the United Kingdom are contributing assets to SANSO 03 while other PSI countries -- Australia, Japan, the Netherlands and Poland -- will participate as observers for this exercise.

Although PSI participants are capable and ready to execute interdiction operations against such trafficking today, the 11 partner nations have agreed to a series of interdiction training exercises to improve capabilities and interoperability. Seven other PSI exercises are currently being planned for the remainder of 2003 and the first few months of 2004. The first exercise in the PSI series, Pacific Protector, was led by Australia and conducted in mid-September in the Coral Sea.

Nicholas, homeported in Norfolk, Virginia, is currently performing a Mediterranean deployment. They have previously visited St. Petersburg, Russia, and Neum, Bosnia and Herzegovina. The ship is commanded by Commander Chan Swallow.

US State Department

U.S. to Host 5th Meeting on Proliferation Security Initiative

Initiative designed to curb WMD proliferation

2 December 2003

The United States will host the fifth operational meeting of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a compact designed to enhance efforts to block the spread of weapons of mass destruction, December 16-17 in Washington.

John Bolton, under secretary of state for arms control and international security, discussed the proliferation initiative and the planned meeting, along with related nonproliferation issues December 2 at the opening of a conference in Washington on security issues jointly sponsored by the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis and the Fletcher School of Tufts University.

The PSI operational meeting will bring together military and law enforcement experts from Canada, Denmark, Norway and Singapore, as well as those from the original 11 participating countries -- Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Britain and the United States -- to develop preparations for future interdictions of cargoes of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and related materials and equipment.

"At the December operational meeting," Bolton said, "legal experts will analyze their authorities [for interdiction] against real world scenarios and examine any gaps in authorities that can be filled in either through national legislation or policy or international action." He said enhanced information sharing also will be on the agenda.

PSI is the newest tool in the Bush administration's effort to "roll back the proliferation activities of rogue states and to ensure that their WMD progress is not passed on to terrorist groups or their state sponsors," Bolton said.

Bolton also spoke of U.S. concerns regarding the nuclear weapons programs of Iran and North Korea. He cited specific examples of Iran's efforts to build the capacity to develop nuclear weapons and its repeated attempts to circumvent its obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).

Bolton urged the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to "remain together in its insistence that Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons is illegitimate." The United States, he said, "will continue its efforts to prevent the transfer of sensitive nuclear and ballistic missile technology to Iran, from whatever source, and will monitor the situation there with great care."

On North Korea, Bolton said, "President Bush's objective is quite clear: the United States seeks the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear program."

He emphasized that this was not a bilateral issue between the United States and North Korea, but "a profound challenge to regional stability, and to the global nuclear nonproliferation regime."

"Whether the nuclear capabilities of states like Iran, North Korea and others are threats today or 'only' threats 'tomorrow,' there can be no dispute that our attention is required now," he said, "before the threats become reality."

Following is the text of Bolton's remarks:

Nuclear Weapons and Rogue States: Challenge and Response

John R. Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security

Remarks to the Conference of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis and the Fletcher School's International Security Studies Program

Washington, D.C. - December 2, 2003

It is a real pleasure to have the opportunity to be here at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis to discuss the risks we face from nuclear weapons in the hands of rogue states, and the steps the Bush Administration is taking to deal with those threats. Progress by terrorist states towards a nuclear weapons capability, while often slow and uncertain, concealed and camouflaged, must nonetheless engage American attention in a sustained and systematic fashion. Often undertaken in conjunction with ambitious ballistic missile programs, efforts to attain nuclear weapons pose a direct and undeniable threat to the United States and its friends and allies around the world. Whether the nuclear capabilities of states like Iran, North Korea and others are threats

today, or only threats tomorrow, there can be no dispute that our attention is required now before the threats become reality, and tens of thousands of innocent civilians, or more, have been vaporized.

This is not to say by any means that we should not also be gravely concerned about chemical and biological weapons programs. We are, and many of the steps that we take internationally against nuclear weapons are applicable to chemical and biological threats as well. In fact, states around the world are closely scrutinizing the way we deal with the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and you can be sure that they will draw the appropriate conclusions about the utility of other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) based on our performance in the nuclear field.

Of course, our information about WMD programs in other countries is not perfect. No one is more aware of the uncertainties that we face than the senior American intelligence officials and policy makers who deal with these life-and-death issues. Some analysts have said that not finding WMD in Iraq -- to date -- proves that Saddam was not an imminent threat, and that our Coalition military action was therefore not justified. These criticisms miss the mark that our concern was not the imminence of Saddam's threat, but the very existence of his regime, given its heinous and undeniable record, capabilities, intentions, and longstanding defiance of the international community. President Bush specifically and unambiguously addressed this issue in his January 2003, State of the Union message when he said: Some have said we must not act until the threat is imminent. Since when have terrorists and tyrants announced their intentions, politely putting us on notice before they strike? If this threat is permitted to fully and suddenly emerge, all actions, all words, and all recriminations would come too late. Trusting in the sanity and restraint of Saddam Hussein is not a strategy, and it is not an option.

Given the right opportunity or incentive, Saddam could have easily transferred WMD capabilities to terrorist groups or others for their use against us, with potentially catastrophic results. State sponsors of terrorism are aggressively working to acquire weapons of mass destruction and their missile delivery systems. While Saddam's removal from power has unquestionably improved the international security situation, we face significant challenges in other parts of the world. Rogue states such as Iran, North Korea, Syria, Libya and Cuba, whose pursuit of weapons of mass destruction makes them hostile to U.S. interests, will learn that their covert programs will not escape either detection or consequences. While we will pursue diplomatic solutions whenever possible, the United States and its allies are also willing to deploy more robust techniques, such as the interdiction and seizure of illicit goods. If rogue states are not willing to follow the logic of nonproliferation norms, they must be prepared to face the logic of adverse consequences. It is why we repeatedly caution that no option is off the table.

Iran

Let me discuss two problems in particular: Iran and North Korea. Although Iran has biological, chemical and missile programs, I will focus today on their nuclear weapons program, which Iran itself has acknowledged has been underway for at least eighteen years -- all in violation of Iran's obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Our strategy for nearly three years has been to use bilateral and multilateral pressure to end that program, and to secure international consensus against Iran's pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability. On November 26, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors unanimously adopted a resolution that strongly deplores Iran's past failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with the provisions of its Safeguards Agreement. There was also unanimous agreement that should any further serious Iranian failures come to light, the Board of Governors would meet immediately to consider...all options at its disposal, in accordance with the IAEA Statute and Iran's Safeguards Agreement.

This decisive action followed three successive reports by the IAEA's Director General, which established beyond doubt Iran's multiple violations. While Iran has consistently denied any program to develop nuclear weapons, the IAEA has amassed an enormous amount of evidence to the contrary that makes this denial increasingly implausible.

In what can only be an attempt to build a capacity to develop nuclear materials for nuclear weapons, Iran has enriched uranium with both centrifuges and lasers, and produced and reprocessed plutonium. It attempted to cover its tracks by repeatedly and over many years neglecting to report its activities, and in many instances providing false declarations to the IAEA. For example, the IAEA Director General reports that Iran conducted uranium enrichment experiments with centrifuges using uranium Iran told the IAEA was lost due to its leaking valves. Iran conducted unreported uranium conversion experiments with uranium Iran declared to the IAEA as process loss. And Iran delayed IAEA inspectors until key facilities had been sanitized.

I repeat: The United States believes that the longstanding, massive and covert Iranian effort to acquire sensitive nuclear capabilities make sense only as part of a nuclear weapons program. Iran is trying to legitimize as "peaceful and transparent" its pursuit of nuclear fuel cycle capabilities that would give it the ability to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. This includes uranium mining and extraction, uranium conversion and enrichment, reactor fuel fabrication, heavy water production, a heavy water reactor well-suited

for plutonium production, and the "management" of spent fuel -- a euphemism for reprocessing spent fuel to recover plutonium. The IAEA Director General's report confirms that Iran has been engaged in all of these activities over many years, and that it deliberately and repeatedly lied to the IAEA about it.

The international community now needs to decide over time whether Iran has come clean on this program and how to react to the large number of serious violations to which Iran has admitted. Unfortunately, Iran itself has already indicated that it has mixed feelings about its obligations to adhere to the IAEA's resolutions. Last Saturday, Hasan Rowhani, head of Iran's Supreme National Security Council and the man who concluded the October deal in Tehran with the three European foreign ministers, gave Iran's most recent interpretation of the IAEA's actions. He said, Our decision to suspend uranium enrichment is voluntary and temporary. Uranium enrichment is Iran's natural right and [Iran] will reserve for itself this right....There has been and there will be no question of a permanent suspension or halt at all. Rowhani went on to say, We want to control the whole fuel cycle. Since we are planning to build seven nuclear fuel plants in the future, we want to provide fuel for at least one of the plants ourselves.

The IAEA's November 26 resolution should leave no doubt that one more transgression by Iran will mean that the IAEA is obligated to report Iran's noncompliance to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations, in accordance with Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute. This Statute explicitly states that when non-compliance is found, the Board shall report the non-compliance to all members and to the Security Council. Iran's Safeguards Agreement similarly provides that if the Board finds the Agency is not able to verify there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded, the Board may report to the Security Council. The real issue now is whether the Board of Governors will remain together in its insistence that Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons is illegitimate, or whether Iranian efforts to split the Board through economic incentives and aggressive propaganda will succeed. For our part, the United States will continue its efforts to prevent the transfer of sensitive nuclear and ballistic missile technology to Iran, from whatever source, and will monitor the situation there with great care.

North Korea

With regard to North Korea, President Bush's objective is quite clear: the United States seeks the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear programs. We seek to bring this about, as we have said repeatedly, through diplomatic dialogue in a multilateral framework involving those states with the most direct stakes in the outcome. Other states may yet be involved as appropriate. The North Korean nuclear program is not a bilateral issue between the United States and the DPRK. It is a profound challenge to regional stability, and to the global nuclear nonproliferation regime.

We look forward to the earliest resumption of the next round of six-party talks. Secretary Powell has repeatedly emphasized a special thanks to the People's Republic of China for the work that they have done to encourage North Korea to come to the negotiating table. At those talks, we hope to make tangible progress toward the goal of a nuclear weapons-free North Korea. We are prepared to provide a written document on security assurances to Pyongyang with other participants in the talks. Such assurances can only be provided, however, in the context of agreement and implementation of an effective verification regime that would provide assurances to us that the DPRK will not reconstitute its nuclear program. For the United States, irreversibility is a paramount goal.

We are determined that bad behavior on the part of North Korea will not be rewarded. North Korea will not be given inducements to reverse actions it took in violation of its treaty commitments and other international obligations. Moreover, attempts to delay or postpone the six-party talks simply because one or more of the parties wishes to raise issues of vital concern should be rejected. Japan, for example, feels strongly that it should have the right at least to raise the issue of North Korean abductions of Japanese citizens over the years. For Japan, this is a fundamental issue, and Japan's desire to raise it should be respected. Japan's participation in the six-party process is essential. Whether North Korea yet understands these fundamental precepts of American policy remains to be seen.

As in the case of Iran, of course, the Security Council is another logical venue in which to discuss the threat to international peace and security represented by the DPRK's nuclear weapons program. To date, China, supported by Russia, has argued that the DPRK issue is better handled in the six-party context rather than the Security Council, and we have agreed. Similarly, France, the United Kingdom and others urged recently that the case of Iran not be reported to the Security Council, and we agreed to that, too. Of course, we hope that the other four Permanent Members of the Security Council are aware of the long-term implications of these decisions, as we are. Policies intended to bring about the termination of the Iranian and DPRK nuclear weapons programs, which result in reducing the Council's role under the Charter, would be truly unfortunate and ironic.

The Proliferation Security Initiative

To roll back the proliferation activities of rogue states and to ensure that their WMD progress is not passed on to terrorist groups or their state sponsors, the United States employs a variety of diplomatic and other methods. President Bush announced our newest and most promising effort, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), on May 31 in Krakow, Poland. The United States and ten other close allies and friends have worked to develop this initiative, which seeks to combat proliferation by developing new means to disrupt WMD trafficking at sea, in the air, and on land. Our goal is to create a more robust approach to preventing WMD, missiles, and related technologies flowing to and from would-be proliferators.

The PSI has been a fast-moving effort, reflecting the urgency attached to establishing a more coordinated and active basis to prevent proliferation. On September 4, we published the PSI -- Statement of Interdiction Principles -- and shared it with countries around the world. More than 50 countries have signaled that they support the PSI and are ready to participate in interdiction efforts.

To date, PSI participants have agreed on a series of ten sea, air, and ground interdiction training exercises. Four have already taken place, and the remaining exercises will occur in the coming months. Australia conducted the first exercise in October in the Coral Sea, involving both military and law enforcement assets. The United Kingdom then hosted the first PSI air interception training session, a table-top exercise to explore operational issues arising from intercepting proliferation traffic in the air. In mid-October, Spain hosted the second maritime exercise, this one in the western Mediterranean Sea. Finally, France recently hosted a third maritime exercise in the Mediterranean Sea. PSI nations have now trained for maritime interdictions in both the Mediterranean and the western Pacific Ocean, two areas that are particularly prone to proliferation trafficking.

The eleven original PSI participants are now involving additional countries in PSI activities. Last month, the Japanese Government hosted a meeting to inform Asian governments about PSI and encourage their cooperation in interdiction efforts. There was broad support among the governments that further efforts needed to be undertaken to stop proliferation and that they would study the PSI as a new tool for addressing nonproliferation.

Later this month [December], the United States will host the fifth PSI operational experts meeting, which will bring together military and law enforcement experts from the original eleven participating countries, as well as Norway, Denmark, Singapore, and Canada. Since PSI is an activity rather than an organization, the meeting will develop military and law enforcement capabilities and preparations for interdictions.

As the PSI moves forward, we expect other countries will join in training exercises to enhance global capabilities to respond quickly when governments receive intelligence on proliferation shipments. President Bush has made clear that our long-term objective is to create a web of counterproliferation partnerships through which proliferators will have difficulty carrying out their trade in WMD and missile-related technology. As the President said, We're determined to keep the world's most destructive weapons away from all our shores, and out of the hands of our common enemies.

Our PSI interdiction efforts rest on existing domestic and international authorities. The national legal authorities of each participant will allow us to act together in a flexible manner, ensuring actions are taken by participants with the most robust authorities in any given case. By coordinating our efforts with other countries, we draw upon an enhanced set of authorities for interdiction. At the December operational meeting, legal experts will analyze their authorities against real world scenarios and examine any gaps in authorities that can be filled either through national legislation or policy or international action. Experts also will work to enhance our ability to share information with law enforcement and military operators in a timely and effective manner, in order to allow operators to increase the number of actual interdictions.

Properly planned and executed, the interception of critical technologies can prevent hostile states and terrorists from acquiring these dangerous capabilities. At a minimum, interdiction can lengthen the time that proliferators will need to acquire new weapons capabilities, increase their cost, and demonstrate our resolve to combat proliferation.

Conclusion

Our initiatives move us closer to a more secure world where we are able not only to impede the spread of WMD, but also to "roll back" and ultimately eliminate such weapons from the arsenals of rogue states and ensure that the terrorist groups they sponsor do not acquire a shortcut to their deadly designs against us. As President Bush said recently, "After all the action we have taken, after all the progress we have made against terror, there is a temptation to think the danger has passed. The danger hasn't passed....America must not forget the lessons of September 11th." Indeed, danger is present in a growing number of places, and we must be vigilant in recognizing -- and then confronting -- these emerging threats against our common security.

Proliferation Security Initiative: Next Experts Meeting, China's Role

Taken Question from December 3, 2003 Daily Press Briefing

Question: When are we planning on the next experts level meeting on the Proliferation Security Initiative? Is China participating in the Proliferation Security Initiative?

Answer: The United States will host the fifth meeting of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Operational Experts in Washington December 16-17. This meeting will bring together military and law enforcement experts from the original eleven participating countries, as well as Norway, Denmark, Singapore, and Canada.

As the Proliferation Security Initiative moves forward, we expect additional states will be involved in its activities that build global capabilities for interdiction, for example by participating in interdiction training efforts.

China is not among the countries that will attend the December meeting. We continue to consult with China on the Proliferation Security Initiative and on our broad concerns about weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missile proliferation.

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The Argus

President's proposal seeks arms policing

Bush asks in U.N. speech that each nation outlaw weapons trafficking and deputize itself to enforce it
By Ian Hoffman – 1 October 2003

In a little-noted portion of his speech to the United Nations, President Bush made a plea last week for laws to aid a new, global "coalition of the willing" in frustrating the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

Faced with nuclear crises on two continents and an unraveling of the nonproliferation regime, Bush proposed a very old, if modest, solution to the U.N. General Assembly: Each nation should outlaw WMD trafficking and, in essence, deputize itself for enforcement.

If enough nations agree, the "gray market" in weapons technologies eventually could join slavery and piracy as internationally condemned practices. That would give a freer hand to the United States and its allies in forcibly halting and searching shipments by land, sea or air anywhere in the world.

Asking the "broadest possible cooperation," Bush pressed for a U.N. Security Council resolution calling on each nation to "criminalize" transfers of A-bombs, poison gas, germs -- and the technology to make them -- using international lists of forbidden exports.

"The United States stands ready to help any nation draft these new laws and to assist in their enforcement," he said.

Many nonproliferation experts dismissed the president's proposal, by itself, as a half-hearted and lightweight addition to the web of international treaties already targeting the spread of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. Most of these condemn weapons transfers or require treaty parties to adopt laws forbidding them.

"It seemed they knew they needed to throw something in there, but they didn't have any real idea what the contents are," said Jon Wolfsthal, deputy director of the nonproliferation project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "So they put forward an initiative to sound good."

Impact questioned

Checks at the White House showed few of the usual trappings of a major policy -- no drafts of the new laws, no advance briefings and scant consultation with career diplomats at the U.S. State Department.

"It can't do any harm," said Fred Wehling, a senior research associate at the Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies. "But it's not likely to have any major impact on any state involved in the transit of material for making WMD."

North Korea and Iran, in other words, are no more likely to jail their nuclear scientists than the United States is. Saddam Hussein pre-empted President Bush in February and forbade Iraqis to make or possess weapons of mass destruction, just weeks before U.S. forces toppled his regime.

Bush's U.N. proposal dovetails neatly with his administration's new Proliferation Security Initiative, a U.S.-led coalition of 11 nations that plan on forcibly seizing cargo ships, planes, trucks and trains suspected of carrying

WMD and related technologies. The more nations that criminalize WMD exports, the more freedom the coalition will have to interdict shipments.

At least one U.S. expert called Bush's proposal a step in the right direction. And for good reason: It's his idea.

"It's neither harmless nor useless, but beneficial and of some use," said Henry D. Sokolski, executive director of the Washington, D.C.-based Nonproliferation Policy Education Center.

Pushing the loophole

A former top Defense Department nonproliferation official under Paul Wolfowitz in the first Bush administration, Sokolski has been firing e-mails at key administration players and penning articles in conservative journals, arguing the case for a new legal stick to wield against proliferators.

Sokolski believes North Korea and Iran saw this same loophole and exploited it. But so far, the United Nations and its International Atomic Energy Agency have preferred negotiations to pinning them as violators and sanctioning them, he says.

The Proliferation Security Initiative, or PSI, is a parallel path: Instead of diplomatic talks and wrangling at the U.N., the United States and its closest allies would try the equivalent of a roving military blockade, boarding suspect ships on the high seas or forcing planes to land in friendly airspace.

Exercise in South Coral Sea

Ten days before Bush's General Assembly speech, a U.S.-led task force of four nations' navies staged an interdiction exercise in the South Coral Sea, with Japanese commandos rappelling from helicopters to seize a merchant ship. In two weeks, the Spanish navy will lead a look-alike exercise in the Mediterranean, with others scheduled for the Arabian and Indian seas. The drills are intended as a forceful message to proliferators, most pointedly North Korea and Iran.

Experts say PSI plays to U.S. strengths by shifting confrontations over WMD to military engagements in friendly seas, territory or skies, away from international diplomacy and the weapons inspections in which the Bush administration has little faith.

But PSI confronts the same fundamental challenge as the United States did in Iraq: It relies on solid intelligence regarding secret shipments of missile, weapons machinery or "dual-use" material that can be destined for innocuous purposes as easily as nefarious ones.

"There's no question it's a heavy reliance on intelligence," said Dean Wilkening, science program director at Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation.

Late in the Clinton administration, the United States forced a Chinese vessel into port to be searched for chemical weapons. None were found.

Even so, said Stanford's Wilkening, "Boarding a ship is a much less provocative act than invading a country. Certainly it has nowhere near the consequences in Iraq."

The PSI coalition -- Australia, Japan, Spain, France, Germany, Poland, the United Kingdom and others -- is on more dubious legal ground in international waters. There, an intercepting flotilla must have the permission of the nation that a ship is flagged under to seize and search it. Nations such as North Korea, which has threatened to export nuclear weapons, are unlikely to grant the request.

But, says Sokolski, if enough nations outlaw WMD transfers, the United Nations and an international maritime body will be under pressure to allow interdictions in international waters, as is permitted in cases of piracy and slave trading.

"This is so modest. It's too tepid," he says. But it's a step toward cutting off proliferators from their outside suppliers that doesn't involve case-by-case approval by the U.N. Security Council.

"Doing things on the high seas is very different than creating an international secretariat that you have to ask permission from or process intelligence through," Sokolski said.

The Bush administration could do a great deal more to shore up the international treaties restricting the spread of WMD, he said.

"This is not the last word on making the Nonproliferation Treaty credible. But it is the first word. We hope more will come," he said.

European Stars and Stripes

Forces from 11 countries converge on Mediterranean for Sanso 2003 exercise

By Scott Schonauer – 16 October 2003

ABOARD THE USS NICHOLAS, Atlantic Ocean — The British Royal Navy sailors looked like they meant business.

Dressed in camouflage and toting rifles, they climbed aboard the U.S. frigate in an exercise to find weapons of mass destruction.

Some U.S. sailors acted as crewmembers of a make-believe commercial ship led by an annoyed skipper, while others just watched the British ship-boarding team go to work.

The purpose of Tuesday's drill was to practice how to search a merchant ship suspected of carrying illegal arms. The training served as a prelude to a three-day, multinational exercise, which began Wednesday.

Military forces from 11 countries are in the western Mediterranean Sea participating in what is being dubbed Sanso 2003. The Spanish-led exercise is the third in a series planned through early 2004. Each is part of a U.S.-created initiative to stop weapons trafficking.

President Bush debuted the Proliferation Security Initiative in May with hopes of creating a global alliance and agreements that would allow the United States and its allies to search planes and ships suspected of carrying lethal cargo anywhere in the world.

Spanish Capt. Ramon Marquez Montero said this week's exercise is a chance to build teamwork among the international forces and pump up weapon-hunting skills on the high seas. He said initiative partners are still discussing how the alliance would best be able to impede weapons trafficking.

"This is not a political organization," he said. "It is only an initiative.... And the exercise is just one part of the initiative."

The five countries providing ships and planes for this week's maritime exercise are the United Kingdom, the United States, France, Portugal and Spain. Other initiative member nations include Japan, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and Australia.

Military officials insist the exercise does not target any specific state, but it is no secret that North Korea and Iran are at the top of the list of suspected banned weapons traders.

Last December, the Spanish Navy — with the help of U.S. forces — boarded a Yemen-bound North Korean ship with Scud missiles. The ship was eventually allowed to deliver the cargo to its destination, but the incident showed how easy it is to ship ballistic missiles long distances.

During Tuesday's exercise, French, Spanish, British and U.S. forces tested their ship-boarding tactics. The ships cruised to a diamond formation near the Strait of Gibraltar as a team from each boarded the adjacent ship looking for suspected weapons of mass destruction.

U.S. sailors wearing desert fatigues and black Special Operations-style helmets launched from the frigate in a small rubber boat and sped to the French warship *Jacouvet*, while the British team boarded the Norfolk, Va.-based USS *Nicholas*.

Royal Navy Petty Officer Keith Pierce had his team rummage through the wardroom to look for contraband just as if they had stormed a suspicious merchant vessel. British sailors opened china cabinet doors, searched garbage cans and peaked under ceiling tiles. A typical bow-to-stern search could take more than an hour. For time's sake, it was much shorter.

"You have to be critical of everything," Pierce told his men. They wouldn't find any weapons, real or fake.

The only items the Brits would take back were a bottle of red wine and a plaque — both gifts from the USS *Nicholas* commander and his crew. U.S. sailors who boarded the French ship didn't return empty-handed, either. They seized a bottle of champagne.

Global Security Newswire

More Nations Expected to Join Proliferation Security Initiative

16 October 2003

A U.S.-led, 11-nation effort to interdict shipments of WMD materials will soon be joined by other nations, Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer said yesterday.

The Proliferation Security Initiative is intended to prevent proliferation by seizing shipments of WMD-related cargo in transit. Participants currently include Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States.

The program "will now be opened up to countries and to international bodies that want to, and have the capacity to, contribute expertise and capabilities which help the PSI achieve its aim," Downer told the Australian Parliament.

The group is planning eight exercises before the middle of next year, including a maritime exercise — led by France and Spain — and an Italian-led air exercise.

“I think this broadening of the participation in the PSI is essential and it will obviously strengthen the capacity of the PSI to deal with the trafficking of weapons of mass destruction around the world,” Downer said. The PSI effort is widely acknowledged to be focused on North Korea, Reuters reported.

Arms Control Today

Bolton: Trafficking in Weapons of Mass Destruction is a Global Problem

December 2003

The New Proliferation Security Initiative an interview with John Bolton

(John Bolton, undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, discussed the Bush administration's new Proliferation Security Initiative during a November 4 interview with Arms Control Association Research Director Wade Boese and Arms Control Today Editor Miles Pomper.)

ACT: Could you explain what the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is and how it fits into the broader Bush administration strategy to prevent proliferation?

Bolton: We believe that the existing system of national export control systems [and] multilateral export control agreements were not completely effective because there's still a thriving black market in WMD [weapons of mass destruction] components, technologies, and production materials. And what we wanted to do was to find more active ways of dealing with the ongoing trafficking in all of these WMD-related materials—not to replace the export control regimes, but to do something that would be more effective in handling all of this trafficking. And based on what we've seen with the So San interdiction¹ [and] based on a variety of law enforcement and other operations that had been conducted, we felt there was a potential to have a multilateral agreement that would allow us to do that -- to conduct interdiction of WMD trafficking at sea, in the air, and on land. That's why, following the president's announcement of the initiative in Krakow, Poland, on May 31, we were pleased [with the reception]. Actually the Spaniards volunteered to host the first meeting [and] we then had a series that led to the promulgation in Paris of the statement of interdiction principles² that represented the agreement of all 11 countries on what our obligations would be as participants in the PSI and what we would then take to other nations and explain the PSI to them and seek their support for it. It is intended as a way of encouraging greater involvement by a variety of countries in stopping the trafficking in weapons of mass destruction and WMD-related materials through more vigorous exercise of the existing national and international authorities that we already have.

ACT: Following up on that, you said you did not want to replace existing export control regimes, arms control treaties, or groups. Is it simply a supplement to those? Or do you envision changing or supplanting some of those regimes?

Bolton: No, we see it in addition. We see PSI as an interdiction activity. In fact, I think it was actually in the meeting in Madrid³, we talked about what to do with the Australia Group⁴, the MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime)⁵, how they would relate to PSI and basically what we said was we were not going to reinvent the wheel, we were not going to try and redefine the commodities involved or anything like that. But that what we would do was to ask our representatives to the Nuclear Suppliers Group⁶, Wassenaar⁷, the whole range of multilateral export control regimes to see what they might do to enhance their regimes to make them more effective in ways that would complement the interdiction activities that we contemplate taking under the PSI.

ACT: Some media reports suggest that PSI involves stopping illegal trade in drugs and other non-weapons contraband. There are other reports that this is the beginning of a blockade of North Korea. Is either description accurate?

Bolton: Neither description is accurate. We've never contemplated that the initiative would involve anything other than the trafficking of WMD-related material, and it was never contemplated as a blockade of any place. We are obviously worried about some places more than others as proliferants or would-be proliferants. In fact in Brisbane⁸, at the meeting there, the 11 PSI participants said that North Korea and Iran were two states of particular concern. But this is something we see as a global activity. We stressed we think it is worldwide problem and it requires a worldwide response.

ACT: PSI is described as targeting "rogue" countries and terrorist groups. What about shipments of WMD-related goods to Israel, India, and Pakistan?

Bolton: What we're concerned about are rogue states and terrorist groups that threaten instability, and threaten their neighbors with the use of these WMD. There are unquestionably states that are not within existing treaty regimes that possess weapons of mass destruction legitimately. We're not trying to have a policy that attempts to cover each and every one of those circumstances. What we're worried about are the rogue states and the

terrorist groups that pose the most immediate threat. And that's why there was consensus, as there was at the G-8 statement at Evian and the U.S.-EU summit declaration this past summer, for naming North Korea and Iran, specifically.

ACT: Was it geared toward countries that are threats to the United States and other participants or those that may likely use these weapons in conflict, such as India and Pakistan, which routinely threaten each other?

Bolton: I think what we're worried about is the issue of the threats to the 11 states that are participants in the regime now, but also to others that would like to join. The issue of outward proliferation, for example, you could have cargoes that come from any number of countries that contain dual-use chemicals that could be used for chemical weapons production, or chemicals that have legitimate industrial uses, but may also be particularly important in plutonium reprocessing or something like that, that we would consider interdicting. But we certainly never thought at the outset of the negotiations, or today for that matter, that we could write an encyclopedic description of everything that the PSI would encompass. We would try and work on a case-by-case basis to see what the pattern of interdictions that we accomplished actually looked like.

ACT: Does PSI empower its participants with authority to do anything that they legally could not do before the initiative's creation?

Bolton: PSI is a political arrangement at this point, and we contemplate that's what it will be over a sustained period of time. We think we have very substantial authorities under existing national and international treaties and export control regimes to do a lot of what we're doing, and we consider also that there are aspects of customary international law that give us authority as well.

ACT: What are some of the legal constraints on possible interdiction activities? Are there any you would like to see eliminated or changed?

Bolton: Well, there are essentially an infinite number of potential circumstances and variations and permutations where interdictions could take place, and for as many different hypotheticals as there are, there are different levels of authority. We think we've got plenty of authority as it stands now. It is not the case that all of the interdictions will take place in international waters or international airspace. Probably more likely is that most of them will take place in national territory where national authorities are strongest. We understand that there are circumstances in which our authorities may be ambiguous or open to question, and there are almost certainly circumstances where authority under current national and international interpretation doesn't exist. And, under those circumstances, the 11 PSI countries have talked about the prospect for seeking additional authority, either to clarify an existing ambiguity or fill a gap where no authority exists. Right now, for example, there are amendments being considered to the Suppression of Unlawful Acts at Sea Convention, which is an international maritime organization which has over 90 states party to it, where there are provisions concerning weapons of mass destruction that are being discussed among the parties to the convention. And the 11 PSI countries also talked about circumstances where one could envision a Security Council resolution that might give authority in certain circumstances. So I think there's general agreement that seeking additional authority might be useful at some point and that we would consider it when it became appropriate.

ACT: Is there any effort now underway to go to the Security Council to broaden the mandate or to get its blessing so that you can take additional actions?

Bolton: No, I think the general view of the 11 countries was that, and I don't speak for all of them, but I think this is a fair summary: it's usually, the history of the Security Council in granting enforcement authority, has usually been in the context of a specific problem and a specific country that people were concerned about, and we thought probably it would be best to leave the evolution of that to circumstances as they develop. But there are three permanent members of the council among the 11, and I think we have a lot of common understanding of how things work, and that we would talk about it at future meetings.

ACT: How does PSI fit in or square with President Bush's proposal to get a UN resolution on outlawing WMD trafficking in general that he spoke of earlier this year?

Bolton: Well what he said in the speech in September was that he wanted to strengthen national laws criminalizing WMD-related behavior, and to bring the national export control regimes up to international standards, and we're in discussions now with other Security Council members about what that resolution would look like, but we don't contemplate at this point, nor do the other PSI members, seeking Security Council authorization.

ACT: And how is that resolution proceeding?

Bolton: We're working away on it. Consultations continue.

ACT: What are the main challenges facing PSI and how can they be overcome?

Bolton: Well, I think the first thing that we're doing now - -we really started after the Paris meeting where the statement of interdiction principles was adopted -- the United States went out to every country that we have diplomatic relations with, provided them with a copy of the statement of interdiction principles, and tried to explain what the PSI was about, and solicited support from the country, depending on the circumstances of the

country. Some states are flag states for ships, some states are coastal states, some states have borders that are used for transshipment, some states are important manufacturing states, obviously there's overlap there as well. But we've been soliciting both public statements of support and ways of working with countries that are particularly important, some of the big transshipment countries and big transshipment centers and that sort of thing. That public outreach function is something that has consumed a lot of our time diplomatically since the Paris meeting. I think explaining the thinking behind the initiative and what the states that have become participants in it have agreed to and what might follow in the future has been the major [activity]. I wouldn't describe it as a problem so much, but a necessary next step so that we can gain broader support for the initiative.

ACT: What about intelligence and knowing what is out there on the oceans? I've seen a number of people speak to the problem of having timely, actionable intelligence.

Bolton: I think obviously before you can interdict the WMD-related shipment, you have to know about it. It is the case that much of the interdiction work that may occur under the PSI will never be publicly known, or at least not for a long time because it will be done in intelligence or law enforcement channels, and we contemplate that it won't all be dramatic interdictions at sea. But the point of the effort is to increase the amount of interdictions, whether it's done by law enforcement or it's done by other cooperating countries, customs officials, or by the military. We've had meetings of the intelligence services of the 11 countries that are participants, and they've had a lot of discussions about how to establish better communication among them, how to arrange the expeditious sharing of information when it's appropriate to support an interdiction operation and we've made a lot of progress both on that side and the operational side since we began the discussions back in Madrid.

ACT: Going back to your outreach activities, after the London meeting 9., there was a statement by the British government about how over 50 countries have now voiced their support for the initiative. Can you us some sense of who those 50 are and what their support is?

Bolton: Well it's actually much higher now. In the London meeting, which was about a month after the Paris meeting, we had gone out to a lot of countries at the time, and there were countries that were very interested that said, "we'd like to study this and we don't want to react until we've had a chance to examine it." Since the London meeting, a lot more have come back in and said "this is a good idea and we want to support your efforts, how can we cooperate?" and that kind of thing. There are counties all over the world. I think one of the positive aspects of this is that there is very broad support for it.

ACT: Two countries that have expressed some reservations are Russia and China. Can PSI be effective without their active cooperation, particularly with regard to North Korea?

Bolton: Well the Russians have said to us that they have no objection to engaging in interdiction activities against WMD trafficking. We've been talking to them at all kinds of levels, both before and after the Paris meeting, and we've extended invitations to them to participate in operational meetings with PSI experts, and I think that's something that is part of the ongoing diplomatic dialogue. The Chinese have told us very clearly: they support the concept behind the initiative, and that they're prepared to engage in joint activities dealing with WMD trafficking. I think that while there are probably further conversations that should be had, I'd actually say their reactions have been reasonably positive. They've inquired about the applicability of the initiative in North Korea, and we've ensured both of them that it's not intended as a form of blockading North Korea. It's a global initiative designed to deal with a global problem.

ACT: So why have they not formally joined?

Bolton: Nobody else has formally joined. We've got 11 countries when we started out and we still have 11 participants. I think the number will go up slightly, but we're not looking for large diplomatic meetings. We're looking for operational capabilities that actually increase the level of interdictions that are taking place. And as I say in practical terms -- and I've done the discussions myself, and they've been done at higher levels as well -- both those countries have said that they're willing to cooperate and engage in interdiction against WMD trafficking.

ACT: The U.S. intelligence community continues to identify Russia and China as being sources of WMD-related goods and being participants in proliferation or as being proliferators. So how does that square with their general support for this initiative?

Bolton: Well, I think we have made it plain in our discussions with both countries, both in diplomatic channels and, where appropriate, through the imposition of economic sanctions, that we want enhanced performance by them in terms of outward proliferation activities by entities in those countries. But I think one can certainly square their cooperation with us in PSI-related activities with our working with them to get their own performance to be better. If we insisted that we'd only cooperate with countries that were completely perfect, it'd be a pretty small group of countries that we had been cooperating with. You know, there are companies in the United States that violate our export control laws. When we find them, we prosecute them. I mean, our

record isn't perfect either, but we have a strong law enforcement response when one of our companies violates our export control laws.

ACT: You noted before, with regard to the Hague Code of Conduct on Ballistic Missiles, that it is not valuable to bring in countries or participants that may not live up to their obligations. Noting that Russia and China may be a little less than perfect, why do you have a different perspective on PSI versus the International Code of Conduct?

Bolton: Well, certainly we want everybody who cooperates with PSI activities to subscribe to the statement of interdiction principles and to the philosophy of nonproliferation that lies behind it. I think that is a substantial difference between the Hague Code and PSI. PSI is entirely operational. What we care about is more and better interdiction efforts. I think if a country's cooperation in international interdiction efforts 1) helps the overall cause and 2) has the spillover effect of getting them to do better in their own domestic enforcement, I think that's all for the good.

ACT: Since the launch of the initiative, have there been any interdictions?

Bolton: Well, there have been some, but they have not been made public-and won't be made public.

ACT: So you won't discuss those with us?

Bolton: No.

ACT: Can you give us a number?

Bolton: No. I think President Bush made this analogous point shortly after September 11, in terms of the campaign against terrorism, is that a lot of this will be done clandestinely and has to be. There's nobody involved in PSI in the government who would be more eager to get some of these successes out in public than I would be. But the fact is, you have to recognize that that could be actually more damaging to the overall effort than simply carrying out the interdictions and keeping them necessarily confidential. That's part of the ongoing struggle against this unfortunately flourishing black market in WMD material.

ACT: In your recent speech in London, you made reference to a dangerous materials initiative. That was the first time I've heard of it. Can you elaborate a little more on what that is?

Bolton: We can get you some additional materials on that, but that is intended to supplement a lot of the activity that we've had in export controls, border controls, looking at assisting countries that have problems with chemical weapons remains or perhaps BW (Biological Weapons) facilities, or radiological sources or remnants of aspects of nuclear programs. They might not be able to undertake a clean up of a facility or something like that. What we've done is taken some activities that have actually been carried out before and tried to conceptually group them together, like the Vinca reactor -- the removal of the spent fuel from outside of Belgrade, somewhere in Serbia, and took the fuel back to Russia.¹⁰ If you think of radiological sources, in particular, which are unregulated, but if accumulated could be the basis for a radiological weapon. Collecting that sort of thing and neutralizing it or destroying it...These are activities we have conducted in the past, but we want to do more of it and group it together.

ACT: We should expect more funding for this initiative?

Bolton: We're probably a couple months away from saying much more in specific terms, but I think the reason I wanted to put it in the London speech was we were ready to start talking about it, to alert people that we were going to move forward on it.

ACT: Is it a Department of State initiative?

Bolton: Principally, but I think there are a lot of activities that DOE (Department of Energy) and DOD (Department of Defense) are engaged in that would fit under that rubric as well.

ACT: In that speech you also discuss North Korea a little bit and mention that we should not give inducements to reverse actions that are in violation of treaty commitments. How does that square with the President's recent statements on U.S. willingness to offer North Korea multilateral security guarantees?

Bolton: Well, I think he's been very clear that we're not going to succumb to North Korean blackmail or reward North Korean bad behavior -- I think that's exactly the same thing I said.

ACT: A U.S. official [at] the First Committee said that that U.S. is reviewing its policy on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT).¹¹ We've been pressing for this treaty for over a dozen years. Can you give us an idea why we're conducting a review on it now?

Bolton: I don't have the statement in front of me. I think it speaks for itself. I don't really have anything to add to it.

ACT: Two prominent inspectors, Hans Blix and Mohamed ElBaradei, have come forward with some proposals recently about how new initiatives that might be undertaken by the UN and multilateral agencies. Mr. Blix talked about permanent inspectors for biological weapons and missiles. ElBaradei talked about multilateral controls and transparency of all enrichment and reprocessing activities. I was interested in your thoughts on these proposals.

Bolton: I think with respect to the latter, I think there's a lot of concern about the gaps in the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) that allow countries to undertake a lot of activity that brings them closer to a nuclear weapons capability, but which don't violate any of the existing provisions of the NPT, and I think that's something we need to take a look at. In terms of inspector corps, we have the IAEA 12., we have an OPCW 13., and I don't see a pressing need at the moment for any other inspector corps and I don't anticipate any of that going forward.

ACT: Thank you.

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UK Hansard

House of Commons Hansard

11 September 2003 – Column 491

The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. Geoffrey Hoon): Before moving to the specific subject matter of this debate, I would be grateful for the opportunity to respond directly to the criticisms of the Intelligence and Security Committee's report which was published earlier today. I ask the House to allow me the opportunity to set out in full what I have to say on this issue, but I will certainly take interventions at the end.

The ISC report is measured and detailed. First, it clearly finds that there was no attempt by anyone in Government—whether in Downing street, the Ministry of Defence, the Foreign Office or elsewhere—to sex up the dossier published on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction in September last year. Secondly, it finds that the dossier was a fair and accurate summary of the intelligence. Thirdly, it finds that, in respect of the so-called 45-minute claim, no one in Government interfered with the intelligence assessment, though the Committee finds that the Joint Intelligence Committee could have put the wording of that particular piece of intelligence in a different and more detailed way. I appreciate that the ISC was concerned about the initial approach of the Ministry of Defence, and I want to make it quite clear that I had no intention whatever of being other than open and straightforward with the Committee. I regret any misunderstanding that may have arisen.

So far as my own position is concerned, the Committee states fairly that I did inform it of the dispute within the Defence Intelligence Staff about the way in which the 45-minute claim was described in the dossier. In fact, I volunteered the information in my first evidence session on 22 July that there were people in defence intelligence who had made proposals for amendments and who indicated that they thought that the language in places could be tightened up. I outlined the substance of the dispute as to whether the intelligence showed or indicated particular conclusions, and how this was resolved before it ever reached the Joint Intelligence Committee, let alone any Minister.

The essence of this debate was set out by two DIS staff, who took the view that the wording on three points in the dossier—including on the 45-minute claim—should have been expressed differently. The disagreement was resolved by the then Chief of Defence Intelligence and his deputy, who concluded that the dossier wording was sound. It cannot be stressed too strongly that even the two DIS members who took the view that they did were not against the inclusion of the 45-minute claim in the dossier. They simply proposed different wording, reflecting the intelligence that they had seen.

The Committee, however, believed that the failure to disclose specifically that the views of the two DIS staff had been recorded in writing was unhelpful, and that it could potentially have misled it as to the seriousness of the dispute. Given the focus on these issues, I recognise that it would have been helpful to the Committee if I had mentioned specifically that the dispute was recorded in writing. I did not say specifically that points made by the two staff members had been put in writing, since these were detailed drafting points on the language of the dossier which were seen at the time as contributions to the normal healthy debate in the DIS about assessments. It did not seem so unusual for such suggestions or amendments to be made in writing.

The Committee also comments on my decision not to have a letter written to it outlining the concerns. The Committee has had the advantage in this case of seeing a briefing note prepared for me by officials before my appearance. It suggested that a letter should be sent to the Committee if the matter did not arise during the session on 22 July. As I had raised the dispute in the DIS voluntarily at that session with the Committee, I judged that there was no need to write subsequently.

I hope that the Committee accepts that I did not, in fact, mislead it. I note that the Committee finds in the final words of its report that it agrees with the conclusions of the Foreign Affairs Committee report that "Ministers did not mislead Parliament".

I believe that this is a fair assessment of the issues, and I thank the Committee for what its Chairman said this morning.

Mr. Bernard Jenkin (North Essex): It would be churlish of the House not to recognise the contrite way in which the Secretary of State has approached it this afternoon, but it should be noted that a Committee of this stature has written that, in giving evidence to the Committee—evidence of which he personally took charge—his Department was unhelpful and potentially misleading. Does he regard that as a ringing endorsement of his

reputation for departmental competence, or should he not do the honourable thing—accept responsibility and resign?

Mr. Hoon: I have accepted that the Ministry of Defence—and I am not in any way avoiding my personal responsibility—could have been more helpful. I have made that clear. The essence of the criticism, however, is this. The Committee is saying that, having indicated or volunteered to the Committee the information that there was a dispute, that amendments had been tabled and that the process had been followed through in the DIS in the assessments made about the intelligence, I should have indicated to the Committee that that had been recorded in writing. That seems to me to be the difference between us.

Mr. Paul Keetch (Hereford): The Secretary of State is a football fan, so he will understand what I mean when I say that I intend to play the ball, not the man. In the context of the other important aspects of today's report, however, may I ask him some questions?

Does the Secretary of State believe that if the Prime Minister's original foreword had not been taken out of the dossier, if the intelligence showing that there was no connection between al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein had remained in the dossier, if the dossier had contained intelligence that war with Iraq would increase the threat to the United Kingdom because of the dispersal of weapons of mass destruction, and if it had been made clear in the dossier that the claim about 45 minutes related to battlefield rather than strategic weapons, the Government would still have won the vote on 18 March?

Mr. Hoon: I do. The hon. Gentleman has asked a series of hypothetical questions which I believe the ISC dealt with properly in what I have described as a fair and balanced report. I do not intend to take up more of the House's time by discussing the matter in detail, as I am sure there will be further opportunities for us to do so in the future.

Mr. John Redwood (Wokingham): Will the Secretary of State take this opportunity to tell us why he thinks Dr. Kelly died, given that Dr. Kelly was a member of his staff? I think it would help the Secretary of State to give Parliament his view clearly today, as he has been the subject of so much adverse briefing and comment—often, probably, from his own friends and colleagues—which has done a lot of damage to his reputation in the press.

Mr. Hoon: I hope that I do not appear unhelpful to the right hon. Gentleman, but I am sure he understands why, as Lord Hutton's inquiry is continuing, it would not be right or proper for me to respond to that question in any way at all.

Mr. A. J. Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed): Does the Secretary of State agree that the picture would be fuller and clearer if he indicated that he did of course volunteer the information he has described properly in response to a question, but that the report records that after he had left the room his staff were pressed further on the matter, and we still did not discover the names or the nature of the two people involved?

Has the Secretary of State noted the recommendation in the report that the DIS needs an arrangement whereby people who have minuted dissent know what procedure to follow, and the fact that they have done so is recognised and communicated to the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee?

Mr. Hoon: During the further discussions we had when I attended the Committee on a second occasion to consider these matters, the right hon. Gentleman made a number of telling points about procedures that needed to be adopted in the DIS. I assure him, as I assured the Committee, that those points will be taken fully on board.

Mr. Michael Portillo (Kensington and Chelsea): I am trying to put myself quite sympathetically in the position of the Secretary of State, because it is a position that I held. I am trying to understand. Perhaps the Secretary of State can help.

Given the allegation that some dissenting elements in the intelligence services had objected to the 45-minute claim being in the dossier, and given that that was central to the Andrew Gilligan accusations that have been given such tremendous publicity, I cannot quite understand how the Secretary of State reached the judgment that he would not make a full disclosure that there had been written correspondence from intelligence officials which, on the face of it, clearly matched the accusation that Andrew Gilligan had made.

Mr. Hoon: I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for the fair way in which he put his question, but I invite him to look again at its premise. As I said a few moments ago, the suggestions from the two individuals in the DIS were not that the material should not be included in the dossier. They constituted, essentially, a linguistic analysis of what the intelligence either showed or indicated. In each of their proposed amendments they wanted, in effect, to draw a distinction between the intelligence showing that Saddam Hussein's regime had the ability to deploy chemical or biological weapons within 45 minutes and the intelligence indicating that.

As I suggested earlier, there was no suggestion from those individuals that the material should not be included. It was simply a case of the placing of the emphasis in the assessment. Given an indication of that kind, I judged that it was not necessary to provide the ISC with the specific amendments in writing; but I did

give a very full account of the fact that there had been amendments and discussion, and that these particular linguistic discussions were resolved by the Chief of Defence Intelligence.

Several hon. Members *rose*—

Mr. Speaker: Order. The Secretary of State must indicate to whom he is giving way.

Mr. Hoon: I give way to my hon. Friend the Member for Doncaster, North (Mr. Hughes).

Mr. Kevin Hughes (Doncaster, North): I have had a look at the report, and I watched the Committee's press conference. I see nothing in the report that is either a resigning issue or a sacking issue, and I believe that that view was confirmed by the Committee's members at the press conference. Unfortunately for my right hon. Friend, that does not fit in with what the Opposition wanted to be in the report, or what the media, in their feeding frenzy, wanted to be in it. The media will continue with that feeding frenzy, baying for my right hon. Friend's resignation or sacking. And may I say—

Mr. Speaker: Order. The intervention is too long. I think the Secretary of State has got the drift of the support that he is being given.

Mr. Hoon: I am grateful for my hon. Friend's support.

Mr. Michael Mates (East Hampshire) *rose*—

Mr. Speaker: Order. I hope the hon. Gentleman is not going to criticise the Chair. He had better not do that, or he will be in trouble.

Mr. Mates : The Secretary of State has given way to me, Mr. Speaker.

Is it not the case that when anyone comes to the House and says that a mistake has been made which he regrets, and that he will see that it does not happen again, the House is generous? The real answer to all this is that, ultimately, the Committee was not misled. There will be plenty of opportunities to debate this matter, because the Government are required to respond to our report, and there will then be a debate about it. I suggest that that is the time when we shall be able to go over this ground again.

Mr. Hoon: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman. I have always felt that I have an extremely good relationship with the Committee. I have sought at all times to be open and straightforward with it. I intend to learn whatever lessons are necessary from this period.

Several hon. Members *rose*—

White House

Press Briefing by Scott McClellan (White House Press Secretary)

The James S. Brady Briefing Room

29 September 2003

[...]

Q Is the White House aware of the House Intelligence letter to the CIA on prewar intelligence, and what's the reaction to it? And does the President think that he was given bad or incomplete information that ultimately led to his decision to war?

MR. McCLELLAN: One, if you look at the statement put out by the CIA, they said that the intelligence community stands -- and this is a quote -- "The intelligence community stands fully behind its findings and judgments as stated in the National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs."

And that is the part of the judgment -- that is the judgment of the intelligence community. We looked at that, as well. But let's go back when we're talking about Iraq and look back at everything here. Let's look at what we knew. We knew, just like the United Nations Security Council and intelligence agencies across the world and previous administrations, that Saddam Hussein had possessed and used weapons of mass destruction, that he had used chemical weapons, that he had a history of doing that. We knew that Saddam Hussein had large, unaccounted for stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons. We knew that he had -- and everybody knew -- that he had invaded his neighbors. So this was a very unique situation.

Saddam Hussein and his regime defied the United Nations over 12 years and some 17 resolutions -- they were in defiance of the international community. They went to great lengths to conceal their program. We know that he had -- that Saddam Hussein's regime had ties to terrorist organizations. We know that it was a brutal and oppressive regime. We've seen that from the torture chambers and the mass graves. So we knew all these facts.

Then came September 11th, the attacks of September 11th. September 11th taught us that we must confront the new, dangerous threats of the 21st century, that we can no longer wait for threats to gather and come to our shores before it's too late. The nexus between outlaw regimes with weapons of mass destruction and terrorist

organizations is the most dangerous threat of our times. And we must confront those threats before it's too late.

Q Given that 180 members of Congress cited the nuclear threat, as reported to them by the President of the United States, as a primary reason to support a war authorization resolution, and the fact that no weapons of mass destruction have been found to date in Iraq, why shouldn't the American people believe that this President overstated the predicate for war?

MR. McCLELLAN: I think I answered that with some of what I just went threw. But Chairman Goss, who is also one of the signatures on this letter, stated that he believes that what our -- at least sources in his office have stated that he believes that this was accurate information presented by the intelligence community. He was certainly -- he was concerned about one area, about the human intelligence. And you look at the letter and it talks about this is a preliminary assessment, that they want to get some comment, they're still looking at this, they're still looking at the findings. So that's where things --

[...]

Q -- you just said a moment ago that: we knew there were large unaccountable -- unaccounted stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons. In 2001, in March or February, Colin Powell said there weren't, as we learned of two days ago --

MR. McCLELLAN: Secretary Powell went before the United Nations and said, there were.

Q No, no, listen to this. No, no, he said, at that point, there weren't. The DIA produced a classified --

MR. McCLELLAN: That's not what he said.

Q -- assessment in October 2002 which said: we don't have any hard or reliable information about stockpiles. And the U.N. inspectors, themselves, said they had no hard information about stockpiles. So where are you getting your information from?

MR. McCLELLAN: Again, I think you're mischaracterizing Secretary Powell's comments. Secretary Powell went before -- and he said, that I never said that he was not a threat. He went before --

Q -- looking for WMD.

MR. McCLELLAN: Let me finish. Secretary Powell went before the United Nations and presented that very case to the world and made it very clear what was unaccounted for. Secretary Powell went through an exhaustive process to back up everything that he said, talking directly with members of the intelligence community --

Q -- to what he said in early 2001. You said, before 9/11 we knew there were accounted stockpiles. He said, there weren't.

MR. McCLELLAN: Before 9/11 -- I'm glad you pointed that out, because September -- and, no, that is not what he said. September 11th taught us --

Q He said that in --

MR. McCLELLAN: It was well documented by the United Nations Security Council that there were undocumented stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons.

Q That's not true. Talk to Ekeus, the Chairman. He has said that that's not the case, that you are mischaracterizing U.N. reports.

MR. McCLELLAN: We're going to move on. I think I've answered this question. I think September 11th, again, changed the way we look at threats. I want to make that point very clear, and that it became even more real after September 11th, the threat posed by Saddam Hussein and his regime.

Let me make very clear --

Q (Inaudible.)

MR. McCLELLAN: -- no let me make very clear the results of the action that we took. America is safer, the world is better, the world is safer because Saddam Hussein and his brutal regime have been removed from power. Saddam Hussein will no longer be able to oppress the people of Iraq. He will no longer be able to carry out the brutality that he did in the past. His regime is gone, it is removed from power, and it is not coming back. And it's very clear that America is more secure because of the action that we took.

Q Can I follow up? When the Secretary of State says, as he did yesterday, that the administration believes Iran is trying to pursue nuclear weapons and that there is no legitimate justification for any of its nuclear programs, does the failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and what seems to be the gulf between pre-war claims and post-war reality, does that hurt the credibility of the country, in making it --

MR. McCLELLAN: Again, I think, one, Dr. Kaye continues to do his job. I think the CIA, in their statement, put out -- let me go back to this part of their statement that they put out about the NIE and the letter from the congressional leaders: "David Kaye has, for only two-and-a-half months, been attempting to unravel Iraq's WMD programs. His effort, which has only just begun, will be important in our process of continuing self-evaluation."

There are miles of documents that Dr. Kaye is still going through in his Iraq survey group. There are interviews that he is still conducting with Iraqis, themselves, who are providing more information. So that process needs to continue. We'll know the truth. He'll pull together the full extent and full picture of Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction and weapons of mass destruction program.

But I, again -- look at the results that we've achieved. Look at the opportunity that is presented to us in Iraq. The stakes are very high in Iraq. The world has a stake in seeing a free, sovereign and prosperous Iraq. It's the central front in the war on terrorism. And foreign terrorists and remnants of the former regime are desperate, because they know we are making significant progress. And when we prevail in this front in Iraq, then we will have dealt a significant blow to the terrorists, and we would have made a significant -- we will make significant progress in the war on terrorism. And we will see it through.

UK Hansard

Commons - Oral Answers, Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs

14 October 2003 - Column 8

Mr. Peter Kilfoyle (Liverpool, Walton): To consolidate support in the House for the initiatives that the Foreign Secretary has adumbrated today, does not he think that it is now time for the Government to apologise for the dodgy dossier, which misled the House on Iraq in the first place?

Mr. Straw: No, because that dossier—the one published on 24 September last year—has been shown, after very careful scrutiny by the Intelligence and Security Committee, to be accurate in all material respects, as were the contents of the dossier published in February.

Mr. Michael Ancram (Devizes): I welcome the new draft resolution, and I hope that, this time, it will secure the support of the Security Council, including from France.

On a slightly different matter, has the Foreign Secretary discussed with Secretary Powell the information on the basis of which the Prime Minister told the Liaison Committee on 8 July that he had "absolutely no doubt that we will find evidence of" weapons of mass destruction "programmes" - later explained by his official spokesman as "including concrete evidence of the product of these programmes as well".

Where is that evidence, which has apparently so far eluded the international survey group? Or should we put as much faith in the Prime Minister's assertions on weapons of mass destruction as in his now totally discredited assertion—as we learned yesterday—that he had nothing to do with the naming of Dr. Kelly?

Mr. Straw: I think that that is one of the more incredible observations that I have ever heard from those on the Conservative Front Bench, given their position on 18 March. I think that I am going to buy the right hon. Gentleman a pair of open sandals and a false beard, and he can join the Liberal Democrats.

Commons - Written Answers, Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs

14 October 2003 - Column 62W

Dr. Cable: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a statement on progress in the search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.

Mr. MacShane: David Kay, the senior CIA officer in the Iraq Survey Group presented an interim report on the activities of the group to a number of Congressional committees on 2 October. According to his report the ISG has produced further conclusive and incontrovertible evidence that the Saddam regime was indeed in breach of UNSCR 1441.

The ISG has discovered "dozens of WMD-related programme activities and significant amounts of equipment that Iraq concealed from the United Nations during the inspections that began in late 2002".

Commons - Written Answers, Prime Minister

15 October 2003 - Column 233W

Paul Flynn: To ask the Prime Minister pursuant to his answer of 18 September, Official Report, column 870W, on Iraq, whether the (a) chairman and (b) members of the (i) Intelligence and Security Committee, (ii) Defence and (iii) Foreign Affairs Select Committees were invited to comment on the content of the Iraq dossier before it was published.

The Prime Minister: As I said in my reply to my hon. Friend on 18 September, all three chairmen were briefed on the content of the Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction dossier by the chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee on 19 September 2002, shortly before it was published.

In addition, I invited Ann Taylor to see it in advance of the briefing to the whole Intelligence and Security Committee and to pass comment if she wished.

Mr. Dalyell: To ask the Prime Minister if he will make a statement about the advice which he received before the conflict on the impact of a military offensive against Iraq on the incidence of terrorism.

The Prime Minister: The assessment I received was that the greatest terrorist threat to Western interests came from al-Qaeda and related groups, and that this threat would be heightened by military action against Iraq. This assessment informed the Ministry of Defence's planning for military action, as well as the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's consular planning and in the published Travel Advice.

When I took the decision that military action would be required to ensure that Iraq complied with United Nations Security Council Resolutions, I had to weigh all the factors, including the possible short term risk of increased terrorism, against the longer term risks of rogue states developing weapons of mass destruction.

Commons - Written Answers, Solicitor-General

20 October 2003 - Column 352W

Mr. Marshall-Andrews: To ask the Solicitor-General pursuant to her answer to the hon. Member for Stone (Mr. Cash) of 17 March 2003, Official Report, column 515W, on Iraq, to what extent, in concluding that it was plain that Iraq had failed to comply with Resolution 1441, the Attorney-General relied upon facts and assertions contained in the Government dossier published in January as material to his conclusion and to the opinion he gave as to the authority to use force and specifying which such facts and assertions were so relied upon.

The Solicitor-General: The Attorney-General did not rely at all on the Government dossier published on 30 January in reaching the conclusion that Iraq had failed to comply with resolution 1441 and in stating his view that a legal basis for the use of force existed in the combined effect of UN Security Council resolutions 678, 687 and 1441. However, it was material to that conclusion that there was intelligence evidence that the Iraqi authorities had intimidated scientists which UNMOVIC wished to interview; that rooms designated for such interviews had been bugged; and that some potential interviewees had been kept away from UNMOVIC by the Iraqi authorities and that there was evidence that Iraqi scientists had been intimidated into refusing interviews with UNMOVIC outside Iraq. These points were also covered in the section on interviews in chapter one of the dossier.

Mr. Marshall-Andrews: To ask the Solicitor-General pursuant to her answer to the hon. Member for Stone (Mr. Cash) of 17 March 2003, Official Report, column 515W, on Iraq, whether, in concluding that it was plain that Iraq had failed to comply with Resolution 1441, the Attorney-General relied upon the facts and assertions contained in Chapter 3 paragraphs (a) two to five, (b) six to seven, (c) eight to 11, (d) 12 to 13, (e) 14, (f) 15, (g) 16, (h) 18 to 23 and (i) 24 to 32 of the Government dossier published in September 2002 as material to his conclusion and to the opinion he gave as to the authority to use force.

The Solicitor-General: The Attorney-General did not rely upon any facts or assertions contained in the Government dossier published in September 2002 as material to his conclusion set out in his statement of 17 March that Iraq had failed to comply with resolution 1441 and that a legal base for the use of force existed in the combined effect of UN Security Council resolutions 678, 687 and 1441.

Commons - Prime Minister's Questions

22 October 2003 - Column 636

Alan Simpson (Nottingham, South): On the war on Iraq, will the Prime Minister make one point clear? When the Attorney-General gave his advice about the legality of the war, did he know that the 45-minute warning related only to battlefield weapons and not to weapons of mass destruction?

The Prime Minister: The Attorney-General's advice was clear and dependent not on that specific information but on the legal position in United Nations resolutions. I refer my hon. Friend to an excellent article that was written today and makes precisely the same case that the Attorney-General made in his advice.

Commons - Written Answers, Prime Minister

23 October 2003 - Column 647W

Llew Smith: To ask the Prime Minister pursuant to his statement of 4 June 2003, Official Report, column 148, what subsequent communication with the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee he has had in respect of disquiet over the 45-minute claim made by members of the Defence Intelligence staff prior to the final publication of the dossier on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, of September 2002; and whether the Defence Intelligence staff brought to his attention the disquiet after he requested that if people had any evidence on the matter they should produce it.

The Prime Minister: None.

This matter was considered by the Intelligence and Security Committee in its report on "Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction—Intelligence and Assessments" (Cm 5972), copies of which are available in the Libraries of the House. It has also been covered in both written and oral evidence to the Hutton Inquiry which has been published on its website at www.the-hutton-inquiry.org.uk.

Commons - Written Answers, Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs

28 October 2003 - Column 186W

Paul Flynn: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs how long the search in Iraq for weapons of mass destruction will continue.

Mr. MacShane: No time limit has been set for completion of the search. It will continue for as long as it is necessary to satisfy ourselves that no weapons or associated programmes remain in Iraq.

[...]

Mr. Menzies Campbell: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs how many British personnel are part of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG); who commissioned the ISG report; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Straw: As at 20 October there were 65 UK personnel under the control of the Iraq Survey Group. The Iraq Survey Group's interim report presented on 2 October was produced on the basis of an understanding by Dr. Kay that a progress report should be produced. There is no formal requirement on the ISG to report according to a particular timetable.

Mr. Menzies Campbell: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if his Department has received the full version of the Iraq Survey Group report; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Straw: A full copy of the interim report of the Iraq Survey Group was passed to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office at the time of its presentation.

My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and I have both publicly stated the Government's position with regard to the report and the continuing search for Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.

Commons - Written Answers, Defence

30 October 2003 - Column 318W

Llew Smith: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what was the reason no action was taken to take into account (a) factual errors and (b) suggested errors of interpretation brought to the attention of their seniors by concerned defence intelligence officers in respect of the draft dossier on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction of September 2002, prior to its final publication; and when he was first informed of the misgivings of the defence intelligence staff officers relating to the draft.

[...] Mr. Hoon: As indicated in my evidence to Lord Hutton's Inquiry on 27 August 2003, I was first informed in a minute dated 18 July 2003 that two officials in the Defence Intelligence Staff had expressed some concerns about certain language used in the dossier. I set out the action taken as a result of those concerns in my remarks in the House on 11 September 2003, Official Report, columns 491–95.

White House

Press Gaggle by Scott McClellan (White House Press Secretary)

Crawford Middle School - Crawford, Texas

31 October 2003

[...]

Q -- Intelligence Committee, if I may. Two things. First of all, do you mind telling us who the staffer is that the Intel Committee wants to speak with and they have not been able to get in touch with?

MR. McCLELLAN: Well, one, I'm not sure of the exact request in that regard that they've made. But let me be very clear, we are working very closely with the Senate Intelligence Committee, we've have been. We've provided them access to NSC staff members, we provided them relevant documents related to information that they need, and we will continue to do that. But I think it's best, versus doing this in the media realm, that we continue to work closely with the committee to address their concerns and address their requests, and that's what we will continue to do.

Q The letter also seems to suggest that Dr. Rice and the White House has been an impediment to the CIA's cooperation with the Intel Committee. Is that the case? Have you barred the CIA from participating and disclosing documents and the briefers? And, if so, why? And, if not, will you encourage the CIA to participate in this process?

MR. McCLELLAN: Well, one, we have not objected to allowing the committee to access -- to have access to CIA documents sent to the White House. And, in fact, we have made copies of those documents available to committee investigators previously, this past summer. So that's why I say that we've been working with the committee, we'll continue to do so. Obviously, this latest request came just late yesterday. Despite the fact that they don't have jurisdiction over the White House, we want to continue working with them to help them in their work to review the intelligence relating to Iraq.

[...]

White House

Press Gaggle by Scott McClellan (White House Press Secretary)

Aboard Air Force One

En Route Birmingham, Alabama – 3 November 2003

[...]

Q Scott, Senator Roberts said on CNN yesterday that he had talked to, what he called, almost the top official in the White House, who gave him a pledge that led him to believe that the White House would give him "every document" that he wants about prewar Iraqi intelligence. Is that accurate?

MR. McCLELLAN: Well, we -- well, one, I'll let him characterize his own thoughts about what information they have received or are receiving. We have had good conversations with the committee, and we will continue to work with the committee, as we have been doing, despite the committee's lack of jurisdiction over the White House.

Q How could Senator Roberts have been so mistaken? There's a huge gap between good conversation --

MR. McCLELLAN: Well, again, I think you need to ask the committee, in terms of -- you need to direct those questions to Senator Roberts in terms of how he would characterize what we are doing. But we are working with the committee and trying to be helpful to the committee, to assist them in their efforts.

Q Scott, you say, "good conversations," and he says, "every document." There's quite a chasm between those two things. How could there have been such a miscommunication between the White House official and --

MR. McCLELLAN: I think he said, we're working in a spirit of cooperation, and we are working in a cooperative way with the committee. Keep in mind that the committee doesn't have jurisdiction over the White House. But at the same time, we want -- we want the -- we want to be helpful to the committee. And I think I'll let the senators characterize their remarks in the way that they best see fit. But I think that, again, we're both saying that we're working with the committee in a cooperative way.

Q Who was the official he talked to?

MR. McCLELLAN: Well, I think that they are in regular contact with staff at the White House, and I would just leave it at that.

[...]

Washington Post

Senators Give Tenet Deadline to Provide Prewar Intelligence

By Walter Pincus – 30 October 2003

In a sharply worded letter, the top two senators with the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence called on CIA Director George J. Tenet to supply long-sought materials and schedule interviews by noon Friday and to be ready to appear before the panel "at a time determined by the committee."

The letter to Tenet showed that although the committee's chairman, Pat Roberts (R-Kan.), and vice chairman, John D. Rockefeller IV (D-W.Va.), may disagree on whether their investigation of prewar intelligence will examine its use by Bush policymakers, they are together in pressing for the CIA and other intelligence community agencies to produce information they have been seeking since July.

Last Friday, responding to a Washington Post story that indicated the committee was preparing a report about weaknesses in prewar intelligence, Tenet offered to have senior officers involved in producing the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction appear before the senators to present what a senior administration official described as a "comprehensive explanation as to how [the intelligence community] reached their conclusions."

Up to that point, the committee inquiry had consisted primarily of staff members interviewing intelligence analysts who had taken part in the process without senators being present.

"To date, our staff has interviewed dozens of WMD analysts comprising hundreds of hours of testimony. Committee staff was led to believe that the people they have interviewed were all the key individuals involved," the senators wrote.

Roberts and Rockefeller, who have been waiting for information that they said "was to have been provided five months ago," also took offense at another part of Tenet's Friday letter that said there was "additional material" still to be supplied to the panel. "The committee has been patient," the senators wrote yesterday, "but we need immediate access to this information."

Bill Harlow, CIA director of public affairs, said the agency was reviewing the Roberts-Rockefeller letter and was "working hard to fulfill the committee's requests."

Also yesterday, Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton (D-N.Y.), a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee called on President Bush to "level with the American people" on Iraq with "the good, the bad and the ugly." In a speech before the Center for American Progress, a new liberal think tank, Clinton said she agreed with Bush "that we cannot fail in Iraq." But she added that "what is going right should not delude us about what is going wrong."

Washington Post

Panel Issues Broad Demand for Iraq Intelligence Data

By Dana Priest – 31 October 2003

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, which is investigating the quality of prewar intelligence on Iraq, sent stern letters yesterday to three departments in the executive branch demanding that they produce previously requested documents and allow interviews to be scheduled by noon today.

The committee said it cannot finish its inquiry without the information.

"You must expedite our access to the outstanding documents and immediately make available the individuals identified," the letters say. ". . . The credibility of the government with its people and the nation with the world is at stake. Incomplete answers and lingering doubts will haunt us for many years."

The deadline is not binding, but failure to comply or to offer a reasonable explanation for the delay will give fodder to critics, including most Democratic presidential candidates, who assert that the administration and intelligence agencies overstated the threat from Iraq and are trying to cover up.

The letters represent a partial victory for Democrats on the committee. These senators insist that their mandate includes analyzing how the administration used or misused information from the intelligence community in its decision to go to war, and in making its public case for military action. The committee's chairman, Sen. Pat Roberts (R-Kan.), has not agreed, however, to the wider probe of the White House that Democrats want.

Yesterday's letters went to national security adviser Condoleezza Rice, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Colin L. Powell.

The Senate and House intelligence committees are preparing reports that congressional sources say will be critical of CIA Director George J. Tenet and the intelligence community for its reliance on circumstantial and outdated intelligence, even though Iraq was considered an important national security threat before the U.S. invasion this spring.

Among the documents the Senate panel requested in July but has not yet received are certain daily reports President Bush received from his CIA briefers and other weapons and terrorism documents developed by the National Security Council, according to officials familiar with the committee's inquiry.

The panel also asked the Defense Department for detailed information on several handpicked, Iraq-focused policy groups headed by Undersecretary for Policy Douglas J. Feith. It also requested information on the activities and personnel of the Pentagon's Office of Special Plans.

The special plans office, headed by William Luti, has been accused by administration critics of being a rogue shop that collected and analyzed intelligence on Iraq outside the normal channels. Luti has denied this. The allegations have never been substantiated.

The letter to Rice says "you must lift your objection to the Central Intelligence Agency providing the committee with certain documents and allowing us to interview individuals involved in briefing senior administration officials."

Usually, the White House resists such requests, citing executive privilege.

Yesterday's letters, signed by Roberts and the panel's ranking Democrat, Sen. John D. "Jay" Rockefeller IV (W.Va.), follow a public admonishment by the CIA that the committee had not done enough work to have arrived at any preliminary conclusions. The agency made the same charge when the leaders of the House intelligence committee criticized Tenet and the quality of intelligence last month.

On Wednesday, the Senate panel responded with a toughly worded letter to Tenet giving him the same noon deadline today to turn over requested documents.

It also countered public CIA statements criticizing the committee for not yet interviewing the right people. The panel said its staff has interviewed "every analyst who had been involved in coordinating" the key prewar intelligence document on Iraq called the National Intelligence Estimate. The interviews with dozens of analysts comprised "hundreds of hours of testimony," the committee told Tenet.

Washington Post

U.S. Gives Senate Panel Some Intelligence Data

By Dana Priest – 1 November 2003

A number of documents on prewar Iraq intelligence requested by a Senate committee were turned over by the government yesterday, but the White House balked, saying it was discussing them with the panel.

Officials of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, who this week gave the CIA, the National Security Council, and the departments of State and Defense a noon deadline yesterday to comply with requests for information and interviews that it made in July, said they were generally pleased with the response.

"The CIA has complied quite substantially," said Sen. John D. "Jay" Rockefeller IV (W.Va.), the panel's ranking Democrat. The others, he added "are taking a little longer, but we want them to understand we are extremely serious about this."

The committee this week sent the agencies an unusually stern letter demanding the information as it seeks to determine the quality of prewar intelligence on Iraq and to square it with the lack of weapons of mass destruction after months of searching. Rockefeller and his Democratic colleagues also want to investigate how the administration used or misused the information it was given in making the case for invading Iraq.

The White House has refused to turn over copies of the daily intelligence briefings President Bush receives from a top CIA official and internal communications at the NSC on Iraq that the committee wanted. Like other administrations, the White House is likely to assert they are protected by executive privilege when declining to respond further. Rockefeller has said it is impossible to do a thorough inquiry without the White House material. A Defense Department spokesman said "we are still working" on outstanding questions from the committee, including details about the activities of the Office of Special Plans.

The State Department scheduled six interviews the committee had been requesting and turned over all but two of the documents requested in July. "We have been, we think, very responsive to their requests," State Department spokesman Richard A. Boucher said. "We have completed or made arrangements now for all of the interviews or briefings." He said the remaining two documents would be handed over soon.

At the CIA, spokesman Mark Mansfield said, "we are working hard to respond to the committee's request. We will be providing a significant amount of material today and more will be forthcoming."

Washington Post

White House to Provide Papers, Roberts Says

By Mike Allen – 3 November 2003

CRAWFORD, Tex., Nov. 2 -- Sen. Pat Roberts (R-Kan.) said Sunday that President Bush's aides had pledged to provide "every document" they have been denying the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, but the White House replied with a noncommittal statement.

The White House missed the committee's deadline of noon Friday for information about prewar Iraq intelligence that had been requested in July.

Roberts, the committee chairman, said on CNN's "Late Edition" that his staff informed him late Friday that "in a spirit of cooperation, that the White House has agreed to supply us with the documents and the interviews that we want."

"I have talked with very top White -- or almost the top, you know, White House official, and he has promised that," Roberts said. "Every document we want will be made available."

That would be a remarkable concession by the White House, which has long resisted yielding internal records to Capitol Hill, even about matters less sensitive than war planning. The White House later issued a statement after Roberts's appearance that stopped far short of the commitment he described.

The statement said officials "have had productive conversations about ways we can work with and assist the committee."

"While the committee's jurisdiction does not cover the White House, we want to be helpful," the statement continued. "We will continue to talk to and work with the committee in a spirit of cooperation."

Sen. John D. "Jay" Rockefeller IV (W.Va.), the panel's ranking Democrat, was informed of the supposed agreement by Roberts as they appeared together on CNN. Roberts said he had not told Rockefeller because he hadn't "had a chance to call you over the weekend."

Rockefeller expressed skepticism. "I want to see the documentation . . . before I'm satisfied," he said. "I want to know that we really have it in hand."

Congressional sources said committee Democrats have requested speech drafts, files showing documentation for assertions in the State of the Union address and other speeches by Bush and Vice President Cheney, intelligence reports to the president, and correspondence between the White House and the Pentagon, the CIA and the State Department. Committee Republicans and the White House interpret the request more narrowly.

The congressional sources said the senators have requested interviews with officials of the National Security Council and Cheney's office.

The sources said the committee is interested in a statement by Bush during a prime-time address from Cincinnati on Oct. 7, 2002, referring to "the smoking gun that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud."

Washington Post

Classified U.S. Report On Iraq Sought by U.N.

By Colum Lynch – 4 November 2003

UNITED NATIONS, Nov. 3 -- The U.N.'s top nuclear weapons inspector Monday called on the United States to provide his agency with a copy of a classified American report on Iraq's banned weapons and to allow his inspectors to return to Iraq.

"If there are weapons, we would like to find [them]; if there are no weapons, we would like to conclude the issue," Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, said in an interview. "They owe us the classified version."

ElBaradei said the United States, like all U.N. member states, is obliged under the terms of Security Council resolutions to provide his agency with information that advances its knowledge of Iraq's past nuclear ambitions. But he said the United States has yet to respond to a request he made last month for a copy of the classified version of a report by David Kay, the head of the Iraq Survey Group, that indicated there was no new evidence Iraq had reconstituted its nuclear weapons program before the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq.

U.N. weapons inspectors -- who have a mandate to verify the elimination of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction -- left Iraq before the invasion. The United States has not permitted them to return, except for a brief June visit by IAEA inspectors to the uranium storage facility at Tuwaitha.

ElBaradei, who was visiting New York for his annual address to the U.N. General Assembly, also said he would need more time to assess whether Iran has provided international inspectors with an adequate account of its nuclear power program.

Iran announced last week that it would temporarily stop enriching and reprocessing uranium and submit to more aggressive inspections by the nuclear agency. The IAEA board of directors is set to evaluate Iranian cooperation at a meeting Nov. 21.

ElBaradei said Monday that although there are serious gaps in Iran's accounting on its nuclear program, he welcomed Iran's decision to present his inspectors with more documentation on the program's origins.

"We can't reach a final assessment by the 21st," he said. "This will take time, but that is the nature of the verification process. As long as [we] are moving forward, as long as we are unearthing new facts and as long as we see cooperation, I am satisfied."

In his address, ElBaradei made a proposal aimed at tightening controls on Iran and other suspected nuclear weapons proliferators: He said all production of weapons-grade materials, including highly enriched uranium and plutonium, should be placed under the control of an international organization.

"In light of the increasing threat of proliferation, both by states and by terrorists," he said, the United Nations should consider restricting the production of weapons-grade fuel to "facilities under multinational control."

BBC News

Bush interview: Key points

16 November 2003

Here are the key points of US President George W Bush's interview on the BBC's Breakfast with Frost programme.

[...] On the absence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq:

"I think our intelligence was sound and I know the British intelligence was sound. It's the same intelligence that caused the United Nations to pass resolution after resolution after resolution. It's the same intelligence that was used by my predecessor to bomb Iraq. And I'm very confident that we got good intelligence.

"And not only that, David Kay, who went over to kind of lead the effort to find the weapons or the intent of weapons, came back with a report that clearly stated that Saddam Hussein had been in material breach of resolution 1441; in other words, had the inspectors found what Kay found, they would have reported back to the United Nations that he was in breach, that he was in violation of exactly what the United Nations expected him not to do.

"Nobody could say that Saddam Hussein wasn't a danger. I mean, not only was he a danger to the free world, I mean, and that's what the world said. The world said it consistently.

"And he's a danger to his own people as well. Remember, we discovered mass graves with hundreds of thousands of men and women, and children, clutching their little toys, as a result of this person's brutality."

On whether he believed the claim that Iraq could unleash weapons of mass destruction in 45 minutes:

"Well, I believed a lot of things, but I know he was a dangerous man, and I know that for the sake of security he needed to be dealt with." [...]

Washington Post

CIA Finds No Evidence Hussein Sought to Arm Terrorists

By Walter Pincus – 16 November 2003

The CIA's search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq has found no evidence that former president Saddam Hussein tried to transfer chemical or biological technology or weapons to terrorists, according to a military and intelligence expert.

Anthony Cordesman, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, provided new details about the weapons search and Iraqi insurgency in a report released Friday. It was based on briefings over the past two weeks in Iraq from David Kay, the CIA representative who is directing the search for unconventional weapons in Iraq; L. Paul Bremer, the U.S. civil administrator there; and military officials.

"No evidence of any Iraqi effort to transfer weapons of mass destruction or weapons to terrorists," Cordesman wrote of Kay's briefing. "Only possibility was Saddam's Fedayeen [his son's irregular terrorist force] and talk only."

One of the concerns the Bush administration cited early last year to justify the need to invade Iraq was that Hussein would provide chemical or biological agents or weapons to al Qaeda or other terrorists. Despite the disclosure that U.S. and British intelligence officials assessed that Hussein would use or distribute such weapons only if he were attacked and faced defeat, administration spokesmen have continued to defend that position.

Last Thursday, Undersecretary of Defense Douglas J. Feith defended the administration's prewar position at the Council on Foreign Relations. "The idea that we didn't have specific proof that he was planning to give a biological agent to a terrorist group," he said, "doesn't really lead you to anything, because you wouldn't expect to have that information even if it were true. And our intelligence is just not at the point where if Saddam had that intention that we would necessarily know it."

Yesterday, allegations of new evidence of connections between Iraq and al Qaeda contained in a classified annex attached to Feith's Oct. 27 letter to leaders of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence were published in the Weekly Standard. Feith had been asked to support his July 10 closed-door testimony about such connections. The classified annex summarized raw intelligence reports but did not analyze them or address their accuracy, according to a senior administration official familiar with the matter.

During the recent Baghdad briefing, Cordesman noted that Kay said Iraq "did order nuclear equipment from 1999 on, but no evidence [has turned up] of [a] new major facility to use it."

Although there was no evidence of chemical weapons production, Kay said he had located biological work "under cover of new agricultural facility" that showed "advances in developing dry storable powder forms of botulinum toxin," Cordesman wrote.

During his Nov. 1-12 trip, Cordesman visited Baghdad, Babel, Tikrit and Kirkuk, where he met combat commanders and staff in high-threat areas. Reporting on his briefing by Bremer, Cordesman said 95 percent of the threat came from former Hussein loyalists while most foreign terrorists, who entered Iraq before the war, arrived from Syria, with some from Saudi Arabia and only "a few from Iran." Bremer "felt Syrian intelligence knows [of the volunteers] but is not proactive in encouraging [them]." He also said there was "no way to seal borders with Syria, Saudi [Arabia] and Iran. Too manpower intensive."

Bremer said Hussein loyalists "still have lots of money to buy attacks [because] at least \$1 billion still unaccounted for." He also said the Syrians had admitted "some \$3 billion more of Iraqi money [is] in Syria."

The Coalition Joint Task Force briefers noted that the Iraq Governing Council felt "the U.S. is too soft in attacking hostile targets, arrests and use of force," while the U.S. side "feels restraint is the key to winning hearts and minds."

Hussein, according to the briefers, "is cut off, isolated, moving constantly, [and has] no real role in control." They told Cordesman that the "problem is ex-generals and colonels with no other future -- not former top officials." They also said Hussein "made officers read 'Black Hawk Down' [Mark Bowden's book about the fatal downing of U.S. helicopters in Somalia a decade ago] to try to convince them U.S. would have to leave if major casualties."

They said there will be attacks "until the day U.S. leaves" and "cannot ever get intelligence up to point where [they can] stop all attacks."

During his visit to the Polish-led international division, south of Baghdad where the Shiites predominate, Cordesman said there were 34 attacks before a Pole was killed Nov. 6.

The force there considers the holy cities "stable" but notes that Shiite leaders such as Grand Ayatollah Ali Hussein al-Sistani, Iraq's top Shiite cleric, "protect themselves with their own militias with CPA [Coalition Provisional Authority] approval. This has its advantages, but it means they cannot be given effective coalition protection," he wrote.

Guardian

No proof Saddam armed al-Qaida, says CIA

Duncan Campbell – 17 November 2003

The CIA has found no evidence that Saddam Hussein tried to transfer chemical or biological weapons or technology to al-Qaida or any other groups, according to a new American report.

The details of the CIA's findings were published as the domestic political debate over how long US troops will remain in Iraq intensified.

The report by Anthony Cordesman, a senior fellow at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, was compiled from briefings in the past two weeks by David Kay, the CIA representative leading the search for unconventional weapons in Iraq, Paul Bremer, the US civil administrator, and military personnel. "No evidence of any Iraqi effort to transfer weapons of mass destruction or weapons to terrorists," Mr Cordesman wrote of Mr Kay's briefing.

According to the report, details of which were published in the Washington Post yesterday, Mr Kay said that Iraq "did order nuclear equipment from 1999 on, but no evidence [has turned up] of [a] new major facility to use it."

Mr Kay added that he had located Iraqi biological work "under cover of new agricultural facility" that indicated "advances in developing dry storable powder forms of botulinum toxin".

The report concluded that 95% of current attacks on coalition forces came from former Saddam loyalists, with some assistance from fighters from Syria, Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Money looted from the central bank in Iraq in the regime's dying days may be financing the attackers' activities, the report suggested. "At least \$1bn [was] still unaccounted for," it said.

The briefings indicate that Saddam is "cut off, isolated, moving constantly [and has] no real role in control."

Mr Bremer also told CNN that there was no evidence that Saddam was coordinating the attacks.

USA Today

CIA will examine raw data on Iraq

By John Diamond – 19 November 2003

WASHINGTON — CIA Director George Tenet has ordered investigators to substantially widen their internal probe of Iraq intelligence to consider whether the agency missed telltale signs that Iraq had gotten rid of its weapons of mass destruction before the U.S.-led invasion last March.

The probe, which has been conducted by a four-member team of former senior CIA analysts since early this year, was broadened this week. It will now extend into 20 volumes of raw intelligence reports, such as electronic intercepts, spy satellite photos and reports from human sources. Until now, the team had limited its work to a far smaller volume of finished intelligence reports and assessments.

In a probe that parallels investigations by the House and Senate intelligence committees, the team is examining the quality of prewar intelligence that said Saddam Hussein's regime had chemical and biological weapons and a resurgent nuclear weapons program. The alleged weapons were the Bush administration's key stated reason for invading Iraq, but U.S. searchers have failed to find such weapons there since U.S. forces entered Iraq.

The expanded probe was disclosed by two intelligence officials who asked not be named, and was confirmed by Richard Kerr, former CIA deputy director and head of the four-member team. Kerr said in a telephone interview Wednesday, "It's important to figure out, from an intelligence point of view, if we didn't do it well, how could we have done better."

Although Kerr would like to wait until chief U.S. weapons searcher David Kay finishes his work in Iraq sometime next spring or summer, the team has already concluded that no matter how long Kay's teams look, they are unlikely to turn up the vast arsenal U.S. intelligence said was in Iraq before the war. And meanwhile, the clock is ticking on the House and Senate investigations, which are expected to be sharply critical of the CIA and could issue findings long before Kay wraps up his work.

Tenet, who ordered the expanded investigation last week, also wants Kerr's team to see what he regards as an enormous volume of solid information the CIA assembled over the past decade indicating that Iraq had illegal weapons.

The two intelligence officials said a key aim is to look for raw prewar reports indicating that Iraq may have, as it claimed, dismantled its weapons of mass destruction programs. The concern is that CIA analysts discounted or overlooked those reports because of an overriding assumption that Saddam was secretly hoarding an arsenal of banned weapons.

Diplomat Pushes for U.N. Return to Iraq

21 November 2003

MOSCOW - A senior Russian diplomat said United Nations inspectors should continue their search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.

Deputy Foreign Minister Yuri Fedotov, Russia's diplomatic point man on Iraq, said that the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, or UNMOVIC, must resume its work in Iraq until it makes a definitive conclusion on whether the country possesses forbidden weapons.

"It is necessary to make a decision on issues relating to Iraqi weapons of mass destruction," Fedotov said, according to the Interfax news agency. "This can be done with the help of mechanisms established by the U.N. Security Council, in particular, through UNMOVIC."

Fedotov said he was heading Friday to an UNMOVIC meeting in New York, where a draft version of the commission's report to the U.N. Security Council will be discussed.

Moscow strongly opposed the U.S. war in Iraq. Russian officials repeatedly have pointed to the U.S. failure to locate weapons of mass destruction - a key U.S. justification for the war against Saddam Hussein.

A recent nationwide poll conducted by the respected VCIOM-A independent opinion research group had 44 percent of respondents saying they sympathize with Iraqi guerrillas who stage terror attacks against the U.S. troops in Iraq, while only 15 percent said they side with the Americans. The remaining 41 percent were undecided.

Sixty-three percent said the United States made a wrong decision when it launched war in Iraq, while 17 percent said the United States acted correctly and 20 percent were undecided.

The poll also showed that in spite of the strong opposition to the U.S.-led war in Iraq, six out of every 10 respondents had a positive general attitude to the United States. The poll had a margin of error of 3.4 percent.

Guardian

Lib Dems ask for investigation into Iraqi WMD claim

By David Hencke – 22 November 2003

A US government ban on the release to parliament of crucial information which could reveal whether two mobile biological laboratories discovered in Iraq are weapons of mass destruction or harmless equipment is to be investigated by Ann Abraham, the parliamentary ombudsman.

The discovery of the labs by the Iraq Survey Group last May was claimed by Tony Blair and George Bush as proof that Saddam Hussein had battlefield weapons of mass destruction.

At the time Mr Blair said: "We have already found two trailers, both of which we believe were used for the production of biological weapons."

Mr Bush said: "Those who say we haven't found the banned manufacturing devices or banned weapons - they're wrong. We have found them."

Last July Lord Bach, the minister of defence procurement, told Lord Redesdale, the Liberal Democrat defence spokesman, that the vehicles had been built in Iraq using industrial components that had been obtained abroad, including from the UK.

He told the peer: "The components of British origin would not have been restricted under the sanctions scheme."

When he tried to press Lord Bach on the vehicles, he was told that his questions could not be answered because: "We would not release information passed to us in confidence by foreign governments."

Now Lord Redesdale has got his Commons counterpart, Paul Keetch, to ask the ombudsman to investigate, pointing out that the refusal to release information is subject to a "public interest" test. The ombudsman is entitled to see internal Ministry of Defence papers and correspondence from the US and the Iraq Survey Group.

Lord Redesdale suspects that the equipment - which could have been supplied by Marconi in the UK - is not suitable for making weapons.

He said yesterday: "Either British companies supplied equipment that was used to make WMD or not. If these vehicles were indeed WMD, then it is in the public interest for the government to release the information. And if these vehicles are actually harmless, there is even more reason we should be told."

"There is no reason why the government should be withholding this harmless information now that Saddam Hussein's regime is gone. The only plausible explanation can be that it might be embarrassing to Downing Street and the White House."

Guardian

Intelligence heads under fire

Former chief delivers damning attack over Iraq war

Richard Norton-Taylor – 6 December 2003

A former intelligence chief yesterday delivered a scathing attack on his successors, saying they abused their position by helping Tony Blair to make a case for war against Iraq.

He accused the heads of Britain's intelligence agencies of bowing to government pressure to use secret intelligence to justify a war when other arguments "were cutting too little ice with the public".

In a damning assault, Sir Rodric Braithwaite, a former chairman of Whitehall's joint intelligence committee, the JIC, told the Royal Institute for International Affairs that intelligence chiefs allowed their objectivity to be undermined.

The JIC, whose members include the heads of MI6, MI5, and GCHQ, "stepped outside its traditional role", said Sir Rodric. "It entered the prime minister's magic circle. It was engulfed in the atmosphere of excitement which surrounds decision-making in a crisis".

He added: "Its members went beyond assessment to become part of the process of making and advocating policy. That inevitably undermined their objectivity."

One reason why the government claimed in its controversial September dossier that "intelligence confirmed" Saddam Hussein's weapons threatened British interests was because their "other arguments for war were cutting too little ice with the public", said Sir Rodric.

"But we live in a democracy, and in a democracy the government should not try to justify its actions on the basis of information it is not prepared to reveal."

Secret intelligence was unlikely ever to provide the killer fact, the certainty which would alone justify an exception, he added. The public was always entitled to be sceptical of claims to the contrary.

Though he mentioned no names, he made it clear his main target was John Scarlett, the chairman of the JIC who developed a close relationship with Alastair Campbell, Mr Blair's former communications director, as they drew up the September dossier.

Sir Rodric described the dossier as "a pretty muddled affair". Though it was titled Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction, large passages were not about that at all, he said. They were about "Saddam's unpleasant regime and his unpleasant secret policemen. Much of the information in the dossier was in the public domain. Much of it came from the UN inspectors".

He added: "Much of the rest was said to be either 'indicated' or 'confirmed' by intelligence. I have no idea what that intelligence actually was. But the failure so far to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq does not inspire confidence."

He attacked the way the dossier warned that Saddam could "deploy" weapons of mass destruction within 45 minutes. It spoke of an "imminent" or "current" threat. The press and the public came to alarming conclusions. The headline in the Sun was 45 Minutes to Doom, he said.

He continued: "This illustrates an iron law about the way drafting committees work. In the effort to get consensus, the drafters lose sight of what words mean to the ordinary reader."

Sir Rodric pointed out that Lord Hutton was told the phrase "WMD" simply meant that Saddam could fire chemical shells from field artillery.

In a reference to Mr Scarlett - a candidate to succeed Sir Richard Dearlove, head of MI6, next year - and Geoff Hoon, the defence secretary, he said two witnesses to the Hutton inquiry, into the death of the weapons expert Dr David Kelly, said it was not their fault if the press misinterpreted them.

"That is absurd", said Sir Rodric. "One writes in order to be understood by one's audience. The JIC and Downing Street have only themselves to blame if the public failed to grasp what they were trying to say".

Iraqi colonel: I am WMD claim source

By Andrew Clennell - 07 December 2003

An Iraqi colonel said yesterday that he was the source of the Government's "dodgy dossier" claim that Iraq could deploy weapons of mass destruction within 45 minutes.

Lieutenant-Colonel al-Dabbagh, who said he was the head of an Iraqi air defence unit in the desert, outed himself. But he explained that the weapons he was talking about were battlefield weapons to be fired from rocket-propelled grenades, and were not for use in missiles.

"They arrived in boxes marked 'Made in Iraq' and looked like something you fired with a rocket-propelled grenade," Col al-Dabbagh told The Sunday Telegraph.

"They were either chemical or biological weapons; I don't know which, because only the Fedayeen and the Special Republican Guard were allowed to use them. All I know is we were told that when we used these weapons we had to wear gas masks."

When shown the information about the 45-minute claim in the Iraq WMD dossier issued by the Government in September 2002, he said: "I am the one responsible for providing this. Forget 45 minutes, we could have fired these within half an hour."

The 45-minute claim led to the death of scientist Dr David Kelly, after BBC journalist -Andrew Gilligan reported a source telling him the dossier was "sexed up" by Downing Street and that the 45-minute claim was included against MI6's wishes.

Geoff Hoon, the Secretary of State for Defence, told the Hutton inquiry into Dr Kelly's death on 22 September that he knew the claim in the dossier referred to battlefield weapons only.

Andrew Caldecott QC, for the BBC, then asked: "A number of newspapers had banner headlines suggesting this [the 45-minute claim] related to strategic missiles. Why was no corrective statement issued for the benefit of the public?" Mr Hoon replied: "I don't know."

Col al-Dabbagh, who was described as an advisor to the Iraqi Governing Council, said he was not prepared to release his first name for safety reasons. But he said he was willing to give evidence to the Hutton inquiry. British intelligence previously said it relied on a single senior officer from the Iraqi military for the WMD claim.

A Downing Street spokesman would not confirm or deny last night whether Col al-Dabbagh was the source of the 45-minute claim.

However, Col al-Dabbagh doubted Saddam developed missiles that could carry WMD and hit targets such as Israel or Britain's Cyprus military bases.

Col al-Dabbagh said he had no idea what became of the weapons he was describing. He believed the weapons would not be found until Saddam was caught or killed, as people would then feel freer to speak about them.

ANP

VN eisen verslag over wapenspeurtocht Irak

8 december 2003

NEW YORK (ANP) - De Verenigde Naties willen weten hoe de Amerikaans-Britse speurtocht naar massavernietigingswapens in Irak verloopt. Een meerderheid van de leden van de VN-Veiligheidsraad eist informatie van de westerse coalitie over de stand van zaken.

Het verzoek is maandag achter gesloten deuren geformuleerd tijdens beraad van de Veiligheidsraad, zo is uit diplomatieke bronnen vernomen. Tot de voorstanders van een verslag behoren de permanente raadsleden Frankrijk en Rusland, die zich fel tegen de oorlog in Irak verzetten.

De Amerikanen en Britten rechtvaardigden de invasie in Irak door te stellen dat de Iraakse dictator Hussein over massavernietigingswapens zou beschikken.

COMMENTAAR EN VRAGEN

De regering zal in de Kamer bij de behandeling van de begroting voor buitenlandse zaken ook haar beleid aangaande de proliferatie van massavernietigingswapens moeten verdedigen. In de begroting staat: “De proliferatie van massavernietigingswapens is een van de grootste gevaren die de mensheid vandaag de dag bedreigt.” Daarover is dit jaar veel te doen geweest, onder andere vanwege een reeks nieuwe internationale afspraken om de proliferatie van massavernietigingswapens tegen te gaan. Kenmerkend voor die stappen is dat ze bijna allemaal geïnitieerd worden door de landen die zelf kernwapens bezitten, of hun bondgenoten. Aanvoerder in deze is de huidige Amerikaanse regering. Overname van dit beleid (dat in een aantal nummers van deze reeks aan de orde is geweest: zie de inhouseopgave achterin) betekent ook de langzame ondermijning van bestaande multilaterale verdragen, die enerzijds genegeerd worden, of anderzijds omarmd in officiële verklaringen die de tegenstrijdigheid tussen unilateraal en multilateraal negeren.

In de begroting staat bijvoorbeeld onder geoperationaliseerde doelstelling 7: ”De regering zal zich het komend jaar nog krachtiger dan voorheen inzetten voor de versterking van het multilaterale systeem op nonproliferatie-, wapenbeheersings- en ontwapeningsgebied. De actie zal zich allereerst richten op bevordering van universaliteit van verdragen en normen en op effectieve naleving ervan.”

Tegelijkertijd kiest de regering voor ondersteuning van één van de unilaterale plannen: de ‘Proliferation Security Initiative’, alsook voor “Een solide en productieve transatlantische relatie...” (geoperationaliseerde doelstelling 9a).

Antwoorden op schriftelijke vragen over deze tegenstrijdigheid bevestigen dat “uitvoering van resoluties, verdragen etc ...nodig (is).” terwijl tegelijkertijd “maatregelen” worden ondersteunt die “op concrete wijze de verspreiding van massavernietigingswapens en onderdelen daarvoor tegengaan” (antwoord op vraag 36,41,42 en 96).

De tegenstrijdigheden worden nog helderder als de regering zich in het antwoord op vraag 136 uitsprekt tegen de Amerikaanse plannen om ‘mininukes’ te ontwikkelen, terwijl ze in het nota-overleg van 20 oktober over bezuinigingen op defensie, haar gebruikelijke ‘geen ja en geen nee’ antwoord geeft over de kernwapens van de NAVO op luchtmachtbasis Volkel. Helaas steunde de Kamer minister Kamp van defensie daarin: een resolutie van kamerlid van Velzen waarin gevraagd werd om contact met de VS regering ten einde een einde te maken aan de aanwezigheid van kernwapens op Volkel werd alleen door PvdA, SP en GroenLinks ondersteund.

In de VN werd een gematigde resolutie van de Nieuwe Agenda Coalitie, om tot systematische nucleaire ontwapeningsstappen te komen, niet gesteund door Nederland (evenals de rest van de NAVO).

Deze tegenstrijdigheid in het beleid was een spiegel van dat binnen de NAVO. In het communiqué van de Nuclear Planning Group van 1 december jl. werd de gebruikelijke tegenstelling opgenomen: men houdt vast aan de kernwapens toegewezen aan de NAVO (para 9) en steunde tegelijkertijd de slotdocumenten van diverse conferenties over het Non-Proliferatie Verdrag waarin de stappen naar nucleaire ontwapening zijn vastgelegd (para 10).

Ook de NATO Parliamentary Assembly, bijeen in november in Florida, steunde in een resolutie (nr. 327) de NPV afspraken terwijl tegelijkertijd de nadruk werd gelegd op het tegengaan van proliferatie via meer unilaterale wegen (para 12 j en k).

Intussen wordt het PSI stelsel verder uitgebouwd (in een interview met onderminister Bolton is zelfs sprake van uitbreiding van de 13 oprichters - waaronder Nederland - met nog eens 50 landen). Rusland en China doen vooralsnog niet mee. In een toespraak van onderminister Bolton zegt hij dat in het optreden tegen proliferatielanden “no option is off the table”. Onder ‘rogue countries’ die door het PSI regiem moeten worden aangepakt rekent hij niet kernwapenstaat Israël, dat geen dreiging zou zijn voor de buurlanden.

De kwestie van de Iraakse massavernietigingswapens is nog niet verdwenen. De Amerikaanse, Nederlandse en Britse regeringen nemen de positie in dat de oorlog werd gevoerd vanwege de niet-uitvoering van VN resoluties, en niet de aanwezigheid van inzetbare massavernietigingswapens. Woordvoerders hielden vol ondanks overweldigende bewijzen van het tegendeel, dat ze de publieke opinie niet hebben misleid. De woordenwisseling tussen verslaggevers en kamerleden in de VS en VK hebben we ook meegenomen, evenals de verklaring van een Iraakse officier die zegt dat hij de bron was van het bericht als zou Irak binnen 45 minuten massavernietigingswapens kunnen afvuren (en verduidelijkt dat het ging om slagveldwapens).

Intussen kon de Amerikaanse onderzoeks commissie onder Kay volgens een tussenrapportage geen bewijzen vinden voor de Iraakse massavernietigingswapens. Het rapport van Kay werd overigens niet doorgegeven aan de IAEA, ondanks een verzoek daartoe.

Daarnaast is er nog steeds sprake van mogelijke crises rondom Noord-Korea en Iran. Binnen een maand zal er vermoedelijk weer een conferentie plaatsvinden over Noord-Korea, terwijl in het voorjaar ook Iran weer aan de orde komt in een IAEA vergadering.

Al met al afdoende redenen voor een aantal vragen aan de regering:

1. Is er geen tegenstrijdigheid tussen het vasthouden aan kernwapens in het kader van het NAVO beleid terwijl tegelijkertijd wordt opgetreden tegen landen waarvan vermoed wordt dat ze massavernietigingswapens hebben?
2. Waarom nemen Israël, India en Pakistan een uitzonderingspositie in als onofficiële kernwape­nstaten. Wat wordt daartegen ondernomen?
3. Onderminister Bolton verklaarde in het Arms Control Today interview (december 2003) dat er al transporten waren onderschept in het kader van de PSI samenwerking. Om welke transporten ging het?
4. In antwoord op vraag 96 verklaart de regering dat de “uitvoering van resoluties, verdragen etc... nodig (is)”. Wat gaat de regering ondernemen om te bewerkstelligen dat de VS het teststopverdrag ratificeert?

KRONIEK 2003-2004

1-2 december	Bijeenkomst NAVO Ministers van Defensie, Brussel
1-2 december	Ministeriële bijeenkomst OVSE, Maastricht
1-3 december	WEU Assemblee, Parijs
1-5 december	CCW States Parties Bijeenkomst, Geneve
2-5 december	Executive Council OPCW, Den Haag
4-5 december	Bijeenkomst NAVO Ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken, Brussel
7 december	Parlementsverkiezingen Rusland
8-9 december	EU – General Affairs and External Relations Council, Brussel
12-13 december	Europese Raad, Brussel
16-17 december	Expertmeeting Proliferation Security Initiative, Verenigde Staten
17-18 december	Zeslanden-bijeenkomst over Noord-Korea, Peking (gepland)
17-18 december	Behandeling begroting Buitenlandse Zaken in Tweede Kamer
januari	Lord Robertson vertrekt als Secretaris-Generaal van de NAVO
1 januari	Ierland neemt voorzitterschap EU over
1 januari	Einde Nederlands voorzitterschap OVSE
1 januari	Verenigde Staten nemen voorzitterschap G8 over
20 januari - 26 maart	Eerste sessie Conference on Disarmament, Geneve
21-25 januari	World Economic Forum, Davos
6-7 februari	Annual Munich Security Conference, München
maart	Parlementsverkiezingen Spanje
8 maart	IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, Wenen
14 maart	Presidentsverkiezingen Rusland
april	Parlementsverkiezingen Zuid-Korea
5-23 april	UN Disarmament Commission, jaarlijkse bijeenkomst, New York
26 april – 7 mei	NPT PrepCom, New York
mei	Bijeenkomst Chemical Weapons Convention, Den Haag
1 mei	Toetreding diverse landen tot de Europese Unie
10 mei -25 juni	Tweede sessie Conference on Disarmament, Geneve
juni	Verkiezingen Europees Parlement
juni	Parlementsverkiezingen Japan
8-10 juni	G-8 Summit, Sea Island, Georgia
28-29 juni	NAVO-top, Istanbul
1 juli	Nederland neemt voorzitterschap EU over
19-30 juli	Biological Weapons Convention, expert meeting, Geneve
september	Start Algemene Vergadering Verenigde Naties, New York
26 juli – 10 september	Derde sessie Conference on Disarmament, Geneve
13 september	IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, Wenen
20-24 september	IAEA General Conference, Wenen
27 september	IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, Wenen
2 november	Presidentsverkiezingen Verenigde Staten
25 november	IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, Wenen
6-10 december	Jaarlijkse bijeenkomst Biological Weapons Convention, Geneve

FACTS AND REPORTS

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1. US unilateralism – official foreign comments
Citaten van internationale politici en diplomaten over het Amerikaans unilateralisme.
2. Veiligheidsvraagstukken en de verkiezingen – standpunten van de politieke partijen
Relevante delen van de partijprogramma's van de Nederlandse politieke partijen, plus citaten van politici op het terrein van oorlog en vrede.
3. Transatlantic relations – recent developments
Overzicht van recente ontwikkelingen in de transatlantische betrekkingen, met name binnen de NAVO, mede naar aanleiding van uitspraken in de State of the Union.
4. Ontwikkelingen betreffende kernwapens en de Nederlandse politiek – briefing paper
Periodiek overzicht van ontwikkelingen rond kernwapens in de internationale en nationale politiek, met uitgebreide hoeveelheid bijlagen.
5. Nucleaire vraagstukken – standpunten van de Nederlandse regering en de Tweede Kamer
Overzicht april 2001 – april 2002
6. Crisis in de OPCW – de verwijdering van directeur-generaal Bustani
Documenten en artikelen over het ontslag van directeur-generaal Bustani van het OPCW
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Verklaringen en rapporten van staten en ngo's tijdens de Prepcom van het NPV
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14. Aanval op Irak (2) – recente ontwikkelingen
15. Documenten First Committee Verenigde Naties 2002 – resoluties, verklaringen, rapporten
16. De NAVO-top in Praag – documenten
17. Aanval op Irak (3) – het inspectieregim
18. Internationaal veiligheidsbeleid Verenigde Staten – officiële documenten en reacties van de Nederlandse regering
19. Veiligheidsvraagstukken en de verkiezingen (2) – standpunten van de politieke partijen
Een update voor de verkiezingen van 22 januari 2003
20. Korea, de tweede crisis
21. Aanval op Irak (4) – de aanloop
22. Aanval op Irak (5) – vooravond van de aanval
23. De andere crises
Informatie over het Amerikaans nucleair beleid, missile defense, de Conference on Disarmament en de recente ontwikkelingen rond Noord-Korea, Iran en India en Pakistan.
24. Aanval op Irak (6) – de slachtoffers
25. Nucleaire vraagstukken (2) – standpunten van de Nederlandse regering en de Tweede Kamer en recent nieuws nucleair beleid Verenigde Staten - Overzicht april 2002 – mei 2003
26. Teststopverdrag Artikel XIV Conferentie – de kwestie van de Amerikaanse minikernwapens
27. G-8 en Proliferation Security Initiative – stappen naar unilaterale contra-proliferatie
28. Irak (7) – Nederland en de massavernietigingswapens
29. Proliferatievraagstukken – Standpunten van de Nederlandse regering
30. Iran – Documentatie massavernietigingswapens
31. Twee proliferatiecrises – Iran en Noord-Korea

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