



PROLIFERATIE
Recente ontwikkelingen

INHOUDSOPGAVE

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COMMENTAAR EN VRAGEN

In deze F&R hebben we een aantal documenten en berichten verzameld over het proliferatie vraagstuk. Het belang daarvan is evident – er is sprake van grote zorg in politieke en diplomatieke kringen over de verspreiding van de technologie van massavernietigingswapens. In het documenten gedeelte zijn parlementaire vragen en antwoorden uit het VK en Nederland bij elkaar gebracht, evenals officiële verklaringen van President Bush en directeur generaal El Baradei van het Internationaal Atoomagentschap. Daarnaast een verzameling nieuwsberichten uit de Nederlandse en internationale pers, waarbij de nadruk ligt op de nucleaire proliferatie kwestie, vooral mbt de affaire Khan – de proliferatie van kernwapen gerelateerde technologie naar en vanuit Pakistan.

In deze verzameling documenten zit een sterke mate van vertekening: de nadruk ligt op het probleem van de proliferatie terwijl twee bijzonder relevante zaken enigszins uit het zicht verdwijnen. Het belangrijkste verdrag op dit gebied, het Non-Proliferatie Verdrag, kon in 1970 alleen tot stand komen (en onbeperkt verlengd worden in 1995) op grond van twee afspraken; de eerste was dat de in het verdrag erkende kernwapenstaten zouden streven naar nucleaire ontwapening (art 6). De tweede dat alle ondertekenaars, die dus afzagen van de ontwikkeling van kernwapens, onbeperkt toegang kregen tot nucleaire technologie voor vreedzaam gebruik dwz kernenergie (art 4).

Die afspraken hebben helaas de basis gelegd voor de gebeurtenissen waarnaar in de verslagen en documenten wordt verwezen. De belangrijkste vooronderstelling is immers dat het mogelijk is om kernenergie technologie te verspreiden (onder controle van het Internationale Atoom Agentschap) zonder dat men de basis legt voor het aanleggen van kernwapenarsenalen. Vanwege de aard van het nucleaire productieproces is dit vrijwel onmogelijk. Bovendien werd de andere helft van de afspraak, nucleair ontwapenen, niet serieus aangepakt. Er zijn ontegenzeggelijk duizenden kernwapens ontmanteld. Maar tegelijkertijd is het duidelijk dat er geen reële stappen naar volledige nucleaire ontwapening of zelfs het minimaliseren van de bestaande kernwapenarsenalen zijn gezet.

Vanwege dit belangrijke politieke feit, zal het bijzonder moeilijk zijn om de door president Bush en IAEA directeur generaal El Baradei voorgestane aanscherping van de maatregelen tegen proliferatie door te voeren. Hoe meer deze maatregelen lijken op de bestendinging van de bestaande situatie, namelijk het voortzetten van de tweedeling van de wereld in landen met kernwapens tegenover landen zonder kernwapens, hoe groter de oppositie ertegen. Dit ondanks de in brede kring aanvaardde noodzaak om paal en perk te stellen aan de proliferatie van alle massavernietigingswapens technologie.

Het is dus relevant om het belang van multilaterale processen en verdragen te benadrukken, en dus ook de noodzaak voor Nederlandse politici en diplomaten om de unilaterale druk voornamelijk afkomstig van de VS, maar daarin deels gesteund door andere kernwapenstaten, te weerstaan. Dat is er immers op gericht om alleen nog over proliferatie te praten en niet over ontwapening.

Redactie Facts and Reports

DOCUMENTEN

UK House of Commons

House of Commons Hansard

Column 645W – 13 January 2004

[...] Mr. Ancram: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

(1) what discussions he has had with his (a) Libyan and (b) German counterparts concerning the seizure of the German-flagged ship BBC China; [146839]

(2) what part was played by British officials in the recent tracking and seizure of the German-flagged ship BBC China. [146840]

Mr. Straw [*holding answer 12 January 2004*]: It is our policy to co-operate with our allies in seeking to take action against the transport of goods which could contribute to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The UK is an active participant in the Proliferation Security Initiative designed to improve international co-ordination in this area. I am withholding further information under exemption 1 of Part 2 of the Code of Practice on Access to Government Information. [...]

Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Beantwoording KV Wilders over mogelijke nucleaire contacten van Pakistan met onder andere Saoedi-Arabië

DVB/NN-029/04 – 2 februari 2004

Antwoord van de heer Bot, minister van Buitenlandse Zaken op vragen van het lid Wilders (VVD) over mogelijke nucleaire contacten van Pakistan met onder andere Saoedi-Arabië.

Vraag 1: Bent u op de hoogte van de centrale rol die Pakistan, en met name het bedrijf van de ‘vader’ van de Pakistaanse kernbom dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, speelde en speelt in de kernwapenprogramma’s van Libië, Iran, Irak en Noord-Korea?¹ Kan dr. Khan als ‘fundamentalist’² worden omschreven? Zo neen, waarom niet?

Antwoord: De Nederlandse regering is op de hoogte van berichten dat Pakistaanse onderdanen betrokken zijn bij kernwapenprogramma’s van diverse landen. Zoals aangegeven in de beantwoording van de kamervragen van het lid Wilders (TK, vergaderjaar 2003-2004, Nr. 630) is het de Nederlandse regering op dit moment echter niet duidelijk hoe Iran de betreffende technologie heeft kunnen verkrijgen en dus ook niet of deze technologie afkomstig is uit Pakistan. Er bestaat evenmin een helder beeld waar deze technologie eventueel nog elders zou kunnen zijn terechtgekomen.

De Pakistaanse overheid heeft een onderzoek ingesteld naar beschuldigingen van betrokkenheid van wetenschappers werkzaam in de A.Q. Khan Research Laboratories, Kahuta (KRL), bij de ontwikkeling van kernprogramma’s in Iran, Irak, Libië en Noord Korea. Het onderzoek is nog lopende. Gegeven de veiligheidsmaatregelen waarmee dit onderzoek is omringd, is geen informatie beschikbaar over de voortgang van het onderzoek, noch over enige (voorlopige) resultaten.

Sinds eind november 2003 zijn enkele wetenschappers in hechtenis genomen. Ook Dr. Khan zelf is inmiddels ondervraagd en onder huisarrest geplaatst. Overigens werd Dr. Khan reeds op 11 maart 2001 uit zijn functie van algemeen directeur van KRL ontheven, en bekleedt hij sindsdien hierbinnen geen officiële functies meer.

Over de persoonlijke geloofsovertuigingen van Dr. A.Q. Khan is dezerzijds niets bekend.

Vraag 2: Kunt u bevestigen dat in navolging van bovenstaande staten nu ook Saoedi-Arabië de ‘Pakistaanse route’ bewandelt in een poging kernwapens te verkrijgen? Is het waar dat de Saoedische kroonprins Abdullah in oktober 2003 naar Pakistan is gereisd en daar een overeenkomst heeft gesloten met de Pakistaanse president Musharraf over de levering van olie in ruil voor nucleaire wapentechnologie?³ Wat is uw oordeel hierover?

Vraag 8: Op welke wijze zult u in bi- en multilateraal verband de regering van Saoedi-Arabië aanspreken op zijn poging nucleaire wapentechnologie te verkrijgen?

Antwoord: Kroonprins Abdullah van Saoedi-Arabië bracht op 18 en 19 oktober 2003 een bezoek aan Islamabad, op de terugreis van de OIC-top in Maleisië. Hij besprak met President Musharraf onder andere economische samenwerking, de situatie van de islamitische gemeenschap en regionale relaties. Hoewel in de pers gespeculeerd werd over besprekingen inzake mogelijke nucleaire samenwerking, zijn hiervoor geen concrete aanwijzingen voorhanden. In dit licht zie ik geen aanleiding om Saoedi-Arabië op dit punt aan te

spreken. Ik verwijs ook naar de beantwoording van vragen terzake van het lid Ormel, TK, vergaderjaar 2003-2004, nr. 166.

Vraag 3: Kunt u het bericht van de zoon van de Libische leider Gadaffi, Saif al-Islam Gadaffi, bevestigen dat Pakistan de leverancier was aan Libië van nucleaire wapentechnologie welke door een Westerse bron is omschreven als een ‘full bomb dossier’?⁴ Kunt u tevens bevestigen dat er ook materiaal uit andere landen afkomstig was, waaronder Dubai en Maleisië? Welke andere landen waren hierbij betrokken? Wat is uw oordeel hierover?

Antwoord: Blijkens berichten in de Pakistaanse media heeft Saif al-Islam Qaddafi ontkend gezegd te hebben dat Pakistan of Pakistaanse wetenschappers betrokken waren bij de levering van nucleaire technologie aan Libië. De regering beschikt zelf overigens niet over eigen bronnen betreffende de precieze uitspraken van Saif al-Islam Qaddafi.

In oktober 2003 is een schip aangehouden en onderzocht dat in Dubai een lading aan boord had genomen bestaande uit onderdelen voor ultracentrifuges met bestemming Libië. Uit welke landen deze onderdelen afkomstig waren is thans nog voorwerp van onderzoek door onder meer het IAEA.

Vraag 4: Hoe verklaart u de verschillende inschattingen van de Amerikanen en de Britten enerzijds en het International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) anderzijds over de omvang van het Libische nucleaire wapenprogramma?⁵

Antwoord: Het onderzoek van het IAEA naar het Libische wapenprogramma is nog niet afgerond. Zodra het IAEA zijn bevindingen publiceert en daarover in het kader van het IAEA een bespreking plaatsvindt zal duidelijk worden of inderdaad sprake is van meningsverschillen.

Vraag 5: Heeft u aanwijzingen dat de Pakistaanse regering geen of weinig controle heeft over het opereren van dr. Khan en zijn bedrijf?⁶ Kunt u berichten van Westerse en Pakistaanse bronnen bevestigen dat individuele Pakistaanse geleerden voor persoonlijk gewin nucleaire geheimen verkocht hebben?⁷ Zo ja, aan welke landen is dit gebeurd en wat is uw oordeel hierover? Zijn dr. Khan en/of zijn medewerkers deze geleerden?

Vraag 6: Is het waar dat de Pakistaanse autoriteiten dr. Khan vorige week hierover ondervraagd hebben? Zijn dr. Khan en andere nucleaire geleerden voor de Pakistaanse autoriteiten moeilijk aan te pakken vanwege hun enorme populariteit in Pakistan?

Antwoord: Onder Generaal President Zia-ul Haq kwam het Pakistaanse kernwapenprogramma onder militair beheer. Het is onduidelijk hoeveel controle er is op individuele wetenschappers. Het door de Pakistaanse overheid ingestelde onderzoek naar de activiteiten van wetenschappers van KRL wordt door Nederland nauwlettend gevolgd en zal met name ook op deze vragen antwoord moeten geven.

Vraag 7: Welke acties heeft u ondernomen, of gaat u ondernemen in bi- en multilateraal verband om de Pakistaanse regering te ondersteunen bij het aanpakken van de verspreiding van nucleaire technologie en kennis, dan wel de Pakistaanse regering hiertoe te dwingen?

Antwoord: De EU-Trojka, die op 18 en 19 februari in Islamabad politieke consultaties voert, zal daarbij de aanpak van de verspreiding van nucleaire technologie en kennis nadrukkelijk aan de orde stellen. De Nederlandse regering heeft bepleit dat Pakistan deze ernstige zaak zorgvuldig onderzoekt en dat de schuldigen zullen worden bestraft. Met de Pakistaanse Ambassadeur is onlangs nog op het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken over deze kwestie gesproken. Daarbij werd ook benadrukt dat Pakistan meer werk moet maken van regelgeving op het gebied van strengere exportcontroleregels. De bilaterale contacten met Pakistan over deze kwestie zullen worden voortgezet.

Vraag 9: Deelt u de mening van de directeur-generaal (DG) van het IAEA El Baradei dat het non-proliferatieverdrag verouderd is, omdat inmiddels 35 tot 40 landen beschikken over de kennis om een atoomwapen te maken? Deelt u tevens zijn mening dat het beter zou zijn elke installatie die splijtstof kan produceren te onderwerpen aan multilateraal toezicht?⁸ Wat zijn hiervan de voor- en nadelen? Is er internationaal steun voor de ideeën van DG El Baradei?

Antwoord: DG El Baradei van het IAEA heeft op 16 oktober 2003 in The Economist een aantal ideeën gelanceerd om de nucleaire splijtstofcyclus beter proliferatie-resistent te maken. De internationale discussie hierover dient nog op gang te komen. Nederland zal een vertegenwoordiging afvaardigen naar een eerste bijeenkomst ter bespreking van de plannen van DG El Baradei, die op 5 februari te Wenen zal plaatsvinden. Nederland staat positief tegenover de voorstellen van DG El Baradei, maar zijn ideeën dienen nog nader op uitvoerbaarheid en haalbaarheid te worden getoetst.

De DG had het overigens niet over multilateraal toezicht op installaties die splijtstof kunnen produceren - voor alle niet-kernwapenstaten die partij zijn bij het Non-proliferatieverdrag bestaat al zulk toezicht middels het IAEA waarborgensysteem - maar over multilateraal beheer.

Noten: 1) Het Parool, 3 januari jl., 'De Watergraafsmeer als oorsprong van de schurkenstaten', De Volkskrant, 6 januari jl., 'Het geheime nucleaire web van dr. Khan', Washington Times, 7 januari jl., 'Pakistan's arsenal', Sunday Times, 4 januari jl., 'Gadaffi's nuclear deal with Pakistan'; 2) Sunday Times, 4 januari jl., 'Gadaffi's nuclear deal with Pakistan'; 3) Washington Times, 5 januari jl., 'Saudi nukes: a looming intelligence failure', Richard L. Russell.; 4) Sunday Times, 4 januari jl., 'Gadaffi's nuclear deal with Pakistan'; 5) Zo spreken de Amerikanen en Britten na 9 maanden onderzoek in Libië over een 'uranium enrichment programme actually in progress' en het IAEA over een 'low level, small-scale testing of enrichment equipment'; 6) Washington Times, 7 januari jl., 'Pakistan's arsenal'; 7) Sunday Times, 4 januari jl., 'Gadaffi's nuclear deal with Pakistan'; 8) De Volkskrant, 6 januari jl., 'Het geheime nucleaire web van dr. Khan'.

White House

Remarks by the President on weapons of mass destruction proliferation

Fort Lesley J. McNair - National Defense University Washington, D.C. - 11 February 2004

THE PRESIDENT: Thanks for the warm welcome. I'm honored to visit the National Defense University. For nearly a century, the scholars and students here have helped to prepare America for the changing threats to our national security. Today, the men and women of our National Defense University are helping to frame the strategies through which we are fighting and winning the war on terror. Your Center for Counterproliferation Research and your other institutes and colleges are providing vital insight into the dangers of a new era. I want to thank each one of you for devoting your talents and your energy to the service of our great nation.

I want to thank General Michael Dunn for inviting me here. I used to jog by this facility on a regular basis. Then my age kicked in. (Laughter.) I appreciate Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger, from Germany. Mr. Ambassador, thank you for being here today. I see my friend, George Shultz, a distinguished public servant and true patriot, with us. George, thank you for coming; and Charlotte, it's good to see you. I'm so honored that Dick Lugar is here with us today. Senator, I appreciate you taking time and thanks for bringing Senator Saxby Chambliss with you, as well. I appreciate the veterans who are here and those on active duty. Thanks for letting me come by.

On September the 11th, 2001, America and the world witnessed a new kind of war. We saw the great harm that a stateless network could inflict upon our country, killers armed with box cutters, mace, and 19 airline tickets. Those attacks also raised the prospect of even worse dangers -- of other weapons in the hands of other men. The greatest threat before humanity today is the possibility of secret and sudden attack with chemical or biological or radiological or nuclear weapons.

In the past, enemies of America required massed armies, and great navies, powerful air forces to put our nation, our people, our friends and allies at risk. In the Cold War, Americans lived under the threat of weapons of mass destruction, but believed that deterrents made those weapons a last resort. What has changed in the 21st century is that, in the hands of terrorists, weapons of mass destruction would be a first resort -- the preferred means to further their ideology of suicide and random murder. These terrible weapons are becoming easier to acquire, build, hide, and transport. Armed with a single vial of a biological agent or a single nuclear weapon, small groups of fanatics, or failing states, could gain the power to threaten great nations, threaten the world peace.

America, and the entire civilized world, will face this threat for decades to come. We must confront the danger with open eyes, and unbending purpose. I have made clear to all the policy of this nation: America will not permit terrorists and dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most deadly weapons. (Applause.)

Meeting this duty has required changes in thinking and strategy. Doctrines designed to contain empires, deter aggressive states, and defeat massed armies cannot fully protect us from this new threat. America faces the possibility of catastrophic attack from ballistic missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction. So that is why we are developing and deploying missile defenses to guard our people. The best intelligence is necessary to win the war on terror and to stop proliferation. So that is why I have established a commission that will examine our intelligence capabilities and recommend ways to improve and adapt them to detect new and emerging threats.

We're determined to confront those threats at the source. We will stop these weapons from being acquired or built. We'll block them from being transferred. We'll prevent them from ever being used. One source of these weapons is dangerous and secretive regimes that build weapons of mass destruction to intimidate their

neighbors and force their influence upon the world. These nations pose different challenges; they require different strategies.

The former dictator of Iraq possessed and used weapons of mass destruction against his own people. For 12 years, he defied the will of the international community. He refused to disarm or account for his illegal weapons and programs. He doubted our resolve to enforce our word -- and now he sits in a prison cell, while his country moves toward a democratic future. (Applause.)

To Iraq's east, the government of Iran is unwilling to abandon a uranium enrichment program capable of producing material for nuclear weapons. The United States is working with our allies and the International Atomic Energy Agency to ensure that Iran meets its commitments and does not develop nuclear weapons. (Applause.)

In the Pacific, North Korea has defied the world, has tested long-range ballistic missiles, admitted its possession of nuclear weapons, and now threatens to build more. Together with our partners in Asia, America is insisting that North Korea completely, verifiably, and irreversibly dismantle its nuclear programs. America has consistently brought these threats to the attention of international organizations. We're using every means of diplomacy to answer them. As for my part, I will continue to speak clearly on these threats. I will continue to call upon the world to confront these dangers, and to end them. (Applause.)

In recent years, another path of proliferation has become clear, as well. America and other nations are learning more about black-market operatives who deal in equipment and expertise related to weapons of mass destruction. These dealers are motivated by greed, or fanaticism, or both. They find eager customers in outlaw regimes, which pay millions for the parts and plans they need to speed up their weapons programs. And with deadly technology and expertise going on the market, there's the terrible possibility that terrorists groups could obtain the ultimate weapons they desire most.

The extent and sophistication of such networks can be seen in the case of a man named Abdul Qadeer Khan. This is the story as we know it so far.

A. Q. Khan is known throughout the world as the father of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. What was not publicly known, until recently, is that he also led an extensive international network for the proliferation of nuclear technology and know-how.

For decades, Mr. Khan remained on the Pakistani government payroll, earning a modest salary. Yet, he and his associates financed lavish lifestyles through the sale of nuclear technologies and equipment to outlaw regimes stretching from North Africa to the Korean Peninsula.

A. Q. Khan, himself, operated mostly out of Pakistan. He served as director of the network, its leading scientific mind, as well as its primary salesman. Over the past decade, he made frequent trips to consult with his clients and to sell his expertise. He and his associates sold the blueprints for centrifuges to enrich uranium, as well as a nuclear design stolen from the Pakistani government. The network sold uranium hexafluoride, the gas that the centrifuge process can transform into enriched uranium for nuclear bombs. Khan and his associates provided Iran and Libya and North Korea with designs for Pakistan's older centrifuges, as well as designs for more advanced and efficient models. The network also provided these countries with components, and in some cases, with complete centrifuges.

To increase their profits, Khan and his associates used a factory in Malaysia to manufacture key parts for centrifuges. Other necessary parts were purchased through network operatives based in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. These procurement agents saw the trade in nuclear technologies as a shortcut to personal wealth, and they set up front companies to deceive legitimate firms into selling them tightly controlled materials.

Khan's deputy -- a man named B.S.A. Tahir -- ran SMB computers, a business in Dubai. Tahir used that computer company as a front for the proliferation activities of the A. Q. Khan network. Tahir acted as both the network's chief financial officer and money launderer. He was also its shipping agent, using his computer firm as cover for the movement of centrifuge parts to various clients. Tahir directed the Malaysia facility to produce these parts based on Pakistani designs, and then ordered the facility to ship the components to Dubai. Tahir also arranged for parts acquired by other European procurement agents to transit through Dubai for shipment to other customers.

This picture of the Khan network was pieced together over several years by American and British intelligence officers. Our intelligence services gradually uncovered this network's reach, and identified its key experts and agents and money men. Operatives followed its transactions, mapped the extent of its operations. They monitored the travel of A. Q. Khan and senior associates. They shadowed members of the network around the world, they recorded their conversations, they penetrated their operations, we've uncovered their secrets. This work involved high risk, and all Americans can be grateful for the hard work and the dedication of our fine intelligence professionals. (Applause.)

Governments around the world worked closely with us to unravel the Khan network, and to put an end to his criminal enterprise. A. Q. Khan has confessed his crimes, and his top associates are out of business. The government of Pakistan is interrogating the network's members, learning critical details that will help them prevent it from ever operating again. President Musharraf has promised to share all the information he learns about the Khan network, and has assured us that his country will never again be a source of proliferation. Mr. Tahir is in Malaysia, where authorities are investigating his activities. Malaysian authorities have assured us that the factory the network used is no longer producing centrifuge parts. Other members of the network remain at large. One by one, they will be found, and their careers in the weapons trade will be ended.

As a result of our penetration of the network, American and the British intelligence identified a shipment of advanced centrifuge parts manufactured at the Malaysia facility. We followed the shipment of these parts to Dubai, and watched as they were transferred to the BBC China, a German-owned ship. After the ship passed through the Suez Canal, bound for Libya, it was stopped by German and Italian authorities. They found several containers, each forty feet in length, listed on the ship's manifest as full of "used machine parts." In fact, these containers were filled with parts of sophisticated centrifuges.

The interception of the BBC China came as Libyan and British and American officials were discussing the possibility of Libya ending its WMD programs. The United States and Britain confronted Libyan officials with this evidence of an active and illegal nuclear program. About two months ago, Libya's leader voluntarily agreed to end his nuclear and chemical weapons programs, not to pursue biological weapons, and to permit thorough inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. We're now working in partnership with these organizations and with the United Kingdom to help the government of Libya dismantle those programs and eliminate all dangerous materials.

Colonel Ghaddafi made the right decision, and the world will be safer once his commitment is fulfilled. We expect other regimes to follow his example. Abandoning the pursuit of illegal weapons can lead to better relations with the United States, and other free nations. Continuing to seek those weapons will not bring security or international prestige, but only political isolation, economic hardship, and other unwelcome consequences. (Applause.)

We know that Libya was not the only customer of the Khan network. Other countries expressed great interest in their services. These regimes and other proliferators like Khan should know: We and our friends are determined to protect our people and the world from proliferation. (Applause.)

Breaking this network is one major success in a broad-based effort to stop the spread of terrible weapons. We're adjusting our strategies to the threats of a new era. America and the nations of Australia, France and Germany, Italy and Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom have launched the Proliferation Security Initiative to interdict lethal materials in transit. Our nations are sharing intelligence information, tracking suspect international cargo, conducting joint military exercises. We're prepared to search planes and ships, to seize weapons and missiles and equipment that raise proliferation concerns, just as we did in stopping the dangerous cargo on the BBC China before it reached Libya. Three more governments -- Canada and Singapore and Norway -- will be participating in this initiative. We'll continue to expand the core group of PSI countries. And as PSI grows, proliferators will find it harder than ever to trade in illicit weapons.

There is a consensus among nations that proliferation cannot be tolerated. Yet this consensus means little unless it is translated into action. Every civilized nation has a stake in preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction. These materials and technologies, and the people who traffic in them, cross many borders. To stop this trade, the nations of the world must be strong and determined. We must work together, we must act effectively. Today, I announce seven proposals to strengthen the world's efforts to stop the spread of deadly weapons.

First, I propose that the work of the Proliferation Security Initiative be expanded to address more than shipments and transfers. Building on the tools we've developed to fight terrorists, we can take direct action against proliferation networks. We need greater cooperation not just among intelligence and military services, but in law enforcement, as well. PSI participants and other willing nations should use the Interpol and all other means to bring to justice those who traffic in deadly weapons, to shut down their labs, to seize their materials, to freeze their assets. We must act on every lead. We will find the middlemen, the suppliers and the buyers. Our message to proliferators must be consistent and it must be clear: We will find you, and we're not going to rest until you are stopped. (Applause.)

Second, I call on all nations to strengthen the laws and international controls that govern proliferation. At the U.N. last fall, I proposed a new Security Council resolution requiring all states to criminalize proliferation,

enact strict export controls, and secure all sensitive materials within their borders. The Security Council should pass this proposal quickly. And when they do, America stands ready to help other governments to draft and enforce the new laws that will help us deal with proliferation.

Third, I propose to expand our efforts to keep weapons from the Cold War and other dangerous materials out of the wrong hands. In 1991, Congress passed the Nunn-Lugar legislation. Senator Lugar had a clear vision, along with Senator Nunn, about what to do with the old Soviet Union. Under this program, we're helping former Soviet states find productive employment for former weapons scientists. We're dismantling, destroying and securing weapons and materials left over from the Soviet WMD arsenal. We have more work to do there.

And as a result of the G-8 Summit in 2002, we agreed to provide \$20 billion over 10 years -- half of it from the United States -- to support such programs. We should expand this cooperation elsewhere in the world. We will retain [sic] WMD scientists and technicians in countries like Iraq and Libya. We will help nations end the use of weapons-grade uranium in research reactors. I urge more nations to contribute to these efforts. The nations of the world must do all we can to secure and eliminate nuclear and chemical and biological and radiological materials.

As we track and destroy these networks, we must also prevent governments from developing nuclear weapons under false pretenses. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was designed more than 30 years ago to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons beyond those states which already possessed them. Under this treaty, nuclear states agreed to help non-nuclear states develop peaceful atomic energy if they renounced the pursuit of nuclear weapons. But the treaty has a loophole which has been exploited by nations such as North Korea and Iran. These regimes are allowed to produce nuclear material that can be used to build bombs under the cover of civilian nuclear programs.

So today, as a fourth step, I propose a way to close the loophole. The world must create a safe, orderly system to field civilian nuclear plants without adding to the danger of weapons proliferation. The world's leading nuclear exporters should ensure that states have reliable access at reasonable cost to fuel for civilian reactors, so long as those states renounce enrichment and reprocessing. Enrichment and reprocessing are not necessary for nations seeking to harness nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

The 40 nations of the Nuclear Suppliers Group should refuse to sell enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technologies to any state that does not already possess full-scale, functioning enrichment and reprocessing plants. (Applause.) This step will prevent new states from developing the means to produce fissile material for nuclear bombs. Proliferators must not be allowed to cynically manipulate the NPT to acquire the material and infrastructure necessary for manufacturing illegal weapons.

For international norms to be effective, they must be enforced. It is the charge of the International Atomic Energy Agency to uncover banned nuclear activity around the world and report those violations to the U.N. Security Council. We must ensure that the IAEA has all the tools it needs to fulfill its essential mandate. America and other nations support what is called the Additional Protocol, which requires states to declare a broad range of nuclear activities and facilities, and allow the IAEA to inspect those facilities.

As a fifth step, I propose that by next year, only states that have signed the Additional Protocol be allowed to import equipment for their civilian nuclear programs. Nations that are serious about fighting proliferation will approve and implement the Additional Protocol. I've submitted the Additional Protocol to the Senate. I urge the Senate to consent immediately to its ratification.

We must also ensure that IAEA is organized to take action when action is required. So, a sixth step, I propose the creation of a special committee of the IAEA Board which will focus intensively on safeguards and verification. This committee, made up of governments in good standing with the IAEA, will strengthen the capability of the IAEA to ensure that nations comply with their international obligations.

And, finally, countries under investigation for violating nuclear non-proliferation obligations are currently allowed to serve on the IAEA Board of Governors. For instance, Iran -- a country suspected of maintaining an extensive nuclear weapons program -- recently completed a two-year term on the Board. Allowing potential violators to serve on the Board creates an unacceptable barrier to effective action. No state under investigation for proliferation violations should be allowed to serve on the IAEA Board of Governors -- or on the new special committee. And any state currently on the Board that comes under investigation should be suspended from the Board. The integrity and mission of the IAEA depends on this simple principle: Those actively breaking the rules should not be entrusted with enforcing the rules. (Applause.)

As we move forward to address these challenges we will consult with our friends and allies on all these new measures. We will listen to their ideas. Together we will defend the safety of all nations and preserve the peace of the world.

Over the last two years, a great coalition has come together to defeat terrorism and to oppose the spread of weapons of mass destruction -- the inseparable commitments of the war on terror. We've shown that proliferators can be discovered and can be stopped. We've shown that for regimes that choose defiance, there are serious consequences. The way ahead is not easy, but it is clear. We will proceed as if the lives of our citizens depend on our vigilance, because they do. Terrorists and terror states are in a race for weapons of mass murder, a race they must lose. (Applause.) Terrorists are resourceful; we're more resourceful. They're determined; we must be more determined. We will never lose focus or resolve. We'll be unrelenting in the defense of free nations, and rise to the hard demands of dangerous times. May God bless you all. (Applause.)

White House

Strengthening International Efforts Against WMD Proliferation

New steps to help combat weapons of mass destruction

Press release – 11 February 2004

"There is a consensus among nations that proliferation cannot be tolerated. Yet this consensus means little unless it is translated into action. Every civilized nation has a stake in preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction." -- President George W. Bush, February 11, 2004

Presidential Action

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) poses the most serious danger to the peace of the world. Chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists or outlaw regimes could bring catastrophic harm to America and the international community. Recent developments, as highlighted by the President today, demonstrate the new, complex, and challenging threats to the international community from WMD.

President Bush today proposed seven new steps to help combat the development and spread of weapons of mass destruction. The policies will:

- Improve and modernize nonproliferation laws to address new and changing threats;
- Restrict the sale and transport of nuclear technologies and equipment;
- Close a loophole in the nuclear nonproliferation regimes that allow states to pursue WMD under the false cloak of legitimacy; and
- Expand efforts to secure and destroy nuclear weapons and materials.

Policy Recommendations

Law Enforcement Cooperation

The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), announced by President Bush in May 2003, currently focuses on taking practical steps to interdict proliferation shipments of WMD, delivery systems, and related materials at sea, in the air, or on land.

- The President proposes that participants in the PSI and other willing nations expand their focus and use Interpol and other mechanisms for law enforcement cooperation to take additional actions to pursue proliferators and end their operations.

Swift Passage of United Nations Security Council Resolution

- The President calls for swift passage of the resolution he proposed in September 2003, requiring all states to criminalize proliferation, enact strict export controls, and secure sensitive materials within their borders.

Expansion of G-8 Global Partnership

- To ensure the nations of the world are doing all they can to secure and eliminate WMD and dangerous materials, the President proposes the expansion -- in funds, donors, and recipients -- of the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.

- The Partnership originally provided \$20 billion in nonproliferation assistance to the former Soviet Union, it should now also work to reduce and secure dangerous materials elsewhere in the world.

Controls Against Enrichment and Reprocessing

Currently, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty allows states like Iran to develop the capability to produce weapons material under the cover of peaceful programs by pursuing a nuclear enrichment and reprocessing capability. The world must create a safe orderly system to fuel civilian nuclear reactors without adding to the danger of nuclear proliferation.

-- The President has proposed that the members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group ensure that states which renounce enrichment and reprocessing technologies have reliable access, at reasonable cost, to fuel for civilian reactors.

-- The 40 states in the Nuclear Suppliers Group should refuse to sell uranium enrichment or reprocessing equipment or technology to any state that does not already possess full-scale, functioning enrichment or reprocessing plants.

Strengthening the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

The President offers three key proposals to strengthen the IAEA in its work against nuclear proliferation.

-- First, all states should sign the IAEA Additional Protocol, which greatly expands the Agency's tools to detect clandestine nuclear activities. Signing of the Additional Protocol should be a condition for countries seeking equipment for their civilian nuclear programs by next year.

-- Second, the IAEA Board of Governors should create a special committee on safeguards and verification, to improve the organization's ability to monitor and enforce compliance with nuclear nonproliferation obligations.

-- Finally, no state under investigation for proliferation violations should be allowed to serve or continue serving on the IAEA Board of Governors or on the new special committee.

Key Accomplishments

Today, President Bush welcomed key accomplishments in our determined efforts to prevent and protect against the proliferation of WMD.

Abdul Qadeer (A.Q.) Khan Network

The President provided details on the activities of A. Q. Khan, who led an extensive international network for the proliferation of nuclear materials and knowledge. The President also discussed the actions of the U.S. and British governments in penetrating and ultimately shutting down this network:

-- Khan and his associates used a factory in Malaysia to manufacture key parts for centrifuges, and purchased other necessary parts through network operatives based in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. Libya, Iran, and North Korea were customers of the Khan network, and several other countries expressed an interest in Khan's services.

-- Over several years, American and British intelligence services gradually uncovered the network's reach, and identified its key experts, agents, and financial network. This work involved substantial risk -- and all Americans can be proud of the hard work and dedication of our fine intelligence professionals.

-- As a result of our penetration of the network, American and British intelligence identified and tracked a shipment of advanced centrifuge parts. As part of the PSI, German and Italian authorities stopped the ship as it was heading for Libya, seizing several containers filled with parts for sophisticated centrifuges manufactured at the Malaysia facility.

-- The Government of Pakistan is interrogating the network's members, and learning critical details that will help prevent the network from ever operating again. President Musharraf has promised to share all the information he learns about the Khan network, and has assured us that his country will never again be a source of proliferation.

Libya

The President welcomed the historic decision of Colonel Qadhafi to end his weapons of mass destruction programs, and expects other regimes to follow his example. On December 19, 2003, Libya pledged to:

-- Eliminate all elements of its chemical and nuclear weapons programs;

-- Declare all nuclear activities to the IAEA;

-- Eliminate ballistic missiles with more than 300 km range when carrying a payload of 500 kg;

-- Accept international inspections to ensure Libya's complete adherence to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and sign the IAEA Additional Protocol; and

-- Eliminate all chemical weapons stocks and munitions, and accede to the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Libya is now working in partnership with the United States, United Kingdom, the IAEA, and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons on implementing those commitments.

Saving Ourselves From Self-Destruction

by IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei

New York Times – 12 February 2004

Nuclear proliferation is on the rise. Equipment, material and training were once largely inaccessible. Today, however, there is a sophisticated worldwide network that can deliver systems for producing material usable in weapons. The demand clearly exists: countries remain interested in the illicit acquisition of weapons of mass destruction.

If we sit idly by, this trend will continue. Countries that perceive themselves to be vulnerable can be expected to try to redress that vulnerability - and in some cases they will pursue clandestine weapons programs. The supply network will grow, making it easier to acquire nuclear weapon expertise and materials. Eventually, inevitably, terrorists will gain access to such materials and technology, if not actual weapons.

If the world does not change course, we risk self-destruction.

Common sense and recent experience make clear that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which has served us well since 1970, must be tailored to fit 21st-century realities. Without threatening national sovereignty, we can toughen the Non-Proliferation regime.

The first step is to tighten controls over the export of nuclear material, a priority President Bush identified yesterday in his speech on nuclear non-proliferation. The current system relies on a gentlemen's agreement that is not only non-binding, but also limited in its membership: it does not include many countries with growing industrial capacity. And even some members fail to control the exports of companies unaffiliated with government enterprise.

We must universalize the export control system, remove these loopholes, and enact binding, treaty-based controls — while preserving the rights of all States to peaceful nuclear technology. We should also criminalize the acts of people who seek to assist others in proliferation.

In parallel, inspectors must be empowered. Much effort was recently expended — and rightly so — in persuading Iran and Libya to give the International Atomic Energy Agency much broader rights of inspection. But the Agency should have the right to conduct such inspections in all countries. Verification of non-proliferation treaty obligations requires more stringent measures, but to date, fewer than 20 percent of the 191 United Nations members have approved a protocol allowing broader inspection rights. Again, as President Bush suggested yesterday, it should be in force for all countries.

In addition, no country should be allowed to withdraw from the treaty. The treaty now allows any member to do so with three months' notice. Any nation invoking this escape clause is almost certainly a threat to international peace and security.

This provision of the treaty should be curtailed. At a minimum, withdrawal should prompt an automatic review by the United Nations Security Council.

The international community must do a better job of controlling the risks of nuclear proliferation. Sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle — the production of new fuel, the processing of weapon-usable material, the disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste — would be less vulnerable to proliferation if brought under multinational control. Appropriate checks and balances could be used to preserve commercial competitiveness and assure a supply of nuclear material to legitimate would-be users.

Toward this end, negotiations on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty must be revived. The treaty, which would put an end to the production of fissionable material for weapons, has been stalled in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva for nearly eight years. For the material that already exists, including in some countries of the former Soviet Union, security measures must be strengthened.

Of course, a fundamental part of the non-proliferation bargain is the commitment of the five nuclear States recognized under the non-proliferation treaty — Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States — to move toward disarmament. Recent agreements between Russia and the United States are commendable, but they should be verifiable and irreversible. A clear road map for nuclear disarmament should be established — starting with a major reduction in the 30,000 nuclear warheads still in existence, and bringing into force the long-awaited Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

If the global community is serious about bringing nuclear proliferation to a halt, these measures and others should be considered at the non-proliferation treaty review conference next year.

We must also begin to address the root causes of insecurity. In areas of longstanding conflict like the Middle East, South Asia and the Korean Peninsula, the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction — while never justified — can be expected as long as we fail to introduce alternatives that redress the security deficit. We

must abandon the unworkable notion that it is morally reprehensible for some countries to pursue weapons of mass destruction yet morally acceptable for others to rely on them for security — and indeed to continue to refine their capacities and postulate plans for their use.

Similarly, we must abandon the traditional approach of defining security in terms of boundaries — city walls, border patrols, racial and religious groupings. The global community has become irreversibly interdependent, with the constant movement of people, ideas, goods and resources. In such a world, we must combat terrorism with an infectious security culture that crosses borders — an inclusive approach to security based on solidarity and the value of human life. In such a world, weapons of mass destruction have no place.

Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Beantwoording kamervragen Wilders over mogelijke verontrusting van IAEA inzake de proliferatie van kernwapens

DVB/NN-053/04 – 18 februari 2004

Antwoord van de heer Bot, minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, mede namens de heer Kamp, minister van Defensie, de heer Remkes, minister van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksaangelegenheden en de heer Brinkhorst, minister van Economische Zaken op vragen van het lid Wilders (VVD) over mogelijke verontrusting van IAEA inzake de proliferatie van kernwapens

Vraag 1: Heeft u kennisgenomen van het interview dat de directeur van het International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), de heer Baradei, onlangs heeft gegeven aan het Duitse weekblad ‘Der Spiegel’?¹

Antwoord: Ja.

Vraag 2: Deelt u de mening dat er een atomaire zwarte markt is ontstaan, die met een buitengewoon raffinement wordt gaande gehouden c.q. waarbij in het ene land plannen worden gemaakt, in het andere centrifuges worden geproduceerd die via een derde land worden verscheept terwijl over de eindafnemer onduidelijkheid bestaat en dat daarbij commercieel ingestelde experts, gewetenloze firma’s en eventueel zelfs staatsinstellingen zijn betrokken? Welke nadere informatie kunt u de Kamer hierover verstrekken?

Antwoord: Het was de regering reeds bekend dat prolifererende staten door onderlinge samenwerking, alsmede door middel van verwervingen in geïndustrialiseerde landen, doende waren hun capaciteiten op het gebied van massavernietigingswapens te vergroten. De Kamer is hierover regelmatig geïnformeerd, alsmede over de maatregelen die hiertegen nationaal en in internationaal kader zijn genomen, waaronder het uitvoeren van een strikt exportcontrolebeleid.

De regering heeft met verontrusting kennis genomen van de kennelijke omvang en efficiëntie van netwerken van bedrijven en individuen, die ten behoeve van prolifererende staten handelen in nucleaire en gerelateerde technologie. In hoeverre ook statelijke actoren, anders dan aan de vraagzijde, hierbij betrokken zijn is op dit moment niet met zekerheid vast te stellen. De regering verleent medewerking aan het IAEA om aard en omvang van de thans aan het licht komende netwerken in kaart te brengen en te onderzoeken of en zo ja, in hoeverre ook Nederlandse staatsburgers bij deze praktijken betrokken zouden zijn.

Vraag 3: Hebben Iran en Libië overvloedig gebruik gemaakt van dit netwerk en hebben deze landen naar uw oordeel de IAEA in het verleden bedrogen? Hoe beoordeelt u de toezeggingen van de Pakistaanse president Musharraf om samen te werken met de IAEA bij het opsporen van de ‘complexe onderwereld’ die derde landen helpt bij het ontwikkelen van atoomwapens?²

Antwoord: Op grond van informatie afkomstig van het IAEA en verklaringen van Iran en Pakistan kan worden vastgesteld dat Iran en Libië gebruik hebben gemaakt van netwerken van individuen en bedrijven bij hun proliferatie-activiteiten. Over de mate waarin genoemde landen van deze netwerken gebruik hebben gemaakt, valt op dit moment geen uitspraak te doen. Nader onderzoek van het IAEA zal hierop hopelijk een beter zicht mogelijk maken.

De bereidheid die de Pakistaanse president Musharraf heeft uitgesproken om samen te werken met het IAEA bij het ophelderen van bestaande proliferatienetwerken, wordt door de regering positief beoordeeld.

Vraag 4: Deelt u de verontrusting van de heer Baradei over de ontwikkeling van een nucleaire capaciteit door Noord-Korea en houdt u het evenzeer voor mogelijk dat Noord-Korea reeds over kernwapens beschikt? Wordt het nog steeds door weinig deskundigen reëel geacht dat Noord-Korea reeds zover gevorderd is met het opwerken van de nucleaire brandstofstaven, zoals u de Kamer berichtte in uw brief over de situatie in Noord-Korea van 30 september 2003?³

Antwoord: Ik berichtte uw Kamer over het mogelijk bezit van kernwapens door Noord-Korea en de proliferatierisico's die van dat land uitgaan in genoemde brief van brief van 30 september 2003 (29200 V, nr. 7). De situatie op dit punt is niet wezenlijk gewijzigd. Noord-Koreaanse activiteiten op het gebied van massavernietigingswapens en ballistische raketten blijven, ook al bestaat over de precieze stand van zaken onvoldoende duidelijkheid, een onacceptabel proliferatierisico inhouden, ook in relatie tot terrorisme.

Vraag 5: Deelt u de mening van de heer Baradei, dat het gevaar voor een daadwerkelijk inzetten van atoomwapens nog nooit zo groot is geweest als nu? Hoe groot acht u de kans dat terroristen over nucleaire wapens beschikken?

Antwoord: Ik ben het met de heer ElBaradei eens dat het risico van gebruik van kernwapens toeneemt, indien deze in handen zouden vallen van onverantwoordelijke staten of terroristen. Hoewel de kans dat terroristen de beschikking zullen krijgen over kernwapens klein is, valt deze mogelijkheid nimmer uit te sluiten. Vandaar dat de regering er alles in haar vermogen aan zal doen om dit risico zo klein mogelijk te houden.

Vraag 6: Bent u, met de heer Baradei, van mening dat de internationale exportcontroles volledig gefaald hebben, dat deze exportcontroles drastisch moeten worden verbeterd en dat de wereldgemeenschap zich dient te bezinnen op een nieuw internationaal controlesysteem? Rust op Nederland, dat ooit tekort is geschoten bij het voorkomen van een belangrijk lek van nucleaire informatie naar derde landen (zaak-Khan), niet de morele verplichting om actief bij te dragen aan een drastische verbetering van het non-proliferatiesysteem? Bent u bereid hiertoe het initiatief te nemen in internationaal verband? Zo ja, welke voorstellen zult u hiervoor doen?

Antwoord: Ik ben het met de heer ElBaradei eens dat de effectiviteit van het non-proliferatieregime, inclusief exportcontroles, moet worden verbeterd. De regering deelt echter niet de mening dat internationale exportcontroles volledig gefaald hebben. Stringent exportcontrolebeleid bemoeilijkt pogingen om extern kennis en materiaal te verwerven voor het opbouwen van een kernwapencapaciteit. Zo is door stringent exportcontrolebeleid een aantal staten dat trachtte een kernwapencapaciteit te verwerven, er nog altijd niet in geslaagd dit doel te bereiken. Bekend is dat prolifererende staten onderling zijn gaan samenwerken, een verschijnsel dat wel wordt aangeduid met de term secundaire proliferatie, waarbij betreffende leveranties zich onttrekken aan de exportcontroles van de landen die bij de bestaande exportcontroleregimes zijn aangesloten. Uw Kamer is hierover ook enkele malen geïnformeerd in antwoord op vragen van het lid Wilders.

De regering zal zich blijven inzetten voor verbetering van de effectiviteit van het multilaterale non-proliferatiestelsel, in het belang van nationale en internationale veiligheid, ongeacht het te betreuren feit dat in de jaren '70 technologische informatie uit Nederland heeft bijgedragen aan internationale proliferatie.

De aanzetten voor die verbetering zijn reeds gegeven. Nederlandse deelname aan het *Proliferation Security Initiative* behoort daartoe. Ook de in december 2003 door de EU aangenomen Non-proliferatiestrategie en de daarin vervatte acties beogen bij te dragen aan effectieve bestrijding van proliferatie. De implementatie van deze strategie zal een van de speerpunten zijn van het aanstaande Nederlandse Voorzitterschap van de EU. De regering steunt daarnaast eveneens de totstandkoming van een non-proliferatie-resolutie in de VN-Veilighedsraad. Nationaal wordt gewerkt aan verdere verbetering van implementatiewetgeving op het gebied van non-proliferatie, onder meer middels herziening van de In- en Uitvoerwet en verbetering van de beveiliging van biologische agentia.

Derhalve blijft de Regering met volle inzet streven naar effectieve bestrijding van proliferatie. Al blijven wij ons ervan bewust dat het een kwestie van lange adem is en blijft, waarin wetgeving, handhaving, internationale samenwerking en effectieve diplomatie hand in hand dienen te gaan.

Noten: 1) Der Spiegel, 26 januari jl.; 2) De Telegraaf, 26 januari jl.; 3) Kamerstuk 29 200 V, nr.7

UK Lords

Lords Hansard

Column WS25-WS28 – 25 February 2004

[...] **Written Statements**

Weapons of Mass Destruction

The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean): Over the past year, there have been some significant breakthroughs in countering the proliferation of weapons of mass

destruction (WMD). The United Kingdom has worked effectively with the United States in the case of Libya's programmes and in countering AQ Khan's network. We have played a leading role, with France and Germany, on the issue of Iran's nuclear programme. We have enforced UN Security Council resolutions on Iraq. We have been active on the Proliferation Security Initiative designed to interdict the passage of cargoes intended for use in WMD programmes. We support the six-party talks in North Korea. All of this demonstrates effective multilateralism in action.

We would like to set out for the House other steps we are taking and further proposals we will be discussing with our partners to deter, check and roll back WMD programmes in countries of concern, and to prevent WMD equipment and expertise falling into the hands of terrorists.

Proliferation Security Initiative

The Proliferation Security Initiative has developed well since it was launched in May 2003. Some 60 countries have indicated their support for it and their intention to apply its principles. There is more that we can do to extend its possibilities.

We are working in the International Maritime Organisation to secure amendment to the Suppression of Unlawful Acts at Sea Convention, which will make it an internationally recognised offence to transport WMD, their delivery systems and related materials on commercial vessels. It is already an offence under the Chicago Convention of the International Civil Aviation Organisation to transport WMD on civil aircraft.

Agreements have been concluded in the past providing for the boarding of vessels which may be carrying drugs. We now plan to negotiate similar agreements with the main commercial flag states allowing for the boarding of vessels which may be carrying cargoes which could be used in WMD programmes. Shipping of the 10 largest commercial flag states covers some 70 per cent of maritime trade. So with a relatively small number of such agreements, a large proportion of the world's shipping would be covered. The options available to the proliferator and rogue supplier would be reduced.

We will consider with our partners whether new penalties should be introduced to deter air or shipping lines from seeking to transport such cargoes. Might the vessels and planes of any companies found to have engaged in such transport be denied landing or port rights around the world? Should we consider an international register of companies and individuals convicted of proliferation offences?

We support President Bush's call to use Interpol and all other means to help law enforcement agencies to work against the traffickers.

Within the EU, we see a case for Customs experts considering how to tighten regulations and practices, and how better to exchange information in order to prevent the trafficking of WMD.

In the UK, we have begun work on the screening of traffic for the illicit movement of radioactive materials. This will eventually cover all air, sea and Channel Tunnel traffic—passengers, parcels, vehicles, freight and containers.

Global Partnership

Eighteen months ago, the Kananaskis G8 summit established a global partnership against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction. Under this initiative G8 leaders decided to support specific co-operation projects, initially in Russia, to assist the destruction of chemical weapons, the dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines, the disposition of fissile materials and the employment of former weapons scientists. The United Kingdom announced that it would make up to 750 million dollars available over 10 years for this work. The first report of work undertaken by the UK was published in December.

Since Kananaskis, we have had the Iraq conflict and Libya's decision to dismantle its WMD programmes. Work is under way to develop a programme for the employment of former weapons scientists in Iraq. The UK has offered to help with a similar programme in Libya. We would like to see the Global Partnership expanded so that it is fully global in its geographical extent, and for the number of donor states to be expanded so that the target of 20 billion dollars can become a floor rather than a ceiling.

The United Nations and Counter Proliferation

An anomaly in the field of counter proliferation has been the lack of discussion since 1992 of proliferation in an overall sense by the UN Security Council. Following a proposal by President Bush last September, work is now under way on a resolution which will call on states to adopt tough national legislation to criminalise the possession, manufacture or trafficking of WMD, in particular for terrorist purposes; to develop effective export controls where these do not exist; and to maintain effective physical protection of sensitive materials. We hope the council will pass this soon.

We also believe that the council should also consider establishing an appropriate follow-up mechanism, perhaps a counter-proliferation committee, just as the council's Counter-Terrorism Committee was established in 2001.

The European Union

The European Security Strategy, adopted by the European Council in December, highlights the importance of work against WMD. The month before its adoption, the EU agreed that agreements with other countries should include a non-proliferation clause. We are working with our EU partners and the Commission to see this introduced as new agreements arise or existing ones are renewed.

Non-Proliferation Treaty and International Atomic Energy Agency

The Non-Proliferation Treaty obliges states party to enter into safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to verify that nuclear activities are and remain legitimate. Article IV of the treaty confirms states' rights to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

But states which fail to comply with their safeguards obligations inevitably lose the confidence of the international community. The bargain which is at the heart of the treaty is then called into question. We should consider whether such states should not forfeit the right to develop the nuclear fuel cycle, particularly the enrichment and reprocessing capabilities which are of such proliferation sensitivity. That does not mean that they would be deprived of the possibility of constructing and running civil nuclear power stations. These could still operate with fuel supplied by countries honouring their safeguards obligations. The fuel would be subject to agency monitoring while in the receiving country, and would be returned to the country of supply when spent. This would prevent a seemingly civil programme masking a weapons programme.

Experience in recent years has shown the need for more wide-ranging agency inspections of national nuclear industries. The agency's additional protocol provides the basis for carrying out such inspections. It is important that all members of the international community adopt one. Suppliers of nuclear technology should increasingly see this as a key commitment when they judge export licence applications.

The agency has done well to meet a growing verification workload within the constraints of its budget. But we should not ask it forever to do more within the same resources. We may need seriously to consider further strengthening of its safeguards division.

Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention

The Government set out in a Green Paper in April 2002 ideas on how to verify compliance with the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention. We continue to believe that we need a mechanism, possibly under the authority of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, for investigating instances of alleged use and suspect biological weapons facilities. We will be putting forward proposals to follow this up at the next meeting of states party of the convention in Geneva in July.

Conclusion

Countering proliferation remains as important today as it ever was. The part our intelligence services play in it is vital. We and they can be proud of what we have achieved over the past year. But we cannot let up. There is much work still to do. The proposals we have outlined are designed to assist that.

US State Department

DeSutter Says States Who Proliferate Should Learn From Libyan Model

27 February 2004

Countries such as Iran and North Korea should learn from Libya's example and relinquish advanced nuclear weapons programs to "rejoin the community of civilized nations," a key State Department arms control official says.

Libya provides a rare example of "a state [that] has volunteered to rid itself of its WMD (weapons of mass destruction) programs -- and it is a first for a state sponsor of terror to do so without regime change," according to Paula DeSutter, assistant secretary of state for Verification and Compliance.

She told members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee February 26 that Libya is a model for other proliferators "to mend their ways and help restore themselves to international legitimacy."

While emphasizing that further improvement in Libyan-U.S. relations is tied to continued progress in the dismantlement of Libya's WMD, DeSutter praised Libya's cooperation saying "there is every indication ... that these commitments are, indeed, sincere."

Last December, after quietly working with U.S. and British intelligence services, Libya declared its intention to rid itself of WMD programs, equipment, and materials, as well as restrict itself to missiles permitted by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). In addition, the Libyan government indicated it would adhere to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) Additional Protocol.

The assistant secretary reported that Libya allowed open and unhindered inspections and was forthcoming with information about its WMD and missile programs.

According to her testimony, the first items removed by the inspectors were detailed nuclear weapons designs Libya had acquired from "the nuclear black market network of Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan." They also took away advanced centrifuges purchased from Pakistan's Khan Research Laboratories still in their original packing containers.

In addition, Libya turned over "five Scud-C guidance sets, including their gyroscopes, thereby making inoperable all of Libya's existing Scud-C missiles, produced with extensive assistance from North Korea," DeSutter said.

"To date, Libya has cooperated closely with our teams, with our British partners and international organizations. With Libya's agreement, we removed significant and dangerous elements of its nuclear weapons program and key guidance parts for Libya's most advanced missile program and stand ready to remove more still," she added.

To secure against theft by terrorists, DeSutter said Libya has begun consolidating its stockpiles of chemical weapons agents easing the way for their eventual destruction. There are also plans to convert Libya's research reactor to low enriched uranium and redirect the country's WMD scientists, engineers and technicians into civilian pursuits.

The State Department has headed the coordination of the project to assist the Libyans disarmament efforts which includes the Departments of Energy and Defense, the CIA, the IAEA, and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, as well as the British government. DeSutter said British cooperation has been crucial to the success of this venture.

President Bush's commitment to stopping the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons has had "a galvanizing effect on the world's view on the trade of WMD," DeSutter said.

"We have isolated and pressured outlaw states dedicated to developing WMD, and engaged our friends and allies in a range of multinational diplomatic, economic and even military coalitions to combat this danger," she said. "Thanks to our efforts, proliferation is today becoming riskier and more uncertain, and we are now sending the message the pursuit of WMD brings not security but insecurity. At the same time, we have made clear that countries that abandon such dangerous pursuits can enjoy the prospect of improved relations with the United States and our friends."

House of Commons

House of Commons Hansard

Column 757W – 1 March 2004

[...] Mr. Dalyell: To ask the Prime Minister what action has been taken by the UK Government to monitor the activities of Abdul Qadeer Khan since he was a research student with access to URENCO, with particular reference to the matters raised in the debate of 18 December 1979, *Official Report*, column 554 ff. [154969]

The Prime Minister: We have for many years been gathering information on the private network of suppliers of nuclear components operating across many countries and hinging on the activities of Dr. A Q Khan. The nature of this network is now well known to us and we, in cooperation with the US and other Governments have been engaged in closing down this network. [...]

Brief over de Algemene Vergadering van de Verenigde Naties (2003)

26150 nr. 11 - 1 maart 2004

[...] In de Eerste Commissie betrof het belangrijkste discussiepunt de hogere prioriteit die door de westelijke landen aan non-proliferatie wordt gegeven, hetgeen in de ogen van de Niet-Gebonden Landen (NGL) ten koste gaat van de aandacht voor kernontwapening. De voorstellen van President Bush om middels een Veiligheidsraadsresolutie lidstaten te verplichten proliferatie van massavernietigingswapens strafbaar te stellen, en van President Chirac om een permanent korps van non-proliferatieinspecteurs in te stellen gaven in het algemeen debat de toon aan. Beide voorstellen werden door minister De Hoop Scheffer in zijn rede verwelkomd. Over het voorstel van President Bush wordt thans in het kader van de Veiligheidsraad een resolutievoorstel voorbereid.

Chili moest als voorzitter van de “Haagse gedragscode tegen de proliferatie van ballistische raketten (HCOG)” - na intensief overleg - tot de conclusie komen dat een resolutie over deze gedragscode dit jaar niet haalbaar was. Een dergelijke resolutie vergt een intensievere voorbereiding. Chili heeft daarom aangekondigd pas het komende jaar een solide onderbouwde resolutie in de Eerste Commissie te zullen introduceren.

De Nederlandse resolutie over nationale wetgeving inzake overdracht van wapens, militair materieel en *dual use*-goederen en technologie, die vorig jaar na stemming door de AV werd aanvaard, is dit jaar met consensus aangenomen. Daarmee levert de resolutie een bijdrage aan de ontwikkeling van een universele norm die stelt dat de VN-leden effectieve nationale wetgeving dienen te ontwikkelen voor controle op overdrachten van wapens en *dual use*-goederen en daarover aan de VN dienen te rapporteren. [...]

Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Allemachtig Amerika - De verhouding VS Europa in de 21ste eeuw

Minister Bot – Beijen-lezing – 6 maart 2004

[...] Non-proliferatie/IAEA

De affaire Khan heeft ons niettemin met de neus op de feiten gedrukt. Het non-proliferatie stelsel in zijn huidige vorm slaagt er niet goed in om de verspreiding van nucleaire technologie en onderdelen van massavernietigingswapens tegen te gaan. Volgens El Baradei zijn de recente gevallen van illegale handel in nucleaire technologie slechts het topje van de ijsberg.

Het is dus van groot belang dat wij de loopholes in het non-proliferatiestelsel zo snel mogelijk dichten. Daartoe hebben zowel President Bush als de heer El Baradei onlangs voorstellen gedaan, die ik nu kort zal belichten.

In zijn toespraak voor de *National Defense University* heeft president Bush voorgesteld om te komen tot een non-proliferatieresolutie van de VN-Veiligheidsraad. Deze resolutie zou staten onder meer verplichten om medewerking aan proliferatie strafbaar te stellen. Een dergelijke resolutie zou een volkenrechtelijke basis kunnen bieden voor wereldwijde verscherping van exportcontrole- en transportcontroleregimes. Nederland steunt dit voorstel. En als het aan Nederland ligt zal de gehele resolutie onder Hoofdstuk VII van het Handvest worden gebracht.

Een ander belangrijk thema vormt de werking van het non-proliferatieverdrag, het NPV en de verificatie daarvan door het Internationaal Atoom en Energie Agentschap, het IAEA. Landen die toetreden tot het NPV verwerven daarmee het recht op het vreedzaam gebruik van kernenergie. Probleem is alleen dat sommige landen daar misbruik van maken of lijken te willen maken. Landen hebben in de huidige situatie het recht een complete splijtstofcyclus op te bouwen, onder controle van het IAEA. Maar wanneer het vervolgens de cyclus heeft afgerond kan datzelfde land het verdrag opzeggen, de inspecteurs van het IAEA de deur wijzen en negentig dagen later overgaan tot de productie van nucleaire wapens. Dat is natuurlijk niet de bedoeling van het NPV! Toch speelt dit scenario zich af in een land als Noord-Korea. En in Iran spelen sommigen blijkbaar met de gedachte.

We moeten toe naar een regime dat universeel is en waar geen land zich aan kan onttrekken. De weg daarheen is lang, maar op korte termijn valt te denken aan een besluit door de Veiligheidsraad, om uittreden uit het NPV in de toekomst *automatisch* tot een bedreiging van de internationale vrede en veiligheid te verklaren. *De facto* zou het dus verboden moeten worden het NPV te verlaten wanneer men eenmaal partij is.

Zo'n aanpak vergt wel dat het verdrag door iedereen als eerlijk wordt ervaren. Dat houdt ook in dat de Kernwapenstaten onder het NPV meer werk gaan maken van het terugdringen van hun eigen kernwapens.

De inspecteurs van het IAEA moeten bovendien niet alleen kunnen verifiëren of een land doet wat het *zelf* zegt te doen de huidige gang van zaken maar ook of dat land misschien iets doet dat het *niet* heeft gedeclareerd. Dit is de basis van wat het Additionele Protocol heet. Dit Additionele Protocol dient een verplichting te worden voor alle landen die bij het IAEA zijn aangesloten. Op zijn minst moet op korte termijn toetreding tot het Additionele Protocol de voorwaarde gaan vormen waaronder aan een land nucleaire goederen voor vreedzaam gebruik van kernenergie kunnen worden geleverd.

Het multilaterale non-proliferatieregime moet worden versterkt, daar zijn wij het over eens. Tegelijkertijd moeten we werken aan de oorzaken van gevoelens van onveiligheid die landen aanmoedigen zich te bewapenen en aan de diepere oorzaken van instabiliteit. Hierbij valt te denken aan regionale crises zoals in het Midden Oosten en Kashmir.

Het zijn thema's die centraal staan in de Europese veiligheidsstrategie die december vorig jaar door de Europese Raad officieel werd aangenomen. Dit document bevat ook een uitgewerkte non-proliferatiestrategie, op basis waarvan de EU de externe betrekkingen met derde landen toetst aan hun gedrag op het terrein van non-proliferatie. Landen als Iran en Syrië merken dit nu al in de praktijk. De Veiligheidsstrategie bevat ook een zachte kant, gericht op het effectief aanpakken van de diepere oorzaken van instabiliteit, of het ondersteunen van positieve ontwikkelingen waar dat mogelijk is. [...]

ANP

China en VS willen meer nucleaire samenwerking

12 januari 2004

PEKING (ANP) - China en de Verenigde Staten gaan meer samenwerken op het gebied van nucleaire non-proliferatie, veiligheid en contraterrorisme. Daartoe hebben zij een voorlopig akkoord getekend, zo heeft de Amerikaanse ambassade in de Chinese hoofdstad Peking bekendgemaakt.

Onder het akkoord zullen beide landen samen met de atoomwaakhond van de Verenigde Naties, de IAEA, onder meer samenwerken bij exportcontroles en de bescherming van nucleair materiaal en installaties. Ook willen China en de VS de verdere verspreiding van nucleair materiaal tegengaan.

De ondertekening komt enkele dagen nadat een groep Amerikaanse experts in Noord-Korea waarschijnlijk opgewerkt plutonium te zien had gekregen. Dit is het belangrijkste onderdeel voor kernwapens. China en de VS proberen met onderhandelingen de nucleaire ambities van het stalinistische Noord-Korea in te dammen.

Ook met India willen de VS nauwer gaan samenwerken. Daarbij moeten zowel het kernprogramma voor vreedzame doeleinden, ruimtevaartprogramma's en technologische handel aandacht krijgen. De Amerikaanse president Bush zei maandag dat hij met de Indiase premier Vajpayee ook was overeengekomen om te gaan praten over een raketafweersysteem.

Washington Post

Pakistanis Say Nuclear Scientists Aided Iran

Iran Nuclear Effort Said Aided in Secret '80s Deal

By John Lancaster and Kamran Khan – 24 January 2004

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan, Jan. 23 -- Pakistani investigators have concluded that at least two of the country's top nuclear scientists -- including Abdul Qadeer Khan, considered the father of Pakistan's nuclear bomb -- provided unauthorized technical assistance to Iran's nuclear weapons program in the late 1980s, according to senior Pakistani officials.

The scientists allegedly provided the help under a secret agreement between Pakistan and Iran that was supposed to be limited to the sharing of peaceful nuclear technology, the officials said on condition of anonymity.

The findings pose a political dilemma for Gen. Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's president. Islamic hard-liners have rallied to the defense of the scientists, who are regarded as national heroes, and have accused the government of pursuing the investigations to gain favor with the Bush administration.

Musharraf acknowledged on Friday that it appeared Pakistani scientists had sold nuclear secrets abroad "for personal financial gain" but reiterated his government's position that there had been no official involvement, the Reuters news agency reported from Davos, Switzerland, where Musharraf was attending the World Economic Forum. "There is no such evidence that any government personality or military personality was involved in this at all," he said.

Pakistani officials identified the second scientist as Mohammed Farooq, a high-ranking manager at the country's premier nuclear weapons laboratory, which is named after Khan. Some investigators have recommended charging Farooq under Pakistan's Official Secrets Act, which carries a possible prison term, the officials said. Farooq has been in government custody since his arrest Nov. 22.

Musharraf will make a final decision on whether to pursue charges against either scientist -- and perhaps others -- after he returns from Davos this weekend.

"A legal examination of the probe is underway, but it seems that Dr. Farooq will be charged with violating the Official Secrets Act," said a senior intelligence official, adding that Farooq had implicated Khan in the course of his discussions with investigators. "Dr. A.Q. Khan was questioned in view of Dr. Farooq's statement," the official said.

Pakistan launched its investigation in November after the International Atomic Energy Agency provided information suggesting Pakistani scientists had helped Iran develop centrifuges used to make enriched uranium, a key ingredient in nuclear weapons. U.S. officials have said that Pakistan over the years has

provided similar assistance to North Korea and that they suspect its scientists of doing the same for Libya; they have also said they accept Musharraf's assurances that any collaboration with North Korea has stopped. The investigation has been widely condemned by Pakistanis as further evidence that Washington is meddling in their country's internal affairs, and some government officials also question the aggressiveness with which it is being pursued.

An aide to Musharraf acknowledged that a public trial of Farooq or Khan could prove highly embarrassing if it led to further disclosures, especially concerning the role of the military, the main power center in Pakistani politics and for decades the overseer of its nuclear program.

"Any trial of a nuclear scientist -- particularly any gesture of public disgrace for A.Q. Khan from the government -- will open a Pandora's box," said the aide, who spoke on condition of anonymity. "Bygones are bygones, let's move forward -- this is what the president believes in these crucial moments."

The uniformed establishment has largely escaped scrutiny in the probe, which is being conducted primarily by the Inter-Services Intelligence agency, a branch of the military, and is said to be days away from completion. Officials acknowledged, for example, that investigators have yet to interview retired Gen. Mirza Aslam Beg, who openly advocated a military alliance with Iran during his tenure as army chief of staff from 1988 to 1991.

Chaudry Nisar Ali Khan, a former cabinet-level assistant to Nawaz Sharif, the prime minister at the time, said in an interview Thursday that Beg approached him in 1991 with a proposal to sell nuclear technology to Iran. Former U.S. ambassador Robert Oakley said Beg told him in 1991 that he had reached an understanding with the head of Iran's Revolutionary Guards to help Iran with its nuclear program in return for conventional weapons and oil.

Later, Oakley said, Sharif and Pakistan's president at that time, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, told Iranian president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani that the Pakistani government had no intention of carrying out such an agreement. That, however, "did not necessarily mean that Beg and A.Q. Khan did not go forward," Oakley said.

In interviews Thursday and Friday, Beg acknowledged that he had maintained close ties with Iranian generals but denied that he ever authorized the transfer of nuclear technology. "It never happened," he said, describing allegations as "part of the conspiracy against me."

Beg acknowledged, however, that he worked out an agreement with Iran on sharing expertise on several types of conventional-weapons technology but that the planned collaboration never took place.

Although several retired military officers of lower rank have been detained in connection with the probe, its focus on the cream of the civilian nuclear establishment has prompted charges by opposition politicians and family members, among others, that the scientists are being singled out under U.S. pressure.

"My father is being made a scapegoat," Asim Farooq, a physician and the son of the detained scientist, said in a telephone interview Friday. "He is just a scientist, not a decision maker. He only did what was best for Pakistan." An open trial, he said, "will expose the whole truth."

Khan, who has been questioned but has not been detained, did not return a telephone message left at his home here Friday. A strident nationalist who has accused the West of hostility to Islam, he was forced out as director of the nuclear lab in 2001, partly under U.S. pressure, and currently serves as an adviser to the government of Prime Minister Zafarullah Khan Jamali.

Information Minister Rashid Ahmed said in an interview Thursday that there was "no need" to interview Beg or other senior military officers because the country's nuclear program "was not under the control of the military" during the period when Beg was army chief. Most of Beg's tenure coincided with the first government of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, who was forced from power in August 1990 by President Khan and succeeded by Sharif.

Bhutto claimed that the army engineered her ouster because she had tried to exert control over its activities, including the nuclear program.

In an e-mail response to questions, Bhutto, who lives abroad, said that as prime minister she had limited influence over the activities of the Khan Research Laboratories, known as KRL, and that the facility's "security was in control of the military." Her attempts to "control the direction of nuclear policy" were "much resisted," she added.

In Washington, U.S. officials expressed skepticism about the vigor of Pakistan's investigation and its denials of high-level army complicity. On the other hand, said a Bush administration official who spoke on condition of anonymity, "it's not lost on us that it's a fragile situation there. We are sensitive to the pressure that Musharraf is under from Islamic extremists."

The official suggested that with international pressure mounting on Pakistan following revelations of its nuclear dealings with North Korea, some of which allegedly took place as recently as 2001, Musharraf

apparently felt he had no choice but to follow up on the latest allegations concerning Iran, even though they relate to a period that long predates the 1999 coup that brought him to power.

"They couldn't stick their heads in the sand any longer and say, 'It wasn't on our watch,' " the administration official said. "Outside pressure would be too great."

While Iran has not directly named Pakistan as a supplier, IAEA inspectors who examined the country's nuclear facilities last fall concluded that its centrifuges were probably based on Pakistani designs, a finding the U.N. agency shared with Islamabad in a two-page letter in November.

Authorities subsequently have acknowledged detaining at least 11 current or former employees of the Khan laboratory, including eight picked up for what officials described as "debriefing" last week. Several have been released but most, including Farooq, remain in custody. Two other nuclear scientists were barred this week from traveling to Mecca, Saudi Arabia, on the annual Muslim pilgrimage, according to Ahmed, the information minister.

Officials described Farooq as a close confidant of Khan who has worked at the lab since the 1980s and, like Khan, is an expert in centrifuge technology. The purpose in detaining him and several other close associates of the former lab chairman, including Nazir Ahmad, a former director general of the lab, is to "scan the whole range of Dr. A.Q. Khan's activities in the past 15 years or so," a senior intelligence official said.

The leakage of nuclear weapons technology to Iran, officials said, apparently originated in 1987, when former president Mohammed Zia ul-Haq secretly approved a long-standing request from the Iranian government for cooperation in non-military nuclear programs.

A former senior scientist in Pakistan's nuclear program, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said Iranian scientists had expressed interest in "non-peaceful nuclear matters." The scientist said that when he called this to Zia's attention shortly before the general's death in 1988, Zia "asked me to play around but not to yield anything substantial, at any cost."

The scientist said the Iranians also pursued the matter with Beg but that he did not know what became of their efforts because by that time he had left the program.

Nisar Ali Khan, the former cabinet official under Sharif, said the army chief of staff argued in the immediate aftermath of the 1991 Persian Gulf War that "if America is able to overwhelm Iraq, next it will be the turn of Pakistan and Iran."

Beg proposed that to keep that from happening, Pakistan should sell its nuclear technology to Iran as part of a "grand alliance" against the United States, Nisar Ali Khan said. "He was generally saying that if America comes down hard on us in response to this alignment, we could easily take advantage of our new technology financially."

Nisar Ali Khan said neither he nor Sharif took the proposal seriously.

Beg denied the conversation ever took place. "It was always under the chief executive," he said of Pakistan's nuclear program. "To think that Dr. Qadeer [Khan] or I would transfer technology to any other country is, I would say, preposterous."

Washington Post

Confronting The Nuclear 'Underworld'

25 January 2004

Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, survivor of two recent assassination attempts, arrived at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, and immediately had to deal with allegations that some of his country's leading scientists had sold nuclear technology to Iran and Libya in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In an interview on Friday with Newsweek-Washington Post's Lally Weymouth, the 60-year-old general insisted that the government itself was not involved in any transfer of nuclear know-how or technology and was not aware of the scientists' activities at the time. On the assassination plots, he charged that al Qaeda was behind the attacks and pledged to crack down on extremist groups operating in Pakistan. He also spoke at length about turning a new page in Pakistan's tense relations with neighboring India. Excerpts:

[...]

Have you put down new rules to stop nuclear technology transfers to rogue countries such as Libya, as Pakistan has been charged with doing in the past?

Pakistan has not at all been charged. Some individuals in Pakistan and also some Europeans have been charged. It started with Iran giving the names of some individuals who helped them get nuclear designs or whatever they had. These names included some Pakistanis and a number of Europeans. I got [the list] from

the IAEA [the International Atomic Energy Agency] and then we started our investigation. We discovered there is an underworld of people who have been manufacturing. Most of them come from Europe.

Have you actually put in place new controls on technology transfers?

Yes. There are strong custodial controls in Pakistan and there is no possibility of a leakage. Before, there was a covert program for maybe 30 years, and there was a lot of autonomy given to the organization and individuals running the program. There was a lot of chance for leakages. Now it's no longer covert. It's overt. We are a nuclear and a missile state. And there are total custodial controls and an intelligence organization and a number of rings around our establishment to ensure prevention of any leakage. There is no question of leakages any more from our side.

Reportedly, Pakistan is one of the biggest proliferators in the world.

It is not Pakistan. These are individuals and our investigation has concluded that no government of Pakistan - - and I don't have a soft spot for the governments of [former prime ministers] Benazir [Bhutto] and Nawaz [Sharif] -- sanctioned or authorized anyone to proliferate. There are individuals whose names have come up.

There's a new sort of threat taking shape, isn't there? Now when we talk about proliferation, we may be talking about something as simple as someone selling the phone number of a contact who has the design for a uranium enrichment centrifuge.

We are investigating whatever our scientists are involved in. When it's a question of knowledge or the know-how to build a centrifuge, it's in the mind of a person or in diagrams that can be carried in a briefcase or in a pocket. If it's in the mind of a person, you can't intercept it.

What do you expect to come out of your talks with India?

Confidence-building measures are going on. The two foreign offices are interacting to decide on the venue, the date and the level of the contact.

[...]

Reuters

U.S. Mulling Stronger International Nuclear Curbs

By Carol Giacomo - 25 January 2004

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The Bush administration is considering a change in international rules to prevent countries like Iran from legally acquiring components for a nuclear weapons program, senior U.S. officials say.

The goal is to strengthen the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, cornerstone of efforts to stem the spread of atomic arms, by closing what is now viewed as a major loophole.

The initiative is similar to a deal that France, Germany and Britain recently offered Iran and to proposals advocated by some of Washington's most respected security experts.

It is still in early discussions but may be formally advanced at the June 8 U.S.-hosted summit of the Group of Eight major industrialized countries, U.S. officials told Reuters.

Under a bargain struck when the NPT took effect 33 years ago, most countries pledged never to acquire nuclear weapons.

In return, they were promised that the five declared nuclear weapons states -- the United States, Russia, France, Britain and China -- would help them acquire nuclear technology for peaceful uses, namely nuclear power plants.

However, U.S. officials and experts say it is clear that some NPT signatories -- like Iran, Libya and North Korea -- exploited the pact to acquire technology that brings them close to being able to produce nuclear weapons.

In general, the proposal now under discussion in Washington would guarantee and even enhance the ability of non-nuclear weapons states to obtain nuclear power for electricity.

ENDING FUEL PRODUCTION

But they would be denied the right to manufacture, store or reprocess nuclear fuel -- a key component of nuclear bombs.

"A lot of people have been talking about that and we're considering it -- cutting off enrichment and reprocessing technology to close the loophole while guaranteeing them (non-nuclear states) access to fuel," one U.S. official said.

"Guaranteeing these states access to (nuclear) fuel has its own risks, but it's better than allowing them to have enrichment and reprocessing capabilities ... We may well do that in the G8 context," he said.

The official added: "It's obvious that there is a problem with the NPT when a country can stay in compliance with it and still get very close to a nuclear weapons capability."

Experts say acquiring weapons-grade material is the biggest hurdle countries face in seeking to make atomic bombs.

President Bush put a new spotlight on Iran's ambitions in 2002 when he accused the Islamic republic of being part of an "axis of evil" -- with North Korea and Iraq -- bent on acquiring atomic arms.

Later, the U.N. nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency, found traces of bomb-grade highly enriched uranium at two sites in the country.

Iran insists its nuclear program is purely peaceful. Libya, on the other hand, recently agreed to dismantle its nuclear program while North Korea, having withdrawn from the NPT, claims its nuclear activities are proceeding.

European deal

Last November, France, Germany and Britain struck a deal under which Iran agreed to suspend enrichment activities and accept more intrusive snap IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities in exchange for western technology.

But Iran has since balked at fully suspending the nuclear program as Washington and the Europeans demand.

Rather than amend the NPT -- a tedious and maybe impossible task -- experts have suggested that the international community supplement the pact with additional inducements and penalties.

Writing in the New York Times last month, former national security adviser retired Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, former Defense Secretary William Perry and two other former officials -- Arnold Kanter and Ashton Carter -- outlined their proposal.

Nuclear countries should withhold nuclear power technology from states that do not forsake atomic weapons but should offer a reliable source of nuclear fuel to, and retrieval of spent fuel from, states that do forsake atomic weapons, they said.

They urged Washington to propose that Russian plans to help Iran build a network of civilian nuclear power reactors be permitted to proceed -- as long as Tehran agrees to a verifiable ban on enrichment and reprocessing and lets a Russian-led consortium handle its nuclear fuel needs.

Such a deal will not be easy, partly because of a lack of U.S. trust in Iran and because Russia and Europe may argue over whose nuclear industry should benefit most from this arrangement, experts said.

But it would present Iran with a "clear test" of whether it harbors nuclear ambitions, Scowcroft and his co-authors said.

Guardian

Nuclear chief tells of black market in bomb equipment

Global network puts together essential equipment – 26 January 2004

The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohamed ElBaradei, gives notice today of the existence of a nuclear black market of "fantastic cleverness" supplying countries illicitly seeking to develop a nuclear bomb.

Speaking after Pakistan's virtual admission that some of its top scientists were active in the illegal trade networks and the IAEA's confirmation that Libya had acquired a nuclear bomb design, he says in today's issue of Der Spiegel: "It's obvious that the international export controls have completely failed in recent years.

"A nuclear black market has emerged, driven by fantastic cleverness. Designs are drawn in one country, centrifuges are produced in another, they are then shipped via a third country and there is no clarity about the end user.

"Expert nuclear businessmen, unscrupulous firms, and perhaps also state bodies are involved. Libya and Iran made extensive use of this network."

He said at the weekend that his experts were working with Pakistan to try to crack the nuclear black market, the scale of which has stunned the IAEA and the western intelligence services investigating the Libyan and Iranian nuclear programmes.

The IAEA confirmed on Friday that Libya had used the black market to buy equipment for turning uranium into weapons-grade material and had acquired designs for a nuclear warhead.

The chief suspects for helping Iran and Libya are Pakistani scientists who developed their country's bomb. The investigation is now focused on who may have supplied Colonel Muammar Gadafy with a bomb design. "Did Pakistan provide a nuclear weapons design to Libya?" said David Albright, a US nuclear analyst and former UN inspector who is closely tracking the investigation. "Pakistan has offered that in the past. The IAEA has to know that."

Pakistani investigators went to Iran and Libya last week to seek help in their own inquiry. At the world economic forum in Switzerland in recent days President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan admitted for the first time that nuclear scientists in Islamabad helped the Iranians in the mid-80s and early 90s. At least eight veterans of the Pakistani bomb programme are currently being held for questioning. Much of the equipment seen in Libya after Col Gadafy announced last month that he was renouncing weapons of mass destruction is of similar design to Iran's extensive uranium enrichment technology, all based on Pakistani designs derived from a 30-year-old European design.

"The Pakistani government has never, and will never proliferate," President Musharraf said. "As far as Pakistan is concerned, we are carrying out a thorough investigation of any proliferation that may have been done by individuals for their personal financial gain."

His comments reflect the "rogue scientists" theory officially held by the US and the IAEA: that the Pakistanis implicated in the secret trade were acting privately and without the knowledge or blessing of the government.

But experts and analysts doubt that such sensitive information and technology could have been traded from Pakistan without the involvement of the military and intelligence services.

If the "rogue scientists" explanation may protect Mr Musharraf it is also important to Washington, since he is a key ally in the "war on terror".

Libyan officials have told IAEA investigators that their suppliers of nuclear technology and expertise were "non-state actors", a senior source said. That supports the rogue theory, but Dr ElBaradei said that "state bodies" might be involved.

The information which led to the questioning of the Pakistani scientists came from a dossier on Iran's nuclear activities supplied to the IAEA by Tehran at the end of October

Der Spiegel

Die Jagd nach der Atombombe

Erich Follath, Georg Mascolo – 26. Januar 2004

Skrupellose Wissenschaftler, Spione, Dealer: Ein internationaler Schwarzmarkt für Nukleartechnik zeigt, wie hilflos die Uno-Kontrolleure gegen die Weiterverbreitung der Kernwaffe sind. Nordkorea, Iran und Libyen haben sich bei Pakistans Atompiraten wohl schon bedient - wer kommt als Nächster?

Der Blitz ist bläulich und wirft grelle Strahlen bis zum Horizont, bevor er alles in Dunkelheit stürzt. Der Verkehr, der Lärm, jede Unterhaltung ersterben von einer Sekunde auf die nächste. Es legt sich eine unheimliche Stille über die japanische Großstadt Hiroschima an jenem 6. August 1945, um 8.16 Uhr morgens.

Die junge Lehrerin Katsuko Horibe ist vor den anderen Kollegen in die Honkawa-Grundschule gekommen. Die dicken Mauern schützen sie einigermaßen, jedenfalls vor dem sofortigen Tod, obwohl sie sich nur wenige hundert Meter von Ground Zero aufhält - dem Zentrum der Bombe, die in 550 Meter Höhe explodiert ist. Horibe merkt zunächst nichts von ihren Brandwunden, zugefügt von Hitzestrahlen. Sie sieht nur die Kinder auf dem Schulhof. Sieben sind es, ihre Haut ist schwarz, hängt in Fetzen vom Körper. Sie wimmern vor Schmerz.

"Zum Fluss", ruft die Lehrerin, und die Kleinen folgen wie in Trance. Sie sind nicht die Einzigen. Es ist, als habe sich die Bevölkerung Hiroschimas zum Treck Richtung Wasser entschlossen. Jedenfalls alle, die noch gehen, hinken, kriechen können. Horibe sieht Hunderte verkohlter Leichen auf dem Weg. An der Kaimauer des Flusses bricht unter den Verzweifelten Panik aus. Die Lehrerin wird niedergetrampelt, verliert ihre Schutzbefohlenen - und wird keinen mehr wiedersehen.

Sie rafft sich auf. Brennender Schutt von zerstörten Holzhäusern blockiert das Wasser. Körper treiben vorbei. Menschen neben ihr fallen in den Fluss, gestoßen von der Masse oder auch freiwillig. Die Gesichter sind verkohlt, blutig und auf groteske Weise entstellt. Jetzt erst spürt die Lehrerin, wie der Schock weicht, der Schmerz zunimmt. Ihr Gesicht und ihre Kleidung sind blutgetränkt. Sie spuckt eine seltsame gelbe Flüssigkeit. Die ganze Stadt steht in Flammen. Dies ist der Tag, an dem die Welt untergeht, denkt Horibe

noch. Dann springt sie. Und überlebt, um später immer wieder ihre Geschichte zu erzählen - bis auch sie von den furchtbaren Spätfolgen, durch den strahlenbedingten Krebs, dahingerafft wird.

Im Himmel über der Stadt notiert der amerikanische Co-Pilot der "Enola Gay", nachdem er den riesigen Atompilz gesehen hat, nur einen Satz: "Mein Gott, was haben wir getan?"

In Hiroshima sterben an diesem 6. August 1945 über 80 000 Menschen und bis Ende des Jahres noch einmal 60 000. Beim zweiten Atombombenabwurf, am 9. August 1945 über Nagasaki, lassen mindestens 70 000 Menschen ihr Leben. Sechs Tage danach kapituliert Japan. US-Präsident Harry S. Truman hat seine unmenschliche Entscheidung für die ultimative Waffe zeitlebens nie bereut, sie als beste Möglichkeit gewürdigt, einen von Japan mit rücksichtsloser Brutalität geführten Angriffskrieg zu beenden.

Was immer an Rechtfertigung für Hiroshima angeführt wurde: Die Menschheit schien begriffen zu haben, dass der Einsatz der Atombombe ein menschlicher Sündenfall war. Jedes Jahr läuten zur Erinnerung an die Angriffsminute die Glocken, ein dumpfer, mahnender Ton. Nie wieder, sagen die Festredner. Und verweisen regelmäßig auf den verantwortungsvollen Umgang der Atommächte mit den Sprengköpfen; auf die internationalen Kontrollmechanismen zur Verhinderung der Weiterverbreitung, die doch längst greifen.

Greifen sie wirklich noch? Oder hat der nukleare Krebs in den letzten Monaten seine Metastasen über die Welt verbreitet - mit apokalyptischen Gefahren? Ein Einsatz der nach Hiroshima so lange Zeit "undenkbaren" Waffe ist heute wieder denkbar geworden, auch nach Meinung von Experten, die nicht zur Hysterie neigen. "Noch nie war die Gefahr so groß wie heute. Ich habe Angst davor, dass Atomwaffen in die Hände von skrupellosen Diktatoren und Terroristen fallen", sagt Mohammed al-Baradei, 61, oberster Waffenkontrollleur der Vereinten Nationen zum SPIEGEL.

Verantwortlich dafür sind die unzureichend ausgestatteten Kontrollorgane der Uno, die trotz der verzweifelten Bemühungen ihres Chefs die Proliferation nicht verhindern konnten - und ein schillernder, genial-gefährlicher pakistanischer Atomwissenschaftler, zu dem viele Spuren eines blühenden internationalen Schwarzmarkts für Kerntechnik führen. "Dr. Strangelove" nennen ihn seine Feinde. Eine Anspielung auf den Stanley-Kubrick-Film "Dr. Seltsam oder Wie ich lernte, die Bombe zu lieben", in dem eine versehentliche Zündung der ultimativen Waffe zum Weltuntergang führt.

Islamabad, Pakistan, 17. Januar 2004

Abdul Qadir Khan alias Dr. Seltsam hat Freunde in seine Villa am Stadtrand eingeladen, zu einem gemütlichen Samstagabend-Dinner. Es ist halb neun, die Gäste sind gerade erst angekommen, und alle "himmeln den Hausherrn an", wie einer der Eingeladenen später erzählt. Khan, 67, ist ein Frauentyp, groß gewachsen, markantes Gesicht mit einem stets überlegenen Lächeln, volle silbergraue Haare und kesser Schnurrbart: mehr als ein Hauch von Omar Sharif.

Atomwaffen für Diktatoren – der nukleare Krebs hat Metastasen gebildet

Wie so oft hat er die wilden Affen gefüttert, die in dem Wald nahe seiner Residenz leben und den Hügel zu seiner Villa herunterturnen, hat Vogelfutter ausgelegt. "Ich könnte keiner Ameise ein Leid antun", pflegt der Vater der pakistanischen Atombombe zu sagen. Die Massenvernichtungswaffe sieht er als "Friedenswaffe", sich selbst als Patriot und tief gläubigen Vorkämpfer aller Muslime. "Die westlichen Länder, einschließlich Israel, sind nicht nur Feinde Pakistans, sondern des Islam", wurde er zitiert.

Khan ist an diesem Samstag vorvergangener Woche besonders gut gelaunt. Gerade hebt er zu einem Toast an "auf die guten Freunde und unser stolzes Land", da umstellen Uniformierte die Villa. Sie geben sich als Geheimdienstler zu erkennen. Sie führen Islam ul-Haq ab, den Freund und engsten Mitarbeiter Khans. Major Haq, pensionierter Militär und einer der Leiter des prestigereichen Nuklearforschungsinstituts von Kahuta, gilt als Nummer zwei unter den pakistanischen Atomwissenschaftlern. Seiner Frau wird später von den Behörden mitgeteilt, Haq werde wegen des Verdachts auf Preisgabe von Atomgeheimnissen verhört.

Die Runde im Haus des Nationalhelden löst sich nach der Verhaftung schnell auf. "Gefasst, aber bedrückt" sei Khan gewesen, wird später von Freunden berichtet. Er ist sicher klug genug, um zu wissen: Die Einschlüge kommen immer näher, nachdem die Behörden nun mindestens acht Nuklearwissenschaftler und Ex-Offiziere verhaftet oder verhört haben, darunter die Atomdirektoren Yasin Chohan und Farooq Mohammed. Die Behörden verboten Dienstag vergangener Woche sogar allen Nuklearwissenschaftlern bis auf weiteres, das Land zu verlassen. Im Dezember hat ein staatlicher Untersuchungsbeamter Khan schon einmal persönlich befragt, höflich, respektvoll und mit der Bemerkung: "Dies ist kein Verhör, Sir." Aber er hat angedeutet, dass er wiederkommen könnte.

Nun scheint nicht einmal mehr undenkbar, dass Abdul Qadir Khan der Prozess gemacht wird: einziger Bürger seines Landes, der den Staatsorden "Nishan-i-Imtiaz" gleich zweimal verliehen bekam, Träger von 42 nationalen Goldmedaillen und anderen Auszeichnungen, Schulstifter und Moscheebauer und bis heute

"Berater des Ministerpräsidenten". Kann man Khan & Co. nachweisen, an Pakistans Autoritäten vorbei aus ideologischer Überzeugung oder Gewinnstreben Pläne und Materialien für den Bau einer Atombombe weitergegeben zu haben?

Es ist ein riskantes Spiel, das Präsident Pervez Musharraf spielt, wenn er den Vater der pakistanischen Bombe und seine engsten Mitstreiter so in die Zange nimmt. Dass Pakistan zu den Nuklearmächten zählt - neben den fünf anerkannten Kernwaffenländern USA, Russland, Großbritannien, Frankreich, China sowie den später in den Kreis der "Bombenfamilie" gerückten Staaten Indien und Israel -, hebt Macht und Prestige der verarmten Nation (BSP pro Kopf: 420 Dollar). Man werde zur Not "Gras essen", um so weit zu kommen, hatte vor 30 Jahren schon Pakistans Staatslenker Zulfikar Ali Bhutto gesagt. SPIEGEL-Redakteure erlebten noch im vorletzten Frühjahr einen auf Atomerfolge fixierten Staatschef: General Musharraf zeigte in seinem Vorzimmer einen Stein hinter Glas, der vom nuklearen Testgelände stammt. Stolz wie ein Kardinal auf eine kostbare Reliquie.

Pakistanische Atomwissenschaftler sind Volkshelden – und stehen jetzt unter arrest

Am Tag, als er Khans Vertrauten aus dessen Villa heraus verhaften ließ, sprach Musharraf zum ersten Mal vor dem Parlament. "Unsere nukleare Macht dient der Verteidigung Pakistans", sagte der Militär, der sich im Oktober 1999 an die Macht geputscht hatte. Beifall von den Abgeordneten. "Wir müssen der Welt beweisen, dass wir eine verantwortungsvolle Nation sind und die Weitergabe von Atomwaffen nicht erlauben." Unruhe im Saal, vereinzelte Buhrufe. Tags darauf verhöhnten islamistische Abgeordnete den Präsidenten als "Lakaien der Amerikaner". Verwandte der Verhafteten demonstrierten. Die Vereinigung der Rechtsanwälte drohte mit einem Streik ihrer Mitglieder.

Seit sich Musharraf unmittelbar nach dem Terror vom 11. September 2001 an die Seite der USA geschlagen hat und gegen die lange Zeit von Islamabad gehätschelten Taliban und Qaida-Terroristen vorging, steht er im Fadenkreuz der Radikalen. Islamistenparteien kontrollieren inzwischen die Provinzparlamente der Northwest Frontier Province und Belutschistan. Dort, im unwegsamen Bergland zur afghanischen Grenze, soll sich bis heute Osama Bin Laden aufhalten, der zur Ermordung Musharrafs aufgerufen hat. Zweimal im vergangenen Monat entging der Präsident nur um Haaresbreite Attentätern. Sie attackierten seine Fahrzeugkolonne, offensichtlich aus der unmittelbaren Umgebung des Präsidenten mit detaillierten Informationen über seine Route und seinen Zeitplan versehen.

Islamisten halten trotz wiederholter Säuberungen Musharrafs weiter wichtige Positionen im Militär und beim Geheimdienst ISI. Während die anti-westlichen Fanatiker empört sind, dass der Präsident in Pakistan FBI- und CIA-Agenten mehr oder weniger offen operieren lässt, beklagen die Amerikaner immer wieder die Kompromisse, die Musharraf aus taktischen Gründen mit Fundamentalistenparteien macht. Der General tanzt auf einem Drahtseil, jede zu entschlossene Bewegung in die eine oder andere Richtung kann seinen Sturz bedeuten. Noch vor einigen Wochen hat er jeden Verdacht empört zurückgewiesen, Pakistan hätte etwas mit der Weiterverbreitung von Bombenplänen und Nukleartechnik zu tun. Inzwischen lautet die Sprachregelung, einzelne Wissenschaftler könnten "unehrenhaft gehandelt" und "sich auf eigene Faust illegal bereichert haben".

Wenn der Präsident jetzt so offen auf Distanz zu seinen Nationalhelden geht, dann handelt es sich um eine unvermeidliche Flucht nach vorn. Amerikanische Agenten und unabhängige Waffenkontrolleure der Uno fanden erdrückende Beweise für einen Schwarzmarkt des Schreckens, für das skrupellose Verscherbeln des atomaren Feuers.

Ob im stalinistischen Nordkorea, das mit seinen angeblich schon zusammengebastelten Atombomben die Welt zu erpressen versucht; ob in der Religionsdiktatur Iran, wo nicht deklarierte Nuklearanlagen wie die bei Natans eine heimliche Uran-Anreicherung sicherstellen sollten; ob in Libyen, wo der Präsidentensohn Saif al-Islam Gaddafi nach dem überraschenden Schwenk Richtung Westen im Dezember offen verkündete, man habe "für 40 Millionen Dollar" Gaszentrifugen und Baupläne auf dem Schwarzmarkt eingekauft und dabei ein Land besonders hervorhebt - etliche der Spuren führen die Fahnder nach Pakistan. Weltumspannend sind die Ermittlungen. Ein ganzes Netz dubioser Geschäftsleute und Mittelsmänner in Europa, Nahost und Asien verdient an dem Geschäft mit. Auch mindestens ein deutscher Geschäftsmann steht unter Verdacht.

Für Pakistans Ministerpräsident Musharraf geht es nur noch darum, nicht persönlich in den Skandal hineingezogen zu werden. Wenn es atomare Schandtat gab, dann nicht zur Amtszeit dieses Präsidenten, suggerieren seine Sprecher.

Die Regierung Bush scheint entschlossen, ihrem vielleicht wichtigsten Alliierten im Krieg gegen den Terror zu glauben, obwohl Musharraf zumindest zur Zeit der letzten Lieferungen nach Libyen schon an der Macht war. Atomwissenschaftler Khan aber, dem von der Regierung in den Neunzigern jahrelang ein Privatflugzeug für Trips in alle Welt zur Verfügung gestellt worden war, wird kaum auf Ahnungslosigkeit

plädieren können. Die ideologische Weiterverbreitung der Bombe ist sein Credo (obwohl er das bei seiner jüngsten Vernehmung bestritten haben soll), geheime Deals bis hin zum Diebstahl sind seine Spezialität: So lernte Dr. Seltsam, die Bombe zu lieben.

Abdul Qadir Khan

wächst in unruhigen Zeiten auf, und zwar im Land des Erzfeindes Indien. Sein Vater, ein Lehrer, beschließt nach der blutigen Teilung Britisch-Indiens zunächst, mit seiner Frau und den fünf Kindern in Bhopal zu bleiben. Abdul ist 16, als sich die tief religiöse Familie dann doch entschließt, in den Muslimstaat Pakistan ("Land der Reinen") zu emigrieren. Er beobachtet, wie aufgehetzte Hindu-Soldaten an einem Bahnhof willkürlich Frauen berauben. Ihm selbst entreißt ein Grenzer einen Kugelschreiber, den ihm sein Bruder zum Examen geschenkt hat. "Der Stift hatte nur ideellen Wert. Aber ich vergesse das mein Leben lang nicht", sagt Khan später.

Er beendet seine Schulausbildung in Karatschi und bekommt wegen seiner blendenden Leistungen 1961 ein Stipendium an der Technischen Universität in West-Berlin. Anschließend zieht es den Studenten ins niederländische Delft, wo er in Metallurgietechnik sein Diplom macht. 1972 promoviert er an der Katholischen Universität von Leuven in Belgien.

Ein Wunderkind sei er gewesen, sagen Kommilitonen von damals. Geradezu genial als Ingenieur, enorm sprachbegabt, immer von einer Aura des Geheimnisvollen umgeben. Khan heuert in Amsterdam bei einem Zulieferer des britisch-deutsch-holländischen Zentrifugenbauers Urenco an. (Die Firma ist bis heute im Geschäft und betreibt im westfälischen Gronau die einzige deutsche Uran-Anreicherungsanlage.)

Der Pakistaner ist gerade eine Woche in seinem Job, da wird er ins niederländische Almelo geschickt, wo Urenco eine Anreicherungsanlage baut. Die Sicherheitsbestimmungen sind lax, Khan kommt buchstäblich über Nacht ins Allerheiligste - an die Quelle der nuklearen Feuerstelle, von der jeder Bombenbauer träumt. Denn bei der Herstellung einer Kernwaffe ist nicht das Design des Sprengkopfs das größte Problem, diese Technik beherrschen kundige Physiker. Sondern der Erwerb des richtigen Zündstoffs.

Der eine Weg dazu ist die Gewinnung von Plutonium. Dieser Stoff, hoch radioaktiv und spaltbar, wird bei der Wiederaufarbeitung den verbrauchten Brennstäben eines Reaktors entnommen. Schwer, dies im Geheimen zu tun, zumal wenn der Reaktor überprüft wird. Der andere Weg führt über die Uran-Anreicherung - und hat große Vorteile: Man braucht dafür nur "normales" Natururan, das auf dem Weltmarkt relativ leicht erhältlich ist; und man kann den Prozess der Hochanreicherung zum waffenfähigen U 235 in Anlagen durchführen, die relativ einfach vor neugierigen Augen zu verstecken sind. Die geheime Technologie ist wie eine hochtechnische Variante des Goldwaschens. Sie bedarf Hunderter präzise gearbeiteter Zentrifugen, deren Rotoren mit hoher Geschwindigkeit arbeiten.

Deutsche Ingenieure entwickeln Ende der sechziger Jahre zwei besonders fortschrittliche Zentrifugentypen, in der Fachsprache G-1 und G-2 genannt. In dem von Niederländern und Briten mitgegründeten Drei-Staaten-Konsortium Urenco müssen komplizierte technische Beschreibungen ständig hin- und herübersetzt werden - ein unbeliebter Job. Da ist jeder im Werk dankbar, dass sich der sprachbegabte Pakistaner einschaltet. Und weil es so schrecklich viel Arbeit ist, stört sich auch keiner daran, dass er Unterlagen der alten und neuen Zentrifugentechnik gelegentlich mit nach Hause nimmt, um nach Feierabend, und mit dem Kopierer in ungestörter Nähe, weiterzumachen.

Kahn klagt für die Armen – und sieht sich als “Robin Hood des Atomzeitalters”

Im Januar 1976 ist der nette Herr Khan dann verschwunden. Ein plötzlicher Krankheitsfall in der Familie, er bitte um Verständnis. Wochen später schreibt seine Frau an Nachbarn, Abdul habe Gelbfieber, seine Rückkehr verzögere sich. Noch wird niemand misstrauisch. Erst als Khan im März 1976 mit einem Brief aus Pakistan offiziell kündigt, gehen bei den Europäern erste Warnlichter an.

Es ist zu spät. Khan gründet auf der Basis der in Europa gewonnenen Erkenntnisse in der Heimat sein eigenes Nuklearforschungsinstitut. 1985 wird in Pakistan erstmals Uran angereichert, das Institut in Kahuta, 40 Kilometer südlich der Hauptstadt, wird nach seinem gefeierten Direktor benannt. Khans Zentrifuge, stellen Experten später fest, gleicht dem europäischen Design fast wie ein Ei dem andern - was es den Atomfahndern heute vergleichsweise einfach macht. Ob in Iran oder Libyen, ein Blick, einmal das Maßband gezückt: Stets sind die Zentrifugen baugleich denen, die Khan entwendete. Noch musste er sich Technologie zusammenkaufen. "Aber Firmen bettelten förmlich darum, uns ihre Waren zu liefern, während ihre Regierungen unseren Aufstieg zur Atommacht verhindern wollten", wurde der Wissenschaftler später in einem Interview zitiert.

1983 verurteilt ein Gericht in Amsterdam ihn wegen Industriespionage in Abwesenheit zu vier Jahren Haft. Dr. Seltsam bestreitet bis heute, Kopien gemacht zu haben. Inzwischen ist das Urteil aufgehoben, allerdings

nur wegen eines verfahrenstechnischen Fehlers - die Richter hatten es nicht geschafft, dem Angeklagten die Vorladung fristgerecht zuzustellen.

Khan arbeitet damals fieberhaft am Unternehmen "islamische Bombe". Finanziert wird es wesentlich durch "Spenden" der reichen Ölstaaten Saudi-Arabien und Libyen. Auch die Volksrepublik China, lange ein enger Verbündeter Pakistans, ist involviert. Doch schon Jahre bevor Khan & Co. selbst die Bombe zünden können, beginnt offenbar der Deal mit den Nuklearkenntnissen. Westliche Geheimdienstler greifen sich heute an den Kopf, dass es nicht gelungen ist, den Atompiraten das Handwerk zu legen. Denn aktiv werden sie in Iran, Nordkorea und Libyen, allesamt Staaten, die - anders als Pakistan - den Atomwaffensperrvertrag unterschrieben und sich damit internationalen Kontrollen unterworfen haben.

Erstes Land der geheimen Geschäfte ist nach neuesten Erkenntnissen die Islamische Republik Iran. Die Wissenschaftler in Teheran sind mit ihren Bemühungen zur Uran-Anreicherung gescheitert; da kommt, dafür sprechen alle bisherigen Ermittlungen, 1987 Hilfe aus Pakistan. Die Regierung winkt offenbar ab. Aber der wirklich mächtige Mann im Land ist, wie so oft in der Geschichte Pakistans, ein Militär: der spätere Armeechef Mirza Aslam Beg. Er soll nach den noch geheim gehaltenen Aussagen der jetzt verhafteten Wissenschaftler den Millionendeal mit Teheran genehmigt haben. General Beg, heute in Pension, leugnet die Vorwürfe. Er hat allerdings aus seinem Wunsch nach einer anti-amerikanischen Staaten-Allianz nie ein Hehl gemacht, sogar noch im Golfkrieg von 1991 Saddam Hussein unterstützt.

Die Hilfe der Khan-Techniker bringt die Iraner weiter. Aber sie müssen ihr Programm vor den Uno-Inspektoren verbergen und gehen bei weiteren Einkäufen erstaunlich vorsichtig zu Werke.

Immerhin fallen deutschen Ermittlern Mitte der neunziger Jahre iranische Firmen auf, die Spezialmagneten und hochfestes, gegen Korrosion geschütztes Aluminium für Zentrifugen zu kaufen versuchen. Eine Überprüfung der Abmessungen nährt den Verdacht, dass es sich um europäisches Design der Firma Urenco handelt. Der BND schreibt damals in einem Geheimpapier: "Es soll eine Zusammenarbeit der Atomenergie-Organisation Irans mit den pakistanischen Khan-Laboratorien geben." Die Politik tut wenig, Teheran wird zunächst weder von europäischen Regierungen noch von der Uno unter Druck gesetzt. In diesen Zeiten schien anderes wichtiger: Es tobte die fast hysterische Diskussion, dass untreue russische Bombenbauer und geklaute Atomsprengköpfe aus der untergegangenen Sowjetunion die größte Gefahr für den Weltfrieden seien.

Als Nächstes erscheint Khans Name 1990 in dem Brief eines Mittelsmanns aus Dubai, der Saddam Hussein Nukleartechnologie anbietet - in diesem Fall ohne Erfolg. Der Diktator hat seine Wissenschaftler die geheimen Zentrifugenpläne zwar schon beschaffen lassen - aber nicht pakistanische, sondern deutsche Experten lieferten sie. Nach der "Operation Wüstensturm" und der Befreiung Kuweits im Januar 1991 wird dem irakischen Aggressor von der Uno ein Abrüstungsprogramm verordnet; die Kontrolleure sehen bei ihrem Abzug aus Bagdad im Dezember 1998 keinerlei Anhaltspunkt mehr für ein Nuklearprogramm.

Unterlagen über den angeblichen irakischen Kauf von Natururan in Niger und den Erwerb von Zentrifugenteilen, die US-Außenminister Colin Powell am 5. Februar 2003 vor dem Sicherheitsrat als Gründe für eine sofortige Invasion anführte, sind heute als blamable Fälschungen und Irrtümer entlarvt.

Vielversprechender als das Saddam-Business ist für Khan - nach Überzeugung von US-Geheimdiensten - der Deal mit Nordkorea. 1992 unternimmt der Wissenschaftler die erste von mehr als einem Dutzend Reisen nach Pjöngjang. Diktator Kim Jong Il hat etwas zu bieten: Atomar bestückbare Nodong-Raketen mit einer Reichweite von 1500 Kilometern - im Tauschgeschäft gegen Zentrifugentechnologie. Seit 1997 hat Nordkorea Nukleartechnologie erhalten, mit der sich abseits der den Amerikanern bekannten Anlagen waffenfähiges Uran herstellen ließ.

Pakistans Raketentechnik macht einen großen Sprung nach vorn. Die neuen Ghauri-Raketen, stolz bei Militärparaden präsentiert, sehen den koreanischen Nodongs zum Verwechseln ähnlich. Den USA und ihren Weltraumsatelliten bleiben die Deals lange verborgen.

Die große Stunde des persönlichen Triumphes für Abdul Khan schlägt im Mai 1998. Nur Wochen nach den - von brillanten eigenen Wissenschaftlern initiierten - indischen Atomtests zündet auch Pakistan erfolgreich Kernwaffen, in der Nähe der unbewohnten Chagai-Berge. Dr. Seltsam ist am Ziel. Er feiert mit Freunden in seinem Büro von Rawalpindi mit Orangensaft, und nach dem Ausschalten der Kameras auch mit Whisky.

Die ganze Wand hinter seinem Schreibtisch ist von einem Gemälde bedeckt, das in Blutrot gehalten ist: Es zeigt verwundete Muslime auf einem Eisenbahnwagen bei ihrer Flucht aus Indien - eine permanente Erinnerung an die "Gräueltaten der Hindus", wie Khan zu sagen pflegt, ohne Gräueltaten der Muslime bei dem gegenseitigen Abschlachten während der Teilung von 1947 zu erwähnen.

Khan ruht sich nicht lange aus auf seinen Lorbeeren. Er will wohl mehr sein als der Vater der pakistanischen, der islamischen Atombombe: auch der internationale Pate der Proliferation. Er sieht sich, wie er Freunden

einmal sagt, als "eine Art Robin Hood des Atomzeitalters". Er möchte der armen Dritten Welt geben, was die reiche Erste ihr vorenthält: die Bombe als großen Gleichmacher.

Haben das einige seiner Leute so verstanden, dass auch al-Qaida-Kämpfer in den Genuss der ultimativen Waffe kommen sollten?

Es gibt keinen Beweis dafür, dass der Chef etwas von solchen Plänen erfahren, sie gar genehmigt hat. Aber 1999 konferieren in der Taliban-Hochburg Kandahar zwei Nuklearwissenschaftler mit bekannten Beziehungen zu Pakistans Islamistenparteien und hochrangige Vertreter der Terrororganisation. Die Qaida-Männer sind interessiert an der Atomtechnik, doch sie erkennen angeblich, dass sie nicht über die technologischen Voraussetzungen verfügen - so berichten jedenfalls die pakistanischen Emissäre dem amerikanischen Geheimdienst. Von einer einfacheren "schmutzigen" Bombe sind die Terroristen jedoch sehr fasziniert. Und bekunden bei einem erneuten Treffen mit der Qaida - diesmal unter der Führung von Osama Bin Laden selbst - erneut Interesse. Baschiruddin Mahmud, Chef des Kommissariats für pakistanische Atomenergie, soll laut "Wall Street Journal", Anfang August 2001, einen Monat vor dem Twin-Tower-Terror, die Delegation aus Islamabad angeführt haben.

Ein internationales Schwarzmarktnetz – und mittendrin ein Deutsches Schiff

Khan wird nach der erfolgreichen Explosion in seiner Heimat jedenfalls auf Händen getragen. Und der schillernde Held genießt seinen Ruhm, badet in seiner Popularität: "Ich konnte nirgendwo mehr meine Rechnung bezahlen, alle wollten mich einladen, mir gratulieren - was für ein Gefühl." Er wird reich. Pakistans Zeitungen wissen von Beteiligungen an Hotels und Restaurants zu berichten, selbst ein Nachtclub der Hauptstadt namens "Hotshot" soll, so geht das Gerücht, ihm gehören.

Neben dem Glamour lernt Khan aber auch die Gefahr kennen, die seine Schattengeschäfte mit sich bringen. Über Nacht verliert er zwei seiner besten Bekannten. Der Nordkoreaner Kang Tae Yun verschwindet auf Nimmerwiedersehen - seine Frau wird zwei Wochen nach dem pakistanischen Atomtest erschossen. Später heißt es, die beiden hätten über die Nukleardeals auspacken wollen und seien auf Befehl Pjōngjangs liquidiert worden.

Khan trifft nach seinem Triumph viele hochrangige Gäste. Im Frühjahr 1999 empfängt er in seinen hoch geheimen Laboratorien Sultan Ibn Abd al-Asis, den mächtigen Verteidigungsminister Saudi-Arabiens. Er ist bis heute der einzige ausländische Politiker, der sich in Pakistans Atomallerheiligstem umsehen darf. Seitdem hat es noch mehrere Treffen mit prominenten Saudis gegeben. Die Finanziere fürchten nach der Abkühlung des Verhältnisses zu Washington allem Anschein nach, vom Strom amerikanischer Hightech-Waffen abgeschnitten zu werden: Sind sie jetzt auch am Eigenerwerb der Bombe interessiert?

Ein Proliferations-Problemfall war bis vor kurzem auch Libyen. Mitte Dezember überraschte Tripolis die Welt mit dem Eingeständnis, man habe ein geheimes Atomwaffenprogramm unterhalten, wolle es jetzt aber beenden. Uno-Experten bekamen kurz vor Silvester zwei komplette Zentrifugen, Rotoren und Magnete gezeigt, auch Vakuumpumpen einer hessischen Spezialfirma. Das meiste war in Kisten verpackt: modernste Bestandteile für eine Gaszentrifuge, Ausgangspunkt der Uran-Anreicherung. Nun sollen US-Experten die Anlagen außer Landes schaffen, nach Protesten auch im Beisein der IAEA-Fachleute, die sie zunächst für überflüssig gehalten hatten.

Am Fall Libyen zeigt sich jetzt exemplarisch, wie raffiniert inzwischen das internationale Schwarzmarktnetz geknüpft ist. Im Zentrum dieses Schmuggels: ein deutsches Schiff.

Amerikanischen und britischen Geheimdienstlern war schon im Oktober vergangenen Jahres gelungen, einen wichtigen Atomdeal aufzudecken - möglicherweise war diese Entlarvung der letzte Anstoß für den erratischen Revolutionsführer Muammar al-Gaddafi, sein Nuklearprogramm aufzugeben und den überraschenden Schwenk Richtung Westen zu vollziehen. Der deutsche Frachter "BBC China", so die Erkenntnis der Agenten, hatte Atomfracht geladen. Mit Hilfe des wohl ahnungslosen Reeders aus dem niedersächsischen Leer wurde das Schiff ins italienische Taranto umgeleitet. Deutsche Experten konnten am 6. Oktober die abgeladenen fünf Container inspizieren.

In den Transportbehältern fanden sich mehr als 2000 Gehäuseteile, exakt der Urenco-G-2-Zentrifuge nachgebaut; dazu Hunderte Vorrichtungen für das Einspeisen des Gases und die Entnahme des hochangereicherten Urans - Hightech-Ware für den Bombenbau. Deklariert war die heiße Fracht mit den gefälschten Containernummern als "Präzisionsmaschinenteile", als Empfänger fungierte der libysche "Nationalrat für Wissenschaftsforschung". Hergestellt wurde das Material wahrscheinlich von einer geheimnisvollen Firma in Malaysia, an Bord ging es in Dubai.

Die Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate sind ein Umschlagplatz, der in Geheimdienstberichten öfter auftaucht. Den Ermittlern gilt ein dort ansässiger britischer Geschäftsmann als einer der Hauptverdächtigen. Pikantes

Detail: Bei dem Engländer gehen pakistanische Atomwissenschaftler ein und aus; Khan selbst betrachtet Dubai als seinen zweiten Wohnsitz.

Alles so hoch geheim, dass keiner Verdacht schöpfen konnte? Der "New York Times" und dem SPIEGEL fiel vor einigen Wochen eine Broschüre der "Khan Forschungslaboratorien" in die Hände, die in Mächtgern-Nuklearstaaten und bei internationalen Zwischenhändlern zirkuliert. Auf dem Umschlag findet sich ein Siegel mit der Aufschrift "Regierung der Islamischen Republik Pakistan", daneben ein Bild Khans. Unterlegt ist das Ganze mit einem Schattenriss, der stark an einen Atompilz erinnert. Die Broschüre bietet Interessenten Produkte der Nuklearindustrie an - nichts direkt Verbotenes, aber vieles, das Appetit auf mehr macht. "Demnächst gehen die mit ihrem Atomschwarzmarkt noch ins Werbefernsehen", kommentiert sarkastisch ein Geheimdienstler. Fälschung, sagen sie in Islamabad. Aber die deutschen Experten, die das Werk seit Jahren kennen, glauben an die Echtheit.

Pakistans Regierung schickte vorige Woche eiligst zusammengestellte Untersuchungskommissionen nach Tripolis und Teheran. Khan aber gibt sich gelassen. Er sei dabei, seine Memoiren zu schreiben, hat er einem pakistanischen Journalisten beim Gespräch in seiner Villa verraten. "Die ganze Truhe hier ist voll mit meinen Tagebüchern, nichts lasse ich aus, was mir in meinem Leben passiert ist", sagte Dr. Seltsam, in dem ihm eigenen Tonfall, halb drohend, halb scherzend. "Im Moment allerdings komme ich nicht weiter. Ich habe den Schlüssel zu der Truhe verloren."

Welche Überraschungen stehen der Welt noch bevor? Was genau ist der letzte Schrei auf dem internationalen Schwarzmarkt? Das präzise Design für die Bombe - oder gar das Komplettpaket mit der Hilfe von Experten bei der Montage, Nuklearwaffe frei Haus?

Das möchten gern auch die wissen, die von Berufs wegen dafür zuständig sind und derzeit bei den entscheidenden Entwicklungen so wenig gefragt werden. Die Überwachungsprofis der Vereinten Nationen.

Wien, internationale Atomenergiebehörde

Die IAEA hat ihren Hauptsitz ein wenig jenseits der Fiaker-Seligkeit der Touristenzentren Wiens, auf der anderen Seite der Donau. Über 46 Jahre lang existiert die Organisation nun schon im Rahmen der Uno. Und sie soll dafür sorgen, dass das Geheimnis der Bombe auf keinen Fall verbreitet wird.

Die IAEA beschäftigt 2200 Angestellte, Diplomaten, Wissenschaftler, Inspektoren, Sekretärinnen, Fahrer; 269 Millionen Dollar Jahresetat. In der Eingangshalle des schmucklosen, funktionalen Hochhauses hängen die Flaggen aller 191 Uno-Staaten. Streng alphabetisch geordnet, die irakische also direkt neben der israelischen, was Saddam Husseins Emissäre früher zu wütenden, aber natürlich vergeblichen Protesten veranlasst hat: Bagdad fühlte sich von der Nähe zum "Zionistengebilde" beschmutzt. An einem Kiosk werden Souvenirs verkauft, Uno-Briefmarken, aber auch IAEA-Golfmützen und IAEA-Jogginghemden. In die Wand eingelassen ist ein mit Koranzitaten verzierter Brunnen, Gastgeschenk aus Marokko.

Strenge Taschenkontrolle und Leibesvisitation, bevor es aus den Vorräumen ins Herzstück geht. Auf den Gängen werden die Betreuungsmöglichkeiten für Kinder angepriesen. In der Wiener Hofburg findet, wie ein Plakat verkündet, demnächst der jährliche IAEA-Ball statt. Eine Karikatur am schwarzen Brett zeigt ein Hochzeitspaar, das sich Treue schwört, "bis dass im Irak Massenvernichtungswaffen gefunden sind". Chinesen konferieren mit Finnen, Amerikaner mit Franzosen. Ganz entspannte vereinte Nationen - auf den ersten Blick.

In den Zimmern der IAEA-Fachleute aber sind die Mienen ernst, die Diskussionen hitzig. "Die jüngsten Entwicklungen in einigen Staaten würden einen internationalen Aufschrei auslösen, wären sie international bekannt", sagt einer, der sich nur als "ein der IAEA nahe stehender Diplomat" zitiert sehen will. "Der Geist ist aus der Flasche, und wie soll ihn da wieder einer zurückbringen?", heißt es in den Labors der Behörde geheimnisvoll.

Da ist der Chef schon offener. Mohammed al-Baradei, ägyptischer Diplomat und seit 1997 oberster Waffenkontrollleur, nimmt auf seiner Couch Platz unter einem reproduzierten Gemälde des norwegischen Malers Edvard Munch. "Der Schrei" heißt das Werk und zeigt einen zutiefst verstörten, entsetzten Menschen. Baradeis Mitarbeiter sehen es nicht gern, wenn man ihn unter dem Gemälde fotografiert. Aber er hat damit keine Probleme. "Manchmal muss auch ich schreien, um mir Gehör zu verschaffen", sagt der Generaldirektor der IAEA zum SPIEGEL.

Und dann fügt er sehr ernst hinzu: "Wir hatten unbestreitbare Erfolge mit unseren Inspektionen, vor allem bei der Aufdeckung und Beseitigung des irakischen Atomprogramms. Doch ich denke, wir müssen unser ganzes Kontrollsystem jetzt neu überdenken. Denn noch nie in meiner Amtszeit waren die Gefahren eines Atomkriegs so bedrohlich."

Gab es denn nicht gerade in den letzten Monaten Erfolgsmeldungen von der nuklearen Front der internationalen Sorgenkinder? Hat sich Iran nicht im November auf internationalen Druck hin bereit erklärt,

zusätzliche und strenge IAEA-Kontrollen seiner angeblich nur zivilen Nuklearanlagen zu erlauben? Ist Libyen nicht durch die Offenlegung seines Atomprogramms im Dezember auf absehbare Zeit atomar "entschärft"?

Baradei sieht die positiven Zeichen. Aber alle Entdeckungen, die in den letzten Monaten gemacht wurden, haben - gerade weil sie so unerwartet kamen - nur eine schmerzliche Erkenntnis verstärkt: Die Überwachung der Nuklearmaterialien könnte bald ganz vor dem Kollaps stehen. Es brennt in mehreren Weltregionen.

Gefahrenherd Ostasien: Nordkorea hat im Herbst 2002 erklärt, ein illegales Bombenprogramm zu betreiben, und alle IAEA-Kontrollure aus dem Land geworfen. Erst vor zwei Wochen ließ Diktator Kim Jong Il einer inoffiziellen amerikanischen Delegation bei einem Besuch im Reaktor von Yongbyon sein "nukleares Abschreckungspotenzial" vorführen. Die US-Experten waren anschließend unsicher, ob die Nordkoreaner wirklich schon über einsetzbare Bomben verfügen; dass sie mit ihren vorgeführten Plutoniumvorräten in der Lage sind, sie zu bauen, schien ihnen unbestreitbar. "Es ist der gefährlichste Platz auf der Welt", sagt der frühere US-Verteidigungsminister William Perry.

Kim Jong Il versucht, die USA zu erpressen - Abbau des Potenzials gegen massive wirtschaftliche Hilfsleistungen. Inzwischen scheint Washington von der Forderung abgerückt zu sein, dass sich Nordkorea wieder den IAEA-Kontrollen unterziehen müsse. Die Bush-Regierung sucht einen anderen Deal, möglicherweise eine direkte Überwachung durch amerikanische Experten.

Sollte es Pjöngjang gelingen, internationale Verträge ungestraft zu verletzen und für den Verzicht des unrechtmäßig Erworbenen auch noch mit Wirtschaftshilfe belohnt zu werden, müsste das andere "Schurkenstaaten" ermutigen, einen ähnlichen Weg zu gehen. Eine unerfreuliche Variante, aber vermutlich noch die beste. Denn beließe man Nordkorea die Bombe, ist bald ein weiterer skrupelloser nuklearer Proliferateur auf dem Markt: Diktator Kim könnte die Kernwaffe und sein Know-how meistbietend auf dem Schwarzmarkt versteigern. Und bald dürften sich dann auch Südkorea, Japan, möglicherweise Taiwan gezwungen sehen, über nukleare Optionen nachzudenken.

Nicht nur Schurkenstaaten gefährden den Atomwaffensperrvertrag – auch die USA

Vielleicht schon im nächsten Monat sollen die so genannten Sechser-Gespräche (unter Beisein von China, Südkorea, Japan, Russland) über Nordkoreas Arsenal wieder aufgenommen werden - Erfolgsaussichten höchst fraglich.

Gefahrenherd Naher Osten: Ob die Zugeständnisse, die Teheran Ende 2003 gemacht hat, die iranischen Machthaber lange von der Bombenentwicklung abhalten können, bezweifeln Experten. Zwar dürfen Baradeis Leute jetzt alle Nuklearanlagen im Land ohne lange Vorankündigung untersuchen. Aber schon in der Vergangenheit haben es die Mullahs erfolgreich mit Tricksen, Tarnen und Totschweigen versucht. Teheran verfügt heute, vor allem mit seiner erst im letzten Jahr von Dissidenten entlarvten, nahezu fertig gestellten UranAnreicherungsanlage bei Natans, über alle Mittel zur Produktion des Bombenstoffs. Auch deutsche Technik, darunter eine Fließdruckmaschine, steht in Natans, die IAEA will jetzt klären, wer sie lieferte. Das iranische Regime gibt sich kooperativ, könnte aber jederzeit die IAEA-Verpflichtungen wieder aufkündigen - und Kernwaffen bauen.

Nach dem mehr oder weniger freiwilligen Verzicht des Irak und Libyens auf die Bombe rückt Israels Nuklearpotenzial wieder in den Vordergrund. Über abenteuerliche Umwege sind die Israelis schon in den sechziger Jahren zur - offiziell nie erklärten - Atommacht geworden (siehe Seite 110). Jerusalem verfügt heute vermutlich über mehr als 200 einsetzbare Bomben. Seit der Lieferung deutscher U-Boote der Delfin-Klasse mit der technischen Ausrüstung zum Abschuss von Atomraketen hat Israel auch die Möglichkeit, sie seegestützt einzusetzen.

Für die arabischen Staaten ist die stillschweigende Akzeptanz des israelischen Programms der Beweis für das "zweierlei Maß", mit dem der Westen in der Region messe. Als "Ausgleich" erforscht Syrien offenbar seit Jahren biologische Kampfstoffe und besitzt Chemiewaffen.

Daneben strecken Terrororganisationen ihre Fühler aus. Ähnlich wie al-Qaida versucht auch der militärische Arm der iranisch finanzierten Hisbollah im Libanon an Spaltmaterial zu kommen. Tschetschenische Gruppen haben es nach Geheimdienstinformationen auf die noch immer nicht überall gesicherten Nuklearmaterialien aus Sowjetzeiten abgesehen. "Fast jeden Monat" wird nach Erkenntnissen des früheren Unterstaatssekretärs im Pentagon, Graham Allison, jemand bei dem Versuch geschnappt, gefährlichen Stoff aus diesen Restbeständen zu stehlen. Im August ging den Behörden in Murmansk ein besonders dicker Fisch ins Netz: Alexander Tjuljakow, Vizechef bei der russischen "Atomflot"-Truppe, die Reparaturarbeiten an Atom-U-Booten ausführt, wollte heißes Material entwenden und zu Geld machen.

Die IAEA und ihr Generaldirektor sind in einer schizophrenen Lage. Die Kontrollbehörde verdankt ihre Bedeutung dem Atomwaffensperrvertrag (NVV). Sie ist aber gleichzeitig auch gefesselt durch die

Schwächen des früher so viel gepriesenen Abkommens. Sie kann nicht so flexibel handeln, wie es sich Baradei wünscht - wenn ihre Rolle nicht neu definiert wird.

Geprägt durch den Horror von Hiroshima, aber auch den erfolgreichen Test der sowjetischen Waffe hat die Nachkriegsordnung auf ein atomares Patt gebaut. Das zentrale Dogma lautete, jede Seite im "Kalten Krieg" werde vom Angriff auf die andere abgehalten, weil ihr selbst durch einen Vergeltungsschlag die Vernichtung drohe. Dieses Gleichgewicht des Schreckens konnte nur aufrechterhalten werden, wenn der Club der damals fünf Atommächte begrenzt blieb. Die Großen vereinbarten deshalb 1968 mit dem Rest der Welt den Nichtverbreitungsvertrag.

Kein Nuklearstaat, so will es der Pakt, darf die Bombe weitergeben, kein Unterzeichner nach ihr streben. Die Atommächte verpflichteten sich gegenüber den Habenichtsen, ihnen bei der zivilen Nutzung der Kernenergie mit Know-how und Technik zu helfen - und ihr eigenes atomares Waffenarsenal abzurüsten. In Deutschland war der Verzicht auf Kernwaffen zu dieser Zeit höchst umstritten. Man träumte in Bonn von der europäischen Bombe. CSU-Chef Franz Josef Strauß schmähte den Pakt als "ein neues Versailles von kosmischen Ausmaßen". Erst 1975 tritt die Bundesrepublik bei.

189 Staaten haben sich bis heute dem Vertragswerk angeschlossen, zuletzt nach Kuba auch Osttimor; seit einer Zusatzvereinbarung gilt der Vertrag auf ewig. Draußen vor blieben die "Aussätzigen", die aus Macht- und Prestige Gründen an der Bombe basteln wollten: Israel, Indien und Pakistan. Die beiden letzteren Staaten wurden nach ihren Atomwaffentests von den USA deshalb mit Handelssanktionen "bestraft". Nordkorea ist nach dem NVV-Austritt international geächtet, Ähnliches droht Ländern, denen man einen Vertragsbruch nachweisen kann - außer sie kriegen, wie Libyen und Iran, gerade noch die Kurve.

Aber auch die Großen Fünf haben sich nicht immer an Geist und Buchstaben des NVV gehalten: Sie bauten weder ihr Arsenal entscheidend ab, noch gaben sie den "Habenichtsen" immer technologische Hilfen bei der friedlichen Nutzung der Kernenergie. Und George W. Bush hat mit seiner neuen Nuklearstrategie, die Entwicklung taktisch anwendbarer "Mini Nukes" vorzubereiten und mit ihrer Anwendung zu drohen, nur eines geschafft: "Er hat die Motivation (der potenziell Bedrohten) erhöht, ihre eigenen Atomwaffen zu modernisieren oder sie sich, wenn noch nicht vorhanden, ganz schnell zu beschaffen", so Michael May, früherer Chef des berühmten amerikanischen Lawrence Livermore Laboratory.

Der Nichtverbreitungsvertrag ist nach Meinung des IAEA-Chefs Baradei "das Beste, was damals zu bekommen war". Er hat dann auch bei der freiwilligen nuklearen Abrüstung Südafrikas und Brasiliens funktioniert; ebenso in den Nachfolgestaaten der UdSSR, die die auf ihrem Gebiet stationierten Atomraketen abgaben. Doch in einer sich technisch schnell verändernden Welt ist der Vertrag längst nicht mehr gut genug.

Um die IAEA effizienter zu machen, müssten nach Ansicht des Berliner Sicherheitsexperten Oliver Thränert westliche Politiker unbedingt darauf dringen, dass alle Staaten das 1997 beschlossene Zusatzprotokoll für schärfere und unangemeldete Kontrollen unterschreiben - zurzeit ist es erst gerade mal in 38 Staaten in Kraft.

Noch immer krankt die Effizienz der IAEA an dem, was selbst Baradei-Bewunderer unter den Berliner Politikern als "multilateralen Quotenschwachsinn" bezeichnen. Um den Konsens der Uno-Organisation nicht zu schwächen, gelten alle Staaten als gleich verdächtig - was dazu führt, dass die Masse der Inspektionen in Ländern wie Deutschland, Kanada oder der Schweiz stattfindet.

Baradei geht noch weiter. Er möchte die gesamte Herstellung von Plutonium und hochangereichertem Uran weltweit nur noch unter multinationaler Aufsicht zulassen: "Ohne Kontrolle des waffenfähigen Materials keine Kontrolle der Weiterverbreitung." Und er will in allen zivil genutzten Kernkraftwerken eingebaute Vorrichtungen, die anzeigen, wenn bombengeeignete Stoffe abgezweigt werden. "Das ist mehr als ein futuristischer Traum, es sollte technisch bald möglich sein."

Aber wie viel Zeit bleibt noch?

Der Spiegel

"Ein Atomkrieg rückt näher"

Chefwaffeninspektor Baradei über Schurkenstaaten und den nuklearen Schwarzmarkt.
Interview: Erich Follath, Jürgen Kremb, Georg Mascolo - 26 Januar 2004

SPIEGEL: Herr Baradei, Sie haben kürzlich gesagt, 35 bis 40 Staaten könnten derzeit in der Lage sein, Atomwaffen zu bauen. Ist der Nichtverbreitungsvertrag (NVV), den Sie überwachen sollen, tot?

Baradei: Der NVV hat uns in den letzten 35 Jahren viele Erfolge beschert, aber so geht es nicht weiter. Wir müssen ihn dringend den heutigen Gegebenheiten anpassen - die Sicherheitskontrollen verstärken, ausbauen,

Verstöße sanktionieren. Vor allem aber sollten wir alle Anlagen weltweit, die waffenfähiges Material wie hochangereichertes Uran oder Plutonium produzieren, unter eine multinationale Kontrolle stellen.

SPIEGEL: Ein sehr ehrgeiziges Programm, das radikales Umdenken voraussetzt.

Baradei: Richtig. Die Internationale Atomenergiebehörde kann als eine Einrichtung der Uno nur so stark sein, wie ihre Mitglieder das wünschen. Wir sind als Inspektoren sowohl die Herren als auch die Sklaven der Überwachten - eine schwierige Situation.

SPIEGEL: Und nicht alle Staaten lassen sich überwachen, weil sie es als ungerecht empfinden, dass laut NVV von 1968 den großen Fünf allein Nuklearwaffen gestattet sein sollen.

Baradei: Nicht für immer. Der NVV hat das Arsenal der damaligen Atommächte nur legitimiert, weil diese sich gleichzeitig zur Abrüstung verpflichteten - allerdings ohne einen festen Zeitplan. Es gab dann ja ermutigende Abrüstungsschritte Ende der achtziger Jahre und in den Neunzigern, aber die sind fast zum Stillstand gekommen. Gegenwärtig existieren noch Zehntausende Atomsprengköpfe auf der Welt.

SPIEGEL: Die USA unter Präsident George W. Bush lassen taktische "Mini Nukes" entwickeln. Die Atombombe wird damit, nach einem Zeitalter der Ächtung, wieder zur denkbaren Waffe.

Baradei: Ich bedauere diese Entwicklung sehr. Sie widerspricht dem Geist des Vertrags. Man muss leider auch zugeben, dass wir es nicht geschafft haben, die Nichtunterzeichner des NVV an der Entwicklung der Bombe zu hindern: Pakistan, Indien und wohl auch Israel sind Atommächte.

SPIEGEL: Besorgnis erregend genug. Aber seit Nordkorea aus dem Vertrag ausgestiegen ist und vor gut einem Jahr Ihre Inspektoren aus dem Land warf, verfügt womöglich erstmals auch ein unberechenbarer Diktator über die Waffe.

Baradei: Es sieht ganz danach aus. Über die Entwicklung in Nordkorea bin ich äußerst beunruhigt. Ich wäre keinesfalls überrascht, wenn Pjōngjang schon jetzt über eine einsatzfähige Atombombe verfügt. Es gibt nur eine Lösung: Kim Jong Il muss seine Nuklearanlagen wieder unseren Kontrollen unterwerfen. Wir müssen zurück zum Status quo. Auch Südafrika war ja schon De-facto-Atommacht und hat dann verzichtet.

“Für Kontrollen hat meine Behörde ein Mandat – und niemand anders”

SPIEGEL: Washington scheint diese Forderung an Kim aufgegeben zu haben. Während Sie in Nordkorea keinerlei Zugang mehr haben, durfte eine inoffizielle amerikanische Delegation gerade den Reaktor von Yongbyon inspizieren. Vielleicht gibt es bald einen Deal und dann US-Atomkontrollen in Nordkorea.

Baradei: Für so etwas ist meine Behörde verantwortlich und niemand anders. Wir haben dafür ein vom NVV verordnetes Mandat.

SPIEGEL: Auch in Libyen wollten die Amerikaner eigene Inspektionen durchführen. Misstraute Washington Ihnen und der Effizienz Ihrer Organisation?

Baradei: Das weiß ich nicht. Ich sehe keinen unmittelbaren Anlass zu einer solchen Befürchtung.

SPIEGEL: Politiker in Washington machen Ihnen zumindest unter der Hand den Vorwurf, keinen Schimmer vom Ausmaß des gefährlich fortgeschrittenen Atomwaffenprogramms in Iran und Libyen gehabt zu haben. Hat die IAEA dort versagt?

Baradei: Es stimmt, dass Teheran und Tripolis unsere Behörde in der Vergangenheit getäuscht haben: Sie informierten uns nicht über ihre Forschungen zum Knowhow und ihre internationalen Beschaffungsversuche, wie es ihre Pflicht als Signatarstaaten des NVV gewesen wäre. Ich glaube aber, dass wir entdeckt hätten, wenn diese beiden Staaten in großem Stil angefangen hätten. Dazu braucht man Laboratorien, die sind nicht so leicht zu verstecken wie irgendwelche Baupläne.

SPIEGEL: Iran war mit der Uran-Anreicherungsanlage bei Natans doch schon weit vorangekommen.

Baradei: Diese Anlage ist uns ja auch nicht verborgen geblieben. Wir wissen bis heute noch nicht mit Sicherheit, ob Iran Atommacht werden wollte. Es gab ernsthafte Anzeichen dafür, dass sie sich das Know-how aneigneten. Aber auf unseren Druck hin ist Teheran ja dem Zusatzprotokoll zum Vertrag beigetreten. Dies gibt uns wesentlich erweiterte Inspektionsmöglichkeiten: Wir können nun überall und mit kurzer Vorwarnzeit kontrollieren.

SPIEGEL: Hätten solche Kontrollen auch in Libyen etwas gebracht, oder verdanken Sie alle neueren Erkenntnisse nur Gaddafis Einlenken?

Baradei: Das libysche Atomprogramm befand sich noch ganz im Anfangsstadium. Ich war im Januar selbst in Tripolis und habe mir das angeschaut - mehrere Jahre waren die meiner Schätzung nach von einer einsetzbaren Waffe entfernt. Ich sehe nicht, dass unsere Mechanismen in Libyen versagt hätten. Wissenschaftler, die sich irgendwo in einer kleinen Lagerhalle treffen: Wie sollen Sie solche Aktivitäten bei Kontrollen entdecken?

SPIEGEL: Aber verfügten diese Wissenschaftler nicht schon über präzise Pläne und wichtige Komponenten für den Bau einer Bombe?

Baradei: Das war in Tripolis wie in Teheran das Erschreckendste: Offensichtlich haben die internationalen Exportkontrollen

in den letzten Jahren völlig versagt. Es ist ein atomarer Schwarzmarkt entstanden, vorangetrieben von einer phantastischen Cleverness. Da werden in dem einen Land Pläne gezeichnet, in einem anderen Zentrifugen produziert, die über einen dritten Staat verschifft werden - über den Endabnehmer herrscht Unklarheit. Beteiligt sind geschäftstüchtige Nuklearexperten, skrupellose Firmen, womöglich auch Staatsorgane. Libyen und Iran haben dieses Netzwerk ausgiebig genutzt, wobei Iran deutlich weiter war.

SPIEGEL: Und Ausgangspunkt dieses Nuklear-Basars ist Pakistan?

Baradei: Ich werde mich zu bestimmten Staaten nicht äußern. Offensichtlich sind einige involviert, im Süden wie im Norden. Was bedeutet, dass die Exportkontrollen dramatisch verbessert und, anders als bisher, in einem internationalen Rahmen durchgeführt werden müssen. Ich sage nicht, dass das unbedingt die IAEA machen muss, obwohl wir gezeigt haben, dass wir dazu fähig sind, wenn Regierungen weltweit mithelfen und uns ihre Erkenntnisse über Firmen und deren Deals übermitteln.

SPIEGEL: An welchen Fall denken Sie?

Baradei: An den Irak. Wir haben das Atomwaffenprogramm Saddam Husseins mit internationaler Hilfe umfassend recherchieren und schon im Ansatz beenden können.

SPIEGEL: Was Ihnen manche Politiker in den USA bis heute nicht glauben wollen, obwohl es für die Existenz von Massenvernichtungswaffen im Irak nicht den geringsten Beweis gibt.

Baradei: Wir haben für unsere gesamten weltweiten Inspektionen pro Jahr einen Etat von 100 Millionen Dollar. Die Amerikaner haben für ihre Suche im Irak ein Budget von einer Milliarde veranschlagt.

SPIEGEL: Sie sind seit 1997 Chef der IAEA und seit Jahrzehnten mit der Nuklearproblematik vertraut. Wann war die Gefahr eines Atomwaffeneinsatzes am größten?

Baradei: Noch nie war die Gefahr so groß wie heute. Ein Atomkrieg rückt näher, wenn wir uns nicht auf ein neues internationales Kontrollsystem besinnen. Wir arbeiten als Feuerwehr, doch wenn sich die Brände so mehren wie heute, dann müssen wir alle Sicherheitsinstallationen im gemeinsamen Haus überprüfen und endlich feuersicher machen.

SPIEGEL: Was heißt das konkret?

Baradei: Ich habe Angst, dass die Erinnerung an Hiroshima und Nagasaki zu verblassen beginnt. Ich habe Angst, dass Atomwaffen in die Hände von skrupellosen Diktatoren oder Terroristen fallen. Ich habe Angst auch vor dem Nukleararsenal demokratischer Staaten, denn solange diese Waffen existieren, gibt es keine absolute Garantie gegenüber den katastrophalen Konsequenzen aus Diebstahl, Sabotage oder Unfall. In der Menschheitsgeschichte hat es noch keine Zivilisation geschafft, sich freiwillig ihrer mächtigsten Waffen zu entledigen - mal sehen, ob wir es schaffen, die Ersten zu sein.

SPIEGEL: Das klingt pessimistisch.

Baradei: O nein, ich bin durchaus nicht ohne Hoffnung. Sonst hätte ich mein Amt schon lange aufgeben müssen.

Washington Post

Musharraf Named in Nuclear Probe

Senior Pakistani Army Officers Were Aware of Technology Transfers, Scientist Says

By John Lancaster and Kamran Khan – 3 February 2004

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan, Feb. 2 -- Pakistan's top nuclear scientist, Abdul Qadeer Khan, has told investigators that he helped North Korea design and equip facilities for making weapons-grade uranium with the knowledge of senior military commanders, including Gen. Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's president, according to a friend of Khan's and a senior Pakistani investigator.

Khan also has told investigators that Gen. Mirza Aslam Beg, the Pakistani army chief of staff from 1988 to 1991, was aware of assistance Khan was providing to Iran's nuclear program and that two other army chiefs, in addition to Musharraf, knew and approved of his efforts on behalf of North Korea, the same individuals said Monday.

Khan's assertions of high-level army involvement came in the course of a two-month probe into allegations that he and other Pakistani nuclear scientists made millions of dollars from the sale of equipment and expertise to Iran, Libya and North Korea.

They contradict repeated contentions by Musharraf and other senior officials that Khan and at least one other scientist, Mohammed Farooq, acted out of greed and in violation of long-standing government policy that bars the export of nuclear weapons technology to any foreign country.

In conversations with investigators, Khan urged them to question the former army commanders and Musharraf, asserting that "no debriefing is complete unless you bring every one of them here and debrief us together," according to the friend, who has met with the accused scientist twice during the past two months.

On the basis of Khan's claims, Beg and another former army chief of staff, Gen. Jehangir Karamat, who occupied the post from 1996 to 1998, have been questioned by investigators in recent days, but both have denied any knowledge of the transactions, according to a senior Pakistani military officer who spoke on condition of anonymity.

Gen. Shaukat Sultan, Pakistan's chief military spokesman, declined to comment on the specifics of the allegations but asserted that "General Pervez Musharraf neither authorized such transfers nor was involved in any way with such deeds, even before he was president." Beg and Karamat could not be reached for comment Monday night.

Khan and other senior scientists and officials at the Khan Research Laboratories, the uranium-enrichment facility Khan founded in 1976, have been under investigation since November, when the International Atomic Energy Agency presented Pakistan with evidence that its centrifuge designs had turned up in Iran. The flamboyant European-trained metallurgist, who is 67, became a national hero in Pakistan after the country detonated its first nuclear device in 1998.

In a briefing for Pakistani journalists late Sunday night, a senior Pakistani military officer said that Khan had signed a 12-page confession on Friday in which he admitted to providing Iran, Libya and North Korea with technical assistance and components for making high-speed centrifuges used to produce enriched uranium, a key ingredient for a nuclear bomb.

Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai, commander of Pakistan's Strategic Planning and Development Cell, described Khan as the mastermind of an elaborate and wholly unauthorized smuggling network involving chartered cargo flights, clandestine overseas meetings and a Malaysian factory that reconditioned centrifuge parts discarded from Pakistan's nuclear program for sale to foreign clients, according to a journalist who attended Kidwai's 2 1/2-hour briefing.

The technology transfers began in 1989 and were brokered by a network of middlemen, including three German businessmen and a Sri Lankan, identified only as Tahir, who is in custody in Malaysia, Kidwai told the journalists.

According to Kidwai's account, Khan told investigators that he supplied materials and assistance to Iran, Libya and North Korea not to make money but to deflect attention from Pakistan's nuclear program and -- in the case of Iran and Libya -- as a gesture of support to other Muslim countries.

The senior Pakistani investigator and a senior intelligence official said Monday that Khan also said he supplied Iran and Libya with surplus, outmoded equipment from the laboratory that he knew would not provide either country with any near-term capability to enrich uranium.

"Dr. Khan is basically contesting the merit of the nuclear proliferation charges," the investigator said. "Throughout his debriefing, Dr. Khan kept challenging the perception that material found from the Libyan or Iranian programs would allow them to enrich uranium."

Investigators contend that Khan accumulated millions of dollars in the course of a 30-year career as a government scientist, investing some of it in real estate in Pakistan and abroad. Kidwai told Pakistani journalists that investigators had reached no conclusions about the source of Khan's wealth, but he acknowledged that Khan's lavish lifestyle was "the worst-kept secret in town" and should have triggered suspicions among those responsible for protecting Pakistan's nuclear secrets, according to a journalist who attended the briefing.

Kidwai "admitted to oversight and intelligence failure," the journalist said.

Kidwai avoided any suggestion of complicity on the part of senior military commanders, including Musharraf, who has maintained throughout the investigation that any transfer of nuclear technology abroad was the work of individuals driven by greed.

By all accounts, Khan ran the laboratory at Kahuta, about 20 miles from Islamabad, with scant oversight from either civilian or military-led governments eager to achieve nuclear parity with arch rival India.

The military was ultimately responsible for the facility, where security was overseen by two army brigadiers and a special detachment from Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency, or ISI. And Khan is said to have insisted during his sessions with investigators that senior military commanders were well aware of his efforts to help other countries with their nuclear programs.

The senior Pakistani investigator said that Beg was "in the picture" regarding Khan's assistance to Iran, but said the former army chief of staff was "probably . . . under the impression that material and knowledge being transferred to Iran would not enable them to produce enriched uranium" because of Khan's claim that he was withholding top-of-the-line equipment. Investigators have found evidence that Khan informed Beg of the transfer of outdated hardware from his laboratory to Iran in early 1991, the official said.

Khan told two generals who jointly questioned him last month that three army chiefs of staff, including Musharraf, had known of his dealings with North Korea, according to the friend of the scientist. "Throughout his debriefing, Dr. Khan kept asking the generals why he was not being asked specific questions about the material he passed on to the North Koreans," the friend said.

U.S. officials have long suspected that Pakistan supplied uranium enrichment technology to North Korea in exchange for help with its ballistic missile program, and that Khan acted as the principal agent of the arrangement. After stating in 2002 that it had a program for enriching uranium for use in weapons, North Korea more recently has denied it.

A retired Pakistani army corps commander said Monday that the barter arrangement dates to December 1994, when then-Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto traveled to North Korea at the request of Gen. Abdul Waheed, the army chief of staff at the time. A few months later, Khan led a delegation of scientists and military officers to Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, according to the retired general and a senior active duty officer, both of whom spoke on condition of anonymity. Musharraf was serving at the time as Waheed's director general for military operations.

In January 1996, Waheed was replaced as chief of staff by Karamat, who secretly visited North Korea in December 1997, according to the retired corps commander. Four months after the trip, in April 1998, Karamat presided over the successful test-firing of a medium-range missile the Pakistanis called a Ghauri. According to U.S. intelligence officials and a former Pakistani nuclear scientist, the Ghauri was simply a renamed North Korean-supplied Nodong missile. Pakistani officials maintain publicly that the Ghauri missile is indigenous to Pakistan.

The senior investigator said Khan claimed that Karamat was privy to the details of the barter arrangement through which Pakistan received the missile, and that Khan had insisted that Karamat's role also be examined.

Khan also has asserted that Musharraf had to have been aware of the agreement with North Korea because Musharraf took over responsibility for the Ghauri missile program when he became army chief of staff in October 1998, according to the scientist's friend and the senior investigator.

According to Kidwai's account to journalists, senior military commanders did not get wind of Khan's nuclear dealings with North Korea until 2000, when the ISI conducted a raid on an aircraft that the laboratory had chartered for a planned flight to North Korea. Although a search of the aircraft turned up no evidence, authorities were sufficiently concerned that they warned Khan against pursuing any clandestine trade with North Korea, Kidwai told the journalists.

That concern deepened, according to Kidwai's account, after U.S. officials in 2002 and early 2003 presented evidence that Pakistani nuclear technology may indeed have found its way to North Korea.

Reuters

Pakistan's President Pardons Disgraced Scientist

By Simon Denyer - 5 February 2004

RAWALPINDI, Pakistan (Reuters) - President Pervez Musharraf pardoned the scientist who leaked nuclear arms secrets to Iran, Libya and North Korea, saying Thursday he remained a national hero for developing the country's atomic bomb.

The uniformed general angrily rebuffed calls for an independent inquiry into the military's role in the nuclear leaks, saying Pakistan would not hand over any documents or allow U.N. supervision of its atomic program.

The United States strongly defended Musharraf, reflecting a balancing act between its usual aggressive stance on punishing proliferation and its firm support for Musharraf -- a key ally in the U.S. anti-terror war.

"This proliferation network is no longer. The actions of Pakistan have broken up this network," spokesman Scott McClellan said aboard Air Force One in the United States.

He said Musharraf provided assurances that his government itself was not involved in any kind of proliferation activity and "we value those assurances and those actions."

In a dramatic televised confession Wednesday, Abdul Qadeer Khan, revered as the father of Pakistan's atomic bomb, said he acted independently in leaking secrets as head of Pakistan's nuclear program from the 1970s.

Mohammed ElBaradei, head of the U.N.'s International Atomic Energy Agency, said in Vienna that Khan had help from people in many countries and was "the tip of an iceberg for us."

Western diplomats and local commentators also doubted Khan could have acted independently of Pakistan's military, which controls the nuclear arsenal, and said he had been used as a scapegoat for the army, which Musharraf heads.

Musharraf told a news conference he had agreed to a cabinet recommendation to pardon Khan, a national hero for his role in developing a bomb to rival that of old enemy India.

"I as president of Pakistan have decided to pardon Dr A.Q. Khan who is our national hero but he has made mistakes, which is unfortunate," he said.

Musharraf said IAEA officials were welcome to visit Pakistan to be briefed on the military's investigation into the scandal.

But he said Pakistan would not hand any documents to the U.N. agency, which wants to end illicit trade in atomic secrets. "This is a sovereign country," he said. "No document will be given. No independent investigation will take place here, and we will not submit to any United Nations coming inside here."

Foreign Minister Khursheed Mehmood Kasuri later said while Pakistan would not allow the IAEA to investigate Pakistan's nuclear programs, it would help the body investigate Iran.

"We will not allow them under any situation whatsoever to come and peep into our program. These are our national secrets. But wherever they need support to achieve their declared objectives ... we will fully cooperate," he said.

Political analysts had not expected an independent probe or open trial for Khan, since those might embarrass the military.

Musharraf, aware of the criticism the investigation into Khan and his fellow scientists has triggered in Pakistan, said his decision to force such a "larger than life" figure into the open had been a tough balancing act.

"My job here is number one, to protect my nation, and number two, to protect the honor and dignity of our hero. But I'll never reverse this order," he said.

INVESTIGATION LEADS TO CONFESSION

A senior Pakistani military official said Sunday that Khan made a detailed statement confessing to supplying designs, hardware and materials to enrich uranium for atomic bombs to Iran, Libya and North Korea via a network of overseas middlemen.

Pakistan launched its investigation over two months ago after the IAEA provided evidence of links between Iran's nuclear program and Pakistan. Similar links have been traced to Libya.

Musharraf said 11 people were still being detained -- seven scientists and engineers, three officers and a technician.

"All the proliferation unfortunately was under the supervision and orders of Dr A.Q. Khan. No government official or military man was involved," he said, adding that Khan's motivation appeared to be "lust for money."

Musharraf said former army chiefs, Generals Aslam Beg and Jehangir Karamat, were questioned in the probe but were cleared.

The News broadsheet quoted an official as saying a deal was struck under which Khan, 69, would be allowed to live peacefully in Pakistan for promising not to reveal details in future.

CIA Director George Tenet said U.S. intelligence agencies had been aware for some time of Khan's activities. "Our spies penetrated the network through a series of daring operations over several years," he said in a Washington speech.

But the case is sensitive for the United States as well as for Pakistan and Washington is eager to avoid jeopardizing Musharraf.

In Vienna, diplomats close to the IAEA said it too was treading carefully and had not asked to interview Khan because it knew Islamabad would refuse.

Musharraf is under pressure from critics angered by his support for the "war on terror" and his bid to make peace with India. He survived two attempts on his life late last year blamed on Muslim militants.

U.N. Nuclear Chief Warns of Global Black Market

By Peter Slevin – 6 February 2004

VIENNA, Feb. 5 -- Pakistan's top nuclear scientist, Abdul Qadeer Khan, represented "the tip of an iceberg" in an illicit nuclear supply network that has connections in many countries, the chief of the U.N. International Atomic Energy Agency said Thursday.

The Khan case "raises more questions than it answers," said Mohamed ElBaradei, the agency's director. He said existing safeguards had failed to stop the spread of nuclear technology, and he called for urgent international cooperation to police a global black market whose reach is unknown.

"We need to know who supplied what, when, to whom. Dr. Khan was not working alone," ElBaradei told reporters at his headquarters in Vienna one day after Khan publicly admitted to providing nuclear weapons expertise and supplies to North Korea, Libya and Iran.

Investigators are pursuing leads in Japan, Malaysia, Germany and two still-unidentified European countries, IAEA officials said.

ElBaradei said IAEA investigators were also reviewing an allegation that a representative of Khan's offered to provide Iraq with designs for a nuclear bomb and uranium enrichment equipment for \$5 million on the eve of the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Iraqi authorities rejected the proposal as a scam.

"Maybe in hindsight it was not a scam," ElBaradei said. "But thank God they did not act on it."

ElBaradei described the U.S. failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq as an affirmation of the U.N. inspections process. He said the White House should allow the IAEA to return to Iraq and finish its work.

ElBaradei said a recent report by a former chief U.S. weapons inspector, David Kay, "validated what we have thought, that inspections were working."

Kay's conclusion that Iraq had not rebuilt its nuclear program "strengthened my conviction that we need to go back to Iraq and stop this hullabaloo and bring the issue to closure," ElBaradei said, referring to the debate over the prewar extent of Iraq's nuclear program and U.S. intelligence about it.

"We are the ones who have the credibility, and we know every person there," ElBaradei said. "And I think we can bring that issue to closure as early as anybody else could."

The black market in nuclear components was uncovered in discussions with Iran and Libya. Both countries have revealed secret sources of supplies for programs that long went undetected by foreign intelligence services or international organizations.

The IAEA was among the outside institutions that passed information about the network to the Pakistani government. Pressed by the Bush administration, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's president, ordered the detention and interrogation of senior weapons scientists who worked with Khan, often called the father of his nation's nuclear weapons program.

ElBaradei, noting that the supply network had representatives in at least five countries, said evidence that a Malaysian company had produced sophisticated parts for enriching uranium raised concerns about factories elsewhere peddling such goods outside the public eye.

Malaysian police have said Scomi Precision Engineering, known as SCOPE, had manufactured components for Libya's fledgling nuclear program. SCOPE is a subsidiary of Scomi Group Berhad, a publicly traded conglomerate whose principal shareholder is a son of Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. The parent company said the parts were ordered by Gulf Technical Industries, a company in Dubai, United Arab Emirates.

Scomi Precision Engineering said in a statement that it made "14 semi-finished components." The parts were shipped to Dubai in four batches between December 2002 and August 2003 in a deal worth \$3.4 million.

ElBaradei said the revelations showed that informal rules designed to prevent suppliers from aiding nuclear weapons aspirants were "kaput." He said only 38 countries take part in the Nuclear Suppliers Group, a voluntary alliance.

"You need a complete overhaul of the export control system. It is not working right now," said ElBaradei, who called news about the clandestine supply network "the most dangerous thing we have seen in proliferation in many years."

VIENNA, Feb. 7 -- The rapidly expanding probe into a Pakistani-led nuclear trafficking network extended to at least seven nations Saturday as investigators said they had traced businesses from Africa, Asia and Europe to the smuggling ring controlled by Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan.

Three days after Khan confessed on television to selling his country's nuclear secrets, Western diplomats and intelligence officials said they were just beginning to understand the scale of the network, a global enterprise that supplied nuclear technology and parts to Libya, Iran, North Korea and possibly others.

"Dr. Khan was not working alone. Dr. Khan was part of a process," said Mohamed ElBaradei, director of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Vienna-based U.N. agency that is conducting the probe along with U.S. and other Western intelligence agencies. "There were items that were manufactured in other countries. There were items that were assembled in a different country."

Meanwhile, Pakistani officials disclosed that they had launched their own probe of Khan's activities in October after the Bush administration presented what one senior official described as "mind-boggling" evidence that Khan was peddling nuclear technology and expertise to Iran, Libya and North Korea, and had attempted to do the same with Iraq and Syria.

The evidence included detailed records of Khan's travels to Libya, Iran, North Korea and other nations, along with intercepted phone conversations, financial documents and accounts of meetings with foreign businessmen involved in illicit nuclear sales, the Pakistani officials said.

Pakistan's president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, was personally briefed on the evidence on Oct. 6 by a U.S. delegation led by Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage. Gen. John Abizaid, the head of U.S. Central Command, made a similar presentation to Pakistani political and military leaders, the officials said.

"This was the most important development for us since 9/11," one of the Pakistani officials said. "One more time, the ball was in the court of General Pervez Musharraf."

Khan, known in Pakistan as the creator of the country's atomic bomb, acknowledged in the televised statement Wednesday that he had passed nuclear secrets to others, saying that he acted without authorization from his government. A day later, Musharraf pardoned Khan.

U.S. and U.N. investigators say Khan's nuclear trading network represents one of the most egregious cases of nuclear proliferation ever discovered. Using suppliers and middlemen scattered across three continents, the network delivered a variety of machines and technology for enriching uranium, a key ingredient in nuclear weapons. In the case of Libya, at least, it provided blueprints for the bombs themselves.

Khan's network provided "one-stop shopping" for nuclear technology and parts, said a senior U.S. official, who described how supply met demand in what amounted to a centralized ordering system.

"If I want to buy an IBM computer, I don't have to go to every single element of IBM," the official said, by way of analogy. "I can go to their salesman, and he fixes me up just fine."

Diplomats familiar with the Pakistan operation say Khan and his closest associates were the "salesmen" who filled orders for Libya and other customers. In the case of Libya, representatives of Libyan leader Moammar Gaddafi contacted the Pakistanis, who relayed the requests to middlemen.

The middlemen, in turn, found suppliers to produce the necessary components. Finished parts were then shipped to a firm in the Persian Gulf emirate of Dubai, which arranged for delivery to Libya. The interception of a significant shipment of components in Italy last fall led to Gaddafi's decision to eliminate his nonconventional weapons programs, U.S. officials contend.

Companies or individuals in at least seven countries, including Pakistan, were involved, knowledgeable officials said. Among the countries known to be involved are Malaysia, South Africa, Japan, the United Arab Emirates and Germany. A company in another European country was also involved, two diplomats said.

The commodities produced for Libya ranged from electronics and vacuum systems to high-strength metals used in manufacturing gas centrifuges, which are used in making enriched uranium.

"It was a remarkable network that was able in the end to provide a turn-key gas centrifuge facility and the wherewithal to make more centrifuges," said former IAEA inspector David Albright, a physicist who has studied the nuclear procurement networks of Iran and Libya. "The technology holder was always Khan. Suppliers came and went, but Khan was always there."

Libya and Iran have already given investigators the names of many of the companies and middlemen involved, and are continuing to offer more, according to Western diplomats familiar with the investigation.

Two German businessmen identified by Libya as alleged suppliers of centrifuge technology -- Otto Heilingbrunner and Gotthard Lerch -- have been interviewed by IAEA investigators but not charged with any crimes, according to two officials close to the investigation. A third German named by Libya, Heinz Mebus,

is now deceased. All were formerly employed by companies that manufacture equipment used in gas centrifuges.

Heilingbrunner, reached by phone at his home in southern Germany, said he tried to sell aircraft parts to Iran in the 1980s, but said he never sold nuclear technology to anyone.

"I never did business with this junk," said Heilingbrunner. "I do not know how they came up with me." A senior Bush administration official said the Khan connection may have provided everything Libya acquired for its nascent nuclear program, including weapons designs. The designs were later handed to U.S., British and IAEA officials in Tripoli and are now being studied in the United States.

The disclosure of Armitage's October visit by Pakistani officials provides new details of a claim made this week in a speech by CIA Director George J. Tenet. Tenet said the intelligence agency had successfully penetrated Khan's network long before the IAEA went to Pakistan in November with evidence of illicit technology transfers to Iran.

Two Pakistani officials said Armitage presented the case against Khan and several other associates during a meeting with Musharraf at his official army residence in the city of Rawalpindi. The Americans asked Pakistan to verify the information independently and to take action against those involved, the officials said.

"We were told that Pakistan's failure to take action will most certainly jeopardize its ties with the United States and other important nations," one of the Pakistani officials said. The U.S. officials warned Pakistan that failure to act on the information could lead to sanctions by the United States and the United Nations.

Musharraf was said to be stunned by the detailed evidence against Khan and his associates. "It seemed that the Americans had a tracker planted on Khan's body," a Pakistani official said. "They know much more than us about Dr. Khan's wealth spread all over the globe."

Among other things, he added, the U.S. officials presented evidence of Khan's alleged attempts to sell nuclear secrets to Saddam Hussein when he was president of Iraq and reported that Khan had traveled to Beirut for a clandestine meeting with a top Syrian official in the mid-1990s.

During the second week in November, an Iranian delegation led by a deputy foreign minister, Gholam Ali Khoshru, arrived in Islamabad, according to a third senior Pakistani official.

"They used a very careful formulation," the official recalled of the visit. "They said they had acquired components and designs in '87 from the black market -- they mentioned Dubai -- and said two of the individuals involved were of South Asian origin, though not from the same country. They hinted they were under scrutiny from the IAEA and would have to make these declarations" about who had supplied the technology.

Shortly afterward, the IAEA delivered its findings on Iran in a two-page letter, and Pakistan's investigation began in earnest. Musharraf ordered the Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) and Strategic Planning and Development Cell to check out the evidence that had been provided by the United States and the U.N. agency, the officials said.

ISI officials traveled to Malaysia, Dubai, Iran and Libya and "found that evidence against Dr. Khan was accurate," one of the officials said.

Guardian

Pyongyang denies buying nuclear secrets

10 February 2004

North Korea today denied buying nuclear secrets from Pakistan, accusing the US of inventing the claim to justify an invasion.

The father of Pakistan's nuclear arms programme, Abdul Qadeer Khan, last week admitted that he had illegally sold secrets to North Korea, Libya and Iran.

His confession, and subsequent pardoning by Pakistan's president, Pervez Musharraf, came three weeks before North Korea was scheduled to join the US, China, Japan, Russia and South Korea for a second round of talks to try and end its nuclear weapons programmes.

However, today - in North Korea's first official statement on the issue - a foreign ministry spokesman said that the US had fabricated Mr Khan's story to derail the impending talks and lay the basis for an Iraq-style invasion.

"This is nothing but a mean and groundless propaganda," the spokesman told Pyongyang's official KCNA news agency.

He said that the "US smear campaign would only provide [North Korea] with an opportunity to realise once again what a just measure it [was] to build a nuclear deterrent force".

North Korea, officially known as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), denies pursuing an atomic weapons programme, as the US has alleged.

"The United States is now hyping the story about the transfer of nuclear technology to the DPRK by a Pakistani scientist in a bid to make the DPRK's 'enriched uranium programme' sound plausible," the North Korean spokesman said.

"This is aimed to ... scuttle the projected six-way talks for the present."

There are fears that the latest increase in tension will hinder any chance of the negotiations succeeding.

"If negotiations start getting into the [highly enriched uranium] programme, the situation gets tremendously complicated," Koh Yu-hwan, a professor of North Korean studies at Dongguk University in South Korea, said.

"It is a programme that North Korea cannot admit to, and the United States, for its part, cannot overlook," he said.

After confessing on television to black market nuclear technology dealings, and absolving Pakistan's military and government of blame, Mr Khan was pardoned by Mr Musharraf in an apparent bid to end the controversy.

Washington has defended Mr Musharraf's handling of the scandal, its usual stance on punishing nuclear proliferation compromised by its support for the Pakistani leader, a key ally in the US "war on terror".

However, there was a further twist in the tale today when Mr Musharraf blamed the US for a delay in providing evidence of Mr Khan's activities.

The Pakistani president revealed that he had suspected, for at least three years, that his country's top nuclear scientist was selling atomic knowledge to other states.

However, he said that US officials did not give him strong evidence until last October.

"If they knew it earlier, they should have told us," he said in an interview with the New York Times. "Maybe a lot of things would not have happened."

Mr Musharraf said his suspicions led him to force Mr Khan to retire from his official post in the nuclear weapons lab in 2001, but that the scientist had continued to use his expertise on the nuclear black market.

Mr Musharraf could not take further action against Mr Khan without firm evidence because of the scientist's standing as a national hero in Pakistan.

"It was extremely sensitive," he told the paper. "One couldn't outright start investigating as if he's any common criminal."

ANP

El-Baradei vreest spreiding nucleaire technologie

12 februari 2004

NEW YORK (ANP) - Het hoofd van het Internationale Atoomenergie Agentschap (IAEA) heeft donderdag gewaarschuwd voor vernietiging van de wereld als de steeds verdergaande verspreiding van nucleaire technologie niet wordt tegengegaan. El-Baradei deed dat in een ingezonden brief in The New York Times.

Eind vorige maand sprak el-Baradei al zijn zorgen uit over het gevaar van een kernoorlog. Nucleaire technologie die ooit vrijwel niet verkrijgbaar was, is volgens el-Baradei tegenwoordig te koop via „een verfijnd wereldwijd netwerk". „Uiteindelijk, onontkoombaar, zullen terroristen toegang krijgen tot dergelijke materialen en technologie, of zelfs tot echte wapens. Als de wereld niet van koers verandert, riskeren we zelfvernietiging."

Volgens el-Baradei moet het verdrag tegen kernwapenproliferatie aangepast worden aan de „realiteiten" van de 21e eeuw. De eerste stap is volgens hem een scherpere controle op de export van nucleair materiaal. De Amerikaanse president Bush stelde dat woensdag voor in een toespraak op de National Defense University.

Vuile bom

Volgens A. Versteegh, directeur van de Nuclear Research and Consultancy Group (NRG) in Petten beschikken terroristen nog niet over kernwapens en zijn de komende jaren ook niet in staat om zo'n wapen te maken of te kopen.

Groepen terroristen zijn echter wel in staat om een 'vuile bom' te maken en die te laten ontploffen. Het gaat om conventioneel springtuig met daaromheen een laag radioactief materiaal afkomstig uit ziekenhuizen, laboratoria en kerncentrales.

NRC Handelsblad

Wantrouwen als richtlijn voor een veiliger wereld

door Karel Knip – 12 februari 2004

Met het plan van Bush tegen de verspreiding van kernwapens wordt de vrije toegang tot nucleaire technologie, vastgelegd in het NPV, beperkt tot een selecte groep landen.

Het zeven-puntenplan dat de Amerikaanse president George W. Bush gisteren presenteerde voor de aanpak van de verspreiding van kernwapens kan op zichzelf een explosieve werking hebben. Het kan de bereidheid tot internationale samenwerking op dit punt in gevaar brengen.

Het zwaartepunt van Bush' voorstellen ligt bij punt vier: het voorstel tot beperking van uraniumverrijking en plutoniumopwerking tot die landen die daarvoor nu al *werkende* installaties hebben. Er moet volgens Bush geen verrijkings- en opwerkingscapaciteit in andere landen bijkomen: de kans op misbruik voor wapenproductie is te groot. Landen die civiele kerncentrales willen plaatsen hebben daarvoor niet zelf verrijking en opwerking nodig, aldus Bush. Andere landen kunnen en moeten de benodigde splijtstof tegen een billijke prijs leveren.

Maar ook punt zeven, het laatste voorstel van Bush, kan voor moeilijkheden zorgen. Dat punt tast de autonomie van het internationale atoomenergie agentschap IAEA aan. Landen die ervan verdacht worden het non-proliferatieverdrag (NPV) te schenden zouden voortaan geen zitting meer mogen krijgen in de bestuursraad van de IAEA. Zulke landen vormen 'een hindernis voor effectieve actie'. Voorbeelden van dit soort landen zijn Irak, Iran, Libië en Noord-Korea. Maar *niet* Pakistan, India en Israël, want die hebben het NPV nooit geratificeerd.

Tot op heden wordt de bestuursraad, samen met de jaarlijkse 'algemene vergadering', het hoogste gezagsorgaan van de IAEA, door de IAEA zelf gekozen. Van de 35 landen-vertegenwoordigers worden er 13 door de raad zelf aangewezen (steeds voor één jaar) en 22 door de algemene vergadering (steeds voor twee jaar). Daarbij werd gestreefd naar een zo eerlijk mogelijke vertegenwoordiging van continenten en machtsblokken. Het voorstel van Bush om een aantal verdachte landen op voorhand van een plaats in de raad uit te sluiten kan veel verzet oproepen.

De verleiding is ook groot er een schoffering van de IAEA in te zien, temeer daar in punt zes, geheel ten overvloede, wordt voorgesteld binnen de IAEA een nieuwe speciale commissie op te richten die zich met nucleaire controle en verificatie moet bezighouden. De IAEA bezit al jaren een complete *afdeling* voor dit werk. Nu de mogelijkheden en bevoegdheden van deze afdeling met het zogenoemde 'Additionele Protocol' flink zijn uitgebreid, was er eigenlijk geen aanleiding om aan de bestuursstructuur te tornen.

Maar punt vier, het voorstel om verrijking en opwerking tot een kleine groep landen beperkt te houden, weegt het zwaarst. Interessant is de weg waarlangs Bush dit doel wil bereiken: niet door het non-proliferatieverdrag van 1970 te wijzigen maar door de informele 'Nuclear Suppliers Group' (NSG) over te halen haar richtlijnen aan te passen. De NSG werd in 1974 opgericht in reactie op de Indiase atoomproef. De groep kwam voor het eerst in 1975 in Londen bijeen. Men stelde er een lijst op van typische *dual use*-goederen die voortaan niet vrijelijk geëxporteerd mochten worden naar nucleair-verdachte staten. Op zijn minst moest aan export de eis van IAEA-controle worden gesteld. Elke NSG-staat nam deze richtlijnen op in zijn eigen export-wetgeving. Ontwikkelingslanden hebben de lijst gezien als een poging hun de toegang tot westere technologie te bemoeilijken.

Bush stelt nu voor dat de veertig landen van de huidige NSG voortaan de export verbieden van alle apparatuur en kennis die in verband staat met verrijking en opwerking. Dit gaat rechtstreeks in tegen de geest van het non-proliferatieverdrag dat juist beoogt alle aangesloten landen toegang te geven tot *alle* nucleaire technologie, zolang misbruik dankzij IAEA-inspecties wordt uitgesloten. Daar stond tegenover dat de drie toenmalige kernwapenstaten (VS, Engeland en Rusland, die niet of nauwelijks geïnspecteerd worden) zouden streven naar nucleaire ontwapening.

De vrije toegang tot nucleaire technologie was voor veel landen de prikkel om het NPV te tekenen. Nu dreigt de strekking van het NPV te worden aangetast zonder dat daarover in VN-verband overleg wordt gevoerd. Dat kan nooit de bedoeling zijn geweest van IAEA-directeur ElBaradei toen hij onlangs uitsprak dat het NPV inhoudelijk moest worden aangepast.

Malaysia: U.S. Overplaying Nuclear Role

By Rohan Sullivan – 12 February 2004

KUALA LUMPUR, Malaysia - Malaysia's leader on Thursday questioned U.S. intelligence on this country's role in a global nuclear trafficking network, and said the man President Bush called its "chief financial officer and money launderer" would not be arrested, for now.

"He is on his feet and free to move around," Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi said of B.S.A. Tahir, allegedly a middleman who helped Pakistan's top nuclear scientist sell equipment and know-how to Iran, Libya and North Korea.

Malaysia has said Bush is unfairly singling out this Southeast Asian country with his assertions about its role in the network run by the scientist, Abdul Qadeer Khan.

"There is no such thing as Malaysia's involvement," Abdullah told reporters Thursday, when asked to respond to the remarks Bush made in a speech. "We are not involved in any way. I don't know where Bush is getting his evidence from."

The government-controlled New Straits Times newspaper accused Bush of "double standards and hypocrisy" in an editorial Friday and compared his drive against nuclear proliferation to "the sham of his weapons of mass destruction theory behind the invasion of Iraq."

"President George W. Bush's hypocrisy is at work again as he seeks to plug what he described as 'major loopholes' in the international system for stopping the spread of nuclear weapons to countries that don't have them," the newspaper said.

Bush said Khan and his associates used a company in Malaysia to make parts for centrifuges - which can be used to enrich uranium for weapons - and that front companies had been used to "deceive legitimate firms into selling them tightly controlled materials."

The Malaysian company doesn't deny making the parts, but says it didn't know what they were for.

Both U.S. officials and the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency say the components were clearly for nuclear use, disputing Malaysian police assertions that they could have had other purposes.

Tahir, a Sri Lankan based in the Persian Gulf emirate of Dubai, operated a computer company to order centrifuge components from a Malaysian factory - using designs from Pakistan - Bush said. Other parts came from Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, he said.

"Tahir acted as both the network's chief financial officer and money launderer," Bush said. "He was also its shipping agent, using his computer firm as cover for the movement of centrifuge parts to various clients."

In his speech Wednesday, Bush demanded tougher laws to stop the illicit spread of weapons technology.

The Malaysian-made parts were seized in October in a shipment of items bound for Libya. The seizure was central to uncovering Libya's nuclear program, which was allegedly helped by Khan.

The Malaysian company, Scomi Precision Engineering, says it supplied 14 semifinished machine components, ordered by Tahir, to Dubai. It says it understood the parts were for use in the oil and gas industry.

The company's parent, Scomi Group, is majority-controlled by Kamaluddin Abdullah, the prime minister's only son, who does not play an official management role in the company.

Malaysia's leader has promised that the current police investigation into the matter will be conducted "without fear or favor." Police say they have found no evidence of wrongdoing by Scomi.

Malaysian police have been investigating Tahir, who is married to the daughter of a former Malaysian diplomat, said a senior official.

"Malaysian police have spoken to him and asked him a lot of questions," Abdullah said.

Police say they're not detaining Tahir because he has apparently broken no local laws. Malaysia has ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but it is unclear whether its laws allow criminal prosecution for nuclear parts trafficking.

China Backs Bush on Illicit Arms Battle

By Joe McDonald – 12 February 2004

BEIJING - China declared its support Thursday for President Bush's call for steps to halt illicit arms trafficking, saying it had a "common interest" with Washington in fighting the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue said Beijing would take "effective measures" to enforce recently issued rules against exports of weapons technology by Chinese companies.

"China resolutely opposes the proliferation of WMD as well as its vehicles of transportation. So China has a common interest with the United States," Zhang said. "China consistently advocates strengthening international cooperation in the field of nonproliferation."

The unusually prompt response to Bush's proposals in a speech Wednesday reflected China's efforts in recent months to portray itself as a responsible nuclear power and partner in keeping weapons technology out of the hands of rogue states or terrorists.

Beijing is under pressure to stop what U.S. officials say is the transfer of missile and weapons technology by Chinese companies to Iran, Pakistan and other countries. The United States has sanctioned several Chinese companies accused of spreading weapons technology, including a major state-owned conglomerate.

China is a close ally and the main weapons supplier to Pakistan, whose former chief nuclear scientist has admitted passing nuclear technology to Iran, Libya and North Korea.

China published rules in December restricting the export of missile, nuclear and biological technologies that can be used to make or deliver weapons of mass destruction. It was the first time Beijing had released such a list, which it had been promising for several years.

"The Chinese side is willing to undertake effective measures to implement those rules that already have been promulgated," Zhang said.

Zhang said Beijing was working closely with international bodies such as the Missile Technology Control Regime, a 34-nation coalition to limit the spread of long-range missiles. China isn't part of the group, but has promised to abide by its restrictions.

"We are very concerned with the proliferation of vehicles for WMD," she said. "We also hold that political and diplomatic means should be taken, within the framework of international law, to solve this problem."

Asked whether China supported Bush's proposals for changes at the International Atomic Energy Agency to give the U.N. agency stronger powers to enforce compliance with rules limiting nuclear proliferation, Zhang said, "We support the general goal of nonproliferation, and we also support the international community to conduct earnest discussions on relevant proposals."

Zhang also emphasized China's desire to see a quick settlement to the standoff over North Korea's nuclear program.

China has played a leading role in organizing six-nation talks aimed at ending the dispute. The unusual diplomatic effort by Beijing, which has traditionally avoided such conflicts, reflects its growing alarm at the prospect that North Korean nuclear weapons could destabilize the region.

Associated Press

AP: Nuclear Suppliers Were Known to U.S.

By Matt Kelley – 12 February 2004

WASHINGTON - Several of the men believed to have helped Iran, North Korea and Libya buy nuclear weapons equipment were on the radar of U.S. and European investigators two decades ago but still managed to become enmeshed in the black-market network, U.S. officials say.

The evidence developed by the United States points to at least two college friends and three other associates of Abdul Qadeer Khan, the Pakistani nuclear scientist who admitted he was the mastermind of the scheme, according to officials familiar with the intelligence and to proliferation experts assisting the international effort. All spoke to The Associated Press on condition of anonymity.

Khan's friend from the Netherlands, Henk Slebos, was convicted there in 1985 of trying to sell equipment to Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. Slebos' wife told the AP this week he would not talk to reporters.

The officials said some evidence came from Khan himself and from Iran's admissions to U.N. inspectors, while other intelligence was developed during a covert CIA operation aimed at cracking the smuggling ring.

Khan recently admitted selling nuclear secrets and equipment. He was pardoned by Pakistan's president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf.

U.S., international and Pakistani investigations into Khan's network continue as they try to determine whether it provided equipment or information to anyone outside the three countries already named. President

Bush said Wednesday the United States would "find the middlemen, the suppliers and the buyers" and stop them.

Some experts are alarmed that black market figures suspected of smuggling in the 1980s had a role in Khan's effort.

"You would have thought they would have been taken out of commission, one way or another, by now," said Leonard Spector, a former top Energy Department counterproliferation official under President Clinton.

CIA Director George Tenet said agents worked for years to penetrate Khan's network; their efforts paid off in the October seizure of a ship full of nuclear components headed for Libya. That helped prompt Libya to reveal - and renounce - its nuclear weapons program in December.

Khan's network became a comprehensive one-stop-shopping venue for countries wanting atomic bombs, experts from the United Nations' International Atomic Energy Agency and U.S. agencies have said.

The network provided the know-how, the materials, even 24-hour technical support if problems cropped up, diplomats and intelligence officials have said.

Khan even had glossy brochures - complete with his own photo - with pictures and specifications of some of the centrifuge parts for sale.

The network provided Libya and Iran with the resources to make a centrifuge plant to separate bomb fuel from uranium. Libya also got a rough but workable nuclear warhead design from Pakistan, U.S. intelligence officials and diplomats allege.

The network evolved after Khan's black-market deals to supply Pakistan's nuclear program in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. Khan began stealing centrifuge designs while working in the early 1970s for Urenco, a European uranium enrichment consortium. Khan was convicted in absentia in the Netherlands for stealing the designs, but the conviction was overturned because he was not properly served with court papers.

Several European businessmen Pakistan tapped for nuclear help also are believed to have aided Libya and Iran, say senior U.S. intelligence officials and outside nuclear experts.

One was Slebos, convicted in 1985 of trying to ship high-tech equipment to Khan's laboratory in Pakistan. The U.S. officials said evidence points to Slebos as a participant in the Khan network that supplied nuclear weapons equipment to Libya in the 1990s.

Slebos runs Slebos Research, a company that sponsored a conference organized by Pakistan's Khan Research Laboratories last year. Dutch officials have said they intercepted five shipments to Pakistan from Slebos Research and another company in 1998.

Slebos did not respond to telephone and e-mail messages left at his firm. A woman who answered Slebos' home telephone and identified herself as his wife said Slebos would not talk to reporters.

Iran identified to the IAEA three German businessmen among five middlemen who were sources for some of its centrifuge technology. The U.N. nuclear watchdog has not released their names, but U.S. officials and outside experts say they included two former executives, Otto Heilingbrunner and Gotthard Lerch, of a company that made centrifuge components. German prosecutors investigated them in the 1980s for allegedly selling equipment and blueprints to Pakistan's nuclear program.

Both men worked in the 1980s for Leybold AG, which got nuclear-related designs from Urenco while bidding on a centrifuge contract for the uranium enrichment consortium. Leybold has publicly acknowledged it sold nuclear equipment directly to Iraq and Iran in the 1980s.

Heilingbrunner said in a telephone interview that he was involved in selling aircraft engine parts to Iran in the 1980s. He denied any involvement with nuclear sales.

"I have nothing to do with Libya, Iraq, North Korea or any others," he said.

Lerch could not be located for comment.

Another German supplier named by Iran, the late Heinz Mebus, was a college friend of Khan. Mebus worked in the early 1980s for Albrecht Migule, who was convicted in the former West Germany of selling equipment to Pakistan to help its uranium enrichment program.

Khan's network also used at least five factories in Malaysia and other countries to make centrifuge components, the U.S. officials and outside nuclear experts said.

Scomi Precision Engineering, or SCOPE, owned the most sophisticated factory located in Malaysia. The majority owner of SCOPE's parent company Scomi Group is Kamaluddin Abdullah, son of Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi.

Scomi officials have said they did not know precision parts they made were destined for uranium centrifuges. Centrifuge parts by SCOPE were on the ship seized in Italy last October.

The middleman for that deal was B.S.A. Tahir, a Sri Lankan based in the United Arab Emirates port of Dubai, a hub for Khan's network, Bush said Wednesday. Malaysian authorities have questioned Tahir, Bush said. Tahir started ordering the centrifuge parts in 2001 for a company, Gulf Technical Industries LLC. The

multimillion-dollar contract made GTI Scomi's biggest customer in fiscal 2002, according to Scomi's public financial reports.

Trouw

VS / Bush geprezen om wapenkoers

Atoomagentschap wil stap verder in tegengaan verspreiding kernwapens
door Eric Brassemer – 13 februari 2004

AMSTERDAM - De Amerikaanse president Bush heeft gisteren veel bijval gekregen voor zijn oproep van woensdag om de handel in atoomtechnologie en -materiaal tegen te gaan. Niet alle bijval was even oprecht. Ook Bush' eigen oprechtheid werd betwijfeld.

Lof kwam er gisteren bijvoorbeeld uit Pakistan -nota bene het land van waaruit Iran, Libië en Noord-Korea cruciale kerntechnologie importeerden. En ook China -zelf verdacht van kernwapenhandel met Pakistan, Iran, Noord-Korea en Libië- schaarde zich gisteren vroom achter „versterking van de internationale samenwerking”.

Het hoofd van de VN-atoomwaakhond IAEA Mohamed El Baradei, leek zich gisteren met een opiniestuk in The New York Times achter Bush te scharen. Maar ook zijn instemming is betrekkelijk. El Baradei schaarde zich achter Bush' pleidooi voor striktere controle op de export van gevoelige materialen.

Maar El Baradei wenst ook maatregelen die Bush absoluut niet wil: inspecties van kerninstallaties in de VS en andere erkende atoomstaten, en kernontwapening, zoals beoogd in het Non-Proliferatieverdrag dat de VS (en de overige erkende kernmachten Groot-Brittannië, Frankrijk, China en Rusland) hebben ondertekend.

Bush bepleitte woensdag zeven maatregelen. Drie daarvan beogen versterking van het IAEA -waarmee hij zelf overhoop lag inzake Irak.

Alleen landen die zich onderwerpen aan de stringentste bepalingen van het Non-Proliferatieverdrag zouden onderdelen voor kerncentrales mogen importeren, vindt Bush. Een nieuw IAEA-comité moet controleren of landen de bepalingen naleven. En staten die zelf verdacht zijn, moet het IAEA uit zijn bestuur weren.

Bush bepleit strenger optreden van de Nuclear Suppliers Group, een samenwerkingsverband van veertig staten (waaronder Nederland), die dertig jaar geleden werd opgericht na de eerste kernproef van India. Deze landen zouden alleen nog maar materialen of technologie voor verrijking of opwerking van splijtstof mogen leveren aan landen die al een opwerkings- of verwerkingsindustrie hebben. Dat moet voorkomen dat meer landen straks splijtstof voor kernwapens kunnen maken. Verder wil Bush het Proliferatie Veiligheidsinitiatief (PSI) uitbreiden. Dat is een negen maanden oud samenwerkingsverband van (nu nog) elf landen waaronder Nederland, die samenwerken om transporten in gevoelige materialen te onderscheppen. Het PSI zou ook justitieel moeten samenwerken om de verantwoordelijken achter de transporten te vervolgen.

Voorts herhaalde Bush de noodzaak van een nieuwe Veiligheidsraadsresolutie, die proliferatie verbiedt aan alle staten, zelfs als ze het non-proliferatieverdrag niet hebben ondertekend.

Bush' toespraak was ook een poging om te komen met een nieuw, krachtdadig buitenlands-beleidsinitiatief, na alle Irak- en Noord-Korea-misère, en kritiek op zijn (vermeende) lankmoedigheid jegens Pakistan. Kritische reacties konden niet uitblijven. Kandidaat-uitdager John Kerry hekelde onder meer Bush' warme woorden over bijstand aan ex-Sovjetrepublieken om hun oude wapens te ontmantelen, terwijl hij daarop juist 40 miljoen dollar bezuinigt in de begroting van volgend jaar.

De Los Angeles Times wees in een commentaar op de tientallen miljarden extra die Bush uittrekt voor onderzoek naar 'bunker-busters' en andere nieuwe atoomwapens. En op de ontwikkeling van een 'Star Wars' anti-raketsysteem, dat andere landen zal stimuleren om voor alle zekerheid méér kernraketten te plaatsen.

Algemeen Dagblad

Gevaar van kernwapens: waarom nu?

Door Carl Stellweg – 13 februari 2004

President Bush en het Atoomagentschap van de VN (IAEA) waarschuwen de wereld voor het gevaar van kernwapens. Waarom nu? Zes vragen en antwoorden.

1. Wat was voor Bush en el-Baradei (de baas van het IAEA) de aanleiding de noodklok te luiden?

Enkele maanden geleden ontdekten inspecteurs van het IAEA dat de nucleaire industrie van Iran misschien niet zo vreedzaam is als Teheran wilde doen voorkomen. Washington was er al langer van overtuigd dat Iran streeft naar een kernwapen en meent in zijn gelijk te zijn bevestigd. Toch staat alleen vast dat als Iran werkelijk een atoombom wil maken, het nog ver van dat doel is verwijderd.

Nog een onthulling: geleerden van de 'illegale' kernwapenmacht Pakistan hadden nucleaire geheimen verkocht aan Iran, Libië en Noord-Korea. Zo zou er een 'nucleaire zwarte markt' zijn ontstaan - volledig buiten medeweten van de Pakistaanse regering.

2. Is dat laatste niet ongeloofwaardig?

De kerngeleerden zouden in absolute vrijheid aan het Pakistaanse kernwapenprogramma hebben gewerkt. Vreemd in een land dat vooral door militaire dictators is geregeerd. Nog vreemder is dat president Musharraf de vader van de Pakistaanse atoombom, Abdoel Qadeer Khan, vergiffenis heeft geschonken. Hij bevestigde zelfs Khans status van nationale held. De kwalificatie landverrader lijkt beter op zijn plaats.

3. Vanwaar dan deze milde behandeling?

Misschien omdat de Pakistaanse regering op de hoogte was van Khans activiteiten. Het is moeilijk te bewijzen of de kennis en het materiaal die aan Iran zijn geleverd, bedoeld waren voor de ontwikkeling van een kernbom. Het is toch al vaak lastig het onderscheid te bepalen tussen 'vreedzame' en 'agressieve' nucleaire toepassingen. Elk land dat een atoombom wil maken, begint met de bouw van een kernreactor.

Nog iets waarvan de Pakistaanse regering 'niets wist': de levering van nucleaire technologie aan Noord-Korea, in ruil voor lange-afstandsraketten. Overigens hoeft niemand verstoemd te staan van een dergelijke transactie. Israël heeft India ook geholpen bij de ontwikkeling van een nucleair arsenaal, terwijl het hardnekkige gerucht gaat dat de VS Frankrijk in de jaren 70 heeft bijgestaan bij de ontwikkeling van een neutronenbom.

4. Is het geruststellend dat een schurk als Saddam geen wapens voor massavernietiging blijkt te hebben gehad, terwijl een andere schurk, de Libische leider Gadaffi, heeft gezegd dat hij ze niet meer wil? Dat de internationale gemeenschap geen oorlog onder valse voorwendselen kon voorkomen, is weinig geruststellend. De winnaar van die oorlog zit nu met een publicitaire ramp opgescheept. Bush's waarschuwing aan de wereld is misschien een poging om het geschonden prestige te herstellen. De boodschap: de CIA mag in Irak hopeloos hebben gefaald, diezelfde CIA is er wel achter gekomen wat de Pakistanen in hun schild voerden. Ook heeft Amerika's krachtige Midden-Oosten-politiek er voor gezorgd dat Gaddafi eieren voor zijn geld koos.

Dat neemt niet weg dat het kernwapenprogramma van het verarmde Libië bar weinig voorstelde: een paar oude scud-raketten, een kleine onderzoeksreactor en wat kapotte centrifuges. Zeker is dat Gadaffi's nucleaire coming out hem uit zijn totale isolement verlost, terwijl de VS zich er op kan laten voorstaan de gevaarlijke fanaticus van weleer tot goede Arabier te hebben opgevoed. Dat de fanaticus zijn beste tijd al had gehad, blijft buiten beschouwing.

5. Is het dan allemaal gebakken lucht?

De motieven van Bush zijn misschien onzuiver, maar daarom is er nog wel een reëel gevaar. Na de Koude Oorlog is de wereld minder overzichtelijk geworden. Terroristen en andere misdadigers opereren steeds autonomer. Het is daardoor moeilijker te achterhalen hoe militaire kennis zich over de wereld verspreidt.

6. De oplossing?

Bush vindt dat het IAEA, een instelling waarvoor hij overigens grote minachting koestert, moet worden versterkt. Hij wil dat alle ondertekenaars van het verdrag tegen de verspreiding van kernwapens, verrassingsinspecties moeten toestaan. Landen met twijfelachtige regimes mag geen gelegenheid worden gegeven nucleaire brandstof te produceren. Desnoods kopen ze die maar.

Helaas verliezen deze aanbevelingen geloofwaardigheid als ze uit de mond komen van de leider van een land dat zelf het meest afschrikwekkende wapenarsenaal ter wereld bezit en nooit tot inspecties is verplicht. De andere permanente leden van de Veiligheidsraad, ook wel 'legale kernmachten' genoemd (Frankrijk, Groot-Brittannië, Rusland, China) genieten eenzelfde uitzonderingspositie. Misschien is de grootste opgave de komende jaren om op veilige wijze een einde te maken aan deze ongelijkheid

Reuters

U.S., Liberia Sign Ship Interdiction Agreement

13 February 2004

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The United States and Liberia have signed a ship interdiction agreement in support of a treaty that aims to prevent the movement of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons around the world, the State Department said on Thursday.

The agreement, signed on Wednesday, authorized the boarding of sea vessels suspected of carrying unlawful shipments of weapons of mass destruction, delivery systems or related materials, the department said.

"Liberia has the world's second largest ship registry and this agreement sends a strong signal to proliferators that the United States and Liberia will not allow the use of their vessels for the transport or transfer of items of proliferation concern," State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said.

The U.S.-Liberia agreement supports the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), launched last May by President Bush.

The PSI treaty is aimed at halting the flow of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons-related materials and missiles bound for states viewed with distrust in Washington, like North Korea and Iran.

U.S. officials say it has already had successes, including the seizure last October of a Libyan-bound ship carrying nuclear centrifuge equipment that helped persuade Tripoli to give up its nuclear ambitions.

Participating countries have also held multinational exercises that have provided experience in interdiction and intelligence sharing for their militaries, U.S. officials say.

Associated Press

AP: Kazakhstan Probes Nuclear Black Market

By Bagila Bukharbayeva – 20 February 2004

ALMATY, Kazakhstan - Kazakhstan has opened an investigation into the nuclear black market that helped Iran, Libya and North Korea, exploring suspected ties in the country that housed much of the Soviet Union's atomic arsenal, officials told The Associated Press.

Kazakhstan's intelligence agency is examining the Almaty office of a Dubai company linked by President Bush to the market headed by the father of Pakistan's nuclear program, the officials said.

The black market's potential connection to Kazakhstan - which served as a nuclear testing ground until it disarmed after its 1991 independence - has raised concern about the proliferation of remnants of the Soviet weapons program. Kazakh officials strongly deny any highly enriched uranium - the form used in weapons - has leaked out of the country.

Bush accused Sri Lankan businessman Bukhary Syed Abu Tahir of brokering black-market deals for nuclear technology using his Dubai-based company SMB Computers as a front. That firm also has an office in the Kazakh commercial capital, Almaty.

The Kazakh intelligence agency, the National Security Committee, is investigating allegations that SMB Computers' affiliate was dealing with highly enriched uranium, spokesman Kenzhebulat Beknazarov said Thursday.

SMB Computers' office in Almaty was closed Thursday.

According to a receptionist in the building where the company rents a room, the only person who staffed the office hasn't shown up there for a week. The receptionist, speaking on condition of anonymity, said he had been planning to "wrap up business" and move out.

The Dubai headquarters of SMB identified the head of its Almaty office as Shaul Hameed, but said they didn't have any further contact details for him. A receptionist there, who didn't give her name, said "our company has nothing to do with this," regarding allegations of nuclear smuggling.

Bush named SMB Computers' owner Tahir as a key link in a clandestine network run by Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistan's nuclear program who has confessed to leaking nuclear technology to Iran, Libya and North Korea. Tahir was described as the network's chief financial officer, money launderer and shipping agent - using the firm as a cover to ship parts for centrifuges, used to enrich uranium.

Kazakhstan transferred all its Soviet nuclear warheads to Russia by April 1995, and destroyed its nuclear testing infrastructure at the major Semipalatinsk weapons test site by July 2000. About 1,320 pounds of weapons-grade highly enriched uranium was removed to the United States from the Ulba Metallurgy Plant in 1994.

Yet the Central Asian nation still holds weapons-grade nuclear material, including 3.3 tons of plutonium at a mothballed breeder reactor in the country's west, and small amounts of highly enriched uranium at two nuclear research institutes, according to the Web site of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, a U.S.-based foundation.

Still, Kazakh nuclear officials denied the chance of any weapons-grade uranium leaks.

"It is impossible to illegally take any uranium out of Kazakhstan," said Shinar Zhanibekova, spokeswoman for Kazakhstan's national atomic energy company, KazAtomProm.

The Atomic Energy Committee, which grants licenses for the export of nuclear materials, said it had never done any business with SMB Computers and never granted it a license.

Kazakhstan has 30 percent of the world's uranium reserves and is the fourth biggest uranium producer, according to KazAtomProm.

Zhanibekova said the country now produces only low-enriched uranium tablets for nuclear power plants, which require a maximum 3 percent enrichment. Weapons-grade uranium has to be enriched to at least 98 percent.

She said all uranium exports from the country were monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency, the U.N. nuclear watchdog, and tightly controlled by Kazakh nuclear and security agencies. All shipments are accompanied by armed guards, Zhanibekova said.

A Europe-based Western diplomat working on issues of nuclear proliferation questioned the reliability of Kazakh safeguards for its nuclear assets.

"Nobody can pretend that everything is perfectly secure," the diplomat said, speaking on condition of anonymity. However, he had no further information on SMB Computers' possible activities in Kazakhstan.

Beknazarov, the intelligence agency spokesman, said there had never been leaks of highly enriched uranium from Kazakhstan.

However, huge amounts of unguarded nuclear waste - material that could potentially be used by terrorists to create a "dirty bomb," combining conventional explosives with radioactive materials - are scattered around the country and are unguarded.

Reuters

Malaysia Coy on Fate of Suspected Nuke Middleman

By Patrick Chalmers – 21 February 2004

KUALA LUMPUR (Reuters) - Malaysia declined to say Saturday what will happen to the man police say confessed to a web of dealings with Pakistani atomic scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, including selling nuclear centrifuges to Iran.

Malaysian police released a report Friday detailing evidence from Buhary Syed Abu Tahir, suspected middleman in Pakistan's illicit nuclear parts trade.

In the report, Tahir, a Sri Lankan now resident in the Malaysian capital, told of a \$3 million sale to Iran of nuclear centrifuge parts made in Malaysia and how Khan arranged the shipment of enriched uranium to Libya.

Malaysian Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar brushed off questions Saturday about what was next for 44-year-old Tahir, labeled by Washington as Khan's deputy and money launderer.

Though the businessman remains free in the country, a Malaysian intelligence source said Friday he had left his house but remained in the capital Kuala Lumpur.

Syed Hamid told reporters police would handle any U.S. government inquiries on Tahir.

"Let the police handle all these things," Syed Hamid told a news conference, declining further questions on the issue.

Diplomats and arms experts have said they believe Khan, who has admitted leaking nuclear secrets to Iran, Libya and North Korea, offered Iran his centrifuge designs on the black market.

Pakistan says Khan, a national hero dubbed the father of the nation's nuclear bomb, acted alone in selling nuclear secrets but many inside and outside the South Asian country believe the military played a role.

Tahir told police of cash-filled briefcases left in a Dubai apartment and meetings in Casablanca, Morocco, Dutch-design nuclear centrifuge units airlifted from Pakistan to Libya and machine shop parts Tripoli bought from Italy and Spain.

He named British and Swiss nationals, detailed Khan's contact-building from Germany and Switzerland to Turkey and South Africa and described how a consultant of his worked at Malaysian firm Scope on a contract to make centrifuge parts.

Police have absolved the company of any wrongdoing. The firm is part of publicly listed Scomi Group Bhd, which is controlled by the Malaysian prime minister's son, Kamaluddin Abdullah, and two other investors.

"I am delighted that the police have come out in the open about their investigation. This goes to show that whatever we have said has been totally vindicated and we hope we can put this issue to rest," Deputy Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak told reporters Saturday.

The 12-page police report, carrying handwritten additions and sentences blanked out by corrector fluid, included the political assessment that Malaysia had violated none of its obligations under the nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty.

But the document added that some of the European nations implicated by Tahir's evidence might have fallen short of their treaty commitments, which are more stringent than Malaysia's.

"What is clear is that most individuals involved in the networking are from Europe, whose countries are signatories to the Additional Protocol and the Nuclear Supplier Group," it said.

Associated Press

U.N. Seeks Clues to Nuke Market in Libya

By George Jahn – 23 February 2004

TRIPOLI, Libya - The chief United Nations nuclear inspector took his search for the key players in the atomic black market to Libya on Monday, where he is seeking to determine who supplied Moammar Gadhafi's government with technology to develop weapons of mass destruction.

Mohamed ElBaradei began a two-day visit officially focused on monitoring the progress of dismantling Libya's illicit nuclear program - a process that began in December when Gadhafi's government agreed to scrap its weapons effort.

"He's going to take stock of what's happening and review the next steps," said Melissa Fleming, a spokeswoman for the U.N. International Atomic Energy Agency.

But diplomats said ElBaradei would also be looking for new clues about the clandestine nuclear network that for decades provide technology and equipment to Libya, North Korea and Iran.

There was no official IAEA comment. But Fleming said information provided by Libya was crucial to identifying the network, its key players and their roles in getting equipment and expertise to nations willing to pay for the means to acquire nuclear arms.

Since Libya revealed the extent of its efforts in December, Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, has acknowledged heading the network described by ElBaradei as a "nuclear supermarket" with middlemen extending to five continents.

Libya's openness on the illicit trade network helped the IAEA "understand the most serious case of proliferation in recent time," said Fleming.

Khan and dozens of associates circumvented national export controls in Europe, Asia and elsewhere to ship nuclear technology to Libya, which managed to hide experiments geared toward making weapons for nearly two decades.

Among the most startling discoveries were engineers' drawings of a 1960s warhead of Chinese design apparently provided by those linked to Khan, who originally turned to China to develop Pakistan's country's nuclear weapons.

While far from building such arms, Libya managed to process minute quantities of plutonium, used in the core of nuclear warheads, says a report by ElBaradei written for an IAEA board of governors meeting next month.

Centrifuge designs and other technology originating from Pakistan and found in Libya also were apparently sold to Iran, which has acknowledged hiding nearly two decades of nuclear activity but insists its programs are meant to produce power not weapons.

North Korea denies any link to Khan, but U.S. intelligence and the Pakistani scientist's associates have said that it also received help in its nuclear weapons program from his network.

A diplomat said the Libya revelations helped the agency link Iran's illicit program to the Khan operation.

"Things that the IAEA was learning from Iran strongly implicated Pakistan but finding another country ordering from the same network exposed the whole workings and international connections of that network," including ties to Iran, said the diplomat, asking for anonymity.

Iran has been less forthcoming than Libya on its sources. It confirmed Sunday that it has purchased nuclear equipment from international dealers, including some from the Indian subcontinent, but said it doesn't know where the components came from.

It has made the same argument to the IAEA, saying only the intermediaries that supplied it know the origins of the parts.

Still, the statements Sunday by Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi appeared to corroborate a report that Malaysian authorities released last week after they completed a three-month investigation into the Khan network. The report said Iran had bought \$3 million worth of used uranium centrifuge parts from that operation.

Iran's decade of covert nuclear activities came to light last year, with the discovery that it had set up thousands of centrifuges to enrich uranium - a process that can be used to generate power or make nuclear warheads, depending on the level of enrichment.

A report on Iran is expected next week, ahead of the IAEA board of governors' meeting on March 8.

IPS

US Pushes UN to Endorse Preemptive Action Against Suspected WMDs

by Haider Rizvi – 27 February 2004

The United States is pressing the U.N. Security Council to endorse a draft resolution that would allow the use of force against "entities and individuals" suspected of trying to develop, possess or transfer weapons of mass destruction (WMD), diplomats and observers here say.

Though they say they are equally concerned about proliferation of the weapons, many Security Council members fear the resolution would give Washington a free hand to unilaterally deal with the as yet undefined "entities and individuals".

The draft resolution states that some countries "may require assistance within their territories, and invite states in a position to" prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, rockets and vehicles capable of delivering such weapons, a phrase that makes many suspicious of U.S. intentions.

The proposal "should not be a context to whip the countries", says an Asian diplomat who did not want to be named. "How can we talk about faceless actors when there's no agreed definition of terrorists? You know, whom you called a terrorist yesterday could be a president today".

According to the draft, Washington wants the Security Council to ask all member nations to help prevent and "if necessary, interdict shipment of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, their means of delivery and related material in accordance with the international and national laws".

"This is a dangerous concept," says an Asian diplomat who also requested anonymity. "This can be misused by adversaries in the name of interdiction".

The US resolution stems from the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a plan announced by President George W. Bush in May last year as a step towards creating new legal agreements authorizing the search of planes and ships carrying suspect cargo.

The PSI has been endorsed by nine European nations, including Britain, Germany and France, as well as Australia. Washington and its allies claim the proposal is legal under the UN Charter and the Security Council Presidential Statement of 1992.

But legal experts say neither of those regulations gives nations the authority to interdict shipments on the high seas.

Diplomats say negotiations have stalled on the question of the definition of "interdiction" because two of five permanent Council members, China and Russia, have refused to go along with the current draft resolution.

"The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a serious issue," Russia's UN Ambassador Sergey Lavrov told reporters recently. "But we need to develop a language which is clear".

"It's a sensitive issue," said Chinese ambassador Wang Guangya, who is also president of the Security Council for February. "It can be best solved by the judgments of the International Atomic Energy Agency" (IAEA), the U.N.'s nuclear watchdog, he added.

Recent IAEA investigations into Iran's nuclear program led to the arrest of Pakistani nuclear scientist Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, who publicly confessed his involvement in transferring his country's nuclear technology to other nations.

Diplomats say so far that case is the only example that could be used to define the "entities and individuals" in the draft US resolution.

But Pakistan, a non-permanent Security Council member, sees the case in a different light. "Dr. Khan was an aberration," a Pakistani diplomat told IPS. "He has been taken care of."

A US diplomat had a different interpretation. "This resolution is trouble for (Pakistan)," he said.

Negotiations on the resolution have so far been confined to the five permanent members of the Security Council, which frustrates some non-permanent but elected members.

"Why is it up to the P-5 (permanent five) to determine the agenda of non-proliferation?" asked a diplomat from a non-permanent member nation. "On the one hand, they are the preachers. On the other hand, they are the sinners".

All permanent members – the United States, Russia, Britain, France and China – continue to possess thousands of nuclear weapons in their arsenals. Washington is no longer making it a secret that it is producing a new generation of those weapons.

Experts on international law say they share the concerns of the elected members of the Security Council – that Washington might use force against some nations under the pretext of implementing a UN Security Council resolution.

"They are right," says John Burroughs, executive director of the [Lawyers Committee for Nuclear Policy](#), a U.S.-based non-profit disarmament advocacy group.

"They think if you get this resolution on paper, the US may use military force like it did in Iraq, even though the UN did not approve it."

Washington is seeking Security Council approval under chapter 7 of the UN Charter, which binds states to implement Council decisions. But Burroughs says he and his colleagues, who have been working on issues related to weapons of mass destruction for more than two decades, doubt if the move to adopt the WMD resolution is legitimate.

"There is nothing in the UN Charter that gives the Security Council the authority to adopt global legislation," he says. "This resolution deals with complex situations" and involves individuals not acting on behalf of states.

Burroughs suggests that any effective implementation of such a proposal would require the involvement of the UN secretary-general and the body's department of disarmament, in addition to negotiations on multilateral agreements such as the Biological Weapons Convention.

Diplomats say non-permanent Security Council members want to address the issue of proliferation by enhancing the agenda on disarmament. But Washington and other permanent members prefer to deal with it separately, they add.

"This is the basic problem with the US and others," says Burroughs. "They think the terrorism threat can be solved with nonproliferation efforts. That's not right. It's going to require eliminating weapons of mass destruction everywhere. It requires political will to do so."

Washington Post

Report Criticizes Uranium Program

By Walter Pincus – 28 February 2004

The Energy Department's program to produce highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons by recovering and purifying materials from retired bombs and missiles will be more than five years behind schedule and cost more than three times its original price when it starts operating in July, according to a report by the Energy Department's inspector general released yesterday.

Poor planning and lack of a consistent funding plan were cited as leading to delays and ballooning costs for the project, which was to be completed by December 1998, the report said. The original cost estimate was \$119 million, but the bill will be about \$400 million by July, the report said.

Inspector General Gregory H. Friedman wrote that one result has been that "the enriched uranium operations necessary for national security are not available to meet future mission needs." But the program's manager, Michael C. Kane of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), took issue with that finding. Kane said the operations at the agency's Y-12 plant at Oak Ridge, Tenn., where uranium is processed, "has consistently achieved meeting 100 percent of current program requirements."

The inspector general's report comes as the Bush administration is trying to stop North Korea and Iran from undertaking uranium enrichment programs of their own.

In a speech this month, President Bush proposed an international understanding in which nuclear fuel would be provided only to countries that renounce the type of nuclear reprocessing the United States has reestablished. "This step will prevent new states from developing the means to produce fissile material for nuclear bombs," Bush said.

David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security, a nonprofit research organization that specializes in nuclear matters, said the reprocessing program makes it more difficult for the Bush administration to sell the idea of new nuclear restrictions.

"Any perception the U.S. stockpile is increasing could make it more difficult for Bush to get support for his initiative," Albright said. "He [Bush] can't get nations to give up enrichment plants if Y-12 is seen as expanding quantity and quality of our stockpile."

Another recent report by the Energy Department's inspector general highlighted other problems in preventing nuclear proliferation, in this case the attempt by the United States to collect weapons-grade, highly enriched uranium that was distributed for research purposes years ago.

The report focused on the U.S. Atoms for Peace program in the 1950s and on other programs in the 1960s, in which nuclear technology and tons of highly enriched uranium were distributed to about 33 countries for use in research reactors. Since 1964, the United States has been trying with limited success to get that nuclear material returned.

The Energy Department's inspector general said 22 countries had returned materials, but 12 countries have not agreed to participate in the program. Among those are Iran, Israel, Pakistan and South Africa. Albright, who has studied the program, estimated that the amounts delivered to Iran were not enough for a bomb, but the amounts given Israel and Pakistan were, if those countries had the capability to purify the uranium.

Associated Press

Inspector Upbeat on Iran Nuke Cooperation

By Paul Ames – 2 March 2004

BRUSSELS, Belgium - The head of the U.N. atomic watchdog agency gave an upbeat assessment Tuesday of Iran's cooperation with international inspectors despite continuing concerns over the Islamic republic's nuclear program.

Mohamed ElBaradei said there had been a major improvement in Iran's relations with the International Atomic Energy Agency over the past year.

"If you look at the big picture, we are clearly moving in the right direction," the IAEA director-general told reporters, alluding to Tehran's commitment under pressure last year to reveal past nuclear secrets and cooperate with agency inspectors.

ElBaradei acknowledged, however, relations had been damaged by discoveries by IAEA inspectors of traces of radioactive elements and advanced equipment in Iran that could be used to make atomic weapons.

"The bad news is that they have some R&D (research and development) activities that have not been declared," said ElBaradei. "That is a setback in the confidence building."

He confirmed that the IAEA is in contact with Pakistan to verify Iran's claims that the traces of enriched uranium and polonium-210 were the result of contamination of components imported for legitimate nuclear power programs.

"It's really important for us to get particle samples from Pakistan," ElBaradei. He praised the Pakistani authorities for cooperating with the agency and expressed hope they would soon provide the samples.

ElBaradei refused to speculate on how the IAEA's board might react next week when it convenes in Vienna, Austria, to discuss Iran's nuclear program.

The United States is seeking a declaration that Iran is in breach of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty by seeking to develop nuclear weapons. Iran is hoping a positive declaration from the agency could lead to the resumption of trade talks with the European Union.

ElBaradei was in Brussels to attend an EU conference on nuclear energy. He was also scheduled to hold talks on Iran and other proliferation issues with the EU's foreign policy chief Javier Solana.

After Iran's decision last year to open up to international inspectors and halt its uranium enrichment program, and a commitment by Libya to end weapons of mass destruction programs, ElBaradei said North Korea had become "the No. 1 proliferation concern."

He said the agency had little firsthand knowledge of what was happening in the Communist state since its inspectors were thrown out in 2002, but the IAEA was "very concerned" about North Korea's capability to develop nuclear arms.

Following revelations of the black-market network in nuclear technology headed by Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, ElBaradei said the agency was making good progress in identifying middlemen in Europe and Asia suspected of involvement.

He said the information would be passed on to governments in expectation that sanctions against illicit traders would "make sure that this will not be a model for people to follow."

Reacting to allegations that British intelligence spied on U.N. officials in the run up to the Iraq war last year, ElBaradei said he'd seen no evidence that IAEA offices had been bugged, but said the agency "worked on the assumption that we are bugged all the time."

Associated Press

Malaysia Urged to Tighten Export Controls

By Patrick McDowell – 2 March 2004

KUALA LUMPUR, Malaysia - The United States urged Malaysia on Tuesday to fall in line with a new crackdown on nuclear trafficking, plugging criminal loopholes and tightening export controls after the discovery that a local company manufactured parts for Libya's nuclear program.

U.S. envoy John Stern Wolf, an assistant secretary heading the State Department's bureau of non-proliferation, held 30 minutes of talks with Deputy Prime Minister Najib Razak and separate discussions for about one hour with Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar at Putrajaya, the administrative capital, officials said.

Wolf left both meetings without speaking to reporters. On Monday, Syed Hamid had promised to hold a news conference after his meeting with Wolf, but canceled it hours later, without giving reasons.

Malaysian officials said Wolf, a former U.S. ambassador to Malaysia, would not be meeting Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, whose son is the majority owner of the Malaysian company that made the parts for Libya. Police say the company was tricked into making the parts and have cleared it of responsibility.

Syed Hamid said Tuesday before meeting Wolf he did not think the American would challenge the way Malaysia handled the probe into the Libyan deal and its refusal to arrest the key middleman, who remains at liberty in Malaysia.

"The whole thing is over already," Syed Hamid said. "Whatever had been needed to be done has been done. There has been full disclosure and a lot of transparency. It is no longer an issue."

Syed Hamid said Malaysia would consider signing additional Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty protocols prohibiting the sale of technology intended exclusively for nuclear use, but did not currently "see any necessity" to do so.

Malaysia contends it does not have the high-tech capacity to produce nuclear-specific technology, and that the parts made here had other conceivable uses.

The meetings follow complaints by Malaysia that it has been unfairly singled out as part of the network led by Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistan's nuclear program, to supply nuclear technology and know-how to Libya, Iran and North Korea.

But U.S. officials are eager for Malaysia to stiffen export controls and take sterner measures against proliferation following the seizure of a ship carrying Malaysian-made centrifuge parts to Libya.

"Assistant Secretary Wolf will be seeking to increase the existing cooperation between the U.S. and Malaysia on non-proliferation," U.S. Embassy spokesman Frank Whitaker said Monday.

Wolf will provide information to Malaysia about steps taken at the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency, as well as President Bush's campaign against proliferation, Whitaker said.

The middleman accused by Malaysian police of orchestrating the parts shipment for Libya, Buhary Syed Abu Tahir, remains free in Malaysia because officials insist that he has broken no local laws.

Bush has described Tahir, a Sri Lankan businessman, as the "chief financial officer and money launderer" of Khan's network.

Tahir is married to a Malaysian and lives part-time here. Malaysian police said in a recent report he deceived a local company, Scomi Precision Engineering, or SCOPE, into making centrifuge parts that could be used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons.

SCOPE, a wholly owned subsidiary of oil-and-gas company Scomi, thought the parts were bound for the oil and gas industry in Dubai, police said.

Scomi is majority owned by Kaspadu, an investment company in which the prime minister's son, Kamaluddin Abdullah, has a controlling stake. Tahir also had a seat on Kaspadu's board, although he stepped down a year ago.

Pakistan may make Nigeria a nuclear power

By Julian Borger – 4 March 2004

Pakistan yesterday offered to share military assistance, including "nuclear power" with Nigeria, in defiance of President George Bush's new counter-proliferation initiative.

The offer was announced by the Nigerian defence ministry in a statement saying that General Muhammad Aziz Khan, chairman of Pakistan's joint chiefs of staff, had made the offer to the Nigerian defence minister, Rabiú Kwankwaso, during a visit to the west African state's capital, Abuja.

"Speaking at the opening of the discussions, the Pakistani chairman of joint chiefs of staff ... said that his country is working out the dynamics of how they can assist Nigeria's armed forces to strengthen its military capability and to acquire nuclear power," the Nigerian press release said. Neither the Pakistani nor the Nigerian governments clarified what Gen Khan had in mind.

The announcement is likely to provoke consternation in Washington, coming just a month after the mastermind behind Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme, Abdul Qadeer Khan, admitted publicly that he had run a black market in nuclear weapons materials.

Pakistan's president, Pervez Musharraf, expressed shock at the confession, but pardoned Mr Khan, much to the anger of nuclear inspectors at the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna.

A detailed report in the New Yorker this week suggested Washington had turned a blind eye to the Pakistani government's connivance in sales of nuclear materials and technology to countries like Iran and Libya, in exchange for permission to send American commandos to hunt down Osama bin Laden in Pakistan's Hindu Kush.

A week after Mr Khan's confession, President Bush launched a counter-proliferation initiative based on international cooperation to curb transfers of nuclear technology and materials. Gen Khan's offer to Nigeria appeared to be in blatant defiance of that initiative.

The general made clear that the snub was intentional, declaring: "Pakistan had to take its destiny into its own hands to become a nuclear state because of the regular threats posed by hostile neighbours with special reference to the Kashmir conflict," according to the press release.

US officials are also baffled at Nigeria's intentions, nearly five years after the country restored civilian rule, and at a time when it is under no threat from its neighbours.

Two months ago, the Nigerian vice president's office announced that it had struck an agreement with North Korea to gain access to Pyongyang's missile technology. The offer was subsequently denied by North Korean officials and played down by a spokeswoman to Nigeria's president, Olusegun Obasanjo.

The Nigerian government said at the time that "nothing was written in stone" and that any North Korean missile help would be used for "peacekeeping" and to protect its territory. It said it was not seeking nuclear technology or any other weapons of mass destruction.

The South Korean unification minister, Jeong Se-hyun, said it was not clear whether Nigeria had accepted the offer, but said he didn't think the issue would cause many problems. "I see it as a tactic by North Korea to arouse anxiousness from the United States ahead of the second round of six-nation talks," Mr Jeong said. Nevertheless, the reports caused alarm in Washington.

"If the Nigerians go through with this purchase, they will have earned the unenviable distinction as the first sub-Saharan African state to introduce ballistic-missile technology to the region. They will become the initiator of a supremely wasteful and potentially deadly arms race," said Richard Norton, a national security expert at the US naval war college.

"Nigeria's motives would be questioned and its moves viewed with suspicion. And the Nigerian-US relationship would be damaged, perhaps badly. Substantial amounts of US military and law enforcement aid given to Nigeria might be placed in jeopardy."

AFP

Straw talks nuclear proliferation, terrorism with Musharraf

4 March 2004

British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw held talks with Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf here Thursday on nuclear proliferation and the war on terrorism, officials said.

Straw, who arrived in the Pakistani capital late Wednesday for a three-day official visit, spent one hour with Musharraf at army headquarters in Rawalpindi, next to Islamabad.

Earlier he met Foreign Minister Kurshid Mahmud Kasuri and will later meet Prime Minister Zafarullah Jamali and Interior Minister Faisal Saleh Hayat, officials said.

Details of Straw's talks with Musharraf were not immediately available, but a senior Pakistani official said earlier that he would discuss Islamabad's four-month probe into the sale of nuclear equipment and designs by Pakistani scientists to Iran, Libya and North Korea.

The probe, launched late November following revelations by Iran to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), resulted in a public confession of proliferation by the architect of Pakistan's nuclear program Abdul Qadeer Khan.

International nuclear experts have described the scandal as one of the most devastating for efforts to contain the spread of nuclear arms.

Musharraf later pardoned Khan and refused to allow an international inquiry, drawing claims from critics that he was trying to prevent the exposure of any alleged role by the army.

Like its nuclear-armed rival India, Pakistan -- which went public as a nuclear power with test explosions in May 1998 -- is not a signatory to nuclear non-proliferation treaties.

Peace moves between Pakistan and India, reconstruction in neighbouring Afghanistan and Pakistan's suspension from the Commonwealth would also be on Straw's agenda, officials said.

On Friday he will visit Peshawar, the capital of Islamist-ruled North West Frontier Province bordering Afghanistan, to deliver a lecture on "Engaging Islam" and visit an Islamic seminary.

Straw's visit is the first by a British leader since media reports last November that British spies bugged Pakistan's embassy in London prompted angry demands from Islamabad for an explanation by the British government.

British officials have refused to comment on the spying allegations.

Guardian

Customs examine British link in nuclear parts trade

by Ian Traynor, Owen Bowcott and John Aglionby – 5 March 2004

Customs officials have opened an investigation into the activities of two Britons, Peter and Paul Griffin, who are alleged to be supplying components for the secret nuclear programmes of Pakistan, Libya and Iran, the Guardian can reveal.

The highly sensitive inquiry is focusing on the roles allegedly played by the Welsh father-and-son business pair in the biggest illegal nuclear proliferation racket ever uncovered.

The Griffins have previously insisted that all their exports were approved by the Department of Trade and Industry.

In a statement released yesterday, the agency said: "HM Customs and Excise are investigating allegations relating to the supply of components for nuclear programmes including related activities of British citizens. Our inquiries are continuing."

In recent weeks there has been a growing number of allegations linking Peter and Paul Griffin with the nuclear trading network masterminded by the Pakistani metallurgist, Abdul Qadeer Khan, who is known as the father of the country's nuclear bomb.

Investigators at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna who are tracking the smuggling network have asked the British authorities for help and are believed to have questioned at least one of the Griffins.

Officials in the safeguards office of the DTI are also involved in the inquiry.

The father, Peter Griffin, 68, is retired and living in the south of France. His son, Paul, 40, manages their company, Gulf Technical Industries (GTI), which is based in Dubai.

They have repeatedly denied breaking any laws, telling the Guardian last month that they had been "framed".

Both men were named publicly last month in a Malaysian police report into the activities of a Malaysian firm, Scomi Precision Engineering (Scope), which was manufacturing parts for the centrifuge machines that produce weapons-grade uranium for nuclear bombs. The equipment was destined for Libya.

Peter Griffin's links with Mr Khan are believed to go back at least 20 years. Father and son have confirmed they have met the Pakistani scientist.

President George Bush and Mohammed ElBaradei, the head of the IAEA, reacted to the revelations about the Khan nuclear trading network by calling for the criminalisation of those found to be engaged in proliferating nuclear technology.

It is clear that British intelligence has played a key role in the disclosures surrounding Libya. During the period that four shipments for Libya were made from Malaysia, MI6 agents were engaged - with the CIA - in top-secret negotiations with the Gadafy entourage, resulting in the Libyan leader's renunciation of his nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons projects.

An MI6 official, with a CIA colleague, also triggered the Malaysian investigation by going to Kuala Lumpur armed with evidence on the Khan network and asking for the Malaysian special branch's help.

The unmasking of the nuclear trafficking network and the allegations of involvement by Britons have sparked calls for tighter international controls on exports of sensitive equipment.

They have also reinforced long-standing concerns about the activities of British dealers or brokers working abroad who avoid being subject to UK export restrictions.

New legislation last year gave the government the power to control illegal arms trafficking by Britons from abroad.

The Export Control Act 2003, however, covers only weapons of torture, trade with embargoed nations and parts for missiles with a range over 300km.

Roger Berry, the Labour MP who is chairman of the Commons quadripartite committee, which examines export controls, yesterday told the Guardian: "There should be full extra-territorial controls [covering all Britons exporting prohibited equipment from overseas] as there is in cases involving bribery."

The Swiss, German, and Dutch authorities have also opened investigations into alleged illegal exports by their nationals. IAEA investigators have interviewed some of the Swiss and German suspects.

IAEA officials are said to be getting good cooperation from the British. "There's a dialogue going with all of the countries involved; information is being exchanged regularly," said one official familiar with the IAEA investigation.

"These [IAEA] investigators are out probing and pressing as much as possible," said a diplomat following events closely. "They're getting reasonable cooperation and it's perfectly reasonable that they would approach Britain."

A third source added: "Every one of those countries with individuals implicated has been contacted."

News of the investigation was disclosed as it emerged that Khan's main aide and chief money launderer, Buhary Seyed Abu Tahir, was a director of a British company for a period.

Mr Tahir, formerly Dubai-based and alleged to be a business associate of the Griffins, was a director of a firm called SMB Europe Ltd. Mr Tahir is listed at an address in Ealing, west London.

A fellow director, Abu Siddiqui, was convicted in 2001 of exporting computer and laboratory equipment to Pakistan for nuclear testing. Mr Siddiqui, who received a 12-month suspended sentence, insisted he was unaware of its final destination. Investigators appear to have missed the significance at the time of Mr Tahir's involvement.

Associated Press

Papers Show U.S. Unease on Pakistan-China

By Siobhan McDonough – 6 March 2004

WASHINGTON - Newly released documents track 30 years of denials and dodging by China on whether it was helping Pakistan develop nuclear weapons, along with efforts by the United States to smoke out the truth, researchers say.

Declassified papers reviewed by the National Security Archive, an institute at George Washington University, show U.S. unease over secret China-Pakistan security and military cooperation dating to the late 1960s, and examples of Chinese assistance to Pakistan's nuclear weapons-related projects in the late 1970s, the researchers said.

William Burr, director of the institute's nuclear documentation project, said exactly what the United States knew remains secret, and the extent of China's involvement with the Pakistani nuclear program is a matter of conjecture.

He said that although the Chinese Foreign Ministry has been investigating charges that China has spread nuclear technology, he did not expect many answers on Pakistan.

"A decision by the Foreign Ministry to publicize the results of its investigation would be a great victory for transparency, although Beijing is more likely to sustain the secrecy surrounding its decisions on the Pakistani nuclear program," he said.

Even so, the papers outline decades of efforts by Washington to get to the bottom of Chinese-Pakistani cooperation and to discourage it.

Researchers say the material, dating to 1965, shows:

- A refusal by Chinese diplomats in 1982 to give an "unequivocal answer" to questions about nuclear weapons aid to Pakistan.

- A conclusion by State Department analysts in 1983 that China was helping Pakistan with the production of fissile materials and possibly with the design of weapons.

- The first Bush administration's concern in 1989 over "reports of Chinese assistance to Pakistan's nuclear weapons program."

- A denial in 1989 by Chinese diplomats of Chinese nuclear aid to Pakistan.

- U.S. pressure on China in 1992 to impose full safeguards on the sale of a nuclear reactor to Pakistan because of proliferation concerns.

- Concerns in late 1992 over China's "continuing activities with Pakistan's nuclear weapons programs."

- The Clinton administration's 1997 certification of improvements in Beijing's nuclear proliferation policies.

Questions about China's nuclear proliferation were raised when Chinese-language documents, supplied by Pakistan, were disclosed in material released recently by Libya. A leading Pakistani nuclear scientist said that he sold nuclear technology to Libya, North Korea and Iran.

Dawn

China denies N-transfer

7 March 2004

BEIJING, March 7: Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing has taken a strong exception to media reports about the alleged transfer of nuclear technology to any other country.

Referring to North Korea's alleged uranium enrichment programme, Foreign Minister Li said at a news conference: "We don't have (any) such information about the alleged uranium programme of North Korea."

"(Even) if the media's information is supported by evidence, that will have nothing to do with China," the minister added. Stressing that China has always advocated a nuclear-weapon-free Korean peninsula, Mr Li said: "We don't wish to see the Korean peninsula with nuclear weapons, we wish to see (the) peninsula that is peaceful, stable and prosperous." [...]

Pakistan Daily Times

Uranium may still be enriched: Iran

8 March 2004

TEHRAN: Iran has threatened to resume uranium enrichment and revise its agreement to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) if the nuclear dispute is not resolved in line with last October's agreement, the Mehr news service reported on Sunday.

"Iran will not wait forever to restore its legitimate national right to pursue peaceful nuclear activities," an unnamed member of the Iranian delegation at the IAEA headquarters in Vienna told Mehr. "We will not only revise cooperation but also keep the option open to restart uranium enrichment if the IAEA and the Europeans do not fulfil their commitments in line with the October declaration and continued their double-standard policies toward Iran," the diplomat added. According to Mehr, continuing accusations against Iran despite its cooperation with IAEA inspectors have irked the Iranian delegation, which has accused the United Nations nuclear agency of dealing with Iran in an "illogical manner".

North Korea's Nuclear Tests in Pakistan

28 March 2004

On June 10, 1998, an Air Koryo chartered plane took off the runway of the Islamabad International Airport of Pakistan. No one had anticipated the significance of this Pyongyang-bound flight in the affairs of the Korean peninsula. On board the plane were the 20 North Korean nuclear scientists who had conducted an underground nuclear test at Pakistan's Balochistan nuclear test site. In addition, the plane was loaded with the nuclear test equipment and test data.

Pakistan has conducted six nuclear tests. On May 28, 1998, Pakistan exploded 5 nuclear devices simultaneously at the Chagal Hills (Ras Koh range) nuclear test site. One of the devices was a boosted fission device. Two days later, a 14 KT nuclear device was tested at the Balochistan test site. This device is believed to be a plutonium bomb flown in from North Korea.

The people of Pakistan were relieved and overjoyed at the news of Pakistani nuclear tests in the aftermath of India's nuclear tests of the same scale (including a boosted bomb) a few months earlier. In stark contrast to the festive mood prevailing in Pakistan, the dark cloud of American spy planes and satellites shadowed the Pakistani nuclear facilities, and a horde of US CIA and DIA agents swarmed to Pakistan's capital.

Pyongyang had no time to celebrate its Balochistan nuclear test because it had the daunting task of extracting its nuclear scientists, test equipment and data safely from Pakistan. Hundreds of American spies and agents were out to grab North Korean scientists and nuclear materials. Even if the plane took off safely, it could have been shot down or forced to land by American planes.

North Korea had anticipated dirty plays by the Americans and worked out detailed counter measures for the safe return of its nuclear assets. Little has been published about this super secret operation. Several American news articles have revealed certain aspects of the operation, however.

The Los Angeles Times has published two articles (1999.8.23 and 2004.3.1) related to the operation. On June 7, 1998, one week after the Balochistan test, a gunshot rang out in the darkness of the night in the exclusive residential district of Islamabad. The district referred to as "E-7" is for high-ranking military officers and nuclear scientists, and as such, it is highly secured. Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of the Pakistani bomb, lives in the district. In fact, the gun was fired only a few meters from Dr. Khan's residence. The victim was Kim Sa-nae, a North Korean woman. There was no eyewitness and Pakistani plainclothes men investigated the incidence. Kim Sa-nae was reportedly well-known for her cold-noodles, a famed North Korean dish.

Kim's death was duly reported on Pakistani newspapers but few paid attention at the time, when the news of the nuclear tests dominated the news at the time. The Pakistanis said that Kim Sa-nae was a North Korean diplomat. Her mysterious murder was forgotten until the Los Angeles Times picked it up one year later in 1998. The Los Angeles Times story went far beyond what was reported by the Pakistanis. It had some sinister twists to the unsolved murder.

1). The Pakistani police refused to disclose the true identity of Kim Sa-nae. The US intelligence claims that Kim was the wife of Kang Thae-yun, a mid-level staff member at the North Korean Embassy in Pakistan, and that Kang was in fact an agent of North Korea's Chang-kwang Trading Company, which sells weapons overseas. The Americans claim that Kang was no diplomat - he was a weapons salesman. Kang left Pakistan one month after Kim's death. On the other hand, the Pakistanis claim that Kim Sa-nae was one of the twenty North Korean nuclear scientists, who were staying at the guest house of Dr. Khan's residence when Kim was shot.

2). The Pakistani police has not disclosed the murderer of Kim Sa-nae. There have been three different speculations. One says that a cook working next door to Dr. Khan borrowed a gun from a guard and fired it by accident. The second story says that one of Dr. Khan's neighbors fired his gun accidentally while cleaning it. Dr. Khan has stated that Kim's death was accidental. In contrast, the American intelligence claims that Kim Sa-nae was an American spy and provided information on North Korea's nuclear tests to the Western intelligence agents, and that she was killed while trying to defect.

3). The Los Angeles Times article claims no autopsy was done on Kim's body and the Pakistani police was told to close the book on her case. The American intelligence claims that her body was returned to Pyongyang on June 10th, four days after her murder on a Pakistani cargo plane, and that her coffin contained two centrifuge machines for enriching uranium and associated manuals. In those days, Air Koryo had two flights per month to Islamabad. In fact, an Air Koryo plane was at Islamabad at the time of Kim's murder. Then, why would Kim's body be on a Pakistani plane?

The truth is most likely that there was no Kim Sa-nae. She was made up by North Korea to create confusion to cover up the extraction of its nuclear assets. On the other hand, the Americans went along to hammer in their claim that Pakistan provided enriched uranium technology to North Korea (and therefore, North Korea has an enriched uranium nuclear program).

The Kim Sa-nae 'murder' was a fabrication to draw away American spies in Pakistan from the imminent departure of the Air Koryo plane carrying North Korean nuclear scientists, test equipment and test data. It was a cat and mouse game, in which North Korea won.

KRONIEK 2004

januari	Lord Robertson vertrekt als Secretaris-Generaal van de NAVO
1 januari	Ierland neemt voorzitterschap EU over
1 januari	Einde Nederlands voorzitterschap OVSE
1 januari	Verenigde Staten nemen voorzitterschap G8 over
20 januari - 26 maart	Eerste sessie Conference on Disarmament, Geneve
21-25 januari	World Economic Forum, Davos
6-7 februari	Annual Munich Security Conference, München
20 februari	Parlementsverkiezingen Iran
27 februari	Bezoek Schröder aan Washington
maart	Parlementsverkiezingen Spanje
1 maart	Ministeriële bijeenkomst VS-EU, Washington
8 maart	IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, Wenen
14 maart	Presidentsverkiezingen Rusland
2 april	Bezoek Colin Powell aan Duitsland en België
2 april	Informele bijeenkomst NAVO Ministers van Defensie
5 april	Parlementsverkiezingen Indonesië
5-23 april	UN Disarmament Commission, jaarlijkse bijeenkomst, New York
9-16 april	Bezoek Dick Cheney aan China, Japan en Zuid-Korea
15 april	Parlementsverkiezingen Zuid-Korea
26 april – 7 mei	NPT PrepCom, New York
mei	Bijeenkomst Chemical Weapons Convention, Den Haag
1 mei	Toetreding diverse landen tot de Europese Unie
10 mei -25 juni	Tweede sessie Conference on Disarmament, Geneve
juni	Verkiezingen Europees Parlement
juni	Parlementsverkiezingen Japan
5-6	Bezoek George W. Bush aan Frankrijk
8-10 juni	G-8 Summit, Sea Island, Georgia
14 juni	IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, Wenen
28-29 juni	NAVO-top, Istanbul
1 juli	Nederland neemt voorzitterschap EU over
19-30 juli	Biological Weapons Convention, expert meeting, Geneve
september	Start Algemene Vergadering Verenigde Naties, New York
26 juli – 10 september	Derde sessie Conference on Disarmament, Geneve
13 september	IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, Wenen
20-24 september	IAEA General Conference, Wenen
27 september	IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, Wenen
2 november	Presidentsverkiezingen Verenigde Staten
25 november	IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, Wenen
6-10 december	Jaarlijkse bijeenkomst Biological Weapons Convention, Geneve

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