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- PROLIFERATIE - REDUCTIE VS KERNWAPENS IN EUROPA

PROLIFERATIE

DOCUMENTEN

European Council

EU Strategy against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

10 December 2003 - excerpts

At Thessaloniki, the European Council adopted a Declaration on non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Member States made the commitment, drawing on the Basic Principles already established, to further elaborate before the end of 2003 a coherent EU strategy to address the threat of proliferation, and to continue to develop and implement the Action Plan adopted in June by the Council as a matter of priority [te vinden op: ue.eu.int/pressdata/EN/reports/76328.pdf]. Delegations will find herewith the draft strategy elaborated to fulfil the commitment taken in Thessaloniki.

Introduction

1. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery such as ballistic missiles are growing threat to international peace and security. While the international treaty regimes and export controls arrangements have slowed the spread of WMD and delivery systems, a number of states have sought or are seeking to develop such weapons. The risk that terrorists will acquire chemical, biological, radiological or fissile materials and their means of delivery adds a new critical dimension to this threat.

2. As the European Security Strategy makes clear, the European Union cannot ignore these dangers. WMD and missile proliferation puts at risk the security of our states, our peoples and our interests around the world. Meeting this challenge must be a central element in the EU's external action. The EU must act with resolve, using all instruments and policies at its disposal. Our objective is to prevent, deter, halt and, where possible, eliminate proliferation programmes of concern worldwide.

[...]

Chapter I – Proliferation of WMD and means of delivery is a growing threat to international peace and security

4. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery are a growing threat. Proliferation is driven by a small number of countries and non-state actors, but presents a real threat through the spread of technologies and information and because proliferating countries may help one another. These developments take place outside the current control regime.

[...]

6. Nuclear weapons proliferation: the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) must be preserved in its integrity. It has helped to slow and in some cases reverse the spread of military nuclear capability, but it has not been able to prevent it completely. The possession of nuclear weapons by States outside the NPT and non-compliance with the Treaty's provisions by states party to the Treaty, risk undermining non-proliferation and disarmament efforts.

[...]

12. All the States of the Union and the EU institutions have a collective responsibility for preventing these risks by actively contributing to the fight against proliferation.

[...]

Chapter II – The European Union cannot ignore these dangers. It must seek an effective multilateralist response to this threat.

14. To address with unceasing determination the threat posed by WMD a broad approach covering a wide spectrum of actions is needed. Our approach will be guided by:

- our conviction that a multilateralist approach to security, including disarmament and non-proliferation, provides the best way to maintain international order and hence our commitment to uphold, implement and strengthen the multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and agreements;
- our conviction that non-proliferation should be mainstreamed in our overall policies, drawing upon all resources and instruments available to the Union;
- our determination to support the multilateral institutions charged respectively with verification and upholding of compliance with these treaties;
- our view that increased efforts are needed to enhance consequence management capabilities and improve coordination;
- our commitment to strong national and internationally-coordinated export controls;
- our conviction that the EU in pursuing effective non-proliferation should be forceful and inclusive and needs to actively contribute to international stability;
- our commitment to co-operate with the United States and other partners who share our objectives.

At the same time, the EU will continue to address the root causes of instability including through pursuing and enhancing its efforts in the areas of political conflicts, development assistance, reduction of poverty and promotion of human rights.

15. Political and diplomatic preventative measures (multilateral treaties and export control regimes) and resort to the competent international organisations form the first line of defence against proliferation. When these measures (including political dialogue and diplomatic pressure) have failed, coercive measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and international law (sanctions, selective or global, interceptions of shipments and, as appropriate, the use of force) could be envisioned. The UN Security Council should play a central role.

[...]

17. If the multilateral treaty regime is to remain credible it must be made more effective. The EU will place particular emphasis on a policy of reinforcing compliance with the multilateral treaty regime. Such a policy must be geared towards enhancing the detectability of significant violations and strengthening enforcement of the prohibitions and norms established by the multilateral treaty regime, including by providing for criminalisation of violations committed under the jurisdiction or control of a State. The role of the UN Security Council, as the final arbiter on the consequence of non-compliance – as foreseen in multilateral regimes – needs to be effectively strengthened.

20. The EU is determined to play a part in addressing the problems of regional instability and insecurity and the situations of conflict which lie behind many weapons programmes, recognising that instability does not occur in a vacuum. The best solution to the problem of proliferation of WMD is that countries should no longer feel they need them. If possible, political solutions should be found to the problems, which lead them to seek WMD. The more secure countries feel, the more likely they are to abandon programmes: disarmament measures can lead to a virtuous circle just as weapons programmes can lead to an arms race.

[...]

22. The EU believes that political solutions to all of the different problems, fears and ambitions of countries in the most dangerous regions for proliferation will not be easy to achieve in the short run. Our policy is therefore to prevent, deter, halt and, where possible, eliminate proliferation programmes of concern, while dealing with their underlying causes.

23. Positive and negative security assurances can play an important role: they can serve both as an incentive to forego the acquisition of WMD and as a deterrent. The EU will promote further consideration of security assurances.

[...]

26. Co-operation with the US and other key partners such as the Russian Federation, Japan and Canada is necessary to ensure a successful outcome of the global fight against proliferation.

[...]

Chapter III – The European Union must make use of all its instruments to prevent, deter, halt, and if possible eliminate proliferation programmes that cause concern at global level.

29. The elements of the EU's Strategy against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction need to be integrated across the board. We have a wide range of instruments available: multilateral treaties and verification mechanisms; national and internationally-coordinated export controls; cooperative threat reduction programmes; political and economic levers (including trade and development policies); interdiction of illegal procurement activities and, as a last resort, coercive measures in accordance with the UN Charter. While all are necessary, none is sufficient in itself. We need to strengthen them across the board, and deploy those that are most effective in each case. The European Union has special strengths and experience to bring to this collective effort. It is important that the EU's objectives, as set out in this strategy, be factored in its policy approach in each area, so as to maximise its effectiveness.

[...]

Veiligheidsraad Verenigde Naties

Draft Resolution on Non-Proliferation

Ingebracht door de Verenigde Staten – 24 maart 2004

De tekst is te vinden in de bijlage achteraan dit dossier

US State Department

U.S. Seeking U.N. Action to Keep WMD From Terrorists

Negroponste: Nations must confront serious problem

By Judy Aita – 24 March 2004

United Nations -- The United States presented a draft resolution to the U.N. Security Council March 24 that attempts to fill a major gap in the current non-proliferation regimes by preventing chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons from falling into the hands of non-state actors, especially terrorist groups.

After presenting the draft resolution during a private Security Council meeting, U.S. Ambassador John Negroponte said that "the fundamental purpose of this draft resolution is to deal with a very important gap that exists in international law today: that is the question of dealing with the possibility of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and materials that could be used to make them falling into the hands of non-state actors."

"It's a very important problem; it's a serious gap in the international regime and its one that needs to be dealt with on an urgent basis," he said.

"There are lots of disarmament and non-proliferation agreements that bind states to certain standards of behavior. This is the issue of preventing these weapons and materials from getting into the hands of non-state actors who, of course, are not parties to such treaties. It's an important draft resolution and an important step that we can take together to confront a serious problem we will be facing for some time to come," he said.

The United States defines "non-state actors" for the purpose of the resolution as "individuals or entity, not acting under the lawful authority of any state in conducting activities."

The text has been negotiated and agreed upon by the five permanent members of the Security Council -- China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and the United States -- that have veto power. The text next will be discussed with the 10 non-permanent members of the council -- Algeria, Angola, Benin, Brazil, Chile, Germany, Pakistan, Philippines, Romania, and Spain -- before being put to a vote.

Negroponte said that the U.S. delegation hopes to move the draft forward "as expeditiously as possible," but gave no indication as to when a vote might be expected.

President Bush first mentioned the resolution in his speech at the opening of the General Assembly in September 2003. He called for the adoption of a new anti-proliferation resolution requiring nations to criminalize the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, enact strict export controls, and secure any and all sensitive materials within their own borders.

"The deadly combination of outlaw regimes, terror networks, and weapons of mass murder is a peril that cannot be ignored or wished away," the president said. "If such a danger is allowed to fully materialize, all works, all protests, will come to late. Nations of the world must have the wisdom and the will to stop grave threats before they arrive."

The United States, Bush said, "is determined to keep the world's most destructive weapons away from all our shores, and out of the hands of our common enemies."

The draft resolution calls on member states to criminalize the proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, and their means of delivery to non-state actors, Negroponte said. "We believe we must act now to set a higher standard to prevent these weapons, key elements used to create them, and designs used to make them from falling into the hands of non-state actors, including terrorists who would seek to do us harm."

"There is explicit language in the draft making clear that this resolution is not meant to supercede, undercut, or undermine existing disarmament and non-proliferation regimes," he said.

The draft resolution calls on member states to refrain from providing support to non-state actors attempting to manufacture, develop, acquire, possess, or use chemical, biological or nuclear weapons. It also calls on member states to adopt and enforce laws prohibiting non-state actors from pursuing these activities and to establish effective domestic controls over these weapons and key items used to create them.

The draft resolution would be adopted under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which makes it binding and mandatory for all U.N. member states.

"The most important obligation it asks member states of the United Nations to undertake is to criminalize the provision of such items and such materials through their own domestic legislation. That is the key part of the resolution," Negroponte said.

The draft resolution "calls upon all nations to review all current procedures, to improve them, and to cooperate to prevent these very dangerous weapons from spreading beyond our control," Negroponte said.

The draft also recognizes that some nations may need assistance in implementing the provisions of the resolution and strengthening controls. It asks nations with the appropriate expertise to provide assistance on legal and regulatory infrastructure, implementation and resources. The council also would appoint a committee to monitor the implementation of the resolution, which would require reports from each nation.

The United Kingdom announced that it will co-sponsor the resolution.

"What we have to do is stop the ultimate nightmare of bringing together weapons of mass destruction and the terrorists," British Ambassador Emyr Jones Parry said.

US State Department

Rep. Tom Lantos on Halting the Nuclear Black Market

Op-ed by ranking Democrat on House International Relations Committee

(This column by Representative Tom Lantos, who is the ranking Democrat on the House International Relations Committee, was published in the San Francisco Chronicle March 30)

Halting The Nuclear Black Market

Tom Lantos

Globalization and the Cold War's end have given rise to a nuclear black market with chilling implications for the future of arms control. Rogue nations and terrorist groups have greater access to the makings of a radioactive "dirty bomb," or even a nuclear device, than ever before.

In the most recent example of this alarming trend, Pakistan's senior bomb-maker was recently found to have linked companies and banks in Europe, Asia and the Middle East that provided high-tech equipment and financing for nuclear weapons programs in Libya, Iran and North Korea, and perhaps others.

The main document governing how countries handle these issues, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, was never expected to address such a dispersed network. To convince states to fore-swear nuclear weapons -- while letting the United States, Britain, France, Russia and China, in the midst of the Cold War, keep theirs - - the treaty codified the right of non-nuclear states to receive and develop the means for peaceful applications of nuclear energy, such as medicine, agriculture and the creation of power. Under this guise, countries can develop or import essentially all the equipment they need to produce a nuclear weapon. Such countries do not even have to reveal the existence of these facilities or let inspectors visit them until they are ready to begin operation.

This freedom to obtain equipment and facilities without transparency means that the system relies only on the discretion of the supplier. A number of countries have been somewhat reluctant to sell to rogue countries any equipment that could be used to develop a nuclear capability. But Iran, Libya and North Korea were able to import all manner of sophisticated equipment from new, essentially private suppliers.

The United States, with outside assistance, is now attempting to shut down this supplier network, but new suppliers may come along if the international community does not act immediately. Strong economic and

diplomatic action must be taken against countries such as Iran, even if it means additional costs and lost investment opportunities. Such actions have been proven effective: After years of sanctions and U.S. leadership, Libya has given up its weapons of mass destruction, including a significant nuclear program. Until recently, I was one of the leading proponents of sanctions against Libya; earlier this year, I learned firsthand what a key role international pressure played in the sea change Libyan leader Moammar Khadafy made. In meetings with him and members of his government earlier this year, it became clear that Khadafy decided Libya could better assure its security through a positive relationship with the United States and the West than with a risky and costly policy of developing weapons of mass destruction. Libya's leaders also told me that their nation faces growing economic difficulties that can be resolved only by redirecting resources into development, integrating closely into the world economy and seeing sanctions ended. If the leadership of other countries, such as Iran, reaches the same conclusion, it will be a great boon to the cause of nonproliferation.

I have just introduced a bill that makes it clear that Iran, as a state abusing its access to the means of peaceful nuclear development, has forfeited the right to produce nuclear material for reactors and must be deprived of new nuclear-related trade, investment and trade agreements until it permanently and verifiably ceases all suspect nuclear activities and dismantles any fuel-production facilities. Furthermore, U.S. nuclear trade sanctions law must be amended to meet these new challenges. Existing law targets governments for illicit nuclear trade, not private individuals, banks or corporations.

I will soon introduce the Nuclear Black Market Elimination Act, which would empower the president to halt all U.S. business and financial transactions with any individual or company that engages in black-market nuclear trade and would require the president to inform Congress of foreign companies that undercut U.S. sanctions.

The technology to produce nuclear weapons has become too dispersed among too many nations to rely solely on Cold War-era approaches. All countries -- those implicated in the black market, those seeking to protect and extend investment in Iran despite its nuclear activities, and the United States -- must now exercise responsibility for their own and their citizens' activities that may support, materially or politically, the creation of more nuclear weapons.

BERICHTEN

Global Security Newswire

U.S. Advocates "Incremental" Nuclear Disarmament

By David Ruppe - 30 March 2004

WASHINGTON — Facing apparent foreign criticism that U.S. policies are undermining global nuclear nonproliferation efforts, a senior U.S. diplomat last week said that a newly emerged "nexus" of terrorism and illicit WMD development argues for "incremental," unregimented nuclear disarmament.

"Events of the past few years have introduced a new and destabilizing unpredictability into world affairs," Ambassador Jackie Sanders, the senior U.S. representative to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, said in a speech Thursday to the conference.

The new threat "poses a risk to the very pillars of civilization," Sanders said.

She added, "These developments do not mean the nuclear disarmament process needs to stop. ... But it illustrates the obvious point that disarmament of any type does not take place in an international security vacuum and reinforces the conclusion that sweeping, unfocused approaches to disarmament such as a nuclear weapons convention or setting timetables are illusory and will not work."

"As history teaches us, progress will come only through incremental approaches that take account of states' threat perceptions," she said.

U.S. Policies Criticized

Sanders' comments followed speeches at the conference earlier this month by representatives of friendly nations who appeared to criticize the United States indirectly for pursuing policies perceived counter to its commitments to move toward nuclear disarmament.

The discussion comes as parties to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty prepare for a major review conference next year. Article 6 of the treaty requires parties to work "in good faith" toward nuclear disarmament and, in the even longer term, toward "general and complete disarmament."

At a 1995 treaty review conference, the nations permitted by the treaty to possess nuclear weapons — the United States, Russia, France, China and the United Kingdom — agreed to move toward eventual nuclear disarmament in exchange for a permanent extension to the treaty. At the 2000 review, the five powers agreed to take 13 steps toward disarmament.

Critics have charged the United States with making insufficient progress on those commitments, citing research and development of new nuclear weapons capabilities, a 2002 strategic policy document that identified certain non-nuclear countries as potential nuclear-weapons targets, and the U.S. refusal to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

In a March 16 statement to the conference, Swedish Foreign Minister Laila Freivalds appeared to restate that concern, though without identifying the United States directly.

“We see a trend toward increased emphasis on nuclear weapons as part of security strategies and signs that a new generation of nuclear weapons might be in the making,” according to a released text of her speech.

“Such pursuits would undermine the credibility of the nuclear nonproliferation regime and could prompt a new arms race,” she said.

Canadian Foreign Minister Bill Graham, in a speech delivered that same day, said his government would be “pressing hard” for progress on the 1995 deal and said failure could encourage proliferation, according to a released text of his speech.

“Without progress toward nuclear disarmament, it will be very difficult to keep non-nuclear countries from seeing nuclear weapons as [a means of] deterrence or even to obtain political prestige,” he said.

Similarly, Irish Foreign Minister Brian Cowen in a released text called progress on disarmament and nonproliferation “mutually reinforcing.”

He added, “There is a tendency for some members of the treaty to stress its nonproliferation aspects to the neglect of the disarmament provisions of the NPT.”

U.S. Examples of Progress

In her address last week, Sanders listed a number of U.S. policy developments that she said demonstrate a “strong U.S. record” on nuclear arms reduction.

She said the United States in the 1990s withdrew from service “large numbers” of nonstrategic weapons, dismantled more than 13,000 nuclear weapons, and with Russia removed large quantities of fissile material from military stockpiles.

During the Bush administration, she continued, the United States signed a 2002 treaty with Russia to withdraw from operational deployment all but a maximum of 2,200 strategic warheads by the end of 2012.

“This reflects a commitment at the highest political level in both countries to Article 6 implementation,” she said.

Critics, though, have said that the latest treaty requires no destruction of any weapons and that the off-loaded warheads could be quickly returned to service.

Sanders also cited a policy outlined in the administration’s 2002 Nuclear Posture Review to focus less on overwhelming nuclear retaliation against Russia, and more on pursuing a variety of nuclear capabilities including low-yield weapons for addressing other threats, as well as conventional weapons, national missile defense and “revitalized defense infrastructure.”

The approach “represents an historic break from the past,” she said, adding that by integrating non-nuclear weapons into offensive strategic capabilities, the United States is “thereby reducing dependence on nuclear weapons.”

Critics have charged the opposite, saying the administration’s interest in developing less-destructive, lower-yield weapons and weapons for destroying chemical and biological agents, could increase the prospect of nuclear use.

Ireland’s Cowen appeared to echo that concern, saying the development of new types or new uses for nuclear weapons “suggests that the taboo on the use of such weapons could be weakened.”

Sweden’s Freivalds said military planners could be tempted to use “nonstrategic” nuclear weapons as “battlefield weapons” and that “blurring the lines between conventional weapons and nonstrategic nuclear weapons would lower the threshold against the use of nuclear weapons.”

Citing the global proliferation of underground bunkers that might offer defense against nuclear attack, U.S. officials have argued that lower-yield weapons could be useful for threatening foreign leaders who either do not value the welfare of their people and would risk overwhelming retaliation, or who believe the United States would not strike a populated area with large-scale nuclear weapons. The Bush administration also is studying improving a high-yield earth-penetrating weapon, citing an inability to strike very deeply buried bunkers.

“Greater flexibility is needed with respect to nuclear forces and planning than was the case during the Cold War,” said the Nuclear Posture Review.

“Today’s nuclear arsenal continues to reflect its Cold War origin, characterized by moderate delivery accuracy, limited earth penetrator capability, high-yield warheads, silo- and sea-based ballistic missiles with multiple independent reentry vehicles, and limited retargeting capability,” it said.

Better Climate Needed

Sanders said that non-nuclear states share a responsibility for creating an international climate to enable nuclear-armed states to reduce their stockpiles.

“While the nuclear weapon states have the primary responsibility to pursue measures related to nuclear disarmament, all parties can contribute meaningfully toward that goal by helping to fashion an international environment that is conducive to a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons and to their eventual elimination,” she said.

“Achieving nuclear disarmament is a gradual process that will be long and difficult. Political realities and changes in science and technology are among the factors that make it so,” she said.

Global Security Newswire

Pakistani Leader Did Not OK Nuclear Proliferation, U.S. Official Says; No Sanctions to Be Imposed

By David Ruppe

WASHINGTON — Pakistani government officials undoubtedly were involved in recently disclosed nuclear weapons technology transfers to Iran, Libya and North Korea, and the most senior officials knew it was occurring, a senior U.S. official said yesterday.

However, the United States does not believe that Pakistani leaders, including President Pervez Musharraf, were complicit in the proliferation and so no U.S. sanctions have been imposed, said Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton in testimony before the House International Relations Committee.

Former Pakistani nuclear weapons laboratory director Abdul Qadeer Khan confessed in February to coordinating the transfers.

“I don’t have any doubt that there were officials in the employ of the government of Pakistan — perhaps at Khan Research Laboratories, perhaps in the military — who participated in Khan’s network and probably enriched themselves just as Khan himself did,” Bolton said. “The issue is the extent to which, if at all, the top levels of the government of Pakistan were involved in his activities,” he added.

“Based on the information we have now, we believe that the proliferation activities that Mr. Khan confessed to recently — his activities in Libya, in Iran and North Korea, and perhaps elsewhere — were activities that he was carrying on without the approval of the top levels of the government of Pakistan. That is the position that President Musharraf has taken, and we have no evidence to the contrary,” he said.

Bolton said Musharraf may have been aware of the proliferation, but that it was not possible for the government to act until this year because of Khan’s status as a national icon and the Pakistani “internal political dynamic.” He cited recent attempts to assassinate the president.

Questions of Complicity

Since Musharraf pardoned Khan the day after the scientist’s confession, the Bush administration has been criticized for not faulting or sanctioning the Pakistani government.

“One has to say it strains credulity to believe that the ... Pakistani government was not aware in detail,” said Victor Gilinsky, commissioner of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission during the Ford and Carter administrations, who testified on a panel following Bolton.

Committee Democrats yesterday grilled Bolton on the administration’s approach.

It should seem to even the “most casual of observers that you cannot use the military transport planes of Pakistan to deliver that kind of materiel and program to North Korea and others without the implicit support of the army of Pakistan,” said the committee’s ranking Democrat, Gary Ackerman (N.Y.).

He noted that Musharraf headed the Pakistani army while suspected transfers were occurring. Musharraf was the army’s chief and Pakistan’s chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee when he took control of the government following a military coup in October 1999.

Bolton argued that Khan's use of Pakistani military aircraft for proliferation did not necessarily indicate that senior officials were involved.

"The understanding we have is that Khan Research Laboratories had extraordinary autonomy and quite likely could use military aircraft for purposes that others in the military would not necessarily know the purpose of because of [compartmentalization] of the information," he said.

Representative William Delahunt (D-Mass.) cited a recent *New York Times* [account](#) of a Central Intelligence Agency report that a clandestine proliferation relationship between Pakistan and North Korea began in the early 1990s and accelerated between 1998 and 2002.

Bolton suggested the newspaper account was inaccurate, and refused to comment further, noting the report is classified.

Representative Betty McCollum (D-Minn.) cited reports that a ship containing nuclear industrial equipment seized last year en route to Libya reportedly contained uranium centrifuges built from a Pakistani design and originated with Khan associates in Malaysia. "Yet you make the statement that no high-level officials knew of this transfer or Mr. Khan's profits of over \$100 million from Libya possibly alone," she said.

A *New Republic* article published last week says Khan has a daughter who possesses information implicating high-level Pakistani officials in the proliferation, McCollum noted. Bolton refused to discuss the article in public.

Bolton said the United States is seeking information on how the proliferation took place by investigating the Khan network and soliciting information from the Pakistani government.

He said U.S. officials have concluded that speaking directly to Khan is unnecessary "because we are satisfied for now that the government of Pakistan is complying with the commitments they've made to us" to assist in the U.S. investigation of the scientist's network.

Bush Policies Criticized

Ackerman criticized the administration for announcing this month it would designate Pakistan a "major non-NATO ally" to the United States, which could give the country better access to U.S. military technology and training.

"Instead of getting to the bottom of A.Q. Khan's nefarious enterprise, the president proposes to make it easier for Pakistan to acquire sensitive U.S. technology?" Ackerman said.

"This double standard with regard to Pakistan makes a mockery of our nonproliferation efforts around the world," he said.

Bolton said the special status "was based on other factors."

Ackerman also questioned why the Bush administration has not so far sanctioned Pakistan under two proliferation sanctions laws, saying the administration is "giving them a pass on proliferating nuclear technology."

"It is clear to me, and I think it should be clear to anyone else, that Pakistan sold nuclear technology and probably nuclear weapons designs to terrorist states, even those in the evil axis," he said, referring to President George W. Bush's categorization of Iran, Iraq and North Korea as an "axis of evil."

"If we had information about complicity of top levels of the government of Pakistan, we would act on it. At this point, there's no such information," Bolton said.

Ackerman acknowledged that Pakistan has supported U.S. efforts to fight international terrorists associated with al-Qaeda, as well as the political difficulties Musharraf faces within his country.

He said, though, that the administration has already provided Pakistan with \$2 billion in aid in the past two years and is requesting \$700 million for fiscal 2005, which "clearly already demonstrates our great support."

Committee Chairman Henry Hyde (R-Ill.) said the administration should be credited for "persuading the leaders of Pakistan to take active measures to interrupt the proliferation of nuclear materials and assistance that has metastasized unchecked from that country for many years."

REDUCTIE VS KERNWAPENS IN EUROPA

DOCUMENTEN

SHAPE

SHAPE news update

10 March 2004

(Website: <http://www.nato.int/shape/news/2004/03/s040310.htm>; inmiddels niet meer beschikbaar)

[...] Gen. Jones' remarks, in a testimony to a Belgian Senate Committee Tuesday, are generating interest. "Gen. Jones said in Brussels Tuesday the United States will significantly reduce its nuclear weapons in Europe," reports La Libre Belgique. The article adds that responding to queries by Belgian senators regarding the presence of nuclear weapons in Belgium and the risk of a U.S. plane carrying nuclear weapons crashing on Belgian soil, Gen. Jones said: "The reduction will be significant. Good news is on the way."

The article notes that while not explicitly mentioning nuclear weapons at Kleine Brogel, Gen. Jones confirmed that in the post-Cold War era, the United States had other priorities. Stressing, however, that the presence of nuclear weapons at Kleine Brogel is an open secret, the article adds:

"The U.S. plan mentioned by Gen. Jones is on a much larger scale since it aims at a worldwide redeployment of U.S. forces.... Gen. Jones also insisted on deep changes within NATO. Missions have changed. Yesterday's enemy—the USSR and the Warsaw Pact—has collapsed.... The threat now comes from drug trafficking, terrorist networks and criminal organizations. 'We have too many forces with a defensive character. We need ... proactive forces able to intervene globally,' Gen. Jones said. One of the responses to these threats is the new NATO Response Force.... But armies must also restructure as is the case for Belgium, 'an important and faithful' NATO partner.... Many efforts must still be made. Gen. Jones indicated that European NATO members have an excess of 177 land brigades, that there are 2.4 million Europeans in uniform but that in reality, 'we need about 40 percent less.' [...]

US Department of Defense

Troop Level Reports: Nothing but Speculation, Rumsfeld Says

By Jim Garamone (American Forces Press Service) – 25 March 2004

WASHINGTON, March 25, 2004 – Any report on specific changes to U.S. troop levels based in various parts of the world is speculation, because the department still is working with friends and allies around the world on those levels, senior Defense Department officials said at a Pentagon news conference today.

Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and Air Force Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, addressed news reports that final decisions had been made in how to adjust the U.S. military's global "footprint" to better address challenges of the 21st century.

DoD began looking at the U.S. global posture almost as soon as the Bush administration took office, Rumsfeld said. Many basing decisions originally made in response to the Soviet threat during the Cold War have carried over. The secretary said that since the end of the Cold War, the numbers of American troops had drawn down, but often they remained in the same places.

The chances of American soldiers fighting a tank battle in Germany today, the secretary said, "are so modest that it calls for a review of how we're arranged."

Rumsfeld said the United States still needs bases overseas. Forward basing allows the United States to deter attacks on regional friends and allies. It also allows the country to move troops quickly to trouble spots and the U.S. military to train with allies, he explained.

A goal of the effort is to have fewer U.S. service members permanently based overseas and add some stability to military life.

"We want to reduce the number of permanent changes of station, and the costs that that imposes on our people," Rumsfeld said. "We'd like ... to reduce stress on families so that, for example, the spouses that work won't be having to change jobs every five minutes, or kids that are in high school don't have to be jerked out as frequently and moved to some other place as often as has been the case in a typical military career."

DoD leaders worked with U.S. combatant commanders to evaluate – from a military standpoint – what makes sense in basing American troops overseas. The initial part of that review is finished, and now

American defense leaders and State Department officials are speaking with affected countries to get their input.

Rumsfeld and Myers indicated the conversations with these countries are going well, but that they are nowhere near completion. Both men indicated they do not know what the final footprint of American forces will be. "To the extent we talk to two or three about where we might be located, we obviously would arrange ourselves where the best arrangement was for the American people and for our friends and allies," Rumsfeld said.

The secretary emphasized that the United States will make no changes in force posture that "would be to the detriment of any of our friends or allies." But that does not mean there won't be fewer "things" or troops in any given country, he added.

"We're used to counting things – how many tanks, how many ships, how many planes, how many troops," Rumsfeld said. "And what we know of certain knowledge today is that that's really not the relevant measurement."

During World War II, it often took hundreds of bomber sorties to knock out one target. Today, one B-2 Spirit bomber can knock out up to 20 targets with one sortie.

What capability the United States bases in a country is more important than how many tanks or aircraft or ships the country bases there, Rumsfeld said. The reorganization will take several years, he added.

Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers België

Commissie voor de Landsverdediging

Integraal verslag – 29 maart 2003

13 Vraag van de heer Theo Kelchtermans aan de minister van Landsverdediging over "Kleine-Brogel en de terugtrekking van de kernwapens" (nr. 2254)

13.01 **Theo Kelchtermans** (CD&V): Ik denk dat de volgende vraag minder discussie zal uitlokken, er zal een klaar en duidelijk antwoord zijn. Ik twijfel daar niet aan omdat het hier gaat over een commentaar op een duidelijk interview dat door generaal Jones is gegeven na het gesprek dat hij in de Senaat had naar aanleiding van het bezoek. Hij liet daarbij volgens mij serieus in zijn kaarten kijken wat de huidige situatie betreft en de wenselijkheid in de toekomstige situatie. Wat de huidige situatie betreft is het hypocriet om er mysterieus over te doen, want iedereen is ervan op de hoogte. Hij sprak dan ook vrijmoedig over de kernwapens in Kleine Brogel; wij zijn een van de zeven landen waar die gestationeerd zijn.

Het is een geheim waarover men hier steeds bijzonder gewichtig deed, hoewel ondertussen zowel de directe omgeving als heel Vlaanderen weet dat er een tiental B-61 tactische kernwapens in Kleine Brogel aanwezig zijn. Het is trouwens een vliegbasis met een nucleaire opdracht. Om het plastisch uit te drukken: ik heb nog nooit gehoord van een frietkot zonder patatten. Zo denk ik ook dat een nucleaire basis verondersteld wordt tenminste één nucleaire bom te hebben, anders zie ik niet goed in hoe ze hun missie kunnen vervullen.

Generaal Jones zei dat er goed nieuws op komst is, wat de verwachtingen natuurlijk enorm heeft doen toenemen. Het verwonderde me dan ook dat het windstil bleef na het interview, vandaar deze opfrissing en mijn vragen. Hij kondigde goed nieuws aan voor het einde van maart en tegelijk is er een globale reorganisatie van de Amerikaanse troepen in Europa op til, met een andere strategische benadering. Dat is iets waar u zelf in uw stuurplan in belangrijke mate op inspeelt en wat ik zelf ook in positieve zin heb beklemtoond. Ik denk dat het een nieuwe evolutie is. Het wil zeggen dat wat nu is, niet meer zal zijn in de toekomst.

Mijn vragen zijn dan ook heel concreet. Ten eerste, is er in deze fase van aangekondigde terugtrekking van de nucleaire wapens geen bevestiging van de aanwezigheid van de nucleaire wapens mogelijk? We zijn toch geen kinderen, we mogen toch wel weten wat daar is, zeker als iedereen het eigenlijk al weet.

Ten tweede, zal men de atoomwapens die er zijn reduceren of helemaal terugtrekken? Ik neem aan dat er overleg over gevoerd is of overleg bezig is en dat de commissie voor de Defensie dat ook mag weten.

Ten derde, wat houdt dat in voor de aanwezigheid van het Amerikaanse detachement op die vliegbasis van Kleine Brogel? Ze hebben toch die specifieke opdracht en worden dan toch – zo neem ik aan – overbodig? Wat gebeurt er op dat vlak met het NAVO-statuut van de vliegbasis Kleine Brogel? Nu hebben ze uitdrukkelijk een nucleaire missie en ik neem aan dat als die vervalt de aanwezigheid van het Amerikaanse detachement niet meer vereist is. Er rijst in dat geval ook een probleem met betrekking tot de toekomstige missie van die nucleaire basis. De concrete vraag die daaruit volgt is dan: wat zal de nieuwe oriëntering worden van de opdrachten van deze vliegbasis, waarvan u de huidige opdracht, net als die van Haspengouw,

in uw stuurplan behoudt? Wat kan er de toekomstige opdracht voor zijn? Tenslotte zou ik ook graag weten binnen welk tijdschema deze strategie zou kunnen verlopen.

13.02 **André Flahaut**, ministre: J'ai lu comme tout le monde les déclarations du général Jones devant la commission du Sénat. Je vous confirme que les Etats-Unis étudient actuellement une révision de leur arsenal nucléaire en Europe. Ce processus vise une restructuration des moyens nucléaires afin de pouvoir mieux répondre aux nouveaux risques prévisibles pour notre sécurité.

Il se déroule en toute transparence avec les alliés de l'OTAN dont les intérêts ont été pris en compte, les alliés actuels comme les alliés futurs. Compte tenu de l'importance du lien transatlantique, tant politique que militaire, l'Alliance souhaite cependant maintenir en Europe une capacité nucléaire très clairement réduite mais jugée suffisante dans le nouvel environnement stratégique. Les informations concernant le nombre ou la localisation des armes nucléaires sont classifiées pour des raisons évidentes de sécurité. La classification des informations se fait par dispositions légales et pénales. Vous ne pouvez pas m'obliger à enfreindre la loi. Donc, en clair, je ne peux pas entrer dans les spéculations à ce sujet. Je veux simplement rappeler qu'au début de la précédente législature, le premier ministre avait formulé une proposition aux deux Chambres pour l'accès à ce type d'informations. Je ne sais pas où on en est dans cette procédure mais j'y renvoie les personnes qui souhaitent avoir des informations à ce sujet.

Dans le plan directeur, la base de Kleine Brogel reste prévue puisque s'y trouvent des F-16 avec des missions de protection de notre espace aérien et même d'un espace aérien plus large vu que certains de ces avions sont partis aujourd'hui en Lituanie. Les avions F-16 belges resteront à Kleine Brogel comme à Florennes. Il n'y a pas aujourd'hui de fusion ou de disparition de cette base à l'ordre du jour.

Il ne s'agit pas d'hypocrisie mais de respecter la loi. Il y a peut-être des gens qui ne la respectent pas; ils en prennent la responsabilité. Moi, je dois respecter la loi.

13.03 **Theo Kelchtermans** (CD&V): Mijnheer de minister, of u dat zegt of niet, de feiten zijn wat ze zijn. Wellicht is hetgeen op de basis aanwezig is, nog beter bekend in deze kring. Mijnheer de minister, ik ben onthutst door uw antwoord op de eerste vraag. Ik kan mij niet inbeelden dat u, na het interview in een Vlaamse en een Franstalige krant te hebben gelezen, geen initiatief hebt genomen of geen opdracht aan uw medewerkers hebt gegeven om de draagwijdte van het interview binnen NATO na te gaan en bij de betrokken generaal uitleg te vragen. U geeft de indruk dat er sindsdien niets is gebeurd en dat u terzake geen enkel initiatief hebt genomen om precies te weten wat de generaal – het is geen klein nieuws – heeft bedoeld en wat de consequenties voor het Belgische leger en de NATO zijn.

13.04 **André Flahaut**, ministre: Je ne suis pas responsable de ce que dit un général, fût-il le SACEUR.

13.05 **Theo Kelchtermans** (CD&V): Dat is toch geen kleine jongen. Het betreft hier generaal Jones, opperbevelhebber van de Amerikaanse troepen in Europa en tevens NAVO-opperbevelhebber, die een uitspraak doet.

13.06 **André Flahaut**, ministre: Monsieur Kelchtermans, vous êtes bourgmestre de la commune, envoyez une lettre au général Jones et demandez-lui de explications.

13.07 **Theo Kelchtermans** (CD&V): Wij beschikken over een minister van Landsverdediging. Mijnheer de minister, wij zijn samen aanwezig in deze commissievergadering, u in uw hoedanigheid van minister van Landsverdediging en ik als parlementslid.

Deze situatie verbaast mij en ik ben er zeker van dat u aan uw medewerkers de opdracht hebt gegeven om te vragen of u zelf een initiatief neemt om te weten wat de generaal precies bedoelt. Dat lijkt mij het meest evidente. Wat hij zegt, is immers ook voor het Belgisch leger zeer verstrekkend. Hij kondigt hele hervormingen aan die daarin perfect kaderen. U zegt dat u dat ook hebt gelezen en daarmee houdt het op. Ik kan moeilijk aanvaarden dat het daarmee ophoudt. Ik vermoed dat er meer is geweten, te meer aangezien het zo stil blijft en het nu al eind maart is. Wij kennen het goede nieuws dat door de generaal - blijkbaar met grote zekerheid – werd aangekondigd. Anders zou hij dat immers niet zo zeggen. Na het debat in de Senaat zijn wij met een aantal leden van deze commissie samen rond de tafel gaan zitten, alwaar die man daarover zeer onbevangen sprak. Ik heb hem geen vragen gesteld over deze aangelegenheid, aangezien hij het tijdens de commissievergadering zelf had verteld. Er was daarover een debat geweest en het werd achteraf nog veel explicieter herhaald in de kranten. Ik vraag u thans zonder meer of dat zo is of niet, maar na al die tijd antwoordt u mij alleen dat u dat ook hebt gelezen.

Ik heb de indruk dat de betrokken generaal zijn mond heeft voorbijgepraat vermits het nu stil blijft. Ik vermoed dat hij tot de orde is geroepen en ik zou graag van u willen vernemen of dat inderdaad het geval is. Wie dat zou moeten weten, is volgens mij de minister van Landsverdediging. Het betrof immers een belangrijke uitspraak die het Belgisch leger ook rechtstreeks aanging. Toch krijg ik geen antwoord op mijn vraag.

13.08 **André Flahaut**, ministre: Il n'y a pas de réponse.

Het incident is gesloten.

(CD&V is de partij Christen Democratisch en Vlaams, Kelchtermans is burgemeester van Peer (de gemeente waar Kleine Brogel onder valt)

Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers België

Plenumvergadering

Integraal verslag – 1 april 2004

[...] 07 Vraag van de heer Theo Kelchtermans aan de eerste minister over "de toekomst van de luchtmachtbasis van Kleine Brogel" (nr. P310)

07.01 **Theo Kelchtermans** (CD&V): Mijnheer de voorzitter, mijnheer de vice-eerste minister, op 9 maart bracht de SACEUR van de NAVO, opperbevelhebber generaal Jones, een bezoek aan de Senaat. Een aantal senatoren voerde met hem een interessant debat. Hij was zeer openhartig en stelde enkele perspectieven voor met betrekking tot de toekomstige ontwikkeling van de NAVO en de aanwezigheid van

Amerikaanse troepen in Europa. Achteraf heeft hij dit in een tweetal interviews in La Libre Belgique en in De Morgen nogmaals herhaald. Hij sprak zeer openhartig over de ontwikkelingen zoals hij ze zag. Hij voegde eraan toe dat dit inderdaad goed nieuws was, maar dat het hem niet toekwam dat goede nieuws officieel kenbaar te maken. Hij sprak heel openhartig over het feit dat ook het nucleair potentieel in Europa zal worden geherpositioneerd en verwees met name naar België en naar een zevental andere Europese landen.

Mijnheer de vice-eerste minister, mijn eerste vraag is wat daarvan de consequenties zijn op het concept op Europees vlak? Generaal Jones is samen met de eerste minister een groot voorstander van een Europees concept inzake defensie. Wat zijn daarvan de gevolgen?

Ten tweede, ik neem aan dat het ook zo zal worden uitgevoerd. Werd over het goede nieuws waarvan de generaal zei dat het ons eind maart zou worden meegedeeld, overleg geweest of - beter nog - werd het al officieel meegedeeld? Het is een feit dat het zal worden uitgevoerd. Als het werd meegedeeld en als het wordt uitgevoerd, wat zijn daarvan de consequenties op het statuut, op de tewerkstelling en op de herpositionering van de huidige vliegbasissen in België?

07.02 Minister **Louis Michel**: Mijnheer de voorzitter, collega's, ik antwoord in naam van collega Flahaut. Ten eerste, er was een overleg in het kader van de NAVO. Ten tweede, ik kan bevestigen dat de Verenigde Staten een deel van hun kernwapenarsenaal uit Europa terugtrekken. Ten derde, het stuurplan van Defensie voorziet helemaal geen verandering voor de luchtmachtbasis in Kleine Brogel.

07.03 **Theo Kelchtermans** (CD&V): Mijnheer de voorzitter, mijnheer de minister, ik stelde deze vraag reeds aan de heer Flahaut in de commissievergadering. Ik kreeg daar alleen het laconieke antwoord dat hij dat interview ook had gelezen en daarom stel ik deze vraag hier opnieuw. Ik richtte ze tot de eerste minister en ik waardeer dat u in de plaats van de eerste minister antwoordt. Het antwoord is trouwens al veel duidelijker dan het antwoord in de commissievergadering. Men mag er dus van uitgaan dat er weldegelijk potentieel nucleair materiaal aanwezig is in België, vermits hij zegt dat men het zal terugtrekken. Men kan iets slechts terugtrekken als het er is, anders kan er van terugtrekking geen sprake zijn.

De geheimzinnigheid waarmee men dit probleem blijft behandelen is volgens mij geen goede zaak, en zeker niet wanneer men ziet hoe openhartig de generaal die het allemaal mee moet beheren daarover spreekt. Ik heb de indruk dat er een strategie is. U kunt mij moeilijk bevestigend of ontkennend antwoorden, maar ik heb de indruk en ik beschik over informatie dat men, ook binnen de NAVO, wat verveeld zit met de grote openhartigheid van de opperbevelhebber.

Mijnheer de minister, ik kan me niet van de indruk ontdoen dat de NAVO verveeld zit over de grote openhartigheid van de opperbevelhebber. Met zwijgen probeert men te doen vergeten wat deze generaal in zijn bewonderenswaardige openhartigheid gezegd heeft.

Het incident is gesloten. [...]

Ministerie van Defensie

Beantwoording kamervragen Van Bommel (SP)

2 april 2004

Antwoord van de heer Kamp, minister van Defensie, mede namens de heer Bot, minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, op vragen van het lid van Bommel (SP) over Amerikaanse kernwapens in Europa. (Ingezonden 15 maart 2004)

1. Heeft u kennisgenomen van de opmerking van de Navo-opperbevelhebber generaal Jones in de Belgische senaat op 9 maart 2004, dat het aantal Amerikaanse kernwapens in Europa zal worden verminderd?¹

Antwoord: Ja

2. Is u bekend of de Amerikaanse autoriteiten daarbij ook aan vermindering van kernwapens op luchtmachtbasis Volkel in Nederland denken? Zo ja, wat zijn de plannen en op welke termijn zullen die worden uitgevoerd?

3. Bent u bereid om van dit Amerikaanse voornemen om kernwapens in Europa te verminderen gebruik te maken door er actief bij de Amerikaanse autoriteiten op aan te dringen kernwapens uit Volkel te verwijderen? Indien neen, waarom niet?

Antwoord: Het Navo Strategisch Concept uit 1999 stelt dat Navo's nucleaire strijdkrachten in Europa een essentieel onderdeel zijn van de politieke en militaire band tussen de Europese en de Amerikaanse bondgenoten. Het Bondgenootschap zal daartoe voldoende nucleaire strijdkrachten in Europa handhaven, op het minimum niveau benodigd voor de handhaving van vrede en stabiliteit. Over aantallen en locaties van de in Europa aanwezige Amerikaanse kernwapens worden geen mededelingen gedaan.

Noot: 1. www.nato.int/shape/news/2004/03/s40310.htm

BERICHTEN

De Morgen

'Kernwapens in basis Kleine Brogel kunnen pasmunt zijn voor Navo-uitbreiding'

VS-generaal stelt 'significante vermindering' kernwapenarsenaal in vooruitzicht

Door Maarten Rabaey – 11 maart 2004

De Amerikaanse generaal James L. Jones verklaarde dinsdag dat er een 'significante vermindering' komt van het aantal kernwapens in Europa. Hij zei dat in de Belgische senaatscommissies Buitenlandse Zaken en Defensie in antwoorden op vragen over Kleine Brogel, waar nog een tiental B61-kernwapens ligt. Volgens Robert S. Norris, directeur van het Nuclear Weapons Databook Project uit Washington, zou de terugtrekking uit Europa al zijn begonnen. 'In Griekenland werden ze in alle stilte al weggehaald'.

James Jones is niet de eerste de beste sterrenmilitair. Hij is sinds januari 2003 de Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) en 'US European Command' commander, de opperbevelhebber van de Amerikaanse en Navo-troepen in Europa. "Er is goed nieuws op komst", vertelde hij aan de senatoren, op de vraag of de reductie van het kernwapenarsenaal ook betrekking zou hebben op Kleine Brogel. Daarmee speelde hij voorbode van het Pentagon, dat eind maart zijn herstructureringsplannen in West- en Oost-Europa bekend zal maken.

Volgens het jaarlijkse Nuclear Notebook van het Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists bevinden zich in Europa nog een 150-tal tactische B61-kernbommen op tien luchtmachtbasissen in zeven Europese landen, voor gebruik op Navo-vliegtuigen. In Kleine Brogel zou een tiental B61-kernbommen liggen.

In april 2001 schreef het onderzoeksinstituut Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) nog dat het Pentagon zijn huidige generatie kernwapens op Europese bodem wou behouden tot 2018. Dat maakte de NRDC toen op uit plannen om de opslagruimtes van de kernraketten te moderniseren vóór 2005 "om het systeem te handhaven tot het najaar van 2018."

Sinds de aanslagen van 11 september 2001 is de wereld echter ingrijpend veranderd. De VS souperen hun defensiebudgetten op aan hun globale 'oorlog tegen terreur'. Maar terroristen kunnen niet worden bestreden met kernwapens, wel met snel inzetbare Quick Reaction Forces zoals de Navo er een opricht tegen ten laatste oktober 2006.

Deze strategiewijziging vereist vergaande herstructureringen binnen de Navo, die volgens Jones "te veel defensieve troepen telt". Volgens de generaal "dragen 2,4 miljoen Europeanen een uniform, terwijl we het met veertig procent minder kunnen doen". Met de Navo-uitbreiding naar het oosten zullen ook meerdere basissen mee opschuiven. Hiertoe bezochten Amerikaanse experts in februari al Polen, Roemenië en Bulgarije.

Volgens NRDC-expert Robert S. Norris, directeur van het Nuclear Weapons Databook Project uit Washington, valt het niet uit te sluiten dat de terugtrekking van de kernwapens pasmunt zal worden voor de

Navo-uitbreiding naar het oosten. "Er liggen nu nog een 150-tal kernwapens in Europa, waaronder een tiental op Kleine Brogel," zegt hij aan De Morgen. "Ze hebben geen echte strategische waarde meer. Ze zijn vooral symbolisch, als een teken van de Navo-cohesie en de Amerikaanse militaire dominantie. Bij mijn weten werden de opslagruimten van de kernwapens zoals gepland gemoderniseerd, maar de tijden veranderen snel. De Navo breidt uit naar het oosten, wat een doorn in het oog is van de Russische generaals. Zij vinden Navo-basissen in hun achtertuin een provocatie en protesteerden ook al herhaaldelijk tegen de resterende VS-kernwapens in Europa. Dat zijn immers de enige atoombommen die een erkende kernwepenaanstaats nog buiten zijn grenzen heeft gestationeerd, als je de onderzeeërs buiten beschouwing laat. De mogelijkheid bestaat dus dat er een soort akkoord wordt gesloten: Moskou laat oogluikend toe dat de Navo basissen opricht in het oosten, maar Washington trekt zijn kernwapens terug. Wij hebben in elk geval al informatie die daarop wijst. Uit Griekenland zouden de kernwapens, een tiental zoals in Kleine Brogel, al zijn weggehaald."

Generaal James L. Jones: 'Er is goed nieuws op komst voor Europa'

Global Security Newswire

Russia Warns NATO of Possible Nuclear Doctrine Revision Ahead of Alliance Expansion

26 March 2004

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov has said that Moscow would revise its defense strategy, including its nuclear weapons doctrine, if NATO continues to maintain an offensive doctrine, *The Hindu* reported today.

Ivanov's warning came shortly before NATO was scheduled to admit seven new members, including the three Baltic former Soviet states — Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

"If NATO is preserved as a military alliance with its current offensive military doctrine, Russia's military planning and principles of development of the Russian armed forces, including their nuclear component, will be revised accordingly," he wrote in the latest issue of the journal *Russia in Global Politics*.

Forum voor Vredesactie

Belgische regering bespreekt NU aanwezigheid kernwapens in België

Bomspotters pleiten voor denuclearisering NAVO-strategie

Persbericht – 1 april 2004

Een verwijdering van de kernwapens uit België én een denuclearisering van de NAVO-strategie:

Uit een persbericht van het Amerikaanse ministerie van defensie van 25 maart blijkt dat het Amerikaanse leger zijn overzeese militaire aanwezigheid geëvalueerd heeft en de resultaten met de verschillende betrokken landen bespreekt. De Belgische regering bespreekt dus NU de toekomst van de Amerikaanse kernwapens in België. Vandaag zullen parlementsleden hierover vragen stellen aan onze regering.

Het Forum voor Vredesactie, organisator van de Bomspotting-campagne, roept de Belgische regering op om de Belgische nucleaire taken af te stoten en om deze discussie aan te grijpen om de nucleaire strategie binnen de NAVO ter discussie te stellen.

De duizenden deelnemers aan de bomspotting-acties op de kernwapenbasis van kleine Brogel en op SHAPE, het militaire hoofdkwartier van de NAVO hebben een duidelijke, dubbele boodschap: een verwijdering van de kernwapens uit België én een denuclearisering van de NAVO-strategie. De twee zijn onlosmakelijk met elkaar verbonden. Zonder het stoppen van de nucleaire strategie van de NAVO is het verwijderen van de oude kernwapens slechts een symbolische daad. Het maakt immers weinig verschil voor de 'vijand' of je hem honderd maal of vijftig maal kan vernietigen. Eenmaal is voldoende. De dreiging blijft even groot.

Wie niet-kernwepenaanstaats wil overtuigen het Non-proliferatieverdrag te blijven respecteren, moet ophouden hen zelf met kernwapens te bedreigen:

In de jaren '90 hebben de Europese regeringen grote kansen laten liggen om verdere stappen te nemen naar nucleaire ontwapening. Het hele decennium bleven ze teren op de grote reductie die ze doorgevoerd hadden vlak na de Koude Oorlog. Het resultaat is dat het Non-proliferatieverdrag steeds zwaarder onder druk komt.

Ook nu dreigen ze de boot te missen. Voor andere niet-kernwapenstaten maakt het weinig verschil of men bedreigd wordt met 100 of 200 kernwapens. Het feit dat men bedreigd wordt met kernwapens is daarentegen van veel groter politiek belang. Wie niet-kernwapenstaten wil overtuigen het Non-proliferatieverdrag te blijven respecteren, moet ophouden hen zelf met kernwapens te bedreigen. Of zoals El Baradei, het hoofd van het IAEA, stelde: "We must abandon the unworkable notion that it is morally reprehensible for some countries to pursue weapons of mass destruction yet morally acceptable for others to rely on them for security - and indeed to continue to refine their capacities and postulate plans for their use."

Een ander signaal is nodig. Een volledige terugtrekking van de Amerikaanse kernwapens uit Europa én een verandering van de nucleaire NAVO-strategie maakt duidelijk dat de niet-kernwapenstaten binnen de NAVO kernwapens niet meer nodig vinden voor hun verdediging. Dit is een noodzakelijke stap om nucleaire ontwapening weer op gang te brengen en om het Non-proliferatieverdrag intact te houden.

Washington Times

Bold basing plan

By Michael O'Hanlon – 4 April 2004

In an effort under way since 2001, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and his regional combatant commanders are completing a plan to revamp how the United States stations its military forces overseas.

Among other implications, the plan would dramatically reduce forces in Germany while shifting some troops to smaller facilities in Eastern Europe, and scale back U.S. personnel in East Asia while repositioning many of those remaining in Korea.

Fifteen years after the Cold War and almost three years into the war on terror, Mr. Rumsfeld's plan makes generally good sense. And despite the claims of critics and anxieties of allies, it has been brewing for too long to be viewed as reprisal against Germany, South Korea or any other country that challenged the Bush administration over the Iraq war. Its rationale is clearly strategic, not vindictive. But it also has flaws that need to be corrected before it is finalized and put into place.

A word of background. Prior to September 11, 2001, the United States had about a quarter-million troops abroad at any given time. Just more than 100,000 were in Europe. Most of these were in Germany (75,000 troops total, almost 60,000 of them Army soldiers); another 13,000 were in Italy, almost 12,000 in the United Kingdom, and smaller numbers elsewhere. Nearly 100,000 American military personnel were in East Asia, divided between Japan, South Korea and the waters of the western Pacific. About 25,000 were ashore and afloat in the Persian Gulf; smaller numbers were in Latin America and Africa.

Since 2001, U.S. capabilities in Europe and Asia have changed little, while we now have some 25,000 troops in or near Afghanistan and another 150,000 in and around Iraq. Meanwhile, we have withdrawn virtually all combat forces from Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

Mr. Rumsfeld now wants to make other big changes too. Under his near-complete plan, according to The Washington Post's reporter Bradley Graham, up to 15,000 troops in Asia apparently would be brought home.

The reductions would occur largely through consolidation of redundant headquarters in Korea and Japan. In Europe, if reports are right, half of the U.S. forces in Germany could either be brought back stateside or deployed in smaller numbers on shorter assignments to new bases in Eastern Europe. Remaining Army forces in Europe would become lighter, involving at least one of the Army's new medium-weight Stryker brigades.

Most of the Rumsfeld plan makes eminent sense. In East Asia, the United States has complex and overlapping command structures in Hawaii, Japan and Korea. Streamlining and regularizing them, while also moving U.S. military headquarters in Korea out of heavily populated Seoul, are long overdue.

Similarly, given South Korea's increasingly capable military forces, the U.S. Army's 2nd Infantry Division no longer is needed near the Demilitarized Zone to help repel any initial North Korean onslaught. Better to deploy it south of Seoul where it could prepare for an American-South Korean counteroffensive outside the range of North Korean artillery.

As for Europe, rather than keep two of the U.S. Army's six heavy divisions in Germany, far from any plausible combat theater, there is a good argument the United States should go smaller, lighter and quicker. As NATO top commander Gen. James L. Jones suggests, bases in Europe should be viewed as "lily pads" for regional and global deployments.

Such a smaller, more mobile U.S. force in Europe would face fewer problems training than at present in heavily populated Germany. It could exercise more easily with new NATO members. And it would also provide a model of rapid deployability most European militaries need to emulate.

That said, there apparently are still some problems with the proposal for a new global strategic architecture that should be fixed before the plan is completed.

If taken too far, some of the changes proposed for the U.S. Army could worsen an overdeployment problem that poses the greatest challenge to the all-volunteer force in its 30-year history. Given the ongoing strains of the Iraq and Afghanistan missions, it simply makes no sense to take large numbers of Army soldiers out of bases in Germany, where they are stationed with their families, and deploy them on unescorted tours to Eastern Europe.

For the foreseeable future, any new deployments need to be very modest in scale. Nor should the budgetary cost of new bases be overlooked. It makes sense to develop this plan in its entirety before next year's base closure process, so we know what facilities need to be retained stateside. But it should not be rushed into effect.

By contrast, the plan's likely effects on the U.S. Marine Corps do not go far enough. Notably, it does not appear to make major changes in the U.S. presence on Okinawa, where 20,000 Marines continue to be stationed on a densely populated island (implying mediocre training opportunities). This causes local political problems and puts the broader U.S. base network in Japan at some risk.

The U.S. does need to store equipment on or near Okinawa and have contingency access there in event of a crisis, but it does not need to station most of those Marines on the island.

So some modifications to the Pentagon's plan are badly needed, as well as much greater consultations with other parts of the U.S. government and other countries. But if Mr. Rumsfeld gets these things right, his new basing plan will merit strong support at home and abroad.

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