



VS NUCLEAIR BELEID

Recente ontwikkelingen

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COMMENTAAR EN VRAGEN

De kwestie van massavernietigingswapens (MVW) is de afgelopen maanden uitgebreid in het nieuws geweest. Dat is echter steeds gebeurd op zo een manier dat het grootste deel van het publiek dit begrip associeert met wapensystemen die door 'anderen' worden gemaakt dan wel gebruikt. De gebruikers van MVW werden beschreven als 'boevenstaten' dan wel landen die dwars lagen en geen medewerking verleende aan terechte eisen dat ze geen MVW, zoals kernwapens, zouden ontwikkelen. Zo werd Pakistan al snel neergezet als niet alleen een soort boevenstaat (zij het een bevriende) maar ook als supermarkt voor andere landen die kernwapens willen maken. Irak en Iran stonden centraal in de publiciteit, evenals Noord Korea. Het is dan ook niet verbazingwekkend dat de eigenaars van de grootste aantallen van de meest effectieve massavernietigingswapens - kernwapens - enigszins buitens schot zijn gebleven.

Naast de landen en wellicht 'niet-staatsgebonden acteurs' ('terroristen') die graag een of meer kernwapens zouden willen bouwen, bestaan er nog steeds acht staten die in ieder geval een omvangrijke nucleaire slagkracht bezitten. Dat zijn naast het al genoemde Pakistan ook India en Israël, plus de permanente vijf van de Veiligheidsraad: Verenigd Koninkrijk, Volksrepubliek China, Frankrijk, Russische Federatie en de grootste bezitter van allemaal: de Verenigde Staten.

Als belangrijkste van de vijf bekijken we in dit dossier de kernwapensslagkracht van de VS, de enige supermacht, met een nadruk op de plannen voor de onmiddellijke toekomst. Het gaat daarbij niet alleen om de aantallen - een slordige 10.4000 kernkoppen, waarvan duizenden klaar staan om binnen minuten gelanceerd te worden - maar ook om de plannen die er worden gemaakt voor het gebruik ervan.

In de VS is de afgelopen maanden de begrotingscyclus weer van start gegaan. Dat betekende in maart de presentatie in het Congres van de begrotingen en de plannen voor het komende boekhoudjaar, dat in oktober begint. In deze bundel worden de bijdragen van Spencer Abraham, Secretary, *U.S. Department of Energy* (verantwoordelijk voor de Amerikaanse kernbommen), Ambassador Linton F. Brooks (van de *National Nuclear Security Administration*, een onderafdeling van DoE) Admiral James O. Ellis, Jr., USN *Commander United States Strategic Command*, aangehaald, omdat ze een goed beeld geven van de Amerikaanse nucleaire slagkracht en hoe die wordt gehandhaafd. Congres zal de komende maanden goedkeuring moeten geven aan deze plannen, die dus nog kunnen veranderen. Maar dat zal geen verstrekkende ommekeer van de gekozen weg zijn. Men wil \$16.8 miljard uitgeven aan de kernwapen werkzaamheden van het DoE gerelateerd aan defensie. Dit staat dus los van de uitgaven van het Pentagon voor de nucleaire strijdkrachten (infrastructuur, draagsystemen).

Naast de concrete plannen worden er ook adviezen gegeven over de toekomstige samenstelling van de nucleaire strijdkrachten door denktanks, waarvan een van de belangrijkste de Defense Science Board is. De samenvatting van hun rapport hebben we vertaald. Een van meest bizarre rapporten aan het Congres was dat van de VS regering waarin beweerd wordt dat de ontwikkeling van zogenaamde 'mininukes' geen probleem zal zijn voor de proliferatie kwestie. Onderminister Bolton van buitenlandse zaken geeft een overzicht van de proliferatiegevaaren in de wereld. Dat is belangrijk, omdat ze potentiële doelwitten zijn voor Amerikaanse unilaterale initiatieven. Naast de officiële verklaring en rapporten is er ook informeler commentaar geweest, bijvoorbeeld van de Arms Control Association en het Natural Resources Defence Council, kritische ngo's in Washington DC - ook hun commentaren hebben we in het 'berichten' deel bijgevoegd. Het artikel uit de *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* geeft overigens een uitstekend overzicht van de huidige omvang van de nucleaire strijdkrachten. Omdat het buitenlandse beleid van de Nederlandse regering strak wordt afgestemd met het Amerikaanse, menen we dat het nuttig is om de omvang en blijvende aard van de Amerikaanse kernbewapening mee te laten wegen in dit debat.

Redactie

Defense Science Board

Future Strategic Strike Forces

Report – February 2004

Het Defense Science Board is een belangrijk adviesorgaan van het Pentagon, het Amerikaanse Ministerie van Defensie. Het adviseert ondermeer over wetenschappelijke, technische en acquisitie-aspecten van het defensiebeleid. Leden worden aangesteld door de Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (op dit moment Michael W. Wynne, een voormalig vice-president van General Dynamics); het zijn overwegend gepensioneerde marine- en luchtmachtofficieren, nucleaire wetenschappers en analisten van denktanks.

Samenvatting rapport 'Future Strategic Strike Forces'

(Het volledige rapport is te vinden op Internet: <http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/fssf.pdf>)

In dit rapport wordt door de task force gekeken naar de komende 30 jaar met als doel de President te voorzien met een breed spectrum aan aanvalsopties die:

- de Verenigde Staten en haar strijdmachten in het buitenland beschermen;
- vrienden en bondgenoten de toekomstige commitment verzekert;
- handelt met toekomstige tegenstanders op voorwaarden die gunstig zijn voor de Verenigde Staten.

De task force identificeerde systemen volgens de huidige planning die nog relevant zullen zijn en beveelde nieuwe systemen ter ontwikkeling aan.

Een strategische aanval wordt in dit rapport gedefinieerd als 'een militaire operatie die op beslissende wijze de basisactievoers van een tegenstander kan veranderen in een relatief compacte tijdsperiode.'

Uit eerdere beleidsdocumenten, zoals de National Security Strategie, de Quadrennial Defense Review, de Nuclear Posture Review en de Defense Planning Guidance, worden de volgende drie sleutelprincipes voor beleid afgeleid:

- Zorg voor bekwaamheden voor brede doelen: verzekeren, weerhouden, afschrikken, verdedigen, verslaan;
- Verschuif van afhankelijkheid van nucleaire wapens naar een synergistische combinatie van niet-nucleaire en nucleaire aanvalskrachten, verdedigingen en een gerevitaliseerde technische en industriële infrastructuur;
- Verschuif van bedreiging-specifieke scenario's naar een bekwaamheden-gebaseerde benadering van planning.

De Task Force groepeerde tegenstanders in twee afzonderlijke categorieën:

- Zich urgent voordoende bedreigingen: schurkenstaten en terroristen: Tegenover deze categorie zal het strategische doel van de Verenigde Staten het voor handen hebben van de krachtigste en en meest veelomvattende verdediging en strategische aanvalsbekwaamheden die de massavernietigingswapens van de vijand kunnen vernietigen of onschadelijk maken voordat deze vijanden de Verenigde Staten kunnen aanvallen met welke middelen dan ook. In een conflict met deze vijanden zullen de Verenigde Staten trachten
 - de massavernietigingswapens van de vijand te annuleren en te elimineren;
 - het regiem van de tegenstander te verwijderen, maar het land te sparen;
 - een oorlog met massavernietigingswapens snel te beëindigen;
 - zich te verzekeren dat de oorlog de 'juiste lessen' leert.
- Toekomstige vijandige grootmachten met massavernietigingswapens: Tegenover een grootmacht die een nucleaire bedreiging voor de Verenigde Staten kan vormen ondanks de hun verdediging, zullen de doelen anders zijn: het transformeren van verhoudingen door ontrading en verzekering. De Verenigde Staten kunnen nog steeds in conflict met zo'n tegenstander, maar de doelen zullen meer beperkt moeten zijn:
 - Ontraden, afschrikken, overreden, terwijl de vooruitzichten op ongewenste escalatie en schade aan bondgenoten moeten worden geminimaliseerd;
 - Het zo snel mogelijk beëindigen van het conflict onder voorwaarden die consistent zijn met de Amerikaanse waarden en doelen.

Doelen voor een strategische aanval zijn die objecten die van de grootste waarde zijn voor een tegenstander, zoals:

- massavernietigingswapens;
- het regime;
- andere militaire activa;
- speciale doelen (zoals harde en ondergrondse doelen, drijvende doelen);
- specifieke activa of functies waarvan bekend is dat ze van significante waarde zijn voor het regime.

Op het gebied van overbrengingssystemen kan er gekozen worden. Huidig gepland staande overbrengingssystemen voor tactische slagveldmissies kunnen echter niet eenvoudig een dubbele taak voor strategische aanvallen krijgen.

De task force adviseert waar het gaat om overbrengingssystemen het volgende:

- Het Pentagon zou de volgende nucleaire overbrengingssystemen volgens de huidige plannen moeten behouden en uitbreiden: intercontinentale ballistische raketten, van onderzeeërs te lanceren ballistische raketten en kruisraketten, door bommenwerpers en vanuit de lucht gelanceerde (geavanceerde) kruisraketten;
- De luchtmacht zou 50 Peacekeeper intercontinentale ballistische raketten, die op dit moment gedeactiveerd zijn, moeten behouden en moeten deployeren op Vandenberg en Cape Canaveral voor gebruik met conventionele wapenkoppen;
- De marine zou een nieuwe niet-nucleaire ballistische raket voor de nucleair aangedreven kruisraketonderzeeërs moeten ontwikkelen, die later opgesteld kunnen worden op oppervlakteschepen, met een bereik van 1500 nautische mijlen, een nuttige lading van 2000 pond en een nauwkeurigheid van 5 meter;
- De luchtmacht zou een analyse van alternatieven voor een onmiddellijke aanvalscapabiliteit moeten initiëren, gevolgd door een conceptdefinitie van veelbelovende alternatieven.

De task force heeft zich ook bezig gehouden met kernkoppen. Het is Amerikaans beleid de nucleaire drempel hoog te houden en waar mogelijk niet-nucleaire aanvalsopties te volgen. In de toekomst zal er echter waarschijnlijk proliferatie van kernwapens plaats vinden en er zijn al openlijke discussies gaande in vaktijdschriften in andere landen over nucleaire aanvallen op gedeployeerde Amerikaanse strijdkrachten en communicatiesystemen. Om af te schrikken en indien noodzakelijk op deze dreigingen te antwoorden, zouden toekomstige presidenten strategische keuzemogelijkheden tussen grootschalige conventionele aanvallen en de huidige relatief grote wapens met een hoge fallout die overgebracht worden door ballistische raketten moeten hebben.

De lijn in het Nuclear Posture Review is consistent met het hoog houden van de nucleaire drempel en met het volgen van het Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) om te voorzien in veilige, zekere en betrouwbare kernwapens zonder het hervatten van kernproeven, wanneer dit maar enigszins mogelijk is. Het kernwapenprogramma zoals dat op dit moment wordt voorgesteld – een programma primair gericht op het renoveren van de geërfde voorraad – zal de toekomstige behoeften van het land niet tegemoet komen.

De task force adviseert daarom het volgende:

- Een significante verlaging van de geplande levensduurverlenging in het SSP;
- Verschuif het SSP in de richting van een nieuwe visie: een voorraad gebaseerd op eerder geteste nucleaire ontwerpen om te voorzien in wapens die meer relevant zijn voor het toekomstige milieu van dreigingen.

Er zijn kernwapens nodig die een veel lagere ‘collateral damage’ produceren; die robuuste prestatiemarges hebben; die zijn bedacht met het oog op gemak van fabricage en onderhoud en die speciale effecten produceren.

De task force adviseert het initiëren van onderzoek naar wapens die aan deze nieuwe visie tegemoet komen. Of nieuwe wapentypes testen vereisen hangt af van de resultaten van technisch ontwikkelingswerk, alsmede van operationele en beleidsoverwegingen.

Het Pentagon wordt aangeraden de nucleaire rol van de Tomahawk kruisraketten en van de in andere landen gestationeerde tactische dual-capable vliegtuigen af te schaffen. Er is geen militaire noodzaak voor deze systemen en het elimineren van de nucleaire rol zal geld vrij maken dat gebruikt kan worden voor het financieren van strategische strike-programma's met een hogere prioriteit. Hun voortbestaan is voor een belangrijk deel een politiek besluit.

Statement of Spencer Abraham, Secretary, U.S. Department of Energy

Before the Senate Committee on Armed Services – 23 March 2004

Introduction

Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. It is a pleasure to be here today to discuss the President's Fiscal Year 2005 budget request for the Department of Energy (DOE). In doing so, I want to stress the ways this budget is going to help us accomplish our various missions related to defense and the environment. At \$24.3 billion in gross budget authority, the FY 2005 budget request is the largest in the history of the Department. Within the \$24.3 billion, approximately 69 percent of the total Department of Energy budget, or \$16.8 billion, is for the Department's Atomic Energy Defense Activities within the jurisdiction of this Committee. Within this part of the budget, there is \$9 billion to support activities in the National Nuclear Security Administration, \$7.4 billion to fund the environmental cleanup activities, \$131 million to fund the Defense Nuclear Waste Fund, and \$663.6 million to fund Other Defense Activities.

This budget request builds on a number of successes we have had over the past 3 years. I am very proud of what we have accomplished in terms of fulfilling the President's management vision for this Department and also what we have achieved to promote energy and economic security for the American people.

The Office of Management and Budget recently announced that DOE has made the most progress among cabinet-level agencies in the implementation of the President's Management Agenda. OMB recognized DOE as the cabinet-level agency "leading the pack with regard to management improvement" in the areas of human capital, competitive sourcing, financial management, e-government, and budget/performance integration.

Over the past 3 years, with the strong support of the Administration and Congress, our national nuclear security programs, through the Department's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), have achieved a level of stability that is required for accomplishing our long-term missions. As the post-Cold War era evolves, the NNSA is managing the Nation's nuclear warheads according to the guidance in the Nuclear Posture Review. The Department, through the NNSA, works to ensure that the nation's nuclear stockpile remains safe, secure, reliable, and ready, and to extend the life of that stockpile in support of Department of Defense (DOD) military requirements. Our nation will continue to benefit from the security resulting from an effective nuclear deterrent and can be confident that the nuclear weapons complex is ready and prepared to respond rapidly and effectively if required.

We have also made great progress in a number of other program areas. We have implemented changes that have fundamentally reformed DOE's Environmental Management program. Complex-wide, we have taken an approach to accelerated cleanup that says we will not allow the legacy of the work done in the weapons complex to be part of a community's burden for future generations. At the beginning of this Administration, the timetable for completing cleanup at all sites was 70 years. Today, we have implemented reforms to accelerate completion of the cleanup program by 35 years and reduce estimated program costs in excess of \$50 billion.

With national security as our overarching Departmental mission, we cannot be said to be fulfilling our mission with any confidence unless we can guarantee security at our facilities. We are attempting to do that with a request of \$1.38 billion in FY 2005 for all DOE safeguards and security activities. We have revised the Design Basis Threat (DBT), which is the post-September 11th analysis of potential threats against which we must protect DOE sites and materials across the country, and are implementing our response to it. We also have a high-level review of security procedures underway by some of the nation's top military and civilian experts. Lastly, we have made significant managerial changes in the security leadership at our facilities.

A critical component of our national security mission is counterintelligence. Last summer, I informed this committee and others that our national security will be best served by consolidating the two counterintelligence programs within the Department in one office reporting directly to the Office of the Secretary. I came to this conclusion after extensive review of the current bifurcated counterintelligence functions between the Department of Energy and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), which have proven to be an impediment to coherent and effective counterintelligence activities.

This must be corrected. More recently, I submitted proposed legislation to the Congress to effect the needed consolidation. I believe that having a single counterintelligence office reporting directly to the Secretary of Energy will create a more streamlined and effective program, clarify accountability, and provide a clear line of authority for policy development and implementation. The NNSA Administrator, the National

Counterintelligence Executive, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation share this view. I urge prompt passage of the legislation.

The sections that follow provide the details of the FY 2005 budget request.

National Nuclear Security Administration

Representing approximately 37 percent of the Department's entire FY 2005 budget request, our national security programs have made great progress and continue to address the challenges of a post-September 11th environment.

The FY 2005 budget request totals \$9.0 billion, an increase of \$383 million or 4.4 percent. We are making progress in managing our program activities within a disciplined 5-year budget and planning envelope. We are doing it successfully enough to be able to address emerging new priorities and provide for needed funding increases in some of our programs within an overall modest growth rate – notably Safeguards and Security, Nuclear Weapons Incident Response, and Facilities and Infrastructure Recapitalization – by reallocating from other activities and projects that are concluded or winding down. The NNSA budget justification contains the required 3 years of budget and performance information, as well as similar information for 5 years as required by Sec. 3253 of the NNSA Act, as amended (Title XXXII of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2000, P.L. 106-65, 50 U.S.C. 2453). This section, entitled Future-Years Nuclear Security Program (FYNSP), requires NNSA to provide to Congress each year at the time the budget is submitted the estimated expenditures necessary to support the programs, projects and activities of the NNSA for a 5-fiscal-year period, in a level of detail comparable to that contained in the budget. Since the inception of NNSA, the FYNSP has been provided as a separate document supporting the budget request. Starting with this budget, NNSA will meet this statutory requirement by including outyear budget and performance information as part of a fully integrated budget submission.

Weapons Activities

The FY 2005 budget request for the programs funded within the Weapons Activities appropriation is \$6.568 billion, an increase of 5.4 percent over FY 2004 due largely to the increase in security and facilities infrastructure. Within Weapons Activities, the budget structure has been changed in response to Congressional concerns to align Directed Stockpile Work funding with individual weapon systems, and to highlight Nuclear Weapon Incident Response as a separate line.

The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) guidance directed that NNSA maintain a research and development and manufacturing base that ensures the long-term effectiveness of the Nation's stockpile; and, support the facilities and infrastructure that are responsive to new or emerging threats. The NPR also directed NNSA to begin a modest effort to examine concepts that could be deployed to further enhance the deterrent capabilities of the stockpile in response to the national security challenges of the 21st century.

The United States is continuing work to refurbish and extend the life of the B61, W76 and W80 warheads in the stockpile. Within the FY 2005 request of \$1.4 billion for Directed Stockpile Work (DSW), funding for the life extension programs increases by 7 percent to \$477.4 million. This reflects the expected ramp up in the three systems with First Production Units scheduled in FY 2006-2009, and the completion of life extension activities for the W87. In FY 2005, DSW funding will support research and development of advanced weapon concepts to meet emerging DOD needs that will enhance the nuclear deterrent, and to ensure a robust and capable NNSA for the Future. The NPR highlighted the importance of pursuing advanced concepts work to ensure that the weapons complex can provide nuclear deterrence for decades to come.

In FY 2005, \$9.0 million is requested to support the modest research and development effort in the Advanced Concepts Initiatives (ACI) to meet emerging DOD needs and to train the next generation of nuclear weapons scientists and engineers. The Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) is the most mature concept being studied in this program. Funds for the RNEP study are included in the FY 2005 budget as a separate line item from the rest of the advanced concepts study activity. A request for \$27.6 million is also included for the continuing RNEP feasibility, design definition and cost study. The RNEP study was requested by the Nuclear Weapons Council in January 2002.

The RNEP study is to determine whether either of two existing warheads – the B61 or the B83 – can be adapted without resuming nuclear testing to improve our ability to hold at risk hardened, deeply buried facilities that may be important to a future adversary. The request for advanced concepts funding is to investigate new ideas, not necessarily new weapons. For example, we are currently examining the feasibility of adapting an existing weapons carrier and existing nuclear warheads to achieve a delivery system with

greater assurance that the intended nuclear mission could not be compromised by either component failure or adversary attack, thus giving greater reliability for nuclear missions.

Appropriate uses for additional work in advanced concepts might include examining the feasibility of warheads with improved design margins, easier manufacturing, greater longevity and improved safety. Any of these ideas would only be pursued for future development if directed to do so by the President and the Congress.

Progress in other parts of the Stockpile Stewardship Program continues. The FY 2005 request for Campaigns is \$2.4 billion, essentially level with FY 2004. This request funds a variety of Campaigns, experimental facilities and activities that continue to enhance NNSA's confidence in moving to "science-based" judgments for stockpile stewardship, and provide cutting edge technologies for stockpile certification and maintenance. While there is no reason to doubt the ability of the Stockpile Stewardship program to continue to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear deterrent, the nation must maintain the ability to carry out a nuclear weapons test in the event of some currently unforeseen problems that cannot be resolved by other means. Within the guidance provided by the Congress, we are beginning to improve our readiness posture from the current ability to test within 24 to 36 months to an ability to test within approximately 18 months. The FY 2005 budget request of \$30 million supports achieving an 18-month readiness by September 2005. But let me be clear, there are no plans to test.

National Ignition Facility at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) remains on budget and schedule. The FY 2005 request of \$130 million continues construction installation and commissioning of laser beams. Once complete in 2008, the 192-laser beam facility will be capable of achieving temperatures and pressures found only on the surface of the sun and in exploding nuclear weapons. We are anticipating the first Stockpile Stewardship experiments in 2004 using four laser beams. As a result of recent technical advances in capsule design, target fabrication and computer simulations, we expect to begin the fusion ignition campaign in FY 2009 with a goal of achieving fusion ignition in FY 2010. The Advanced Simulation and Computing Campaign request for FY 2005 is \$741.3 million, an increase of nearly three percent over FY 2004. Working with IBM and Cray Research, the program expects delivery of Red Storm in FY 2004 and Purple in FY 2005. These will be the world's fastest machines, operating at 40 and 100 Teraops, respectively, and they will continue to revolutionize supercomputer capabilities and three-dimensional modeling. Having these machines on-line will begin to redress the capacity and capability issues raised in the September 2003 JASONs report required by the Congress.

The NPR recognized a need, over the long run, for a Modern Pit Facility (MPF) to support the pit manufacturing needs of the entire stockpile. NNSA's FY 2005 request for the Pit Manufacturing Campaign is \$336.5 million, an increase of 13 percent over FY 2004, but with some changes since the last budget request. We delayed the final environmental impact statement (EIS) for the MPF in order to address congressional concerns that it is premature to pursue further decisions on an MPF at this time. The decision to delay the final EIS also delays identification of a preferred site for constructing the MPF.

This decision will in no way affect the W88 pit manufacturing and recertification program underway at Los Alamos, which is reestablishing the technological base to manufacture pits and which thereby will inform many of the technology decisions which will be contained in the eventual MPF design.

Readiness Campaigns are requested at \$280.1 million in FY 2005, a decrease of about 14 percent. The decrease is attributable mainly to continuing progress in construction of the Tritium Extraction Facility that is funded within this account.

NNSA's Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities activities operate and maintain current facilities and ensure the long-term vitality of the NNSA complex through a multiyear program of infrastructure construction. About \$1.5 billion is requested for these efforts, a slight decrease from FY 2004 that is attributable to a 20 percent decline in funding needed to support line-item construction project schedules.

In FY 2005 the President's budget provides a total of \$201.3 million for the Office of Secure Transportation, which is responsible for meeting the Department's transportation requirements for nuclear weapons, components, special nuclear materials and waste shipments.

[...]

Nuclear Weapons Incident Response

The third growth area in the FY 2005 budget request is the Nuclear Weapons Incident Response programs. The FY 2005 request of \$99.2 million reflects an increase of 11 percent over the FY 2004 level, recognizing the greatly increased number of deployments of these assets within the United States and abroad. The long-term sizing of this effort in terms of dollars and people continues to evolve along with its critical role in homeland security. We have relocated this account separately within the Weapons Activities appropriation to provide additional visibility into these programs and funding request.

Safeguards and Security/Design Basis Threat

Protecting NNSA people, information, materials, and infrastructure from harm or compromise is one of our most serious responsibilities and highest priorities. The FY 2005 budget request for NNSA's Safeguards and Security program is \$706.9 million, an increase of 21 percent over the FY 2004 enacted level that is needed to implement our response to the new Design Basis Threat at all NNSA sites and facilities. The Secretary of Energy issued the new DBT in May 2003, as a result of a post-September 11th analysis of the threats against which we must protect DOE sites and materials across the country. Implementation plans based on vulnerability assessments for each of the sites are in final preparation.

These will delineate the upgrades and associated costs plan to upgrade service weaponry, extend explosive impact zones, consolidate nuclear material, and make additional improvements of a classified nature to bring NNSA facilities into full compliance with the new DBT by the year 2006. The FY 2005 NNSA budget includes \$107.9 million (\$89.6 in Safeguards and Security and \$18.3 million in Secure Transportation Asset) to address the new DBT. NNSA will shortly submit a request for FY 2004 reprogramming and appropriation transfer to allow this important work to continue on schedule. The FY 2006 funding request for DBT implementation will be addressed during this spring's programming process, and accommodated within the current five year funding profile for NNSA.

In recent months we have had some highly publicized occurrences at some NNSA sites. In each instance, NNSA and DOE have taken immediate and aggressive actions to address these occurrences and to ensure that any potential vulnerability is mitigated as soon as possible and that longer term fixes are put into place as appropriate. Because of these problems, we have chartered two external review groups to provide an independent assessment of our management of security. While we are confident that there has been no compromise of classified material and that no nuclear material is at risk, we believe security can and should be improved. Funding for Safeguards and Security in NNSA has increased over 70 percent during this Administration, which is strong indicator of the priority we place on this responsibility. The Administrator of NNSA and I join together in making it well known that we will not tolerate any reduction, perceived or real, in our protective forces and our abilities to protect the complex.

Nuclear Nonproliferation

We also continue to make great progress with Russia on nuclear nonproliferation. Of the \$1.35 billion included in this budget for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (NN), \$999 million is requested for nonproliferation programs with Russia and other countries. We have accelerated the material protection programs and expanded the scope of our work to ensure that dangerous materials do not fall into the wrong hands. We have increased our cooperation with Russia's Strategic Rocket Forces by initiating warhead security work at three new sites.

We have extended our International Radiological Threat Reduction program to states that were once part of the Former Soviet Union and others. Working with them, with Russia, and with the International Atomic Energy Agency, we have been able to secure radiological materials in these countries.

Moreover, in this budget request we are continuing our MegaPorts program with \$15 million to detect the trafficking of nuclear or radioactive materials in the world's busiest seaports. We will complete installations at three ports in FY 2004 and complete an additional three ports in FY 2005. Eventually we hope to have detection equipment in key locations all over the planet.

The largest investment in nuclear nonproliferation in FY 2005 is the Fissile Materials Disposition program. We are working to design and build facilities to dispose of inventories of surplus U.S. weapons-grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium, and supporting concurrent efforts in Russia to obtain reciprocal disposition of similar materials.

One of the major obstacles encountered this year is a disagreement with Russia regarding liability protection for plutonium disposition work performed in that country. This has resulted in a 10-month delay in the planned start of construction of a MOX Facility in Russia as well as a similar facility in the United States. The liability issue is being worked at high levels in the Administration. The President's FY 2005 budget request seeks \$649 million for this program to begin construction of both the U.S. and Russian MOX facilities in May 2005, as we work to resolve the liability issue by this spring. Our outyear funding profiles reflect the Administration's full commitment for proceeding with plutonium disposition.

Not only are we pursuing the disposition of weapons-grade plutonium but we are also working hard to stop more from being produced. We have assumed the responsibility from the Department of Defense (DOD) for shutting down the last three plutonium production reactors in Russia and replacing them with fossil fuel plants by 2008 and 2011. This will result in the cessation of the annual production of 1.2 metric tons of

weapons-grade plutonium. Under the Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production program, we will provide oversight for Russian contractors who will actually be performing the work. The FY 2005 request for this effort is \$50.1 million.

In FY 2005, NNSA assumes responsibility for the Off-site Source Recovery Project from the Office of Environmental Management. The requested program funding is \$5.6 million, with a projected cost of about \$40 million over the next 5 years to substantially reduce the risk of these source materials being used for radiological dispersion devices. The program works closely with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to prioritize source recovery.

We are mindful of this committee's concerns about the finances of the programs funded by the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation appropriation. NNSA is currently developing the framework for the first semi annual report on uncosted balances and commitments as directed by last year's authorization act.

[...]

Senate Armed Services Committee

Statement of Ambassador Linton F. Brooks, Under Secretary of Energy for Nuclear Security and Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration

Before the Senate Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Strategic Forces - 24 March 2004

[...] Overview of the Nuclear Posture Review

Since before he took office, President Bush has been committed to achieving a credible deterrent with the lowest number of nuclear weapons consistent with current and future national security requirements. On 1 May 2001, at the National Defense University, he articulated his vision: "Nuclear weapons still have a vital role to play in our security and that of our allies. We can, and will, change the size, the composition, the character of our nuclear forces in a way that reflects the reality that the Cold War is over. I am committed to achieving a credible deterrent with the lowest-possible number of nuclear weapons consistent with our national security needs, including our obligations to our allies. My goal is to move quickly to reduce nuclear forces. The United States will lead by example to achieve our interests and the interests for peace in the world."

The President recognized clearly that, almost a decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was time to conduct a fundamental examination of the role of nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War world. The results of that reexamination were described in the December 2001 Nuclear Posture Review. The purpose of that review was to set forth the direction for American nuclear forces over the next decade and beyond. Let me highlight some key points about the review.

The Nuclear Posture Review reassessed the role of nuclear forces and their contribution toward meeting defense policy goals. It reaffirmed that nuclear weapons, for the foreseeable future, will remain a crucial element of U.S. national security strategy. But, consistent with the changed international environment, the Nuclear Posture Review represented a radical departure from the past and the most fundamental re-thinking of the roles and purposes of nuclear weapons in almost a quarter-century. Among the many changes, three are the most important:

- Instead of focusing on deterring the nuclear threat posed by a single, specific enemy, as in the Cold War, it established the need for a capabilities-based force to accomplish four distinct defense policy goals.
- Instead of treating nuclear weapons in isolation, it considered them as an integrated component of American military power, thus allowing us to achieve national security objectives through other means that previously could only have been addressed with nuclear weapons.
- Instead of treating the future as static and predictable, it recognized that requirements could change and that U.S. nuclear forces must be prepared to respond to those changes, including by increasing the fraction of the force that is deployed.

Let me discuss each of these in turn.

The Policy Goals of U.S. Nuclear Forces

Under the new thinking of the Nuclear Posture Review, our nuclear forces serve four goals:

- To *assure* allies of our commitment to them and our ability to make good on that commitment. The implications of this goal are that forces must be effective and reliable. Assurance serves our non-

proliferation objectives because those allies with the capability to develop nuclear weapons can continue to forego doing so, safe in the knowledge of the reliability of the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

- To *dissuade* potential adversaries from trying to match our capabilities or from engaging in strategic competition. This requires that we maintain a combination of forces and infrastructure so that no potential power can have any hope of matching our capability and will be dissuaded from attempting to do so.
- To *deter* any threats that do emerge. This implies an ability to hold at risk those elements of power that a potential adversary values. I will say more on this point in a moment.
- To *defend* against and *defeat* those threats that, for whatever reason, we do not deter. The first two policy goals help determine the size of our nuclear forces, while the second two govern the nature of those forces. As the Committee will readily see, these goals are, in a sense, the goals of our entire military. That is why Admiral Ellis often says that we should, perhaps, refer to the Nuclear Posture Review more generally as a Strategic Posture Review.

The New Triad

Had Admiral Ellis and I appeared before you a few years ago, we would have spoken of a “triad” of strategic nuclear forces. This triad included bombers, ICBMs and Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles, each with unique strengths that operated synergistically to ensure our ability to retaliate under any condition of war initiation. The Nuclear Posture Review broadens our thinking to encompass a New Triad of flexible response capabilities consisting of:

- Non-nuclear and nuclear strike capabilities including systems for command and control,
- Active and passive defenses including ballistic missile defenses,
- R&D and industrial infrastructure needed to develop, build, and maintain nuclear offensive forces and defensive systems.

To provide a practical means to implement this new, integrated approach, the President established a new Strategic Command, with responsibility for global strike - both nuclear and non-nuclear - and for integrating missile defenses with offenses.

Contrary to some press reports, this new triad - and the Nuclear Posture Review generally - continued the trend of the past decade towards a reduced reliance on nuclear forces in U.S. national security strategy. The new emphasis on ballistic missile defenses means that the U.S. will no longer be as heavily dependent on offensive strike forces to enforce deterrence as it was during the Cold War. The strengthening of non-nuclear strike forces - including precision conventional strike and information operations - means that the U.S. will be less dependent than it has been in the past on nuclear forces to provide offensive deterrent capabilities.

Present and Future Nuclear Stockpiles

Our new approach, coupled with the judgment that we no longer need to plan our forces as if Russia presented an immediate threat to the United States, was the basis for dramatic reductions - codified in the Moscow Treaty - in operationally deployed strategic nuclear forces.

Over the next eight years, the United States will cut the number of deployed warheads by approximately two-thirds from today’s level. But the experience of the past decade and a half makes it clear that it is unwise for us to base our security on the false belief that we can predict the future. Thus, while dramatically reducing the number of deployed weapons, we must plan against an uncertain future.

Specifically, the United States needs to be prepared to respond to both unforeseen technical problems and unanticipated geopolitical change. One element of such a response is a responsive infrastructure, which I will discuss in a moment. But another component of such a response is the non-deployed stockpile. As part of its plan to implement the Nuclear Posture Review, the Administration is conducting an assessment that, when completed, will clarify the long-term requirements for non-deployed weapons. The Congress requested such a revised stockpile plan as well. The Administration is working to complete this complex task as soon as possible. While we regret the delay, the importance of nuclear weapons to our security makes it imperative to conduct a thorough review.

While I am not prepared to provide specifics—and could not do so in an unclassified forum in any case—I can provide some of the considerations factoring into the review. The 2012 nuclear stockpile will be substantially reduced from current levels. But reductions will not lower the stockpile to 1700-2200 total warheads. Additional warheads over and above the operationally deployed strategic warheads will be needed for routine maintenance of the stockpile including as logistics spares and to replace those warheads eliminated during destructive surveillance testing.

In addition, a small number of warheads (reduced by 90% from Cold War levels) for U.S. nonstrategic nuclear forces will be retained, among other things, to meet commitments to allies.

Finally, warheads over and above the operationally deployed force will be retained over the near term for prudent risk management in connection with mitigating geopolitical and technical risks. In particular, sufficient warheads will be retained to augment the operationally deployed force in the event that world events require a more robust deterrence posture.

We also must preserve diversity of warhead types in the overall stockpile in order to mitigate technical risks. Although we are making progress in restoring a responsive nuclear weapons production infrastructure, we are not yet able to produce replacement warheads in sufficient quantity to respond if a technical problem called into question the safety or reliability of one or more warheads critical to our nation's deterrent. Thus, for example, we are planning to deploy two types of ICBM warheads - the W87 and W78 - and will retain sufficient numbers of these two types in reserve so that if a technical failure occurred in one type, there would be sufficient warheads of the other type to restore the operationally-deployed ICBM force. We seek to apply this approach, where appropriate, to other nuclear delivery means.

Responsive Nuclear Weapons Infrastructure

Of the many new concepts in the Nuclear Posture Review, one of the most important is formal recognition that a robust defense R&D and industrial base—a key element of which is a *responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure*—is as important as strike forces or defenses in achieving our overall defense goals. The demonstrated capabilities of the defense scientific, technical and manufacturing infrastructure, including its ability to sustain and adapt, provides the U.S. with the means to respond to new, unexpected, or emerging threats in a timely manner. If we can employ this infrastructure to produce new or replacement warheads on a timescale in which geopolitical threats could emerge, or in response to stockpile “surprise”, then we can go much further in reducing the standing stockpile and meet the President's vision of the smallest stockpile consistent with our nation's security.

By “responsive” we refer to the resilience of the nuclear weapons enterprise to unanticipated events or emerging threats, and the ability to anticipate innovations by an adversary and to counter them before our deterrent is degraded—all the while continuing to carry out the day-today activities in support of the stockpile. Unanticipated events could include complete failure of a deployed warhead type. Emerging threats could call for new or modified warhead development, or for providing additional warheads for force augmentation.

A key measure of “responsiveness” is how long it would take to carry out certain activities to address stockpile “surprise” or deal with new or emerging threats. Specific goals have been established for several activities; our progress towards meeting them is an important measure of the success of our program:

- ***Fix stockpile problems:*** The ability to assess a stockpile problem, once one has been identified, and then design, develop, implement and certify a fix will depend on the nature and scope of the problem. For a relatively minor problem, our goal is to be able to deploy warheads modified to overcome the problem within one year.
- ***Adapt weapons:*** Our goal is to achieve a capability to modify or repackage existing warheads within 18 months of a decision to enter engineering development. I note that under current law such a step would require Congressional approval.
- ***New warhead design, development and initial production:*** Our goal is to be able to design, develop, and begin production of a new warhead within 3-4 years of a decision to enter engineering development. Among other things this capability is critical to reduce reliance on warheads that are beyond their life expectancies. Once again, Congressional approval would be required. While there are no current plans to develop new weapons, maintaining the capability is an important pre-requisite to extensive reductions.
- ***Quantity production of new warheads:*** Our goal is to maintain sufficient production capacity to produce new warheads in sufficient quantities to meet any defense needs that arise without disrupting ongoing refurbishments. In the near term, refurbishment demands, starting later this decade and continuing until about 2014, will dominate production capacity.
- ***Support for force augmentation:*** We must assure that services such as warhead transportation, tritium support, etc., are not “long poles in the tent” for force augmentation - they must be capable of being carried out on a time scale consistent with the Department of Defense's ability to deploy weapons.
- ***Underground nuclear test readiness:*** We have no plan to resume testing; our efforts to improve test readiness are a prudent hedge against the possibility of a problem arising in the stockpile that cannot

be confirmed, or a fix certified, without a nuclear test. Our goal is to achieve an 18-month test readiness posture as directed by the Defense Authorization Act. Eighteen months is appropriate because that is a typical time to diagnose a problem and design a test to confirm the problem or certify the fix.

A responsive infrastructure has both intellectual and physical dimensions. Intellectually, the Administration's proposals to examine new advanced concepts will allow us to train the scientists and engineers who must provide the design underpinning for a responsive infrastructure. Physically, restoring a capability to produce plutonium pits in sufficient quantities will be essential. The Modern Pit Facility - or, more accurately, a pit rework facility - will support the pit remanufacturing needs of the entire stockpile. It is important to understand that we need this facility even if the United States never produces another new weapon. All existing plutonium pits will ultimately need to be rebuilt due to aging effects, for example, caused by radioactive decay of plutonium.

We are just beginning the transformation to a responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure. I call for your support in this important endeavor.

Near Term Implications

Let me now discuss two specific elements of the Administration's budget request and how they relate to the principles we have been discussing. The Nuclear Posture Review highlighted the importance of ensuring that the weapons complex can adjust to the changing requirements of nuclear deterrence in the coming decades. In FY 2005, we propose continuing a modest research effort on Advanced Concepts to meet potential new or emerging requirements. We also propose continuing the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator feasibility and cost study now underway.

Because there has been a great deal of discussion on the implications of these two programs, I would like to review them in some detail. We intend to use advanced concepts funds to investigate new ideas, not necessarily new weapons. For example, we are beginning a study examining the feasibility of adapting an existing nuclear warhead to provide a cruise missile capability that incorporates enhanced safety and use control. Some additional work is underway to examine the feasibility of improving warhead design margins in order to ensure continued high confidence in warhead reliability without nuclear testing. We are also in discussion with the Air Force on examining the utility of nuclear weapons to destroy chemical and biological agents, although no decisions to study this area have yet been reached. The Departments of Defense and Energy will jointly determine the specific uses of the remaining FY 2004 and the proposed FY 2005 funds.

Perhaps the single most contentious issue in our budget request is continued funding for the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator study. This study is to determine whether existing warheads - the B61 and the B83 - could be adapted without nuclear testing to improve our ability to hold at risk hardened, deeply buried facilities that may be important to a future adversary. I want to correct several misconceptions about this effort:

- There is a clear military utility to such a weapon, which is why the Defense Department asked for it to be studied. A classified report was submitted to this committee last year on this subject and remains valid.
- Despite this utility, we will move beyond the study stage only if the President approves and funds are authorized and appropriated by the Congress. We included funds in our out-year projections only to preserve the President's options. No decision will be made until the study is completed. The law is clear that beginning development engineering requires Congressional approval.
- Even if deployed, this weapon does not represent a change from our policy goal of deterrence. Deterrence requires we be able to hold at risk that which an adversary values. Our efforts to determine the potential effectiveness of an earth penetrating weapon reflect a continued emphasis on enhancing deterrence. Once again I refer you to the classified report submitted last year.

Nuclear Misconceptions

Let me conclude my statement by addressing three misconceptions that have been raised both by members of Congress and by others:

- That we sought repeal of the Prohibition on Low-Yield Warhead Development in order to develop and field new, low-yield nuclear weapons,
- That in doing so we will blur the distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons, making nuclear use more likely, and
- That nuclear weapons research and development necessarily undercuts U.S. nonproliferation efforts.

While press accounts have spoken of Administration plans to develop new, low yield weapons, there are no such plans. Nor does repeal of the Prohibition on Low-Yield Warhead Development commit the United

States to developing, producing or deploying new, low-yield warheads. Such warhead concepts could not in any case proceed to full-scale development, much less production and deployment, unless Congress authorizes and appropriates the funds required. Repeal of this vague restriction simply removed the chilling effect on scientific inquiry that has hampered our scientists' ability to explore technical options of any yield because such options "could lead to" designs of less than five kilotons. Our scientists need the freedom to explore new concepts both to maintain and exercise their intellectual capabilities and to respond to needs that one day might be articulated by this or a future President.

Nor are U.S. research and development programs blurring the line between conventional and nuclear weapons, making nuclear use more likely. This is not simply an assertion, but is empirically based. Recall that from the 1950's and continuing through today, the U.S. nuclear stockpile has contained warheads capable of producing very low nuclear yields. At the height of the Cold War many thousands of these warheads were deployed, but never used - even in regional confrontations where their use would not necessarily have provoked a Soviet response.

There is no evidence that the simple possession of these weapons made nuclear use by the United States more likely. To be clear, only the President can authorize use of U.S. nuclear weapons and no President would be inclined to employ any nuclear weapon, irrespective of its explosive power, in anything but the gravest of circumstances. Simply put, the nuclear threshold for the United States has been, is, and always will be very high.

Along these lines, the Nuclear Posture Review emphasized an increasing potential to base deterrence more on non-nuclear and missile defense capabilities, and called for development of high-precision, advanced conventional weapons to replace nuclear systems, where possible, to further reduce our reliance on nuclear forces to deter aggression.

Finally, the major U.S. nonproliferation objective is to prevent rogue states and terrorist groups from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and systems for their delivery. Neither advanced concepts efforts nor studies of an earth-penetrating weapon will increase incentives for *terrorists* to acquire such weapons—those incentives are already high and are unrelated to U.S. capabilities. Nor are they likely to have any impact on *rogue states*, whose proliferation activities march forward independently of the U.S. nuclear program. Over the past decade we have seen very significant reductions in the numbers of U.S. (and Russian) nuclear weapons, reductions in the alert levels of nuclear forces, and the abandonment of U.S. nuclear testing. No new warheads have been deployed and there has been little U.S. nuclear modernization. There is absolutely no evidence that these developments have caused North Korea or Iran to slow down covert programs to acquire capabilities to produce nuclear weapons. On the contrary, those programs have accelerated during this period.

Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, the United States will continue to lead the way to a safer world through the deep reductions in nuclear forces codified by the Moscow Treaty, through Nunn-Lugar and other cooperative threat reduction efforts, and through other actions. At the same time, although conventional forces will assume a larger share of the deterrent role, we will maintain an effective, reliable, and capable - though smaller - nuclear force as a hedge against a future that is uncertain and in a world in which substantial nuclear arsenals remain. Our ongoing efforts to reduce the current stockpile to the minimum consistent with national security requirements, to address options for transformation of this smaller stockpile, and to restore a responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure are key elements of the Administration's national security strategy.

Carrying out these efforts will pose no risk to critical U.S. nonproliferation objectives. Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I look forward to your questions.

Defense Armed Services Committee

Statement of Admiral James O. Ellis, Jr., USN Commander United States Strategic Command

Before the Strategic Forces Subcommittee – 24 March 2004

[...] Global Ballistic Missile Defense (GBMD)

In my statement presented to the full Senate Armed Services Committee on 11 March 2004, I discussed the status of US Strategic Command's Global Ballistic Missile Defense mission. Missile defense concepts have evolved from separate efforts focused on the terminal intercept of short and medium range ballistic missiles. The single entity of GBMD now includes mid-course intercept of intercontinental ballistic missiles, and, in

the years ahead, development of a multi-layered missile defense system contributing to the defense of the US, our allies, and our interests abroad. US Strategic Command is developing the GBMD concept of operations and the battle management architecture in order to provide full capabilities for RCCs defensive employment.

The IDO is the first increment of a capabilities-based approach in developing and providing Global Ballistic Missile Defense (GBMD). Initial capability will include the ability to detect a launch, display the data for decision makers, relay command and control execution decisions, and then to fire a ground-based interceptor. Our plan calls for a continued assessment of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) capabilities as they are developed and fielded by the MDA. Fielding a layered and integrated GBMD system is best accomplished in a spiral manner. An initial capability, followed by evolutionary improvements, provides commanders with both operational flexibility and an increased range of system design options based on extensive testing and assessment

[...]

IV. FUTURE OF NUCLEAR FORCE STRUCTURE

Sustainment and Modernization

• Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs)

ICBMs have been a mainstay of strategic deterrence for decades, providing prompt responsiveness, high reliability, accuracy, rapid and flexible targeting, and a high state of alert readiness. With Peacekeeper deactivation proceeding as planned, Minuteman III will soon be our Nation's only remaining land-based strategic deterrent. Recognizing the importance of the Minuteman III weapon system, the Air Force has implemented an aggressive life extension program for the Minuteman III ICBM force to ensure weapon system reliability through 2020.

We appreciate Congress' continued strong support for ICBM weapon system by funding reliability upgrades to critical components of the Minuteman III. These include the Guidance Replacement Program, Propulsion Replacement Program, Propulsion System Engine Life Extension, Safety Enhanced Vehicle Program, and Command and Control, Security and Cryptography Upgrades.

Finally, we support an Analysis of Alternatives that will examine follow-on systems to the Minuteman III.

• Bomber Force

The long-range bomber fleet is the second essential element of the Nation's strategic deterrent force as well as a primary element of our conventional Global Strike capability. The B-52 Avionics Midlife Improvement Program remains a high priority for US Strategic Command and is critical to sustaining the platform into the next decade. Of equal concern is keeping the B-2 radar replacement program on track.

The viability of our bombers in a nuclear and conventional role requires unimpeded access to increased bandwidth as well as secure, survivable, and enduring global communication capabilities inherent in the next generation satellite communication constellations. Robust command and control, coupled with the recently demonstrated value of real-time, in-flight bomber weapon re-targeting, require that we continue to synchronize the fielding of bomber communication terminals with the launches of advanced communications satellites.

• Strategic Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN)

The final leg of strategic deterrence is the D5 Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile. Life Extension (LE) and back-fit programs will provide a standardized fleet of 14 Ohio Class SSBNs capable of employing D5 Trident II missiles for the full hull life of these submarines (extended to 45 years).

The last two submarines awaiting upgrade will complete their D5 back-fit and refueling overhauls in FY07 and FY08. D5 LE upgrades the guidance and missile electronics on fielded D5 missiles and procures additional missiles to meet system reliability and accuracy testing needs for the life of the program, while also providing a sufficient quantity of missiles to fully load out 12 SSBNs.

The conversion of the four Ohio Class SSBNs to Guided Missile Submarines (SSGNs) is an example of modifying existing platforms, concepts and capabilities for a dramatically different military role. SSGN conversions are on schedule and are being completed in conjunction with scheduled Engineering Refueling Overhauls (ERO). The boats will be equipped with conventional cruise missiles, extensive special operations capability, and will be assigned evolving new missions. The USS OHIO, USS FLORIDA, and USS MICHIGAN have entered ERO and are proceeding on an aggressive conversion schedule with deliveries scheduled for 2005 and 2006. The USS GEORGIA is scheduled for ERO in 2004 and conversion will be completed by 2007.

• Stockpile Stewardship

In addition to our vital life extension and modernization programs, we are working closely with our partners in the Departments of Defense and Energy and the Congress to ensure our nuclear stockpile remains safe,

reliable, and credible. As the Nation's nuclear stockpile continues to age, we must carefully monitor its condition. Through the NNSA's Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship Program, we continue to improve our surveillance, modeling, simulation tools and processes in order to provide the critical data on aging effects, component reliability, and physics phenomena we require in the absence of nuclear weapon testing. As you know, past reductions in nuclear weapon infrastructure capacity require that the essential warhead life extension programs be carefully sequenced with scheduled warhead dismantlement so as to provide just-in-time delivery to meet operational deterrent force requirements. We are working closely with the NNSA, the national laboratories, and plants to shape their support to our future stockpile. With the production complexes operating near peak capacity, we will need to optimize the balance between essential life extension programs and dismantlement work.

A 2003 congressionally mandated panel, led by Dr. John Foster, Jr., reported that our nuclear weapons program must be balanced between maintaining the existing warheads and the need to transform elements of the existing stockpile for the future. As we reduce our nuclear forces toward the goal of 1700-2200 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads by 2012, we must concurrently analyze and research advanced concepts in order to realize the vision of the Foster Panel and the NPR. The results of this research will, in turn, enable objective, fact-based discussions on very important deterrence and policy issues.

• **Assessment and Testing**

The United States' nuclear stockpile has a weighted average age of over twenty years, and we are the only nuclear power without a current capability to build a complete nuclear weapon. The Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship Program supports ongoing research and development of new advanced technologies and analytical tools to assess the health of our aging stockpile without a current need for underground testing.

Since 2000, the Department of Energy has used the Advanced Computing Initiative as an integral part of the Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship Program to analytically simulate nuclear explosions. These computational experts and their physicist colleagues in our technical laboratories are a national treasure, trained to make sense of torrents of information obtained from those simulations to certify the safety and reliability of the current stockpile.

House Committee on International Relations

The Bush Administration's Nonproliferation Policy: Successes and Future Challenges

Testimony by Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John R. Bolton to the House International Relations Committee - 30 March 2004

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify today before this Committee to discuss what the Bush Administration is doing to keep our country and our friends and allies safe from the threat of weapons of mass destruction.

President Bush has stressed repeatedly that "the greatest threat before humanity today is the possibility of secret and sudden attack with chemical or biological or nuclear weapons." We take this threat very seriously, and are working diligently to protect the American people from it.

Why Ousting Saddam Hussein Bolstered International Security

Until the U.S.-led Coalition took action last year, the world faced a serious security threat with Saddam Hussein in power in Iraq. Here was a dictator who had used chemical weapons against his own people and against his neighbors, had defied more than a dozen Security Council resolutions, had ambitions to reconstitute his weapons arsenal, had obstructed and deceived international inspectors for the better part of twelve years and did so to the end of his regime, had twice invaded neighboring countries, and who had harbored and supported terrorist groups. Eliminating his dictatorial regime, while far from solving all of Iraq's or the region's problems, has nonetheless manifestly made the region and the world safer and more secure.

Much has been made of the fact that the United States has not yet found chemical or biological weapons in Iraq. Sadly, however, there has been inadequate attention to what has been found, evidence of significant and dangerous WMD programs that I believe clearly justified Operation Iraqi Freedom. David Kay last fall testified to the House Permanent Committee on Intelligence ("HPSCI") that Iraq's WMD programs spanned more than two decades, involved thousands of people and billions of dollars, and were elaborately shielded by security and deception operations that continued even beyond the end of the major combat-phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The discoveries Kay reported to HPSCI included:

- Dozens of WMD-related program activities and significant amounts of equipment that Iraq had concealed from the United Nations during the inspections that began in late 2002;
- A prison laboratory complex that may have been used for human testing of BW agents;
- New research on BW-applicable agents, including Brucella, Congo Crimean Hemorrhagic Fever, and research on aflatoxin and ricin that was not reported to the UN;
- Plans and advanced design work for new long-range missiles with ranges up to at least 1,000 kilometers -- well beyond the 150 kilometer range limit imposed by the UN; and
- Interest in acquiring from North Korea technology for even longer range missiles.

In particular, Saddam Hussein's aggressive missile program begs two important questions: What was the purpose of these missiles? Were WMD payloads planned for them?

CIA Director George Tenet's provisional bottom line in his Georgetown University speech was that although Iraq was not in possession of a nuclear weapon, Saddam Hussein still wanted one, and Iraq intended to reconstitute a nuclear program at some point. I believe this is consistent with a statement Hussein made in September 2000 calling on his "nuclear mujahidin," Iraq's nuclear scientists, to "defeat the enemy."

He noted that a senior Iraqi official confirmed that Iraq had misled inspectors about two groups that were working on a number of unmanned aerial vehicle ("UAV") designs. Some UAV programs, in the past, had likely been intended to deliver biological weapons. Although Tenet conceded that the jury is still out on whether Iraq intended to use its newer, smaller Unmanned Aerial Vehicles to deliver biological weapons, he also stated that a senior Iraqi official admitted that their two large Unmanned Aerial Vehicles -- one developed in the early 90s and the other under development until late 2000 -- were intended for delivery of biological weapons. Tenet noted that Saddam Hussein had dual-use facilities that could quickly produce biological agents and provisionally concluded that Saddam Hussein had the capability and the intent to quickly convert civilian industry to chemical weapons production.

To date, we have not found post-1991 chemical and biological weapon stockpiles and there are numerous outstanding questions raised by UNSCOM about Iraq's WMD program. Some of these questions, reported in UNSCOM's final comprehensive report in January 1999, include:

- Iraq claimed it had "lost" 550 mustard-gas filled artillery shells.
- The mustard in the few CW artillery shells found by the UN was of very high purity.
- UNSCOM could not verify how much VX Iraq had produced but Iraq claimed it had produced 3.9 tons. Although Iraq denied it had weaponized VX, UNSCOM together with a panel of international experts found chemical evidence to the contrary.
- Concerning biological weapons, the UNSCOM report stated, "For half of the eight-year period of the relationship between Iraq and the Special Commission, Iraq declared that it had no biological weapons program. When that claim was no longer tenable, Iraq provided a series of disclosure statements all of which have been found by international experts, on multiple occasions, to be neither credible nor verifiable."
- Importantly, UNSCOM documented that Iraq's deceptions, which UNSCOM called a concealment effort, continued well into the mid-1990s and was never able to confirm that they had ended.

Some have said that not finding WMD in Iraq -- to date -- proves that Saddam was not an imminent threat, and that, therefore, our Coalition military action was not justified. These criticisms miss the mark. Saddam's continued defiance of UN resolutions requiring Iraq to disarm and his continued interest in developing weapons of mass destruction justified coalition action. Our concern was not the imminence of Saddam's threat, but the very existence of his regime, given its heinous and undeniable record, capabilities, and intentions. President Bush made this point forcefully in his 2003 State of the Union address:

"Some have said we must not act until the threat is imminent. Since when have terrorists and tyrants announced their intentions, politely putting us on notice before they strike? If this threat is permitted to fully and suddenly emerge, all actions, all words, and all recriminations would come too late.

Trusting in the sanity and restraint of Saddam Hussein is not a strategy, and it is not an option."

David Kay has said that because of the fact that Iraqi officials clearly had acquired WMD know-how and were in contact with terrorist organizations, and because Saddam clearly was growing increasingly desperate and losing control over his regime, Iraq in many ways was an even greater threat than before:

"I quite frankly think we were on the verge of Iraq becoming more dangerous as it decayed into this storehouse of huge amounts of military equipment, including WMD capability and technology, just at the time that other groups and countries were seeking that.... I think, if Saddam had remained in power and this regime continued to crumble, you could have gone there and got it [WMD] in one-stop shopping. And people would have sold it, not fearful of a Saddam regime that would have kept them from it. He was less

and less in control of it. So I think by removing that, we've removed that threat. That doesn't make the world safer completely, but it does take one major threat down."

We acted in Iraq because we were not willing to trust our security, and the security of our friends and allies, to the supposed restraint and circumspection of a dictator committed to acquiring deadly weapons of mass destruction, a history of using chemical weapons, and a twelve-year track record of defiance.

The risks of continued inaction were simply too high. As President Bush said in his speech earlier this month to U.S. military personnel at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, "my administration looked at the intelligence, and we saw a threat. Members of Congress looked at the intelligence, and they saw a threat. The United Nations Security Council looked at the intelligence, and it saw a threat."

The President concluded, "I had a choice to make, either take the word of a madman, or take such threats seriously and defend America. Faced with that choice, I will defend America every time."

Kenneth Pollack, a former staff member of the Clinton National Security Council (NSC), now at the Brookings Institution, well summarized how the evidence of Iraq's WMD program was widely seen as compelling before the war. He wrote in a February 2004 article in *The Atlantic* that "[s]omewhat remarkably, given how adamantly Germany would oppose the war, the German Federal Intelligence Service held the bleakest view of all, arguing that Iraq might be able to build a nuclear weapon within three years. Israel, Russia, Britain, China, and even France held positions similar to that of the United States; France's President Jacques Chirac told *Time* magazine last February, '[t]here is a problem -- the probable possession of weapons of mass destruction by an uncontrollable country, Iraq. The international community is right ... in having decided Iraq should be disarmed.' In sum, no one doubted that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction."

Pollack also observed that despite the criticism of the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq, "the report accurately reflected what intelligence analysts had been telling Clinton Administration officials like me for years in verbal briefings." People may have disagreed about what to do about the Iraqi threat, but there was unanimity on the dangers of the Saddam regime.

When we think about Operation Iraqi Freedom, it is important to remember that it was Saddam Hussein who was defying the international community and violating UN Security Council resolutions that required him to disarm and cooperate with UN inspectors. Iraq harassed inspectors and concealed its WMD/missile programs in direct violation of UN Security Council Resolution 687. Saddam wasted untold billions building "presidential palaces" that he declared "off limits" to UN inspectors, rather than buying food at a time that Iraq was spending less on food than the UN recommended. Operation Iraqi Freedom was amply justified by Saddam's behavior and his calculation that he could flout the UN Security Council and the United States and not be held accountable. He was wrong.

Libya

We face significant challenges in other parts of the world from terrorist-sponsoring regimes that are developing weapons of mass destruction in many forms. Rogue states whose pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, reckless behavior, and repressive ideologies make them hostile to U.S. interests, will learn that their covert programs will not escape either detection or consequences. The government of Libya came to this conclusion in early 2003 as the United States was preparing to go to war with Iraq. And while we will pursue diplomatic solutions whenever possible, as in the case of Libya, the United States and its allies must be willing to deploy more robust techniques, such as the interdiction and seizure of illicit goods, the disruption of procurement networks, the imposition of sanctions, or other means. If rogue states are not willing to follow the logic of nonproliferation norms, they must be prepared to face the logic of adverse consequences. It is why we repeatedly caution that no option is off the table.

On December 19, 2003, Libya announced that it would voluntarily rid itself of its WMD equipment and programs. Libya also declared that it had "decided to restrict itself to missiles with a range that complies with the standards of the Missile Technology Control Regime." Libya declared its intention to comply in full with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty ("NPT") and the Biological Weapons Convention ("BWC"), and that it intended to sign the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol and accede to the Chemical Weapons Convention ("CWC"). All of these remarkable steps, Libya announced, would be undertaken "in a transparent way that could be proved, including accepting immediate international inspection."

Libya appears to be living up to these commitments. In cooperation with the United States, the United Kingdom, and the IAEA, Libya has dismantled its declared nuclear weapons program. Libya has destroyed more than 3,000 unfilled chemical munitions. They are planning to destroy their stockpile of approximately 23 tons of sulfur mustard gas under the supervision of the Organization of the Prohibition of Chemical

Weapons, ("OPCW") which would have gone into those bombs. The declared SCUD-C missile program has been removed.

Within the last few months, with Libya's cooperation, the United States and the United Kingdom removed:

- Nuclear weapon design documents;
- Gas Centrifuge components designed to enrich uranium;
- Containers of uranium hexafluoride (UF6);
- Five Scud C-s, two other partial missiles and related equipment; and
- Approximately 15 kilograms of fresh high-enriched uranium reactor fuel that was removed by Russia with U.S. and IAEA support

This month, Libya submitted its first declaration under the CWC, and signed its IAEA Additional Protocol in Vienna. Questions still remain regarding certain aspects of Libya's WMD programs, and long-term verification issues also remain open, but we are working with Libya to resolve these questions as quickly as possible.

There has been much speculation about Libya's reasons for making this historic decision. Here are the facts: In March 2003, as we were preparing to invade Iraq, Libya approached the United Kingdom seeking to discuss its WMD program with the United States and the United Kingdom. In October, as we and our allies stopped a large shipment to Libya that would have advanced their uranium enrichment effort, Libya agreed to allow visits by U.S. and UK teams. Finally, in December 2003, Libya announced that it would voluntarily rid itself of its WMD equipment and programs. I believe the conclusion is obvious. As Col. Qadhafi himself put it, weapons of mass destruction now clearly "represents a danger to the country which has them."

Iran

Libya recognized that the United States and the international community would not tolerate their development of nuclear weapons. Iran has not. But our resolve on the continuing threat posed by Iran's nuclear weapons program has brought this issue to the attention of the world.

Although Iran has robust BW, CW, and missile programs, today I will focus just on its nuclear weapons efforts. The United States has worked hard over the last three years to garner international support to require Iran to admit and to end its almost twenty-year-long covert nuclear weapons program. That Iran has such a program is the inescapable conclusion not just of our intelligence findings, but of four reports by the IAEA Director General that disclose Iran's repeated failure to abide by its safeguards obligations and Tehran's two-decades long record of obfuscation and deceit vis-à-vis the IAEA. All four IAEA reports are now on the public record.

Despite strong actions taken by the IAEA Board of Governors over the past year, there is no reason to believe that Iran has made a strategic decision to abandon its nuclear weapons program. The recent discovery of Iran's development and testing of uranium enrichment centrifuges of an advanced design is a clear indicator that Iran continues its quest for nuclear weapons. Following an all-too-familiar pattern, Iran omitted this information from its October, 2003 declaration to the IAEA -- a declaration that Tehran maintained was the "full scope of Iranian nuclear activities" and a "complete centrifuge R&D chronology."

Iran's known civil nuclear power program currently consists of a single nuclear reactor under construction by Russia at Bushehr. Over the past three years, President Bush and his Administration have had intensive discussions with Russian authorities, from President Putin on down, on the threat posed by the Iranian nuclear weapons program. Russian leaders have repeatedly assured us that they will not supply fuel for the Bushehr reactor until agreement is reached with Iran to return all spent fuel to Russia, the subject of difficult and protracted negotiations that are not complete. The Russian government won't ship the initial fuel load for the Bushehr reactor before next year, with the commissioning of the reactor well after that. These delays and postponements are significant, and we intend to continue to work closely with Russia on Bushehr.

Iran's ambitious nuclear reactor program is a remarkable venture for a country whose oil and gas reserves will last several hundred years at current extraction rates. In my testimony on June 4, 2003, I displayed charts showing that Iran's uranium resources are so small that nuclear power cannot materially increase exports of Iran's vast oil and gas resources. There is no conceivable economic justification for Iran to build costly nuclear fuel cycle facilities to support this small "nuclear power" program. We can only conclude that the primary role of this program is to serve as a cover and a pretext for the import of nuclear technology and expertise that can be used to support nuclear weapons development.

Iran has embarked, moreover, on a massive and, until recently revealed, largely clandestine effort to put in place all the elements of a nuclear fuel cycle. Iran is developing a uranium mine -- after receiving IAEA assistance in uranium prospecting -- and is constructing a facility for conversion of yellowcake into other uranium compounds, including uranium hexafluoride and uranium metal. Uranium hexafluoride is the

feedstock for the centrifuge enrichment process. Uranium metal is the feedstock for the laser enrichment process, and also has important nuclear weapons applications.

Iran has pursued two separate approaches to uranium enrichment. It has established a number of workshops for the manufacture and testing of centrifuge components (most of which, according to a recent IAEA report, are owned by military-industrial organizations), a pilot enrichment facility designed for 1,000 centrifuges, and a large, partially underground facility at Natanz intended to house up to 50,000 centrifuges. In parallel, Iran has pursued another program to enrich uranium with lasers, a complex and difficult technology few countries have mastered. Laser technology is not used commercially for uranium enrichment even in the most advanced countries because it is considered uneconomical in commercial applications. Both of these programs were covert until their existence was publicly disclosed by an Iranian opposition group.

In addition to this effort to produce enriched uranium, Iran also has a program to produce plutonium, which represents an alternate path to nuclear weapons. Iran is building a large heavy-water production plant, which was also covert until disclosed by an Iranian opposition group in 2002. Its purpose is to supply heavy water for a "research reactor" that Iran plans to begin constructing this year. The technical characteristics of this heavy water moderated "research reactor" Iran plans to build are well-suited for producing weapons-grade plutonium. Not by coincidence, Iran was also forced to admit earlier this year that it had secretly conducted experiments in plutonium reprocessing that involved uranium "targets" irradiated at the Tehran research reactor. Iran is also pursuing a reprocessing capability, a necessary step to separate plutonium from irradiated fuel.

Another potential source of plutonium for weapons is the Bushehr reactor. That reactor is under IAEA safeguards, and Iran and Russia are discussing an agreement to return spent fuel to Russia, but if Iran should withdraw from the Nonproliferation Treaty after three years of operations, the reactor and spent fuel would contain enough plutonium for dozens of nuclear weapons.

There can be no economic reason for such a massive investment in facilities encompassing all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle other than to produce fissile materials for nuclear weapons.

Another unmistakable indicator of Iran's intentions is the pattern of repeatedly lying to and providing false reports to the IAEA. The IAEA Director General has reported on several such instances, including some where Iran had to change its story after being confronted with evidence by the IAEA that it had not been truthful in its disclosures. Recent press reports suggest that Iran's nuclear denial and deception efforts continue and are very elaborate.

Despite Iran's massive deception and denial campaign, the IAEA has uncovered a large amount of information indicating numerous major violations of Iran's treaty obligations under the NPT and its IAEA Safeguards Agreement. The list of serious violations discovered by the IAEA increased over the last few months and the results of several 2004 IAEA inspections of Iranian facilities have not yet been reported to IAEA member governments. To date, violations cited by the IAEA include:

- Iran denied testing centrifuges with uranium, denied the existence of a laser enrichment program, and denied producing enriched uranium. In each of these cases, Iran later backtracked and confessed the truth only when confronted with irrefutable technical evidence from IAEA inspections.
- Iran failed to report the production of plutonium by covertly introducing uranium targets into the safeguarded Tehran Research Reactor;
- Iran reprocessed irradiated targets to separate plutonium;
- Iran failed to report the use of imported uranium hexafluoride for testing centrifuges and producing enriched uranium;
- Iran failed to report the use of imported uranium metal for laser enrichment experiments, including producing enriched uranium;
- Iran failed to report the production of uranium hexafluoride and other uranium compounds;
- Iran failed to provide required information about centrifuge, laser, and uranium conversion facilities;
- The discovery by the IAEA of irradiation of bismuth in the Tehran research reactor to produce polonium-210, an isotope that could be used in conjunction with beryllium, as a neutron initiator in some designs of nuclear weapons;
- On at least one occasion, moreover, after IAEA inspectors asked to visit a suspect facility at which it turned out centrifuges had secretly been operated, Iran delayed the visit for months while the interior of the entire facility was torn out, repainted, and tiled over in an effort to defeat IAEA testing for radioactive particles.

On the basis of the evidence collected by IAEA inspectors and exhaustively documented in his reports, the Director General concluded in his November 20, 2003 report to the Board of Governors that, "it is clear that

Iran has failed in a number of instances over an extended period of time to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement...."

The international community has reacted strongly to the revelations contained in the Director General's reports. The IAEA Board of Governors' most recent resolution, adopted on March 13, "deplores" the omission of advanced P-2 uranium enrichment centrifuge development and testing from Iran's October, 2003 submission to the IAEA, a declaration that was supposed to be the correct, complete, and final story of Iran's past and present nuclear activities.

Nonetheless, Iran has repeatedly sought to "close the file" at the IAEA, and get out from under the international spotlight. Iran seems determined to pursue its nuclear weapons program in an undisturbed and clandestine fashion, and so that it can more easily obtain critical nuclear technology that it needs for its weapons program. An important feature of the March 13 IAEA resolution, however, is precisely that it does not "close the file" on the problems that have been uncovered to date in Iran. Instead the resolution decides that the next meeting of the Board of Governors in June will consider the omissions already uncovered, in addition to whatever is contained in the next report of the Director General, or whatever other information becomes public by then.

The IAEA statute requires that non-compliance with safeguards obligations be reported to the United Nations Security Council. In the U.S. view, this standard was clearly met as early as June of last year: Iranian noncompliance with safeguards obligations has been manifest for many months, and both the Board and the Director General have noted Iran's multiple breaches and failures in this regard. We did not press for such a report at the recent March meeting, in part because the Board had considerable work to do on Libya, including a report to the Council on Libya's non-compliance and its voluntary decision to eliminate all elements of its nuclear weapons program. The Board's handling of the Libya issues sets an important contemporary precedent for the responsible handling of nuclear weapons programs that violate the NPT. Similarly, the IAEA Board will at some point, in order to uphold the effectiveness and credibility of the entire NPT regime, need to fulfill its responsibility under the IAEA Statute to report the safeguards failures found in Iran to the UN Security Council. If Iran continues its unwillingness to comply with its NPT and IAEA obligations, the Council can then take up this issue as a threat to international peace and security. If the Security Council is unable to do so, it will not only be a blow to our efforts to hold Iran accountable, but also a blow to the Council itself.

Prior to the November, 2003 meeting of the IAEA Board, the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany went to Tehran. The result was a publicly agreed to statement committing Iran to suspend uranium enrichment activities, as defined by the IAEA, something the IAEA Board had already called for in its September 2003 resolution. The same parties reached a further elaboration of this agreement just prior to the March Board. The revelations in the Director General's most recent report in February that the production of centrifuge components had not stopped in Iran, and that IAEA inspectors uncovered undisclosed work on a more advanced centrifuge design months after Iran's commitment to suspend all of its enrichment activities and provide a full accounting of its nuclear program, raise serious doubts about Iran's commitments to the Europeans. If Iran has followed through on these commitments, why did it postpone inspections scheduled for earlier this month? Was it afraid of what they would find? Repeated public statements by senior Iranian officials that the suspension of enrichment activities is only temporary, and that their enrichment program will resume once the issues with the IAEA are resolved, raise further questions whether the undertakings between Iran and the Europeans are having the intended effect of turning Iran away from its nuclear weapons effort.

For example, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei said on November 2 that Iran would not "give up" enrichment "at any price." Hasan Rowhani, the head of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, has been consistent and explicit that the suspension of enrichment is temporary, stating on November 29, 2003, that "a permanent suspension has never been an issue and will never be," and as recently as March 7, 2004, that "there is nothing permanent ... when to resume is in the hands of our system." He has been equally clear Iran expects European cooperation and support while retaining the right to continue its nuclear program. "Iran will not accept restrictions on its peaceful nuclear program," he said on January 22 in Paris, and continued that, "Iran expects its European friends to honor their commitments." Rowhani has been remarkably candid on Iran's goals and intentions -- to get out from under the scrutiny of the IAEA and press on with its nuclear program. He said on March 7, on the eve of the IAEA Board meeting, that Iran had two goals: "We must arrive at a stage where the Board of Governors totally close the file and list of concerns on the Iranian nuclear program," and "the international community has to accept Iran in the world nuclear club."

The Iranian nuclear weapons program, compounded by the Iranian effort to develop long-range missiles, is one of the most serious proliferation challenges we face today. It is clear that Iran draws from many of the

same networks that supplied Libya with nuclear technology, components, and materials, including the A.Q. Khan black market network. Destroying this network is a priority objective of the United States. Our strategy is to use bilateral and multilateral pressure, and to secure international consensus against Iran's pursuit of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. If Iran does not comply with its NPT and IAEA obligations, the IAEA Board of Governors must do its duty and -- based on the facts already reported by the Director General, along with whatever else he reports and other public information-report to the Security Council Iran's noncompliance with its NPT safeguards obligations. If that occurs, we expect the Security Council would then call on Iran to comply with IAEA demands, and would use its authority to reinforce the IAEA's efforts.

North Korea

Ensuring a Korean peninsula free of nuclear weapons remains a central Bush Administration focus. The quickest and easiest route to achieving this goal would be for North Korea to make the same historic decision that Libya made, and abandon the pursuit of WMD in a verifiable way. North Korea should take note that Libya opened itself up voluntarily to full transparency about its weapons programs, and that, with continued cooperation with the United States and the United Kingdom, a completely transformed relationship with the United States may be possible.

Absent a Libya scenario, we believe that the best way to achieve our goal of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula is through the Six-Party Talks. But let me be clear -- the Six-Party Talks are a means to an end. We are not talking simply for the sake of talking. As Secretary Powell has stated, we want and expect "tangible" progress and results, which will serve the national security goals of the United States, and which coincide with those of North Korea's neighbors.

Nonetheless, the dangers presented by North Korea's ongoing nuclear weapons program -- not to mention risk that Pyongyang might export nuclear expertise, technology, fissile material, or even transfer nuclear weapons, which they have threatened to do -- are too serious to ignore.

The greatest obstacle to a successful conclusion for the Six-Party Talks remains North Korea's unwillingness to date to address the problem honestly. The DPRK dictatorship contends that the lack of progress in the Six-Party Talks is because the U.S. refuses to abandon its "hostile" policy. It cites the presence of U.S. troops in South Korea and activities such as the Proliferation Security Initiative as examples of this "hostile" policy. As for the presence of U.S. troops in South Korea, they are there because both the United States and South Korea want them there to deter North Korean aggression. Moreover, Pyongyang's criticism of the Proliferation Security Initiative is akin to drug lords complaining about drug laws. If North Korea has a problem with the Proliferation Security Initiative, there is an easy solution-get out of the proliferation business. It is time for North Korea to embrace the principles of the free market in industries besides weapons of terror and illegal narcotics.

The real obstacle to progress in the Six-Party Talks remains North Korea's unwillingness to commit to the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of its nuclear programs. Setting aside the crucial issue of verification for a moment, let me discuss what the United States and our allies mean when we talk about the complete and irreversible dismantlement of the North's nuclear weapons program.

In order for dismantlement to be "complete," North Korea must give up not only all elements of its path to nuclear weapons based on the reprocessing of plutonium, but also its nuclear weapons path based on highly-enriched uranium.

And, in order to ensure that the world will not continue to be at risk from the threat of the DPRK's ongoing nuclear-weapons activities, this dismantlement must be "irreversible," which will require North Korea to abandon both its so-called "civil" and "peaceful" nuclear programs and permit the removal of all critical items.

North Korea also does not accept our definition of "irreversible." In December and January, Pyongyang offered some indication through public pronouncements that it would be willing to "freeze" its plutonium program, including the five-megawatt reactor at Yongbyon. This was only a freeze, mind you, which would, by definition, be neither complete nor irreversible, but North Korea wasn't willing to stick with even this tepid promise. At the last round of Six-Party Talks, however, the DPRK reversed course, claiming that only those facilities directly related to the weapons program would be subject to a freeze, assuming, of course, that adequate compensation were provided. The idea that the Yongbyon facility serves any peaceful purpose is untenable. The amount of electricity it could produce is minimal, and it is questionable that North Korea even has the necessary infrastructure in place by which to distribute it.

North Korea must declare and fully account for all of its nuclear activities and subject them to effective verification measures. While the exact modalities of this verification regime are to be worked out -- in part

because of its decision to withdraw from the NPT last year and the removal of international inspectors and monitoring equipment -- one could reasonably expect some of the five legitimate nuclear weapons states, which are also the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, would play a role in dismantling the weapons and extracting all weapons design information from North Korea. Other inspectors, with the IAEA playing an essential role, would undoubtedly assist in verifying the dismantlement of North Korea's plutonium and uranium-based nuclear weapons programs.

Unfortunately, North Korea continues to make clear that they have no intention to dismantle their facilities in a complete, verifiable and irreversible way, claiming as recently as last Saturday, "How can our Republic accept such a thing?" In this statement, their clearest to date, North Korea made the absurd claim that inspectors would "ransack" their country as a pretext for U.S. intervention. They also unequivocally stated that they would not dismantle their so-called peaceful nuclear reactors. In the eyes of North Korea, the solution is for us to "compensate" them, even for just a "freeze" of the weapons aspect of its nuclear program. It would appear, as President Bush has stated before, that North Korea is "back to the old blackmail game." This time, however, it will not work. We will not follow the mistaken path of the 1994 Agreed Framework because as Secretary Powell has said, "we bought that horse once." We will not provide inducements or reward the North Koreans to come back into compliance with their international obligations. Fundamentally, North Korea needs to understand that the end state is not a freeze, but the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all their nuclear programs, including the Yongbyon facility.

While I have focused my remarks on the nuclear programs of the DPRK, the Six-Party Talks have also provided a vehicle to identify other critical issues of concern. These issues, which the United States and others have raised in both previous sessions of the Six-Party Talks, include the disposition of conventional forces along the demilitarized zone, North Korea's other WMD programs involving chemical and biological weapons, and its outward proliferation record, with particular regard to missiles constraints on DPRK's indigenous missile programs that threaten the U.S. and its Asian allies, and its dangerous exports of destabilizing missiles and missile technologies. Moreover, we must also deal with North Korea's abysmal human rights record, such as the abduction of Japanese citizens. We do not raise these issues because we want to set the bar higher for any negotiated settlement with North Korea. While our long-term goal remains the peaceful reunification of the peninsula, we know that any interim solution will require a comprehensive change in North Korean behavior. Given its past violations of agreements, its extensive, well-documented program of deception and denial, its dangerous proliferation activities, as well as its terrorist activities and its egregious human rights record, North Korea must know that relations with the United States can only become fully normalized when it deals with all of our concerns. They must make this strategic decision themselves, or face continued isolation and other unwelcome consequences. The Six-Party Talks can help to persuade North Korea and its neighbors that such a decision is in its own interests as well as those of its neighbors and the international community as a whole. The choice is Kim Jong Il's.

Syria

As I testified to this Committee last fall, we are concerned about Syria's nuclear research and development program and continue to watch for any signs of nuclear weapons activity or foreign assistance that could facilitate a Syrian nuclear weapons capability. We are aware of Syrian efforts to acquire dual-use technologies -- some, through the IAEA Technical Cooperation program -- that could be applied to a nuclear weapons program. In addition, Russia and Syria have approved a draft program on cooperation on civil nuclear power. Broader access to Russian expertise could provide opportunities for Syria to expand further its indigenous capabilities, should it decide to pursue nuclear weapons. Syria is a party to the NPT, and has a standard safeguards agreement with the IAEA, but has not yet signed or, to our knowledge, even begun negotiations on the IAEA Additional Protocol. The Additional Protocol, if fully implemented by Syria, could enhance the IAEA's ability to verify whether Syria has been conducting clandestine nuclear weapons research barred by the NPT.

The President signed the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act last December, which provides for the imposition of sanctions if the President determines that the Syrian government has not ended its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, as well as ceased providing support for international terrorist groups, ended its occupation of Lebanon, and ceased any support for terrorist activities inside Iraq. Syria has not met these requirements, and the President will soon announce tough sanctions against Syria under the Act. The Bush Administration intends to impose further sanctions if Syrian behavior does not improve.

In addition, Syria's failure to demonstrate a consistent effort against foreign fighters reaching Iraq increases the threat to Coalition forces. We saw Syria take a series of hostile actions toward Coalition forces in the

days before the war and shortly after hostilities began, such as allowing equipment to flow into Iraq. Syria also permitted foreign fighters to transit on their way to Iraq, volunteers who sought to attack coalition forces. Although the Syrian Government has taken steps to secure their Iraqi border, Syria remains a preferred hub for foreign fighters on their way to Iraq and more needs to be done.

Cuba

Cuba is a special security concern to the United States, lying just 90 miles from the U.S. mainland. This totalitarian state has long been a violator of human rights, earning it a place on the State Department's list of state-sponsors of terrorism. We said last year in the Annual Report on Human Rights Practices for 2003 that human rights abuses in Cuba worsened dramatically last year when 75 peaceful dissidents were sentenced to prison terms averaging 20 years for trying to exercise their fundamental rights. The Cuban Government continues to violate systematically the fundamental civil and political rights of its citizens. Citizens there do not have the right to change their government peacefully. Prisoners die in jail due to lack of medical care. Members of the security forces and prison officials continues to beat and otherwise abuse detainees and prisoners. The Government denies its citizens the freedoms of speech, press, assembly and association.

Havana has long provided safe haven for terrorists, and has collaborated in biotechnology -- including extensive dual use technologies with BW applications -- with state sponsors of terror. The country is known to be harboring terrorists from Colombia and Spain. Colombia's two largest terrorist organizations, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the National Liberation Army, both maintain a permanent presence on the island. Perhaps the clearest evidence that Cuba is ruled by a criminal regime is the fact that it is providing refuge to over 70 fugitives wanted by the FBI. Many have committed serious crimes, including assassination, murder, bombings, and narcotics trafficking. Three have killed American policemen.

The Bush administration has said repeatedly that we are concerned that Cuba is developing a limited biological weapons effort, and called on Fidel Castro to cease his BW aspirations and support of terrorism. Existing intelligence reporting is problematic, and the Intelligence Community's ability to determine the scope, nature, and effectiveness of any Cuban BW program has been hampered by reporting from sources of questionable access, reliability, and motivation.

In early 2002, the intelligence community approved the following unclassified language on Cuba's BW efforts for an unclassified speech I was planning to give:

"The United States believes that Cuba has at least a limited developmental offensive biological warfare research and development effort. Cuba has provided dual-use biotechnology to other rogue states. We are concerned that such technology could support BW programs in those states. We call on Cuba to cease all BW-applicable cooperation with rogue states and to fully comply with all of its obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention."

In March and June 2002, Assistant Secretary Carl Ford used the above IC language in testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I used the same language in a May 2002 address to the Heritage Foundation, although I dropped the word "developmental" since I thought it was superfluous.

Castro has repeatedly denounced the U.S. war on terrorism. He continues to view terror as a legitimate tactic to further revolutionary objectives. In 2000, Castro visited Iran, Syria, and Libya. He made the following disturbing comments in mid-2001 at Tehran University: "Iran and Cuba, in cooperation with each other, can bring America to its knees. The U.S. regime is very weak, and we are witnessing this weakness from close up."

Incredibly, a major U.S. intelligence analysis in 1998 concluded that Cuba did not represent a significant military threat to the United States or the region.

It went only so far as to say that, "Cuba has a limited capacity to engage in some military and intelligence activities which could pose a danger to U.S. citizens under some circumstances." Why was the 1998 report on Cuba reach so narrow a conclusion? Why did it underplay the threat Cuba posed to the United States? A major reason is Cuba's aggressive intelligence operations against the United States, which included recruiting the Defense Intelligence Agency's senior Cuba analyst, Ana Belen Montes, to spy for Cuba. Montes had a hand in drafting the 1998 Cuba report. She also participated in interagency coordination of a national intelligence estimate on BW, and passed some of our most sensitive information about Cuba back to Havana. Additionally, Monte's espionage materially strengthened Cuba's denial and deception efforts; the data Montes passed gave Havana ample opportunity to generate controlled information that could, via defectors and émigrés, reach Washington. Montes pleaded guilty to espionage for Cuba against the United States, and was sentenced to a 25-year prison term in 2002.

For four decades, Cuba has maintained a well-developed and sophisticated biomedical industry, supported until 1990 by the Soviet Union. This industry is one of the most advanced in Latin America, and leads in the

production of pharmaceuticals and vaccines that are sold worldwide. Some analysts and Cuban defectors, however, have long cast suspicion on the activities conducted in these biomedical facilities. Nor can we forget what was learned after the collapse of the USSR about the biological warfare research and development work carried out by ostensibly "civilian" facilities belonging to the Cuban biotechnology industry's Soviet patrons.

As I said earlier, I believe the case for the existence of a developmental Cuba BW R&D effort is strong. The Administration believes that Cuba remains a terrorist and BW threat to the United States. The Bush Administration continues to watch this rogue state very closely. While my remarks so far have focused on rogue states, I would also like to take this opportunity to discuss our non- and counterproliferation dialogue with India and with Pakistan. Both could assemble a limited number of nuclear weapons in a relatively short period, and have air-delivered bombs and land-based missiles capable of delivering such weapons, and India is pursuing a sea-based ballistic missile capability. We believe this has diminished, not strengthened, security on the subcontinent.

India

With respect to India, in September, 2001, the Bush Administration lifted nuclear-related sanctions imposed on India following its 1998 nuclear weapons tests. This decision resulted not from a diminution of U.S. concerns regarding India's development of nuclear weapons, but reflected the Administration's view that a different approach, including regular engagement on nonproliferation issues, would prove more effective in advancing our nonproliferation goals. We have embarked on an intensive program of cooperative technical exchanges on export controls, which both sides have found useful. While there has been progress in some notable cases, U.S. sanctions remain in place against proliferating entities in India, such as NEC Engineers, and its president, Hans Raj Shiv. We are gratified by the ongoing Indian prosecution of NEC and are following the case with interest. On January 12th of this year, President Bush and Prime Minister Vajpayee announced the "Next Steps in Strategic Partnership" ("NSSP") initiative to expand cooperation in the areas of civilian nuclear and civilian space applications, high-technology commerce, and dialogue on missile defense. This important initiative reflects our growing strategic relationship with India. As part of the expanded cooperation, India will undertake meaningful steps to improve its export controls systems, and work with the U.S. in pursuit of shared nonproliferation goals. Consistent with its obligations under U.S. law and international commitments, the United States is offering no assistance to India's nuclear weapons or missile programs.

Pakistan and the A.Q. Khan Network

The United States Government is working cooperatively with Pakistan to improve its export control regimes and nonproliferation policies. While Pakistan has not conducted nuclear explosive tests since 1998, it continues to develop nuclear weapon and missile programs. The sanctions imposed in 1998 were lifted in September, 2001, and a more cooperative approach to achieve our mutual nonproliferation goals has since been implemented.

Our recent nonproliferation focus with Pakistan is to work with the government to eliminate once and for all the network of Abdul Qadeer Khan, the so-called "father" of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. Recent revelations have implicated Khan in leading an international network working in Europe, Asia, and Africa that sold uranium enrichment technology and equipment to rogue states. As the President laid out in great detail in his NDU speech last month, we have been concerned about the scope and the breadth of Khan's activities for quite some time. What we have learned about the international black market in weapons of mass destruction shows how sophisticated WMD proliferators are, and how skilled they are at deception and camouflage. The complexity of the Khan network illustrates the need for a multi-faceted approach to ultimately defeat the WMD black market. This approach will require using all the tools we have available, including close cooperation with our allies and friends.

Khan's recent admissions that he provided uranium enrichment expertise to North Korea and Iran has put the lie to protestations by these states about their covert uranium enrichment programs. President Musharraf has assured the United States that he will provide us, and the IAEA with information from Khan and his associates that we can use to advance our investigations into the Khan network and worldwide trading in nuclear weapons technology.

President Bush's Counterproliferation Initiatives

In his speech at the National Defense University last month, President Bush said, "There is a consensus among nations that proliferation cannot be tolerated. Yet this consensus means little unless it is translated

into action. Every civilized nation has a stake in preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction." The President made seven proposals to strengthen the world's efforts to stop the spread of deadly weapons:

- Expanding the work of the Proliferation Security Initiative
- Passing a UN Security Council Resolution calling on all nations to strengthen laws and international controls against WMD and missile proliferation
- Expanding the G8 Global Partnership recipients, donors, and funds to prevent WMD proliferation worldwide
- Closing a loophole in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty that allows states to pursue fissile material for nuclear weapons under peaceful cover
- Limiting the import of peaceful nuclear technology to states that have signed the IAEA Additional Protocol and calling on the Senate to quickly ratify the protocol.
- Reorganizing the IAEA to create a special IAEA committee to that will ensure all states comply with NPT obligations
- Barring states under investigation for violating their IAEA obligations from serving on the IAEA Board of Governors or on the new IAEA special committee.

The Proliferation Security Initiative

Foremost among President Bush's efforts to stop WMD proliferation is the Proliferation Security Initiative. The United States and ten other close allies and friends have worked assiduously from May 2003 to develop this initiative, which seeks to combat proliferation by developing new means to disrupt WMD trafficking at sea, in the air, and on land. Our goal is to create a more robust approach to preventing WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials flowing to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern.

The PSI has been a fast-moving effort, reflecting the urgency attached to establishing a more coordinated and active basis to prevent proliferation. The Proliferation Security Initiative is unique in that it is not an organization but an activity. Countries will participate in a variety of ways. On September 4, we published the PSI "Statement of Interdiction Principles" and shared it with countries around the world. Already, more than 60 countries have signaled that they support the PSI and are ready to cooperate in interdiction efforts.

States are becoming involved in PSI efforts in a number of different capacities -- operational, political, or both -- to help build the initiative. Three additional countries -- Canada, Norway, and Singapore -- joined the PSI core group at the most recent PSI plenary meeting in Lisbon earlier this month.

As PSI has developed, countries have worked together under PSI auspices to prevent additional shipments of illicit materials. The most recent example of this cooperation, noted by the President in his February 11 address, involved the United States working with the United Kingdom, Italy, and Germany to stop and seize a shipment of centrifuge parts useful for uranium enrichment bound for Libya.

In mid-April, PSI operational experts will gather in Ottawa, Canada, to develop further the work of the December meeting hosted by the United States, where PSI participants agreed on a growing series of sea, air, and ground interdiction training exercises. Six have already taken place, and four additional exercises will occur in the coming months. Most recently, the United States led an exercise in January in the Arabian Sea, known as "Sea Sabre," and the Italians hosted an air interception exercise in February. PSI nations have now trained for maritime interdictions in the Mediterranean, the Arabian Sea, and the western Pacific Ocean, all areas that are particularly prone to proliferation trafficking, and are beginning to evolve our collective ability to conduct air interceptions. Meanwhile, as we speak, Germany is hosting the first airport-based law-enforcement-focused interdiction training exercise, "Operation Hawkeye." Poland will host the first ground interdiction training exercise in April; Italy will host a maritime interdiction exercise in April; and France will host an air interdiction exercise in June.

As the PSI moves forward, other countries will join in training exercises to enhance global capabilities to respond quickly when governments receive intelligence on proliferation shipments. Our ally, Japan, has worked closely with the United States as it deployed expert missions to each of the ASEAN nations to encourage support and active involvement in the PSI. We have been in close discussions in these capitals, including visits I have made to two key countries, Malaysia and Indonesia.

President Bush has made clear that the long-term objective of the United States is to create a web of counterproliferation partnerships through which proliferators will have difficulty carrying out their trade in WMD and missile-related technology. With this in mind, we are making progress in negotiating ship-boarding agreements with key flag states. Liberia was the first country to sign an agreement, and cited its desire to work with us so that its ships were understood to operate under high standards. The Administration also is discussing with the United Kingdom and others, proposals to deny ships known to have unacceptable proliferation records from entry into ports.

Our PSI interdiction efforts rest on existing domestic and international legal authorities. The national legal authorities of each participant will allow us to act together in a flexible manner, ensuring actions are taken by participants with the most robust authorities in any given case. By coordinating our efforts with other countries, we draw upon an enhanced set of authorities for interdiction. Experts will work to improve our ability to share information with law enforcement and military operators in a timely and effective manner, in order to allow operators to increase the number of actual interdictions.

In his February address, President Bush directed that we work with other participants to expand PSI's mission to target not only shipments and transfers of WMD, but the entities and networks involved in illicit proliferation activities more aggressively. Such steps will require greater cooperation not just among intelligence and military services but in law enforcement as well.

Specifically, PSI participants will focus more broadly on those who traffic in deadly weapons, and work to shut down their labs, to seize their materials, to freeze their assets, to disrupt the middlemen, the suppliers and the buyers.

Work has already begun to build support for this expanded PSI effort. At the most recent plenary meeting in Lisbon, Portugal, the Chairman's Conclusions contain a strong statement of political support for the President's call to expand PSI's role. Participants agreed to pursue greater cooperation through military and intelligence services and law enforcement to shut down proliferation facilitators and bring them to justice. PSI participants agreed on some practical first steps to: 1) identify national points of contact and internal processes developed for this expanded goal; 2) develop and share national analyses of key proliferation actors and networks, their financing sources, and other support structures; and 3) undertake national action to identify law enforcement authorities and other tools or assets that could be brought to bear against efforts to stop proliferation facilitators.

We are nearing the first anniversary of President Bush's announcement of PSI in Krakow, Poland. To commemorate the anniversary, the Government of Poland will host a meeting in Krakow, where they anticipate participation by many of the governments supporting PSI, and ready and willing to participate in PSI activities. This meeting will demonstrate PSI's global scope and the strong resolve of nations to take robust actions to deny proliferators the ability to trade in the most deadly weapons and materials. As the President said in his February address: "Our message to proliferators must be consistent and it must be clear: We will find you, and we're not going to rest until you are stopped."

Strengthening Laws and International Controls Governing Proliferation

In his February address and also in his September address to the U.N. General Assembly, the President called upon the Security Council to pass a resolution calling for each nation to require all states to criminalize proliferation, enact strict export controls, and secure all sensitive materials within their borders. After months of difficult negotiation, the Permanent Five members of the Security reached agreement last week. We have circulated a draft resolution to the rest of the Council, and we hope that the full Council will move quickly to adopt this resolution.

WMD Sanctions

The front lines in our nonproliferation strategy need to extend beyond the immediate states of concern to the trade routes and entities that are engaged in supplying the countries of greatest proliferation concern. In support of this "forward" policy of nonproliferation, we are employing a number of tools to thwart and counter countries' weapons of mass destruction and missile programs, including sanctions, interdiction, and credible export controls. Most of these states are still dependent on outside suppliers and expertise. Thus, we can slow down and even stop their weapons development plans by implementing a policy that seeks to disrupt their procurement attempts.

Proliferating states and entities are employing increasingly sophisticated and aggressive measures to obtain WMD or missile-related equipment, materials, and technologies. They rely heavily on the use of front companies and illicit arms brokers in their quest for arms, equipment, sensitive technology, and dual-use goods for their WMD programs. These front companies and brokers are expert at concealing the ultimate destination of an item, and in making an illicit export appear legitimate -- in essence hiding the export in the open. Proliferators take other measures to circumvent national export controls, such as falsifying documentation, providing false end-user information, and finding the paths of least resistance for shipping an illicit commodity. If there is a loophole in a law or a weak border point, those responsible for rogue states' WMD programs will try to exploit it. All too often they succeed.

Economic penalties or sanctions are an essential tool in a comprehensive nonproliferation strategy. The imposition or even the mere threat of sanctions can be a powerful lever for changing behavior, as few countries wish to be publicly labeled as being irresponsible. Sanctions not only increase the costs to suppliers

but also encourage foreign governments to take steps to adopt more responsible nonproliferation practices and ensure that entities within their borders do not contribute to WMD programs.

The Bush Administration has imposed WMD sanctions an average of 22 times per year and 32 times per year in 2002 and 2003. Compare that with the average number of sanctions imposed per year during the last Administration -- eight -- and you will see that this Administration is very serious about using sanctions as a nonproliferation tool. We have imposed measures under the Iran Nonproliferation Act, the Iran-Iraq Act, the Arms Export Control Act, and Executive Order 12938 among others. While we see sanctions as an effective policy tool, most of these sanctions are required by law and we will implement them as Congress intended.

Consider a recent case involving Macedonia. In December, 2003, the United States imposed nonproliferation penalties pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act and E.O. 12938 on the Macedonian entity, Mikrosam, and Macedonian citizen, Blagoje Samokovski. Penalties were imposed because the United States Government determined that these entities contributed materially to the efforts of the end-user to use, design, develop, produce, or stockpile missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. The Macedonian Government understands the importance of dealing with these issues and has recently completed a first draft of a new Macedonian export control law.

Our perspective on sanctions is clear and simple. Companies around the world have a choice: trade in WMD materials with proliferators, or trade with the United States, but not both. Where national controls fail, and when companies make the wrong choice, there will be consequences. U.S. law requires it, and we are committed to enforcing these laws to their fullest extent.

For example, the forthcoming report that the Department of State will soon submit to Congress pursuant to the Iran Nonproliferation Act illustrates how we are implementing the Act to advance our nonproliferation goals. We will be announcing 13 new sanctions for transferring WMD technology to Iran.

Restricting Dangerous Materials and Continuing the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Another important Administration initiative is the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, launched by the Leaders of the G-8 at the Kananaskis Summit in June, 2002. The G-8 Leaders pledged to raise up to \$20 billion over ten years for nonproliferation, disarmament, and nuclear safety cooperation projects to prevent dangerous weapons and materials from falling into the wrong hands.

The United States will contribute half of this total -- \$10 billion -- through projects funded and implemented by the Departments of Defense, Energy, and State, most of which were begun under the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program. Of the remaining \$10 billion to be committed by other G-7 countries, approximately \$7 billion has already been pledged. Last year the G-8 welcomed the participation of six additional donor countries -- Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, and Switzerland -- and we have recently invited a number of additional nations to join this important enterprise.

The initial focus of the Partnership has been on projects in Russia, with formal recognition anticipated for other states of the former Soviet Union (FSU), but the problems of dangerous weapons, materials, and expertise extend to many other countries. The United States already has nonproliferation projects underway in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Georgia, and other FSU states, and counts this assistance toward our Global Partnership commitment. Some other Global Partnership countries already have assistance in the FSU as well. The United States has recently begun assistance in Iraq and Libya. We are encouraging our partners to undertake their own projects in such states and to expand the Global Partnership into these areas. The United States has new legislative authority to devote a portion of Department of Defense CTR resources to countries beyond the former Soviet Union, and we are looking to expand the scope of our efforts accordingly.

In the decades after World War II the United States and the Soviet Union built research reactors that used highly enriched uranium for fuel in dozens of locations around the world. As a result, substantial amounts of highly enriched uranium fuel are stored at or near such reactors under security arrangements that vary widely in quality. Both the United States and Russia want to convert such reactors to low enriched uranium fuel, and to remove highly enriched uranium. In recent months we have worked with Russia to remove highly enriched uranium fuel from Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Libya, and continue to plan for additional removals. Our goal is to reduce to an absolute minimum international commerce in weapons-usable uranium throughout the world.

Another important nonproliferation instrument, our Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance program ("EXBS"), is our primary vehicle for providing other governments the advice, training, and equipment they need to bring their export control systems up to international standards. The EXBS program also initially focused on the former Soviet Union and nearby transit states, but in recent years has expanded to over forty countries in South Asia, Southeast Europe, and key transshipment states from the Mediterranean to the Middle East to Southeast Asia. Foreign governments receiving this assistance have

passed new export control laws and interdicted shipments of arms, radioactive materials, and other sensitive items destined for suspicious end-users.

The Dangerous Materials Initiative ("DMI"), responds to the President's February 11th call to strengthen efforts against the spread of deadly weapons. The DMI is a project-based international assistance initiative that will help criminalize proliferation, remove and/or secure dangerous materials, enact stricter export controls, expand G-8 nonproliferation efforts beyond Russia and help implement the Proliferation Security Initiative. We have already conducted DMI projects in Libya to remove nuclear materials and related material, and in Iraq to control dangerous materials. We are seeking DMI partnerships with other countries, on a pilot basis, to strengthen national controls over biological and nuclear materials, including sensitive technology and equipment. We encourage other countries to participate in similar partnerships in Iraq, Libya, and elsewhere.

Closing NPT Loopholes and Strengthening the IAEA

President Bush is committed to ensuring that all IAEA members and all states parties to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty honor their treaty obligations, and that banned activities are reported to the United Nations Security Council.

The President is determined to stop rogue states with secret nuclear weapons programs from benefiting from peaceful nuclear technology. President Bush has proposed creating a special committee of the IAEA to "focus intensively on safeguards and ... [and] ensure that nations comply with their international obligations."

The President also wants to stop states that are suspected of having covert nuclear weapons programs from holding seats on the IAEA Board of Governors from which they now can sit in judgment of their own programs as well as the weapons programs of other rogue states. For example, it was outrageous that Iran actually was a member of the Board last year while that body was deliberating how to deal with Iran's nuclear weapons effort. Ensuring that suspect states do not sit on the IAEA Board is particularly important given the Board's tradition of trying to reach decisions by consensus -- which is obviously impossible when the fox helps guard the henhouse.

Stopping MANPADS Proliferation

The Administration is also actively seeking to address the threat posed by the terrorist use of Man Portable Air Defense Systems ("MANPADS") through bilateral and multilateral initiatives. At the June 2003 G-8 Evian Summit, leaders agreed to a U.S.-initiated MANPADS Action Plan that includes: providing assistance and technical expertise for destroying excess MANPADS; adopting stringent national controls on production of and export of MANPADS and their essential components; banning transfers to non-state actors; exchanging information on uncooperative countries and entities; and examining for new MANPADS the feasibility of adding specific technical performance or launch control features that preclude their unauthorized use. During the October 2003 APEC summit, APEC economies issued a statement on MANPADS similar to the G-8 Action Plan. In December 2003, the Wassenaar Arrangement adopted strengthened guidelines for control over MANPADS transfers. We are continuing efforts in all of these for this year. New MANPADS initiatives are also being proposed in the OSCE and other regional organizations.

We are also engaged on a bilateral basis with countries that have a combination of excess MANPADS stocks, poor controls, and a demonstrable risk of proliferation to terrorist groups or other undesirable end-users. The existing NADR Small Arms and Light Weapons Destruction Program is funding programs to destroy obsolete weapons which have little military value, but could be lethal against civil aviation in the hands of terrorist organizations. NADR also strives to improve safety and security of weapons which may be needed for legitimate self-defense purposes; and improve standards of inventory control and accountability to ensure that remaining stocks are not stolen or illicitly transferred.

Many countries participating in the bilateral MANPADS reduction programs have requested that we treat their activities as confidential. Public success stories include the destruction of nearly 6000 MANPADS in Bosnia-Herzegovina. After a State Department-led assessment, Prime Minister Hun Sen of Cambodia declared that Cambodia would destroy its entire stockpile of 233 MANPADS. The State Department also disabled and will destroy 45 MANPADS in Liberia. 7,922 MANPADS have been destroyed in eight countries in Africa, Eastern Europe, and Latin America since the beginning of 2003. We have received commitments for the destruction of almost 2,500 more and continue to pursue efforts worldwide.

Conclusion

We are making steady progress in the war against WMD proliferation and terrorism. We have broken up the Khan network, worked in partnership with Libya to dismantle its WMD programs, put the international spotlight on Iran's nuclear program, moved North Korea into multilateral negotiations, eliminated Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq, and successfully used the Proliferation Security Initiative to stop WMD shipments. We are turning up the pressure on Syria to end its WMD efforts, and by all these efforts are seeking to deter other would-be proliferators. We have worked with our G-8 partners to spend billions of dollars to safeguard dangerous materials and weapons left over from the Cold War. We are strengthening the Nunn-Lugar program and the G-8 Global Partnership and we are assisting other countries to develop and enforce effective export controls.

India and Pakistan have committed to strengthen their export controls to prevent transfers of sensitive technology and have launched a dialogue of their own that we hope will lead to the reduction of nuclear risks on the Subcontinent.

These efforts are bearing fruit. Proliferation is today becoming riskier and more uncertain, and we are now sending the message that the pursuit of WMD brings not security but insecurity. At the same time, we have made clear that countries that abandon such dangerous pursuits can enjoy the prospect of improved relations with the United States and our friends. President Bush said in February, "We've shown that proliferators can be discovered and can be stopped. We've shown that for regimes that choose defiance, there are serious consequences." But while the United States has made progress in stopping WMD proliferation, the threat is far from being eliminated.

It would be irresponsible to believe that stopping WMD proliferation will be any easier than the war against terrorism, or that it will be resolved any sooner.

Only by sustained efforts over a protracted period will we achieve our goals of allowing America and its allies to be free from the continuing threat of blackmail and terrible destruction that these weapons pose.

Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Energy

An assessment of the impact of repeal of the prohibition on low-yield nuclear warhead development on the ability of the United States to achieve its nonproliferation objectives

Report to Congress – 31 March 2004

Het rapport is te vinden als bijlage.

US State Department

The NPT: A crisis of non-compliance

Statement by John R. Bolton

Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security

to the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

New York - April 27, 2004

Good morning, Mr. Chairman

It is a pleasure to address the third Preparatory Meeting of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate the Chairman on assuming his responsibilities.

The United States supports the Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT] and is committed to its goals. But despite our strong support, the support of many NPT countries and the best intentions of most of you here, at least four NPT non-nuclear member countries were or are using the NPT as cover for the development of nuclear weapons. States like Iran are actively violating their treaty obligations, and have gained access to technologies and materials for their nuclear weapons programs. North Korea violated its NPT obligations while a party, and then proved its strategic decision to seek nuclear weapons by withdrawing from the Treaty entirely. Two states in the past -- Iraq and Libya -- had also violated the NPT. Libya took the important decision to disclose and eliminate its weapons of mass destruction programs, a paradigm that other nations now seeking nuclear weapons should emulate.

There is a crisis of NPT noncompliance, and the challenge before us is to devise ways to ensure full compliance with the Treaty's nonproliferation objectives. Without such compliance by all members, confidence in the security benefits derived from the NPT will erode. To address this serious problem, President Bush recently announced a series of proposals that are aimed at strengthening compliance with the obligations we all undertook when we signed the Treaty. These proposals will address a fundamental problem that has allowed nations like Iran and North Korea to exploit the benefits of NPT membership to develop their nuclear weapons programs. The president is determined to stop rogue states from gaining nuclear weapons under cover of supposed peaceful nuclear technology. As President Bush said on February 11, "Proliferators must not be allowed to cynically manipulate the NPT to acquire the material and infrastructure necessary for manufacturing illegal weapons."

We must resolve to deal firmly and swiftly with countries whose nuclear programs pose a serious threat to the NPT. We must resolve to send a signal to potential Treaty violators that their actions will not be tolerated. We must resolve to take action now, or more and more states could be emboldened to follow the lead of Iran and North Korea, and could hide behind the cover of NPT legitimacy while pursuing nuclear weapons technology. As President Bush said, "There is a consensus among nations that proliferation cannot be tolerated. Yet this consensus means little unless it is translated into action. Every civilized nation has a stake in preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction."

President Bush's Proposals

The U.S. remains strongly committed to its Article VI obligations, and President Bush has made major contributions to the goals of Article VI. The transformation of our relationship with Russia led quickly to a commitment by President Bush to undertake reductions in deployed nuclear weapons to historically low levels. A similar pledge by President Putin soon followed, and both commitments were later codified in the Treaty of Moscow. There are many similar accomplishments, such as the establishment of the Global Partnership against the spread of WMD, which President Bush has proposed expanding, and which will accomplish much toward ridding the world of WMD materials and equipment. Overall, it is a very impressive record of action that is making the world a safer place.

In order to address loopholes and the crisis of noncompliance with the NPT, President Bush announced four proposals that would strengthen the Treaty and the governance structures of the International Atomic Energy Agency ("IAEA"). The first proposal would close the loophole in the Treaty that allows states such as Iran and North Korea to pursue fissile material for nuclear weapons under peaceful cover. Enrichment and reprocessing plants would be limited to those states that now possess them. Members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group would refuse to sell enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technologies to any state that does not already possess full-scale, functioning enrichment and reprocessing plants. Nuclear fuel supplier states would ensure a reliable supply of nuclear fuel at reasonable prices to all NPT parties in full compliance with the NPT that agreed to forego such facilities. In this way, nations could use peaceful nuclear power as anticipated by the Treaty, but not to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. The Treaty provides no right to such sensitive fuel-cycle technologies.

Second, President Bush proposed creating a special committee of the IAEA Board of Governors, to "focus intensively on safeguards and ... ensure that nations comply with their international obligations." The Bush administration is committed to working with the IAEA and its members to ensure that clandestine nuclear activity is uncovered and reported to the United Nations Security Council. As the president said when announcing these proposals, "For international norms to be effective, they must be enforced."

As a third step, the president urged states that are serious about fighting proliferation to approve and implement the [IAEA] Additional Protocol and proposed that, as of the end of 2005, the Additional Protocol be a condition of supply for Nuclear-Suppliers Group-controlled items. While the Additional Protocol is not foolproof, if implemented and rigorously enforced it would give the IAEA important new tools to detect undeclared nuclear activity. As President Bush said: "Nations that are serious about fighting proliferation will approve and implement the Additional Protocol." There are no excuses; if you wish to be considered a responsible partner and leader in strengthening nuclear nonproliferation, you must be willing to do your share by demonstrating a willingness to assume the obligations of this important new tool. The IAEA has demonstrated over the years that it is able to devise approaches that can protect sensitive or proprietary technology. I urge all states that have not concluded an Additional Protocol to do so at the earliest possible date.

Fourth, the president proposed that we stop states under investigation for NPT and IAEA violations from holding seats on the IAEA Board of Governors or on the new IAEA special committee. As it now stands, states under investigation by the IAEA are allowed to sit in judgment of their own covert nuclear weapons

programs, as well as those of other rogue states. Violators thus can get a platform to impede effective IAEA action and enforcement against their own secret nuclear weapons efforts. It was outrageous that Iran actually was a member of the Board last year while that body was deliberating how to deal with Iran's nuclear weapons effort. Ensuring that suspect states do not sit on the IAEA Board is particularly important, given the Board's tradition of trying to reach decisions by consensus. As the president said, "The integrity and mission of the IAEA depends on this simple principle: Those actively breaking the rules should not be entrusted with enforcing the rules.

The Inherent Linkage Between Articles II & IV of the NPT

The central bargain of the NPT is that if non-nuclear weapons states renounce the pursuit of nuclear weapons, they may gain assistance in developing civilian nuclear power. This bargain is clearly set forth in Article IV of the Treaty, which states that the Treaty's "right" to develop peaceful nuclear energy is clearly conditioned upon parties complying with Treaty Articles I & II. If a state party seeks to acquire nuclear weapons and thus fails to conform with Article II, then under the Treaty that party forfeits its right to develop peaceful nuclear energy.

To determine whether states are in conformity with Article II, we must be able to verify rigorously compliance with the Treaty. All parties to the NPT should have comprehensive laws and regulations in force to ensure compliance with their obligation not to seek or acquire assistance in developing nuclear weapons. It is our view that non-nuclear weapons states also share the Article I requirement not to assist others to acquire nuclear weapons or the means for their development.

This is even more important after the revelations of the extent of the A.Q. Khan black market network. Khan's network made enormous sums of money selling nuclear designs and equipment to countries with clandestine nuclear programs. The network operated in countries all over the world, including many NPT member states, for purposes of manufacturing, brokering, and transiting nuclear technology. Many of the countries in which the network operated did not even know that nuclear-related black market activities were taking place in their countries.

The United States is willing to work with nations that need to set up efficient export control systems. But nations must also be willing to enforce those controls. President Bush proposed a new Security Council resolution last fall requiring all states to criminalize WMD proliferation, enact strict export controls, and secure all sensitive materials within their borders. And last month, the five Permanent Members of the Security Council circulated a draft resolution. We hope that the Council will adopt that resolution this very week. Once it is passed, we are prepared to assist other governments in drafting and enforcing the new laws that will help stem WMD proliferation.

But verification is not enough. The most air-tight verification regime in the world is worthless if confirmed violations are ignored.

Enforcement is critical. We must increase the costs and reduce the benefits to violators, in ways such as the Proliferation Security Initiative [PSI] now being pursued actively around the world, and which President Bush has proposed strengthening further. We cannot look the other way, out of fear or concern that the cost of enforcement will be borne by those objecting to the violation. We cannot hope the problem will go away. We cannot leave it to "the other guy" to carry the full measure of the challenge of demanding full compliance. We cannot divert attention from the violations we face by focusing on Article VI issues that do not exist. If a party cares about the NPT, then there is a corresponding requirement to care about violations and enforcement.

Iran

We face significant challenges from terrorist-sponsoring regimes that are developing weapons of mass destruction in many forms. Today, I would like to focus on three very different cases, one a major success story for nonproliferation, and two where the nuclear proliferation threat to international peace and security continues to grow.

First, Iran, one of the most fundamental challenges to the nonproliferation regime, which has concealed a large-scale covert nuclear weapons program for over 18 years. It is clear that Iran draws from many of the same networks that supplied Libya with nuclear technology, components, and materials, including the A.Q. Khan network, as Khan himself has confessed.

It is no surprise that the IAEA has uncovered much evidence of Iran's undeclared activity. There is as yet, however, no reason to believe that Iran has made a strategic decision to abandon its nuclear weapons program and its violation of its NPT Article II obligations. Iran's recent failures to disclose work on uranium enrichment centrifuges of an advanced design and on Polonium-210, and to explain the presence of highly

enriched uranium, are clear indicators that Iran continues its quest for nuclear weapons. Following an all-too-familiar pattern, Iran omitted this information from its October 2003 declaration to the IAEA -- a declaration that Iran said provided the "full scope of Iranian nuclear activities" and a "complete centrifuge R&D [research and development] chronology."

Iran has expressed interest in the purchase of up to six additional nuclear power plants, and has told the IAEA that it is pursuing a heavy-water research reactor at Arak -- a type of reactor that might be well-suited for plutonium production. This ambitious reactor program is a remarkable venture for a country whose oil and gas reserves will last several hundred years. There is no conceivable economic justification for Iran to build costly nuclear fuel cycle facilities to support a small "nuclear power" program. It is clear that the primary role of Iran's "nuclear power" program is to serve as a cover and a pretext for the import of nuclear technology and expertise that can be used to support nuclear weapons development.

Iran's continued deception and delaying tactics have not gone unnoticed by the international community. Despite Iran's massive deception-and-denial campaign, the IAEA has uncovered a large amount of information indicating numerous major violations of Iran's treaty obligations under its NPT Safeguards Agreement. On the basis of the evidence collected by IAEA inspectors and exhaustively documented in his reports, the director general has concluded that "it is clear that Iran has failed in a number of instances over an extended period of time to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement...."

The IAEA Statute requires that the IAEA Board of Governors report non-compliance with safeguards obligations to the United Nations Security Council. In the U.S. view, this standard was clearly met as early as June of last year. Iranian noncompliance with safeguards obligations has been manifest for many months, and both the Board and the director general have noted Iran's multiple breaches and failures in this regard. We did not press for such a report at the recent March meeting. The IAEA Board will at some point, however, need to fulfill its responsibility under the IAEA Statute to report the safeguards failures found in Iran to the Security Council, as it did in the case of Libya. If Iran continues its unwillingness to comply with the NPT, the Council can then take up this issue as a threat to international peace and security. If the Council is unable to do so, it will not only be a blow to our efforts to hold Iran accountable, but also a blow to the effectiveness of the Council itself and to the credibility of the entire NPT regime.

Iran's oil-rich environment, grudging cooperation with the IAEA, its deception, and its 18-year record of clandestine activity leads us to the inevitable conclusion that Iran is lying and that its goal is to develop a nuclear weapon in violation of its Article II commitments. We believe that Iran's stalling tactics clearly indicate that it has not fulfilled even the minimal steps it agreed to last September and again in February. If we permit Iran's deception to go on much longer, it will be too late. Iran will have nuclear weapons.

If Iran wants to restore international confidence in its civilian nuclear program, it must "come clean" and answer satisfactorily all unresolved IAEA questions. Iran must make a clear decision to open up its nuclear program to transparent inspections, including full access under the Additional Protocol, and comply with all of its NPT and IAEA responsibilities. If Iran does not do this, it will remain in violation of Article II of the Treaty and, according to Article IV, will forfeit any right to civilian nuclear power assistance.

North Korea

North Korea's use of the NPT as a cover to hide its nuclear weapons ambitions and its subsequent withdrawal from the Treaty constitute the clearest example of a state cynically manipulating the NPT to threaten the international community with its nuclear weapons program. We now face the danger not only of a North Korea in possession of nuclear weapons, but the risk that it will export fissile material or weapons to other rogue states or to terrorists. Continuous international pressure is essential to ensure the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of its nuclear weapons program, including both its plutonium and uranium enrichment programs. The United States continues to support the Six-Party Process, but we have long said that we will measure success in the talks through concrete progress. Simply continuing to talk, however, is not progress. And as Vice President Cheney recently stated in China, "Time is not necessarily on our side." We urge all member states to support the Six-Party talks aimed at achieving a peaceful, diplomatic end to North Korea's nuclear programs.

Libya

On December 19, 2003, Libya announced that it would voluntarily rid itself of its WMD equipment and programs. Libya declared its intention to comply in full with the NPT and to sign the Additional Protocol. All of these remarkable steps, Libya announced, would be undertaken "in a transparent way that could be proved, including accepting immediate international inspection."

Libya has made enormous progress toward fulfilling these commitments. In cooperation with the United States, the United Kingdom, and the IAEA, Libya has dismantled its known nuclear weapons program. In cooperation with the United Kingdom, Libya and the IAEA, we removed nuclear weapon design documents, gas centrifuge components designed to enrich uranium, containers of uranium hexafluoride (UF6), a uranium conversion facility, and 15 kilograms of fresh high-enriched uranium reactor fuel, which was removed to Russia.

As Colonel Qaddafi said recently in his speech to the Organization of African Unity, "The security of Libya does not come from the nuclear bomb, the nuclear bomb represents a danger to the country which has them." If they wish to rejoin the community of civilized nations, states like Iran and North Korea could learn from Libya's recent example. On December 19, 2003, when Libya made its WMD commitment, the president of the United States indicated that fulfillment of Libya's commitment would open the way for better relations with the United States. We meant exactly that. Last week the president decided to terminate application of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act ("ILSA") on Libya. The president is changing the Executive Order sanctions under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act that will enable trade with Libya. The United States will not be the only nation that seeks to improve its relations with Libya, but based upon changed behavior by the Libyan regime, we believe that these steps toward better relations are warranted. As President Bush said in February, "Abandoning the pursuit of illegal weapons can lead to better relations with the United States, and other free nations. Continuing to seek those weapons will not bring security or international prestige, but only political isolation, economic hardship, and other unwelcome consequences."

Conclusion

As I said at the outset, the United States is committed to a strong and effective nuclear non-proliferation regime. But the time for business as usual is over. An irresponsible handful of nations not living up to their Treaty commitments are undermining the NPT's mission. Without full compliance by all NPT members, confidence in the NPT as a nonproliferation instrument erodes. What will eventually result is a world with an ever-growing number of states possessing nuclear weapons, where terrorists and rogue states would have expanded access to nuclear technology and expertise. In such a world, the risk of catastrophic attacks against civilized nations would be far greater.

The president's initiatives aim to prevent such a scenario, and I urge you to lend your full support to them. We must be mindful that only transparency, rigorous verification, and firm political resolve against violators can shore up confidence in the NPT. After all, the Treaty can only be as strong as our will to insist that states comply with it.

US State Department

NPT Article VI

Stephen G. Rademaker, Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control

Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons – New York, 3 May 2004

Introduction

Mr. Chairman, I welcome the opportunity to address this meeting of the Preparatory Committee. Today, as in the past, the United States is consistently meeting its obligations under every element of this critical international instrument, and Article VI is no exception. President Bush and his Administration are committed to the NPT, both in word and deed.

The nuclear weapon states bear a particular responsibility under the NPT to pursue effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament. For many years, NPT states looked almost exclusively to the United States and the former Soviet Union on Article VI issues. However, the end of the Cold War and the challenges of the new century have led to significant changes in the international security environment. We need to take these changes into account when looking at implementation of Article VI.

The end of the Cold War led to greater U.S.-Russian cooperation on nuclear matters throughout the 1990s. The new era was given expression in November 2001, when Presidents Bush and Putin issued a joint statement declaring a new relationship between their countries. This situation led to new opportunities for nuclear force reductions.

The end of the Cold War also left a huge legacy of weapons of mass destruction and related materials throughout the states of the former Soviet Union. This potentially perilous situation led the United States and many others to undertake cooperative measures to deal with the problem.

Finally, terrorism has grown to become an immediate danger to global peace and security. Some terrorist groups seek weapons of mass destruction. The possible nexus between this threat and those states in noncompliance with the NPT presents a scenario of unimaginable horror. The potential for terrorist violence on a large scale is a major destabilizing factor in today's world and undermines disarmament goals.

Mr. Chairman, I offer this perspective at the outset to reinforce the point that progress toward nuclear disarmament is increasingly becoming a cooperative responsibility. All NPT parties have obligations under Article VI. And all should find some way to contribute, whether it is helping to fight terrorism, assisting in efforts to eliminate WMD-related materials, or taking a strong stand against those nations that seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction in violation of the NPT and international norms.

In laying out the highlights of the U.S. Article VI record, the U.S. delegation will draw your attention to the trends of the past 15 years. We will demonstrate how progress has been accelerated under the current Administration and provide specific examples of how the goals of Article VI are increasingly being advanced through the cooperation of more and more countries.

The Big Picture

Mr. Chairman, looking back over the past 15 years, it is easy to recognize the diminishing role of nuclear weapons in international security and geopolitics. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the United States built large strategic nuclear forces, with each side possessing at its height an arsenal of over 10,000 strategic nuclear warheads. The standoff in Europe between NATO and the Warsaw Pact led to the deployment by both sides of literally thousands of nuclear weapons in support of their security interests in the region. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent dissolution of the Soviet Union left both sides with large nuclear weapon stockpiles built up over 40 years.

The immediate benefit was an end to both the nuclear arms race between the United States and the then-Soviet Union, and to the dangerous confrontation between the large armies of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe. The international security environment had changed for the better, allowing for a cessation of the nuclear arms race as called for in Article VI and substantial progress on the goal of nuclear disarmament.

Mr. Chairman, distinguished Delegates, the facts speak for themselves. Over the past 15 years, the United States has taken many concrete steps that promote the goals of Article VI. We have:

Reduced from over 10,000 deployed strategic warheads to less than 6,000 by December 5, 2001 as required by the START Treaty.

Eliminated nearly 90 percent of U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons and reduced the number of types of nuclear systems in Europe from nine in 1991 to just one today.

Dismantled more than 13,000 nuclear weapons since 1988.

Not produced highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons since 1964 and halted the production of plutonium for nuclear weapons in 1988.

Not conducted a nuclear explosive test since 1992.

Removed more than 200 tons of fissile material from the military stockpile; enough material for at least 8,000 nuclear weapons.

I could go on, but the obvious conclusion for those prepared to be objective is that the United States has an impressive record of achievement toward the goals of Article VI.

Current Policies and Actions

Mr. Chairman, the Bush Administration has contributed in major ways to this record, and, indeed, has accelerated policies designed to reduce U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons. One of the first major policy initiatives by President Bush was to transform the nature of our relationship with Russia and decide to reduce unilaterally U.S. strategic nuclear warheads to the lowest level in decades. This U.S. commitment led to a similar undertaking by President Putin, and both pledges were later codified in the Moscow Treaty, which entered into force on June 1 of last year. The Treaty requires both countries to reduce to 1700-2200 strategic nuclear warheads by December 31, 2012. The Bilateral Implementation Commission established under the Treaty had its first meeting in Geneva last month.

Upon completion of the Moscow Treaty reductions in 2012, the United States will have reduced about 80 percent of the strategic nuclear warheads that we had deployed in 1991. Meanwhile, we already have deactivated 28 of 50 Peacekeeper ICBMs and removed four ballistic missile submarines from strategic service. For most of the 1990s, the United States and Russia struggled to negotiate, ratify and bring into force bilateral treaties designed to achieve reductions below the 6,000 warhead level of START. While those

efforts ended in failure, in less than two years President Bush's approach placed both countries on the path to unprecedented reductions in strategic nuclear forces.

Our critics attempt to make much of the fact that the streamlined Moscow Treaty allows for flexibility in deployment and contains no specific verification measures. This view ignores the opportunities for simplified nuclear reductions brought about by the new U.S.-Russian relationship. Moreover, there can be no argument that the President's decision to reduce U.S. forces has led to significant progress on implementation of Article VI -- progress that had not been achieved through traditional approaches to nuclear arms control tried in the 1990s. The United States and Russia continue to meet regularly, not as rigid adversaries, but as flexible partners, to discuss implementation of the Moscow Treaty and to explore additional ways to enhance transparency and predictability.

Mr. Chairman, the other major nuclear decision of the United States with positive ramifications for Article VI relates to the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review. Publicity surrounding this review in 2002 led to misleading and inaccurate portrayals, some of which continue to this day. Many critics falsely charge that the United States is developing new low-yield weapons and pursuing policies that will lead to a reduction in the so-called threshold of nuclear weapons use. In fact, the contrary has happened: the United States is now pursuing policies that will reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons.

The premise of this new approach to deterrence is that the time has come to shift the emphasis away from nuclear forces to other means, including conventional forces, missile defenses, and a more responsive defense infrastructure. This represents a very significant change in the U.S. deterrence concept, and one that makes sense in the new security environment. The United States has many programs designed to implement this policy shift. For example, we are developing and deploying a missile defense system as well as developing advanced conventional weapons programs.

Consistent with our alliance commitments and defense requirements, we will continue to plan for contingencies and conceptually explore technical options that could maintain the credibility of our nuclear deterrent capability. Looking at options says nothing about what we will do. The facts are: the United States is not developing any new nuclear weapons, including low-yield weapons. The study of new weapons designs under current congressional funding for advanced concepts will be entirely conceptual. Furthermore, the United States has no plans to conduct a nuclear explosive test, and continues to observe its nuclear testing moratorium. We encourage other states not to test as well. These U.S. nuclear weapons policies may not be altered without a presidential decision and congressional authorization.

Finally, we note that the United States has had low-yield nuclear weapons in its stockpile for decades, and does today. A new low-yield weapon, therefore, would not lower the nuclear threshold in any way. A recommendation to use a nuclear weapon, of whatever yield, would come to the desk of any U.S. President only as a last resort on a matter of the highest concern to U.S. national security. The political leadership of the United States, now and in the future, will have a keen appreciation for the consequences of a decision to use nuclear weapons. The nuclear threshold is and will remain very high.

The United States targets no countries with its nuclear weapons. We understand that some NPT non-nuclear-weapon states continue to place great importance on security assurances. As at previous meetings of this Committee in 2002 and 2003, we affirm that there has been no change in the U.S. policy toward negative security assurances (NSA) and positive security assurances (PSA). The substantial initiatives of the P-5 in 1995 led to national declarations and the passage of U.N. Security Council Resolution 984. These actions reflect a strong response to the concerns of NPT non-nuclear-weapon states. Of course, these assurances are applicable only to NPT non-nuclear-weapon states in compliance with the Treaty.

At the same time, we would urge NPT parties to reflect on the huge changes that have taken place in the world and take account of the real security concerns of today. Frankly, it is clear that the risks to the NPT today come from North Korean nuclear threats, violations by NPT non-nuclear-weapon states such as Iran of their nonproliferation undertakings, terrorism, and proliferation rings run by non-state actors, much more so than from any nuclear policy of the NPT nuclear weapon states. Moreover, NPT parties are also deeply concerned about the dangers posed by nuclear weapons in South Asia. In this security environment, it is apparent that NSAs by the NPT nuclear weapon states are of diminishing importance as a possible remedy to the security concerns of NPT non-nuclear-weapon states.

Instead, our emphasis should be on strict compliance with the NPT by all states, strong export controls, programs to combat nuclear terrorism, continued pressure on North Korea and Iran, and restraint in South Asia. This security environment also highlights the importance of PSAs, which as formulated in 1968 focus on providing assistance to NPT non-nuclear-weapon states that are threatened with or the victim of aggression involving nuclear weapons. The United States is prepared to exchange views with the other nuclear weapon states on PSAs prior to the 2005 NPT Review Conference.

Cooperation Related to Arms Reductions and Disarmament

As noted earlier, the end of the Cold War and the increased threat from terrorism and rogue states has significantly increased the WMD threat and the need for broader cooperation in stemming that threat.

The United States continues to work hard to foster such cooperation through programs run by the Departments of State, Defense and Energy -- the total U.S. commitment in dollars over the past 15 years exceeds \$9 billion, and now averages over \$1 billion a year. For FY 2005, the Administration again asked the Congress for over \$1 billion to continue these programs. Mr. Chairman, America's budget outlays for cooperative threat reduction programs reinforce the strong U.S. record on Article VI. We are spending hundreds of millions of dollars each year to dismantle missiles and WMD in the United States and Russia, while spending zero -- let me repeat -- zero dollars on the development or production of new nuclear weapons.

The results are amazing. Under these programs, over 1000 ballistic missiles from the former Soviet Union have been eliminated; more than 600 air-to-surface nuclear missiles have been destroyed along with 126 bombers and 27 ballistic missile submarines. More than 6,000 strategic nuclear warheads have been removed from deployment. Even as others talk about disarmament, this U.S. cooperative effort with former Soviet states continues as we meet today. In FY 2003 alone, the program destroyed nearly 130 submarine and land-based ballistic missiles -- enough delivery capability to launch thousands of Hiroshima-size bombs.

Mr. Chairman, let me be clear, the totality of this work represents enormous progress toward ensuring the irreversibility of nuclear reductions, and toward the Article VI goal of nuclear disarmament. Without this U.S. investment, there would have been significant delays in the elimination of strategic forces in the states of the former Soviet Union along with the attendant risk of theft, diversion, or accidental or unauthorized use of these forces.

The United States and Russia have also cooperated in a wide range of programs related to the security and disposition of fissile material useable in nuclear weapons. While the effort to negotiate a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty encountered obstacles at the Conference on Disarmament over the past decade, the United States and Russia were not standing still. In 1997, we concluded a bilateral agreement to ensure the permanent shutdown of both sides' 27 plutonium production reactors.

Also, over 200 tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from Russia's military stockpile have been converted to low enriched uranium fuel for civil reactors, with more to be eliminated in this fashion. The United States has identified 174 tons of excess HEU for this purpose -- about 40 tons have been processed to date. Together, the United States and Russia have already converted into peaceful uses enough HEU to make 10,000 nuclear weapons -- another dramatic sign of irreversibility.

Both countries remain committed to implementation of the 2000 agreement under which each will dispose of 34 tons of plutonium from their military stockpiles. The Department of Energy requested over \$600 million dollars in its FY 2005 budget to fund this multi-year effort, including assistance to Russia's program. Construction of the U.S. facility to fabricate the U.S. plutonium into reactor fuel is projected to start in FY 2005.

Mr. Chairman, these are hard facts that demonstrate the commitment of the United States and Russia to maintain the current halt in the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. The ages-old dream of beating swords into plowshares is occurring with this conversion of HEU and plutonium from military stockpiles.

The United States and Russia are not the only states that are engaged in disarmament and nonproliferation projects. Many others are involved in cooperative efforts. The Global Partnership, launched by G-8 leaders at the Kananaskis Summit in 2002, includes a G-8 commitment to raise up to \$20 billion over ten years for nonproliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism, and nuclear safety projects. These projects are to focus initially on Russia, but with other states of the former Soviet Union and beyond in mind. The United States pledged half of the total.

Project commitments among the G-8 in the nuclear area include the dismantling of nuclear submarines, the disposition of weapons-grade plutonium from military programs, and the physical protection of nuclear material. Good progress has been made toward obtaining the necessary commitments to reach the financial goal. However, the United States considers the \$20 billion a floor, not a ceiling, and is urging further contributions to meet needs worldwide.

The Global Partnership expanded last year when the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Switzerland, Finland and Sweden joined as donors. On February 11, President Bush proposed that cooperation on such programs be further expanded. For this year's G-8 Summit, the United States is seeking more donor countries, as well as a recognition that states other than Russia need assistance, including Ukraine and other former Soviet states, and countries such as Iraq and Libya.

Finally, I would like to address the general and complete disarmament obligations of Article VI. There are significant steps that can be taken to achieve progress toward that goal and in the process help to create an environment conducive to continued efforts to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons. Measures that can and are being taken include limiting conventional weapons, increasing transparency on transfers of weapons including small arms, working to strengthen regional security, developing and implementing confidence-building measures, and promoting universal adherence to and full compliance with the Conventions banning chemical and biological weapons.

All NPT parties have the capacity to contribute to one or more of these undertakings. It is incumbent on all parties to approach Article VI with a broader perspective than the goal of nuclear disarmament alone. We invite NPT non-nuclear weapons states, in particular, to lay out their record in the area of general and complete disarmament.

Conclusion

It is indeed clear that a large and significant cooperative effort is under way throughout the world to fulfill the goals of NPT Article VI. The United States has a special role not only because of its NPT obligations, but also because of its global leadership in nonproliferation and the economic and technical resources it can bring to these collaborative efforts to eliminate WMD programs. We continue to invest large amounts of human and financial capital in this area, and believe it is money well spent. Taken together with the other numerous strides that I have outlined today, there can be no doubt that the United States is in full compliance with its Article VI obligations.

Mr. Chairman, in addition to this statement, we invite governmental representatives assembled here to acquire copies of our Article VI information paper, which also has been made available to the Secretariat.

Thank you for your attention.

US House of Representatives

H.AMDT.540 (A009)

Amends: [H.R.4200](#)

Sponsor: Rep Tauscher, Ellen O. [CA-10] (offered 5/20/2004)

AMENDMENT PURPOSE:

An amendment numbered 9 printed in House Report 108-499 to transfer \$36,557,000 from the Department of Energy's Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator and Advanced Concepts programs to increase both intelligence capabilities to get at hard and deeply buried targets and improve conventional bunker-busting capabilities.

STATUS:

5/20/2004 1:10pm:

Amendment (A009) offered by Mrs. Tauscher.

5/20/2004 3:21pm:

On agreeing to the Tauscher amendment (A009) Failed by recorded vote: 204 - 214

Dismantling U.S. nuclear warheads

by Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen – January/February 2004

Since the end of the Cold War, the main activity at the Pantex Plant in Texas has been dismantling warheads removed from the U.S. nuclear stockpile. Over the next decade, the plant's primary workload will shift toward modifying warheads to extend their service life.

Pantex is located 17 miles northeast of Amarillo, in the Texas panhandle near Highway 60. The plant employs nearly 3,200 people. Its Web site indicates a five-day work week with three shifts. Pantex has more than 323 buildings containing 1,900,000 square feet. The plant's replacement value was estimated at more than \$3 billion in the early 1990s.

Today Pantex is the only U.S. assembly and disassembly site for stockpiled nuclear weapons, but many sites since World War II have at different times shared those responsibilities. The major components of the Fat Man and Little Boy bombs (the plutonium pit and uranium target insert and projectile, respectively) were cast at Los Alamos in New Mexico in July 1945 and shipped to Tinian in the Marianas Islands. There they were assembled into the bombs that were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August. Immediately after World War II, bomb parts were fashioned and nuclear weapons were assembled at facilities at Los Alamos, Sandia Army Base in Albuquerque, and the Naval Ordnance Test Station at Inyokern, California.

In 1949, the army's Iowa Ordnance Plant in Burlington, Iowa, began producing chemical high explosive components for nuclear warheads. The first warhead, a Mark IV (Fat Man-type) bomb, was assembled there in 1949—minus its fissile core. The core was kept separate from the bomb assembly mainly for reasons of civilian-military custody, but also because of the bomb's design.

The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) selected Pantex as a second assembly facility in 1951. Originally built under the supervision of the Army Corps of Engineers in 1942, Pantex was used during World War II to load conventional munitions (bombs and artillery shells) with TNT. The plant was rehabilitated and began full operation assembling Mark VI bombs in May 1952. Procter & Gamble, makers of Ivory soap and Crisco, operated Pantex for the AEC. Mason & Hanger took over on October 1, 1956, and ran Pantex until 2001, when the contract was awarded to BWXT Pantex, an independent company comprised of BWX Technologies, Honeywell, and Bechtel that was formed solely to manage Pantex.

The Burlington plant closed in 1975, and its functions were transferred to Pantex. Until then, with some exceptions, warheads designed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory were assembled at Pantex, and Los Alamos-designed warheads at Burlington.

In November 1951, with the Cold War heating up, the AEC estimated it might need as many as five plants to build the number of warheads scheduled. A third facility was planned at Spoon River, Illinois, but by 1953 it was deemed unnecessary and was cancelled.

The first bombs, with sandbags packed tightly around them, were shipped by rail from Burlington in normal boxcars. Later, special railcars were built to transport nuclear weapons. Today, land transport is the responsibility of the Albuquerque-based Office of Secure Transportation (OST).

OST operates a fleet of special 18-wheel tractor-trailers to transport nuclear weapons, non-nuclear weapon components, special nuclear materials, and limited life components (which contain tritium). The main routes—between Albuquerque, Amarillo, and Oak Ridge, Tennessee—follow the interstate highway system. The trucks have traveled more than 100 million miles since 1975. They are ruggedly designed to survive severe accidents and to withstand extreme temperatures in case of fire. Armed federal agents accompany each convoy of one or more trucks and their escort vehicles. The convoys keep in constant communication with Albuquerque.

We estimate that from 1945 to 1990, the United States produced at several sites approximately 70,000 nuclear weapons of approximately 70 types for more than 120 weapon systems. Annual production rates rose dramatically throughout the 1950s. In 1959 and 1960, there were 7,088 and 7,178 new builds, respectively, or about 28 warheads each workday. By 1967 the stockpile reached a historic high with approximately 32,000 warheads of 30 different types, from sub-kiloton landmines (atomic demolition munitions) to multi-megaton strategic bombs. The historic high for megatonnage was reached in 1960 with nearly 20,500 megatons (that's 20 billion tons, or 40 trillion pounds, of TNT)—the equivalent of about 1,400,000 Hiroshimas. Today the total is about one-tenth the 1960 level, or about 2,000 megatons, or 140,000

Hiroshimas.

The United States has dismantled approximately 60,000 warheads. For four decades, there was a steady rhythm to the size of the stockpile; old warheads were retired, their plutonium and uranium components recycled, and new warheads were fabricated and fielded. This ended in 1989, when the Rocky Flats plant in Colorado, where the pits were made, was shut down for safety and environmental reasons. Since then, no new warheads have been produced.

When the Cold War ended, there were approximately 21,500 nuclear warheads in the U.S. stockpile. More than 11,000 nuclear warheads were disassembled and disposed of during the 1990s, leaving about 10,400 in the current stockpile. Only a few hundred more are slated for dismantlement. Work at Pantex also includes modifying certain warheads and randomly removing small numbers of different types from the stockpile for testing and evaluation. Some are converted into "joint test assemblies"—the nuclear material ("physics package") is removed and an instrumentation package substituted. The instruments record and transmit data when the Pentagon tests the warhead on an actual delivery system.

We estimate that it takes one to two weeks to dismantle an average warhead. Disassembly is essentially a reversal of the assembly process. The chemical high explosive is separated from the nuclear components and burned at Pantex. The separation is done in one of 13 assembly cells known as "Gravel Gerties," specially reinforced rooms able to withstand an explosion equivalent to 250 kilograms of TNT. From 1981 to 1986, the amount of high explosives burned annually averaged about 227,000 pounds.

Subassemblies and components are further broken down in assembly bays for salvage or disposal. A wide variety of non-nuclear components are returned to the facilities where they were originally manufactured. Among the items returned to the Kansas City Plant (operated for the Energy Department by Honeywell) are radars, contact fuses, arming and firing sets, permissive action links, safing components, thermal batteries, capacitors, and crystal resonators. Neutron generators once made at the Pinellas Plant in Clearwater, Florida, are now the responsibility of Sandia National Laboratories. The explosive actuators and other pyrotechnic components that were fabricated at the Mound Plant near Dayton, Ohio, are now also returned to Kansas City.

Thermonuclear secondaries (canned subassemblies) contain uranium and lithium-6 deuteride (the fusion material of a hydrogen bomb) and are returned to the Y-12 Plant at Oak Ridge for storage or processing. Tritium, a hydrogen isotope with a half-life of 12.3 years used for boosting the yield of the primary, is shipped to Savannah River Site in South Carolina. For the past 15 years, that tritium has been recycled into active warheads. From the mid-1950s until 1988, Savannah River reactors were used to produce tritium. In October 2003, the civilian Watts Bar Nuclear Power Plant, located 50 miles south of Knoxville, Tennessee, began producing tritium for nuclear weapons.

A modern pit is a hollow, spherical or aspherical shell of plutonium encased in stainless steel or other metal or alloy, that is, with its other components, a fission (atomic) bomb. In a thermonuclear weapon, the fission bomb acts as the first (primary) stage in triggering the fusion (secondary) stage. After removal, the plutonium pits are placed in drums or containers and stored in the Pantex igloos. A few pits are sent to Los Alamos and Livermore laboratories for research and analysis.

More than 12,000 pits are stored at Pantex. In 1995, President Bill Clinton declared that 38.2 tons of weapon-grade plutonium were in excess of military needs. To account for plutonium waste and scrap, this amount was later reduced to 34 tons. Russia agreed to dispose of a similar amount of its plutonium. The schedule for the final disposition of the excess plutonium has not been set. Most of the U.S. share exists in the form of about 7,000 pits at Pantex. The United States plans to convert the metallic pits into a plutonium oxide that, when added to uranium oxide, forms a mixed-oxide fuel (MOX) that can be used to fuel nuclear reactors.

The remaining 5,000 pits in storage at Pantex are currently considered a strategic reserve. The U.S. government claims it is essential to keep this many pits to be used as possible replacements should warheads in the active stockpile become unreliable. Theoretically, these pits could also be used in new nuclear weapons, if it were decided to produce new types. For now, the "excess" pits sit next to the "strategic reserve" pits in dozens of igloos.

In Pantex's Zone 4, about two kilometers from the disassembly area, are 60 igloos that routinely housed (for temporary periods of a few months) new warheads that were awaiting shipment to Military First Destination points for transfer to the air force, army, or navy. Because there is no new production, the igloos now store the pits that were once returned to Rocky Flats. A small number of igloos are used to store warheads awaiting immediate dismantlement.

There are two types of igloo: 18 Richmond, and 42 Steel Arch Construction. Both kinds are 39 feet deep, 25 feet wide, and a maximum of 15 feet high. Each igloo can store 240 pits if they are single-stacked (two rows

in the igloo divided by a center aisle for forklift operations; containers stacked four to six high). If the pits are double-stacked (four rows), each igloo could hold 400 pits. Theoretically, the 60 igloos can hold as many as 14,400 pits (single-stacked) or 24,000 pits (double-stacked). Analyses and environmental assessments were prepared to examine safety concerns associated with double-stacking.

In 1999, Pantex began repackaging pits into AL-R8 2030 sealed-insert containers to improve storage conditions. At an average rate of more than 200 pits per month, the 8,000th pit was repackaged on October 10, 2003. Presumably all the pits will be repackaged, which could be accomplished by the summer of 2005.

Preparations are underway to produce new pits at Los Alamos National Laboratory. The goal is to be able to manufacture as many as 80 pits per year. The W88 warhead for the Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missile was chosen as the initial type. Prototypes have been produced. A certifiable pit that meets all manufacturing requirements and specifications will soon begin extensive computer simulations and non-nuclear testing. Under the current schedule, it will enter the war reserve stockpile in 2007. The Bush administration has more ambitious plans and wants to build the Modern Pit Facility capable of producing 250–900 pits annually by 2018.

AFP

US not to reduce nuclear arsenal to Moscow Treaty levels

25 March 2004

The United States will not cut its nuclear arsenal to levels designated by an arms accord it concluded two years ago with Russia because it must hedge against an uncertain future, a top administration official announced.

The Moscow Treaty signed with great fanfare by Presidents George W. Bush of the United States and Vladimir Putin of Russia in May 2002 calls on both sides to reduce their strategic nuclear warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 by 2012.

But it refers to "operationally deployed" weapons, essentially offering both governments a loophole that allows them to move an unlimited number of warheads into storage and keep them indefinitely under lock and key.

While US officials have often praised this option, Wednesday's remarks by Undersecretary of Energy Linton Brooks before the Senate Subcommittee on Strategic Forces represented the first official indication the Bush administration had actually decided to exercise it.

"The 2012 nuclear stockpile will be substantially reduced from current levels," Brooks told lawmakers. "But reductions will not lower the stockpile to 1,700-2,200 total warheads."

He said the retained warheads will be needed for routine maintenance of the arsenal, for meeting "commitments to allies," and to address threats that may arise in the future.

"In particular, sufficient warheads will be retained to augment the operationally deployed force in the event that world events require a more robust deterrent posture," Brooks argued.

The current US nuclear arsenal is estimated by experts to contain between 6,500 and 7,000 weapons.

The announcement came as the administration is pushing for a dramatic expansion of its study program focusing on so-called bunker-busting nuclear bombs that would enhance the military's ability to destroy underground command and control centers and hidden arms depots believed to exist in countries like North Korea and Iran.

Under the project, scientists are looking into whether they will be able to convert, for these purposes, two existing warheads - the B61 and the B83, officials said.

The B61 is a tactical thermonuclear gravity bomb that can be delivered by strategic as well as tactical aircraft -- from B-52 and B-2 bombers to F-16 fighter jets, experts said.

The B83 is designed for precision delivery from very low altitudes, most likely by B-2 stealth bombers.

The main task facing the scientists is finding how to harden the bombs' shells so they can survive penetration through layers of rock, steel and concrete before detonating, according to the experts.

Last year, Congress allocated 7.5 million dollars for the project. This year, the administration is seeking to boost these appropriations to 27.6 million.

"There is a clear military utility to such a weapon, which is why the Defense Department asked for it to be studied," Brooks said.

He disclosed that the Energy Department was discussing with the Air Force the effectiveness of using nuclear weapons to destroy stocks of chemical and biological weapons, but acknowledged that "no decision to study this area has yet been reached."

Experts believe an atomic blast could have the advantage of instantly incinerating chemical and biological agents, an effect that is unlikely to be achieved with conventional bombing.

The administration is also requesting 336.5 million dollars for restoring US capability to manufacture so-called plutonium pits that form the core of nuclear weapons -- an increase of 13 percent over the current year.

Although no new weapons production is currently planned, Brooks said it was important to maintain a manufacturing and scientific base for such projects.

"Our goal is to be able to design, develop, and begin production of a new warhead within three-four years of a decision to enter engineering development," he said.

Washington Post

Defense Panel Faults Nuclear Plans

Weapons Should Address Threats From 'Rogue States,' Task Force Says

by Walter Pincus – 28 March 2004

A prestigious Defense Department panel has recommended major changes to the United States' nuclear arsenal, saying the current plans to refurbish the existing weapons stockpile will not protect the nation from new threats from rogue states and terrorist groups.

A task force of the Defense Science Board said it is "most urgent" to create strong defenses against these new threats. In a report distributed inside the Pentagon last month, it said U.S. strategic forces should emphasize smaller nuclear warheads and should arm the nation's 50 giant Peacekeeper intercontinental ballistic missiles with conventional warheads to allow a wide variety of options for targeting hostile forces.

"The nuclear weapons program as currently conceived -- a program focused primarily on refurbishing the [current] stockpile -- will not meet the country's future needs," the DSB group said in its study, made public last week by Steven Aftergood of the Federation of American Scientists. "Nuclear weapons are needed that produce much lower collateral damage," the panel said, indicating the need for greater precision, reduced radioactivity and the ability to dig deep into the ground to get hard targets.

The DSB recommendations come at a time when the Bush administration is struggling to determine the future size and makeup of the current U.S. nuclear stockpile of about 6,000 warheads, an issue that has been pending for more than two years. At a Senate Armed Services subcommittee meeting this past Tuesday, Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham said he hoped the plan, which was due to be sent to Congress last month, would be submitted soon.

The DSB study recommended that the United States' high-yield nuclear warheads, now being refurbished to last another two decades, be reduced. It said the nation should procure special-purpose nonnuclear weapons; develop a new, submarine-launched nonnuclear missile; and study development of new sensors that could find small, moving and hidden targets.

The DSB report also sharply criticized current U.S. intelligence capabilities. It said intelligence agencies have "not developed the resources to adequately understand the leadership culture and values of its potential adversaries, particularly rogue states and terrorist organizations." It cited specifically the erosion of "our understanding of North Korean goals and tactics under Kim Jong Il" and "distinctions among the diverse elements of al Qaeda," Osama bin Laden's terrorist network.

The DSB is highly influential within the Pentagon, and many of its past recommendations have been the basis for changes in U.S. military policies. This study's critique of intelligence carries additional weight, because one of the task force's co-chairmen was retired Adm. Dennis Blair, who worked at the CIA during the Clinton administration and retired in 2002 after serving as commander in chief of U.S. forces in the Pacific. The other co-chairmen were retired Gen. Michael Carns, a former Air Force vice chief of staff, and Vincent Vitto, president of the Draper Laboratory, a nonprofit research institution that has played a significant role in defense activities.

William Schneider Jr., the DSB chairman, wrote that the task force recommendations to senior Defense Department officials are "fully justified and actionable," and that the potential threat "demands that we consider solutions that go beyond 'improvements on the margin.' "

The DSB task force said that while it could take decades to build defenses against all weapons of mass destruction, it is more practical and "most urgent to create strong defenses against rogue states and terrorist organizations."

Central to that approach is attacking and killing leaders of those groups. That is a different strategy than when dealing with an enemy with an established government, where the primary mission is "to disable the adversary leadership's ability to carry out its responsibilities," the report said.

In Iraq, the task force said the "deck of cards" leaders, including former president Saddam Hussein, could not be found during the fighting and that weapons of mass destruction have not been discovered. "These physically small entities are essentially impossible to find without in situ [on site], intrusive sensors and probably HUMINT [human intelligence] as well," the panel said. "There has not been enough progress to date given the post-September 11 need for such systems."

To find such future targets, the panel said new technology is required that would feature sensors that could be placed on the ground, including devices to be installed by spies that would tag vehicles electronically to allow for tracking, locating and targeting weapons at far distances.

Because the targets would have to be able to be struck within a short time frame, the panel said the United States needs to develop a new cruise missile that could be launched from an offshore submarine and hit a target 1,500 miles away in 15 minutes.

In addition, it proposed that the Air Force keep the 50 Peacekeeper ICBMs now set for deactivation and redeploy them to Vandenberg Air Force Base in California and Cape Canaveral in Florida for use with conventional warheads. "These weapons would give the U.S. a 30-minute response capability for strategic strike worldwide," the panel said, noting it would cost less than \$1 billion for development and deployment and could be ready by 2010.

"Future presidents should have strategic strike choices between massive conventional strikes and today's relatively large, high-fallout weapons delivered primarily by ballistic missiles," the study said.

"While we could previously execute some military operations only with nuclear weapons," the panel wrote, "we can now execute many of these with highly precise conventional weaponry." Among its recommendations in the nonnuclear area is development of so-called "interrogation rounds" or warheads filled with sensors that penetrate hidden bunkers and stay in place where they land, sending back information to guide in more powerful missiles.

Oakland Tribune

Pentagon panel calls for update of nuke arsenal

Experts argue that weapons should be upgraded to provide best defense in 21st century

By Ian Hoffman – 30 March 2004

An influential Pentagon panel wants to cut back maintenance of the nation's 1970s and 80s-vintage thermonuclear weapons and create a new, more flexible arsenal capable of killing, disarming or influencing a foreign adversary worldwide in a matter of hours.

In a report obtained by the Federation of American Scientists, a panel of the Defense Science Board suggests retooling the nation's strategic forces -- limited in the Cold War to nuclear weapons aimed at enemy leaders and their nuclear forces -- to rely more than ever on highly precise conventional and exotic weapons, including lasers in space, unmanned hypersonic craft and earth penetrators up to 10 tons.

"U.S. interests are best served by preserving into the future the half-century-plus non-use of nuclear weapons," stated the board's Task Force on Future Strategic Strike Forces.

Yet for its most lethal and decisive forces, the panel said the United States still should expand its nuclear arsenal beyond late Cold War-era nuclear warheads to add new nuclear weapons tailored for lower yields and special effects.

"This is moving away from anything ordinary people would understand as deterrence," said Andrew Lichterman, an arms researcher at the Western States Legal Foundation, an Oakland-based disarmament group. "This is talking about developing strategic weapons for new purposes, and it's something that should get a deep national debate before it goes further."

The Bush administration's drive for new, low-yield nuclear weapons has been highly controversial. Critics say the new weapons hold little military use, could spur other nations' interest in nuclear arms and could blur the line between nuclear and conventional combat.

"Pre-emptive nuclear war, that's what they're pushing, and it's absolute madness," said Bob Peurifoy, a former Sandia National Laboratories weapons manager. "Nuclear weapons are the absolute weapons of last resort. If we're losing American cities, then we should respond (with nuclear strikes). Short of that, I can't see any use of weapons with any nuclear yield, I don't care how low."

Peurifoy and many other weaponeers say the current arsenal of about 7,600 weapons is well-tested and capable against a wide array of targets.

Since 1995, the nation's three nuclear-weapons labs have studied those weapons for aging defects and found the essential nuclear components last for at least 45 to 60 years. Scientists are engaged in the bread-and-butter work of "stockpile life extensions" for all eight basic designs of warheads and bombs, upgrading them and adding decades to their shelf life.

The Defense Science Board said that program is "on the wrong track" and should be scaled back to free up scientists and money for adding new weapons to the arsenal.

Echoing the Bush administration's Nuclear Posture Review of December 2001, the Defense Science Board said current U.S. weapons would create so much blast and radioactive fallout that rogue nations or terrorists might doubt a president would use them in response to attack on the United States or its allies.

The panel argued that fielding lower-yield weapons makes the threat of their use more believable. This broader, more capable arsenal also is designed to keep Russia and China from trying to compete with the United States and discourage allies such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan from seeking weapons to counter North Korea, for example.

"Assuring U.S. allies in Europe and Asia that they need not develop nuclear arsenals of their own in anticipation of deterioration in their security environment remains an important U.S. objective," the task force said.

The panel, composed largely of retired senior Navy and Air Force officers, nuclear-weapons scientists and think-tank analysts, recognized that creating a new nuclear arsenal will demand wholesale political and military commitment from U.S. Strategic Command in Omaha to Capitol Hill.

"Ultimately, the issue requires deep White House involvement and the difficult creation of a consensus in Congress that can be sustained over a number of years if not decades," the panel wrote.

In recent months, however, the Bush administration has softened its rhetoric on new weapons. Top U.S. weapons executives sought to mollify Congress last week with assurances that its new \$9 million "advanced concepts" design program will "investigate new ideas, not necessarily new weapons."

Linton Brooks, head of the National Nuclear Security Administration, said scientists might redesign warheads for longer life and easier manufacture. So far, the military has not formally requested a specific, new nuclear weapon.

The Defense Science Board called on Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to "provide guidance" to the commander in charge of U.S. nuclear forces on the need for new weapons research. STRATCOM's commander would list his needs to the Nuclear Weapons Council, which in turn would assign research into the weapons to scientists in California and New Mexico.

These weapons are mostly not new but resurrections of 1960s and 70s thermonuclear designs produced by University of California scientists at Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos labs.

None were deployed, primarily due to political opposition or dubious practical utility for the military.

The Defense Science Board envisions using them largely against underground bunkers, to shake, crush or incinerate the leaders or weapons inside. Panelists suggested that by driving the weapons dozens of yards into soil, small nuclear explosions could be contained. But the panel stressed, that doesn't mean the weapons would be used.

"It is, and will likely remain, American policy to keep the nuclear threshold high and to pursue non-nuclear attack options whenever possible. Nothing in our assessment or recommendations seeks to change that goal," the panel stated. "Nonetheless, in extreme circumstances, the president may have no choice but to turn to nuclear options."

Arms Control Today

Congress Critical of Bush Nuclear Weapons Budget

by Karen Yourish Roston – April 2004

As they make their annual rounds on Capitol Hill on behalf of the president's proposed budget, Bush administration officials are finding themselves in the hot seat defending President George W. Bush's fiscal

year 2005 request for the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP). Lawmakers are also peeved that they have yet to receive the administration's overdue nuclear stockpile report.

Arms Control Today reported last month that the president's 2005 budget proposal lays out a five-year schedule for RNEP that foresees production of the new weapon by the end of fiscal year 2009. (See ACT, March 2004.) Administration officials maintain the program is still in the study phase and that no decision has been made to develop or produce the weapon, but they have not convinced key members of Congress.

"I find it really hard to conceive of any circumstances under which this country would even use a nuclear weapon again," Rep. David Hobson (R-Ohio), chairman of the House Appropriations energy and water subcommittee, told Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham at a March 11 hearing. "Despite those constraints, [the Department of Energy] seems to think they should spend another half a billion dollars of taxpayers' dollars to explore and test the concept of Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator."

During a March 23 hearing, Hobson's Senate counterpart, Pete Domenici (R-N.M.), traditionally a staunch supporter of the Energy Department, told Linton Brooks, head of the department's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), that he was "surprised" to see nearly \$500 million provided for the RNEP in out-year funding.

Moreover, both lawmakers expressed frustration at the administration's failure to deliver a nuclear stockpile plan to Congress.

"This kind of, quote, Money is no object, unquote, thinking might have been the norm for the nuclear weapons complex during the Cold War years, but I think it's completely out of touch with the political and fiscal realities that we face today," Hobson said. "[U]ntil we receive a revised stockpile plan from [the Department of Defense] that shows real change in the size and the composition of the stockpile, and until [the Energy Department] re-calibrates its planning, workforce facilities, and budget to support the smaller stockpile, I do not believe that we should spend our limited budget resources on expansion of NNSA's nuclear weapons activities."

Facing similar prodding from Domenici, Brooks responded that the report "is being worked on, literally, as we speak, but because of the importance, I think this will have to be personally approved by the president and I can't predict how long that will take."

Still, Brooks did clarify at a March 24 hearing before the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces that, although the United States plans to "substantially" reduce its deployed strategic nuclear arsenal to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads as called for by the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), it will retain a significant number of additional warheads in storage. He said "sufficient warheads" need to be retained "to augment the operationally deployed force in the event that world events require a more robust deterrent posture."

Signed May 24, 2002, by Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin, SORT requires the United States and Russia each to reduce its number of deployed strategic warheads from today's 5,000-6,000 to no more than 2,200 by the end of 2012, when the treaty will expire. The agreement requires that the warheads be removed from their delivery systems but does not require their destruction, permitting each side to keep as many warheads and delivery vehicles as they want for future use. Washington intends to store enough so it could field up to 4,600 warheads in as little as three years after the treaty ends. Secretary of State Colin Powell acknowledged in Senate testimony in July 2002 that the accord does not limit the amount of warheads either country can possess. "The treaty will allow you to have as many warheads as you want," Powell stated. (See ACT, September 2002.)

Even as he battled over the stockpile plan, Brooks characterized RNEP as "the single most contentious issue in our budget." He said the out-year projections are included in the budget request only "to preserve the president's option," should he decide to move beyond the study stage.

"[T]here is a clear military utility to this weapon," Brooks stated. "[D]espite this obvious utility...we will move beyond the study stage only if the president approves and if funds are authorized and appropriated by Congress."

The nonpartisan Congressional Research Service noted in a March 8 report that the president's 2005 budget plan casts "serious doubt" on administration claims that the RNEP is just a study.

Nuclear earth penetrator weapons, sometimes called "bunker busters," burrow deeply into the ground before detonating, increasing their ability to destroy hardened underground targets. In May 2003, the Air Force began studying modifications to convert existing B61 or B83 nuclear bombs to an earth penetrator configuration.

Rep. Ellen Tauscher (D-Calif.), a member of the House Armed Services Committee, argued in a March 8 letter to Brooks that "the planning and budgeting for further steps in the...process in the next five years

speaks to a clear intent to develop these modified nuclear weapons at a time when the feasibility study has not been completed and the Department of Defense has not submitted a request for this weapon.”

Some in Congress are more forgiving. Sen. Wayne Allard (R-Colo.), chairman of the Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, said during the March 24 hearing that the administration is “kind of caught between the rock and a hard spot....[I]f you don’t put in the money, then somehow or the other they think you’re hiding it. If you do put in and you save for it, then you can be accused of trying” to move ahead with the program without congressional approval.

“I’ve looked at this figure, too, and that, obviously, sticks out there,” Allard continued. “But, on the other hand, I think we need to have some estimate in case we decide to move ahead with [RNEP] about where those future costs will be.”

NRDC

Bush Administration Wasting Billions on Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Research and Production, Report Charges

Administration Is Spending 12 Times More on Beefing Up Nuclear Research and Production than Curbing Nuclear Proliferation

13 April 2004

WASHINGTON (April 13, 2004) -- Despite the end of the Cold War, the Bush administration is spending 12 times more on nuclear weapons research and production than on nonproliferation efforts to retrieve, secure and dispose of nuclear weapons materials worldwide, according to an analysis of Department of Energy programs released today by NRDC (Natural Resources Defense Council). Much of the spending on weapons research and production, which amounted to \$6.5 billion in fiscal 2004, is funding costly projects that are "irrelevant to the defense and security challenges" that confront the nation, the report found. (The report is available on the Internet: <http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/weaponeers/weaponeers.pdf>)

"The Energy Department is asking Congress for \$6.8 billion for nuclear weapons projects for next year's budget -- double what we spent a decade ago," said Christopher Paine, a senior policy analyst at NRDC's Nuclear Program and author of the report. "Spending billions to extend the life of thousands of Cold War nuclear warheads is a colossal waste of taxpayer dollars. The government could keep a small fraction of those weapons in the stockpile and spend the rest of the money to make the world safer by eliminating nuclear threats."

The report, "Weaponeers of Waste," focuses on a half-dozen DOE nuclear weapons projects at the nation's nuclear weapons laboratories, revealing they are billions of dollars over budget and years behind in meeting their goals. The projects are part of the "stockpile stewardship" program, whose purpose was to guarantee a safe and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile in absence of full-scale underground testing.

"DOE has pursued these projects over the past decade with little accountability or oversight, consuming vast sums of money along the way," said Paine. "At a time of record budget deficits, it's time for Congress to take a hard look at these programs and either cancel them outright or cut them back significantly."

The main projects reviewed are located at the three national weapons laboratories: Los Alamos in New Mexico, Lawrence Livermore in California, and Sandia in New Mexico and California. Among the projects are a gigantic high-energy fusion laser being built at Livermore, a facility that is supposed to test the "primary," or first stage, of a nuclear weapon at Los Alamos, a host of high-speed computer programs at all three labs, and plans to resurrect U.S. nuclear weapon production capability by manufacturing plutonium pits. All of these projects have proven to be costly boondoggles.

For example, DOE sold Livermore's high-energy fusion laser, the massive National Ignition Facility (NIF), to Congress in 1997 by saying it would be ready to begin the quest for fusion ignition in fiscal year 2005 at a cost of \$1.2 billion. Now it appears that DOE's weapons laboratory scientists vastly overstated their scientific and technical readiness to pursue fusion ignition experiments, and that an ignition-ready NIF project will cost as much as \$5 billion to \$8 billion by the time of the first ignition demonstration sometime between 2010 and 2014, if it happens at all.

DOE also is pushing for a new facility at South Carolina's Savannah River Site to produce tritium, a gas placed in warheads to enhance nuclear explosions. The facility, originally due to begin production at the end of this year at a cost of \$391 million, will now cost at least \$506 million, and startup has been pushed back three years, to late 2007. "In a real world sense, however, this hardly matters," Paine pointed out, "because if

the United States adopted a sensible nuclear arms reduction policy, the facility would not be needed for decades."

At \$6.5 billion, the current level of annual U.S. spending on nuclear weapons greatly exceeds the \$4.2 billion (in 2004 dollars) the nation spent, on average, every year throughout the Cold War, which stretched from 1948 to 1991. Over the next five years the Bush administration plans to spend \$36.6 billion to modernize the nuclear weapons stockpile and laboratory production complex, including \$485 million to develop, test, and begin production of the controversial robust nuclear earth penetrating warhead.

Developing a new generation of nuclear weapons could restart an international arms race, Paine said, making the world less secure. "Essentially we are now in an arms race with ourselves, but we could spur other countries, like China and Russia, to jump back in." The report recommends that Congress:

- Defer action on any new facility or weapons refurbishment request until the administration submits and Congress approves a plan reducing the number of nuclear warheads to sensible levels in a post-Cold War world.
- Consolidate the nuclear weapons complex to eliminate Cold War redundancies, reduce its size, and curb security costs, which are escalating rapidly.
- End funding for the robust nuclear earth penetrator and other new nuclear weapon designs.
- End funding for preparations to resume nuclear testing.
- Scrap plans to build a new facility to manufacture plutonium nuclear bomb pits and instead replace worn-out pits by refurbishing 20 to 50 per year, based on existing recycled or recast designs.
- Reinvigorate unilateral, bilateral, multilateral, and international efforts to reduce and eliminate national stocks of nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear materials.
- Direct DOE to establish an independent outside advisory committee under the Federal Advisory Committee Act to conduct peer reviews of stockpile stewardship and technology projects.

The Natural Resources Defense Council is a national, nonprofit organization of scientists, lawyers and environmental specialists dedicated to protecting public health and the environment. Founded in 1970, NRDC has more than 1 million members and e-activists nationwide, served from offices in New York, Washington, Santa Monica and San Francisco.

Global Security Newswire

U.S. Air Force Plans Next Generation ICBMs

16 April 2004

U.S. Air Force officials have said that the next generation of nuclear-capable ICBMs could be a mobile missile force of varying accuracies, ranges and payloads, *Inside the Pentagon* reported yesterday.

Air Force Space Command is set to begin an analysis soon to determine the best way to replace the U.S. arsenal of 500 Minuteman 3 ICBMs, which are expected to begin losing operational effectiveness in 2018, according to *Inside the Pentagon*. The Air Force has anticipated that it will begin an acquisition program for the new land-based strategic deterrent as early as next year, *Inside the Pentagon* reported.

Col. Rick Patenaude, head of the Air Force Space Command's deterrence and strike requirements directorate, said the new ICBMs might have varied capabilities, instead of the uniformity of the Minuteman 3s. "We certainly see the possibility where you don't have the same thing in every silo," he said, adding that the replacement missiles might not be silo-based (David Perera, *Inside the Pentagon*, April 15).

Global Security Newswire

Bush Administration Says Low-Yield Nuclear Weapons Research Will Not Foster Proliferation

by David Ruppe – 16 April 2004

WASHINGTON — The Bush administration says in a new report to Congress that a recently repealed ban on U.S. low-yield nuclear weapons research and development will not harm U.S. nonproliferation diplomacy or encourage proliferation, as critics have charged.

The White House sought and won a repeal of the 10-year-old law last year despite opposition from congressional Democrats and significant international disapproval, enabling the administration to pursue

plans this year for basic research and development on low-yield nuclear weapons, defined as those with yields below five kilotons.

“There is no reason to believe that [the] repeal has had or will have any practical impact on the pursuit of nuclear weapons by proliferating states, on the comprehensive diplomatic efforts ongoing to address these threats, or on the possible modernization of nuclear weapons by China or Russia,” said Linton Brooks, administrator of the Energy Department’s National Nuclear Security Administration, in a letter accompanying the report on March 31.

The report argues that the pursuit of nuclear weapons capabilities — by rogue states, terrorists and Russia — would occur regardless of what the United States does with its own nuclear weapons.

Rogue state proliferation “marches forward independently of the U.S. nuclear programs,” it says.

Other states, it says, “typically base their nuclear R&D programs on their own perceived security needs not on the specifics of U.S. R&D.”

International Reaction Detected

A range of prominent critics, though, including officials from several friendly governments and the director of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), have argued the opposite of the report’s claims.

They have said that by pursuing such work the United States is stepping back from its Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty commitment to move towards eventual nuclear disarmament, making other countries feel less secure and undermining U.S. credibility when it urges restraint by other nations.

“I have strong reservations, to say the least, when I read that there are plans to research small nukes,” IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei reportedly told National Public Radio last September.

“It really sends absolutely the wrong message, that we are not moving towards disarmament, but that we are reversing course,” he said.

A senior Russian official said earlier this month that the emergence of such “battlefield weapons” would be “super scary” and could prompt Russia to pursue its own low-yield warheads.

“We will be compelled to modify the development of our own strategic nuclear forces depending on Washington’s plans for the use of these weapons,” Deputy Chief of the Russian General Staff, Col.-Gen. Yuri Baluyevsky was quoted this month in the Russian journal Izvestia.

“This research could let the genie out of the bottle. These weapons could disrupt the existing parity of nuclear deterrence and drastically alter the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons,” Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov also said in the Izvestia story.

“That’s typical of the comments that the Russians have been making for 10 years,” said David Culp, legislative representative of the Friends Committee on National Legislation.

“The repeal “undercuts our political and moral stance when we’re saying we’re going to develop weapons ourselves,” he added.

The U.S. secretaries of state, defense, and energy prepared the report as required by law, and recently sent it to Congress. It was obtained by the Friends Committee and distributed to reporters by e-mail Wednesday.

The report says, “Although Russia states that U.S. nuclear capabilities are still a factor in its decisions about nuclear forces, we believe there is a relatively weak coupling between Russian and U.S. nuclear weapons R&D efforts.” [...]

Washington Post

Poll Finds Support For Arms Control

By Peter Slevin – 17 April 2004

Americans continue to fear weapons of mass destruction and believe the Bush administration should work more closely with U.S. allies to stop their spread, according to a nationwide opinion poll released this week in Washington.

International cooperation and arms-control agreements are likely to be more effective than U.S. military threats against countries that try to develop nuclear weapons, respondents said.

“They really understand how hard it is to address proliferation. The United States by itself, even with all its military power, can’t target the problem. You have to have cooperation between states,” said Steven Kull of the Program on International Policy Attitudes.

The results came in a poll that touched on a panoply of unconventional weapons. Conducted in March, it followed by one month a call by President Bush for measures to curb development of nuclear weapons and halt the illicit global trade in nuclear materials.

Although the White House called for more stringent international efforts, including tougher inspections and a global interdiction program, the Bush administration has made high-profile departures from treaties -- and from peaceful solutions, most notably in Iraq.

When asked about Pakistan, where weapons scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan recently admitted peddling nuclear technology to North Korea, Libya and Iran, 73 percent of respondents said the most important lesson is that the United States should give international agencies "more power to conduct intrusive inspections."

Reflecting worries about atomic dangers, 86 percent of respondents to the poll -- conducted by PIPA/Knowledge Networks -- said the United States should work with other nuclear powers toward eliminating nuclear weapons. A similar percentage said the administration should join the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, signed but not ratified.

A majority questioned the effectiveness of a test ban, given that crude nuclear weapons can be built without testing. Yet only 18 percent supported the idea of periodic explosions to make certain U.S. weapons work.

Seventy-seven percent countered that the United States has other testing methods "and, anyway, the U.S. has so many nuclear weapons, America's enemies have to assume that an overwhelming number will work."

As the Bush administration studies low-yield nuclear weapons for potential use against underground targets, such as terrorist caves, two-thirds said production of such weapons would set a bad example.

A treaty banning all weapons in space was considered a good idea by 74 percent of respondents, and only 21 percent favored building a missile defense system right away. Sixty-eight percent said more research should be done first.

The Bush administration has said it is committed to deploying an antimissile system.

Associated Press

Los Alamos Lab: Classified Data Missing

20 May 2004

LOS ALAMOS, N.M. - Classified information was discovered missing at Los Alamos National Laboratory this week, but a lab spokesman said the data would not jeopardize national security even if it fell into the wrong hands.

The information, which was on a data storage device, was still unaccounted for Thursday, said LANL spokesman Kevin Roark. A federal review team is set to investigate.

"This in our view is not a major event and it's certainly not a breach of security," Roark said. He said lab employees conducting an inventory of classified information could not locate the device.

"It's our strong belief (it) was either destroyed or retasked (reused), but the proper paperwork wasn't done to track its destruction or reuse," Roark said.

The lab said in a statement that the storage device was slated for destruction in March as part of an effort to reduce what the lab called Classified Removable Electronic Media.

"The lab can spin it however they want," said Danielle Brian, executive director of the Project on Government Oversight, a Washington D.C.-based watchdog group that has uncovered Los Alamos issues before. "Classified data is missing once again from Los Alamos."

Rep. Tom Udall of New Mexico said he was assured by lab officials the missing information contained no nuclear weapons data.

The lab, operated by the University of California under contract with the Energy Department, has suffered a string of embarrassing management failures in recent years. They include reports of financial abuse by employees, two misplaced computer hard drives with secret nuclear-related material and the firing of two lab investigators who raised concerns about management.

Late last year, Los Alamos management halted operations at its Nuclear Nonproliferation Division after an inventory found that nine floppy disks and a large-capacity storage disk believed to contain some classified information were missing.

Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham said then that misplaced classified information at the lab was the type of management failure that prompted the department to seek bids for a new contractor to run the lab when the university's contract expires in September 2005.

House Backs Nuclear Weapons and Missile Defense Plans

By David Ruppe – 21 May 2004

WASHINGTON — In approving yesterday the largest defense budget in U.S. and world history, \$447 billion, the U.S. House of Representatives also authorized funding for the Bush administration's national missile defense program and nuclear weapons research and development activities (see [GSN](#), May 13).

Several potential Democratic amendments to the bill, which would have cut some missile defense program funding and required operational testing before deployment of systems, were blocked by the Republican-majority rules committee from reaching the floor for a vote.

A Democratic amendment to block the nuclear weapons research and development plans was allowed, but was defeated in a narrow vote.

The fiscal 2005 defense authorization bill, approved in a 391-34 vote, authorized \$10 billion for ballistic missile defense programs, effectively approving a \$1 billion increase over fiscal 2004 funding.

The bill, however, authorized the administration's plan for fielding an initial long-range missile defense capability beginning this year, despite Democratic objections over the system's lack of proven effectiveness through operational testing. It also authorized initial funding for a second batch of missile defense capabilities — including land- and sea-based interceptors and a third missile base.

The House vote also approved early funding for developing and testing a space-based interceptor by around 2010, and a request for testing an existing interceptor in space scheduled for early 2006.

The bill fully authorized funding requested for fiscal 2005 by the Bush administration for nuclear weapons research and development for projects such as the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator and other Advanced Concepts nuclear weapons programs, and for the Enhanced Test Readiness program to reduce the preparation time for resuming nuclear testing if ordered.

Democratic Efforts Prevented

The Republican-controlled House Committee on Rules on Wednesday prevented several Democratic amendments challenging the administration's missile defense deployment plans from reaching the House floor for a vote.

One potential amendment by Representative John Spratt (D-S.C.) would have redirected \$414 million for four ballistic missile defense programs to increase military personnel pay, reimburse life insurance premiums for troops in imminent danger, pay for increased force protection equipment for troops in Iraq, and improve the PAC 3 theater missile defense system.

Two other amendments would have blocked deployment of missile defense systems that had not met operational testing requirements.

"I think this is a tremendous amount of political cover for an untested system," said Representative Ellen Tauscher (D-Calif.).

"It's our job to determine what we think are the most important issues for the House to debate, and that's what we did with 28 bipartisan amendments," said committee spokeswoman Jo Maney.

The Committee on Rules allowed an amendment by Tauscher that would have transferred the requested \$36.6 million for the earth penetrating nuclear weapon feasibility study and other Advanced Concepts work to "to increase both intelligence capabilities to get at hard and deploy buried targets" and to "improve conventional bunker-busting capabilities."

It failed in a narrow 204-214 vote.

The overall defense budget increase, from \$400.5 billion last year, includes an added \$25 billion mainly to support operations in Iraq, a 3.5-percent pay increase and other benefits for members of the armed forces, and an additional \$2 billion for more force protection equipment.

KRONIEK 2004

januari	Lord Robertson vertrekt als Secretaris-Generaal van de NAVO
1 januari	Ierland neemt voorzitterschap EU over
1 januari	Einde Nederlands voorzitterschap OVSE
1 januari	Verenigde Staten nemen voorzitterschap G8 over
20 januari - 26 maart	Eerste sessie Conference on Disarmament, Geneve
21-25 januari	World Economic Forum, Davos
6-7 februari	Annual Munich Security Conference, München
20 februari	Parlementsverkiezingen Iran
27 februari	Bezoek Schröder aan Washington
maart	Parlementsverkiezingen Spanje
1 maart	Ministeriële bijeenkomst VS-EU, Washington
8 maart	IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, Wenen
14 maart	Presidentsverkiezingen Rusland
2 april	Bezoek Colin Powell aan Duitsland en België
2 april	Informele bijeenkomst NAVO Ministers van Defensie
5 april	Parlementsverkiezingen Indonesië
5-23 april	UN Disarmament Commission, jaarlijkse bijeenkomst, New York
9-16 april	Bezoek Dick Cheney aan China, Japan en Zuid-Korea
15 april	Parlementsverkiezingen Zuid-Korea
26 april – 7 mei	NPT PrepCom, New York
mei	Bijeenkomst Chemical Weapons Convention, Den Haag
1 mei	Toetreding diverse landen tot de Europese Unie
10 mei -25 juni	Tweede sessie Conference on Disarmament, Geneve
juni	Verkiezingen Europees Parlement
juni	Parlementsverkiezingen Japan
5-6	Bezoek George W. Bush aan Frankrijk
8-10 juni	G-8 Summit, Sea Island, Georgia
14 juni	IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, Wenen
28-29 juni	NAVO-top, Istanbul
1 juli	Nederland neemt voorzitterschap EU over
19-30 juli	Biological Weapons Convention, expert meeting, Geneve
september	Start Algemene Vergadering Verenigde Naties, New York
26 juli – 10 september	Derde sessie Conference on Disarmament, Geneve
13 september	IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, Wenen
20-24 september	IAEA General Conference, Wenen
27 september	IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, Wenen
2 november	Presidentsverkiezingen Verenigde Staten
25 november	IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, Wenen
6-10 december	Jaarlijkse bijeenkomst Biological Weapons Convention, Geneve

FACTS AND REPORTS

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Relevante delen van de partijprogramma's van de Nederlandse politieke partijen, plus citaten van politici op het terrein van oorlog en vrede.
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Overzicht van recente ontwikkelingen in de transatlantische betrekkingen, met name binnen de NAVO, mede naar aanleiding van uitspraken in de State of the Union.
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Periodiek overzicht van ontwikkelingen rond kernwapens in de internationale en nationale politiek, met uitgebreide hoeveelheid bijlagen.
 5. Nucleaire vraagstukken – standpunten van de Nederlandse regering en de Tweede Kamer
Overzicht april 2001 – april 2002
 6. Crisis in de OPCW – de verwijdering van directeur-generaal Bustani
Documenten en artikelen over het ontslag van directeur-generaal Bustani van het OPCW
 7. Prepcom van het NPV – nucleaire ontwapening stopt
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 14. Aanval op Irak (2) – recente ontwikkelingen
 15. Documenten First Committee Verenigde Naties 2002 – resoluties, verklaringen, rapporten
 16. De NAVO-top in Praag – documenten
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 19. Veiligheidsvraagstukken en de verkiezingen (2) – standpunten van de politieke partijen
Een update voor de verkiezingen van 22 januari 2003
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 21. Aanval op Irak (4) – de aanloop
 22. Aanval op Irak (5) – vooravond van de aanval
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