



PROLIFERATIE (2) Recente ontwikkelingen

INHOUDSOPGAVE

Commentaar en vragen	2
Iran	3
Berichten	3
Libië	8
Documenten	8
Berichten	9
Noord-Korea	11
Berichten	11
Veiligheidsraad resolutie	21
Documenten	21
Berichten	29
Proliferation Security Initiative	32
Documenten	32
Berichten	37
G8 Global Partnership	42
Documenten	42
Berichten	46
Zwarte markt	48
Berichten	48
Global Threat Reduction Initiative	52
Documenten	52
Berichten	56
Proliferatie algemeen	58
Berichten	58
Kroniek 2004	60
Overzicht Facts and Reports	61

COMMENTAAR EN VRAGEN

De G-8 top die tussen 8 en 10 juni plaatsvindt op Sea Island, Georgia in de Verenigde Staten, zal een aantal cruciale internationale problemen bespreken. Een daarvan is de kwestie van de proliferatie (verspreiding) van massavernietigingswapens en de technologie die vereist is om ze te maken. Het is niet de eerste keer dat deze regelmatige bijeenkomst van de zeven rijkste landen ter wereld (plus Rusland) het onderwerp behandelt. Al in 2002 werden op de G-8 top in Canada afspraken gemaakt om tot programma's te komen die moesten zorgen voor de opruiming van de MVW (massavernietigingswapens) erfenis van de Sovjet Unie. Dat wil zeggen het veiligstellen dan wel ontmantelen van biologische, chemische en nucleaire wapens en de componenten en grondstoffen die nodig waren om ze te maken. Het plan van de "Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction," was om 20 miljard dollar bijeen te brengen en uit te geven aan deze programma's. Tussentijdse conferenties en de komende G-8 top moeten het proces van opruiming een nieuwe stimulans geven, onder andere door nieuwe donorlanden naast de G-8 te rekruteren voor een reeks opruimprojecten. De mogelijkheid dat 'MVW' materiaal in de handen valt van terroristische groeperingen, die er aanslagen mee zouden uitvoeren, heeft de politieke druk op dit project verder versterkt. Een groep van denktanks, waaronder het Haagsche Clingendael, heeft dit non-proliferatie project kritisch begeleid. Daarin worden ze gesteund door het Amerikaanse 'Nuclear Threat Initiative', een nauw aan senatoren Nunn en Lugar verwante niet-gouvernementele organisatie. Het waren deze twee senatoren die de afgelopen tien jaar Amerikaanse wetgeving hebben bewerkstelligd om de nucleaire sovjet erfenis op te ruimen. In deze F&R is een reeks aanbevelingen afkomstig van het zogenaamde 'consortium' van denktanks opgenomen. Daarin worden een aantal suggesties gedaan aan de G-8 om het opruimingsproces te bevorderen. .

Dit is het positieve aspect van het non-proliferatiebeleid van de geïndustrialiseerde wereld. Maar het opruimen van de nucleaire erfenis om proliferatie tegen te gaan heeft ook een aantal bedenkelijke kanten die minder bekendheid genieten. Zo is het een jaar geleden door de VS in Polen opgerichte verband van staten (waaronder Nederland) die willen optreden tegen de export van MVW technologie, het 'Proliferation Security Initiative', druk bezig om haar plannen verder uit te werken en in de praktijk te brengen. Die zijn niet kinderachtig: het ligt in de bedoeling om oa op volle zee schepen te onderscheppen die worden verdacht van het transporten van MVW technologie. Deze manier van ingrijpen, die veel te maken heeft met de Amerikaanse 'pre-emptive' oorlogsdoctrine, wordt ook regelmatig geoefend met schepen van de deelnemende landen. De bedoeling is om dit door de VS geleide gezelschap van landen verder uit te bouwen, buiten de bestaande multilaterale structuren om. De laatste ontwikkelingen worden in dit nummer beschreven.

Twee andere evenementen gerelateerd aan proliferatie vonden in april plaats: er werd een VN resolutie aangenomen die alle lidstaten verplichtte om wetgeving aan te nemen die optreden mogelijk maken tegen niet-staatsgebonden groeperingen op te teren. De tekst van de resolutie staat in dit nummer. Een groot aantal landen hebben commentaar op die resolutie geleverd, waarover artikelen zijn verschenen in de pers. Verder vond de 'prepcom', de tussentijdse vergadering van het Non-Proliferatie Verdrag plaats. Daarin werden nogal wat meningsverschillen duidelijk over hoe proliferatie het beste kon worden tegengegaan. De kern van de meningsverschillen ligt in de nadruk van de G-8 staten op het bestrijden van proliferatie, terwijl nucleaire ontwapening langzamerhand uit zicht verdwingt. Zoals bekend bezitten de acht erkende kernwapenstaten nog steeds meer dan tienduizend kernwapens, waarvan een substantieel deel gereed wordt gehouden voor onmiddellijke lancering. De onwil om deze kernwapens definitief af te schaffen, maakt het beleid om proliferatie tegen te gaan, ongeloofwaardig. Erger nog, een groot aantal staten op wie dit beleid is gericht, zullen redeneren dat als kernwapens goed genoeg zijn als grondslag voor de bewapening van de kernwapenstaten, dat die ook voor hen geschikt is. Om die reden is het van cruciaal belang dat nucleaire ontwapening gelijk op gaat met de uitgebreide programma's om de verdere proliferatie van massavernietigingswapens tegen te gaan. Gebeurt dit, dan is verdere proliferatie onvermijdelijk.

Redactie Facts and Reports

IRAN

BERICHTEN

Associated Press

U.S.: Iran May Be Running Nuke Programs

by George Jahn – 27 April 2004

VIENNA, Austria - Iran may be running a covert military nuclear program parallel to the peaceful one it has opened to international scrutiny in efforts to dispel suspicions it has weapons ambitions, U.S. officials said Tuesday.

The officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said new intelligence on Iran's nuclear activities was strengthening suspicions of two programs — one that inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency have access to and another, run by the military and geared toward making nuclear weapons.

"We are beginning to see indications that there is a parallel military program," one of the officials told The Associated Press. The source cautioned that the "limited evidence" was not enough to draw firm conclusions.

Alireza Jafarzadeh, a former spokesman for Iran's exiled opposition National Council of Resistance, said "between 350 and 400 nuclear physicists" are involved in the weapons program.

Another official spoke of "explicit concerns" of that the military is controlling nuclear programs aimed at making weapons.

The United States has long maintained that Iran is not telling the truth when it says its nuclear programs are geared only toward generating energy, insisting that Iran's real goal is to make arms.

Undersecretary of State John R. Bolton has repeatedly said that Iran is actively violating its treaty obligations.

But the comments Tuesday by the U.S. sources appeared to be the first suggesting that Tehran was running two programs — one for public show and the other to make weapons.

Pirooz Hosseini, Iran's chief delegate to the Vienna-based IAEA, dismissed the comments as "baseless allegations."

Any valid information on Iran's nuclear intentions "will come from the IAEA and not from these kinds of people," Hosseini told the AP.

The IAEA declined comment.

But Jafarzadeh said sources "with access to the Iranian regime's nuclear program" told him that hard-liners answering directly to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei had recently formed a "new military special unit to take over the (military) nuclear program."

Jafarzadeh said the unit controlled a program separate from that under the responsibility of Atomic Energy Organization of Iran now being probed by IAEA inspectors.

That program runs facilities scattered over the country, including secret sites used for enriching uranium with the objective "of making (nuclear) weapons, he said from Washington.

Jafarzadeh said "between 350 and 400 nuclear physicists, experts and researchers are under the control of the military special unit."

He spoke as a senior U.S. State Department official accused Iran of using the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty — the cornerstone of international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons — "as cover for the development of nuclear weapons."

"States like Iran are actively violating their treaty obligations, and have gained access to technologies and materials for their nuclear weapons programs," Bolton said, speaking at U.N. headquarters in New York.

The best thing Iran can do now is "come clean," answer all outstanding questions, and open its nuclear program "to transparent inspections," said Bolton.

Iran said it suspended uranium enrichment last year under international pressure but continued manufacture of uranium-enriching centrifuge components. This month it said it had also stopped building centrifuges.

Iran's nuclear aims first came under international scrutiny after the IAEA discovered a covert centrifuge facility at Natanz. First word of the existence of the centrifuges came nearly two years ago from Jafarzadeh.

He now runs the Strategic Policy Consulting think tank after his exile organization was closed down in the United States, which lists it as a terrorist group.

Since the initial discovery of the centrifuges, traces of weapons grade, highly enriched uranium, new, more advanced centrifuge prototypes and suspicious covert experiments that can also have military applications

have increased suspicions, even though Tehran says it was interested only in low-enriched uranium for power generation.

Tehran last month acknowledged for the first time that its military was involved in the country's nuclear program but insisted that its participation — building centrifuges — had been for the civilian sector.

After several inconclusive board meetings of the IAEA on Iran's agenda, agency chief Mohammed ElBaradei hopes to present a fuller assessment of Iran's nuclear activities to the next board of governors gathering in June.

Iran said Saturday it has offered the "complete story" to the U.N. nuclear watchdog both about the traces of weapons-grade uranium and documents pertaining to advanced centrifuges that could be used to produce atomic bombs.

Reuters

U.N. Nuclear Head Says Not Ready to Clear Iran

By Grant McCool – 14 May 2004

NEW YORK (Reuters) - The United Nation's nuclear watchdog is not ready to clear Iran over whether or not its nuclear program is weaponized, the head of the agency said on Friday.

Mohamed ElBaradei, the director-general of the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency, said Tehran "had the know how" to enrich uranium but he had no proof that it had been processed to a military level.

"We will close the file when we have dealt with all the issues that require to be investigated," said ElBaradei, whose board of governors will meet in June on Iran's nuclear activities.

ElBaradei told diplomats and business leaders at the Council on Foreign Relations think tank in New York that the issues were technical, not political.

"It will come to an end when it comes to an end -- when I am satisfied based on the technical advice I get that 'yes' now we can bring that issue to a close and 'yes' we can say that Iran's program is dedicated exclusively for peaceful purposes and we are not there yet," ElBaradei said.

Iran's ambassador to the United Nations in Vienna, Pirooz Hosseini, said on Thursday that his government was ready to present a complete account of its nuclear activities and plans to the agency by mid-May.

The United States says Iran's nuclear program is a front for building a nuclear bomb and has called for the board to report Tehran to the U.N. Security Council for breaching the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Tehran says it is only interested in generating electricity and wants the agency to take Iran off its agenda after the June meeting.

October report

In October, Iran gave the IAEA what it said was a full declaration of its atomic operations. But it omitted a number of research projects that could relate to a weapons program, such as advanced "P2" centrifuges that can make arms-grade uranium.

Iran said last week it had given P2 designs to the IAEA, but the agency has yet to resolve traces of bomb-grade uranium found in the country last year.

ElBaradei said he believed the U.N. Security Council system for dealing with nuclear materials had not been adjusted to the post-Cold War era.

He suggested a moratorium or ban on the right of every country to develop plutonium and highly enriched uranium. He said he plans to appoint experts to examine how to develop better security around enrichment and processing.

"At least if we don't have a ban right now let us have these facilities under multinational control," ElBaradei said.

He said the long-standing diplomatic wrangle over North Korea's nuclear program sent "the worst signal" to would be proliferators.

"If you want to protect yourself, accelerate yourself. You are injured in a way, then people will sit around the table with you. And if you don't do that, you tough it out, you might be subject to pre-emption."

The United States and North Korea disagree over Pyongyang's alleged pursuit of a highly-enriched uranium program for nuclear weapons.

The nuclear crisis erupted in October 2002 when U.S. officials said North Korea had disclosed it was working on a secret program to enrich uranium for weapons, in violation of an international agreement.

North Korea, which denied the disclosure, then pulled out of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, expelled U.N. inspectors and took a plutonium plant out of mothballs.

Associated Press

Tehran Gives U.N. Watchdog Nuclear Report

By William J. Kole – 22 May 2004

VIENNA, Austria - Iran has delivered an initial report on its nuclear program to the U.N. atomic watchdog, a key step ahead of an agency meeting next month to assess suspicions that it is covertly trying to make weapons, the agency said Saturday.

The Tehran regime handed over the dossier on Friday to the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the documents "should provide broader information about Iran's nuclear activities," IAEA spokesman Mark Gwozdecky said.

The Vienna-based agency will work to assess the "correctness and completeness" of the declaration, and IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei will deliver a report to the IAEA's 35-nation board of governors when it meets on June 14, Gwozdecky said.

Iran was obligated to provide the declaration under a so-called additional protocol to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which allows international inspectors to conduct intrusive unannounced checks of its nuclear facilities.

ElBaradei has said his inspectors are getting the access they want in Iran but need additional information.

The United States has long maintained that Iran - part of President Bush's "axis of evil" along with Iraq and North Korea - is not telling the truth when it says its nuclear programs are geared only toward generating energy. Washington insists that Iran's real goal is to make arms.

The U.S. House of Representatives this month accused Iran of "continuing deceptions and falsehoods" involving development of nuclear weapons, alleging in a resolution that "it is abundantly clear that Iran remains committed to a nuclear weapons program."

Last month, U.S. officials said Iran may be running a covert military nuclear program parallel to the peaceful one it has opened to international scrutiny in efforts to dispel suspicions it has weapons ambitions.

The officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said new intelligence on Iran's nuclear activities was strengthening suspicions of two programs - one that IAEA inspectors have access to and another, run by the military and geared toward making nuclear weapons.

Iran has dismissed the allegations as "baseless" and has insisted it has offered the complete story on its nuclear program.

Iran said it suspended uranium enrichment last year under international pressure but continued manufacture of uranium-enriching centrifuge components. In April, it said it had also stopped building centrifuges.

Iran's nuclear aims first came under international scrutiny after the IAEA discovered a covert centrifuge facility in the central city of Natanz.

Since the initial discovery of the centrifuges, traces of weapons-grade, highly enriched uranium; new, more advanced centrifuge prototypes; and suspicious covert experiments that can also have military applications have increased suspicions.

Last year, IAEA inspectors found radioactive particles that had been enriched to weapons-grade level - higher than what Iran requires for fuel for a nuclear reactor. Iran said the particles came from imported equipment.

Although the U.N. agency has no proof that Iran has enriched uranium to weapons levels or has attempted to build a bomb, it suspects the Iranians have the expertise to do so, ElBaradei said earlier this month.

Reuters

Iran Bars UN from Military Sites - Diplomats

By Louis Charbonneau – 24 May 2004

VIENNA, Austria (Reuters) - Several Western diplomats on the board of the U.N. nuclear watchdog accused Iran of barring U.N. inspectors from military sites, but Tehran said the agency was getting full access inside the Islamic republic.

Diplomats who follow the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said IAEA inspectors had been prevented from inspecting around a dozen workshops at three locations.

"They have yet to allow access to the military sites," one Western diplomat said. "This will probably be the topic of one of the inspection visits" by IAEA officials.

"They (Iranian officials) have been obstructing visits to military sites," said another diplomat, adding U.N. inspectors were being escorted by members of Iran's Revolutionary Guards.

The United States says Iran has two nuclear programs -- a public one it has declared to the U.N. and a secret one aimed at developing atomic weapons. Tehran rejects this charge, saying its plans are limited to the peaceful generation of electricity.

Iran's ambassador to the United Nations in Vienna, Pirooz Hosseini, denied that the IAEA was facing access problems.

"This is not correct information ... from these unnamed diplomats," Hosseini told Reuters, adding that there were "discussions" between Tehran and the United Nations about site access.

"They're not problems. (The IAEA) will have access to the sites they want to visit. Everything is going in a smooth way."

IAEA officials declined comment.

But a third diplomat close to the IAEA said the agency had the right only to what is called "managed access" to sensitive sites, not the "anytime, anywhere" powers U.N. weapons inspectors had in Iraq.

A fourth Western diplomat said any delays caused by discussion of "managed access" would only deepen suspicions that Iran is hiding something.

"Iran's got to throw open the doors," the diplomat said.

The IAEA began looking closely at Iran after an exiled Iranian opposition group said in August 2002 Tehran was hiding a massive uranium enrichment plant at Natanz and other facilities from the U.N. Iran later declared these sites to the IAEA.

No hard evidence

"There's a general hardening of opinion" against Iran on the 35-nation IAEA governing board, the second diplomat said. "The pattern of behavior suggests they're trying to hide something."

However, he acknowledged there was no hard evidence that Iran was concealing anything, just suspicions.

He said a number of countries wanted IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei to criticize Iran's less-than-adequate cooperation in his new report on Iran, due out soon. But he said ElBaradei, concerned about Tehran's reaction, was putting up resistance.

The diplomat close to the IAEA disagreed, saying ElBaradei felt strongly about the importance of the IAEA being objective and would not withhold criticism for fear of anyone's reaction.

The first diplomat said Iran may grant the IAEA inspectors access to the sites right before ElBaradei's report comes out -- so ElBaradei would not need not to mention access problems.

ElBaradei's report will be discussed at a meeting of the IAEA's board of governors beginning on June 14, at which the United States is expected to push hard for a resolution that harshly condemns Iran's nuclear program.

Reuters

Russia, Iran Reportedly to Sign Nuclear Deal Soon

By Maria Golovkina – 25 May 2004

MOSCOW (Reuters) - Iran will sign a deal soon with Russia obliging it to return spent fuel from a new nuclear reactor to Moscow, a Russian official said, in a move intended to ease U.S. fears the material could be used to make bombs.

Russia has faced down U.S. opposition to its construction of Iran's \$800-million reactor at Bushehr, but it has insisted on the spent fuel deal to alleviate U.S. concerns that Iranian scientists could extract plutonium from spent fuel and potentially use it in warheads.

Alexander Rumyantsev, head of Russia's Atomic Energy Agency, said Tuesday Moscow and Tehran would sign the document during a visit to Iran this summer, ending years of talks.

"During this trip we plan to sign an additional protocol on the return of spent nuclear fuel to Russia for storage and processing," Itar-Tass news agency quoted Rumyantsev as saying.

The document must be signed before the end of the summer for Bushehr's first 1,000-megawatt reactor to go on-stream in 2005. The plant was originally supposed to start up in 2003.

Washington has branded Iran part of an "axis of evil" of states seeking illegal arms and fears Iran would use Bushehr as a cover for the transfer of other sensitive nuclear technology.

Russia says Iran could not produce a nuclear bomb, even using Moscow's nuclear technology.

Iran, which sits on the world's second largest gas reserves after Russia, also denies the U.S. allegations. It says it needs nuclear energy to meet booming demand for electricity and keep oil and gas reserves for export.

Spent fuel sent to Siberia

Iran's former representative to the U.N.'s International Atomic Energy Agency, Ali Akbar Salehi, was quoted Tuesday as saying Iran was still some way from mastering the full nuclear fuel cycle.

"Iran has achieved some 60 to 70 percent of the technology needed for a full fuel cycle," Salehi told the hard-line Kayhan evening newspaper.

He said Iran was many years away from producing enough nuclear fuel to feed even one atomic reactor.

"We need at least ten years to feed the Bushehr nuclear plant with the fuel," Salehi said.

Once the protocol on returning spent fuel is signed, Russia will ship fuel to Iran to start up the Bushehr reactor. Spent fuel will be sent back to a storage facility in Siberia after roughly a decade of use.

Western diplomats in Moscow say that decade would enable Iran to acquire the necessary technology to make bombs. Russia says much longer would be required.

An official from a nuclear fuel plant in Siberia was quoted as saying that up to 168 nuclear fuel units would be dispatched to Bushehr after the signing to start up the reactor. A further 43 would be shipped each year thereafter.

Signing of the document has been delayed repeatedly. Industry insiders say disagreement over technical matters and the row with the United States nearly prompted both sides to abandon the project this year.

Rumyantsev told Tass delays were linked to "failure to fulfil certain contract obligations by some Russian and Iranian firms." He did not elaborate.

Reuters

Iran's Khatami Warns on Future Nuclear Cooperation

By Parisa Hafezi – 27 May 2004

TEHRAN (Reuters) - Iran warned the U.N.'s nuclear watchdog on Thursday it might resume uranium enrichment and halt snap inspections of its nuclear sites if the body did not recognize Tehran's cooperation at a board meeting next month.

"The (International Atomic Energy Agency's) decision will have an influence on our cooperation with the agency," President Mohammad Khatami told reporters.

"We suspended (uranium) enrichment voluntarily, we implemented the Additional Protocol (on snap inspections) voluntarily, so we can stop that at any time," he said.

Under intense international pressure following revelations it had engaged in an 18-year cover-up of sensitive nuclear research, Iran agreed last year to halt uranium enrichment activities which can be used to make bomb-grade material.

Iran has also signed and agreed to implement the Additional Protocol to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) allowing short-notice, intrusive inspections of its nuclear facilities.

Iran, which last week submitted what it says is a full declaration of its nuclear activities, has repeatedly called for the IAEA's board of governors to remove Tehran's case from its agenda after its meeting in Vienna next month.

Iran insists its nuclear program is entirely peaceful and says accusations it is hiding a secret atomic arms program are unfounded and politically motivated.

But Khatami acknowledged for the first time that the IAEA was unlikely to close Iran's case after the June meeting.

"We know this case is not going to be closed in June, but the June meeting's decision is very, very important," he said.

Diplomats close to the IAEA have said the U.N. body has not been receiving full cooperation from Iran in recent weeks and has been denied access to some military sites in the country.

Iranian officials have previously denied these charges but Khatami suggested that some sensitive sites had been put off-limits for U.N. inspectors.

"We will not let anyone have access to our military secrets," he said. "But based on the regulations we have let the inspectors visit military sites which do not involve secrecy or confidentiality," he added.

He said Tehran wants the IAEA to reflect Iran's close cooperation with the agency in its June report.

"If we feel that, under political pressure, they don't mention Iran's goodwill and cooperation, we will adopt new methods," he said.

But Khatami said Iran had no intention of following North Korea's example of pulling out of the NPT as some hard-liners in the Islamic Republic have wanted.

LIBIË

DOCUMENTEN

Security Council

Security Council welcomes Libya's decision to abandon Weapons of Mass Destruction

Press release SC/8069 – 22 April 2004

The Security Council this morning welcomed Libya's decision to abandon its weapons of mass destruction programmes, as well as the positive steps taken to meet its commitments and obligations, including its active cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).

Through a presidential statement read out by its President, Gunter Pleuger (Germany), the Council took note of resolution 2004/18 of the Board of Governors of the IAEA regarding implementation of the safeguards agreement of Libya, a State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). That resolution requested the Agency's Director-General to report a case of non-compliance to the Security Council for information purposes only, while commending Libya for the actions it had taken to date and those it had proposed to take to remedy it.

The Council also noted that the Board's resolution had recognized Libya's decision as a step towards the realization of the goal of an Africa and a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction and at peace.

In a related provision, the Council reaffirmed the need to seek to resolve proliferation problems by peaceful means through political and diplomatic channels. It encouraged Libya to ensure the verified elimination of all of its weapons of mass destruction programmes.

It welcomed the roles played in that regard by the IAEA and the OPCW in facilitating the fulfilment of Libya's commitments, demonstrating the importance and usefulness of existing international treaty regimes.

The meeting began at 9:42 a.m. and adjourned at 9:46 a.m.

The full text of the statement, which will be issued as document S/PRST/2004/10, reads as follows:

"The Security Council takes note of resolution 2004/18 of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regarding the implementation of the safeguards agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, a State party to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, by which the Board requested the Director-General of the IAEA to report a case of non-compliance to the Security Council for information purposes only, while commending the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya for the actions it has taken to date and those it has proposed to take to remedy it.

"The Security Council welcomes the decision by the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to abandon its programmes for developing weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery and the positive steps taken to fulfil its commitments and obligations, including its active cooperation with IAEA and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).

"The Security Council takes note that in its resolution 2004/18 the Board of Governors of IAEA recognized the decision of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya as a step towards the realization of the goal of an Africa and a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction and at peace.

"The Security Council reaffirms the need to seek to resolve proliferation problems by peaceful means through political and diplomatic channels.

“The Security Council welcomes existing and future efforts to assist the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in this task and expresses the hope that the steps taken by the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya would facilitate and improve international cooperation with and enhance the security of that country.

“The Security Council encourages the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to ensure the verified elimination of all of its weapons of mass destruction programmes. It welcomes the roles played in that regard by IAEA and OPCW in facilitating the fulfilment of the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya’s commitments, demonstrating the importance and usefulness of existing international treaty regimes.

“The Security Council expresses the hope that resolution 2004/18 of the Board of Governors of IAEA will be implemented in the spirit of continued cooperation.”

US State Department

U.S. Lauds Libya's Move to Curtail Trade with WMD Proliferators

State's Bolton calls announcement "an important step forward"

13 May 2004

The Bush administration welcomed Libya's May 13 announcement that it would not deal in military goods or services with countries that it considers "of serious weapons of mass destruction proliferation concern."

Speaking at the May 13 State Department briefing in Washington, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton said Libya would also announce a pledge to renounce trade in missiles and related equipment and technology with countries that are not members of the Missile Technology Control Regime.

The announcement is "an important step forward and an indicator of Libya's seriousness in abandoning weapons of mass destruction proliferation and rejoining the international community," said Bolton.

Bolton said Libya was including North Korea, Syria and Iran among the countries with whom it had renounced all military trade.

"[W]hen a state like Libya, which was pursuing weapons of mass destruction and advanced delivery systems, not only gives up the pursuit of those assets but says it's not going to have military dealings with other states that are pursuing weapons of mass destruction, I think that's a very important step forward," he said.

He said the United States is satisfied with the progress that has been made thus far in implementing Libya's decision to give up its weapons of mass destruction. The Bush administration is working to remove chemical weapons agents and Scud B missiles from the country, he said.

The May 13 announcement, he said, is "a continuing example of Libya's openness and transparency in giving up weapons of mass destruction, [and] we hope this will be a productive example for others in the region and around the world."

The under secretary said North Korea had provided Libya's Scud missile arsenal, and has been one of the main sources of ballistic missile technology proliferation throughout the world. "They have used the hard currency earnings from that proliferation to finance their nuclear weapons program," he said.

Bolton also described Iran and Syria as "very serious proliferant states."

BERICHTEN

New York Times

After ending arms program, Libya receives a surprise

by William J. Broad and David E. Sanger – 29 May 2004

In March, just as the Bush administration was showing reporters some of the secret nuclear equipment that Libya gave up after renouncing its arms program, the Libyans received a fresh shipment of illegal parts from the nuclear black market, according to a new report by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The Libyan leader, Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi, was not cheating, however. The Libyans may have been as surprised as anybody when the parts - advanced centrifuge components for enriching uranium, a crucial step in making nuclear bombs - showed up in Tripoli's port. Colonel Qaddafi's aides quietly reported the arrival of the shipment to American intelligence and to the atomic agency.

Though accounts of what happened are still contradictory, the American-led team that had originally seized five containers of centrifuge parts from a ship in October amid much fanfare had missed one other container - apparently parts that came from a different place than the Malaysian factory that was a main supplier to Libya. The additional container, the I.A.E.A. said, was full of components for the P-2, the most advanced centrifuge available from the secretive network set up by Abdul Qadeer Khan, known in Pakistan as the father of the country's nuclear bomb.

The International Atomic Energy Agency disclosed the oversight on Friday in a new report on Libya's nuclear disarmament.

It said the intercepted ship, the freighter China, had continued on toward Libya after the raid was over. The container of centrifuge parts that arrived in March, the report said, "had escaped the attention of the State authorities that had seized the cargo ship."

But a senior American official involved with the issue said in an interview on Friday evening that the atomic agency might have its timing wrong. "We didn't miss anything," he said. "Everything we had actionable intelligence on we found. This was not part of the same shipment of parts." He said he believed that Libya had actually received the container in January, and then handed it over to the United States in March.

"The Libyans warned us that they had ordered a lot of additional stuff," he said, "and some of it hadn't shown up. Some might still show up in the future."

The China presumably made other calls around the Mediterranean between the time of its seizure in October and its arrival in Libya.

The seizure of the China's cargo was the biggest achievement for the year-old Proliferation Security Initiative, a new Bush administration program that seeks international cooperation in blocking commerce in unconventional arms. But the fact that inspectors apparently missed one cargo container - the administration said that the team had reported that it would have been impossible to open them all - seemed a bit embarrassing, some experts argued.

"This case, where you actually identified and searched the ship and still didn't find a critical packing crate, makes clear what the limitations are," said Matthew Bunn, a nuclear expert at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard. "That doesn't mean we shouldn't continue. We should. We just have to understand how much reliance we can place on it."

The disclosure of the late-arriving arms shipment was a small part of a larger report on Libyan disarmament.

It also showed that Libya had an agreement to obtain a total of 20 tons - or roughly 10 small bombs' worth - of uranium hexafluoride, a standard raw material for making nuclear arms. Last Sunday, it was reported that North Korea might have been responsible for supplying Libya with nearly two tons of the material, which Libya then turned over to the United States this year. The atomic agency now disclosed that the two tons was simply the first installment, but it did not name the source.

The report, obtained Friday from a Western diplomat, was prepared for the atomic agency's board, which is meeting next month to review the status of Libya's nuclear disarmament, among other issues. The agency, based in Vienna, is a branch of the United Nations that acts as a global inspector to make sure nations live up to their pledges to pursue only peaceful nuclear programs.

The secret Libyan effort to obtain nuclear arms became highly public last October when the China was seized in the Mediterranean.

A search of the ship at the port of Taranto, Italy, by American and British intelligence led to the confiscation of thousands of centrifuge parts bound for Libya.

In December, the White House announced that Libya had agreed to dismantle its clandestine nuclear program, much of it from Dr. Khan's secret nuclear supplier network.

President Bush, in his State of the Union address in January, praised the development as a major accomplishment of his administration. "Because of American leadership and resolve, the world is changing for the better," he said. "Last month, the leader of Libya voluntarily pledged to disclose and dismantle all of his regime's weapons of mass destruction programs, including a uranium enrichment project for nuclear weapons. Colonel Qaddafi correctly judged that his country would be better off, and far more secure, without weapons of mass murder."

In March, at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee and under extraordinary security - guards with automatic weapons stationed every few yards - Bush administration officials showed reporters some of the most basic of the high-speed centrifuges that Dr. Khan had sold Libya, known as P-1's. In addition, they said they had received 4,000 more advanced centrifuges, P-2's, which were kept out of sight.

Later, some experts accused the Bush administration of exaggerating how many operational P-2 centrifuges it actually obtained from Libya. Officials denied any overstatement.

Earlier this year, Libya turned over to the United States a giant cask holding nearly two tons of uranium hexafluoride. Although the Americans identified Pakistan as its likely source, international inspectors have recently found evidence that North Korea secretly provided Libya with the uranium in early 2001. If confirmed, it would be the first known case in which North Korea sold a crucial ingredient for making atomic weapons to another country.

Uranium hexafluoride is a standard raw material for feeding centrifuges, machines that spin incredibly fast to concentrate uranium into its best components for making bombs.

NOORD-KOREA

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Reuters

Wen: N.Korea, U.S. Want to End Nuke Crisis in Peace

28 April 2004

BEIJING (Reuters) - Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao said Wednesday the United States and North Korea had both expressed a desire to solve the North Korean nuclear crisis peacefully and that their aim was a nuclear-free Korean peninsula.

"I think that if the parties join their efforts and actively promote the six-party talks, we still have hopes for a peaceful solution to the Korean nuclear problem," Wen told Reuters in an interview ahead of a trip to Europe.

"They (North Korea and the United States) both expressed their respective willingness to continue with the six-party talks and facilitate a solution to the issue. They both endorsed the ultimate objective of realizing a nuclear-free Korean peninsula."

The nuclear crisis erupted in October 2002 when the United States said North Korea had admitted to a nuclear weapons program. China hosted the United States, the two Koreas, Japan and Russia for two rounds of inconclusive senior-level talks on the North's nuclear programs in August 2003 and in February this year.

Washington Post

N. Korea Nuclear Estimate To Rise

U.S. Report to Say Country Has At Least 8 Bombs

By Glenn Kessler – 28 April 2004

The United States is preparing to significantly raise its estimate of the number of nuclear weapons held by North Korea, from "possibly two" to at least eight, according to U.S. officials involved in the preparation of the report.

The report, expected to be completed within a month, would reflect a new intelligence consensus on North Korea's nuclear capabilities after that country's decision last year to restart a nuclear reactor and plutonium-reprocessing facility that had been frozen under a 1994 agreement. Among the evidence used in making the assessment is a detailed analysis of plutonium byproducts found on clothing worn by members of an unofficial U.S. delegation that was allowed to visit North Korean nuclear facilities several months ago.

The increase in the estimate would underscore the strides North Korea has made in the past year as the Bush administration struggled to respond diplomatically while waging a war against Iraq in an unsuccessful effort to search for such weapons there.

Intelligence officials also have broadly concluded that a separate North Korean uranium-enrichment program will be operational by 2007, producing enough material for as many as six additional weapons a year, one U.S. official said.

With Democrat John F. Kerry's presidential campaign planning to highlight the dangers of nuclear proliferation, the leap in Pyongyang's nuclear capabilities during President Bush's tenure could leave the administration vulnerable to charges that it has mishandled the North Korea crisis. Experts said an arsenal of eight weapons means that North Korea could use its weapons to attack neighbors, instead of merely deterring a possible attack.

But some Bush administration officials believe the new estimate will help pressure North Korea's neighbors to back the U.S. position that Pyongyang's weapons programs must be dismantled without concessions. During a tour of Asia two weeks ago, Vice President Cheney warned that time is running out for diplomacy as an increasingly cash-strapped North Korea might seek to peddle its nuclear technology or fissile material - including, Cheney said, to terrorist groups.

The estimates are guesswork based largely on circumstantial evidence, and administration officials in several agencies have yet to agree on specific numbers. The Energy Department has pressed for a higher estimate of North Korea's weapons and the Defense Intelligence Agency believes the uranium program will be operational at the end of this year, but the State Department's intelligence arm has been the most skeptical. The differences in the estimates depend in part on determinations about the power and efficiency of the North Korean design.

Work on the report began late last summer, after the first round of six-nation talks on the North Korea crisis, when various government agencies sought a unified position on the extent of Pyongyang's programs. Much of the report will not be made public, but its conclusions will guide official statements on North Korean capabilities.

In many ways, the official U.S. estimate of "possibly two" weapons lags significantly behind private-sector reports.

The International Institute for Strategic Studies in London concluded this year that North Korea's nuclear arsenal could reach four to eight bombs over the next year and increase by 13 bombs per year by the end of the decade. The Institute for Science and International Security in Washington recently estimated that North Korea has a maximum of eight or nine weapons.

"It's long overdue for them to do something," David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security, said of the administration.

Albright said that the January visit of the unofficial delegation -- which included Siegfried S. Hecker, a former director of Los Alamos National Laboratory -- brought back evidence that North Korea has reprocessed all 8,000 spent fuel rods that had been held in a cooling pond under a 1994 agreement negotiated by the Clinton administration.

In late 2002, Pyongyang evicted international inspectors observing the pond after the United States suspended shipments of fuel oil because, officials said, North Korea had nullified the 1994 deal by having a clandestine uranium program.

In February, CIA Director George J. Tenet told Congress: "The intelligence community judged in the mid-1990s that North Korea had produced one, possibly two, nuclear weapons. The 8,000 [spent fuel] rods the North claims to have processed into plutonium metal would provide enough plutonium for several more." Tenet added that North Korea is "pursuing a production-scale uranium enrichment program" using technology provided by A.Q. Khan, a Pakistani metallurgist who recently admitted to making millions by providing nuclear equipment and know-how to other countries.

The delegation members provided samples of the clothing they wore during their tour of the Yongbyon facility, when the North Koreans showed Hecker a jar that they said contained recently reprocessed plutonium. Albright said traces of plutonium byproducts, such as americium, that collected on the clothing could be analyzed to indicate how recently the plutonium had been processed.

"I think it is generally accepted the North Koreans are probably telling the truth when they say some reprocessing activity took place," said Gary Samore, a weapons expert who was the principal author of the London institute's report.

The earlier estimate was based on calculations derived from the amount of plutonium North Korea was believed to possess -- about seven to 11 kilograms -- and the new estimate essentially reflects the number of additional weapons North Korea could produce from the plutonium derived from the 8,000 spent fuel rods. The calculation in part depends on determining how much plutonium is lost during reprocessing.

Albright said he reached his estimate of a maximum of nine weapons by calculating that North Korea possesses about 37 to 39 kilograms of plutonium and would need at least four kilograms per weapon.

U.S. officials have said Khan told interrogators that in the 1990s the North Koreans showed him three devices they identified as nuclear weapons. The report, which has not been confirmed, would suggest North Korea was more efficient in its use of plutonium than previously thought.

But Samore said he thought it was implausible that North Korea would show its weapons to an outsider, let alone keep them all in one place. He added that it was in Khan's interest to assert that North Korea already had nuclear weapons when he began supplying materials for the uranium-enrichment program.

Nations to Hold Talks on N. Korean Nukes

by Sang-Hun Choe – 29 April 2004

SEOUL, South Korea - The six nations negotiating the North Korean nuclear standoff will hold low-level meetings on May 12 in Beijing to lay the groundwork for the next round of talks, South Korea and China said Thursday.

The apparent breakthrough comes as the United States reportedly prepares to upgrade its estimate of North Korea's nuclear arsenal to at least eight atomic weapons, from its long-standing estimate of "possibly two."

The report, disputed by Seoul, is being prepared by U.S. intelligence officials to account for strides North Korea has made since last year, when it restarted its nuclear reactor and plutonium reprocessing facility in Yongbyon, the Washington Post reported Wednesday, citing unnamed officials involved in the estimate overhaul.

The officials have also concluded that a separate uranium-based nuclear program will be operational by 2007, producing enough material for as many as six additional weapons a year, the report said.

An upgrade would be seen as upping pressure on other participants in the six-nation negotiations to back Washington at the table. U.S. State Department spokesman Adam Ereli called the report "speculative."

In Seoul, South Korean Deputy Foreign Minister Lee Soo-hyuck quoted U.S. authorities as saying that the Washington Post report was "groundless."

Lee said that an estimate of eight nuclear bombs is based on the assumption that the communist state has reprocessed all its 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods.

The rods, if chemically treated, can yield enough plutonium for several bombs. North Korea says it has reprocessed all and is already increasing its "nuclear deterrent." Speaking at a news conference, Lee said: "There is no scientific proof that the North has reprocessed all the 8,000 rods."

South Korea believes the rival North has enough nuclear material to build one or two nuclear bombs.

Lee said that the six nations involved in resolving the dispute - the United States, China, the two Koreas, Russia and Japan - are scheduled to begin working level talks May 12 in the Chinese capital.

In Beijing, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Kong Quan said the "fundamental goal" of the so-called working-group meetings was to prepare for a third round of six-party talks to be held by the end of June.

Lee said South Korea, the United States and Japan would consider giving the North energy aid if it freezes all its nuclear facilities, including those for power generation, with the condition that it will eventually completely dismantle them.

"As we go into these talks, our principal position remains the same and unchanged, that North Korea should dismantle its nuclear facilities completely and that we cannot tolerate North Korea possessing nuclear weapons," Lee said.

The nuclear standoff began in October 2002, when U.S. officials said North Korea admitted having a secret nuclear program in violation of a 1994 pact.

North Korea says it will dismantle its nuclear weapons facilities only if the United States provides economic aid and makes a nonaggression pledge. The United States demands that North Korea first scrap all its nuclear facilities.

Kyodo News

U.S. eyes permanent peace mechanism for Korean Peninsula

2 May 2004

WASHINGTON - The United States has proposed that the armistice that ended the 1950-1953 Korean War be replaced with a permanent peace mechanism for the Korean Peninsula in the final stage of the three-phase process to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue, U.S. and diplomatic sources said Sunday.

U.S. Undersecretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly made the proposal at the second round of six-party talks in Beijing in late February, the sources said.

The meeting brought together China, Japan, North and South Korea, Russia and the United States for the first time since last August to resolve the standoff over the North's nuclear ambitions.

As the first step, the U.S. proposal calls on North Korea to make a clear commitment to the "complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement" of all its nuclear programs, the sources said.

If North Korea takes such a step, the five other parties will pledge to provide a security assurance to North Korea, they said.

At the second stage, North Korea should make progress in the dismantlement process in a verifiable way while the other parties provide technical and financial support, the sources said.

For their part, the five other countries should consider energy assistance to North Korea and the United States should begin talks with Pyongyang on its removal from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism, they said.

The final stage calls on North Korea to make steady progress toward the complete dismantlement of its nuclear programs and the United States to begin talks with North Korea on the normalization of their relations, the sources said.

In parallel with the U.S.-North Korean normalization talks, the six parties should begin to hold negotiations on replacing the Korean War armistice with a permanent peace mechanism, they said.

The Korean War ended without a peace treaty.

The six parties will hold their first working group meeting in Beijing from May 12 in a bid to facilitate plenary talks on the North Korean nuclear standoff, but it is uncertain whether the upcoming meeting will be able to make progress.

The United States plans to discuss the nuclear issue, but North Korea is expected to reiterate that Washington should abandon what it calls a "hostile" policy against Pyongyang, the sources said.

Global Security Newswire

North Korea Says it Won't Transfer Nuclear Materials, Wants U.S. Friendship

4 May 2004

North Korea does not plan to transfer its nuclear materials to others and wants a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, according to North Korean officials who met recently with a U.S. expert in Pyongyang (see [GSN](#), May 3).

Long-time North Korea analyst Selig Harrison, director of the Asia program at the Center for International Policy in Washington, reported on his four-day talks with North Korean officials in the *Financial Times*.

"Let me make clear that we denounce al-Qaeda, we oppose all forms of terrorism and we will never transfer our nuclear material to others. Our nuclear program is solely for our self-defense," said North Korean Foreign Minister Paik Nam Soon. "We denounce al-Qaeda for the barbaric attack of 9/11, which was a terrible tragedy and inflicted a great shock to America. Bush is using that shock to turn the American people against us, but the truth is that we want and need your friendship," he added.

Korean People's Army spokesman Gen. Ri Chan Bok said North Korea's "nuclear deterrent" is targeted at the United States, not North Korea's neighbors.

"We don't mind the possession of nuclear weapons by Russia and China, because they're not a threat to us," Ri said. "Although Japan is not friendly, I don't know whether Japan is developing nuclear weapons or not, but in any case, our nuclear deterrent is not against Japan or anyone else, just against the United States," he added.

Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye Gwan repeated his country's offer to freeze its nuclear program in exchange for support including energy aid, an end to U.S. economic sanctions and North Korea's removal from the U.S. list of nations that sponsor terrorism. He said that a "freeze" meant that "we would not enlarge the stockpile," and that "the amount frozen would depend on what the United States is prepared to do."

Kim would not give specific information about North Korea's nuclear arsenal (see [GSN](#), April 29).

"That's a confidential military issue," he said. "But remember that the bomb dropped by the U.S. at Nagasaki was made after four months of preparation. It's now a half century later, and we have more up-to-date technologies, so you can come to your own conclusions on this matter," he added.

Kim Yong Nam, president of the Supreme People's Assembly and leader Kim Jong Il's second in command, said he believes U.S. President George W. Bush is delaying resolution of the nuclear standoff due to preoccupation with Iraq and the November elections.

"But time is not on his side," Kim Yong Nam said. "We are going to use this time 100 percent effectively to strengthen our nuclear deterrent both quantitatively and qualitatively. Why doesn't he accept our proposal to dismantle our program completely and verifiably through simultaneous steps by both sides?" he added (Selig Harrison, *Financial Times*, May 4).

Meanwhile, South Korean officials traveled to Pyongyang for three days of cabinet-level discussions beginning tomorrow on the nuclear standoff, the Associated Press reported.

South Korean Unification Minister Jeong Se-hyun said he would "advise (North Korea) that results must come out of the third round of six-nation talks" (Soo-Jeong Lee, Associated Press/*Kansas City Star*, May 4).

In addition, China's special envoy for North Korea, Ning Fuqui, met with U.S. officials in Washington to discuss the working group scheduled to meet May 12 in Beijing (Agence France-Presse/*SpaceWar.com*, May 3).

Reuters

North Korea Crisis Talks End on 'Wholesome' Note

By Jack Kim and John Ruwitch – 14 May 2004

BEIJING (Reuters) - Six-party talks on Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions ended in the Chinese capital on Friday snagged on the stark differences between North Korea and the United States.

But a South Korean official said the three days of discussions ended on a "wholesome" note, suggesting there had been no breakdown.

The open-ended inaugural working-group talks, bringing together host China, the two Koreas, the United States, Russia and Japan, are intended to pave the way for higher-level talks by the end of June on ending North Korea's nuclear programs.

A North Korean delegate said earlier that his government could not go ahead with talks unless the United States dropped its demands for a complete dismantling of its atomic arms programs. Pak Myong-kuk was talking to reporters in a hastily called news conference outside the high walls of the North's embassy in the early hours of the morning.

The hermit state's reiteration of its long-held position underscored remarks by Russia's envoy on Thursday that he saw no chance of a breakthrough at the second-tier talks and China's view that major differences persisted between the protagonists.

A U.S. embassy spokeswoman said Washington's policy had not changed. "The U.S. objective remains a complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement (CVID) of North Korea's nuclear program," she said.

The nuclear crisis erupted in October 2002 when U.S. officials said North Korea had disclosed it was working on a secret program to enrich uranium for weapons, in violation of an international agreement.

North Korea, which denied the disclosure, then pulled out of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, expelled U.N. inspectors and took a plutonium plant out of mothballs.

North Korea's Pak said Pyongyang was prepared to discuss the scope, timing and length of a freeze of its nuclear activities and methods of verifying it.

"But the United States repeated its position that it would be willing to discuss the problem only under the precondition that we pledge a CVID," Pak said.

"We expressed the position that we would not be able to continue discussing a freeze for compensation," Pak said of the talks. But he left the door open for further discussions, saying Pyongyang would continue the process with patience.

North Korea's deputy delegate to the United Nations said the best way to resolve the standoff with the United States would be to replace the 51-year-old Korean War armistice with a peace treaty.

Han Song-ryol told USA Today in a interview his country would hold on to nuclear weapons unless "all the countries with troops on the Korean peninsula" reached a permanent peace.

In Seoul, South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon said his government was surprised and discouraged by Pak's statements.

"However we were a little bit relieved by the statement that, although they have some strong reservations and opposition to the American position on CVID, the North Koreans would continue attending the working group," he told the Asia Society.

Host China, one of the few countries to maintain relatively close ties with the isolated North, has said repeatedly that it is opposed to nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula, but is also keen to see Washington make concessions.

With a U.S. presidential election due in November, however, Washington may be unwilling to make compromises, analysts say. (Additional reporting by Jonathan Ansfield in Beijing and Alan Wheatley in Seoul).

North Korea Decries U.S. Nuke Demands

By Audra Ang – 14 May 2004

BEIJING - U.S. and North Korean envoys held a rare one-on-one meeting Friday, and the North denied claims that Pakistan provided it with uranium enrichment technology, a North Korean official said at the end of three days of nuclear talks.

There was no immediate word on whether envoys made progress on the North's demand for aid in exchange for freezing its nuclear program. The United States and its allies say assistance will come only after North Korea pledges to dismantle the program completely - a stance that the North rejected earlier Friday as "humiliating."

The six-nation "working level" talks held in the Chinese capital ended without setting a date for a third round of high-level talks, said Pak Myong Kuk, a member of the North's delegation. He said that date would be set later "through diplomatic channels."

"The talks are over," Pak told reporters outside the North Korean Embassy.

The U.S. Embassy in Beijing had no comment. China's Foreign Ministry said the talks would officially close Saturday but wouldn't give any other details.

The head of Russia's delegation, Valery Sukhinin, told the Itar-Tass news agency that new high-level talks would take place before July, following one more round of working-level talks.

Other participants in the talks are South Korea and Japan.

In the one-one-one meeting Friday, the United States told North Korea about claims that Pakistan had provided the North with uranium enrichment technology, Pak said.

"Such information is false," Pak said. "As we have said before, there were only missile deals between us and Pakistan."

The former head of Pakistan's nuclear program, Abdul Qadeer Khan, said in February that he had transferred sensitive technology to North Korea, Iran and Libya.

"The United States fabricated claims based on false information," Pak said. He said Washington was trying to create an "anti-North Korea atmosphere."

The talks this week were meant to work out technical details and help create an agenda for new high-level negotiations. Host China says it hopes those talks can take place by July.

In a separate announcement Friday, Japan said Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi will travel to North Korea for wide-ranging talks with leader Kim Jong Il on May 22. The discussions will include the nuclear issue.

The dispute erupted in October 2002 when the United States said North Korea admitted operating a secret nuclear program in violation of a 1994 agreement.

The issue of uranium technology has been a key sticking point in the talks.

North Korea says it has a nuclear weapons program based on plutonium, but denies American claims that it also has a second secret program based on highly enriched uranium, which can be used to make bombs.

Washington is insisting that North Korea pledge to give up both programs as part of a comprehensive settlement - a condition the North rejects.

North Korea reportedly demanded aid in exchange for freezing the nuclear program at the start of this week's talks.

Early Friday, the North angrily accused the United States of refusing to discuss energy or economic assistance.

The U.S. position "is the kind of humiliating measure that can only be imposed on a country defeated in a war," said the earlier statement, also read by Pak to reporters who were summoned to the North's embassy.

But still, Pak said, the North promised to "maintain patience" and stick to the "six-party process with patience."

Responding to the North's complaints, a Japanese government spokesman said diplomats were trying to persuade it to accept the notion of permanently scrapping the program.

Negotiations are "now at the stage of fully explaining why this principle has been established internationally and is needed, how to achieve it and how other countries are doing so," spokesman Hiroyuki Hosoda said in Tokyo.

U.N. Chief: N. Korea Is Security Problem

By Edith M. Lederer – 14 May 2004

NEW YORK - North Korea poses the world's No. 1 security problem, and the way the international community responds to its nuclear program will be an important precedent, the U.N. nuclear chief said Friday.

Mohamed ElBaradei, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, said North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons "sends the worst signal to the would-be proliferators" that if they accelerate their weapons programs, they will be "immune" and powerful countries will negotiate with them.

"We need to make sure that that is not the lesson that people would learn from North Korea," he said. "I think it's the No. 1 international security concern. The way we deal with it, the way the international community responds to North Korea, is very important for the future precedent-setting."

During an hour-long question-and-answer session at the Council on Foreign Relations, ElBaradei addressed the key issues on the IAEA's agenda, including Iran, Libya and Pakistan.

The United States and other nations accuse Iran of having a covert nuclear weapons program and are pushing the United Nations to impose sanctions. Iran said last month it gave the IAEA the complete story about traces of weapons-grade uranium and documents pertaining to advanced centrifuges that could be used to produce atomic bombs. It also says it has suspended uranium enrichment and stopped building centrifuges.

ElBaradei, who is to present an assessment of Iran's nuclear activities to the IAEA board of governors in June, said his inspectors "are getting all the access we want, which is good news, but we still need additional information."

"We don't have proof so far that they have done any weaponization, nor have we seen that they have enriched uranium to the military level," ElBaradei said.

"If you ask me whether they have the know-how to develop highly enriched uranium, the answer is yes," he said.

He accused North Korea of never complying with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and criticized the U.N. Security Council for never condemning Pyongyang's withdrawal from the treaty in January 2003.

The nuclear dispute flared in October 2002 when U.S. officials said North Korea admitted it had a clandestine nuclear program in violation of a 1994 agreement with Washington. The United States and its allies suspended fuel shipments promised under the 1994 deal, and Pyongyang retaliated by expelling U.N. monitors, restarting nuclear fuel facilities and withdrawing from the treaty.

ElBaradei said North Korea used loopholes in the 1994 agreement and the control system aimed at banning trade in nuclear materials to start a weapons program. It also developed a second track of highly enriched uranium production, he said.

Pakistan admitted in February that its leading nuclear scientist, Abdul Qadeer Khan, passed technology to Iran, Libya and North Korea. ElBaradei said the IAEA's priority now was to determine who was involved.

"It spread all over the place," he said. "We are now getting good cooperation from the Pakistani government in trying to help us resolve some issues in Iran, in Libya, and understand the full extent of the black market."

On Libya, ElBaradei said he believes Moammar Gadhafi's decision to stop programs for developing weapons of mass destruction was a result of broad changes in the international landscape rather than the Iraq war.

"I think he has concluded that it's in their interest to regularize relationships in the West," partly because years of sanction have hurt Libya's economy, he said.

Reuters

Powell Urges Patience on North Korea Talks

14 May 2004

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Secretary of State Colin Powell said on Friday six-party talks over North Korea's nuclear program were "working" and he urged patience with the process.

Speaking as another round of the talks ended in Beijing, Powell acknowledged no breakthrough was achieved but said the negotiators had three days of "good open discussions."

"So the six-party process is continuing to work. It's work in which we have to be patient and keep applying the pressure," he told a news conference after a Group of Eight foreign ministers meeting in Washington.

Powell's call for patience seemed at odds with reports that the Bush administration is working on a new intelligence estimate that would formally find the North's program is more advanced and threatening than previously thought.

Two weeks ago, U.S. officials said that while the administration was still debating these issues, some officials believe Pyongyang has manufactured as many as eight nuclear weapons as part of a plutonium program and that a covert highly enriched uranium program could be operational by 2007.

This is up from the one or two weapons that is the formal U.S. estimate at this time.

Although the six-way talks that ended Friday remained snagged over stark differences between the North and the United States, the parties agreed to keep up the dialogue.

At the G8 news conference, Powell said all parties except Pyongyang "are committed to the need for North Korea to have a complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of their nuclear weapons programs, their nuclear programs."

"And we have made it clear to North Korea, once again, that there's no hostile intent or aggressive action coming from any of us, especially from the United States," he said.

Powell restated the U.S. commitment to a "process of dialogue and discussion" if the North agreed to freeze its nuclear program. The parties to the talks also include China, South Korea, Japan and Russia.

Associated Press

N. Korea Talks Center on Dismantling Nukes

By Audra Ang – 15 May 2004

BEIJING - The United States' insistence that North Korea commit to dismantling its nuclear program before asking for aid was the "basic hurdle" in three days of low-level talks this week, the North's chief delegate said Saturday.

The U.S. envoy to the six-nation talks, Joseph DeTrani, struck a different tone, calling the discussions that ended Friday a "good meeting." When asked if progress had been made, he answered: "Yes, definitely," but did not elaborate.

North Korea's chief delegate, Ri Gun, said negotiators supported Pyongyang's bid for aid in exchange for freezing the program. Washington says assistance will come after a freeze only if the North already has committed to "complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantling" - what diplomats call CVID.

"One thing that has been confirmed is that there is a shared view that we must get compensation when we freeze our nuclear weapons development plan," Ri said to reporters at the Beijing airport as he prepared to board a flight home to Pyongyang.

"But the United States kept demanding our promise of CVID, and there has been a shared view that this is the basic hurdle in discussions," he said.

Ri added: "We will, however, continue to participate in the talk process with patience."

The discussions were meant to resolve technical issues and help create an agenda for a third round of high-level negotiations.

China said participants affirmed their plans to hold those talks by the end of June and would hold one more lower-level technical meeting before that.

On Friday, U.S. and North Korean officials held rare one-on-one talks and the North denied U.S. claims that Pakistan had provided it with uranium enrichment technology, according to Pak Myong Kuk, a member of the North's delegation.

The former head of Pakistan's nuclear program, Abdul Qadeer Khan, said in February that he had transferred sensitive technology to North Korea, Iran and Libya.

China's delegate, Ning Fukui, appealed Saturday for participants to push ahead with the talks.

"It is the hope of the Chinese side that all parties could hold consultations in a flexible, practical and patient manner, and explore ways to settle the issues," the official Xinhua News Agency quoted Ning as saying.

Two previous rounds of high-level talks have failed to settle the standoff, which flared in October 2002 when the United States said North Korea admitted operating a secret nuclear program in violation of a 1994 agreement.

A key sticking point is the issue of uranium technology, which the U.S. claims the North uses in a second secret program. Pyongyang has said it has only one nuclear weapons program based on plutonium.

Washington has demanded that Pyongyang commit to giving up both projects as part of a comprehensive settlement - a condition North Korea rejects.

China Says Long Way to Go in North Korea Talks

15 May 2004

BEIJING (Reuters) - China put a brave face on six-way talks aimed at solving the North Korean nuclear crisis on Saturday but said much work remained to be done.

North Korea, the United States, South Korea, Japan, China and Russia agreed to more working-level discussions and a third round of full-fledged six-party talks by the end of June, but little else when their three days of second-tier discussions in Beijing ended on Friday.

"There is still a long way to go to settle the Korean nuclear issue," Xinhua news agency quoted Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo as telling delegates on Saturday.

"But if all sides, with full sincerity, enough patience and confidence, try to enhance trust and settle suspicion, they can expand consensus and push forward the six-party talks."

North Korea, in its first reaction to the talks, blamed the United States for the lack of progress but said Pyongyang would continue to negotiate.

The North Korean Foreign Ministry said a majority at the talks had supported Pyongyang's "reward for freeze" proposal to resolve the standoff.

The crisis erupted in October 2002 when U.S. officials said North Korea had said it was working on a secret program to enrich uranium for weapons, in violation of an international agreement.

North Korea, which subsequently denied the disclosure, then pulled out of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, expelled U.N. inspectors and took a plutonium plant out of mothballs.

"The U.S. side made an absurd assertion about the enriched uranium program, its own fabrication," a North Korean ministry spokesman told the official KCNA news agency on Saturday.

"This clearly proves that the U.S. does not wish to see any progress in the solution of the nuclear issue at the six-party talks before the presidential election slated for late this year in a bid to win it without difficulty."

The spokesman said no one supported the U.S. stand at the talks.

In Washington, Secretary of State Colin Powell said on Friday the talks were working and all parties except Pyongyang "are committed to the need for North Korea to have a complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of their nuclear weapons programs, their nuclear programs."

He told a news conference after a Group of Eight foreign ministers meeting that patience was needed.

"We have made it clear to North Korea, once again, that there's no hostile intent or aggressive action coming from any of us, especially from the United States," he said.

Powell restated the U.S. commitment to a "process of dialogue and discussion" if the North agreed to freeze its nuclear program.

The North Korean spokesman said the United States had "put a brake on discussion of the issue" of compensation for a freeze of the North's nuclear program. He said "meaningless delaying tactics" would prompt the North to strengthen its nuclear force.

Global Security Newswire

North Korea Light-Water Reactor to Remain Suspended

21 May 2004

Construction of a light-water reactor in Kumho, North Korea, is to remain suspended, despite discussions between Pyongyang and Washington about the possibility of restarting the project, Reuters reported today.

The board of the U.S.-led Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, which manages the project, said after a one-day meeting in New York yesterday that the site of two prospective reactors remains under a one-year freeze that began in December 2003.

"The board continues to monitor developments including diplomatic discussions," KEDO spokesman Roland Tricot said. "The board decision on suspension remains in place until Dec. 1, 2004," he added.

In talks last week, Pyongyang offered to freeze its nuclear programs in exchange for the organization resuming construction. The State Department said the United States rejected the proposal (Reuters/Yahoo!News, May 21).

North Korean nuclear trade exposed

IAEA team finds Pyongyang sold uranium to Libya for bomb

by Ian Traynor – 24 May 2004

North Korea supplied uranium for Libya's secret nuclear bomb programme, UN investigators have established, raising alarm about the heightened risk of so-called rogue states or terrorist groups buying nuclear materials.

Western diplomats in Vienna close to the International Atomic Energy Agency confirmed yesterday that the IAEA investigation into the Pakistan-led black market in nuclear materials and technology had found that 1.7 tonnes of slightly enriched uranium hexafluoride uncovered in Libya when Colonel Muammar Gadafy voluntarily scrapped his nuclear project last December was sent from North Korea. It was initially suspected that the material had been obtained via private traders.

"There was a direct North Korea-Libya connection through the Khan network," said a diplomat close to the agency, referring to Abdul Qadeer Khan, the Pakistani scientist who led the secret nuclear trading network. "This is the first time that there is evidence that North Korea has sold nuclear materials to another country."

The discovery, reported yesterday by the New York Times and confirmed by diplomats in Vienna, was made recently, the source added. It indicates that North Korea is the first state known to be involved in the illicit nuclear trade.

Officials at the agency declined to comment publicly on the North Korea case, although they did not deny that the Libyan uranium was of North Korean provenance.

The discovery by IAEA investigators does not reflect well on British or US intelligence, who spent nine months last year negotiating secretly with the Libyans to get Col Gadafy to scrap his weapons of mass destruction programmes. The bargain was sealed with a dramatic announcement. Col Gadafy lost his pariah status in return for surrendering his programmes and information.

The Americans spirited the nuts and bolts of the Libyan nuclear project out of Libya to the US, including the uranium in question, enrichment centrifuge equipment bought on the black market to refine the uranium to weapons grade, and a nuclear bomb blueprint.

But the news of the North Korean involvement has come not from the US or Britain but from the IAEA's investigation, led by Finnish inspector Olli Heinonen, of the Khan network.

A western diplomat with extensive knowledge of North Korea and its secret weapons programmes said that he was not surprised by the news since Col Gadafy was a principal supplier of hard currency to the impoverished Pyongyang regime, mainly through engineering and medical contracts.

He stressed that North Korea had done nothing illegal in supplying minimally enriched uranium to Libya. Pyongyang kicked UN nuclear inspectors out of the country, cut relations with the IAEA, abrogated its pledges under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, and said it was building a bomb at the end of 2002.

The main row over the North Korean bomb project concerns weapons-grade plutonium retrieved from spent nuclear fuel rods in power stations. But the supplies to Libya appear to confirm US charges that the North Koreans also have a uranium mining and enrichment project that could deliver bomb-grade material.

"The North Koreans are obviously mining, refining uranium and selling it to others," said the diplomatic source close to the IAEA. "This is worrying since they have the capability for enriching uranium."

Given that Pyongyang supplied Libya, investigators are worried that it may also have supplied other clients, possibly including terrorist groups, and that it could also have sold on a more lethal form of uranium.

The exposure of the Khan network threw up evidence of cooperation between Pakistan and North Korea in the nuclear sphere. The expert on North Korea also believes that Pyongyang has been involved in Iran, the prime international suspect in the illicit nuclear wargames rackets.

The Iranians at the weekend handed over to the IAEA what they said was a full dossier on their nuclear projects ahead of an IAEA meeting in three weeks which had been due to focus on the Iranian programme, but will also now be preoccupied with the North Korean trading.

VEILIGHEIDSRaad RESOLUTIE

DOCUMENTEN

Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Antwoord van de heer Bot, minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, op vragen van het lid Koenders over een resolutie van de Veiligheidsraad van de VN inzake non-proliferatie.

DVB/NN-156/04 - 13 april 2004

Vraag 1

Bent u op de hoogte van berichten over de grote zorgen die bestaan bij internationale juristen over de inhoud van de resolutie inzake non-proliferatie die in voorbereiding is bij de leden van de Veiligheidsraad?¹

Antwoord

Het artikel van Inter Press Service waarin zorgen worden geuit over de inhoud van een ontwerp-resolutie inzake non-proliferatie is mij bekend.

Vraag 2

Heeft u inzage in de concept-resolutie en bent u betrokken bij de opstelling van de resolutie?² Steunt u de inhoud van de concept-resolutie? Zo ja, waarom? Zo nee, waarom niet?

Vraag 3

Deelt u de zorgen van de niet-permanente leden van de Veiligheidsraad, van experts in internationaal recht en van anderen over de inhoud van de concept-resolutie?

Vraag 7

Bent u bereid om bij de leden van de Veiligheidsraad, waaronder de VS, erop aan te dringen tegemoet te komen aan de zorgen over de concept-resolutie?

Antwoord

De Nederlandse regering heeft inzage in de thans voorliggende ontwerp-resolutie van 24 maart 2004. Dit ontwerp is tot stand gekomen in overleg tussen de vijf permanente leden van de Veiligheidsraad en is verspreid onder de overige leden van de Veiligheidsraad. De regering is niet betrokken geweest bij de opstelling van de ontwerp-resolutie. Zij steunt evenwel de inhoud ervan, omdat deze universeel bindende resolutie een versterking betekent van de multilaterale aanpak van de proliferatie van massavernietigingswapens, een ook door de regering erkend gevaar voor de internationale vrede en veiligheid.

De thans voorliggende concept-resolutie zal binnen de Veiligheidsraad worden besproken. Eventuele zorgen van niet-permanente leden van de Veiligheidsraad zullen in dat forum besproken worden.

De Nederlandse regering deelt niet de zorgen van experts in het internationaal recht zoals verwoord in het in vraag 1 aangehaalde persbericht.

Vraag 4

Hoe verhoudt zich volgens u deze resolutie met de totstandkoming van internationale wetgeving op het terrein van non-proliferatie? Deelt u de mening dat de nu voorliggende ontwerp-resolutie overige internationale wetgeving ondermijnt? Zo nee, waarom niet?

Antwoord

De regering deelt de mening niet dat de ontwerp-resolutie van 24 maart 2004 internationale wetgeving zou ondermijnen. Zij acht het juist positief dat de ontwerp-resolutie onder Hoofdstuk VII van het Handvest valt. Op grond van onder andere Artikel 25 van het Handvest zijn alle staten gebonden aan resoluties die onder dit Hoofdstuk worden aangenomen. Het voordeel van deze resolutie is dat zij voor eenieder bindend is, hetgeen van belang is in deze kwestie die duidelijk de internationale vrede en veiligheid betreft.

Vraag 5

Vindt u het van belang dat in de resolutie ook de besluitvorming en verplichtingen in het kader van het Non-Proliferatie Verdrag benadrukt worden? Zo nee, waarom niet?

Vraag 6

Bent u bereid om in het kader van de EU te komen tot een evenwichtige resolutie die ook de verplichtingen volgens het Non-Proliferatie Verdrag benadrukt?

Antwoord

De Nederlandse regering is voorstander van opname in de ontwerpresolutie van tekst die steun uitspreekt voor het Non-proliferatieverdrag en andere multilaterale verdragen die gericht zijn op de bestrijding van proliferatie van NBC-wapens of de onrechtmatige verkrijging ervan, en waarin tevens het belang wordt onderstreept van de volledige implementatie door staten van deze verdragen. In het thans voorliggende ontwerp is dit het geval.

De Nederlandse regering is van mening dat de thans voorliggende ontwerpresolutie evenwichtig is en zal binnen de EU streven naar brede Europese steun voor deze ontwerpresolutie.

Noten:

1) Inter Press Service (IPS) News, UN Journal, 27 februari j.l., 'US pushes UN to endorse preemptive action against suspected WMDs'.

2) Aanhangsel-Handelingen nr. 909, vergaderjaar 2003-2004.

UN Security Council

Speakers in Security Council debate on weapons of mass destruction express doubts over content of proposed non-proliferation text

Concerns over draft's implications balanced by widespread agreement with intent

Press release SC/8070 – 22 April 2004

Delegates in today's open Security Council debate expressed doubts about the content and implications of a draft resolution seeking to prevent the proliferation of mass destruction weapons to non-State actors, despite widespread support for its intent.

Among the many speakers voicing support for the draft, ahead of anticipated Council action on it, was the representative of the United States, who said that terrorist groups, such as Al Qaeda, had shown a readiness to kill thousands and had not hidden their desire to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD). If they did acquire the weapons, they could bring destruction and suffering on a scale the world could scarcely imagine. The threat being addressed by the Council was both "clear and present", and the proposed resolution was the fastest way to address it. The text was forward-looking and set the standard for future behaviour by States.

France's representative said that in the present era of "wholesale terrorism", with the most dangerous technology becoming easily available through trafficking, the international community could not remain passive. Faced with a serious threat, the Council had a role to play and was doing so through the proposed resolution. Measures to counter proliferation fell upon States and, while the Council could not take their place, it could decide that they must undertake their responsibilities. It was setting the goals, but leaving each State to determine what penalties and measures to adopt.

The representative of the Russian Federation said terrorists would stop at nothing in their desire to acquire WMD components or even produce them. Most dangerous was the black markets for those weapons. The draft resolution highlighted the evolution of international cooperation in the non-proliferation field, and its co-sponsors, which included the Russian delegation, were not seeking to supersede global disarmament and non-proliferation treaties. The Security Council was not only entitled to take appropriate measures to counter the threat of WMD proliferation, but was obligated to do so and needed full support.

Among the divergent views expressed, however, were those of Council member Pakistan, whose representative acknowledged that his country had recently detected and dismantled a proliferation network involving its own nationals and those of several other countries. He said the existing treaty regime could address most of the threats. As a nuclear-weapon State, Pakistan had established effective command and control and physical security of its nuclear assets and sites. But the draft raised some doubts, questions and concerns, first among which was whether the Security Council had the right to assume the role of prescribing legislative action by Member States.

The debate continued among the wider United Nations membership, as India's delegate voiced similar concerns over the Council's increasing tendency in recent years to assume new and wider powers of legislation on behalf of the international community. The Council was seeking both to define the non-proliferation regime and monitor its implementation. Its exercise of legislative functions, combined with recourse to Chapter VII mandates, under which the present text would be voted, could disrupt the balance of power between itself and the General Assembly. Further, the exclusive focus on non-proliferation did a disservice to the principle of the mutually reinforcing link between disarmament and non-proliferation, he added.

South Africa's representative, whose delegation had requested the debate together with those of Canada, Mexico, New Zealand, Sweden and Switzerland, said that any far-reaching assumption of authority by the Council to enact global legislation requiring each Member State to modify its national legal system and policies would be unjust and unsustainable. It was a cause for concern that the draft contained only a passing reference to disarmament, despite the fact that chemical and biological weapons had been banned by international law and despite the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to eliminate their nuclear arsenals. Also, the draft only addressed non-State actors, while ignoring the international security threat posed by State proliferation.

Also speaking today were representatives of Council members the Philippines, Brazil, Algeria, China, Spain, Angola, Chile, United Kingdom, Benin, Romania and Germany.

The Council also heard from the representatives of Canada, Peru, New Zealand, Singapore, Ireland (on behalf of the European Union), Sweden, Japan, Switzerland, Israel, Cuba, Indonesia, Iran, Syria, Egypt, Malaysia (on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement), Mexico, Belarus, Norway, Australia, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Argentina, Austria, Jordan, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Nicaragua, Nepal, Nigeria, Tajikistan, Albania, Namibia, Kuwait and Thailand.

Beginning at 9:47 a.m., the meeting was suspended at 1:05 p.m. It resumed at 3:06 p.m. and adjourned at 4:46 p.m.

Statements te vinden op: <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sc8070.doc.htm>

UN News Centre

Threats from non-state users of WMDs discussed in UN Security Council

22 April 2004

The United Nations Security Council held an open debate today on the threat to international security posed by weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), especially if they should pass through black markets and fall into private hands.

In the debate that attracted about 50 speakers, Ambassador James Cunningham of the United States said a draft resolution to be adopted in the coming days responded to the growing threat that the proliferation of WMDs and the means to deliver them posed to global security.

The 15 April draft of the text, a work in progress, would ask Member States to take precautions, review domestic legislation and adopt new legislation to keep the means of making WMDs away from private sectors, or non-state actors.

If non-state actors were able to get such weapons, they could blackmail and threaten entire regions, Mr. Cunningham said. Organizations, such as al-Qaida, which carried out the attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001, had not hidden their desire to acquire WMDs. If such groups got them, they could bring destruction and suffering on an unimaginable scale.

Ambassador Gennady Gatilov of the Russian Federation said his government was one of the initiators of the draft resolution because the problem of the proliferation of WMDs was emerging as one of the primary threats to international peace and security.

Terrorists would stop at nothing to acquire the components for WMDs. In a previous resolution, the Council had highlighted the close relationship between international terrorism, organized crime and illegal trafficking in chemical, biological and other materials and had begun coordinating international efforts to strengthen a global response, he said.

Mr. Gatilov supported the establishment of a Security Council committee to monitor implementation of the eventual resolution.

Ambassador Wan Guangya of China, noting that his proposals were already reflected in the latest draft, said the Council meeting would help improve the text for a security environment in which it was vital to strengthen international cooperation and improve the non-proliferation regime to respond effectively to threats of terrorism.

To ensure the success of non-proliferation efforts, the text would have to recognize the legitimate right of countries to use such technologies for peaceful purposes, he said.

The world was now in an "era of wholesale terrorism," when the most dangerous technology was becoming available, said Ambassador Jean-Marc de La Sablière of France. The international community could not remain passive.

France supported inserting references to disarmament obligations in the preamble of the text and enhancing the monitoring mechanism, he said.

Bringing in such issues as disarmament would risk deadlock and treading on the toes of other international disarmament bodies, said Ambassador Adam Thomson of the United Kingdom.

The text promoted the strengthening of multilateral treaties and did not rule out future arrangements to deal with any gaps in the international framework. It was about a cooperative approach to tackling non-state actors, he added.

US State Department

U.S. urges adoption of resolution on weapons of mass destruction

Ambassador Cunningham's U.N. Security Council remarks on WMD

23 April 2004

The U.S.-sponsored draft resolution on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is the quickest way to stem the threat that terrorist groups will acquire the deadly weapons, U.S. Ambassador James Cunningham said April 22.

The resolution, Cunningham said during a public Security Council meeting, "responds to what all agree is a real and growing threat to global peace and security: the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their means of delivery and the ability to produce them."

If terrorists, non-state actors and outlaw regimes were to possess weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them, the ambassador said, "they would be able to blackmail and create chaos in entire regions."

"The international community has also become aware of the existence of sophisticated, international black-market efforts to buy and sell the plans, technologies and the materials to build these weapons, making them available to the highest bidder," Cunningham said.

More than 50 speakers appeared before the council to discuss the resolution, first proposed by President Bush in his speech to the opening of the U.N. General Assembly in September 2003, when he called for a resolution requiring nations to criminalize the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

U.S. officials have emphasized that the fundamental purpose of the draft resolution is to address urgently a serious gap in international law -- that is, there are no measures to prevent WMD and materials that could be used to make them from falling into the hands of non-state actors.

Cunningham stated that "this resolution is in no way meant to undermine, undercut or otherwise weaken the existing treaties and regimes.

"It asks member states to take precautions to ensure that weapons of mass destruction and their technology are properly controlled. It asks member states to review their domestic controls and to strengthen them, where need be ... to review domestic legislation and adopt appropriate and effective laws to keep dangerous items out of the hands of non-state actors."

A first draft was negotiated and agreed upon by the five permanent members of the Security Council -- China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and the United States - that have veto power, and then discussed with the 10 non-permanent members of the Council -- Algeria, Angola, Benin, Brazil, Chile, Germany, Pakistan, Philippines, Romania, and Spain. Other U.N. member states had an opportunity to comment on a revised text at the April 21 meeting.

A vote is expected in the coming weeks.

Following is the text of the ambassador's remarks as delivered:

USUN PRESS RELEASE # 59 (04)

April 22, 2004

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Statement by Ambassador James B. Cunningham, Deputy United States Representative to the United Nations, on the Draft Non-Proliferation Resolution, in the Security Council, April 22, 2004

Thank you, Mr. President.

And thank you for organizing this discussion today, and for giving us an opportunity to address the entire membership on this vitally important subject and on the draft resolution before the Council.

In September of last year, President Bush came to the General Assembly and said that because proliferators would use any route or channel open to them, we need the broadest possible cooperation to stop them. And he asked the Security Council to help by adopting a resolution that would be effective in the fight against proliferation and against terror.

The same day, Secretary General Annan, in his address to the General Assembly, said that all of us know there are new threats that must be faced, or perhaps old threats in new and dangerous combinations, new forms of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. And he added that terrorism is not a problem only for rich countries: ask the people of Bali, or Bombay, or Nairobi or Casablanca. We agree with that assessment. A terrorist's use of weapons of mass destruction would punish all of us, strong and weak alike.

This resolution that the Security Council will adopt in the coming days responds to what all agree is a real and growing threat to global peace and security: the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery, and the ability to produce them. This is especially relevant with non-state actors, including terrorists. For non-state actors and outlaw regimes to possess these weapons and the means to deliver them, they would be able to blackmail and create chaos in entire regions.

Terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda have shown their willingness to kill thousands, and they do not hide their desire to acquire weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery in order to increase that number many times over. If such a group acquired these weapons, they could be used to bring sudden disaster and suffering on a scale that we can scarcely imagine. And the problem is not just with the weapons themselves; it's with the ability to produce them.

The international community has also become aware of the existence of sophisticated, international black-market efforts to buy and sell the plans, technologies, and the materials to build these weapons, making them available to the highest bidder. Thus the threat the Security Council is addressing is both clear and present.

The resolution under discussion has a focus that is forward-looking; it sets a standard for how nations should act in the future, rather than judging past actions. It reinforces an objective of vital interest to all: that proliferation cannot be tolerated.

We must act now to stem this threat; and the resolution soon to be adopted by the Council is the fastest means to address it.

It asks member states to take precautions to ensure that weapons of mass destruction and their technology are properly controlled. It asks member states to review their domestic controls and to strengthen them, where need be. It also asks member states to review domestic legislation and adopt appropriate and effective laws to keep dangerous items out of the hands of non-state actors, those not authorized by the state.

The goal of this resolution is to halt dangerous traffic by directing member states to make illegal the unauthorized trade in these weapons, their means of delivery, and the plans, technology and materials needed to develop and build them. It asks them to do this by strengthening their national export and transshipment controls, and by providing for the physical protection of sensitive materials within their borders. The desirability of taking these steps, we hope, would be self-apparent.

We have been careful to make clear that this resolution is in no way meant to undermine, undercut or otherwise weaken the existing treaties and regimes. And there is specific language in the resolution to this effect.

The resolution is placed under Chapter VII to send the important political message of the seriousness with which the Council views the threat to international peace and security. It also is placed under Chapter VII because the Council is acting under that chapter and levying binding requirements. But the resolution is not about enforcement.

As others have noted, the current text of the resolution has been revised. The current text is dated April 15. Revisions to the original text introduced by the co-sponsors reflect the useful discussions we have had in the Council, and the many informal exchanges co-sponsors have had with the wider U.N. membership.

The text has been improved by the opinions and ideas shared with us. For example, the revised text includes the recognition of the importance of disarmament obligations.

And while preserving language that makes clear the resolution is not meant to undermine or be at cross-purposes with existing treaties and regimes, it also makes clear that member states not party to treaties or regimes will not be forced through this resolution to adopt them.

Language on the usefulness and necessity of peaceful dialogue has also been made more prominent.

While discussion on a follow-up mechanism continues, I would note that the follow-up committee will establish its own program of work upon its creation, and that this is standard practice for Security Council committees. As is also standard practice, it will be composed of all members and operate under consensus.

I'd also call attention to the language in Operative Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the draft; both of these paragraphs have been included in the resolution to make clear that Member States who find they would like assistance in implementing this resolution may voluntarily request it.

To be clear, we are not necessarily expecting that Member States will be able to report the complete implementation of the resolution when they report to the committee.

In conclusion, the United States and the co-sponsors welcome the views that we are receiving and that we will receive further on today. This is an important issue, and we value this discussion ... as part of our ongoing consultations.

Thank you, Mr. President.

US State Department

U.S. hails U.N. resolution on anti-proliferation

Cunningham remarks on Security Council WMD vote

28 April 2004

By adopting a resolution on weapons of mass destruction, the U.N. Security Council is responding appropriately to what all agree is a clear and present threat to global peace and security: the spread to terrorists and black marketeers of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery, U.S. Ambassador James Cunningham said April 28.

The Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution, first proposed by the United States, which requires nations to take technical and legal steps to keep weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their component materials, and delivery systems secure within their borders and away from "non-state" actors.

"The United States appreciates the broad cooperation of all members of the Security Council and the wider membership in improving this resolution and addressing this threat to international peace and security," Cunningham said after the vote.

"The international community now has a solid basis for moving ahead -- working together to deal with this important security issue," he said.

Following is the text of Cunningham's remarks:

(begin text)

USUN PRESS RELEASE No. 66 (04)

April 28, 2004

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Explanation of Vote by Ambassador James B. Cunningham, Deputy U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, on the Non-Proliferation Resolution, in the Security Council, April 28, 2004

Thank you, Mr. President.

In his address to the General Assembly last September, President Bush said that because proliferators would use any route or channel open to them, we need the broadest possible cooperation to stop them. He asked the Security Council to help by adopting a resolution to counter this growing threat. The president called for a resolution that achieved three primary goals: to criminalize the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to ensure that all countries have strong export controls and to secure sensitive materials within each country's borders. The United States is pleased that the important resolution we adopted today fulfills these key goals and that we have adopted it unanimously with all that implies.

In this resolution the Council is responding appropriately to what all agree is a clear and present threat to global peace and security: the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery, especially to non-state actors, including terrorists. Because this threat, and the actions we are taking today, concerns the entire U.N. Membership, the United States and the cosponsors have made major efforts to consult, listen, and take into account the many views expressed. We share a common goal -- to implement the resolution.

Implementation will require states to undertake a variety of steps, both legal and technical, to meet the requirements of the resolution in a manner that best suits their legal systems and procedures. The language in the resolution calls for "effective and appropriate measures" to be taken to meet the requirements set out by the Council; each member state will need to review its laws and to determine what laws or regulations will be necessary to meet the resolution's requirements. Member states are also called upon to appropriately

strengthen control regimes over nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery and related materials. Member states are also asked, through this resolution, to submit a first report assessing their implementation of this resolution within six months to the committee established by the resolution.

The United States recognises, and the resolution clearly states, that some countries may lack the resources to enact and enforce the laws and regulations called for. As the president told the General Assembly last September, we stand ready, as do others as well, to assist countries, as appropriate, that require technical assistance and we encourage others that are able to do so to provide assistance as well.

The resolution clearly states that it will not alter or amend the existing non-proliferation treaty regimes. The steps to be taken by states under the resolution do not take the place of the commitments that they have made in connection with non-proliferation treaty regimes.

The Security Council today is responding unanimously to a threat to international peace and security -- the uncontrolled spread of nuclear, chemical, biological weapons, their means of delivery, and related materials, by non-state actors, including terrorists, seeking to exploit weak export control laws and security measures in a variety of countries. We believe it is essential that all states maintain adequate controls over their nuclear material, equipment and expertise, not just states party to a specific treaty or supplier regime.

In that regard, as called for in the resolution, we urge all countries to work bilaterally, regionally and internationally to take co-operative action to stop, impede, intercept and otherwise prevent the illicit trafficking in these weapons, related materials and their means of delivery. We are pleased that the resolution addresses the importance of such co-operative action. We believe the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), announced by President Bush in Krakow, Poland, on May 31, 2003, almost one year ago, is a valuable initiative in this regard. We are pleased that so many states are working with us to interdict shipments of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, their means of delivery, and related materials. No one nation can meet this challenge alone. We hope that all states will join us in the PSI and other cooperative efforts consistent with national and international legal authorities to stop the flow of these deadly weapons and materials. Halting such traffic is in the interest of all of us.

The United States appreciates the broad co-operation of all members of the Security Council and the wider membership in improving this resolution and addressing this threat to international peace and security. The international community now has a solid basis for moving ahead -- working together to deal with this important security issue.

Thank you, Mr. President.

US State Department

U.N. Security Council unanimously passes resolution on WMD

Measure designed to punish those who sell WMD components, technology

28 April 2004

The 15-member U.N. Security Council unanimously approved a U.S.-backed resolution April 28 that would punish those who traffic in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons components.

The resolution requires all 191 U.N. members to punish any "non-state actors" dealing in weapons of mass destruction parts and technology.

The resolution requires nations to adopt and enforce laws to prevent terrorists and black marketeers from being able to from being able to "manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery."

Following is the text of the U.N. Security Council Resolution:

United Nations Security Council

26 April 2004

France, Romania, Russian Federation, Spain, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America:

Resolution 1540,

The Security Council,

Affirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery,¹ constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Reaffirming, in this context, the Statement of its President adopted at the Council's meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government on 31 January 1992 (S/23500), including the need for all Member States to

fulfill their obligations in relation to arms control and disarmament and to prevent proliferation in all its aspects of all weapons of mass destruction.

Recalling also that the Statement underlined the need for all Member States to resolve peacefully in accordance with the Charter any problems in that context threatening or disrupting the maintenance of regional and global stability,

Affirming its resolve to take appropriate and effective actions against any threat to international peace and security caused by the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery, in conformity with its primary responsibilities, as provided for in the United Nations Charter,

Affirming its support for the multilateral treaties whose aim is to eliminate or prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and the importance for all States parties to these treaties to implement them fully in order to promote international stability,

Welcoming efforts in this contest by multilateral arrangements which contribute to nonproliferation,

Affirming that prevention of proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons should not hamper international cooperation in materials, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes while goals of peaceful utilization should not be used as a cover for proliferation,

Gravely concerned by the threat of terrorism and the risk that non-State actors/¹ such as those identified in the United Nations list established and maintained by the Committee established under Security Council resolution 1267 and those to whom resolution 1373 applies, may acquire, develop, traffic in or use nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery,

Gravely concerned by the threat of illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, and related materials,¹ which adds a new dimension to the issue of proliferation of such weapons and also poses a threat to international peace and security,

Recognizing the need to enhance co-ordination of efforts on national, sub-regional, regional and international levels in order to strengthen a global response to this serious challenge and threat to international security,

Recognizing that most States have undertaken binding legal obligations under treaties to which they are parties, or have made other commitments aimed at preventing the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, and have taken effective measures to account for, secure and physically protect sensitive materials, such as those required by the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and those recommended by the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources,

Recognizing further the urgent need for all States to take additional effective measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery,

Encouraging all Member States to implement fully the disarmament treaties and agreements to which they are party,

Reaffirming the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts,

Determined to facilitate henceforth an effective response to global threats in the area of non-proliferation,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Decides that all States shall refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery;

2. Decides also that all States, in accordance with their national procedures, shall adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-State actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes, as well as attempts to engage in any of the foregoing activities, participate in them as an accomplice, assist or finance them;

3. Decides also that all States shall take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic control to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials and to this end shall:

(a) Develop and maintain appropriate effective measures to account for and secure such items in production, use, storage or transport;

(b) Develop and maintain appropriate effective physical protection measures;

(c) Develop and maintain appropriate effective border controls and law enforcement efforts to detect, deter, prevent and combat, including through international cooperation when necessary, the illicit trafficking and brokering in such items in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law;

(d) Establish, develop, review and maintain appropriate effective national export and trans-shipment controls over such items, including appropriate laws and regulations to control export, transit, trans-shipment and re-

export and controls on providing funds and services related to such export and trans-shipment such as financing, and transporting that would contribute to proliferation, as well as establishing end-user controls; and establishing and enforcing appropriate criminal or civil penalties for violations of such export control laws and regulations;

4. Recognizes the utility in implementing this resolution of effective national control lists and calls upon all Member States, when necessary, to pursue at the earliest opportunity the development of such lists;

5. Recognizes that some States may require assistance in implementing the provisions of this resolution within their territories and invites States in a position to do so to offer assistance as appropriate in response to specific requests to the States lacking the legal and regulatory infrastructure, implementation experience and/or resources for fulfilling the above provisions;

6. Calls upon all States:

(a) To promote the universal adoption and full implementation, and, where necessary, strengthening of multilateral treaties to which they are parties. Whose aim is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons;

(b) To adopt national rules and regulations, where it has not yet been done, to ensure compliance with their commitments under the key multilateral non-proliferation treaties;

(c) To renew and fulfill their commitment to multilateral cooperation, in particular within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, as important means of pursuing and achieving their common objectives in the area of non-proliferation and of promoting international cooperation for peaceful purposes;

(d) To develop appropriate ways to work with and inform industry and the public regarding their obligations under such laws;

7. Calls upon all States to promote dialogue and cooperation on non-proliferation so as to address the threat posed by proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, and their means of delivery;

8. Further to counter that threat, calls upon all States, in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, to take cooperative action to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, their means of delivery, and related materials;

9. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, for a period of no longer than two years, a Committee of the Security Council, consisting of all members of the Council, which will, calling as appropriate on other expertise, report to the Security Council for its examination, on the implementation of this resolution, and to this end calls upon States to present a first report no later than six months from the adoption of this resolution to the Committee on steps they have taken or intend to take to implement this resolution;

10. Expresses its intention to monitor closely the implementation of this resolution and, at the appropriate level, to take further decisions which may be required to this end;

11. Decides that none of the obligations set forth in this resolution shall be interpreted so as to conflict with or alter the rights and obligations of State Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention or alter the responsibilities of the International Atomic Energy Agency or the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons;

12. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

1/Definitions for the purpose of this resolution only:

-- Means of delivery: missiles, rockets and other unmanned systems capable of delivering nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, that are specially designed for such use.

-- Non-State actor: individual or entity, not acting under the lawful authority of any State in conducting activities which come within the scope of this resolution.

-- Related materials: materials, equipment and technology covered by relevant multilateral treaties and arrangements, or included on national control lists, which could be used for the design, development, production or use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery.

BERICHTEN

Washington Post

U.S. Effort on Arms Opposed

Security Council Members Seek to Limit Resolution

UNITED NATIONS, April 19 -- Pakistan, Brazil, Germany and other Security Council members are working to scale back a U.S. initiative meant to halt the spread of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons to terrorist groups, on grounds the proposals could subject governments to sanctions and weaken the international system of disarmament treaties.

Representatives from the governments say they support Washington's goal of outlawing the transfer of weapons of mass destruction to terrorists and renegade arms dealers. But they maintain that a U.S.-sponsored resolution under negotiation in the 15-nation council would impose new legal obligations on all members of the United Nations without their consent.

The diplomatic standoff shows the difficulty in forging new agreements -- even among friendly nations -- aimed at halting the illegal spread of the world's deadliest weapons. It is also a fresh setback for President Bush, who urged the Security Council in a September 2003 address to criminalize the transfer of weapons of mass destruction to terrorists.

The Bush administration maintains that its push for a new U.N. resolution, which would oblige member nations to crack down on the international black market in nuclear components and technology, would fill a gap in a system of treaties and agreements established after World War II to limit the spread of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.

Concerns over the spread of deadly weapons increased this year when Pakistan admitted that Abdul Qadeer Khan, a scientist revered in that country as the father of its nuclear bomb, was at the center of an international network that sold nuclear components to Libya and North Korea.

Pakistan's U.N. ambassador, Munir Akram, has voiced concern that the U.S. resolution could be used in the future as a pretext for imposing sanctions or using military force against governments because of actions by groups beyond those nations' control. "We have got our concerns with regards to our national security," Pakistan's U.N. ambassador, Munir Akram, said in an interview. "We would not like to be asked to do anything that we have not agreed to."

After six months of negotiations, the permanent five members of the Security Council -- the United States, Russia, Britain, France and China -- agreed last month on a draft resolution that would make it a crime to transfer weapons of mass destruction to "non-state actors."

The draft resolution calls on the 191 members of the United Nations to "combat by all means" the spread of weapons of mass destruction to terrorists. If adopted, it will require states to "adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws" to prevent "any non-state actor" from being able to "manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery."

John D. Negroponte, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, and his deputy, James B. Cunningham, are the top U.S. negotiators. They have sought to assure Pakistan and other council members that the resolution is designed to target terrorists, not governments. They have also insisted that failure to comply with the resolution will not lead to economic sanctions or use of force.

"They've given us assurances that this is not an enforcement resolution, that it's only limited to non-state actors," Akram said. "We would like to see that written into the text."

But the resolution would constrain governments' ability to sell components of weapons of mass destruction to other countries, according to some U.S. officials. It "does cover proliferation between states," John R. Bolton, the U.S. undersecretary for nonproliferation, said in an interview.

Pakistan, Brazil, Germany have proposed amendments that would narrow the scope of the U.S. resolution. In a five-page paper outlining it concerns, Pakistan said the language is sufficiently ambiguous to permit a "powerful state" to take it upon itself to interpret and enforce the resolution.

"Do we open the door to a state saying there is proliferation happening in countries X, Y and Z, and we have the right to use force under this resolution?" Akram added.

Others said the U.S. proposals undermine existing treaties.

Germany's U.N. ambassador, Gunter Plueger, said the draft does not mention ongoing disarmament obligations imposed on the five original nuclear states of the Security Council by the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In that way, he said, the U.S. initiative dispenses with the practice of linking proliferation obligations to disarmament. This "would unbalance the whole system of treaty bodies pertaining disarmament and arms control," he said.

Daryl G. Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, called the resolution "a step in the right direction," but said the Bush administration has weakened its own case because it hasn't done more to disarm.

"This resolution is being interpreted as a 'Do as I say, not as I do' diktat, because it's calling on other states to comply with standards that don't necessarily apply to the United States," he said

Brazil has proposed striking language that urges states to strengthen multilateral nonproliferation treaties, provisions that could reinforce the authority of the International Atomic Energy Agency to press for more intrusive international inspections. It has also called for replacing references to the word "proliferation" with language that more narrowly proscribes the activities of non-state proliferators.

Brazil foreswore nuclear arms ambitions in the 1990s, but recently refused IAEA requests to inspect a nuclear enrichment plant in Resende, citing concerns that its designs could fall into the hands of commercial competitors. Brazil's U.N. ambassador, Ronaldo Sardenberg, said that the dispute has no bearing on his position on the U.N. matter.

Global Security Newswire

U.N. Resolution on Weapons of Mass Destruction Sparks Debate

By Jim Wurst – 23 April 2004

UNITED NATIONS — During a Security Council debate yesterday, a wide range of countries found much to praise and criticize in a draft resolution before the council that would require states to ensure terrorists and other “nonstate actors” are denied access to weapons of mass destruction.

There was no disagreement over the premise of the draft — that more needs to be done to ensure terrorists and other nonstate actors do not acquire nuclear, chemical or biological weapons — but there were concerns over whether this resolution was the best way to accomplish that.

The draft would require states to “adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws” to deny weapons of mass destruction, their components and “means of delivery” (such as missiles and drones) to any “nonstate actors.” The primary goal of the draft, according to its sponsors, is to close loopholes to make it harder for terrorists to obtain such weapons, because existing treaties only deal with governments.

The draft originated with the United States and was presented to the council in March on behalf of all five permanent members of the council — China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States. Spain has joined as a co-sponsor.

One common complaint was that the draft focuses on nonproliferation at the expense of disarmament. The text contains one reference to disarmament.

The goals of arms control treaties “are first and foremost to achieve effective progress toward general and complete disarmament,” said Canadian Ambassador Gilbert Laurin. “The resolution should recognize this important balance and equal emphasis on nonproliferation and disarmament obligations,” he said.

Indian Ambassador V.K. Nambiar said, “Exclusive focus on nonproliferation does disservice to the essential principle of the mutually reinforcing linkage between disarmament and nonproliferation.”

Two other criticisms of the draft dealt with the increasing power that some nations felt the resolution would confer on the council. Specifically, by creating binding obligations, the council would override existing treaties and by invoking Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter — the provision justifying enforcement against noncompliant states — the council would have too much coercive power, according to the critics.

South African Ambassador Dumisani Kumalo said the draft would “establish a mechanism in the Security Council that is isolated” from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions. Nambiar said he was concerned “over the increasing tendency of the council in recent years to assume new and wider powers of legislation on behalf of the international community, and binding on all states.”

While acting under Chapter 7, “the resolution ought to steer clear of any coercive or punitive approach,” said Nambiar.

Deputy British Ambassador Adam Thomson sought to address these concerns. Progress on disarmament is “important,” he said, but added that “it has always been clear” that the draft should be about nonstate actors and proliferation. “The resolution does not in any way undermine the importance of disarmament, it is just that disarmament is not its primary focus,” he said.

Citing Chapter 7 does not mean it is “about coercion or enforcement,” said Thomson, it “simply reflects the fact that what we are dealing with is a clear threat to international peace and security.” He added, “It would send an odd message if the Security Council were to act on any other basis.”

“The resolution does not negate the importance of existing multilateral arrangements,” Thompson added. “It is clear that in the face of this urgent threat, only the Security Council can act with the necessary speed and authority.”

Ambassador Don MacKay of New Zealand said this is only an urgent matter now because “there has not been sufficient will to see the existing multilateral disarmament and nonproliferation regimes significantly strengthened, with the result that the council is now being asked to step forward to fill a gap, with the required urgency.”

The European Union, Australia, Israel, Japan and Singapore were generally supportive of the draft as it stands. “Sweden has consistently advocated that a strong and central role be given to the Security Council in addressing these issues,” said Ambassador Pierre Schori of Sweden, an EU member country. “In our view it is both timely and proper” that the council deal with WMD proliferation.

While this session was called to give noncouncil members an opportunity to comment on the draft, it was also the first opportunity for council members to make their cases publicly. Among the council members, there were enough concerns to make clear that the resolution as it stands could not be approved by consensus. Algeria, Brazil, Germany and Pakistan all had substantial questions about the text, while Angola, Benin and Romania largely favored the draft.

Algerian Ambassador Abdullah Baali said, “It is appropriate and necessary to have this draft resolution reaffirm the need to work for disarmament.”

On the other hand, Spanish Ambassador Inocencio Arias said, “If there are too many paragraphs on disarmament in the draft, we run the risk of diluting the objective of the resolution.”

Approving this resolution would mean the council is “acting in an exceptional manner since, clearly, the Charter does not confer to it a mandate to legislate on behalf of the international community,” said Baali.

Arias called the initiative “part of the global struggle against terrorism,” therefore “this council is competent to act.” Acting under Chapter 7 will “send a strong political message,” he added.

More than 50 countries addressed the session.

PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE

DOCUMENTEN

Proliferation Security Initiative

Proliferation Security Initiative: Lisbon, 4-5 March 2004

Chairman’s conclusions

5 May 2004

1. The fifth Plenary meeting of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) took place at Palácio Foz, Lisbon, on 4-5 March 2004, building on deliberations at Madrid (12/06/03); Brisbane (9 -10/07/03); Paris (3 - 4/09/03) and London (9 -10/10/03). Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, the UK and the US were represented.

2. The participants reaffirmed their strong determination to respond effectively to the threat represented by proliferation and trafficking of WMD, their delivery systems and related materials worldwide. Recent developments leave no doubt as to the seriousness of the danger posed by such proliferation activities. The PSI has been successful in raising worldwide awareness to this threat and in fostering the international co-operation that is required to stop WMD-related shipments as well as the proliferation networks. Trafficking in WMD constitutes a global threat to international peace and security. It is an unacceptable activity and should be addressed by all countries. If linked to terrorism, it can represent a random threat to anyone, in any continent.

3. Deterring trafficking is therefore in the interest of all peace loving countries. The open nature of this Initiative is reiterated and the contributions from countries that share PSI concerns, principles and goals continue to be welcomed. This is a global endeavour with an inclusive nature and it relies on the widest possible co-operation between states from different parts of the world. Participants considered that geographical balance and regional diversity are assets that need to be preserved, as they represent an important added value to PSI effectiveness. In this spirit, the strengthened commitment of Canada, Norway and Singapore to the PSI is warmly welcomed.

4. Participants supported the call by US President Bush to expand the role of the PSI to not only interdict shipments of WMD, their delivery systems and related materials, but to cooperate in preventing WMD proliferation facilitators (i.e. individuals, companies, other entities) from engaging in this deadly trade. They also warmly welcomed contributions by other participants namely the UK. Participants agreed to pursue greater co-operation through military and intelligence services and law enforcement to shut down proliferation facilitators and bring them to justice.

PSI participants agree to begin examining the key steps necessary for this expanded role, including:

- identifying national points of contact and internal processes developed for this goal;
- developing and sharing national analyses of key proliferation actors and networks, their financing sources, and other support structures;
- undertaking national action to identify law enforcement authorities and other tools or assets that could be brought to bear against efforts to stop proliferation facilitators.

Outreach:

5. The participants agreed that it was essential to continue broadening the international consensus in favour of the fight against the proliferation of WMD, their delivery systems and related materials, as well as to the widening of the international political and operational support for PSI aims and actions. This will be carried out notably by building on previous outreach activities (over 60 countries have expressed support for the Paris Statement of Interdiction Principles until now). This may also be done by concluding bilateral agreements with interested States, notably in view of obtaining their consent for expeditious procedures for the boarding of vessels flying their flag, as required. The first examples of such bilateral agreements seem to indicate that this is an approach that can bear fruit most rapidly and which participants could/should usefully pursue.

6. Regarding significant developments related to the fight against WMD-related trafficking, complementary efforts by all relevant international organizations and information sharing with such organizations should be pursued as appropriate.

7. Regional outreach activities have shown to be an effective awareness-raising tool. They provide a useful framework for enhancing the involvement in the PSI activities and create a link between its global aims and the various regional contexts. Participants are encouraged to host further meetings to present and promote the PSI along the lines of those organised by Japan and Poland. The Portuguese announcement of one such outreach meeting for the African continent was welcomed.

8. While continuing to promote wide support for the Initiative, participants agreed to focus their outreach efforts particularly on states that have potentially unique contributions to make to interdictions efforts (i.e. flag states, transshipment states, overflight states, transit states and coastal states). The support of all countries interested in PSI and cooperation in interdiction is welcome and states are encouraged to consider the following practical steps that can establish the basis for involvement in PSI activities:

Formally commit to and publicly endorse the PSI and its Statement of Interdiction Principles and indicate willingness to take all steps available to support PSI efforts.

Undertake a review and provide information on current national legal authorities to undertake interdictions at sea, in the air or on land. Indicate willingness to strengthen authorities where appropriate.

Identify specific national assets that might contribute to PSI efforts (e.g. information sharing, military and/or law enforcement assets).

Provide points of contact for PSI interdiction requests and other operational activities. Establish appropriate internal government processes to coordinate PSI response efforts.

Be willing to actively participate in PSI interdiction training exercises and actual operations as opportunities arise.

Be willing to consider signing relevant agreements (e.g. boarding agreements) or to otherwise establish a concrete basis for cooperation with PSI efforts (e.g. MOU on overflight denial).

9. The participants discussed the proposed amendments to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA) that would criminalise the transport of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems and related materials on commercial vessels at sea.

Operational activities:

10. The participants noted with satisfaction that the PSI is by now operationally active. They also recognised that specific, significant progress was thereby obtained in fighting proliferation activities and that PSI partners had contributed decisively to recently disclosed successes in the disruption or indeed dismantling of some previously covert WMD programmes.

11. The meeting heard a report from the chairman of the operational experts meeting that took place in Washington, DC, on 16-17 December 2003. It encouraged the operational experts to pursue their work at the

meeting that was announced by Canada, to take place in April, notably in view of reaching conclusions on the improvement and rationalisation of the PSI exercise programme, providing for improved thematic and geographical balance, as well as on several other steps identified at the Washington meeting.

12. Training is required for operational effectiveness. Six exercises took place in different parts of the world since the launching of the PSI and further important operational activities are foreseen in the months to come. The Plenary took note with satisfaction that the UK, Australia, Spain, France, Italy, the US, Germany and Poland have organised or will organise PSI exercises. Other participants are encouraged to take similar initiatives, in the framework of a co-ordinated and rationalised exercise programme.

13. The Plenary particularly drew the participants' attention to the fact that the attainment of the PSI goals requires continued efforts within the operational experts group to work through operational legal issues, as commenced at the Washington meeting. All countries are encouraged to take the necessary steps to improve their legal systems and practical tools to strengthen their capacity to effectively act as and when required to take action consistent with the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles. Bearing in mind our common goals, appropriate consultations might be required in this regard.

Future of PSI:

14. Not yet one year from the moment it was launched, the Proliferation Security Initiative has established itself as a crucial instrument to respond effectively to some of the most serious security challenges of the XXI century. This is reflected in the growing number of countries supporting the PSI. All participate in this sense in the Initiative and all their contributions are warmly welcomed. Just like proliferation can be a multifaceted phenomenon, the responses may have to be flexible and may need to take many shapes and forms.

15. PSI is an activity, not an organisation. Progress since the London Plenary demonstrates that the main lines of the PSI are now well established and that several directions of action can be pursued separately but still in a mutually reinforcing mode. However, to further build the PSI as an activity, political vision and strategic guidance remain necessary. Further consideration shall be given to the suggestion of establishing a network of contact points at policy level among participants.

Next meeting:

16. To commemorate the anniversary of the launching of the PSI Poland offered to host a meeting in Krakow that will bring together all countries that support the PSI.

US State Department

Proliferation Security Initiative Ship Boarding Agreement with Panama

Bureau of Nonproliferation

Washington, DC – 12 May 2004

Amendment to the Supplementary Arrangement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Panama to the Arrangement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Panama for Support and Assistance from the United States Coast Guard for the National Maritime Service of the Ministry of Government and Justice

Signed May 12, 2004; provisionally applied from May 12, 2004.

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Panama (hereinafter “the Parties”):

Bearing in mind that the Arrangement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Panama for Support and Assistance from the United States Coast Guard for the National Maritime Service of the Ministry of Government and Justice, signed at Panama, March 18, 1991 (hereinafter “the Arrangement”), and the Supplementary Arrangement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Panama to the Arrangement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Panama for Support and Assistance from the United States Coast Guard for the National Maritime Service of the Ministry of Government and Justice, signed at Panama, February 5, 2002 (hereinafter “the Supplementary Arrangement”), establish a program for conducting bilateral maritime law enforcement operations to stop illegal activities, such as the international trafficking of drugs, illegal fishing and transportation of contraband;

Deeply concerned about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials, particularly by sea, as well as the risk that these may fall into the hands of terrorists;

Recalling the January 31, 1992, United Nations Security Council Presidential Statement that proliferation of all WMD constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and underlines the need for Member States of the United Nations to prevent proliferation;

Recalling also United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 of September 28, 2001, which, *inter alia*, noted with concern the close connection between international terrorism and illegal movement of nuclear, chemical, biological and other potentially deadly materials, and in this regard emphasized the need to enhance coordination of efforts on national, subregional, regional and international levels in order to strengthen a global response to this serious challenge and threat to international security, and called upon States to find ways of intensifying and accelerating the exchange of operational information, especially regarding the threat posed by the possession of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist groups;

Recalling further the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, done at Paris, January 13, 1993; the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London and Moscow, July 1, 1968; and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, done at Washington, London and Moscow, April 10, 1972;

Acknowledging the widespread consensus that proliferation and terrorism seriously threaten international peace and security;

Convinced that trafficking in WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials by States and non-state actors of proliferation concern must be stopped;

Inspired by the Statement of Interdiction Principles for the Proliferation Security Initiative, Paris, September 4, 2003;

Reaffirming the importance of the customary international law of the sea, as reflected in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea; and

Desiring to amend the Supplementary Arrangement in order to enhance cooperation between the Parties to prevent illicit traffic involving proliferation by sea of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials to or from States and non-state actors of proliferation concern;

Have agreed to amend the Supplementary Arrangement as follows:

Article I

1. Paragraph (b) of Article II of the Supplementary Arrangement, Definitions, is amended to read:
“(b) “illicit traffic” also includes proliferation by sea and other illegal activities prohibited by international law, including other international conventions to which both States are party, but only to the extent enforcement pursuant to this Supplementary Arrangement is authorized by the laws of both Parties.”
2. The following paragraphs (u) through (y) are added to Article II of the Supplementary Arrangement, Definitions, as follows:
“(u) “Proliferation by sea” means the transportation by ship of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials to or from States and non-state actors of proliferation concern.
(v) “Weapons of mass destruction (WMD)” means nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological weapons.
(w) “Related materials” means materials, equipment and technology, of whatever nature or type, that are related to and destined for use in the development, production, utilization or delivery of WMD.
(x) “Items of proliferation concern” means WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials.
(y) “States and non-state actors of proliferation concern” means those countries or entities that should be subject to interdiction activities because they are or are believed to be engaged in: (1) efforts to develop or acquire WMD or their delivery systems; or (2) transfers (either selling, receiving, or facilitating) of items of proliferation concern.”
3. Paragraph 3 of Article III of the Supplementary Arrangement, Designated Auxiliary Personnel, is amended to read:
“3. Except as provided in paragraph 3 of Article XV, the designated auxiliary personnel shall not have the powers conferred by this Supplementary Arrangement on law enforcement officials, and their actions shall be limited to providing the technical support described in the notice of their functions given to the other Party.”
4. Paragraph 3 of Article XV of the Supplementary Arrangement, Conduct of Law Enforcement Officials, is amended to read:

“3. Boardings and searches pursuant to this Supplementary Arrangement shall be carried out by law enforcement officials from law enforcement ships or aircraft, or from technical support vessels of a Party or of third States, and, in emergencies and under exceptional circumstances, may be assisted by designated auxiliary personnel from technical support vessels or aircraft of a Party or of third States. However, when law enforcement officials are not readily available, boardings and searches undertaken pursuant to Article X of this Supplementary Arrangement to suppress proliferation by sea may, upon advance notice to the other Party, also be carried out by designated auxiliary personnel. These personnel shall in such cases be subject to the provisions in this Supplementary Arrangement governing the conduct and operations of law enforcement officials.”

Article II

1. The Parties agree that the Government of the Republic of Panama may extend, *mutatis mutandis*, all rights under the Supplementary Arrangement as amended by the present Amendment concerning vessels suspected of proliferation by sea, claiming its nationality and located seaward of any State’s territorial sea, to such third States as it may deem appropriate, on the understanding that such third States shall likewise comply with all conditions set forth in the present Amendment and with those provisions of the Supplementary Arrangement agreed between the Government of the Republic of Panama and the third States for the exercise of such rights. Further, the Government of the Republic of Panama and such third States shall identify Liaison Offices and liaison officials in accordance with Article XII of the Supplementary Arrangement.
2. Such third States shall enjoy rights and be subject to all conditions governing their exercise as set forth in paragraph 1 of this Article, effective on the date of notification by the third State to the Government of the Republic of Panama that it will comply with the conditions for the exercise of those rights.
3. Such rights may be modified by written agreement between the Government of the Republic of Panama and the third State and shall be effective on the date agreed by the Government of the Republic of Panama and the third State.
4. Such rights shall be revocable by the Government of the Republic of Panama or the third State by written notification. Such rights shall be revoked, and the conditions governing their exercise shall cease to apply, effective on the date of such notification.

Article III

1. The Parties shall apply this Amendment provisionally from the date of its signature. This Amendment shall enter into force on the date that the Government of the United States of America notifies the Government of the Republic of Panama that its necessary internal procedures have been completed, and shall remain in force concurrent with the Supplementary Arrangement.
2. Either Party may discontinue provisional application at any time. Each Party shall notify the other Party immediately of any constraints or limitations on provisional application, of any changes to such constraints or limitations, and upon discontinuance of provisional application.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Amendment.

DONE AT Washington, this 12th day of May, 2004, in duplicate, in the English and Spanish languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

John R. Bolton

Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF PANAMA:

Arnulfo Escalona

Minister of Government and Justice

US State Department

Bolton Discusses Upcoming G-8 Meeting While in Moscow

Says U.S. hopes Russia will soon decide to join PSI

24 May 2004

After a meeting with Russian government officials May 20, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control John Bolton discussed what he expects to be the main topics at the group of eight summit this June.

Bolton said that the Proliferation Security Initiative, the global partnership against the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and restricting the sale of nuclear technology to be among the topics the eight industrialized nations will discuss.

Washington -- The State Department's key arms control official says he traveled to Russia in order to discuss preparations for the June summit of the group of eight industrialized nations (G-8) in Sea Isle, Georgia.

Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton held a news conference in Moscow May 20 at the conclusion of his discussions with Russian government officials. He said he expects the main security topics at the G-8 summit to be the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), the global partnership against the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and restricting the sale of sensitive nuclear technology.

"We also expect that the leaders will discuss a number of specific matters of proliferation concern: the success that we've had in Libya ... the questions of Iran and North Korea and efforts in both countries to prevent them from acquiring nuclear weapons and advanced missile technology, and other subjects as well," Bolton said.

Concerning the PSI, Bolton noted that the government of Poland will host a meeting of more than 80 governments that have expressed their support for the Proliferation Security Initiative in Krakow at the end of May. He said the United States hopes that "Russia will join the core group of PSI countries in our efforts to interdict trafficking in WMD and international commerce."

Bolton said the global partnership against the spread of WMD is a two-year-old G-8 initiative. The G-8 leaders had set a target for funding the initiative at \$20 billion over a 10-year period: \$10 billion from the United States, and \$10 billion from the other G-8 countries.

"We expect to announce additional countries, beyond the G-8, that will have joined the global partnership and will discuss the issue of expanding the activities of the global partnership beyond the states of the former Soviet Union to include programs in countries like Libya and Iran," he said.

G-8 leaders also will discuss President Bush's suggestions to restrict the sale of sensitive nuclear technology -- such as uranium enrichment equipment -- to any country that does not already have it, Bolton said.

"There are a variety of ideas that the leaders are considering, but the issue that we are trying to resolve is to make sure that this very sensitive, very dangerous technology which can be of important assistance in states seeking a nuclear weapons capability ... does not fall into the wrong hands," Bolton said.

Responding to a reporter's question, Bolton said his Moscow discussions included how "Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons makes it a threat to international peace and security, and that the issue should be referred by the International Atomic Energy Agency's Board of Directors to the U.N. Security Council."

Despite possible "tactical differences" on the Iran issue among the United States, Russia, the European Union and Japan, Bolton said "there is no difference on the fundamental point that all of us believe that Iran should not have a nuclear weapons capability."

BERICHTEN

European and Pacific Stars and Stripes

U.S. joins Mediterranean exercise in halting WMD traffic

by Kendra Helmer – 21 April 2004

U.S. forces in the Mediterranean Sea are training with four other countries to combat the trafficking of weapons of mass destruction.

About 350 Americans are participating in Clever Sentinel 04. Forces include a P-3C surveillance aircraft operating out of Sigonella, Sicily; the Norfolk, Va.-based destroyer USS Gonzalez; and the Military Sealift Command's container ship Pfc. Eugene A. Obregon.

"The basic scenario is participating naval forces will intercept, escort and perform a compliant boarding of a vessel at sea," said Lt. j.g. Dave Lockett, a 6th Fleet spokesman. "The overall objective is working on communications and techniques with the other countries involved."

Clever Sentinel 04 is one of 10 multinational maritime interdiction exercises that began last year as part of the Proliferation Security Initiative. Under the initiative, which President Bush launched in May, countries

can disrupt the illicit trade in weapons of mass destruction by searching ships and aircraft suspected of carrying suspicious cargo.

Italy is leading Clever Sentinel, which began Monday and ends Thursday. France, Spain and the Netherlands also each are contributing a ship. About a dozen nations sent observers.

Participants in the initiative include Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Global Security Newswire

U.S. Participates in WMD Interdiction Exercise

22 April 2004

The United States joined four other nations this week in sending Navy personnel and ships to the Mediterranean Sea for training on blocking trafficking of weapons of mass destruction.

Clever Sentinel 04 began Monday and ended today, according to *Stars and Stripes*. It involved 350 Americans, the destroyer *USS Gonzalez*, container ship *Pfc. Eugene A. Obregon* and a P-3C surveillance airplane.

Italy led the exercise, and France, Spain and the Netherlands each sent a ship. Observers were present from about 12 nations.

“The basic scenario is participating naval forces will intercept, escort and perform a compliant boarding of a vessel at sea,” said Lt. j.g. Dave Lockett, a 6th Fleet spokesman. “The overall objective is working on communications and techniques with the other countries involved,” he added.

This exercise is one of 10 that began last year under the Proliferation Security Initiative, which now includes 16 nations (Kendra Helmer, *Stars and Stripes* April 21).

Daily Yomiuri

Russia set to join anti-proliferation group

30 April 2004

Russia is expected to join the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), an international program to stamp out proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including ballistic missiles, possibly before a Group of Eight summit meeting scheduled for June in Sea Island, Ga., a government source said Thursday.

The PSI currently comprises 14 countries including Australia, Britain, Japan and the United States. The members currently are co-ordinating over whether to formally admit Moscow to the PSI at a meeting to mark the first anniversary of the group's founding in late May, according to the source.

Russia would be the last country among the G-8 nations to join the PSI. Moscow's participation is likely to further strengthen global efforts to prevent proliferation of WMD by countries such as North Korea.

Russia is likely to attend the two-day commemorative assembly that is scheduled to be held from May 31 in Krakow, Poland, the city where U.S. President George W. Bush proposed the initiative in May last year.

The 14 member states and several associate members including Turkey meet to discuss proliferation and conduct joint military exercises.

The 14 basically have agreed on Russia's participation in the PSI, the source said.

Since Russia, the world's second-largest nuclear power, has great influence over neighbouring countries, its participation in the PSI is expected to enhance enforcement of joint activities such as inspections of ships and airplanes to block the illegal transportation of WMD and the transfer of related technologies. The three-day G-8 summit meeting scheduled to begin in Georgia on June 8 is expected to make strengthening the framework for the prevention of proliferation one of its top priorities.

The United States has been calling for Russia to join the PSI ahead of the summit meeting to expand and strengthen the group.

A New Coalition To Keep WMD Out of Terrorists' Hands

Operating outside the UN framework, the Proliferation Security Initiative sees growing support

By Michael Richardson – 10 May 2004

In the current international climate, the growing menace of terrorism and the risk that weapons of mass destruction will spread are now widely seen as interlocking threats to global security. The challenge posed by terrorist groups and the rogue nations that support them is especially frightening because it disregards national boundaries and threatens a potentially catastrophic scale of casualties if nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons are deployed. Current arms control treaties allow countries like North Korea and probably Iran to import nuclear material and use it to develop clandestine weapons programmes. Alarmed at the possibility of an ever-expanding black market in WMD, the US and several other nations came together last year to form a coalition to block such trade. Known as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), the group is operating outside the framework of the United Nations and the international treaty system.

Despite its shaky legal footing, there is an urgent need for a coalition like the PSI. Since Sept. 11 – and some would argue even before – it has been painfully apparent that the international treaty system put in place after World War II is incapable of preventing the spread of WMD. The nuclear non-proliferation treaty, for example, bans the transfer of weapons and related technology to states, but does not specify restrictions on sales or transfers to non-state actors like terrorist groups. And the treaty may not even be adequate to ensure responsible behavior by states. Most countries have weak or non-existent laws controlling exports of materials that could be used to make WMD. Some have not adequately secured strategically sensitive items within their borders. The PSI is based on the belief that an effective response to the WMD threat will require action on two fronts: a more muscular global enforcement mechanism, including sanctions against violators; and collective action by like-minded nations where the international treaty system fails to apply and the UN cannot muster the will to act.

Before the PSI was established, the US and other countries trying to halt international shipments of WMD materials and delivery systems had to rely on ad hoc exchanges of intelligence, interceptions and searches that mostly took place within the territorial waters of concerned nations. The PSI is likely to become a permanent feature of international arms control precisely because it provides teeth to existing treaties and multilateral arrangements, as well as national export laws on strategically sensitive materials. If these voluntary arrangements fail to halt clandestine WMD programs and shipments, the PSI provides a safety net.

Far from being distrusted as a vigilante organization, the PSI is being enlarged and made stronger by its members because of growing concern that countries or criminal organizations will pass WMD-related materials to terrorists who may use them to attack the US, its allies or other friendly countries. There are now at least 14 core members of the PSI: Australia, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Singapore and the US. But more than 60 countries have reportedly signalled that they support the aims of the PSI and are ready to take part in interdiction efforts on a case-by-case basis.

Despite this strong and growing support, critics hold that a major weakness of the PSI is its limited authority under international law. In an effort designed in part to redress this problem, a resolution to criminalize the spread of WMD was approved unanimously by the UN Security Council last week (28 April), a move which will help legitimate the goals of the group, if not its actions. The resolution calls on member states to stop terrorists, black market traders, and other non-state actors from acquiring WMD or the materials and technology to make or deliver them. While the resolution does not directly give authority for countries participating in PSI activities to seize WMD-related cargos, US officials say that the resolution will make it easier to carry out PSI operations.

The US and its partners are working to further bolster legal arrangements so that they can stop WMD shipments even when they take place outside the jurisdiction of the PSI countries. At sea, national authority extends only 12 nautical miles from the coast. Beyond this, in international waters, the state whose flag a ship flies must expressly consent before foreign naval vessels can legally halt the ship - except in the case of a few “universal crimes” such as piracy, slavery, and unauthorised broadcasting.

In February, however, the US and Liberia announced that they had agreed to new boarding and inspection arrangements on the high seas where either side has reasonable grounds to suspect that one of their ships is carrying items of proliferation concern. Measured by gross tonnage, Liberia has more vessels – over 2,000 – flying its flag than any other country in the world, except Panama. The US can now request the right to board a suspect Liberian-flagged ship anywhere in international waters – and do so after waiting no more than two

hours for a response from the register. The US regards this arrangement as a model for similar agreements it is pursuing with a number of other key flag states.

British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw said that together with its PSI partners, Britain was considering whether to introduce new penalties to deter shipping and air lines from seeking to move WMD cargoes. "Might the vessels and planes of any companies found to have engaged in such transport be denied landing or port rights around the world?" he said. "Should we consider an international register of companies and individuals convicted of proliferation offences?"

Well before this, PSI members were taking preemptive action wherever they were able to do so legally. For example last August, in response to a US request, Taiwanese officials confiscated about 150 barrels of phosphorus pentasulphide from a North Korean freighter, Be Gae Bong, in the Taiwanese port of Kaohsiung before it left for North Korea. The chemical is used to make insecticide and as an additive in motor oil. But it can also be used to manufacture nerve gas.

However, the most important PSI seizure made public so far was the interception by German and Italian authorities in October 2003 of the BBC China, a German-owned ship, after it passed through the Suez Canal bound for Libya. In Dubai, equipment that could be used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons had been loaded onto the ship. Labelling on the packing cases showed that the sophisticated components had been precision-made at a factory in Malaysia, which claimed later it thought the equipment was for the oil industry. The parts had been identified and tracked by US and British intelligence.

The confiscated equipment from the ship helped unravel and shut down an extensive and long-running nuclear black market based in Pakistan that peddled weapons technology to Libya, Iran, North Korea, and perhaps other places. It also put pressure on Malaysia, the United Arab Emirates and, indirectly, on other governments, to tighten their laws and enforcement.

PSI members insist that they are part of an activity, not an organization. But as more governments realise that proliferation and nuclear terrorism are a common global threat, it may be possible not just to enlarge the membership of the group but to codify its work in an effective international treaty.

Straits Times

Anti-WMD initiative makes waves

By Mark J. Valencia – 14 May 2004

THE Bush administration has proclaimed Libya's renunciation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in December last year as a mark of the success of the American-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).

Officials argue that the seizure of WMD-related centrifuges, bound for Libya, by United States and British forces last October, forced it to 'come clean' and abandon its WMD programmes.

But the PSI still faces significant legal and political obstacles if it is to be fully effective.

The PSI was proposed by President George W. Bush in Poland on May 31 last year. Its purpose is to prevent the transfer or transport of WMD, their delivery systems and related materials to and from state and non-state actors 'of proliferation concern'. Such states include first and foremost, North Korea, but also Iran, Sudan, Syria and Cuba.

A 16-member 'coalition of the willing' has approved a set of Interdiction Principles for the PSI. The 11 original members of the coalition are Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Britain and the US. Five others - Canada, Denmark, Norway, Singapore and Turkey - have since signed on to the principles.

The hurdles

So far, so good. But this bold united front belies serious tension, both among the coalition members and between its members and non-participants. Particularly contentious are compliance of PSI interdictions of vessels and aircraft with international law, as well as United Nations processes.

Expanding the coverage of the PSI to the high seas would greatly enhance its efficiency and this is desired by the US and some coalition members. But it would also create serious new problems.

The current Law of the Sea allows the interdiction and boarding of vessels on the high seas (beyond 12 nautical miles from shore) only in specific circumstances. These are if the country under whose flag the ship is sailing gives its permission - as was the case with Germany regarding the Libyan centrifuge shipment - or if the ship is stateless.

Also it is not illegal for non-signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or the Missile Technology Control Regime to ship nuclear materials or missiles to each other. Nor is it illegal to trade commercially in explosives and conventional arms.

For example, the US has shipped cruise missiles to Israel which were subsequently modified to carry nuclear warheads.

The point is that if a country like North Korea uses its own properly flagged ships, shipments of arms, including nuclear materials or missiles, would be protected by international law just as the US and others' arms shipments are so protected.

The US has tried to use the international system. It introduced a United Nations resolution requiring the UN's 191 members to criminalise the spread of WMD, to ensure that they have strong export controls and to secure sensitive materials within their borders.

However the resolution was accepted by the Permanent Five only after the US accepted China's demand - under threat of a veto - to drop a provision authorising the interdiction of vessels suspected of transporting WMD, a cornerstone of the PSI.

Pakistan, a prominent US ally in the war on terrorism, led opposition to the resolution until it was assured that it wouldn't be applied retroactively and a provision allowing intrusive inspections was dropped.

Opponents of the resolution were also concerned about the Security Council's assumption of the authority to make law, and possible sanctions against members which do not comply. They also objected to the secret and presumptuous manner in which the text was negotiated among only the Permanent Five before its introduction.

Malacca straits

Even though the amended resolution passed, it will do little to strengthen the effectiveness of the PSI since it focuses only on non-state actors and does not authorise interdiction, or any action outside current international law.

At best, it would tighten international treaties and domestic safeguards, but not break new ground.

The US is also proposing WMD amendments to the 1988 anti-terrorism Rome Convention. But other convention members have serious reservations that the amendments could jeopardise the freedom of navigation.

The US is also considering a Regional Maritime Security Initiative for South-east Asia to operationalise the PSI by facilitating intelligence sharing and law enforcement activities to monitor, identify and intercept suspected vessels in national and international waters.

The initial focus would be the Malacca Straits. But Malaysia and Indonesia have publicly and vehemently opposed the concept, emphasising that the responsibility for the security of the straits is theirs alone.

Perhaps the most significant PSI success has been the US agreements with flag-of-convenience states Liberia, in February this year, and Panama, on Wednesday, which allow US authorities to board - and search for WMD - more than 12,000 commercial ships or 20 per cent of the world's commercial fleet.

But these agreements are not a blank cheque and, in each case, consultation with Liberia or Panama must be undertaken and consent is required prior to boarding.

Nevertheless, the US has to wait only two hours for a response and no response is considered approval to board.

Britain also plans to negotiate similar agreements with the main commercial flag states. US Undersecretary of State John Bolton said the next goal is reaching agreements with nations to deny overflight rights to aircraft suspected of carrying WMD and related materials.

The longer-term US strategy is to greatly expand the 'loose coalition' of countries adhering to the PSI principles until it encompasses most of the world's major flag, port, coastal and transit countries, particularly those that have been used in the past by 'WMD proliferators'.

It would seem that the plan is to change international law through state practice, that is, the actions of the 'right' states over the 'right' period of time.

A maritime norad?

A corollary to this strategy is to help or persuade countries to change or create national laws to enable them to interdict suspicious ships and aircraft and to seize their WMD cargoes in their territorial waters and contiguous zones.

An adjunct to this effort would be to establish a very accurate real-time picture of what is travelling by sea - a maritime Norad (North American Aerospace Defence Command, a joint US-Canadian military command responsible for the region's air defences).

This system would be akin to air traffic control systems and involve the knowledge and tracking of shipments from port to port, that is, what is being shipped from where, to where, by whom, along what route. But US patience is wearing thin. Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has issued a classified order to the US Navy to prepare all its assets to interdict and search vessels for WMD. This policy is apparently based on the increasing US insistence on the UN Charter right of pre-emptive self-defence, even if the threat is not imminent. The PSI also includes interdiction of aircraft suspected of transporting WMD. Although efforts in this area have progressed more slowly, the US has stated that it would consider - as a last resort - shooting down any aircraft suspected of transporting WMD that refuses to land and be searched.

The fear

These unilateral initiatives worry many countries, including some coalition members. In the absence of a UN Security Council resolution or clear evidence that WMD shipments are bound for terrorists, the legality of interdicting such shipments on the high seas or, in some cases, even in territorial waters, without the consent of the flag state will be highly questionable and could undermine existing international law. On a more practical political level, unlike the 1962 'quarantine' against Cuba, the PSI requires the co-operation of many other countries, including North Korea's neighbours. But key countries in Asia may not participate in the PSI if interdiction is a major component. Indeed, China, Russia and most notably, South Korea, have so far declined to participate, although they are being specifically pressured to do so. More disconcerting is a deep-seated concern among developing countries that the PSI, if carried to its extreme, could further undermine the concept of the sovereignty of nations. Having one set of standards for US-friendly nations and another for arbitrarily declared 'rogue' states contradicts the concept of sovereign equality - the principle that all states are entitled to the same rights and protections in international law. The real fear is that the PSI may become part of the new Bush doctrine of pre-emptive war, that is, the right to strike anywhere, any time, to prevent the spread of WMD to 'dangerous' countries or groups. The dilemma for the US is that allowing legitimate commercial transport of WMD components would undermine the objective of the PSI. But unilaterally interdicting legal shipments would undermine international law and the UN.

G8 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP

DOCUMENTEN

NGO Coalition

International consortium calls for action to prevent WMD terrorism: recommendations to the G8 Global Partnership Sea Island Summit, 2004

May 2004

As an international coalition of 21 research institutes in 16 European, Asian, and North American countries, we call on the G8 leaders to turn their pledges into more urgent action in the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.

The consortium believes that the most effective, least expensive way to prevent weapons of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism is to minimize the number of sites where dangerous weapons and materials are stored and to secure those sites as thoroughly as possible. Acquiring weapons and materials is the hardest and most crucial step for the terrorists to take, and the easiest step for governments to stop. Yet we are not making it nearly hard enough.

Further action needs to be taken immediately to secure these materials. As the Global Partnership (GP) seeks to expand donors and recipients, it is imperative that governments effectively coordinate their work and spend the money where the risks are greatest. When the G8 leaders meet June 8-10 in Sea Island, Georgia, they have an opportunity to reaffirm their commitment to the Global Partnership and to demonstrate their resolve to strengthen and accelerate their cooperative efforts. We recommend the following actions as top priorities for Global Partnership work:

Accelerate Efforts to Consolidate and Secure Weapons Usable Nuclear Material

We call upon the G8 to accelerate the effort to lock down and secure weaponsusable fissile materials in every country and in every facility that has them, beginning in Russia where the vast majority of these unsecured materials reside. The majority of this work in Russia has been done on a bilateral U.S.-Russian basis. However, only 22% of weapons-usable nuclear material has received comprehensive security upgrades, and only an additional 21% has received even minimal security upgrades, leaving 57% without any security upgrades whatsoever. Therefore, G8 governments should immediately work together to expand funding for materials consolidation, protection and destruction, and should coordinate their efforts with existing programs to avoid inefficiency or duplication.

Expedite a Global "Clean-out" of HEU at Research Facilities Worldwide

Highly-enriched uranium exists at more than 130 civilian nuclear research facilities in more than 40 countries around the world. Most lack adequate security measures to thwart theft or diversion of weapons-usable material. Although the United States, Russia, and the IAEA plan to remove potentially vulnerable material, secure material that remains, and shut down or convert reactors to operate on LEU at a number of sites, the majority of sites will continue to use and/or house HEU for a substantial number of years unless additional action is taken. We propose that other G8 donors designate funds for this effort to speed its completion.

Accelerate Weapons-Grade Plutonium Disposition

We call upon the G8 countries to accelerate efforts aimed at disposition of weapons-grade plutonium no longer required for defense purposes. In 2000, Russia and the United States signed the Plutonium Disposition Agreement, which provides for the safe, transparent, and irreversible disposition of 68 tons of weapons-grade plutonium, evenly divided between stocks in the United States and Russia. The cost of this operation was estimated at \$2 billion. However, the United States has committed only \$400 million to the project, and international donors have pledged only an additional \$400 million, leaving the project over a billion dollars short of what it is likely to need in funding. Meanwhile, the United States has put a halt on new contracts related to plutonium disposition because of continuing disputes with Russia over liability. It is extremely important that United States and Russia resolve these political disagreements in order for the disposition effort to move forward and potentially to expand to cover the rest of Russia's weapons-usable stockpile of plutonium that is not needed for national defense.

The other Global Partnership countries should also designate and allocate the additional funds needed to complete disposition efforts as soon as possible.

Expand Efforts to Employ Former Weapons Personnel

International programs, such as the ISTC and STCU, to redirect former WMD scientists and personnel in Russia and the former Soviet Union to civilian work are well established but grossly under-funded. The Global Partnership donor states should also facilitate the retirement, retraining, and resettlement of WMD personnel to new jobs.

While continuing to address scientists in Russia and the FSU, efforts to redirect weapons scientists should also be expanded to other countries where needed, such as Iraq and Libya.

Increase Transparency for and Destruction of Tactical Nuclear Weapons

All countries should provide greater transparency regarding the numbers and locations of nuclear weapons in and around Europe. Group of Eight countries could provide technical assistance to Russia as needed in order to ensure the security and accurate accounting of Russia's tactical nuclear weapons, which are most attractive to terrorists. Prompt steps should be taken to implement the tactical nuclear weapon reductions Russia and the United States pledged to undertake in 1991 and 1992.

Drastically Increase Funding for Chemical Weapons Demilitarization

Current funding is not equal to the task of consolidating, securing, and destroying Russian chemical munitions as rapidly as the risk of terrorist acquisition demands. Russia's budget indicates a clear commitment to chemical demilitarization, but Russia alone cannot shoulder the financial burden of a task estimated to cost nearly \$6 billion.

Therefore the GP donors should drastically expand their current efforts to assist Russia and amplify their roles in these projects, either by directly funding chemical munitions destruction, by providing urgent assistance to secure CW stocks awaiting destruction, or by supporting related infrastructure projects.

Intensify Efforts for Bio-Security

The GP countries should implement confidence-building measures in the biosafety/biosecurity sphere with Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Union, such as Georgia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The initial focus should be on common challenges presented by bioterrorism and could include a wide range of cooperative activities: consultations among civil protection authorities; expansion of current projects on biodefense; retraining of scientists and commercialization of biotechnology projects where possible; aggressive research into vaccines, medicine, and diagnostic tests; and studies of anti-crop warfare and potential threat agents. The GP should also work to improve physical security at facilities housing nonmilitary collections of pathogens (such as those used for research), and redirect biological weapons expertise and facilities to peaceful use.

Strengthen the G8 Global Partnership

· We welcome the expansion of the Global Partnership to other members, both as donors and recipients. We recognize that the task remaining in Russia is vast, but the Global Partnership donors can continue to devote resources to Russia while also addressing urgent risks in other countries. Adding new areas of cooperation to the Global Partnership can be done without losing focus on the concerns initially outlined by G8 leaders at Kananaskis: the destruction of chemical weapons, the dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines, the disposition of fissile materials, and the employment of former weapons scientists.

· As stated in our January 2003 report, we also call on countries to consider the original pledge of \$20 billion as a floor, not a ceiling.

· We call upon the G8 to establish a clear plan for ensuring that GP funds are moving from pledges to project implementation, and to do a better job of prioritizing tasks according to the most urgent threats.

· We call upon Russia to take urgently needed political and organizational steps wherever possible to remove obstacles to the implementation of Global Partnership projects and facilitate prompt execution.

· We encourage efforts to agree upon a division of labor among the Partners to accomplish the tasks and applaud further improvement of coordinating structures to avoid duplication and maximize efficiency.

· Two years after the Kananaskis guidelines were agreed upon, implementation problems remain a key obstacle to progress. We call on the highest levels of leadership to press for resolution of lingering disputes over issues such as transparency, access, and liability.

· We call for periodic reviews of the effectiveness and coordination of Global Partnership projects, including possible independent reviews by nongovernmental organizations.

The Global Partnership shows that the world is willing to work together to stem the threat of WMD terrorism. There remains, however, a dangerous gap between the pace of our progress and the scope and urgency of the threat. We need to do more on an urgent basis with a new level of cooperation. Our current response is inadequate to meet the danger.

And time is not on our side.

Signed,

Centre for Security and Defence Studies, Carleton University; Danish Institute for International Studies; EU Institute for Security Studies; Finnish Institute of International Affairs; Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique; Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik; International Institute For Strategic Studies; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute; Landau Network-Centro Volta/Union Scienziati Per Il Disarmo; Japan Institute for International Affairs; Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security; Netherlands Institute of International Relations "Clingendael"; Norwegian Institute of International Affairs; Center for Policy Studies in Russia (PIR); Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO); Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios Internacionales y Estratégicos; The Swedish Institute of International Affairs; Geneva Center for Security Policy; Center for Defence Studies, King's College London; Center for Strategic and International Studies

Nuclear Threat Initiative and Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs

Pace of Securing Nuclear Weapons Material Has Slowed Since 9/11

The amount of potential nuclear weapons material secured in the two years immediately following September 11, 2001, was less than the amount secured in the two years immediately prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, according to official data described in a new report from Harvard University on steps needed to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of terrorists and hostile states. To accelerate the pace, sustained Presidential leadership, particularly in the United States and Russia, is urgently needed to sweep aside disputes over access to sensitive sites and other bureaucratic obstacles to progress, according to the report.

The new report, *Securing the Bomb: An Agenda for Action*, finds that programs to reduce this danger are making progress, but there remains a potentially deadly gap between the urgency of the threat and the scope and pace of efforts to address it. During fiscal year (FY) 2003, U.S.-funded programs completed comprehensive security and accounting upgrades on enough weapons-usable nuclear material to make more than two thousand nuclear weapons (35 tons of nuclear material), and over 30 tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) was permanently destroyed.

Slow pace. However, the 35 tons of potential bomb material secured last year is just 6% of the estimated 600 tons of potentially vulnerable nuclear material in Russia alone. By the end of FY2003, comprehensive security and accounting upgrades had been completed for only 22% of this material, and initial “rapid upgrades” – bricking over windows, installing detectors at doors – for only 43%. If progress continues at last year’s rate of 35 tons per year, it will take **13 years** to finish the job in just the former Soviet Union. With Presidential action to break through the logjams, the work could be completed in **four years**.

“This report reveals how much more needs to be done to protect against nuclear terrorism. We are not doing all that we can and all that we must,” said former Senator Sam Nunn, Co-Chairman of the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), which commissioned the report. **“There is a leadership gap between the words and deeds of government officials around the globe.”**

Need for action. “President Bush has an opportunity to take actions now that would dramatically reduce the danger of nuclear terrorism within a few years,” said Matthew Bunn, the report’s co-author with Anthony Wier, from the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government. “He needs to seize that opportunity, before it’s too late. The terrorists will not wait.”

The report notes that President Bush himself has set the bar for urgent action, saying “the nations of the world must do all we can to secure and eliminate” these stockpiles, and warning “history will judge harshly those who saw this coming danger but failed to act.”

“Securing the Bomb” and its online companion at www.nti.org/cnwm provide the most detailed assessment of global nuclear threat reduction programs to date, both in terms of work completed and dollars spent. The report includes a comprehensive action plan for accelerating the effort and debunks in detail a series of myths that have led policy-makers around the world to downplay the danger. The website features in-depth program-by-program assessments and recommendations and an interactive budget database including the budgets for each nuclear threat reduction program from 1992 to the present.

Among the report’s key findings:

- While Russia’s economy has stabilized, dangerous nuclear security vulnerabilities still exist – from broken intrusion detectors to security gates propped open for convenience. The security manager at Seversk, one of Russia’s largest nuclear material processing facilities, reports that guards routinely patrol without ammunition in their guns, to avoid accidental firing.
- Threats to these facilities appear to be growing: for example, a 2003 criminal case revealed that a Russian businessman had been offering \$750,000 for stolen weapon-grade plutonium for sale to a foreign client – and had contacted residents of a closed nuclear city to try to arrange the purchase.
- Enough HEU for hundreds of nuclear weapons--some 20 metric tons--exists as fuel for civilian research reactors in more than 130 research reactors in more than 40 countries around the world, many of them guarded by no more than a night watchman and a chain-link fence.
- While Pakistan’s nuclear stockpiles are heavily guarded, the revelation that the father of Pakistan’s bomb was leading a network peddling nuclear supplies and bomb designs all over the world highlights the danger that nuclear insiders might help the large armed remnants of al Qaeda in Pakistan gain access to nuclear weapons or materials.

- U.S. officials have struggled to advance efforts to secure nuclear stockpiles, but progress has been slowed by disputes over access to sensitive sites, liability in the event of accident, and countless other bureaucratic obstacles. Only sustained Presidential leadership can overcome these barriers.
- Dozens of sets of equipment the United States provided for a “quick fix” of security at Russia’s nuclear warhead sites four years ago are still sitting in warehouses, uninstalled, more than two years after the 9/11 attacks – because disputes over the installation have festered unresolved.
- Additional action is needed not only from the U.S. government, but from governments around the world. The \$20 billion Group of Eight (G8) “Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction,” despite its promise, has so far focused only a small fraction of its effort on the urgent task of securing the world’s nuclear stockpiles—and is still struggling to move from pledges and words to action.

Among the report’s key recommendations for action:

- President Bush should issue a directive making it a top priority to secure every nuclear warhead and every pound of nuclear material worldwide, set an aggressive timetable, and appoint a senior official to lead the effort, find and fix the obstacles, and keep it on the front burner at the White House.
- At their next summit, President Bush and President Putin should agree on securing all Russian nuclear warheads and materials within four years, new steps to sweep aside the access problem and other obstacles, and a Russian commitment to sustain security after U.S. assistance phases out.
- President Bush should make securing all the world’s nuclear stockpiles a central element of U.S. relations with Russia, Pakistan, and other key states around the world.
- President Bush should launch a “global cleanout” effort to remove weapons-usable nuclear material from the world’s most vulnerable sites – especially civilian research reactors -- within four years, establishing a task force that consolidates all the necessary resources, authority, and expertise to accomplish that mission.
- President Bush and President Putin should launch a reciprocal initiative under which each side would take thousands of nuclear warheads it no longer needs—including any remaining warheads not equipped with difficult-to-bypass electronic locks or comparable means to prevent their use if stolen—and place them in secure storage open to monitoring by the other side, and commit that they will be verifiably dismantled.
- Russian President Putin should make clear that nuclear security is a critical priority for Russia’s own national security, devote sufficient resources to the task, direct his government to remove the obstacles slowing U.S.-Russian and global cooperation, and appoint a full-time official to lead the effort.
- At the G8 summit next month, the leaders should expand the Global Partnership to include all nations with nuclear stockpiles, set an aggressive timetable for securing these stockpiles, and announce a minimum global security standard that their countries will each commit to meet and to help other states meet.

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Global Security Newswire

United States Supports Expansion of G-8 Nonproliferation Effort, Officials Say

By Mike Nartker – 27 April 2004

MOSCOW — The United States is working to expand an effort conducted by the Group of Eight global economic powers to fund nonproliferation projects in Russia to include both new donor countries and new aid recipients, senior U.S. officials said last week.

During a 2002 summit in Canada, the G-8 members — Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States — initiated the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. Under the effort, the G-8 members pledged \$20 billion over 10 years to fund nonproliferation projects starting in Russia. Since the 2002 summit, the effort has expanded to include several non-G-8 donor countries, including the Czech Republic, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland as well as the European Union.

In advance of the June G-8 summit in the United States, Washington has worked to add eight countries to the Global Partnership, a senior U.S. State Department official said during a nonproliferation conference held here last week by the PIR Center. New donor members could include Australia, New Zealand and South Korea, said Edward Vazquez, director of the Office of Proliferation Threat Reduction in the State Department’s Bureau of Nonproliferation.

While Russia would continue to remain the “priority” of the partnership’s efforts, the United States believes “the time is right” to expand the effort to include nonproliferation-related projects in other nations, such as other states of the former Soviet Union, Vazquez said. He said the United States would like to see the former Soviet states of Georgia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan be invited to take part in the effort as recipients. During a keynote address last week at the conference, U.S. Ambassador to Russia Alexander Vershbow also emphasized the U.S. desire to expand the Global Partnership to include new recipient nations. He added that Ukraine was “a natural choice” to next receive funding for nonproliferation. “Russia will remain our priority, and widening the circle of recipient countries will not diminish or dilute Global Partnership efforts under way in Russia. Yet we believe that a global problem requires an appropriately global approach,” Vershbow said.

Concerns Over Current Status of Global Partnership

While the United States is considering the possible expansion of the Global Partnership, there are concerns that the original aims of the project have not yet been reached. During the conference last week, PIR Center Director Vladimir Orlov said that in the past two years Russia had only received about \$50 million in working funds for nonproliferation. At that rate, he said, it would take decades to meet the original 2002 goal.

In addition, a number of issues have delayed various nonproliferation projects being conducted in Russia, according to participants at last week’s conference. For example, a long-standing dispute between the United States and Russia over establishing U.S. liability protection for damages and injuries that may result from nonproliferation activities has hindered progress, said Robert Einhorn, a senior adviser with the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The issue of liability protection has delayed U.S. and Russian efforts to eliminate a total of almost 70 tons of weapon-grade plutonium, enough to create 8,000 nuclear weapons, said Meggen Watt of the U.S. State Department Office of the Fissile Material Negotiator. Einhorn added that the dispute has not yet received the presidential-level attention needed to resolve the impasse.

Another concern is Russia’s reluctance to provide full site access to U.S. contractors engaged in nonproliferation projects, according to Rear Adm. John Byrd, head of the Cooperative Threat Reduction directorate of the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency. Such a lack of access has delayed U.S. efforts to improve security at Russian nuclear facilities, he said last week.

Russia is also concerned that some Global Partnership members want to “reshuffle” the effort’s priorities, said Mikhail Lysenko, director of the Russian Foreign Ministry’s Department for Security Affairs and Disarmament. Currently, most Global Partnership-aided projects in Russia focus on the two main priorities identified by Moscow — nuclear submarine dismantlement and chemical weapons disposal. Efforts in those two areas, though, have also experienced difficulties, according to conference participants

Russia “badly needs” international aid to help dismantle nearly 200 decommissioned submarines that contain spent nuclear fuel that could be attractive to terrorists seeking to develop crude nuclear or radiological weapons, according to Sergei Antipov, a senior Russian atomic energy official. “We’re craving it,” Antipov said last week, referring to foreign assistance.

Antipov also said that partnership members are focusing too much on providing assistance in dismantling decommissioned submarines based in northwestern Russia and not enough on those on Russia’s eastern coast. Submarines there could be more easily accessed and thus more attractive to terrorists than those based on Russia’s Kola Peninsula, said Christina Chuen of the Monterey Institute of International Studies’ Center for Nonproliferation Studies.

There are also concerns about the progress of constructing a chemical weapons disposal facility near the Russian town of Shchuchye. Canadian Ambassador to Russia Christopher Westdal said last week that a “procedural impasse” has resulted in the delay of a Canadian project to construct a rail spur at the site to transport chemical weapons agents from storage facilities to the planned destruction plant. He added, though, that he was “optimistic” that the dispute would soon be resolved.

While Russia has made substantial progress in its chemical weapons disposal efforts over the past several years, concerns still remain as to lack of a clear overall plan and a lack of transparency in the progress, said James Harrison, deputy director of counterproliferation and arms control in the British Defense Ministry. He last week also blamed the uncertain nature of U.S. funding for the Shchuchye project both for delays in the disposal plant’s construction and for Russia’s overall chemical weapons disposal efforts.

Speaking today in Washington, nonproliferation experts were divided as to whether now is the right time to consider expanding the Global Partnership to include projects beyond Russia. Einhorn told *Global Security Newswire* that despite funding concerns, the partnership should have the necessary resources to conduct projects both within Russia and outside, noting that expenditures for projects outside Russia should be less

expensive. In addition, he said, now that the United States has taken the position that the partnership's original \$20 billion pledge reflected a "floor, not a ceiling," it should be easier to obtain increased resources. For its part, though, Russian opposition may slow down efforts to expand the effort, Einhorn said. He said that Moscow views nonproliferation funding as a "zero-sum game" — every dollar spent on projects somewhere else is one less for Russian efforts. It is important to first fulfill the original intent of the Global Partnership — securing \$20 billion in nonproliferation funding for Russia by 2012 — before considering an expansion of the effort, said Raphael Della Ratta of the Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council. Once that goal is reached, though, "then make it global in more ways than one," he said.

Global Security Newswire

U.S., U.K. Seek G-8 Assistance to Redirect Former Iraqi, Libyan WMD Scientists

30 April 2004

The United States and the United Kingdom want to use a Group of Eight effort intended to finance nonproliferation projects to help redirect Iraqi and Libyan WMD scientists to peaceful activities, the *Financial Times* reported today.

The United States and the United Kingdom are working on an announcement to be made at the June G-8 summit that the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction would be used to help provide peaceful jobs for Iraqi and Libyan WMD scientists, according to a senior Bush administration official. Under the Global Partnership, launched in 2002, the G-8 nations agreed to pledge \$20 billion over 10 years for nonproliferation projects, primarily in Russia.

"It's not so much a question of (giving them) money as it is about what to do with the scientists," said the U.S. official, referring to Libya. "There are enough of them on the nuclear side to worry about: would Iran or another country try to lure them? So it's important to provide them with some activity," the official said (Fidler/Khalaf, *Financial Times*, April 30).

Meanwhile, U.S. efforts to redirect former Iraqi and Libyan WMD scientists need a better understanding of the number and types of scientists targeted and an improved effort to avoid organizing duplicating programs, according to a paper released yesterday by the Russian-American Nuclear Safety Advisory Council (RANSAC release, April 29).

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Global Security Newswire

U.S. Seeking Other Customers of Nuclear Network, Bolton Says

28 April 2004

The United States is working to track down other countries that may have obtained nuclear technology through the international network orchestrated by top Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, U.S. Undersecretary of State John Bolton said yesterday.

Earlier this year, Khan confessed to having provided nuclear technologies to Iran, Libya and North Korea. During a press conference at the United Nations yesterday, Bolton said the United States is "very interested" in learning if Khan provided technology to other countries as well.

"There's a lot of information that we don't necessarily have corroboration for. ... There's more out there than we can discuss publicly," Bolton said. "It's one of the reasons why the depth of our concern about the international black market in weapons of mass destruction and related materials is as substantial as it is," he added (Agence France-Presse/Yahoo!News, April 28).

Pakistan Cabinet Approves Tighter Nuclear Controls

5 May 2004

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan (Reuters) - Pakistan approved draft legislation Wednesday to tighten controls on exporting nuclear weapons technology and missile delivery systems after a U.N. resolution last week aimed at curbing illegal proliferation.

Pakistan has said Abdul Qadeer Khan, a top nuclear scientist revered at home as the father of its atomic bomb, had smuggled nuclear secrets to North Korea, Iran and Libya.

The scandal raised fears that weapons of mass destruction could reach the hands of militants bent on terror attacks as well as what Washington has called "rogue" states.

The Pakistani government said the cabinet had adopted the draft bill on export controls.

"The draft bill manifests Pakistan's strong commitment to the prevention of proliferation of nuclear and biological weapons and missiles capable of delivering such weapons," it said.

The statement referred to last week's U.N. resolution mandating countries to strengthen controls over sensitive technology and material related to weapons of mass destruction.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Masood Khan said the legislation, which parliament is expected to pass soon, had been under consideration for four years.

"This is big news for us," he said.

Officials said the bill envisaged severe punishment for anyone found leaking nuclear technology or hardware, although this did not apply retroactively to A.Q. Khan.

Khan, who made a televised apology for his role in the proliferation scandal in February, is closely guarded at his home in Islamabad, although authorities deny he is under house arrest.

President Pervez Musharraf pardoned the popular scientist, who said he and a few associates acted alone. Western diplomats and analysts argue that he could not have acted without support from the powerful military.

International criticism of Musharraf for the scandal and of his decision to pardon A.Q. Khan was muted, perhaps in recognition of his key role in the U.S.-led war on terror.

But Pakistan has been under quiet, yet constant pressure to strengthen safeguards surrounding its nuclear weapons program.

Pakistan vowed to develop the nuclear bomb after rival India exploded its first nuclear device in 1974 and conducted five tests weeks after India carried out its own tests in May 1998.

Defense experts say Pakistan has about 25 nuclear warheads and India about 50, although estimates vary widely on the size of the secret arsenals.

Guardian

Non-proliferation shortcuts don't pay

US double standards on nuclear proliferation are making South Asia a more dangerous place, warns Samina Ahmed of the International Crisis Group.

12 May 2004

Pakistan has closed off the pipeline through which its nuclear technology ended up in the hands of Iran, Libya and North Korea. How do we know this? Because General Pervez Musharraf says so.

That may be good enough for Washington today, but such promises will not make any of us safer in the long run. The US currently needs Pakistani help in collaring al-Qaeda, so it is little wonder Washington's response to the proliferation scandal has been meek. The US has actually praised Musharraf for his role in reining in A.Q. Khan, the self-proclaimed father of Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme, who supposedly single-handedly masterminded the sale of technology and components around the world.

Musharraf's promises will be viewed with suspicion, however, by anyone who recalls that such words come from a Pakistani leader who is juggling alliances with both the US and his country's most radical Islamist groups. This is, after all, a man who boasts that his country did whatever it took to get its hands on nuclear technology and who continues to reject the idea of any international inspections. Musharraf says he has closed down the technology sales, but the lightening speed with which he pardoned Khan and the lack of

detail about who knew what and when suggests he is more concerned with damage control than with closing down proliferation.

Keen on keeping Musharraf on its side, the US has played along, making no demands for an intrusive inspection regime and no calls for unimpeded access to Khan himself. This timid response will only encourage the spread of nuclear weapons. The fact is, Pakistan is still looking to improve its missile and weapons capabilities and, as in the past, could be tempted to do that by exchanging or selling its expertise in areas such as uranium enrichment.

What is needed is a tougher, more comprehensive non-proliferation regime that looks at all countries outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty and does not turn a blind eye to US allies. Washington must summon the will to act decisively, given the threat proliferation poses.

However, even the most wisely applied unilateral measures will prove insufficient unless they are accompanied by an international consensus to punish those responsible for irresponsible nuclear behaviour. Forging an international sanctions regime against proliferation, mandated through the United Nations Security Council, requires political will. But even that international consensus will fail unless the US learns from its past mistakes. Foremost among those lessons is the need for consistency in dealing with nuclear proliferation, both in terms of the spread of weapons and the upgrading of nuclear arms, be it freelance or state-sponsored.

Inconsistent US non-proliferation policies and weak international restraint regimes have only encouraged India and Pakistan's nuclear development. US policymakers have drawn line after line in the sand, quickly rubbing them out as India and Pakistan passed successive nuclear benchmarks. Non-proliferation sanctions were imposed and, time and again, unconditionally waived.

Over time, Washington's non-proliferation policy towards South Asia has changed from its initial emphasis on elimination of India and Pakistan's nuclear weapons programs, to the rollback to these programs, to its present emphasis on freeze. Even the stated goal of freeze is mere rhetoric. Since its early years, the Bush administration appears to have accepted India and Pakistan's nuclear weapons status. What better indicators of that change of heart than the withdrawal of all nuclear-specific sanctions on both India and Pakistan and the recent US decision to lift curbs on the sale and transfer to India of dual use high technologies and goods, which could easily be converted for military use.

What is needed now is an intensive, multilateral list of targeted, substantial and sustained sanctions. Sanctions should focus on key political, military, bureaucratic, and scientific decision-makers. These should include travel restrictions and a freeze on their foreign deposits. Curbs should also be imposed on loans or grants to any organisation involved in proliferation. These smart sanctions must be linked to clearly defined and verifiable non-proliferation benchmarks. These should include accession to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)'s Additional Protocol, which requires signatory states to provide an expanded declaration of their nuclear activities and grants the IAEA broader access to suspected sites.

Since unilateral sanctions are limited in their effectiveness, the US should join with others to strengthen the Missile Technology Control Regime and other denial regimes. President Bush's call on major nuclear suppliers to impose tighter export controls and a ban on uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing equipment is a step in the right direction, as is his support for more stringent inspection measures. In partnership with the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the US should also retain and impose additional restrictions on the sale and transfer of dual use technologies and goods that could potentially contribute to nuclear weapons development.

Multilateral mechanisms must be devised to monitor high technology and dual use transfers to prevent them from falling into the wrong hands.

Without these tough measures, India is bound to move ahead with its pledge to deploy a nuclear triad - that is, weapons that can be delivered from land, sea and air. Pakistan is sure to follow, given the dual imperatives of prestige and security. The deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems in South Asia would greatly increase the prospects of a catastrophic nuclear exchange.

Restrictions on technology might slow down India and Pakistan's nuclear development. But without the threat of sanctions, states such as Pakistan could as easily revert to trading what it needs in the underground nuclear bazaar, encouraging new networks of proliferation to prosper. India too will be encouraged to expand its nuclear development if external supplies fill the gaps in its current capabilities.

Since a policy of carefully calibrated, consistent and strategic use of carrots and sticks works best, appropriate and conditional incentives should accompany sanctions.

There should also be zero international tolerance for sanctions busters. Above all, the US will have to give up its preferential non-proliferation policies that have only encouraged some of its allies to expand their

weapons programmes and even sell their technology. Such state-driven proliferation, if unchecked, will continue to aid and abet nuclear underground networks.

Global Security Newswire

U.S. Customs Set to Screen Ship Cargo Leaving Tokyo

21 May 2004

U.S. Customs and Border Protection personnel are set to be deployed to Tokyo today to begin screening high-risk cargo containers being shipped to the United States, according to U.S. and Japanese officials.

Customs and Border Protection Commissioner Robert Bonner and the Japanese Customs and Tariff Bureau announced the deployment today as part of the Container Security Initiative. The port of Tokyo would become the 19th port to operate under that program, according to the announcement.

“Because CSI will detect and deter attempts by terrorists to exploit cargo containers, the Container Security Initiative is an insurance policy against terrorism,” Bonner said in a prepared statement.

Customs and Border Protection officers are already deployed to the Japanese port of Yokohama under a reciprocal bilateral agreement, and Japanese customs officials are operating in the U.S. port of Los Angeles/Long Beach.

Global Security Newswire

Nuclear Smuggling Case Illustrates Trafficking

24 May 2004

U.S. authorities contend that the case of Asher Karni, an Israeli businessman accused of trying to sell nuclear components to an associate in Pakistan, offers insight into the international network of nuclear trafficking, the *Los Angeles Times* reported today.

“There are Iranian networks, Chinese networks, Middle East networks, sophisticated networks buying technology and parts all over the world,” said a senior official at the U.S. Homeland Security Department. “They’re operating in the United States every day. Some of them are family businesses, where fathers pass it on to their sons,” the official added.

Officials said the Karni case is an example of what they believe is an international network of entrepreneurs, transporters, scientists, manufacturers, government agents, organized-crime syndicates and possibly terrorists, the *Times* reported.

One network was discovered early this year when Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan confessed to selling nuclear weapons programs to Iran, Libya and North Korea.

“This is another piece in the global puzzle of suppliers and buyers, middlemen and [front companies] all over the planet,” said Representative Christopher Cox (R-Calif.), chairman of the House Select Committee on Homeland Security, who added that he was not commenting on Karni’s guilt or innocence. “The problem was hardly created on Sept. 11. But the stark reality of it and the unspeakable consequences of it have now gripped policy-makers,” he added.

Karni is suspected of trying to ship to Pakistan up to 200 triggered spark gaps, dual-use items that could be used as nuclear detonators. He is charged with violating the federal Export Control Act and other laws; federal authorities have kept Karni in custody since his arrest, arguing that he is a flight risk and a national security threat. He faces a maximum sentence of 10 years in prison (Josh Meyer, *Los Angeles Times*, May 24).

GLOBAL THREAT REDUCTION INITIATIVE

DOCUMENTEN

US Department of Energy

U.S. Wants to Intensify Global Nuclear Security Efforts

Research reactors targeted by new program, energy secretary says
26 May 2004

U.S. Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham has announced a global initiative to intensify and accelerate efforts aimed at preventing high-risk nuclear and radiological materials from falling into the hands of terrorists or rogue states.

In May 26 remarks at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, Austria, Abraham said that the program, called the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, is designed to address the threat posed by the entire range of nuclear materials.

It includes:

- accelerating the repatriation of Russian-origin, high-enriched uranium fuel and both Russian- and U.S.-origin spent fuel;
- converting the cores of civilian research reactors that use high-enriched uranium to use low-enriched uranium instead; and
- identifying and securing equipment not covered by existing threat reduction efforts.

Abraham said that despite progress made by the United States and Russia in improving the security of nuclear materials, more comprehensive and urgent efforts are needed to respond to emerging and evolving threats.

He said that a significant amount of such materials in research reactors and other equipment around the world still poses a proliferation challenge. Abraham noted that more than 200 research reactors are close to the end of their lifespans, and an additional 400 have already been shut down or decommissioned.

The United States and other countries are concerned that terrorists may steal or acquire high-enriched uranium or spent nuclear reactor fuel from a research or other facility to produce a nuclear bomb or, more likely, a "dirty" bomb -- a device that disperses radioactive materials.

"We are forced to assume that rogue states and terrorists, in concert with for-profit proliferators, will act vigorously to achieve their ends," he said.

Abraham said that more money and international cooperation will be required to meet this challenge and complete the job.

He said that international collaboration will be critical in regard to non-Russian and non-U.S. materials -- materials located beyond the reach of the two countries and materials posing a threat that can be effectively addressed only multilaterally.

The energy secretary called on other countries to join the program and participate in a related conference this fall.

He said that a new office will be established in his department to consolidate and accelerate efforts to reduce the threat posed by nuclear materials and to develop, in collaboration with other agencies, a diplomatic strategy to secure, remove or eliminate those materials.

Following is the text of Abraham's remarks as prepared for delivery:

Department of Energy

[Vienna, Austria]

May 26, 2004

International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna

Remarks prepared for Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham

Thank you, [IAEA] Director General [Mohamed] ElBaradei.

Today, I have a special message for the men and women on your staff, many of whom are in the room today, and for the delegates and representatives to this body.

Your efforts are crucial to international safety and security in a world that grows ever more dangerous each day. I know that it often may seem like thankless work -- certainly it is often anonymous work.

But believe me when I say that you labor on the frontlines of the 21st century's greatest conflict --- a conflict between the civilized nations of the earth, and the terrorists and terrorist states that would use devastating technologies to destroy them.

Tens of millions of people in New York, Rome, Geneva, Tokyo, Sydney, London, and other spots all over the globe will sleep soundly tonight because people like you and others who work on these challenges are tireless in their efforts. They rest assured that very capable men and women are on the job, thwarting the malignant designs of very bad people.

My government takes your mission very seriously. It is our mission as well. We thank you, and we pledge our determination and resources to help you go about the business of making the world a safer place.

Saying you want to make the world a safer place is simple. The challenge of actually doing that is the hard part. And that challenge is growing increasingly complicated in a world where technology and science make constant advances ... and where terrorists and rogue states look to use these advances for nefarious purposes.

Where one hundred years ago, authorities had to worry about the anarchist placing a bomb in the downtown square ... now we must worry about the terrorist who places that bomb in the square, but packed with radiological material.

Whereas once we had to worry about the madman whose ambition, within the realm of possibility, was to assassinate a world leader ... worry about the madmen whose ambition is to destroy a world capital.

The recent revelations of the complex network established by [Pakistani scientist] A.Q. Khan give startling scope to the nonproliferation challenge we collectively face. Coupled with the horrific attacks of September 11, 2001, Bali, and, most recently, Madrid, we are forced to assume that rogue states and terrorists, in concert with for-profit proliferators, will act vigorously to achieve their ends.

The large quantities of uncontrolled or lightly controlled nuclear and radiological material of potential use in nuclear weapons or radiological dispersion devices have added an entirely new dimension to this worldwide threat. Over 200 of the world's research reactors are nearing the end of their lifespans. Four hundred reactors have already shut down or been decommissioned, creating large quantities of spent fuel and radiological sources that must be secured and/or disposed of.

Our challenge could not be more clear: As the 21st century takes shape, the stakes are higher. The dangers are increased. The worries are graver. Our challenge is more pronounced.

Commensurately, our resolve must be greater.

The United States already plays a prominent role in responding to these myriad proliferation threats.

Over the course of the last decade, we have developed a number of programs to support the global effort to remove and/or secure vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials:

- To reduce stockpiles and available quantities of nuclear materials, we have been working closely with Russia to irreversibly blend-down at least 500 metric tons of surplus high-enriched uranium (HEU). At the end of 2003, over 200 metric tons had been eliminated.

- We have accelerated our efforts to secure 600 metric tons of weapons-usable material in Russia. To date, we have upgraded security on over 40 percent of this material.

- We are working to further reduce quantities of weapons-usable HEU by converting research reactors in the United States and abroad to use low-enriched uranium (LEU), and we are working to eliminate 174 metric tons of HEU in the United States.

- We are also working proactively and cooperatively with Libya, the IAEA, and international partners to dismantle Libya's weapons of mass destruction infrastructure.

- We are coordinating with our counterparts in Moscow to return Russian-origin HEU fuel to Russia. In 2003, in cooperation with the IAEA and with Minatom [Russian atomic energy agency], we removed 17 kilograms of Russian-origin fresh HEU from Bulgaria and returned it to Russia for safe storage.

- We also returned approximately 14 kilograms of fresh Russian-origin HEU from Romania to Russia to be down-blended and used for civil nuclear purposes. And most recently, working with the IAEA, we returned 17 kilograms of HEU from Libya's research reactor to Russia.

- Under the U.S.-origin spent fuel return program, we have returned approximately 1,100 kilograms of HEU spent fuel to the United States for final disposition. We are cooperating with approximately 40 countries to improve the security and controls of high-risk radiological materials that could be used in a radiological dispersal device, or "dirty bomb."

- And, we have recovered and secured approximately 10,000 high-risk radiological sources in the United States, a figure that exceeds our congressionally mandated target for recovering and securing our domestic sources.

In addition, last year the United States and the Russian Federation co-hosted an international conference with the IAEA to address the threat posed by dirty bombs, and to come up with a joint course of action.

It was a very successful conference. More than 120 nations participated, and it produced action on a variety of fronts, including:

- Identifying high-risk radioactive sources that were not under secure and regulated control, including "orphan" sources.

- Launching an international initiative to facilitate the location, recovery, and securing of such sources.

- And, calling on all IAEA member states to enhance their own national regulatory bodies to address safety and security of radioactive sources in their countries.

I am proud of our action to deal with RDDs [radiation dispersal devices], just as I am proud of all of the efforts I mentioned. The work my Department has done in conjunction with the IAEA and the international community has, to a large degree, been very effective.

But we would be fooling ourselves --- and endangering our citizens -- to think that these past efforts are enough. The continually shifting nature of geopolitics ... the ever-forward advancement of science and technology ... the hardened determination of terrorists to sow death and destruction --- all of these demand that we continually reassess the situation, that we constantly revisit the topic at hand, and that we incessantly update our defenses and our plans to combat proliferation threats.

That is why I have come to Vienna this week.

As the global proliferation threat continues to evolve, it has become clear that an even more comprehensive and urgently focused effort is needed to respond to emerging and evolving threats.

Although we are accomplishing much, there is more we can do.

So this morning I am announcing that, in order to respond to this evolving proliferation threat, the United States is establishing a new initiative to secure, remove, or dispose of an even broader range of nuclear and radiological materials around the world that are vulnerable to theft.

We are calling this new initiative the Global Threat Reduction Initiative --- or GTRI.

This Global Threat Reduction Initiative is an attempt to present a workable strategy for addressing the threat posed by the entire spectrum of nuclear materials. It reflects the realities of the 21st century that were so startlingly made clear on a September morning three years ago.

We have developed this initiative with the expectation it can comprehensively and more thoroughly address the challenges posed by nuclear and radiological materials and related equipment that require attention, anywhere in the world, by ensuring they will not fall into the hands of those with evil intentions.

We will do this by the securing, removing, relocating or disposing of these materials and equipment -- whatever the most appropriate circumstance may be -- as quickly and expeditiously as possible.

Specifically under the Initiative:

- We will first work in partnership with Russia to repatriate all Russian-origin fresh HEU fuel by the end of next year. We will also work with Russia to accelerate and complete the repatriation of all Russian-origin spent fuel by 2010. We will do this on a priority basis according to security threat, so that we remove or secure the most dangerous materials first.

- Likewise, we will take all steps necessary to accelerate and complete the repatriation of all U.S.-origin research reactor spent fuel under our existing program from locations around the world within a decade. Again, we will undertake these efforts in an order dictated by the need to handle the most dangerous, least secure materials first.

- Third, we will work to convert the cores of civilian research reactors that use HEU to use low enriched uranium fuel instead. We will do this not just in the United States --- where we are scheduled to complete core conversion by 2013 --- but throughout the entire world. And we will target those reactors first where the threats and vulnerabilities are highest.

- Fourth, we will work to identify other nuclear and radiological materials and related equipment that are not yet covered by existing threat reduction efforts, and we will rapidly address the most vulnerable facilities first, to ensure that there are not any gaps that would enable a terrorist to acquire these materials for evil purposes.

To help do all this, we will establish a single organization within the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration to focus exclusively on these efforts.

Moreover, we are prepared to spend the resources necessary to guarantee success. The United States plans to dedicate more than \$450 million to this effort which should be more than sufficient to complete the U.S. Foreign Research Reactor Spent Fuel Return, the Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return efforts and to also fund the conversion of all targeted U.S. and Russian supplied research reactor cores under the Reduced Enrichment for Test Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) program. But we will need more funds --- and heightened international cooperation --- to finish the job.

Dedicated as we are to this effort, it is also clear to me that a truly effective nonproliferation regime is made up of the collaboration of efforts by all of us, not just a few. This is particularly the case regarding the collection of materials that are not of Russian or American origin, or that may be located in places where cooperation requires a broader international effort, and that pose certain challenges that the United States and Russia cannot address alone.

So today I am also proposing that the IAEA and international community join us in holding a Global Threat Reduction Initiative Partners' Conference later this Fall. This conference would examine how to address material collection and security in places where --- as mentioned before --- a broader international effort is required. It would also focus on material collection and security of other proliferation-attractive materials, not of U.S. or Russian origin, such as those located at conversion facilities, reprocessing plants, and industrial sites, as well as the funding of such work.

In the coming weeks, we will be discussing this event in more detail with Director General ElBaradei and the IAEA and I expect we will be issuing invitations very soon.

Consolidating current programs ... speeding the return of Russian and U.S. origin fuel ... securing the most dangerous materials worldwide to reduce the most perilous threats ... working together on an international basis. That is the agenda before us.

We will take these steps because we must. The circumstances of a dangerous world have thrust this responsibility on the shoulders of the civilized world. We don't have the luxury of sitting back and not taking action.

As President Bush said in a speech at the National Defense University in February: "The greatest threat before humanity today is the possibility of secret and sudden attack with chemical or biological or radiological or nuclear weapons... America, and the entire civilized world, will face this threat for decades to come."

He is right: We will face this threat for years to come.

Not only will we ... we must.

The responsibility falls to us ... to take necessary action to prevent the horrors of 9/11 being replayed, but on a nuclear scale. That is why the President has increased attention on this evolving threat and as a result of his February speech we have undertaken this new Initiative.

The responsibility falls to us ... to ensure that the civilized world continues to enjoy the peaceful uses of the atom --- in medicine, electricity generation, and beyond --- while minimizing or eliminating any dangers.

I am optimistic that we can do this.

And because of the resolve shown by President Bush, Director General ElBaradei, Member Nations and the dedicated men and women of the IAEA, I am confident that we will. Thank you.

IAEA

IAEA Welcomes US New Global Threat Reduction Initiative

IAEA Staff Report – 27 May 2004

The IAEA has welcomed the US announcement of a new comprehensive global initiative to address the issue of nuclear security around the world and reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism.

The Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) was announced by United States Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham 26 May at a meeting with IAEA senior officials at the IAEA headquarters in Vienna. The initiative aims to minimize as quickly as possible the amount of nuclear material available that could be used for nuclear weapons. It will also seek to put into place mechanisms to ensure that nuclear and radiological materials and related equipment -- wherever they may be in the world -- are not used for malicious purposes.

"We will do this by the securing, removing, relocating or disposing of these materials and equipment--whatever the most appropriate circumstance may be--as quickly and expeditiously as possible", Secretary Abraham said.

At a press conference, IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei said security issues have become a global priority in the past several years, with nuclear weapons related know-how spreading extensively. He said this makes the control of nuclear material that could be used for nuclear weapons extremely critical, and welcomed the proposal on the part of Secretary Abraham and the United States.

"The proposal is a continuation and extension of initiatives that the IAEA, the USA and others have been working on for many years, and with renewed intensity in the past couple of years, to address nuclear security around the world", Dr. ElBaradei said.

Under the GTRI initiative, the US would work with the IAEA and other partners to:

- Repatriate all Russian-origin fresh high enriched uranium fuel (in cooperation with Russia and the other countries concerned) by the end of next year, and accelerate and complete the repatriation of all Russian-origin spent fuel by 2010.
- Take all steps necessary to accelerate and complete the repatriation of all U.S.-origin research reactor spent fuel under existing US program from locations around the world.
- Work to convert the cores of civilian research reactors that use high enriched uranium to use low enriched uranium fuel, throughout the world.
- Work to identify other nuclear and radiological materials and related equipment that are not yet covered by existing threat reduction efforts, and rapidly address the most vulnerable facilities first, to ensure that there are no gaps that would enable a terrorist to acquire these materials for malevolent purposes.

The US will establish a single organization within the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration to focus exclusively on these efforts. It plans to dedicate more than \$450 million to them.

International and global cooperation will be an integral part of the GTRI initiative. At his announcement, Secretary Abrahams also proposed that the IAEA and international community join in holding a Global Threat Reduction Initiative Partners' Conference.

This conference would examine how to address material collection and security in places where a broader international effort is required. It would also focus on material collection and security of other proliferation-attractive materials, such as those located at conversion facilities, reprocessing plants, and industrial sites, as well as the funding of such work.

BERICHTEN

Financial Times

US and Russia to sign enriched uranium retrieval deal

By Carola Hoyos in London – 26 May 2004

The US and Russia will sign a bilateral initiative as early as this week to retrieve highly enriched uranium from unsecured research facilities.

Spencer Abraham, US energy secretary, is expected to outline the initiative in a speech at the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna tomorrow, before he travels on to Moscow.

Mr Abraham said the problem of uranium being vulnerable to theft by terrorists was "one of the most significant challenges that are unaddressed fully right now".

In an interview with the FT, he said: "We are very close to a government-to-government agreement to go from an ad hoc to a more formalised and very systematic programme to retrieve fresh and spent fuel and convert reactors to work without them."

The programme, which has in the past targeted facilities in countries such as Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria and Libya, should fill "major gaps" in the fight against proliferation of nuclear materials.

In Vienna, Mr Abraham hopes to heighten awareness among non-nuclear weapons states about the safety of nuclear material in their research laboratories.

The US hopes to reduce the risk that terrorists could obtain stolen nuclear material to build a radiological or dirty bomb, or even short-cut the process of making the core of a nuclear bomb.

Under the US-Russian programme, highly enriched uranium - originally supplied by Russia and the US - would be extracted from reactors with the agreement of the host country, and taken back to where it came from. The reactor would then be converted to use uranium which was not so highly enriched and therefore unusable in a nuclear weapon, Mr Abraham said. He added that the US "pays the bill".

The US is also concerned about research reactors in Iran, but Mr Abraham said Washington would need a third party with diplomatic ties to Tehran to help secure the uranium there.

There are 15-17 reactors using enriched uranium that originated in Russia and about the same number of facilities using material that originated in the US.

Associated Press

U.S. Seeks to Rid World of 'Dirty Bombs'

VIENNA, Austria - Moving to ease the threat of "dirty bomb" attacks, U.S. Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham announced a \$450 million global cleanup of nuclear materials Wednesday to keep them out of terrorist hands.

The Global Threat Reduction Initiative would remove and secure high-risk radioactive materials that pose a menace to the international community, Abraham said.

"Where 100 years ago authorities had to worry about the anarchist placing a bomb in the downtown square, now we must worry about the terrorist who places that bomb in the square, but packed with radiological material," he told an International Atomic Energy Agency conference on nuclear safety.

The initiative was praised by the head of the U.N. nuclear watchdog agency, but some independent experts said it would not go far enough fast enough.

Since the Sept. 11 attacks on the United States, concerns have grown that terrorists might be trying to acquire material for a so-called dirty bomb - a device that uses conventional explosives to spread low-level radioactive material over several city blocks.

The approach of the Aug. 13-29 Athens Olympics has focused fresh attention on the threat.

The United States provided Greek police and border officials with radiation detection equipment this week to help guard the Games against a nuclear or dirty bomb. Abraham said the security package was similar to one provided during the 2002 Salt Lake City Olympics.

Efforts to collect, secure and dispose of nuclear material began long ago, but the new program offers an "accelerated and more structured framework" for the work, he said.

Dirty bombs use lower-grade radioactive isotopes, such as those used in medicine or research. If a dirty bomb were to be detonated, the radiation release probably would be small.

Nuclear bombs, by contrast, have cores made of either highly enriched uranium or plutonium, materials normally kept under tight security.

Even so, the initiative includes a plan to convert research reactors using highly enriched uranium to lower grade fuel by 2013, Abraham said. IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei said there are 100 such reactors in 40 countries.

Abraham said his first priority is to bring back to the United States some 330 tons of Russian-origin, highly enriched uranium by the end of 2005. More than 220 tons have been eliminated so far.

All Russian spent fuel would be recovered by 2010, while all U.S.-origin spent fuel would be recovered within a decade. Spent fuel can be processed to extract plutonium, which can be used to make nuclear bombs.

Concerns that terrorists could obtain material for a dirty bomb have risen since the father of Pakistan's nuclear program, Abdul Qadeer Khan, disclosed this year that he sold equipment used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons to Iran, Libya and North Korea.

Experts say the same clandestine black market that enabled those countries to obtain nuclear weapons technology might also have supplied bomb components or plans to terrorists.

"It has become clear that an even more comprehensive and urgently focused effort is needed to respond to emerging and evolving threats," Abraham said. "Moreover, we are prepared to spend the resources necessary to guarantee success."

"But we will need more funds, and heightened international cooperation, to finish the job," he said. "We hope there will be universal participation in this. By not only returning fuel from our own country (but also Russia's), we hope to set an example others will follow."

ElBaradei described Abraham's plan as a major step to strengthen the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and crack down on a black market for nuclear technology that has drawn terrorist interest.

"This is clearly a key in our fight to control proliferation ... to protect ourselves from nuclear terrorists," ElBaradei said. "We need to re-examine our rules of the game. We need to adjust our defenses ... The first line of defense is having adequate protection of nuclear material."

But Graham Allison, director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, part of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, told The Associated Press that Abraham's plan doesn't address the problem of recovering as much material as possible fast enough.

"Even as stated, the scale and the effort and the speed at which things are proposed to be done ... is still woefully disproportionate to the challenge that he rightly states," Allison said.

For example, an estimated 43 percent of the stockpiles and supply of highly enriched uranium in Russia is expected to be culled and removed by the end of the year.

"But what about the timetable for the remaining 57 percent?" Allison asked.

"If there's a nuclear 9-11 tomorrow in New York or Paris or Stockholm, where will the weapon come from?" he continued. "Russia is obviously, I would say, at the top of the list because they have the most stuff." Matthew Bunn, a nuclear expert at Harvard University, said for the proposal to truly have a global impact it must have the backing of President Bush and sweep away bureaucratic rules. "The key is being flexible enough to offer the kind of incentives to convince states and sites to give up this material," he told AP.

Guardian

US plan to beat dirty bombs

Ian Traynor – 27 May 2004

The US yesterday unveiled a plan to stop terrorists getting material for radioactive "dirty bombs" and to stem the risk of nuclear proliferation, announcing a \$450m (£250m) programme to repatriate nuclear fuel scattered around the globe.

In a speech at the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, the US energy secretary, Spencer Abraham, laid out a six-year timetable for recovering uranium fuel from research reactors supplied by the US and the former Soviet Union.

Mr Abraham is to travel to Moscow today to sign an agreement with the Russian atomic energy ministry, under which Washington is to finance the repatriation to Russia of uranium fuel from 20 research reactors in 17 countries. The fuel, much of it weapons-grade or easily refined for use in a nuclear device, is to be stored in Russia and blended down.

With experts, diplomats, and governments assuming that it is merely a matter of time before terrorists obtain a "dirty bomb" - a conventional bomb laced with radioactive material - the plan is also to target lower grade radiological instruments commonly used in medicine, agriculture and science.

The initiative is part of a strategy emerging from the Bush administration aimed at curbing nuclear proliferation and preventing so-called rogue states or terrorist groups obtaining nuclear weapons. Mr Abraham said the priority was to recover 300 tonnes of high enriched uranium and have it stored in Russia by the end of next year.

Over the past 18 months the Russians and the Americans have cooperated quietly to send back nuclear materials to Russia from Serbia, Bulgaria, and Romania.

"An even more comprehensive and urgently focused effort is needed to respond to emerging and evolving threats," Mr Abraham said.

Despite the regular tensions between Washington and the IAEA over international nuclear policy, the agency's chief, Mohammed El Baradei, welcomed the US move as a "major initiative."

PROLIFERATIE ALGEMEEN

BERICHTEN

Global Security Newswire

“Breakout” Nuclear States Concern Experts

25 May 2004

“Virtual” nuclear weapon states — those countries that have mastered the basics of nuclear power and could move rapidly to develop nuclear arms — have become a subject of much concern and discussion by nuclear and security experts, the *New York Times* reported today.

With what seems like relative ease, scientists today could divert a peaceful nuclear program to make highly enriched uranium or plutonium. Countries with that level of nuclear know-how include Japan, Germany, Belgium, Canada, Brazil, Kazakhstan, Taiwan and about a dozen others, according to the *Times*.

Experts refer to this crossing of the line between nuclear power and nuclear weapons development as “breakout.”

The question now is whether nuclear power and nuclear arms programs can be separated, the *Times* said. New initiatives are being created to erect such a barrier.

“We can’t give absolute guarantees,” said Graham Andrew, a senior scientist at the International Atomic Energy Agency. “But there will be technological developments to make the fuel cycle more proliferation-resistant,” he added.

“The future looks better than the past in terms of this whole problem,” said Rose Gottemoeller, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “At the moment, it’s a very, very fast-moving arena that a lot of people are into and thinking about,” she added.

Countries can receive support in developing nuclear power plants if they pledge to renounce nuclear arms. That principle was codified in the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and the International Atomic Energy Agency was created to monitor peaceful nuclear programs.

However, surveillance and support have not always stopped nuclear weapon development.

“If you look at every nation that’s recently gone nuclear, they’ve done it through the civilian nuclear fuel cycle: Iraq, North Korea, India, Pakistan, South Africa,” said Paul Leventhal, president of the Nuclear Control Institute. “And now we’re worried about Iran,” he added.

Experts say Iran provides a good example of the breakout danger. IAEA inspectors have found that Iran had been keeping some of its most sensitive nuclear work under wraps for as long as 18 years.

With Russian help, Iran is building a reactor at Bushehr on the Persian Gulf, which officials say would be fueled by low-enriched uranium. Experts say this is the type of peaceful nuclear program that could easily be transformed into a military project.

Uranium fuel generally remains in a reactor for up to four years and, as a byproduct of fission, accumulates plutonium 239, one of two materials ideally suited for making nuclear bombs.

However, the spent fuel also accumulates plutonium 240, which is so radioactive that it can be difficult to turn into weapons. Changing the reactor’s fuel every few months cuts the plutonium 240 levels for weapon building.

Undersecretary of State John Bolton recently told Congress that Bushehr could make enough plutonium for more than 80 nuclear weapons after several years of operation.

IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei is calling for multinational regimes prohibiting any individual country from enriching uranium or reprocessing plutonium on its own. Groups of countries would have to undertake such projects, ensuring instantaneous verification that the work is peaceful.

Iran this month gave some indications that it might be interested in participating in such a group project with Russia and Europe, the *Times* said.

Members of such a consortium should be guaranteed lifetime fuel supplies and spent-fuel removal, under the condition that they forgo building their own enrichment and reprocessing plants, said Matthew Bunn, a nuclear expert at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government.

“What you need is an incentive,” he said.

U.S. President George W. Bush proposed in February to limit the number of countries allowed to produce nuclear fuel to only those countries that already have that capacity.

While many experts agree that a freeze is the best policy, some worry that there is not enough incentive being given to those frozen out of the nuclear game.

“It’s all sticks and no carrots,” Bunn said. “I think you can couch this to be more carrotlike,” he added (William Broad, *New York Times*, May 25).

KRONIEK 2004

januari	Lord Robertson vertrekt als Secretaris-Generaal van de NAVO
1 januari	Ierland neemt voorzitterschap EU over
1 januari	Einde Nederlands voorzitterschap OVSE
1 januari	Verenigde Staten nemen voorzitterschap G8 over
20 januari - 26 maart	Eerste sessie Conference on Disarmament, Geneve
21-25 januari	World Economic Forum, Davos
6-7 februari	Annual Munich Security Conference, München
20 februari	Parlementsverkiezingen Iran
27 februari	Bezoek Schröder aan Washington
maart	Parlementsverkiezingen Spanje
1 maart	Ministeriële bijeenkomst VS-EU, Washington
8 maart	IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, Wenen
14 maart	Presidentsverkiezingen Rusland
2 april	Bezoek Colin Powell aan Duitsland en België
2 april	Informele bijeenkomst NAVO Ministers van Defensie
5 april	Parlementsverkiezingen Indonesië
5-23 april	UN Disarmament Commission, jaarlijkse bijeenkomst, New York
9-16 april	Bezoek Dick Cheney aan China, Japan en Zuid-Korea
15 april	Parlementsverkiezingen Zuid-Korea
26 april – 7 mei	NPT PrepCom, New York
mei	Bijeenkomst Chemical Weapons Convention, Den Haag
1 mei	Toetreding diverse landen tot de Europese Unie
10 mei -25 juni	Tweede sessie Conference on Disarmament, Geneve
juni	Verkiezingen Europees Parlement
juni	Parlementsverkiezingen Japan
5-6	Bezoek George W. Bush aan Frankrijk
8-10 juni	G-8 Summit, Sea Island, Georgia
14 juni	IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, Wenen
28-29 juni	NAVO-top, Istanbul
1 juli	Nederland neemt voorzitterschap EU over
19-30 juli	Biological Weapons Convention, expert meeting, Geneve
september	Start Algemene Vergadering Verenigde Naties, New York
26 juli – 10 september	Derde sessie Conference on Disarmament, Geneve
13 september	IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, Wenen
20-24 september	IAEA General Conference, Wenen
27 september	IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, Wenen
2 november	Presidentsverkiezingen Verenigde Staten
25 november	IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, Wenen
6-10 december	Jaarlijkse bijeenkomst Biological Weapons Convention, Geneve

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Relevante delen van de partijprogramma's van de Nederlandse politieke partijen, plus citaten van politici op het terrein van oorlog en vrede.
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Overzicht van recente ontwikkelingen in de transatlantische betrekkingen, met name binnen de NAVO, mede naar aanleiding van uitspraken in de State of the Union.
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 32. Begroting Buitenlandse Zaken – Proliferatievraagstukken
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