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NON PROLIFERATION TREATY PREPCOM 2004 VERKLARINGEN

GENERAL DEBATE

Australia

[...] The extent of the Khan proliferation network illustrated starkly the critical importance of effective national controls over production and export of sensitive technology, materials and know how, and of international coordination in the application of national laws. We urge all NPT parties to ensure their controls on relevant items and technology are of a standard at least equivalent to the major nuclear export control regimes, and are strictly enforced.

Australia welcomes the proposed UN Security Council non-proliferation resolution which, among other steps, will require states to enact effective domestic controls, including export controls, to prevent WMD proliferation. We hope this resolution will be adopted soon. We would like to see the UN Security Council more active in defending the nuclear non-proliferation norm and responding firmly when states breach their safeguards obligations.

The peaceful nuclear cooperation provisions of Article IV are an essential part of the balance of rights and obligations states which assume under the Treaty. NPT parties which violate their safeguards obligations should not expect to enjoy the benefits of peaceful nuclear cooperation. NPT parties should refrain from any nuclear cooperation with any state called on by the IAEA Board of Governors to rectify violations of its safeguards obligations until the Board determines the state is back in full compliance.

The risk of NPT parties misusing the Treaty's peaceful nuclear energy provisions in order to acquire the technical basis for a rapid breakout to nuclear weapons is a serious matter for the international community. Australia is ready to work in appropriate forums on ways to address this danger, including by considering the ideas raised by IAEA Director General ElBaradei and US President Bush. Australia considers a moratorium on new enrichment and reprocessing plants should be applied while an appropriate framework is developed to ensure such projects do not present a risk to non-proliferation objectives. [...]

We should be quite clear that, while only a few NPT parties are cause for compliance concerns, this situation directly threatens the NPT's non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful use objectives. It is simply not conceivable that a world free of nuclear weapons will be achieved in the absence of complete and permanent assurances of nuclear non-proliferation. Non-proliferation assurances are also fundamental to the climate of long term assurance and stability necessary for peaceful nuclear cooperation. [...]

We acknowledge the progress made on nuclear disarmament, but together with other non-nuclear weapon states expect continued movement by the nuclear weapon states in giving effect to their disarmament obligations. Australia regards the Treaty of Moscow as a significant step towards nuclear disarmament. We look forward to the Moscow Treaty's full implementation which, within a decade, will see US and Russian deployed strategic nuclear warheads reduced by two thirds. It is important that the nuclear weapon states be as transparent as possible regarding their nuclear weapons policies and the actions taken to fulfil NPT nuclear disarmament obligations.

With 171 signatories and 112 ratifications the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) has established a powerful international norm against nuclear testing. Australia urges those yet to sign or ratify the CTBT to do so without delay. Until the CTBT enters into force, existing moratoriums on nuclear testing must be maintained and strong support for development of the CTBT's International Monitoring System sustained. [...]

The Proliferation Security Initiative developed to impede illicit WMD and missile related trafficking has evolved rapidly as a valuable reinforcement for the NPT and other WMD treaties. Over 60 countries have now indicated their support for the PSI. [...]

(Ambassador Mr. H.E. Mr Peter Tesch, Deputy Permanent Representative, 26 April 2004)

Canada

[...] We expect nothing less than full and unequivocal commitment to the letter and spirit of both the non-proliferation and disarmament obligations of the NPT. A world that contains 30,000 nuclear weapons, has 30,000 too many. We need to be bringing these levels down in a progressive and systematic manner. These reductions should be undertaken in a way that renders them irreversible, that is transparent as to the results and provides for verification of these results. It is only through measurable progress on that basis, towards fulfilment of the obligation to eliminate all nuclear weapons, that the nuclear-weapon States will be able to assure the rest of the Treaty's membership that they are respecting their end of the bargain. The 13 steps toward nuclear disarmament, enumerated in the 2000 Review Conference document, constitute a significant action plan against which to measure progress. [...]

In reviving multilateral disarmament activity, it is also essential to demonstrate to those outside the NPT regime, that security is not seen as dependent on acquiring nuclear arsenals. The greater the emphasis on the physical and doctrinal reduction of nuclear weapons in the security posture of the NWS party to this Treaty, the less attraction such weapons will have to those on the outside looking in and the more open they will be over time to reversing the nuclearisation that has occurred and joining the multilateral consensus. It is integral to this Treaty that we all seek to reduce the political or military value ascribed to nuclear weapons in order to facilitate their elimination. Our policies and practices should consistently reflect this stance. To send mixed messages in this regard is to compromise a central feature of this Treaty. [...]

(Mr. Paul Meyer, Ambassador to the United Nations for Disarmament, 26 April 2004)

China

[...] The disclosure of the nuclear smuggling network indicates loopholes in the international non-proliferation regime. The growing risk of terrorists acquiring WMD further demonstrates the significance and urgency to improve the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. China supports speeding up negotiations to amend the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material so as to strengthen physical protection of nuclear weapons and materials and strengthen countries' ability to prevent acquisition of radioactive materials by non-state entities. It must be pointed out that the amendment of the convention should be strengthening, rather than undermining the current international law, let alone granting any country in any manner the right to attack other countries' civilian nuclear facilities. China supports the United Nations to play a role in non-proliferation and is in favour of the Security Council on the basis of full consultation passing relevant resolutions to prevent the smuggling of WMD by non-state entities.

China takes note of the proposals to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. We hold an open attitude to suggestions conducive to maintaining and strengthening the regime and stands ready to discuss such issues with all countries. China believes that any non-proliferation measures should be based on the international law and conducive to resolving the questions of WMD proliferation through political and diplomatic means without undermining the legitimate rights and interests of any sovereign state. [...]

Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation are mutually supportive and complimentary to each other. In the world today, confrontation between countries, especially big countries, has declined while cooperation has strengthened; international terrorism and proliferation of WMDs have become important threats to international security. In this situation, such moves as adopting pre-emptive strike strategy, explicitly listing other states as targets of nuclear strike, lowering the threshold of using nuclear weapons, research and development of new types of easy-to-use nuclear weapons, and shortening the time of preparation for nuclear tests not only run counter to international trend, but also do harm to international non-proliferation efforts, which is in the interests of no state. [...]

China holds that all nuclear weapon states explicitly reaffirm their commitments to a complete and thorough elimination of nuclear weapons, undertake to stop the research and development of new types of nuclear weapons, ratify the CTBT as soon as possible and observe the moratorium, lower the role of nuclear weapons in national security policy and refrain from listing any state as nuclear strike target. The two states

with the biggest nuclear arsenals should implement nuclear weapon reduction treaties that have been reached and further reduce their nuclear arsenals in an effectively verifiable and irreversible manner so as to create conditions for other nuclear weapon states to join the nuclear disarmament process. [...]
(H.E. Ambassador Hu Xiaodi, Head of the Chinese Delegation, 26 April 2004)

Cuba

[...] It is clear that some Nuclear Weapon States do not have the political will required to achieve the objective to prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons forever. Cuba reiterates that the military doctrines based upon the possession of nuclear weapons are unsustainable and unacceptable. [...]

There is an attempt to replace disarmament by non-horizontal proliferation issues. It is about imposing the approach of non-proliferation as an objective in itself, when it should actually be viewed as a contribution in the efforts to achieve the final objective of disarmament.

Meanwhile, outside the traditional disarmament machinery, initiatives with dangerous consequences are moving forward without the possibility for the great majority of States to participate in their drafting.

We are concerned by the fact that the Security Council, a body that is not at all representative of the UN membership and where the veto power prevails, is negotiating a draft resolution on weapons of mass destruction. The main author and promoter of such draft resolution is a State possessing nuclear weapons, that actually has not shown any interest in progressing towards the objective of nuclear disarmament.

The draft resolution considered within the Security Council broadly exceeds the mandate of this body. It is attempted to grant the Council functions in the drafting of international treaties that do not correspond to it.

This draft resolution aims at the horizontal proliferation and it only makes an irrelevant mention to vertical proliferation and to the question of nuclear disarmament.

The adoption of such text under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which is being attempted, could easily facilitate its use by some power as a “pre-authorization or justification” for the unilateral and abusive use of force against some specific States, resulting from alleged suspicions of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or their components.

In the case of Cuba this is of particular concern, if it is taken into account the reiterative false and groundless accusations against our country by high-ranking US Government Officials, alleging -with no evidence whatsoever- that Cuba possesses a limited capacity for biological weapons research’ and development, something we firmly reject.

Currently the draft resolution is ambiguous enough so that some States may proclaim that with its adoption, the so-called Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) would be legitimized, created nearly one year ago by a group of States, without UN mandate or any other broadly accepted multilateral treaty.

As it occurs with the Security Council draft resolution, PSI advocates explain that the Initiative is primarily aimed at struggling efficiently against the threat of terrorism with weapons of mass destruction.

Cuba shares the concerns about the risk of links between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, including their delivery systems, and fully supports legitimate international efforts to deter their acquisition by terrorists.

The coincidental interest of the international community favors the establishment and strengthening of an international coalition of all States against the use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists.

But PSI, instead of contributing to international unity towards this issue and to the strengthening of the role of the United Nations and relevant international treaties, as NPT, weakens it.

Why is it attempted to impose a non-transparent mechanism of selective composition and that acts on the fringes of the United Nations and international treaties, instead of examining the concerns in terms of proliferation using the multilateral legal framework of the treaties and the mandate of the relevant international organizations? Why are the United Nations General Assembly, the UN Disarmament Commission, the Conference on Disarmament, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the Treaty on Non Proliferation (TNP), the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention ignored?

Under the PSI, even opposite actions to key provisions established by the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea could be carried out, as those referring to the right of innocent passage of vessels in territorial waters of States and the jurisdictional regime for the High Seas included in the aforementioned Convention.

There would be no guaranties at all, that the prerogatives self-granted by the participants in the PSI will not be manipulated, particularly by the States with greater military power to abusively act against vessels and aircrafts of other States, due to different reasons.

The possibility of terrorist attacks with weapons of mass destruction cannot be eliminated by means of a selective approach, as the one promoted by PSI, limited to struggle against horizontal proliferation and basically disregarding vertical proliferation and disarmament. [...]
(Ambassador Orlando Requeijo Gual, Permanent representative, 27 April 2004)

France

[...] The community of States parties to the NPT must adopt a "zero tolerance" policy on nuclear proliferation. The slightest deficiency, the slightest suspicion, risk damaging the mutual trust upon which the Treaty's equilibrium rests. If we fail to respond, the actions of a tiny minority of States neglectful of their commitments will swiftly undermine the system of collective security and of technology exchanges desired by the great majority of States. [...]

At their Kananaskis Summit in June 2002, the G8 adopted six principles aimed at preventing terrorists, or those who shelter them, from obtaining weapons of mass destruction and related materials. France calls upon all countries to adhere to these principles. [...]

France participates to activities undertaken to interdict shipments of WMD, in particular within the framework of the PSI. This initiative is consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks. It seeks to involve all States that participate in the fight against proliferation. [...]

(Ambassador H.E. Mr. François Rivasseau, Permanent representative, 27 April 2004)

Holy See

[...] Nuclear-weapon States have not given evidence of fulfillment of their Article VI obligation, that is, the negotiation of effective measures related to the elimination of their nuclear arsenals. The modernization of nuclear weapons and development of new nuclear weapons technologies is taking place now and challenges directly the viability of the Treaty. It continues to be a discordant note in international relationships that some States, which profess ardent support for the NPT, are still attached to military policies which hold that nuclear weapons are essential as the supreme guarantee of security. Nuclear-weapon States should be pressed to reveal under what security conditions and assurances they could eliminate their nuclear arsenals. More positively, the work of the Nuclear Suppliers' Group should help enforce their Article I obligations not to transfer nuclear weapons or assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to acquire such devices.

On the other hand, non-nuclear-weapon States Parties have Article II obligations which include not receiving, transferring, manufacturing or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons. While Article IV admits the "inalienable right of all Parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes", it is becoming clear that such peaceful activities can be too easily diverted into weapons programs. We all know that the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in this regard is vital and should be strengthened, with more vigilance exercised on the part of all States Parties. [...]

At the level of security doctrine, there is a great need to move beyond nuclear deterrence. The time has come for all States to comply with the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that negotiations toward nuclear disarmament be pursued and achieved in good faith under strict and effective international control. [...]

(H.E. Archbishop Celestino Migliore, Permanent observer to the United Nations, 27 April 2004)

Iran

"To some, the cold war rivalries might have served as an excuse for continued development of different types of nuclear arms and reliance thereon in strategic terms. However, contrary to the expectations of Non-Nuclear Weapon States, the demise of the Soviet Union and end of the cold war did not entail an analogous review of nuclear arms and doctrines. On the contrary, some Nuclear Weapon States seem to feel too convinced with the power of nuclear arms to think of the need to fulfil their treaty based obligations to disarm. Worse yet, they are developing new types of nuclear weapons to be used in conventional warfare and thus have lowered the threshold of resort to nuclear weapons.

If in the cold war era, balance of terror saved the world from the catastrophic effects of using nuclear weapons, today the world more than ever faces the real threat of nuclear weapons being used against Non-Nuclear Weapon States. [...]

It always needs to be noted that any disarmament treaty is based on a delicate balance hammered out between the threat perceptions and security requirements of every single member of the regime. True universality which preserves such a balance is the only guarantee for the successful endurance of the regime. The current state of some opting out of the NPT regime, acquiring nuclear arsenals and being exempted from any sanctions merely on the grounds of political affiliation, is definitely the most important threat to the credibility of the NPT regime. [...]

NPT as a disarmament treaty should prove capable of allaying security concerns of its members. However, recent developments and latest posture review by a Nuclear Weapon State have proved that unilateral statements fall too short of providing legally binding security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Such reversals in nuclear policies of Nuclear Weapon States blow the very basis of previous agreements and would certainly run contrary to the promotion of full implementation of the Treaty. [...]

The United States is least authoritative to talk about others' compliance with the NPT provisions. The US has systematically undermined every achievement of multilateral for a in this field and needs first to come clean from serious doubts about its own commitment to the NPT and multilateral disarmament regimes. A country which has violated its obligations under Articles I, IV and VI of the Treaty should first come up with convincing responses to international community's concerns over its nuclear posture review and its development of new types of nuclear weapons. In this context the US has actively been proliferating nuclear weapons and lowering the threshold of resort to nuclear weapons even in conventional conflicts and against Non-Nuclear Weapon States.

The US has another dubious record in actively supporting the Israeli nuclear program and torpedoing the efforts of the international community to control Israeli unsafeguarded facilities and nuclear arsenal, thus undermining international and regional peace and security.

Furthermore, the US's extraterritorial legislations have systematically hampered Iran's economic and technological development and run in clear violations of Article IV of the NPT and general principles of international law. [...]

(H.E. Gholam Ali Khoshroo, Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal and International Affairs, 27 April 2004)

Ireland (on behalf of the European Union)

[...] The EU continues to attribute great importance to the fight against terrorism, the continuing urgency and importance of which has been underlined so tragically by the recent attacks in Madrid. The EU strongly supports all measures that are aimed at preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons and their means of delivery. We therefore supported and welcomed the inclusion of an anti-terrorist clause in each of the export control regimes. We also welcome efforts in other fora such as the G8 to prevent terrorists or those that harbour them from acquiring or developing weapons of mass destruction, missiles and related equipment and technology. We call upon all States to take effective measures to address the problem of diversion of and trafficking in WMD materials, and of the participation of non-state actors in proliferation of WMD. In this context, the EU also underlines the importance of the early adoption of the well-defined amendment to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. [...]

There are concerns about the nuclear programmes of a number of other countries. These relate in particular to civilian nuclear programmes, which might be misused for military ends. In this context, the EU notes with interest the ongoing discussion on measures to strengthen control over the most sensitive parts of the fuel cycle. [...]

We note the conclusion of the Director General of the IAEA that the conversion and centrifuge programmes of Iran and Libya share common elements and that the basic technology is very similar and was largely obtained from the same foreign sources. This is a matter of serious concern. We therefore fully endorse his call for full cooperation from all IAEA member States in identifying the supply routes and sources of the technology and related equipment and nuclear and non-nuclear materials.

The illicit trade in highly sensitive nuclear equipment and technology is a matter of serious concern for the European Union and indeed all State Parties to the NPT. The European Union is committed to strong national and internationally coordinated export controls which we see as a necessary complement to our non-

proliferation obligations under the NPT. Recent revelations have demonstrated the need for us to reinforce our efforts to tackle illicit trafficking and procurement networks and to address the issue of involvement of non-state actors in the proliferation of WMD technology.

In view of the enhanced proliferation threat the EU considers it necessary for exporting States to assume their responsibilities and take measures to ensure that exports of sensitive materials, equipment and technologies are subject to appropriate surveillance and control. Export controls ensure that transfers take place for peaceful purposes as required by the NPT, facilitating also co-operation and technological development. The EU will work towards strengthening the efficiency of export controls, preventing any uncontrolled dissemination of the most sensitive technologies, in particular to non-state actors, and defining adequate consequences for situations of non-compliance. [...]

We have also welcomed the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty between the Russian Federation and the USA on strategic offensive reductions till 2012. It is an important step in the context of international security and a contribution to the efforts of the international community in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. In this context, the principles of irreversibility and transparency remain important. [...]

The EU reiterates that it attaches the utmost importance to the entry into force of the CTBT at the earliest possible date. We call upon all States that have not yet signed and ratified the Treaty to do so without delay and without conditions. We urge in particular those States named in Annex 2 of the Treaty, whose ratification is required for entry into force to do so. In this context we welcome the recent ratification of Algeria to the CTBT which bring us closer to both universalisation and entry into force. Pending the entry into force of the CTBT, the EU urges all States to abide by a moratorium and to refrain from any actions, which are contrary to the obligations and provisions of the CTBT. [...]

The issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons was included in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference. Reductions in these weapons are an integral part of the nuclear arms control and disarmament process. We look forward to the fulfilment of the US and Russian 1991-1992 Presidential declarations on unilateral reductions of their holdings of the tactical nuclear weapons, as well as of the commitments made by relevant States at the 2000 Review Conference. We encourage all States concerned to start negotiations on an effectively verifiable agreement to best achieve the greatest reductions of these weapons.

The EU is convinced that the application of the principle of irreversibility to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures contributes to the maintenance and reinforcement of international peace, security and stability. Transparency by all NPT Parties in fulfilling all their Treaty obligations and respective commitments in the NPT 2000 Final Document further contributes towards international stability and progress in disarmament. [...]

In accordance with Article IV of the NPT and Article II of the IAEA's Statute, the EU reaffirms the inalienable right of all parties to the Treaty to develop the research, production and use of nuclear energy, for peaceful purposes, without discrimination in complete conformity with Articles I and II of the Treaty. In this context it must be made absolutely clear that a possible misuse of civilian nuclear programmes for military purposes has to be effectively excluded. As effective verification is a prerequisite for peaceful uses it is of utmost importance that all States Parties to the Treaty subscribe to full transparency and the full range of verification instruments as offered in particular by the IAEA. This includes early information on nuclear programmes by all States as foreseen by the IAEA Board of Governors decision of 1993 and the signing and bringing into force of Additional Protocols. [...]

(H.E. Mr Richard Ryan, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Ireland, 26 April 2004)

Japan

[...] The year 2005, during which the NPT Review Conference is scheduled to be held, will mark the 60th anniversary of the tragedies in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Japan calls upon all Parties to the NPT to reaffirm their strong commitment to the elimination of all nuclear weapons in the lead-up to the Review Conference, with the unflinching determination that nuclear devastation never again be repeated. There is also strong support from the general public and the international community toward this aim. [...]

Dr. Khan's underground network supporting the proliferation of nuclear-related technology, as a more recent example, reaffirms the necessity for the further strengthening of existing nuclear non-proliferation regimes. In this respect, specific measures, such as the strengthening and universalization of IAEA safeguards, the physical protection of nuclear material, and the strengthening of export control, should be the subject of extensive discussion at this PrepCom. Japan also attaches great importance to the strengthening of non-proliferation mechanisms in Asia, and has been making efforts to this aim. [...]

Nuclear-weapon States should seriously note the commitment made to date by nearly all countries to renounce the option of nuclear armament under the NPT regime, and it is imperative that they respond to this resolute determination held by non-nuclear weapon States by demonstrating tangible progress towards nuclear disarmament.

In this context, Japan welcomes the entry into force of the Moscow Treaty between Russia and the United States, which should serve as an important step for further nuclear disarmament. Japan hopes for full implementation of the Treaty by both States. It is nonetheless regrettable that no progress has been made with regard to the entry into force of the CTBT or the commencement of FMCT negotiations, despite relevant agreements that have been formulated to this end. The CTBT is of historic significance in that it promotes both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation by restricting the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons. Japan considers the early entry into force of the CTBT extremely important. Japan's Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mrs. Yoriko Kawaguchi, attended the Third Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT last year, and stressed the importance of the early entry into force of the CTBT, as well as the moratoria on nuclear test explosions pending the entry into force of the CTBT. [...]
(Ambassador H.E. Mr. Yoshiki Mine, Head of the delegation of Japan, 26 April 2004)

Malaysia (on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement)

[...] The Movement underscores that the indefinite extension of the NPT does not imply the indefinite possession by the nuclear-weapon-states of their nuclear weapon arsenals, and considers, in this regard, that any assumption of indefinite possession of nuclear weapons is incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime both vertical and horizontal, and with the broader objective of maintaining international peace and security. The Movement reaffirms that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. [...]

The Movement reiterates its long-standing and principled position for the total elimination of all nuclear testing. Reiterating that nuclear tests of any kind, in addition to undermining nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects, are in themselves a threat to international peace and security. In this regard, the Movement wishes to stress the significance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), including by all nuclear-weapon-states, which inter alia, should contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament. The Movement emphasizes that the development of new types of nuclear weapons is contrary to the guarantees given by the nuclear-weapon-states at the time of the conclusion of the CTBT, namely, that the Treaty would prevent the improvement of existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons. The Movement calls upon all states, pending the entry into effect of the treaty, to refrain from any actions contrary to the objectives and purpose of this international instrument. [...]

[However,] the Movement does not desire to see international efforts towards achieving universality of comprehensive safeguards to wither away in favour of pursuing additional measures and restrictions on non-nuclear-weapon-states, which are already committed to non-proliferation norms, and which have renounced the nuclear-weapons option. The Movement also expresses its strong rejection of attempts by any member state to use the IAEA's technical cooperation program as a tool for political purposes in violation of its Statute. [...]

While noting the signing of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reduction between the Russian Federation and the United States on 24 May 2002, the Movement stresses that reductions in deployments and in operational status cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons. There is to date no further evidence of agreed measures to reduce the operational status of these weapons. The Movement also expresses its concerns that the non-entry into force of START II is a setback to the 13 practical steps in the field of nuclear disarmament adopted at the 2000 Review Conference;

Strategic defense doctrines continue to set out rationales for the use of such weapons, as demonstrated by the recent policy review by one of the nuclear-weapon-states to consider expanding the circumstances under which these weapons could be used and the countries against whom they could be used;

The possible development of new types of nuclear weapons and new targeting options to serve aggressive counter-proliferation purposes further undermine disarmament commitments;

The abrogation of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) has brought new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Movement remains concerned that the implementation of a national missile defence system could trigger an arms race(s), the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons.

(H.E. Ambassador Rastam Mohd Isa, 26 April 2004)

[...] Fifteen years on from the end of the Cold War we remain deeply concerned that the existing nuclear weapons still amount to many thousands. While we acknowledge the Treaty of Moscow as a positive first step, we continue to question whether it is an effective contribution to nuclear disarmament. The Treaty does not stipulate that nuclear weapons should be destroyed. It also lacks transparency and verification measures, and the many thousands of non-strategic nuclear weapons that exist have not been incorporated into its scope.

Whatever positive steps have been taken, any plans or intentions, including the allocation of resources for studies, by the nuclear-weapon States to develop new types of weapons or rationalizations for their use, contradict the spirit of the NPT and go against the agreement reached at the 2000 Review Conference for a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies. Compliance with the NPT regime cannot be fulfilled as long as these approaches guide new security policies and doctrines.

These approaches to modernize nuclear weapons raise concern that nuclear testing might be resumed. Any moves by the nuclear-weapon States towards the resumption of nuclear testing would be a retrograde step for international peace and security. We call for the upholding and maintenance of the moratorium on nuclear weapon-test explosions, or any other nuclear explosions, pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and reaffirm our attachment to the Treaty and its early entry into force.

The issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons has been so far neglected in disarmament agreements. The New Agenda considers that the reduction and elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner constitutes an essential element in the framework of a complete nuclear disarmament process. [...]

We recognize the risks that WMD might fall into the hands of terrorists. However, no serious effort to tackle this threat should leave aside the importance of disarmament in the field of maintaining international peace and security. We are convinced that, the continued possession of nuclear weapons exacerbates the possibility that these weapons might fall into the hands of terrorists. In a world of increasing interdependence, no one State can resolve these problems on its own, therefore we must all work together.

We reaffirm that every effort should be made to implement the Treaty in all its aspects and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States Parties to the Treaty. [...]

(Ambassador Luis Alfonso de Alba, 26 April 2004)

New Zealand

[...] The nuclear weapons states, China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America are reminded that Article VI makes it clear that its obligation falls on 'Each of the Parties to the Treaty'. There is no scope for selective or deferred compliance. [...]

Nor is the failure of several states to comply with their non-proliferation objectives any pretext for further deferral by the nuclear weapons states of their 'unequivocal undertaking ... to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals' (2000 Review Conference), or of the 'determined pursuit' by them of 'systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally' (1995 Review Conference). [...]

I am very concerned that the current emphasis on counter-proliferation measures should not overwhelm the need to take concrete steps toward nuclear disarmament. These are two sides of the same coin. Ultimately our only security – as the Canberra Commission recognised – will be the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and the assurance that they will never be used or produced again. [...]

There is no doubt that proliferation is a big problem, large enough indeed to warrant addressing it with all the legitimate tools in the toolbox. This includes through the power of positive example – ie, more strenuous efforts by the NWS to disarm (and to persuade the non-NPT possessors to do likewise). [...]

From the perspective of my delegation, the New Agenda's 'omnibus' resolution at the United Nations First Committee and the New Agenda's NPT position papers set out such actions in detail. In our view none of these steps is impractical: each could be carried out straightaway, especially:

- a forthcoming response to such pregnant questions as: what is the threat against which these weapons are retained in their hundreds and thousands, and why, given the costs of maintaining and – under article VI – destroying them, is there little if any evidence of concerted, phased reductions;
- irreversible destruction (rather than storage) of non-deployed nuclear warheads;

- the potentially significant US and Russian commitments (under the “Moscow Treaty”) to reduce their numbers of deployed strategic nuclear warheads to be made verifiable, irreversible, and transparent;
- priority to be given to reductions in non-strategic (“tactical”) nuclear weapons (because these are likely to be deployed away from central control and to be less secure);
- an undertaking by the nuclear-weapons states not to increase the number or types of tactical nuclear weapons deployed, and not to develop new types of weapons or rationalisations for their use;
- more accountability and transparency by the nuclear weapons states about the current size of their nuclear weapons arsenals, including – as just noted – a timetable for the concerted phasing out of those arsenals;
- urgent resumption of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons;
- all nuclear-weapons states to place fissile material no longer required for military purposes under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to ensure that it cannot again be used for military purposes;
- further development of “negative security assurances”, whereby the nuclear-weapons states formally and in a legally binding fashion agree not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states;
- encouragement of nuclear-weapon-free zones. We maintain that a powerful symbol for demonstrating to the international public is the reach - and potential reach - of nuclear weapon free zones over the landmasses of the globe. The ratification of the Treaties of Rarotonga, Bangkok, and Pelindaba by all States of the region, and all concerned States remains a matter of great importance in the cause of nuclear disarmament;
- ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). In a world so bereft of effective verification provisions on WMD why is it that this strong treaty still fails to attract significant support to bring it into force?;
- upholding the moratorium on nuclear testing, pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty;
- all states that have not yet done so to conclude International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) agreements and Model Additional Protocols for full-scope safeguards on their nuclear facilities.

We do not accept that any of these actions can be dismissed as hollow idealism. On the contrary, given the estimated vast size of a number of nuclear arsenals, resolve to undertake these steps would significantly improve the psychology under which other states either feel threatened or betrayed by the nuclear weapons states’ selective application of the NPT. [...]

Permitting nuclear weapons programmes to continue over long periods of time fosters a permissive environment for the proliferators. More leadership from the NWS in reducing their nuclear arsenals and demonstrating compliance under the nuclear disarmament pillar of the NPT, would strengthen their moral authority to put pressure on India, Israel and Pakistan to do likewise, reducing tensions in troubled areas and perhaps lowering the incentive – or pretext – for neighbouring or other states to develop weapons’ programmes. [...]

(Statement by Marion Hobbs, Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control, 26 April 2004)

Norway

[...] The 2005 Conference should confirm that only countries that have signed and implemented the Additional Protocol will be allowed to import materials and equipment for civilian nuclear programs. International cooperation on export controls of sensitive materials should be strengthened. We must consider concrete measures to enhance physical protection. There must be no loopholes for illicit trafficking of nuclear materials. All nations have a responsibility to develop credible national security systems. [...]

Non-proliferation and disarmament are two sides of the same coin. Irreversible reductions of existing stockpiles are the best guarantee that weapons do not fall into the wrong hands. More progress in nuclear disarmament, including tactical nuclear weapons, is therefore essential. [...]

Norway regrets that the CTBT has not yet entered into force. The current moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions cannot replace the value of the legally binding commitment provided by the CTBT. [...]

(Ambassador H.E. Mr. Johan L. Løvold, Permanent representative, 27 April 2004)

Republic of Korea

[...] The existence of an extensive clandestine international nuclear procurement network presents another daunting challenge to the global nonproliferation efforts. The thriving illicit trafficking of sensitive technologies and materials though such a network has demonstrated that the danger of nuclear weapons or fissile materials falling into the hands of terrorists can no longer be dismissed as a far-fetched nightmare. [...]

We further underscore the urgency of the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT). We call upon all States Parties that have not yet done so, particularly those States whose ratification is necessary for the entry into force of the CTBT, to sign and ratify it without further delay. At the same time, pending the entry into force of the Treaty, it is vital that all existing moratoria on nuclear testing be maintained. [...]

Furthermore, the Nuclear Weapon States have an obligation to more seriously take up their share of the bargain, namely, to fulfill the nuclear disarmament obligations under Article VI of the Treaty. [...] While we welcome the entry into force of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (Moscow Treaty) between the United States and the Russian Federation in June 2003, we look forward to further substantial progress in nuclear disarmament. The Nuclear Weapons States will be able to advocate the merits of non-proliferation with stronger moral authority when they demonstrate greater vigor and resolve in fulfilling their nuclear disarmament obligations.

Finally, we emphasize the need to address the root causes of proliferation. The supply-side approach based on export controls will only have limited effectiveness until it is supplemented by a demand-side approach that reduces the incentive for nuclear proliferation. As a growing number of countries come to master the technologies to produce fissile materials and nuclear devices, the export controls and the safeguards system, however perfect they are designed, can never be fool-proof in deterring determined proliferators. As incentive for proliferation often stems from the perception of insecurity, we attach great importance to the reduction of regional tension and the fostering of a peaceful global security environment. We also believe that negative security assurances should be granted to those States Parties complying fully with their obligations under the Treaty. [...]

(H.E. Ambassador Kim Sam-hoon, 26 April 2004)

Russia

[...] We are concerned over the situation with the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which, in our view, is an important non-proliferation and nuclear weapon limitation measure. We hope that the CTBT that, as you know, was long ago ratified by Russia will be joined by the countries whose ratification instruments are required for the Treaty's entry into force. [...]

Special attention should be given to the problem of the "black WMD markets". This is the most dangerous market. Terrorists are smart and resourceful and are willing to go any length to get hold of the WMD production components in order to strike at innocent people.

At this time we are actively discussing in the UN Security Council draft resolution on non-proliferation that should motivate states to prevent falling of the WMD or proliferation-sensitive materials into the hands of non-state actors, first of all for terrorist purposes. Development of multilateral cooperation is essential for fighting this phenomenon. And of course, this work should be based on international law and national legislation and not impede legitimate peaceful cooperation. [...]

Let me stress that all our nuclear weapons are stationed within the territory of the Russian Federation. We expect reciprocity. It is essential that nuclear weapons should be pulled back to national territories of the nuclear powers. This could be a major step toward enhancing international stability and providing additional favorable conditions for further nuclear arms reductions.

Let me also make some other important points. In our view, general and complete nuclear disarmament is a goal to which we should move in a phased manner, on the basis of a comprehensive approach and without putting forward unrealistic goals or targets. Nuclear disarmament, including non-strategic nuclear arms reductions, may not be pursued in isolation from other types of weapons or outside of the overall political situation in the world and Europe, in particular, the present situation with international stability and evolution of the existing military - political alliances and their enlargement, etc. [...]

(Ambassador H.E. Anatoly Antonov, Head of Delegation, 27 April 2004)

South Africa

[...] The accomplishments that have been achieved in the implementation of the NPT and of the agreements and undertakings made at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, however, are a blemished record. While there has been progress in expanding the application of the non-proliferation issues of the Treaty (particularly in the context of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the conclusion of additional protocol agreements to existing safeguards), the same cannot be said for nuclear disarmament. While it is true that the periods since 1995 and 2000 have seen developments which have impacted negatively on the goal of nuclear weapons non-proliferation – the proliferation of States with nuclear weapons capabilities, a withdrawal from the NPT, the proliferation of nuclear weapons technologies and an instance of declared non-compliance – it continues to be fair to say that the overwhelming majority of non-nuclear-weapons States Parties to the NPT have demonstrated, and are continuing to demonstrate, their full commitment to, and compliance with, their obligations. On the other hand – and by way of example:

- There has been only limited progress made in implementing the thirteen steps on nuclear disarmament to which all States Parties agreed at the 2000 Review Conference;
 - The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty has been abrogated, with the concomitant threat of a renewed arms race;
 - Pressure appears to be waning on the three States which are not yet parties to the NPT, and which operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States promptly and without condition, and to bring into force the required comprehensive safeguard agreements, together with additional protocols. To the contrary reports indicate greater co-operation with these States, even in the field of nuclear co-operation; [...]
 - The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has not yet entered into force;
 - There is no sign of engagement by all five nuclear-weapon States in a plurilateral process leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons;
 - There are new emerging approaches to the broader role of nuclear weapons as part of security strategies, including rationalizations for the use, and the possible development of new types, of nuclear weapons. [...]
- (Mr. Peter Goosen, 26 April 2004)

United Kingdom

[...] The IAEA's work alone will not solve today's problems. A broad range of tools is required that will necessitate action by other international bodies and by national governments.

We should expand the work of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Through improved information sharing and enhanced operational readiness, PSI has created the practical basis for co-operation among states in interdicting shipments of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems and related materials. Since its launch last year PSI has gained the support of over 60 countries and the number continues to grow. We hope eventually to involve all countries that have the will and capacity to co-operate.

The Global Partnership is a genuinely multilateral effort to tackle the dangers posed by the weapons legacy of the former Soviet Union. We are now seeing results on the ground. Work under the Partnership includes programmes for the security and disposition of fissile material, improving border security, controlling radiological sources, and redirecting scientists and other specialists with weapons of mass destruction expertise into peaceful civilian employment, including commercial ventures. The UK is a strong supporter of the Global Partnership. We have committed up to \$750 million over 10 years. [...]

States Party that have failed to comply with their safeguards obligations lose the confidence of the international community. We should consider whether such states should not lose the right to the nuclear fuel cycle, particularly the enrichment and reprocessing capabilities which are of such proliferation sensitivity. This does not mean the states concerned could not construct and run civil nuclear power stations. These could still operate with fuel supplied by countries honouring their safeguards obligations. The fuel would be subject to Agency monitoring while in the receiving country, and would be returned to the country of supply when spent. This would prevent a seemingly civil programme masking a weapons programme. [...]

(Ambassador David Broucher, Permanent Representative, 26 April 2004)

United States

Zie F&R-36 voor de volledige verklaring van de Verenigde Staten.

CLUSTER I ISSUES: NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

In zoverre deze niet overlappen met de verklaringen in het General Debate

Australia

[...] Continued, steady progress on nuclear disarmament is central to preserving the political strength and vitality of the Treaty, and remains a key Australian policy objective. While acknowledging the progress made on nuclear disarmament Australia renews its expectation of further nuclear disarmament steps by the nuclear weapon states. We remain firmly committed to practical progress on nuclear disarmament, this being the objective of the 13 disarmament steps from the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

Australia welcomes entry into force of the Moscow Treaty on June 1 2003. We hope the United States and Russia will continue to pursue progressive reductions to strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons in both deployed and reserve holdings. Australia also welcomes the nuclear disarmament steps taken by the United Kingdom and France.

The debate on nuclear disarmament will be most productive if it is well informed. Australia appreciates the reports, both written and oral, to the PrepCom from the nuclear weapon states. We look to the nuclear weapon states to be as transparent as possible about their nuclear weapons policies and disarmament actions.

While the nuclear weapon states continue to possess nuclear weapons they have a responsibility to ensure their nuclear weapons policies do not detract from the global non-proliferation norm. Were this to occur the Treaty's basic foundation could be eroded.

We recall as a key outcome from the 2000 Review Conference the principle of irreversibility should apply to nuclear disarmament. This is an issue all nuclear weapon states should address in providing information on Article VI commitments. As with reductions in nuclear weapons we recognise there has been progress on irreversibility including the substantial amounts of excess fissile material to be disposed of so that it is no longer useable in nuclear weapons. We also welcome the work being done by the United Kingdom on verifying the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons. Effective verification will be central to irreversible nuclear disarmament. [...]

(Dr Geoffrey Shaw, Deputy permanent representative, 29 April 2004)

Canada

[...] Nuclear disarmament concerns us all; it is natural and legitimate that NNWS expect transparency about the weapons states' progress toward disarmament.

Canada welcomes the progress that has been made so far by some NWS in reductions, and we appreciate the amount of information that most of them have provided to recent PrepComs, including on arsenals, nuclear weapons holdings, operational status and reductions, numbers of deployed strategic vehicle deliveries and warheads, and – at least by one – numbers of available weapons. It would be desirable for all five to provide as much information as possible on these and on current developments and on holdings of both strategic and non-strategic weapons, operational or readiness status of arsenals, and on policy and doctrine. Much information is publicly available and much can be provided without impairing national security. Giving NNWS a clear understanding of the policies and practices of the NWS will assist all in dealing with Article VI. We continue to believe that providing such information in the form of a formal report, which can be officially circulated, translated and form part of NPT documentation, allows both a better understanding and better implementation of the Treaty, and reinforces the commitment to permanence with accountability. [...]

(30 April 2004)

China

[...] Gradually degrading the role of nuclear weapons in security, listing no state as target of nuclear weapons, and making no nuclear weapon strike plan against non-nuclear-weapon states will contribute to progress on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon states. We regret the retrogression of certain country's position on security assurances, since it will do no good to international non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament process. [...]

Ireland (on behalf of the European Union)

[...] The EU is convinced that the application of the principle of irreversibility to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures, contributes to the maintenance and reinforcement of international peace, security and stability. Transparency by all NPT Parties in fulfilling all their Treaty obligations and respective commitments in the NPT 2000 Final Document, further contributes towards international stability and progress in disarmament. [...]

We underline the importance of international co-operation for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction. The EU and its Member States fully support and contribute significantly to the G8 Global Partnership, which contributes effectively to disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The comprehensive set of non-proliferation principles set out at the G8 Kananaskis Summit in 2002 constitute the criteria to be adopted, pursued and implemented to allow effective international co-operation in the field of the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. [...]

(Ms. Philomena Murnaghan, Deputy permanent representative, 30 April 2004)

Iran

[...] Last year questions about the US's new posture review were simply refuted as being based on an unofficial paper and today, in spite of allocating hundreds of millions of dollars to this project, questions about mininuclear weapons or the so called bunker busters are played down as their being simple research programs.

One does not know when to expect any real answer to this international concern over violation of Article I obligations by a major Nuclear Weapon State through vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, lowering the threshold of resort to nuclear weapons and the danger of using such inhumane weapons in conventional conflicts and against Non-Nuclear Weapons States parties to the NPT.

Should we still await the finalization of the research phase and beginning of its production? Or do we have to keep silent until they are deployed or rather when they are used? This concern is real and needs to be duly dealt with in the strengthened review process.

The US's nuclear cooperation with Israel, as hard evidenced after the agreement reached during the US Energy Secretary trip to Israel in February 2000, which is in fact another aspect of violations of Article I obligations, is another source of concern for all NPT members and specially the Middle East countries which are all members of the NPT family. Israel's unsafeguarded facilities and nuclear arsenal is a real threat to all countries of the region and to international peace and security.

A lot is being said about the Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions as implementation of Article VI obligations, however there are many questions here too. Any member of the NPT family does have a right to question:

- Given the fact that the de-commissioned nuclear weapons are to be stored, rather than being destroyed, is it a real disarmament measure?
- What is going to be the fate of the de-commissioned nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles?
- How the principle of irreversibility is going to be observed after or even within the ten year time limit?
- What would be the fate of thousands of the tactical nuclear weapons still deployed? [...]

The Nuclear Weapon States should comply with their commitments to the full implementation of Article I. They should refrain from nuclear sharing, under any kind of security arrangements among themselves with non-nuclear weapon states, and those not party to the Treaty. [...]

We would have expected the US representatives to at least in one case brief us on their government's views and steps on implementing its obligations under Cluster I. This was something we were all deprived of. However, we are used to such practices of the US. [...]

(30 April 2004)

Germany

[...] The NPT is the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament under Art VI. It is worth repeating this well-known phrase describing the essence of the NPT and highlighting the firm relationship which was established by the treaty between non-proliferation and disarmament, and vice versa. These two goals can only be effectively be pursued jointly and not at each others expense. It is particularly important to recall this in view of rising concerns not only regarding continuing proliferation and non-compliance with the non-proliferation obligations but also regarding the slow progress in the field of nuclear disarmament and indications of a 'renaissance' of nuclear weapons. [...]

Whilst a lot of focus is now being placed on compliance with the non-proliferation obligations of the NPT we should also in parallel ensure that the nuclear disarmament obligations are continued to be fulfilled. [...]

First steps should be discussed to address in a concrete manner the issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons. As part of the overall nuclear disarmament process non-strategic nuclear weapons must be reduced in a verifiable and irreversible manner. [...] We would [also] welcome a voluntary exchange of information by all nuclear weapons states on existing holdings of non-strategic nuclear weapons. Such an exchange could and should take account of the need to protect confidential information. However, it would already be useful in a first step to get information on the overall numbers of non-strategic nuclear warheads and the numbers and characteristics of delivery vehicles.

(H.E. Ambassador Volker Heinsberg, Permanent representative, 30 April 2004)

Japan

[...] Japan welcomes the progress achieved by the nuclear-weapon States on the reduction of their nuclear weapons, particularly the entry into force of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (Moscow Treaty) between the United States and Russia, which is an important step towards further nuclear disarmament. Japan hopes for full implementation of the Treaty by both States.

Having said this, I must mention a few points which are important under the category of cluster 1. There still remain numerous nuclear weapons and arsenals in the world. Japan believes that all nuclear-weapon States should reduce their nuclear arsenals. We strongly hope that the other nuclear-weapon States will undertake, whether unilaterally or through negotiations, further reductions in their nuclear arsenals, without waiting for the implementation of reductions to be undertaken by the United States and Russia. In this regard, Japan hopes that the nuclear-weapon State(s) which has(have) not taken such measures so far, will do so immediately. [...]

(Ambassador Yoshiki Mine, Head of delegation, 30 April 2004)

Malaysia (on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement)

[...] I would also recall that the XIII NAM Heads of State or Government Summit Declaration had expressed serious concern that the development of new types of nuclear weapons are being considered, and reiterated that the provision for the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States is in contravention of the negative security assurances that have been provided by the nuclear weapon States. The NAM Heads of State or Government had also restated that the development of new types of nuclear weapons is in contravention with the assurances provided by the nuclear weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty that the Treaty would prevent the improvement of existing nuclear weapons and development of new types of nuclear weapons. [...]

(H.E. Ambassador Hussein Haniff, Permanent representative, 30 April 2004)

Mexico (on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition)

[...] 7. We call upon the nuclear-weapon States to implement the commitments made in the NPT, as well as in other nuclear disarmament or reductions agreements or initiatives, and in this context to uphold their commitments to irreversibility by destroying their nuclear warheads and avoid keeping them in a state that lends itself to their possible redeployment, and by closing and dismantling their nuclear test sites.

8. We continue to be disappointed that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), an essential element of the NPT regime has not yet entered into force. We call on those States whose ratification is

necessary for the entry into force of the Treaty to ratify it as soon as possible. We call for the upholding and maintenance of the moratorium on nuclear weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending the entry into force of the CTBT. Any moves by nuclear-weapon States towards the resumption of nuclear testing would be a step backwards for international peace and security.

[...]

13. We express our deep concern that the development of missile defences could impact negatively on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and lead to a new arms race on Earth and in outer space.

15. We call for further efforts by nuclear-weapon States to effectively reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally, and to formalize their unilateral declarations into legal instruments including provisions ensuring transparency, verification and irreversibility.

16. In the general debate, we referred to the Treaty of Moscow and called on the United States and Russia to make it transparent, verifiable and irreversible and to address non-operational warheads, thus making it an effective nuclear disarmament measure. During that debate, we also listened to some very basic information on the implementation of this Treaty, the New Agenda looks forward to receive more detailed information about its implementation and the specific steps that will follow.

17. We call for action to be taken to increase the transparency and accountability of nuclear-weapon States with regard to their nuclear weapons arsenals and their implementation of disarmament measures.

18. The New Agenda believes that the further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons should be accorded a higher priority as an important step towards the elimination of nuclear weapons. In this regard we welcome the reductions that have been achieved so far within the framework of the 1991 and 1992 presidential nuclear initiatives, and call upon the United States and the Russian Federation to finalize its implementation promptly, and to formalize the initiatives in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner so that negotiations on further reductions of such weapons can be initiated. Pending the conclusions of such negotiations, we urge these two, as well as the other nuclear-weapon States, to increase confidence-building and transparency measures to reduce the threats posed by non-strategic nuclear weapons.

19. Nuclear-weapon States should take further measures to de-alert and de-activate nuclear weapons systems, to remove nuclear warheads from delivery vehicles, and to withdraw nuclear forces from active deployment pending the total elimination of these weapons.

20. In regard to vertical proliferation, we recall that the nuclear-weapon States agreed to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in their security policies. Recent trends question to what extent this agreement is being respected. Any plans or intentions to develop new types of nuclear weapons or rationalization for their use stand in marked contradiction with the NPT, and undermine the international community's efforts towards improving the security of all States. [...]

(Ambassador Luis Alfonso de Alba, 3 May 2004)

Sweden

[...] Austria, Ukraine and Sweden would like to draw this meeting's attention to the issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons. [...]

In the current security environment, non-strategic nuclear weapons are of special concern. Due to their portability, their relatively small size and the availability of delivery vehicles for these weapons, they pose particular risks from a non-proliferation perspective. This also makes them appealing to terrorists. Furthermore, the possibility of their forward deployment could increase the risk of use.

There is also the worrying perspective that nuclear weapons arsenals are modernized and that new types of non-strategic nuclear weapons could be developed. Such plans go against the spirit of the NPT and many of the agreements made at the 2000 Review Conference. The development of new weapons may require nuclear testing which would undermine the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, as well as international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts.

The many thousands – perhaps as many as 20,000 – of non-strategic nuclear weapons that exist continue to pose a potential threat to international peace and security. They are a global concern and we are many States Parties to the NPT that have these weapons close to our borders. We know too little about these weapons, due to the lack of transparency. For much too long they have been neglected in arms control and disarmament agreements. [...]

(Ambassador H.E. Ms. Elisabet Borsiin Bonnier, Permanent representative, 30 April 2004)

[...] The United Kingdom welcomes the adoption on 28 April of the Security Council's first-ever resolution addressing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (S/Res/1540(2004)). This resolution underlines the international community's determination to tackle a real, urgent and horrific threat: that these deadly weapons or materials might fall into the hands of terrorists or other non-State actors. It requires all States to adopt robust national legislation that will criminalise attempts to acquire or traffic weapons of mass destruction and the requirement to establish controls that thwart such efforts. The resolution explicitly states that none of these obligations contradict or challenge Member States rights or obligations under the NPT.

[...]

Since the launch of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in May 2003, the United Kingdom has been one of a core group of countries working to drive that initiative forward. In less than one year since its launch, PSI has established itself as an important instrument to respond effectively to some of the most serious security challenges of the 21st century. PSI has succeeded in raising world-wide awareness of the threat posed by trafficking in WMD, their delivery systems and related materials, and in fostering the international co-operation that is required to stop WMD-related shipments and proliferation networks. [...]

At the most recent PSI meeting in Lisbon, participants agreed to look to expand the role of the PSI to not only interdict shipments of WMD but to co-operate in preventing WMD proliferation facilitators (i.e. individuals, companies and other entities) from engaging in this deadly trade. PSI participants have agreed to pursue greater co-operation through military and intelligence services and law enforcement to shut down proliferation facilitators and bring them to justice. [...]

(Mr. Patrick Lamb, member of delegation, 30 April 2004)

CHAIRMAN'S SUMMARY

As of 6 May 2004

[...] 9. States parties reaffirmed the inalienable right of all States to develop the research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination in conformity with Articles I, II and III of the Treaty. In this context, they stressed that ownership of the capability that could be utilized to develop nuclear weapons places a special responsibility on the States concerned to build confidence with the international community that would remove any concerns about nuclear weapons proliferation. Such States need to ensure that the IAEA is able to verify that these capabilities are being used for peaceful purposes only, including through the mechanisms available under the Additional Protocol for strengthened safeguards.

[...]

13. States parties, particularly those with advanced nuclear programmes, were called upon to conclude, bring into force and implement an Additional Protocol to their comprehensive safeguards agreement at the earliest opportunity. States parties recognized that such undertakings will enhance the confidence of States parties and help eliminate concerns regarding their nuclear programmes.

[...]

24. States parties reaffirmed the importance of preventing nuclear terrorism and strongly supported existing IAEA initiatives in this regard, including the action plan on protection against nuclear terrorism. The Agency's work in support of States' efforts to prevent the illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material was also commended. In this context, States parties stressed the importance of contributions to the Nuclear Security Fund of the IAEA. States parties emphasized the need to cooperate in efforts to prevent and disrupt illicit trafficking activities in nuclear weapons related equipment, material and technology. Several States parties noted the G8's Kananaskis principles to prevent terrorists, and those harbouring them, from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and related material.

[...]

30. States parties remained committed to implementing Article VI of the Treaty and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament" and to pursue, with determination, the full and effective implementation of agreements reached in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in particular the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament. In this context, the need was identified to consider the implementation of the practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI as well as to consider their further development.

31. States parties noted that the Treaty should be seen in its larger context of coherent commitments and credible progress towards nuclear disarmament. They also noted that without the fulfillment of Article VI over time, the Treaty, in which non-proliferation and disarmament were mutually interdependent and reinforcing, would lose its true value. They further noted that the goal of nuclear disarmament could best be achieved through a series of balanced, incremental and reinforcing steps to ensure irreversibility.

[...]

35. States parties expressed continued disappointment over the lack of progress made in the implementation of the practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI, notwithstanding the recognition of the incremental nature of the process involved. Concern was expressed that despite the intentions of, and past achievements in, bilateral and unilateral reductions, the total number of nuclear weapons deployed and stockpiled still amounts to many thousands. Concern and uncertainty were also expressed about new approaches to the future role of nuclear weapons as well as the possible development of new generations of nuclear weapons.

36. The nuclear-weapon States parties reiterated their commitment to nuclear disarmament. Some nuclear-weapon states described their respective measures taken in accordance with Article VI of the Treaty. These include inter alia, reductions of strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons arsenals, reduced reliance on nuclear weapons, deactivation of deployed nuclear warheads, dismantlement of nuclear submarines, destruction of missiles and missile silos, elimination of substantial stockpiles of weapon of mass destruction, and the intention not to develop new nuclear weapons.

37. Many States parties expressed concerns that the abrogation of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) has brought new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of arms race in outer space. They were also concerned that national missile defence system could trigger an arms race, the further development of advanced missile system and an increased in the number of nuclear weapons. Nuclear-weapon States were called upon to refrain from any action that could impact negatively on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

38. States parties acknowledged that the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads envisaged in the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (“the Moscow Treaty”) represent a positive first step, and called on the United States of America and the Russian Federation to make the Treaty transparent, verifiable and to address non-operational warheads, thus making it an effective nuclear disarmament measure.

39. The importance of further reductions in non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process, was emphasized to promote international stability and based on the principle of undiminished security for all States. In this context, a view was expressed that States parties must strictly respect their commitments under Articles I and II of the Treaty. There were calls for the preservation, reaffirmation and increased transparency in the implementation of the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991 and 1992 of the Russian Federation and the United States of America on reducing non-strategic nuclear weapons. There were also calls made for the formalization of the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives into a legal instrument and the initiation of negotiation on further reductions of such weapons. It was observed that substantial reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons had taken place through unilateral actions, and that the dismantling of these weapons under such initiatives had been partly concluded. It was stressed by States parties that non-strategic weapons must be further reduced in a transparent, accountable, verifiable and irreversible manner, and that negotiations should begin on further reductions of those weapons as soon as possible. It was argued that such reductions, coupled with enhanced security, would also help to ensure that terrorists would not be able to gain access to such weapons.

40. Strong support was expressed for early entry into force of CTBT as an essential element of nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation regime. In this context, it was emphasized that the commitment to achieve the conclusion of negotiation on, and the entry into force of the CTBT was an integral part of the agreements by the States parties that allowed the indefinite extension of the Treaty. The importance of the Conferences on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT was also emphasized. States parties reaffirmed the importance of upholding and maintaining of the moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending the entry into force of the Treaty and noted the progress made by the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization in establishing the International Monitoring System.

[...]

45. States parties stressed that efforts to conclude a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States should be pursued as a matter of priority. They emphasized that the 1995 Review and Extension Conference noted that further steps should be considered to assure non-nuclear weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

and that these steps could take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument. They also emphasized that the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference calls upon the Preparatory Committee to make recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference on security assurances. States parties were of the view that this could take the form of an agreement or protocol to the Treaty, without prejudice to the legally-binding security assurances already given by the five nuclear-weapon States in the framework of the treaties regarding nuclear-weapon-free zones. Pending the conclusion of such negotiations, the nuclear-weapon States were called upon to honour their commitments under the respective Security Council resolution. Views were expressed that the issue of security assurances was linked with fulfillment of the Treaty obligations. States parties reaffirmed that non-nuclear-weapon States parties should be effectively assured by nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. It was emphasized that negative security assurances, a key basis of the 1995 extension decision, remained essential and should be reaffirmed. Reaffirmations were expressed of commitments under Security Council resolution 984 (1995). Concern was expressed that recent developments regarding the possible use of nuclear weapons might undermine commitments taken under that resolution. Several States parties, including one nuclear-weapon State, emphasized the importance of a no-first-use policy. [...]

PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE

AFP

Russia joins WMD accord

From correspondents in Krakow, Poland – 1 June 2004

Up to 80 nations gathered in southern Poland today to mark the first anniversary of a Washington-sponsored pact aimed at stemming the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), hailing Russia's decision to come aboard.

John Bolton, US under secretary of state for arms control, described Russia's announcement earlier today that it would sign up to the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) as a "major development", which should close off valuable lanes to traffickers of WMD.

"This is a major development, a very welcome decision," Bolton told a news conference, after Russia's foreign ministry announced Moscow would join the group of core countries in the pact.

"I think as a political signal Russia joining the core group of PSI is very profound and I think its implications will reach far and wide."

"Russia is a great naval power and has extensive land and air space that can be used for commercial activities that we now hope and expect will now be closed to proliferators," he said.

Washington has struggled to get Moscow to come aboard the accord, launched exactly a year ago during a visit by US President George W Bush to Poland.

The PSI allows for the seizure of missiles and other potential components of WMD while they are at sea or in the air.

Moscow has argued the PSI would open the way for unilateral military action from Washington and wanted such deals to be negotiated through the United Nations security council in which it has veto power.

However, signs had emerged that it would agree to sign up to the pact at the Krakow anniversary meeting, grouping core members and other supporting nations, or shortly afterwards.

Polish Foreign Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz pointed to the UN's ineffectiveness in fighting the proliferation when opening the conference.

"Currently we had to find rapidly the new effective instruments without waiting when the United Nations acquires the necessarily effectiveness," he said. "The Proliferation Security Initiative was a response born out of this necessity."

"But at the same time we have to renew the effort to reinvigorate the United Nations. The United Nations may completely diminish in importance, unless it undergoes indispensable transformation."

Australia, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain and the United States are the other core signatories to the pact.