



Juni 2004 – No. 37b

BRIEFING: PROLIFERATIE VAN MASSAVERNIEGINGSWAPENS

(Aanleiding: Algemeen Overleg Tweede Kamer met de minister van Buitenlandse Zaken en de staatssecretaris van Economische Zaken over non-proliferatie; 1 juli 2004)

COMMENTAAR EN VRAGEN

De kwestie van de proliferatie van massavernietigingswapens is de afgelopen jaren hoger op de politieke agenda geplaatst. Centraal in het debat staat het bijna universeel ondertekende Non-Proliferatie Verdrag (de de facto kernwapenmachten India, Israël en Pakistan ondertekenden niet), dat veelal gezien wordt als een cruciaal middel om de verspreiding van kernwapentechnologie te verhinderen. Deze opzet is deels geslaagd: in de 34 jaar na de ratificatie van het verdrag zijn er naast de vijf erkende kernwapenstaten (VS, VK, Russische Federatie, Frankrijk en China) slechts drie kernwapenstaten bij gekomen, de niet-ondertekenaars die hierboven zijn genoemd.

Desalniettemin wordt alom erkend dat het NPV onder grote druk staat, vanwege de toegenomen risico's van proliferatie. Het Europese Parlement nam in februari dit jaar een resolutie aan over nucleaire ontwapening, gericht op de PrepCom van het Non-Proliferatie Verdrag die in april plaatsvond (bijgevoegd). Daarin werd aangedrongen op een actievere rol van de EU in het bestrijden van proliferatie en het nastreven van nucleaire ontwapening. De EU had eind 2003 al een contra-proliferatie document aangenomen.

Op de G-8 conferentie in de VS begin juni werd een non-proliferatie plan aangenomen dat deels aan de Amerikaanse wensen tegemoet kwam (bijgevoegd).

Relevant zijn de bepalingen in art. 1 en 2 van het NPV, die de overdracht van kernwapens en kernwapen technologie van het ene land naar het andere verbieden. Een vroeg geval van zo een overdracht was de ontvreemding van de ontwerpen van ultracentrifuges (voor de verrijking van uranium) uit Nederland door de Pakistaanse wetenschapper Khan. De affaire kwam het afgelopen half jaar weer in de publiciteit omdat het ontwerp van de Nederlandse ultracentrifuge, afkomstig van het Brits-Duits-Nederlandse bedrijf Urenco, teruggevonden werd in Iran en Libië. Nederland bleek ongewild een aanzienlijk aandeel gehad te hebben in de proliferatie van kernwapentechnologie naar Pakistan en door naar de andere twee landen. De geschiedenis en achtergronden van deze affaire worden uiteengezet in een paper van Greenpeace ("*A.Q. Khan, Urenco and the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology: - The symbiotic relation between nuclear energy and nuclear weapons*", te vinden op het website www.eurobomb.nl, onder 'publicaties').

Daar wordt ook het dilemma van het NPV geschetst. Het is namelijk zo dat de technologie geschikt om kernwapens te maken, dezelfde is als die voor het niet-militaire gebruik van kernenergie - dwz het in bedrijf nemen van nucleaire opwerkingsfabrieken en centrales. Maar juist deze technologie moet, krachtens het verdrag (art 4), beschikbaar worden gesteld aan de ondertekenaars. Deze strijdigheid in het NPV was de belangrijkste reden voor een aantal meest westerse landen om een reeks maatregelen te treffen om de proliferatie van kernenergie technologie aan banden te leggen, dan wel onder strikte controle te plaatsen. De (volgens het verdrag legale) bouw door Noord Korea en Iran van installaties voor verrijking en opwerking, daarmee de voorwaarden scheppend voor de bouw van kernwapens, vormde de achtergrond van deze maatregelen. Daaronder vielen bijvoorbeeld het vorig jaar opgerichte 'Proliferation Security Initiative', en een speciale Veiligheidsraad resolutie (aangenomen in april) om overdracht van de technologie om kernwapens te bouwen aan niet-staat gebonden 'actoren' te verhinderen. Secretaris generaal ElBaradei van het Internationaal Atoomenergie Agentschap (IAEA) en president Bush hebben verdergaande maatregelen voorgesteld. Deze zullen echter stuiten op de boven genoemde strijdigheid: de NPV ondertekenaars willen volledig gebruik kunnen maken van het recht om kernenergie te ontwikkelen.

De effectiviteit van het 'contra-proliferatie' beleid wordt echter ook ondermijnd door een andere tegenstrijdigheid. Het gaat om de verplichting, vastgelegd in art. 6 van het NPV, om nucleair te ontwapenen. In het verdrag lag een strategische ruil besloten: de potentiële kernwapenstaten zouden afzien van kernwapens en kernwapen technologie, mits de bestaande kernwapenstaten dat op termijn ook deden. Over deze kant van het NPV wordt meestal niet gerept in de publieke debatten. Dat is des te opvallender gezien het evidente belang ervan. Secretaris generaal van het IAEA ElBaradei erkende de tegenstrijdigheid in een toespraak gehouden op 21 juni jl. op een conferentie in Washington DC: *"The time is long overdue to abandon the unworkable notion that it is morally reprehensible for some countries to pursue nuclear weapons but morally acceptable for others to rely on them,"* (bijgevoegd).

Bovendien achtte hij dit ook van toepassing op het voor Nederland relevante NAVO kernwapenbeleid. In een andere toespraak voor de Council on Foreign Relations op 14 mei jl. in New York, (bijgevoegd) stelde hij onomwonden dat *"We need to do better in terms of protecting ourselves, and we cannot just continue to say, well, we have 25 countries, say, the NATO countries, who are relying on the nuclear umbrella, and everyone else should sit quietly in the cold, you know."*

Desalniettemin handhaaft de NAVO haar nucleaire doctrine, zoals te lezen valt in het 'Final Communiqué' van de 'Ministerial Meeting of the Defence Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group' (Press release (2003)147 Brussel, 1 december 2003), in paragraaf 9:

"The nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO continue to provide an essential political and military link between the European and North American members of the Alliance". (zie hieronder)

De belangrijkste kernwapenstaat, de VS heeft zich slechts vastgelegd op marginale reducties van haar immense kernwapenvoorraad (zie de officiële regeringsverklaring en de kritiek daarop van de Arms Control Association in Washington DC, hieronder).

Deze stappen hebben grote twijfels gezaaid bij de niet-kernwapenstaten die het NPV ondertekenden. Dat was de belangrijkste reden voor het chaotische einde van de tussenvergadering - de prepcom - van de NPV, begin mei in New York. Er was geen politieke ruimte om serieus over nucleaire ontwapening te praten (zie artikel Rebecca Johnson in News in Review hieronder).

Nederland was destijds betrokken bij een ernstig geval van proliferatie naar Pakistan. Het gemak waarmee de heer Khan en de firma's die hem later ondersteunden wegwamen met de export van gevoelige technologie, doet vermoeden dat wellicht nog meer landen op deze manier zijn 'geholpen'.

De centrale vragen in deze en andere affaires zijn daarom:

- 1. Is het mogelijk om via het NPV de verspreiding van kernwapentechnologie te verhinderen, gezien de 'overlap' tussen kernenergie en kernwapentechnologie?**
- 2. Als dit niet zo is, is het dan niet noodzakelijk om het NPV aan te passen, of wellicht een protocol er aan toe te voegen?**
- 3. Is het houdbaar om zelf onder een kernwapen paraplu (NAVO kernwapenbeleid) te leven en anderen te beletten hetzelfde te doen? Het gaat her niet alleen over de morele of juridische argumenten, maar ook de politieke. Kan dit blijven werken op de lange duur?**

Karel Koster

EUROPEES PARLEMENT

Europees Parlement

Resolutie van het Europees Parlement over nucleaire ontwapening: Conferentie over de herziening van het Non-proliferatieverdrag in 2005 - Voorbereiding EU op de derde bijeenkomst van het voorbereidend comité van het NPV (New York, 26 april - 7 mei 2004)

26 februari 2004

Het Europees Parlement,

– gelet op artikel 37, lid 4 van zijn Reglement,

A. overwegende dat de in 2000 gehouden Conferentie van de staten die het Non-proliferatieverdrag (NPV) hebben ondertekend, de Conferentie inzake ontwapening (CD) heeft verzocht een adequate hulpinstantie in het leven te roepen voor kwesties in verband met nucleaire ontwapening, zoals vervat in het vierde van de

- dertien punten in verband met artikel VI van het NPV dat door de NPV-Conferentie van 2000 werd goedgekeurd,
- B. overwegende dat alle lidstaten partij zijn bij het NPV en twee lidstaten kernwapenstaten zijn in de zin van het NPV,
- C. overwegende dat de CD de verzochte hulpinstantie niet binnen drie jaar na de toetsingsconferentie heeft opgericht noch daar momenteel mee bezig is,
- D. overwegende dat het altijd veel waarde heeft gehecht aan nucleaire ontwapening en in de afgelopen jaren veelvuldig van gedachten heeft gewisseld over dit onderwerp,
- E. overwegende dat het vertrouwen in de internationale veiligheid ervan afhangt of conform artikel VI van het NPV, maatregelen worden genomen over volledige nucleaire ontwapening in de officiële en de niet-officiële kernwapenlanden,
- F. overwegende dat het NPV ook in de toekomst de relevante internationale wetgeving voor nucleaire ontwapening blijft, en dat voor de tenuitvoerlegging daarvan een tijdschema met vaste ontwapeningsmaatregelen en termijnen nodig zijn,
- G. overwegende dat artikel VI van het NPV de verplichting bevat voor alle staten die partij bij het verdrag zijn om "te goeder trouw onderhandelingen te voeren over doeltreffende maatregelen gericht op beëindiging van de kernwapenwedloop in een vroeg stadium en op nucleaire ontwapening, en over een verdrag betreffende algemene en totale ontwapening onder strikt en doeltreffend internationaal toezicht",
- H. overwegende dat terrorisme, de verspreiding van massavernietigingswapens, het bestaan van zogenaamde "mislukte landen" en georganiseerde misdaad nieuwe bedreigingen vormen voor de internationale veiligheid,
- I. ernstig bezorgd door een nieuw tijdperk van proliferatie waarin niet alleen regeringen technologie en kennis overdragen maar ook individuele personen en ondernemingen,
- J. onder verwijzing naar de verklaringen van prof. Abdul Qadeer Khan, een in hoog aanzien staande wetenschapper uit Pakistan, die heeft toegegeven geheime informatie over kernwapens te hebben doorgegeven aan Iran, Libië, Noord-Korea, Maleisië en Irak,
- K. ernstig bezorgd door de wereldwijde zwarte markt van radioactieve stoffen waardoor de verspreiding van kernwapens aan niet-gouvernementele actoren waarschijnlijk wordt bevorderd,
- L. onder verwijzing naar de door de Europese Raad van Brussel op 12 december 2003 aangenomen nieuwe strategie van de EU ter bestrijding van de verspreiding van massavernietigingswapens,
1. herhaalt zijn standpunt dat het NPV van cruciaal belang is om het verspreiden van kernwapens te voorkomen en dat derhalve alles in het werk moet worden gesteld om het verdrag in al zijn aspecten toe te passen;
 2. wijst erop dat de doelstelling van de EU is om nucleaire wapens volledig uit te bannen en verwacht dat de officiële en niet-officiële kernwapenstaten zich actief met deze kwestie bezighouden en verdere vooruitgang boeken in de richting van een vermindering en afschaffing van kernwapens;
 3. verzoekt de EU en de lidstaten - in een geest van "doeltreffend multilateralisme", van solidariteit en ter uitvoering van de strategie van de EU tegen de proliferatie van massavernietigingswapens - op de vergadering van het voorbereidend comité van het NPV (NPV PrepCom) en de NPV-herzieningsconferentie één front te vormen en een positieve bijdrage aan de gesprekken te leveren; dringt erop aan dat in hun verklaringen bijzondere aandacht wordt besteed aan nieuwe initiatieven op het gebied van nucleaire ontwapening en aan de revitalisering van de VN-ontwapeningsconferentie;
 4. verzoekt het Ierse Raadsvoorzitterschap en de lidstaten hun gemeenschappelijk standpunt, krachtens welk het "Verdrag inzake de non-proliferatie van kernwapens (NPV)" als geheel behouden moet blijven" verder uit te werken;
 5. verzoekt het Ierse Raadsvoorzitterschap - ter ondersteuning van de hogervermelde strategie van de EU en van gemeenschappelijk standpunt 2003/805/GBVB van de Raad van 17 november 2003 betreffende de universalisering en versterking van multilaterale overeenkomsten op het gebied van de non-proliferatie van massavernietigingswapens en overbrengingsmiddelen daarvoor⁽¹⁾ - op de vergadering van het NPV PrepCom een verklaring af te geven;
 6. verzoekt de EU met haar internationale partners samen te werken bij de ontwikkeling en bevordering van beginselen om terroristen of hen die deze onderdak bieden, ervan te weerhouden toegang te krijgen tot massavernietigingswapens en -materiaal;
 7. verzoekt de Raad en de Commissie de ervaring van Euratom te gebruiken om een programma op te zetten dat gericht is op voorkoming van de verspreiding van radioactieve stoffen en van nucleaire technologie en kennis in de wereld;

8. verzoekt het Ierse Raadsvoorzitterschap en de lidstaten hun gemeenschappelijk standpunt verder uit te werken door in grote lijnen te verklaren hoe zij het in het kader van de MVW-strategie van de EU nagestreefde gemeenschappelijke doel" om te pleiten voor een sterkere rol van de VN-Veiligheidsraad en uitbreiding van de vakkennis, om verspreiding van massavernietigingswapens te bestrijden" willen bereiken, en hoe met name de landen die het NPV hebben ondertekend de unieke verificatie- en inspectie-ervaring van UNMOVIC, bijvoorbeeld in het kader van een register van deskundigen, kunnen handhaven;
9. verzoekt het Ierse Raadsvoorzitterschap en de lidstaten voorstellen in te dienen over de wijze waarop zij derde landen ervan zouden kunnen overtuigen zich aan de aanvullende IAEA-protocollen te houden, aangezien alle lidstaten deze protocollen ondertekend en geratificeerd hebben;
10. verzoekt het Ierse Raadsvoorzitterschap en de lidstaten duidelijk te maken hoe zij zichzelf ertoe zouden kunnen verplichten financiële middelen ter ondersteuning van specifieke projecten die worden geleid door multilaterale instellingen, zoals de IAEA, beschikbaar te stellen;
11. verzoekt de EU op de bijeenkomst van het NPV PrepCom in 2004 en op de herzieningsconferentie van 2005 voor te stellen dat de adequate hulpinstantie voor nucleaire ontwapening onverwijld door de CD wordt opgericht;
12. verzoekt de EU de nodige coördinatiemechanismen te ontwikkelen (de MVW Monitoring Unit van de EU in samenwerking met het Situatiecentrum van de EU) om ervoor te zorgen dat de inlichtingendiensten worden ingezet ten behoeve van het opbouwen van solidariteit en vertrouwen tussen de lidstaten op het gebied van het beleid inzake massavernietigingswapens;
13. beklemtoont het belang en de urgentie van de ondertekening en ratificatie, zonder verdere vertraging en onvoorwaardelijk en overeenkomstig grondwettelijke processen, van het Verdrag over een algeheel verbod op kernproeven (CTBT), teneinde te komen tot zo snel mogelijke inwerkingtreding ervan; verzoekt de Raad en de Commissie met klem om in de dialoog met de staten-partners die zulks nog niet hebben gedaan, aan te dringen op ratificatie van het CTBT en/of het Non-proliferatieverdrag;
14. dringt er opnieuw bij de VS op aan een eind te maken aan de ontwikkeling van nieuwe generaties nucleaire strijdwapens ("bunkerbusters") en het CTBT te ondertekenen en te ratificeren;
15. steunt de door de burgemeesters van Hiroshima en Nagasaki geïnitieerde internationale campagne van burgemeesters voor nucleaire ontwapening;
16. verzoekt de Raad en de Commissie het Europees Parlement een voortgangsverslag over de resultaten van de bijeenkomst van het NPV PrepCom voor de leggen;
17. is ervan overtuigd dat het streven naar nucleaire ontwapening aanzienlijk zal bijdragen tot de internationale veiligheid en de strategische stabiliteit en ook het risico van diefstal van plutonium door terroristen zal verkleinen;
18. verzoekt alle landen, en met name de kernwapenlanden, geen steun te verlenen aan landen die streven naar de verwerving van nucleaire wapens of andere nucleaire explosieven, noch hen tot koop aan te zetten, met name die landen die niet bij het NPV zijn aangesloten;
19. erkent de positieve stappen van Iran dat het aanvullend protocol inzake normen voor radioactieve stoffen heeft ondertekend en hoopt dat de Majlis (het Iraanse parlement) de tekst binnen een redelijke termijn zal ratificeren;
20. is ingenomen met de intentie van Libië om af te zien van wapenprogramma's en inspecties, zonder voorwaarden vooraf, toe te staan;
21. verzoekt de EU samen te werken met haar internationale partners om in het Midden-Oosten een kernwapenvrije zone te ontwikkelen en te bevorderen;
22. verzoekt zijn Voorzitter deze resolutie te doen toekomen aan de Raad, de Commissie, de regeringen van de lidstaten, de secretaris-generaal van de Verenigde Naties en alle staten die partij zijn bij het verdrag.

IAEA

IAEA

Transcript

Speaker: Mohamed ElBaradei, director-general, International Atomic Energy Agency

President: Graham T. Allison, director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

Council on Foreign Relations - New York, N.Y. - May 14, 2004

[...] But what I'm talking [about] here, Graham, not the additional protocol, but certain measures which we need to strengthen the nonproliferation regime. It should have, as a built-in component, a commitment to a nuclear disarmament, I mean, restoring again the commitment of the 1970s. So that's where also you can get India, Pakistan, and Israel into the scene, because you have to get everybody. You have to send a powerful message. We need to do better in terms of protecting ourselves, and we cannot just continue to say, well, we have 25 countries, say, the NATO countries, who are relying on the nuclear umbrella, and everyone else should sit quietly in the cold, you know. That, as I said, in the long run, is not sustainable. And there is some problem about the moral foundation of a regime based on this type of equality, you know. [...]

http://www.cfr.org/pub7032/graham_t_allison_mohamed_elbaradei/the_challenges_facing_nonproliferation.php#

BELEID KERNWAPENSTATEN

Boston Globe

World's nuclear powers decried as hypocrites

UN agency chief says reliance cripples push to halt proliferation

By Bryan Bender, Globe Staff – 22 June 2004

WASHINGTON -- The world's nuclear powers have failed to reduce their reliance on atomic weapons, creating a double standard that plagues international efforts to reduce their spread, the United Nations top nuclear watchdog said yesterday.

With the growing availability of weapons of mass destruction materials and expertise to states and terrorist groups, one of the largest obstacles to countering nuclear proliferation is the hypocrisy at the heart of global nuclear policy, said Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The nuclear powers pressuring countries like Iran and North Korea to forgo nuclear arms are clinging to the weapons as the centerpiece of their own security, despite pledges more than 30 years ago to reduce their dependence on them, he said.

The time is long overdue to "abandon the unworkable notion that it is morally reprehensible for some countries to pursue nuclear weapons but morally acceptable for others to rely on them," ElBaradei said in a speech to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington.

ElBaradei's agency is responsible for verifying that nuclear treaties are followed, and has received high marks from around the world for his dogged efforts to rein in Iran and Libya's programs. He is awaiting the outcome of six-party talks with North Korea to restart inspections there.

But he said recent attempts to keep nations from developing nuclear weapons are seriously hampered by the fact that the very countries pressuring them are themselves no closer -- and possibly even further -- from reversing their own nuclear ambitions.

He called on the international community to establish a new strategy for "verified, irreversible nuclear disarmament."

Such a goal is required by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty signed more than three decades ago that called on the declared nuclear states -- the United States, Russia, China, Britain, and France -- to take immediate steps toward full nuclear disarmament.

Many government officials and specialists say such a lofty goal is unrealistic. There are currently more than 30,000 useable nuclear weapons around the globe, according to UN estimates.

ElBaradei said the United States' search for a new class of nuclear weapons is a prime example of this double standard, which some specialists say deepens desires by other countries to join the club of nuclear powers.

"If such efforts proceed, it is hard to understand how we can continue to ask the nuclear have-nots to accept additional nonproliferation obligations and to renounce any sensitive nuclear capability as being adverse to their security," he said at a conference of international nonproliferation specialists.

Taking steps to reduce the US reliance on these weapons will be a primary focus of a speech today by Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Democrat of Massachusetts. Kennedy, a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, will call on the Bush administration to end its work on developing a bunker-busting "mininuke" in making a series of proposals to beef up international nonproliferation efforts.

"They don't strengthen our military options, and they send precisely the wrong signal to the world about America's nuclear intentions," the senator will say, according to a draft of his speech.

These activities have also made it more difficult to persuade undeclared nuclear powers such as India, Pakistan, and Israel to come to the negotiating table, according to ElBaradei.

ElBaradei described an international community that, despite the nature of the nuclear threat, has taken a haphazard approach to dealing with the problem.

"The trend has been toward inaction or late action on the part of the international community, selective invocation of norms and treaties, and unilateral and self-help solutions on the part of individual states or group of states," he said. "Against this background of insecurity and instability, it should not come as a surprise to witness the continued interest . . . in the acquisition of nuclear weapons."

BELEID VERENIGDE STATEN

Defense Science Board

Future Strategic Strike Forces

Report – February 2004

[...] *Non-strategic nuclear systems.* OSD Policy should consider eliminating the nuclear role for Tomahawk cruise missiles and for forward-based, tactical, dual-capable aircraft. There is no obvious military need for these systems, and eliminating the nuclear role would free resources that could be used to fund strategic strike programs of higher priority. To a great extent, their continuation is a policy decision. [...]

US Department of Energy

Text: U.S. Plans to Reduce Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Substantially

(Brooks says action would complement other nuclear reductions) (850)

4 June 2004

The U.S. stockpile of nuclear weapons will be substantially reduced under a new plan approved recently by President Bush, according to an Energy Department official.

Linton Brooks, administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), told members of Congress June 3 that the administration has decided to "substantially reduce the current stockpile. ... By 2012, the United States' nuclear stockpile will be the smallest it has been in several decades," Linton wrote in an unclassified letter accompanying the classified report. The material was delivered to the Appropriations and Armed Services committees of both houses of Congress, an Energy Department official said June 4.

In his letter, Brooks writes that the presidential decision to reduce the number of operationally deployed nuclear weapons to a level of 1,700 to 2,200 by 2012, subsequently codified in the 2002 Moscow Treaty with Russia, "has laid the groundwork for a major reduction in the size of the total nuclear stockpile." However, he continued, having much smaller numbers of both deployed and stockpiled nuclear weapons means that "we must continue administration efforts to restore the nuclear weapons infrastructure."

In order to restore the infrastructure, Linton said three things will be necessary: a modern facility to manufacture plutonium parts for nuclear warheads; an advanced program for nuclear scientists and engineers to retain critical skills in order to respond to new, unexpected, or emerging threats quickly; and enhanced test readiness.

Following is the text of the announcement:

National Nuclear Security Administration

U.S. Department of Energy

June 3, 2004

Administration Plans Significant Reduction In Nuclear Weapons Stockpile

WASHINGTON, D.C. -- National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Administrator Linton F. Brooks, on behalf of the secretaries of Energy and Defense, has submitted a classified report to Congress showing a significant reduction in the nation's total nuclear weapons stockpile by 2012.

The stockpile contains reserve warheads that back up the operationally deployed nuclear weapons. In 2001, President Bush announced that the operationally deployed force would be reduced to 1,700-2,200 nuclear weapons by 2012. His decision was later codified in the Moscow Treaty.

The following is the unclassified cover letter:

Dear Mr. Chairman:

On behalf of the secretary of Energy and the secretary of Defense, I am pleased to submit a report on a revised nuclear weapons stockpile plan as requested in the conference report to accompany the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, 2004.

The president on 13 November 2001 announced his decision to reduce to 1,700-2,200 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads by the end of 2012 -- a two-thirds reduction from then-current levels. This dramatic reduction in nuclear forces -- the most significant in the nuclear age -- was codified in the Moscow Treaty.

Historically, deployed nuclear forces have been supported by a stockpile reserve that ensures that America's military readiness is not compromised. As the number of operationally deployed warheads declines, stockpile reserves take on even greater importance. The Nuclear Posture Review calls for a nuclear stockpile that supports the operationally deployed force and includes a reserve of warheads that could be used to augment the operationally deployed force or to provide replacements for warheads that experience safety or reliability problems.

The president's decision to reduce the number of operationally deployed weapons has laid the groundwork for a major reduction in the size of the total nuclear stockpile. The size and composition of this stockpile has been the focus of a great deal of analysis in the administration. Recently, the president approved a stockpile plan that would substantially reduce the current stockpile. Detailed information about this plan is included in the enclosed report.

By 2012, the United States' nuclear stockpile will be the smallest it has been in several decades. In recommending this stockpile plan to the president, we recognize that maintaining the nation's nuclear deterrence with a much smaller stockpile means that we must continue administration efforts to restore the nuclear weapons infrastructure. The Nuclear Posture Review calls for a "responsive infrastructure" to ensure that we retain the ability and expertise to respond to geopolitical changes that may challenge American security in the future or to address potential problems that affect the safety or reliability of weapons in the current stockpile.

The administration's work to restore a modern infrastructure includes, among other things, three ongoing initiatives:

- (1) planning for a Modern Pit Facility to restore the nation's ability to manufacture plutonium parts for nuclear warheads;
- (2) an advanced concepts program to enable scientists and engineers at the national nuclear weapons laboratories to retain critical skills and to provide the United States with means to respond to new, unexpected, or emerging threats in a timely manner; and
- (3) enhanced test readiness.

Completion of these programs and the realization of a responsive infrastructure will offer opportunities for the United States to reduce further the nuclear stockpile secure in the knowledge that the nation has enhanced its capabilities to respond to possible future challenges to its security.

Sincerely,

Linton F. Brooks

Administrator

Arms Control Association

Arms Control Association Experts Criticize Bush Administration's Plan for Keeping Excessive Nuclear Stockpile: Urge Real Reductions of Nuclear Forces

Press release - 4 June 2004

(Washington, D.C.): The Department of Energy announced yesterday that it had delivered an overdue and classified report to Congress on how many nuclear weapons the United States will keep in the future. While the Energy Department claims the U.S. nuclear stockpile "will be the smallest it has been in several decades" under the proposed Bush administration plan, experts at the Arms Control Association (ACA) said it still far exceeds U.S. security needs and reflects outdated Cold War-era thinking about nuclear weapons.

Few details about the new stockpile plan, which pertains to both deployed and stored warheads, have been made public.

What is known, however, is that U.S. operationally deployed strategic warheads will be reduced from the several thousands existing today to between 1,700 to 2,200 by the end of 2012 as called for by the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), which the United States and Russia signed in May 2002. It is also apparent that the United States, under the new stockpile plan, will retain thousands of additional warheads in storage and is hedging toward building more warheads in the future. According to the Energy Department, the stockpile will be supported by a "responsive infrastructure," including plans for a new facility to make key nuclear bomb components, research into new nuclear weapon designs, and a heightened readiness to resume nuclear testing.

"The reality is that administration's nuclear stockpile plan does not significantly alter the number of existing nuclear warheads and delivery systems and therefore only marginally affects the residual nuclear potential of the United States and Russia," charged Daryl G. Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association. He explained that SORT did not require the destruction of a single warhead or delivery vehicle—only that they be stored apart, which means the United States will be preserving "thousands of reserve warheads that are costly to maintain and could be redeployed relatively quickly, making it difficult to predict total force levels over the next decade."

"The United States and Russia should not be making sleight-of-hand reductions, but actually destroying nuclear weapons and delivery systems," Kimball recommended. "Reductions coupled with preparations to build new nuclear weapons does not inspire confidence that this administration is serious about reducing the long-term role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security policy," Kimball added.

The United States currently deploys approximately 6,000 strategic nuclear warheads on its triad of land-based missiles, submarines, and bombers. Its entire nuclear force numbers approximately 10,000 total warheads. Russia currently deploys roughly 5,000 strategic nuclear warheads out of an estimated arsenal of some 20,000 total nuclear warheads.

Two years ago, the Pentagon indicated it planned to store up to 2,400 nuclear warheads in a state of readiness, enabling them to be returned to service within weeks, months, or at most three years after being removed from deployment. This so-called responsive force would constitute only part of the U.S. nuclear warhead reserve. It is unclear to what extent this proposal made it into the recently recommended stockpile plan.

Kimball stated, "It is in the U.S. national security interest to undertake more rapid and real cuts in its nuclear weapons stockpile to set an example for Russia. The nuclear threat from Russia today is that one of its thousands of warheads could be accidentally launched or stolen by terrorists so the United States should create the conditions necessary for Russian leaders to feel secure enough to dismantle their arsenal to the greatest extent possible. The administration's stockpile plan does not do that."

"The nuclear stockpile plan coupled with this administration's other nuclear weapons policies falls far short of President Bush's rhetoric that he would reduce U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons and cut those forces to the lowest level possible," said Wade Boese, research director of the Arms Control Association. "The administration is missing a grand opportunity to signal to other countries that nuclear weapons are not essential for security. Rather than eliminating thousands of obsolete, excess weapons, the administration continues to cling to them," he added.

NAVO

Defence Planning Committee and Nuclear Planning Group

Ministerial Meeting of the Defence Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group held in Brussels on Monday, 1 December 2003

Final Communiqué - Press release (2003)147 – 1 December 2003

[...]

5. NATO's defence planning processes and the relevant EU processes must result in coherent and mutually reinforcing capability development, not least to support the greatest possible efficiency and cost-effectiveness in our defence spending. In this context, we should vigorously continue to implement those aspects of the Berlin-Plus arrangements relevant to defence planning.

6. We warmly welcome the progress on the NATO Response Force, including successful establishment of its initial rotations and the successful completion of its recent exercise in Turkey. The NRF will become a distinctively high-quality force and a catalyst for transformation of Alliance capabilities. Related defence planning work must be completed in order to further enhance the NRF's effectiveness.

[...]

8. At our Nuclear Planning Group meeting, we reviewed the status of NATO's nuclear forces and the work of the High Level Group. It is a long-standing goal of the Alliance to enhance security and stability at the lowest possible level of forces consistent with its requirements for collective defence and the full range of its missions. In keeping with this goal, we continue to consider deterrence requirements for the 21 st century. We reaffirmed the principles underpinning NATO's security objectives as set out in the Alliance's Strategic Concept.

9. The nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO continue to provide an essential political and military link between the European and North American members of the Alliance. They are maintained at readiness levels consistent with the prevailing security environment. We noted with appreciation the continuing contribution made by the United Kingdom's independent nuclear forces to deterrence and the overall security of the Allies, and reaffirmed the value of this capability.

10. We discussed the growing danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and expressed our serious concern over recent acts of non-compliance with obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which may have negative consequences for regional stability and security. We reaffirmed our full commitment to the NPT and to the goal of universal adherence to it. We recognized the NPT as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and reiterated our continuing commitment to all our obligations under this Treaty. We urge all nations to work together to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

11. We reaffirmed the importance of substantial and productive exchanges by nuclear experts under the auspices of the NATO-Russia Council with a view to gaining better mutual understanding, more confidence and thereby increased security. We are encouraged by the progress achieved in these consultations, in particular the prospect of a series of field demonstrations on nuclear weapon safety and security issues.

NPV Prepcom 2004

News in Review

Confusion and Anger as NPT Meeting Closes in New York

by Rebecca Johnson – 8 May 2004

The Third Session of the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the 2005 Review Conference of the NPT closed in disarray around 8 pm Friday May 7, 2004, with adoption of only parts of its final report containing the most minimal agreements to enable the 2005 Review Conference to take place. States Parties were unable to take decisions on important issues such as the agenda and background documents, in large part because the US delegation was determined to oppose and minimise references to the consensus final document from the 2000 Review Conference, which had resulted in the ground-breaking 13-step plan of action on nuclear disarmament. The United States, actively abetted by France and Britain, with the other nuclear weapon states happy to go along, wanted to rewrite the NPT's history by sidelining the 2000 Conference commitments, at which they had made an "unequivocal undertaking... to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals". A majority of other states, by contrast, wanted the 2005 Review Conference to build on both the groundbreaking agreements from 2000 and the decisions and resolutions from the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

The meeting, chaired by Ambassador Sudjandnan Parnohadinigrat of Indonesia, was expected to be difficult, but was made more so by the ideological US obstruction to anything that mentioned the CTBT or the 2000 agreements. The nonaligned states, frequently spearheaded by South Africa, a key player in both 1995 and 2000, refused to capitulate, though far too many of the western non nuclear weapon states appeared ready to roll belly up and settle for a lowest common denominator trade-off. Most notably, as the meeting went through its motions, a significant number of parties showed preference for 'waiting out' the problem, in the hope that time, further consultations and, most importantly, more constructive political circumstances (which many associated with possible regime change in the United States in November), might make consensus more reachable before the 2005 Conference opens.

Throughout the meeting, there was much stating of positions, but little stomach for confrontation or compromise. After two weeks of lacklustre debates, with much repetition and very few new ideas, the last day of the meeting turned into a bad-tempered shambles that ended in near farce, with a series of confused decisions taken without interpretation, with the majority speaking English but two delegations insisting on French. The PrepCom even failed to abide by its own rules whereby, if discussions have been held in closed session, the meeting is opened to the public for formal decisions to be properly taken.

Along with the rest of civil society, the Acronym Institute was outside the room throughout the long day, gleaning information from a series of frustrated delegates as they wandered back and forth for cigarettes or coffee. As debates went round and round in circles, messing up earlier agreements on access for nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), adding and subtracting words to slide just one outstanding - but importantly context-establishing - paragraph on the agenda past the US blockage, it was clear that many delegates, including, some complained, the Chair, had lost the plot. Their confusion about what they were doing even extended to the final decisions, as illustrated by contradictory reports of what occurred at the end.

President-Elect Ambassador Sergio Duarte of Brazil may have to wait some time before there is full clarity about what was decided and what he will have to do over the next year to create the conditions for the Review Conference to get to work in May 2005. Certainly, the PrepCom failed to agree any substantive recommendations and refused to annex the Chair's summary of the meeting, which will be issued merely as a chair's working paper, with no authority. The Chair's summary, issued late on Thursday evening, was - as with its predecessors - challenged by several states, including the United States and Iran. Canada was angry that the summary had failed to mention initiatives on strengthening the Treaty's enforcement mechanisms; there were complaints that text on nuclear energy and safeguards provided by the Vice Chairs had been ignored. Illustrating the difficulties of walking this Chair's tightrope, the summary provoked grumbles from some states that it too closely resembled the chair's summary issued by Ambassador Laszlo Molnar of Hungary the previous year, while others complained that it read like a NAM (non-aligned states) document, of which Indonesia is a prominent member.

As it turned out, however, the chair's summary was little more than a sideshow, paling into insignificance as states parties realised they were in danger of not being able to take the necessary decisions to enable the 2005 Conference to be held. After much to-ing and fro-ing it appears that the disputed parts of the report dealing with the more fundamental issues of agenda, background documents and subsidiary bodies will now be turned into a chair's working paper that will be forwarded together with the bare bones of a report that were agreed.

In view of the confusion and the lack of reliable documentation on the decisions, a more substantive analysis will be published by the Acronym Institute once the decisions have been clarified and the statements and documents have been further analysed.

Background

The NPT PrepCom opened at the United Nations in New York on April 26, 2004, and ran for two weeks. The meeting was required to come up with recommendations for the 2005 Review Conference, but seemed just to go through the motions, managing only to adopt a timetable of work at the end of the first week. On Friday, April 30, the decision was taken to enable NGO representatives to attend and receive statements and documents from the so-called 'cluster debates', on the non-transfer and acquisition of nuclear technologies and nuclear disarmament, safeguards, and nuclear energy for non-military purposes. The objections to the timetable centred on whether there should be 'special time' allocated to the issues of security assurances (in accordance with which the nuclear weapon states commit not to use nuclear weapons to attack states without nuclear weapons) and the Middle East.

It was finally decided to fold the security assurances discussion into a session devoted to consideration of the practical pursuit of nuclear disarmament measures, and to include the Middle East question in a session on regional issues. For 'equity' among the three 'pillars' of the NPT, it was also decided to devote a session to 'the safety and security of peaceful nuclear programmes'. Symptomatic of the lack of real progress at this PrepCom, it turned out that many statements to these special sessions merely repeated, with slightly more detail or argument, on points already given in general debates.

As anticipated (see Rebecca Johnson, [The NPT in 2004: Testing the Limits](#), Disarmament Diplomacy 76), the main focus of interventions from the United States has been noncompliance by North Korea and Iran and the need for stricter measures to deal with NPT parties who use the Article IV provision on nuclear energy to fulfil nuclear weapon ambitions. At the same time a large number of states, including many US allies, highlighted the importance of fulfilment of disarmament obligations - with emphasis on core agreements such as the CTBT - while also raising concerns about new developments in nuclear weapons or doctrines.

States lined up to support Additional Protocol, and suggestions were put forward for how to manage nuclear fuel cycle supply, restrict exports in sensitive technologies and materials and provide better institutional tools for states parties to strengthen the treaty's implementation.

The General debate heard interventions from: Mexico on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition; New Zealand; Ireland on behalf of the European Union; China; Britain; Algeria; Mexico; Malaysia on behalf of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties; Australia; Peru; Indonesia; South Africa; Egypt; Bangladesh; Republic of (South) Korea; Switzerland; Japan; Syria; Venezuela; Canada; Belarus; Kazakhstan; Bahamas and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The General Debate continued on Tuesday and Wednesday with statements from France; Brazil; the Holy See; the United States (John Bolton); Norway; Iran; Russia; Viet Nam; Burma/Myanmar; Cuba; Ukraine; Morocco; Egypt on behalf of the Arab Group; Nepal; Chile; Argentina; Serbia and Montenegro; Mongolia; Saudi Arabia; Kyrgyzstan; Cuba; Nigeria and Ecuador. As a result of the decision to open the cluster debates to NGOs, these statements are also obtainable from the website of <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org>.

In one three hour session, the PrepCom was addressed by thirteen civil society representatives, including the Mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Senator Patrik Vankrunkelsven from Belgium, the Mayor of Kiev, Olexandr Omelchenko, the Hon Bill Perkins, the Deputy Majority Leader on New York City Council and attended by a host of others. The full texts of the NGO statements, as well as a daily news review with summaries of the many civil society panels held during the first week, are also available from [reachingcriticalwill.org](http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org).

G8

US White House

Global Nonproliferation Action Plan Approved by G8

White House outlines key elements of strategy

9 June 2004

The Group of Eight (G8) countries adopted an action plan June 9 to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by increasing controls over relevant materials and technologies, dismantling proliferation networks, and expanding the global partnership against the spread of WMD.

The action plan advances an ambitious global nonproliferation agenda and furthers the proposals contained in President Bush's February 11, 2004 speech at the National Defense University.

WMD proliferation "together with international terrorism, constitutes the preeminent threat to global peace and security," said the leaders of the G8, who were meeting in Sea Island, Georgia.

Following is a White House fact sheet:

THE WHITE HOUSE Office of the Press Secretary (Sea Island, Georgia)

June 9, 2004

FACT SHEET: G8 ACTION PLAN ON NONPROLIFERATION

"Every civilized nation has a stake in preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction. These materials and technologies, and the people who traffic them, cross many borders. To stop this trade, the nations of the world must be strong and determined. We must work together, we must act effectively."

-- President George W. Bush February 11, 2004

National Defense University Washington, D.C.

Presidential Action

President Bush and the G8 Leaders agreed today to take new actions to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction which, together with international terrorism, constitutes the preeminent threat to global peace and security.

G8 Action: The G8 Leaders adopted today an Action Plan on Nonproliferation that advances an ambitious global nonproliferation agenda, and furthers the proposals contained in President Bush's February 11, 2004 speech at the National Defense University. The G8 Leaders committed to:

- Expand the work of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which now includes all G8 members, to disrupt and dismantle proliferation networks, such as that of A.Q. Khan, and coordinate enforcement efforts;
 - Refrain for one year from initiating new transfers of enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technology to additional states, while working to implement permanent controls before the 2005 G8 Summit to keep this equipment from terrorists or states seeking to use it to manufacture nuclear weapons.
 - Support full implementation of the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540 to criminalize proliferation activities, establish effective export controls, and protect proliferation-sensitive materials. The resolution was proposed by President Bush in September 2003, and passed unanimously in April 2004.
 - Strengthen International Atomic Energy Agency by: Supporting universal adoption of the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Additional Protocol, which expands the IAEA's tools to verify nuclear activity, and making it an essential new standard for nuclear supply; Establishing a new Special Committee of the IAEA Board of Governors to focus on safeguards and verification; and Urging states under IAEA investigation not to participate in decisions regarding their cases.
 - Expand the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction by: Welcoming Australia, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Ireland, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea as new donors; Working with other former Soviet states to discuss their participation in the Global Partnership; Using the Global Partnership to coordinate nonproliferation projects in Libya, Iraq, and other countries; and Reaffirming the commitment to provide up to \$20 billion for the Global Partnership through 2012.
 - Confront Nonproliferation Challenges
- North Korea: the G8 called for the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear programs, and expressed support for the Six-Party Process.
- Iran: the G8 were united in urging Iran to comply fully with its Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty obligations and all IAEA Board requirements.
- Libya: the G8 welcomed Libya's strategic decision to eliminate its WMD and longer-range missile programs.
- Take Action Against Bioterrorism and Radiological Weapons by: Expanding and improving national and international capabilities to detect, prevent, and respond to biological attacks; and Strengthening export and import controls on radioactive sources that could be used to make a "dirty bomb."