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IRAN (2A) Recente ontwikkelingen

INHOUDSOPGAVE

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COMMENTAAR EN SAMENVATTING

De komende maanden zal de proliferatiekwesitie steeds belangrijker worden. Daarbij wordt een debat gevoerd die gaat om de interpretatie van het gevaar van proliferatie en vooral ook over wat er aan gedaan moet worden. Aan de ene kant is er het probleem van de proliferatie van massavernietigingswapens naar steeds meer landen, in het uiterste geval terroristische organisaties. Aan de andere kant het probleem van de 'eigen' massavernietigingswapens. De acht kernwapeinstaten handhaven een bijzonder omvangrijke nucleaire slagkracht, vele malen groter dan de vier of vijf kernwapens waarover bijvoorbeeld een land als Noord-Korea vermoedelijk beschikt.

Er is een evidente contradictie tussen het zelf handhaven van eigen kernwapens en het voeren van een zeer agressief beleid om te verhinderen dat andere landen de beschikking krijgen over massavernietigingswapens. Normaliter wordt deze contradictie ontkend door te verwijzen naar een reeks verplichtingen tot nucleaire ontwapening die men zegt op te volgen. De geloofwaardigheid van deze verklaringen staat echter ter discussie. Dat is belangrijk bij de aanloop naar de toetsingsconferentie van het Non-Proliferatie Verdrag, die in mei volgend jaar plaats gaat vinden.

In het geval van Iran dat de komende maanden een prominente rol zal spelen in de debatten, komen deze contradicties weer naar voren. In deze twee F&R's worden een aantal documenten verzameld om een beeld te geven van de problematiek. We hebben een paar maanden geleden nog in nr. 37 (Proliferatie (2)) aandacht aan Iran besteedt. In nr. 38B staat een verzameling artikelen die een beeld geven van de ontwikkelingen sindsdien, tot de IAEA vergadering van 13 september jl. Het gaat om buitenlandse artikelen (voornamelijk uit de Brits-Amerikaanse pers) en een deel van de Nederlandse pers. Achterin staat een tijdlijn van belangrijke gebeurtenissen. In 38A staat een verzameling documenten die tot doel heeft om een beeld te geven van de stand van zaken in de Iraanse nucleaire industrie, inclusief inschattingen van het potentieel om kernwapens te bouwen. In 38A staan ook een aantal regerings en parlementaire stukken: verslagen van persconferenties van het VS State department, het Witte Huis en congresstukken. Daarnaast een hoofdstukje met relevante stukken afkomstig van de Nederlandse regering en Kamer. Ook daar staat een tijdlijn met belangrijke citaten.

In de vergaderingen van het Internationaal Atoomagentschap, het IAEA, wordt een debat gevoerd over het doorsturen van het 'geval Iran' naar de Veiligheidsraad. Omdat dat mogelijkwerijs kan uitlopen op een veto van Rusland op Amerikaanse voorstellen om een confrontatie aan te gaan met Iran (door het aannemen van vormen van sancties of eisen voor inspecties) proberen momenteel de EU landen zo een stap uit te stellen. In november (na de Amerikaanse presidentsverkiezingen) komt de zaak weer aan de orde in de IAEA.

Daarbij zijn de volgende punten van belang:

1. Iran heeft een uitgebreide nucleaire industrie opgebouwd, die afdoende basis vormt om binnen een paar jaar kernwapens te bouwen (zie F&R38A)
2. Het is onduidelijk of Iran draagsystemen heeft waarop zo een kernwapen kan worden gemonteerd. De bestaande middellange afstandsruketten zijn geschikt voor conventionele explosieve ladingen.
3. De handelingen van Iran om uranium verrijkingstechnologie aan te schaffen dan wel te bouwen zijn in overeenstemming met het Non-Proliferatie Verdrag. Deze verrijkingstechnologie is voor een belangrijk deel evenzeer geschikt voor de bouw van kernwapens als de opbouw van een civiele nucleaire industrie. Dit is het cruciale dilemma van het NPV.
4. De IAEA heeft afspraken gemaakt met de Iraanse regering over een additioneel inspectie-protocol. Dit protocol is nog steeds niet geratificeerd door het Iraanse parlement.
5. De Iraanse regering heeft bij eerdere afspraken met de EU staten Verenigd Koninkrijk, Frankrijk en Duitsland toegezegd om het uranium verrijkingsproces voorlopig stop te zetten. Daar is het deze zomer van teruggekomen in reactie op een negatieve verklaring van de IAEA. Iran gaat door met de bouw van ultracentrifuges die nodig zijn voor het verrijkingsproces.
6. Zoals gezegd zijn deze stappen niet strijdig met het NPV, maar druisen wel in tegen de afspraken die met de 'EU drie' zijn gemaakt. Iran heeft in een gesprek met EU lidstaten een aantal eisen gesteld voor de levering van nucleaire technologie. In ruil daarvoor stemt ze toe met verdergaande inspectieprocedures. De aard daarvan is onduidelijk.
7. De VS regering neemt geen genoegen met deze stand van zaken en willen de kwesitie versneld in de Veiligheidsraad aan de orde stellen.
8. De regionale kernwapenmacht Israël speelt een cruciale rol in deze kwesitie. Premier Sharon heeft verklaard dat Israël (geen ondertekenaar van het NPV) niet zal dulden dat Iran ook een inzetbare kernwapenmacht ontwikkelt. In Israelische kranten zijn berichten verschenen over een mogelijke aanval

op de Iraanse nucleaire installaties om dat te verhinderen (zoals die uitgevoerd op een kernreactor in Osirak, Irak in 1981). Voormalig Amerikaans presidentieel veiligheidsadviseur Brezinski heeft gezegd dat dit niet mogelijk zou zijn zonder VS instemming. Cruciale vraag is op welk ogenblik de Israelische regering beoordeelt dat de Iraanse nucleaire industrie zo ver ontwikkeld is dat een aanval noodzakelijk zou zijn.

9. In reactie op deze dreigementen heeft een vooraanstaand lid van de Iraanse regering verklaard dat ze een aanval niet zal afwachten. In plaats daarvan zal ze zelf eerst preventief aanvallen.

Het gevaar dat de situatie escaleert is aanzienlijk. Hoewel om verschillende redenen een militaire aanval door Israël of de VS onwaarschijnlijk is (militair-technische haalbaarheid, politieke tegenstand van Rusland) laten de uitspraken van de Amerikaanse beleidsmakers deze mogelijkheid open. De politieke invloed van de neo-conservatieven in de Amerikaanse regering, vooral in de aanloop naar de verkiezingen, is van beslissend belang. Het is goed mogelijk dat zij verdere aanvallen juist als een logische stap zien om de 'oorlog tegen het terrorisme' voort te zetten. Aangezien een substantieel deel van het Amerikaanse leger vastzit in Irak, kan het aantrekkelijk zijn als de Israeliese strijdkrachten die taak op zich nemen, eventuele politiek gesteund door de VS.

BASISGEGEVENS MASSAVERNIETIGINGSWAPENS INSTALLATIES IN IRAN































Zie voor informatie over Iran en massavernietigingswapens ook: Facts and Reports nummer 30.

Federation of American Scientists

Iran: Special Weapons Facilities



Locale	Latitude	Longitude	Nuclear	CW	BW	Missile
Abadan	N30°21'	E48°17'				
Abu Musa Island	N25°52'	E55°01'				
Aliabad	?N34°47'	?E51°05'				
Arak	N34°05'	E49°41'				
Bandar Abbas	N27°11'	E56°16'				
Bonab	N38°25'	E45°54'				
Bushehr	28°51'N	50°53'E				
Chalus	N36°40'	E51°25'				
Damghan	N36°10'	E54°20'				
Darkhovin	N30°45'	E48°24'				
Dorud	?N36°00'	?E51°29'				
Esfahan	N32°40'	E51°40'				
<i>Esteghlal</i>	----	----				
Fasa	N28°56'	E53°38'				
Gamsar	?N35°40'	?E51°45'				
Gostaresh	N35°28'	E48°53'				
Hama	N??°??'	E??°??'				
Islaker	N??°??'	E??°??'				
Karaj	N35°50'	E51°00'				
Khorramabad	N33°28'	E48°21'				
Kukh-e-Barjamali	N35°39'	E51°39'				

Lavizan	N35°46'	E51°29'		
Maghdad	N??°??'	E??°??'		
Manzariyeh	N35°49'	E51°28'		
Mashhad	N36°18'	E59°35'		
Mo'allem Kalaych	N36°26'	E50°29'		
Neka	N36°39'	E53°17'		
Okaraman	N?? ??	E?? ??		
Pairzan	N??°??'	E??°??'		
Parchin	N35°31'	E51°46'		
Qazvin	N36°15'	E50°01'		
Qeshm Island	N26°57'	E56°16'		
Saghand	N32°32'	E55°15"		
Saidabad	N29°27'	E55°40'		
Sultanatabad	N35°47'	E51°28'		
Sarji	?N32°46'	?E59°35'		
Semnan	N35°34'	E53°23'		
Shahriyar	N35°39'	E51°03'		
Shiraz	N29°36'	E52°32'		
Seman	N35°07'	E47°05'		
Shahroud	N36°25'	E55°00'		
Shargfabad	N36°25'	E55°00'		
Sirri Island	N25°54'	E54°31'		
Sirjan	N29°27'	E55°40'		
Taba	N??°??'	E??°??'		
Tabas	N32°48'	E60°13'		
Tabriz	N38°05'	E46°15'		
Tehran	N35°40'	E51°25'		
[Uranium Mines]	various	various		
Yazd	N31°55'	E54°20'		

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NTI

Iran

[...] Nuclear

Iran possesses five research reactors and two partially constructed power reactors at Bushehr. It acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1970. In the mid-1970s, Iran initiated a

nuclear power program, though there are reports that it also began a small nuclear weapon research program at the same time. The 1979 revolution ended all nuclear efforts until 1984, when Iran revived the nuclear power program and reportedly began covert procurement for a nuclear weapon program.

Iran's plans for building a civilian nuclear power program have prompted much concern regarding its intention to develop nuclear weapons. Russia is assisting Iran to construct a light water reactor at Bushehr, which is now nearing completion, and will supply the nuclear fuel needed to run it. Although the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) allows transfers of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes to non-nuclear weapon states, the United States has vehemently opposed the Russian-Iranian deal. The United States believes that nuclear energy is not necessary in a country with Iran's large oil supply. It fears that the deal is being used as a cover for the transfer of more sensitive nuclear technology to Iran and to provide training for Iranian nuclear specialists that could be used to support a nuclear weapons program. Russia, however, has expressed its intention to complete the deal. Iran has denied the charges that it is pursuing a nuclear weapons program, and argues that nuclear technology for civilian use is the right of every non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT.

American concerns over Iran's nuclear program intensified in mid-2002, when American intelligence learned of the existence of two secret nuclear facilities. According to an Iranian opposition group, the two sites, a uranium enrichment facility at Natanz and a heavy water production plant near Arak, had been funded by front companies.

In February 2003, Iranian leaders announced a new plan to develop a nuclear energy plan using entirely domestic resources. This development is of particular concern, considering the revelation of the two secret facilities. The United States believes that these facilities might contribute to Iran's development of a complete nuclear fuel cycle, which would enable Iran to build nuclear weapons without importing nuclear material.

Later in February 2003, an IAEA delegation visited the pilot-scale gas centrifuge enrichment plant at Natanz, which is nearly ready for operation. The inspection team learned that Iran has the capability to build more centrifuges. During the IAEA's visit to Iran, Iranian officials indicated that Iran would honor its safeguards agreement with the IAEA, but did not clearly indicate Iran's willingness to accept the Additional Protocol. This means that Iran will place the Natanz facility, and any enriched uranium it produces, under IAEA inspection but that, as long as no nuclear materials are present, the IAEA would have no ability to examine locations in Iran where it believed nuclear weapons design research might be under way. The United States is concerned that if Iran stockpiled enriched uranium, it might, in the future, withdraw from the NPT (as North Korea has) and then build nuclear weapons rapidly, perhaps even in a matter of months.

It is possible that construction of the Natanz plant violated Iran's IAEA safeguards obligations. Such a violation would have occurred if Iran introduced nuclear material into the facility to test it, without informing the IAEA. Reports in the Western media in March 2003 charged that Iran may have taken this step. Iran responded by strenuously denying the charges, but also maintained that it reserved the right to possess nuclear weapons to counter Israel's weaponry.

An Iranian initiative to normalize relations was communicated to the United States in May 2003. It includes a promise to address U.S. concerns on nuclear weapons in exchange for lifting sanctions and eventual normalization of relations. To date, the United States has not responded to the offer. However, intense U.S. pressure for Iran to prove it had no secret atomic weapons program culminated in a toughly worded UN resolution in September 2003, prompting a walkout and subsequent freeze on nuclear inspections by Iran.

In February 2004, it was revealed that HEU traces detected by IAEA inspectors twelve months previously -- in at least two different sites -- were pure enough to produce nuclear weaponry. In March 2004, the revelation, combined with IAEA evidence that nuclear activities had been pursued on Iranian military bases, led to a first-ever acknowledgment by Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani that the Iranian military had produced centrifuges to enrich uranium. Iran continues to assert, however, that its nuclear program is for the generation of electricity alone.

In April 2004, Iran vowed to step up cooperation with the IAEA, adding that it had not only suspended enrichment programs but also stopped producing and assembling related parts. Iran agreed to an IAEA inspection schedule and to a mid-May 2004 deadline for the submission of complete details regarding its nuclear program and goals. [...]

Center for Nonproliferation Studies

Iran's Nuclear Facilities: a Profile

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Bushehr (Busheir)

After years of searching for a supplier to complete its first nuclear power plant, Iran secured a contract with the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) to finish the reactors at Bushehr, which will be under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. The \$800 million contract, signed in January 1995 by Minatom chief Viktor Mikhailov and then Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) head Reza Amrollahi, calls for Russia to complete the first reactor at Bushehr within four years.¹ In February 1998, Mikhailov reaffirmed that timetable, announcing that he expected the power plant to be finished “less than a year from now.”² The 1995 protocol stipulates that the two sides will prepare and sign contracts for Russia to provide a 30–50 megawatt thermal (MWt) light water research reactor, 2,000 tons of natural uranium, and training for 10–20 Iranian nuclear scientists per year.³ The Iranian nuclear specialists will be trained at the Russian Research Center (Kurchatov Institute) and at Russia’s Novovoronezh nuclear power plant.⁴ Both sides also agreed to discuss the construction of a nuclear desalination plant, a uranium mine, and a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facility in Iran.⁵ In May 1995, the U.S. government said it convinced Russia to cancel the centrifuge deal during the U.S.-Russia summit, although Russian officials later denied the deal ever existed.⁶ The light water research reactor deal has also been canceled, but Russia is providing limited uranium mining assistance to Iran (see Yazd).⁷

Further Russo-Iranian nuclear cooperation involving addenda on the delivery of nuclear fuel, financing, and analysis of installations for the Bushehr reactors was discussed in August 1995.⁸ The discussions led to the signing of a supplemental agreement on 24 August 1995, under which Russia will supply \$30 million worth of nuclear fuel each year from 2001 to 2011.⁹ According to Yevgeniy Mikerin, head of Minatom’s nuclear fuel activities, the first core of low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel for Bushehr-1 would be produced at the Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrates Plant in 1998.¹⁰

Construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant has already cost Iran billions of dollars. The German firm Siemens and its subsidiary Kraftwerke Union (KWU) began work on the plant in 1974, but stopped following the Islamic revolution in 1979. At that time, Unit-One was 90 percent complete, with 60 percent of the equipment installed, and Unit-Two was 50 percent complete.¹¹ During the 1980 to 1988 Iran-Iraq war, the Bushehr reactors were repeatedly targeted by Iraq, which bombed the plant six times: 24 March 1984, 12 February 1985, 5 March 1985, 12 July 1986, and twice in November 1987.¹² In an unsuccessful attempt to deter Iraqi attacks in November 1987, Iran moved a small amount of nuclear fuel to the site.¹³ The attacks destroyed the entire core area of both reactors; Iran then sealed the structure of Bushehr-1 and covered its dome with sheet metal.¹⁴ According to officials from West Germany’s national reactor inspectorate (Technischer Ueberwachungsverein), before the bombings, Bushehr-1 could have been completed in about three years, but following them, it would cost an estimated \$2.9 billion to \$4.6 billion to repair the damage.¹⁵ KWU officials noted, however, that none of the core equipment had been installed and vital components for the two reactors were not located at Bushehr. Two steam generators were stored in Milan, Italy, and Germany’s Gutehoffnungshuette (GHH) was storing the pressure vessel for Unit-One.¹⁶

Starting in the mid-1980s, Iran approached several nuclear suppliers about the possibility of completing the Bushehr-1 reactor. A consortium of West German, Spanish, and Argentine companies bid to complete the reactor in the late 1980s, but the deal was never completed due to U.S. pressure. In a similar deal, Iran signed a protocol in February 1990 with Spain’s National Institute of Industry (INI) and Nuclear Equipment (ENSA) to complete the Bushehr plant, and National Uranium Enterprise (ENUSA) to supply the reactor’s fuel.¹⁷ The Spanish firms later canceled the deal citing U.S. political pressure and nonproliferation concerns.

Unable to find a Western European supplier, Iran turned to China and the Soviet Union for nuclear technology. On 6 March 1990, the Soviet Union and Iran signed their first protocol on the project, stipulating that Moscow would complete the Bushehr plant and build an additional two VVER-440 reactors in Iran.¹⁸ The deal was delayed, however, by technical and financial problems.¹⁹ In 1993, Minatom and the AEOI signed a contract for the construction of two VVER-440 reactors at Bushehr.²⁰ That contract never entered into force because Iran asked for a postponement of the fixed time limits due to financing difficulties. Iranian and Russian officials have said that once Bushehr-1 is completed, Russia could also complete the 1,000 MW Bushehr-2 reactor and eventually build two VVER-440 reactors there.²¹

Prior to the 1995 contract, Tehran made several unsuccessful attempts to procure components for the Bushehr project. Again, the United States successfully lobbied the suppliers' governments not to provide Iran with nuclear assistance. Iranian agents tried to acquire eight steam condensers, built by the Italian firm Ansaldo under the KWU contract, but they were seized by Italian customs officials on 11 November 1993 while being shipped through Porto Marghera.²²

The Czech firm Skoda Plzen also discussed supplying reactor components to Iran, but canceled negotiations in 1994.²³ Tehran then tried to buy nuclear power reactor components from Poland's unfinished VVER-440 reactor at Zarnowiec, but was rebuffed.²⁴ More recently, under pressure from the United States, the Ukrainian government abrogated a 1996 agreement between the Russian contractor for Bushehr and Ukraine's Turboatom for the supply of two turbines.²⁵

Minatom officials have subsequently said the turbines will be manufactured in St. Petersburg and that Ukraine's refusal to cooperate would not affect Bushehr's progress.²⁶

Currently, Minatom subsidiary Zarubezhatomenergostroy (Nuclear Energy Construction Abroad) is working on the Bushehr plant.²⁷ Preparation of the Bushehr-1 site is complete, the reactor vessel has been manufactured, and building of the steam generators and other equipment has begun.²⁸ Led by Igor Magala, Russian personnel conducted a feasibility study of the project in 1995.²⁹ Although there are approximately 150 Russian personnel working at the site, that number could increase to 3,000.³⁰

The Russian-Iranian contract entered into force on January 12, 1996, and calls for the reactor to be completed within 55 months.³¹ However, without technical specifications for the German-supplied components, it is doubtful that Russia will be able to complete the reactor on time because existing equipment installed by Siemens may have to be replaced with Russian equipment.³² Russia plans to install a VVER-1000 reactor which requires six horizontal VVER steam generators; the planned Siemens reactor was 1,300 MWe, designed to hold four vertical steam generators.³³ Metallurgical specifications of the German equipment differ from those of Russian primary- and secondary-side components, and the horizontal VVER steam generators are materially different from the vertical Siemens steam generators.³⁴ Failure to match metallurgical specifications in the equipment could lead to corrosion or other serious problems.³⁵ Unless Minatom can match these specifications, the cost of the project will increase greatly and completion could be delayed until at least 2003.³⁶

Iran has repeatedly asked the German government to allow Siemens to ship reactor components and documentation that Tehran has paid for. Under a 1982 International Commerce Commission (ICC) ruling, Siemens is obligated to deliver all plant materials and components stored outside Iran. However, the German government has refused to grant Siemens an export license for the materials or grant permission to complete the plant.³⁷ In response, Iran filed a lawsuit in August 1996 with the ICC, asking for \$5.4 billion in compensation for Germany's failure to comply with the 1982 ruling.³⁸ German officials have stated that any decision to release information or equipment related to Bushehr would be "carefully weighed" and that Bonn would most probably reject any such request.³⁹

Uncertainty surrounding the work schedule, and disagreement on how much of the German equipment can be used, has caused friction between the two partners. Iran is insisting that it will not pay more than \$100 million unless Russia agrees to a firm completion deadline, while Russia insists that it needs a down payment in hard currency before it can proceed.⁴⁰ Although Iran paid Russia \$60 million in March 1997 and work is continuing, uncertainty over the Siemens equipment threatens to significantly delay or even derail the project.⁴¹ Questions remain whether Russian technicians can overcome the incompatibility problems within a reasonable timeframe and budget. If the delays and costs are significantly higher than expected, Iran is not likely to be able to afford any new large-scale nuclear projects until Bushehr-1 is completed, meaning at least into the next century.

Assessment:

Russia's ability to complete the 1,000 MW Bushehr-1 reactor will have a great impact on Iran's civilian nuclear program. If successful, as many as four reactors could be built at the site, giving Tehran substantial expertise for a military nuclear program. The training in Russia and experience gained from running a nuclear power plant will give Iranian scientists and engineers a greater understanding of nuclear matters that have both civilian and military applications, potentially increasing Tehran's ability to produce weapons-grade fissile material and build a nuclear weapon over the long-term. Such training would have to be augmented with additional expertise in critical technologies such as weaponization, reprocessing, or enrichment. The large amount of materiel and technicians moving between Russia and Iran as part of the Bushehr deal could also provide cover for covert weapons-related assistance or smuggling activities.

Furthermore, the Bushehr-1 reactor and corresponding facilities would give Tehran legitimate grounds to conduct research and acquire nuclear-related capabilities that could make a clandestine military nuclear program easier to conduct and conceal.

Although the most worrisome clauses of the 1995 Russian-Iranian nuclear contract — provision of a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plant and a large research reactor — have been halted, other concerns remain. Russian nuclear fuel cycle assistance, such as building a uranium mine and providing 2,000 tons of natural uranium, could enhance Tehran's capability. The natural uranium, which does not require safeguards, could potentially be used to feed a secret uranium enrichment program or could be fabricated into heavy water reactor fuel.

The existence of spent fuel from the Bushehr reactor, which would have to be stored on-site for several years while it cools, would also be a concern. The Bushehr plant could be capable of producing up to 180 kg of plutonium each year in its spent fuel.⁴² Although it would be subject to IAEA safeguards, the spent fuel could potentially be diverted or stolen from the facility for use in a plutonium reprocessing plant. Such a scenario is a long-term concern, as Tehran does not presently have a large-scale reprocessing plant and is years away from having the technical capability to build one. Even if Iranian scientists do manage to build one, such a plant would have to be declared and safeguarded by the IAEA. Furthermore, clandestine reprocessing facilities are difficult to operate and hard to conceal due to the distinct isotopic signatures of elements released during reprocessing.

The spent fuel from Bushehr will pose further proliferation risks, as its final disposition has not yet been determined. It may eventually be sent back to Russia to be stored or reprocessed, but Minatom official Yevgeniy Mikerin said that Russia and Iran “have made no agreements” concerning the spent fuel.⁴³ According to Mikerin, the Russian-Iranian deal covers only the front end of the fuel cycle.⁴⁴

The best option from a nonproliferation standpoint would be to return the spent fuel to Russia for storage at Krasnoyarsk-26 (Zheleznogorsk), in southern Siberia.⁴⁵ Russian environmental law, however, seems to preclude this. The Law on Environmental Protection, two presidential decrees, and a government decree regulate the importation of spent fuel. Article 50 of the Law on Environmental Protection (19 December 1991) prohibits storing or burying radioactive waste or materials from abroad on Russian territory. However, a contradictory law (Presidential Decree 72, dated 25 January 1995) allows Krasnoyarsk-26 to temporarily store and reprocess spent fuel from foreign plants. Following criticism of Decree 72, Presidential Edict 389 was issued on 20 April 1995, to improve oversight of importing and handling spent fuel. On 4 April 1996, the Russian Supreme Court repealed the sections of Decree 72 that provide for the importation and reprocessing of spent fuel.⁴⁶ Edict 389 requires that products of reprocessing be returned to the country of origin. Russian government Resolution 773 of 29 July 1995, also stipulates that Russia must return solid radioactive wastes and “other by-products of reprocessing not intended for further use in Russia.” The law further requires that the process be safeguarded by the IAEA and that the country of origin has in place all the necessary regulatory structures as well as the ability to safely handle radioactive waste.⁴⁷

A second option would be to separate the spent fuel at the RT-2 reprocessing plant in Krasnoyarsk once it is completed.⁴⁸ Russian environmental law appears to allow this, but only if Moscow returns the high-level radioactive waste and separated plutonium to Iran.⁴⁹ However, the presence of separated plutonium in Iran, even under IAEA safeguards, would draw fierce criticism from the United States due to nonproliferation concerns. Furthermore, the RT-2 plant will not be completed until after Bushehr-1 is operating, meaning that sending spent fuel to Russia would be tantamount to storage and therefore violate Russian environmental law.

Bonab

The area 80 km south of Tabriz is home to the Bonab Atomic Energy Research Center, which conducts research on nuclear technology for agricultural uses.⁵⁰ The facility, run by the AEOI and headed by Hussein Afarideh, is not under IAEA safeguards but was visited by IAEA Director General Hans Blix in July 1997.⁵¹ Although Blix found no prohibited activities and the facility has not generally been the subject of allegations, one report claimed that a nuclear reactor housed in a reinforced-concrete bunker was under construction with Chinese assistance there.⁵²

Assessment:

Publicly available information on the Bonab Atomic Energy Research Center suggests that it is a minimal proliferation threat with little military application aside from providing basic nuclear training. The Blix visit and the scant amount of information on the center do not substantiate the report that a secret nuclear reactor is being built at Bonab.

Darkhovin (also called Ahvaz, Esteghlal, and Karun)

Located on the Karun River south of the city of Ahvaz, Darkhovin was the proposed location for a nuclear power plant to be built by either French or Chinese firms. The first proposal was for France to build two nuclear reactors there in the late 1970s. In 1974, Iran signed a contract with the French company Framatome to build two 950 MW pressurized water reactors (PWRs) at the site they called Karun.⁵³ Although Framatome surveyed the area and site preparations had begun, construction had not yet started when Iran canceled the contract following the Islamic revolution in 1979.⁵⁴

Iran made a second attempt to acquire a nuclear power plant at Darkhovin, contracting China to build two 300 MW PWRs for a project the Chinese called Esteghlal. On 10 September 1992, Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani announced that China's Qinshan Nuclear Power Company and the Shanghai Nuclear Research and Design Institute agreed to build the reactors as part of a nuclear cooperation agreement.⁵⁵ Chinese officials said it could take up to 10 years to complete the two reactors.⁵⁶ Western analysts at the time predicted the plant would never be finished because China was not technically capable of building a 300 MW reactor without importing key components from abroad.⁵⁷ These arguments have been disproved by China's apparently successful attempt to build the Chashma-1 reactor in Pakistan, which is nearing completion.

Although preliminary preparations, such as a seismic study, were conducted, the deal now seems to be on hold.⁵⁸ China failed to submit a detailed technical plan for the plant and failed to implement an agreement to train Iranian nuclear technicians.⁵⁹ The Iranian side was unable to provide detailed financial plans on how to raise \$2 billion for the two reactors.⁶⁰ Several reports have quoted Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen as telling U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher on 27 September 1995, that Beijing "terminated" the reactor contract.⁶¹ Qian changed his statement on 30 September 1995, saying the deal was merely suspended "because the original site is not very appropriate for these nuclear reactors."⁶² The planned site was subsequently moved from Darkhovin to near Bushehr due to Darkhovin's proximity to Iraq.⁶³

Since 1995, however, there have been no new developments on the proposal and it is doubtful that Iran could afford the project while paying for construction of Bushehr-1.

Assessment:

A severe shortage of hard currency, coupled with payments for the Bushehr-1 reactor, makes progress on the Darkhovin project unlikely until Iran's financial situation improves. If the project were to proceed, the two reactors would likely be built by the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) near Bushehr. Although the reactors would be under IAEA safeguards, completion of a nuclear power plant at Darkhovin would provide Iran with nuclear technology from which the country's military could draw expertise and personnel. Despite the presence of IAEA safeguards, the concern remains that the reactors' spent fuel could be stolen or diverted for use in a secret reprocessing program. Furthermore, enlarging the size and scope of Iran's nuclear infrastructure could make it more difficult to detect and assess a clandestine nuclear research and development (R&D) program [though not the nuclear facilities themselves].

Isfahan (Esfahan) Nuclear Technology Center

The Nuclear Technology Center at Isfahan was founded in the mid-1970s with French assistance in order to provide training for Bushehr reactor personnel.⁶⁴ Located at the University of Isfahan and directed by Kazem Rassouly, the center houses four small research reactors.⁶⁵ The first, a Chinese-supplied 27 kilowatt thermal (kWt) miniature neutron source reactor (MNSR), went critical in March 1994. The MNSR is used to produce isotopes and burns 900 g of highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel supplied by the CNNC.⁶⁶ The center also has a Chinese-supplied heavy water, zero power, reactor which went critical in 1995, and two Chinese-supplied subcritical reactors which were completed in 1992 (an open tank facility fueled by uranium metal pins and a graphite-moderated facility).⁶⁷ The CNNC supplied the MNSR and the zero-power reactor with heavy water.⁶⁸

During a November 1996 IAEA visit to Isfahan, Iran informed the IAEA Department of Safeguards that it plans to build a uranium hexafluoride (UF₆) conversion plant at the Nuclear Technology Center.⁶⁹ Tehran expects the Chinese-supplied plant, which will be placed under IAEA safeguards, to become operational sometime after 2000.⁷⁰ The plans explain the presence of 15 Chinese nuclear experts at the center in 1995, who were likely making design preparations for the facility.⁷¹ U.S. officials subsequently convinced China to halt the transfer of anhydrous hydrogen fluoride (AHF) and other UF₆-related materials as a prelude to opening nuclear exports to China.⁷² Although AHF is not regulated by the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG) list of controlled nuclear technologies, it is a feedstock material for converting natural uranium into UF₆. Beijing may have already provided Tehran with blueprints for the UF₆ facility.⁷³

The planned UF6 plant prompted allegations that R&D on gas centrifuge technology was secretly being conducted at Isfahan.⁷⁴ Uranium hexafluoride gas is used to feed a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plant. Any R&D activities at the site would likely be overseen by AEOI personnel and Isfahan University staff. Key staff at the center include: Morteza Saghalian Nejad, university chancellor; Ahmad Abrishamchi, vice-chancellor for research; Safa Isfahani, dean of physics; Fakhr-o-Din Ashrafizadeh, dean of materials science and metallurgy; Mahmood Vafaian, dean of mining engineering; H. Bassir, professor of mining engineering; and Mohammad Reza Ehsani, dean of chemical engineering.⁷⁵

Assessment:

The facilities currently operating at the Nuclear Technology Center are not a direct proliferation threat because they are safeguarded, because the research reactors can not produce significant amounts of plutonium-bearing spent fuel, and because only minor amounts of heavy water and HEU are present.

However, Iranian attempts to buy a 30 MWt heavy water research reactor from China in 1991 raised concerns.⁷⁶ A deal to build the reactor at Isfahan, which would have been capable of producing significant quantities of plutonium in its spent fuel, never materialized due to technical and financial problems. Coupled with the rapid build-up of nuclear facilities at Isfahan, the proposed reactor deal raised concerns that the center may be conducting research on nuclear technology with military applications; a worry exacerbated by the fact that part of the center is apparently built underground.⁷⁷

The planned UF6 production plant fuels additional suspicion. There is no logical explanation for Iran to build such a plant, the product from which is used to feed a uranium enrichment facility.

Iran does not have a declared uranium enrichment facility, nor does it require one for its civilian nuclear program. The country's lone commercial reactor, at Bushehr, will use nuclear fuel imported from Russia. Due to the absence of commercial nuclear power plants and the high investment costs associated with building nuclear facilities, the development of fuel cycle facilities such as the UF6 plant suggests that Tehran may wish to use them for non-peaceful purposes.

National Iranian Steel Company

The National Iranian Steel Company (NISCO) in Isfahan, which produces steel for a Defense Industries Organization (DIO) munitions plant, could provide a number of nuclear-related metallurgical products.⁷⁸ With help from Japan's Nippon Steel, the Italian firm Danieli built four specialty steel plants for NISCO that could have the capability to produce maraging steel and other corrosion-resistant alloys useful in a nuclear program and in the construction of ballistic missiles.⁷⁹ The Isfahan Alloy Steel Complex, of which the plants are a part, officially opened on 20 August 1996, and has a capacity of 30,000 tons of alloy steel per year.⁸⁰

Assessment:

The status of the NISCO plants is questionable. In 1996, British customs officials seized a shipment of 55 kg of maraging steel, used to make uranium enrichment centrifuges as well as components for missiles and other military hardware, that was bound from the United States to Iran.⁸¹ If the plants are operable and can produce maraging steel, the Iranian government would be unlikely to waste valuable overseas procurement assets to acquire this high-strength alloy.

Danieli's participation in the project is of additional concern due to the firm's past involvement in building a maraging steel plant for Iraq's Taji uranium enrichment centrifuge production facility.⁸²

Gorgan (also called Neka)

Iran had planned to build two Russian VVER-440 MWe power reactors at a facility in Gorgan, sometimes referred to as either the Gorgan al-Kabir Center or Neka.⁸³ The deal was part of a 6 March 1990, protocol between the Soviet Union and Iran, which stipulated that Moscow would complete Bushehr-1 and -2, as well as build two VVER-440 reactors at an unnamed site, later identified as Gorgan.⁸⁴ Russian technicians conducted a geological survey of the area, but determined that it was unsuitable for nuclear facilities due to seismological instability.⁸⁵ It was then decided to build the proposed reactors at Bushehr.⁸⁶

Despite the location change, allegations persist that the area is home to a secret nuclear weapons-related facility.⁸⁷ According to one report, Iranian, Ukrainian, Russian, and Kazak scientists are working at the Gorgan al-Kabir Center, earning up to \$20,000 a month each.⁸⁸ The facility, said to be one of Iran's largest nuclear research centers, is allegedly supervised by AEOI Deputy Chairman Mansour Haj Azim. Two Russian scientists, Dr. Larichenkov and Dr. Ayshrov, reportedly led the research efforts there.⁸⁹ Other sources have said that Israel threatened to bomb the facility in 1996, ostensibly due to its involvement in Iran's nuclear weapons development efforts.⁹⁰

Assessment:

Although this facility has not been declared to the IAEA, and therefore was not inspected as part of the agency's 1992 trip to Iran, there is no available evidence to justify allegations of nuclear activities in the area. The allegations, which originated with the Iraqi-based Mojahedin-e Khalq resistance group, are likely founded on the now canceled plan to build two Russian reactors at Gorgan. These sources likely confused the presence of Russian technicians conducting the site survey for more dubious activities.

Center for Agricultural Research and Nuclear Medicine

Inaugurated on 11 May 1991, by Iranian Vice President Hassan Habibi, the facility at Karaj is a nuclear medicine and agricultural research center run by the AEOL.⁹¹ A 30 Mega-electronvolt (MeV) cyclotron accelerator supplied by Belgium's Ion Beam Applications, and a small (one milliamp (mA) Chinese-supplied and -installed calutron are located there.⁹² The existence of these devices has led to allegations that, in 1995, China was installing a uranium enrichment facility using calutrons at Karaj.⁹³ A large hydro-electric dam located nearby could provide the facility with the large amounts of electricity it would require.⁹⁴ However, the Chinese-supplied calutron is housed in a gymnasium-sized building that uses an unprotected ventilation system, precluding its work with radioactive substances.⁹⁵

Assessment:

Allegations of a secret uranium enrichment plant at Karaj are likely misinterpretations of the Chinese-supplied calutron's capabilities. Aside from the configuration of the ventilation system, the desktop-sized machine has the wrong technical specification to be used in a uranium enrichment program; it is used to produce stable isotopes of zinc for biological research.⁹⁶ The device is too small to enrich uranium to weapons grade, and Iranian scientists have experienced problems operating it correctly, although some progress has been made.⁹⁷ Furthermore, IAEA inspectors visited the facility in 1992 and determined that its activities were consistent with civilian nuclear research.⁹⁸

Although the Karaj facility does not currently violate IAEA safeguards obligations and is not an immediate proliferation threat, it does present some long-term concerns. Iranian technicians could use the calutron and cyclotron to gain knowledge of electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS) technology. Such technology could be used to build or reverse-engineer larger versions of the devices to clandestinely enrich uranium in another facility. However, an EMIS enrichment plant would require large amounts of electricity, making it difficult to conceal.

Were Iran to try to domestically produce its own calutrons, it would need precision machining facilities to make the large magnets that powerful calutrons require. Although Iran has little indigenous capacity to build precision machine-tools, it imported high-capacity computernumerical-control (CNC) lathes and vertical turning machines from the Czechoslovak firm Strojimport in 1982-83. The Iranian state-owned heavy manufacturing firm Machine Sazi Arak bought eight vertical turning and boring machines (three Model SKJ-12A, three Model SKJ-20A, and two SKD-32A), and the Czech firm TST Kovosvit Semimovo Usti provided Machine Sazi Arak with at least five CNC drilling machines.⁹⁹

Iran could acquire more machine-tools from turn-key factories that foreign firms are establishing in Iran, several of which are scheduled to be completed in the late 1990s. To augment this capability, the Iranian minister for mines and metals signed a letter of intent on 5 December 1996, pledging Tehran's interest in buying the ailing former East German machine-tool manufacturer Sket Magdeburg.¹⁰⁰ Such a move would be similar to Iraq's former arrangement with British machine-tool maker Matrix Churchill, from which Baghdad procured machine-tools used in its weapons of mass destruction programs. Acquisitions from any of these suppliers, in conjunction with the Czech-supplied CNC machines, would give Iran the capability to manufacture the necessary large magnets for a calutron.¹⁰¹

Moallem Kaleyah (Mo'allem Kalayah, Moad'alem Kelayeh, also called Ghaziv (Ghazvin), Qazvin, and Alamout)

Located in the mountains northwest of Tehran, Moallem Kaleyah was the proposed site for a 10 MWt research reactor India was going to build under a 1991 agreement with Iran.¹⁰² Although New Delhi canceled the deal under U.S. pressure, allegations remain that Iran has a secret nuclear facility in the area. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) allegedly oversees a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plant at Moallem Kaleyah, said to be Iran's primary fissile material production center.¹⁰³ This facility was reportedly established in 1987 using equipment acquired from French, German, and Italian companies.¹⁰⁴ Other sources claim the area could be where weaponization and design work is conducted.¹⁰⁵

IAEA inspectors visited the site in February 1992, but found only a small training and recreation facility being built for AEOL staff.¹⁰⁶ Skeptics argue that the inspectors were taken to the wrong location, far away from the intended site.¹⁰⁷ These critics charge that because the inspectors were not carrying navigation

equipment to determine their precise location, they were easily led to an alternative facility that was not the intended inspection site. IAEA officials said those allegations are “just plain wrong.”¹⁰⁸

Assessment:

There is a lack of verifiable open-source evidence to prove that Moallem Kaleyah is anything more than a small AEOI training and recreation facility. Iran has not demonstrated an ability to build even a pilot-scale centrifuge facility and it is unlikely that Tehran could build and hide a large-scale uranium enrichment plant (see Sharif University of Technology). The allegations could stem from past activity in the area associated with the proposed reactor deal with India.

Amir Kabir University of Technology

Founded in 1958 as Tehran Polytechnic, Tehran’s Amir Kabir University of Technology offers doctorates in nuclear science and technology and conducts research into theoretical and highenergy physics.¹⁰⁹ The school has allegedly been used as a front to procure nuclear components, including attempts by university representatives to purchase neutron-shielding equipment from the U.S. firm Reactor Experiments.¹¹⁰ Individuals involved in nuclear-related activities at Amir Kabir would likely include: Mohammed Hussein Salimi, chancellor; Jafar Milimmon-Fared, deputy vice-chancellor; F. Afshar Taromi, head of polymer engineering; H Modarres, head of chemical engineering; and M. Salari, head of mining and metallurgical engineering.¹¹¹

Assessment:

Aside from the nuclear-related training that Amir Kabir could provide, the school could be used as a front for Iran to obtain dual-use technology for its nuclear program. Had it been successful, the neutron-shielding equipment would have likely been located at Tehran University and could be used in a plutonium reprocessing R&D program.

University of Tehran

The Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC), located at the University of Tehran and overseen by the AEOI, is Iran’s primary open nuclear research facility. It is also the nucleus of many secret Iranian atomic programs, including plutonium reprocessing, laser enrichment, and weapon design R&D efforts. The TNRC houses a safeguarded 5 MWt pool-type research reactor, supplied by the United States in 1967, that can produce up to 600 g of plutonium per year in its spent fuel.¹¹² In 1987, the AEOI paid Argentina's Applied Research Institute (INVAP) \$5.5 million to convert the reactor from using 93 percent enriched uranium fuel to burning 20 percent enriched uranium fuel.¹¹³ The Argentine Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEA) has subsequently supplied the reactor with 115.8 kg of safeguarded 20 percent enriched uranium fuel.¹¹⁴

During the former Shah of Iran’s reign, the TNRC experimented with chemically extracting plutonium from spent fuel, a former head of the AEOI said.¹¹⁵ According to a former TNRC technician, Iran completed and cold tested a plutonium extraction laboratory at the center in 1988 but did not reprocess any plutonium.¹¹⁶ The status of this facility is uncertain, although it is believed to be inoperable. The TNRC has hot cells, supplied by the United States in 1967, which can be used to reprocess gram quantities of plutonium from spent fuel.¹¹⁷ Iranian representatives may have approached Argentina about buying additional hot cells, but a deal was never completed.¹¹⁸ Also, Iran acquired tributylphosphate (TBP) from China, a chemical used in the plutonium separation process.¹¹⁹ China may have further supplied Iran with data on chemical separation technology.¹²⁰

In support of its reprocessing program, Iran tried to acquire the capability to produce heavy water and nuclear fuel for a reactor. Such attempts could have been part of a long-term program to clandestinely build and operate a heavy water reactor to produce plutonium-bearing spent fuel for separation in a reprocessing plant. Iran negotiated with Argentina for a fuel fabrication pilotplant and a pilot-scale heavy water production facility, but the deals were canceled by Argentine President Carlos Menem due to U.S. pressure.¹²¹ Iran does have a lab-scale uranium mill at the TNRC, used to produce yellowcake from raw uranium ore, but IAEA inspectors visited the site in 1992 and found that it was not operable.¹²²

Iran does have a lab-scale uranium mill at the TNRC, used to produce yellowcake from raw uranium ore, but IAEA inspectors visited the site in 1992 and found that it was not operable. In addition, China is providing Tehran with a plant to produce zirconium tubes which are used to clad nuclear fuel in a reactor's core.¹²³

The TNRC may have also been the center of Iran’s nuclear weapon design program. The shah assembled a nuclear weapon design team as part of his government’s atomic research efforts, which could have included computer modeling and basic research of a nuclear explosive device.¹²⁴ Following the 1979 Islamic revolution, the new government was able to keep or lure back key TNRC personnel and therefore probably inherited most of the nuclear weapon design team’s data and knowledge.

Although there is a paucity of publicly available information on current nuclear weapon design activities in Iran, such activities would likely involve personnel from the TNRC. Iran has attempted to acquire equipment that could be used to fabricate weapon parts and assist in design efforts. Tehran sought high-speed cameras and flash x-ray equipment which may have been shipped to Iran through the U.K., and purchased an oscilloscope and pulse generators from a U.S. firm (see Sharif University).¹²⁵ Such equipment could be used to measure and calibrate the shock wave of an implosion device. Also, Tehran may have procured a vacuum arc furnace (see Sharif University) and acquired precision machine-tools (see Karaj), which can be used to cast and machine weapon cores, respectively.

The TNRC houses the Laser Research Center and its subsidiary the Ibn-e Heysam Research and Laboratory Complex, which was officially opened on 13 October 1992.¹²⁶ Headed by A. Hariri, the center has been the focal point of Iran's program to enrich uranium using the laser isotope separation (LIS) method since the mid-1970s.¹²⁷ It has production lines for red helium-neon lasers and CO₂ gas lasers, a glass-tube manufacturing unit, an optical manufacturing unit, a nitrogen laser laboratory, a solid laser laboratory, a precision laser laboratory, semi-guided laser laboratories, and a polymer laser laboratory.¹²⁸ In addition to these indigenous LIS development efforts, Iran received at least one copper-vapor laser from China.¹²⁹ During the 1970s, Tehran sought LIS equipment and technology from U.S. scientist Jeffrey Eerkens, who had worked on a classified U.S. government project researching laser enrichment. Eerkens latter said that the laser designs and the more than four lasers he sent to Iran were not suitable for enriching uranium; Iran sought 16 μm lasers, and Eerkens concentrated on 5 μm lasers.¹³⁰ Both of these wavelengths are suitable for enriching uranium, but 5 μm wavelength lasers are preferable.¹³¹

In support of their R&D efforts, Iranian nuclear specialists have received training from the International Center for Theoretical Physics in Trieste, Italy.¹³² In 1991, up to 77 Iranian scientists, along with researchers from other developing countries, conducted advance nuclear research at the Trieste center, where they had access to a U.S.-made supercomputer and laser equipment.¹³³ Some of these scientists are among the 91 TNRC staff researching nuclear physics, chemistry, plasma physics, and laser technology.¹³⁴ Key personnel at the TNRC include: Chancellor Gholam Ali Afrooz; Mousavi Movahedi, vice-chancellor for research; H. Ghafourian, director; A. Owlya, deputy director; M. Naraghi, head of plasma physics; N. Banai, head of spectroscopy; E. Ziai, head of physical chemistry; F. Farnoudi, head of reactor research and development; M. Zaker, head of reactor research and operation; Fereyduun Soltan-Moradi, deputy head of laser research; Ehsanollah Ziai, who headed the laser isotope separation program under the shah; and researcher S.M. Hamadani.¹³⁵

Tehran University has other affiliated institutes that could conduct research useful in a nuclear weapons program. The Electrotechnical Institute, run by M. Rahimian and Deputy Director A. Sabet, has a staff of 200 conducting electrical engineering research.¹³⁶ The Institute of Electric Engineering, headed by R. Mirghaderi, has a graduate research staff of 30.¹³⁷ With an annual R&D budget of approximately \$700,000, the Institute of Electric Engineering's clients include Iran's Ministry of Post, Telegraph, and Telephones (PTT), Ministry of Defense, and Defense Industries Organization (DIO).¹³⁸

Assessment:

Under the guise of seeking civilian nuclear technology, the TNRC is conducting a variety of R&D activities with military applications. Some of these, such as operating a research reactor and training a cadre of nuclear technicians, are consistent with the peaceful development of nuclear energy. In the absence of a large civilian nuclear power program, activities such as plutonium reprocessing and laser enrichment research are hard to justify unless they are for weapons-related purposes.

The TNRC has been, and remains, the center of Iran's plutonium reprocessing efforts. Although the hot cells and other lab-scale reprocessing activities there can produce only small amounts (0.6 kg per year) of plutonium, Iranian technicians could use the facilities to gain the scientific knowledge and competence necessary to operate a larger-scale plant.¹³⁹ Iran has already demonstrated an interest in acquiring further capabilities, having approached Argentina and China for reprocessing technology.¹⁴⁰

Despite these efforts, even small-scale reprocessing activities appear to be currently beyond Iran's technical competence. Furthermore, Tehran is years away from having the capability to build and operate a larger-scale separation plant. Recent Iranian procurement activities suggest that its plutonium reprocessing program is not a priority, possibly due to the sophisticated technical knowledge a reprocessing plant would require. Moreover, Tehran may be deterred by the IAEA's enhanced safeguard program, called 93+2, which will make it more difficult to hide a clandestine reprocessing plant due to the distinct isotopic signatures of elements released during the process.

If Tehran were to build a secret plutonium reprocessing facility, it would need a supply of unsafeguarded spent fuel to feed it. Although Iran could attempt to divert safeguarded spent fuel from its research reactors

or the Bushehr plant, scheduled to begin operating in 2000, large quantities could not be diverted without being detected by the IAEA inspection regime. Iran could also try to procure spent fuel on the black market. However, there are no documented cases of significant amounts of spent fuel being smuggled internationally, and without an indigenous source of spent fuel, Iran's nuclear weapons program would be at the mercy of smugglers.

A more likely scenario would be for Tehran to secretly build a research-sized heavy water reactor for producing spent fuel with a high plutonium content. Not only do heavy water reactors produce relatively more plutonium in their spent fuel than light water reactors, they can burn natural uranium fuel, obviating the difficult step of enriching the uranium fuel. Tehran's approach to Argentina for heavy water and fuel fabrication technology may have been in preparation for commencing such a program. This would be a long-term objective, however, as Iran does not have a facility to produce heavy water or fabricate nuclear fuel and does not possess the capability to build and operate a reactor of even modest size.

In addition to plutonium, nuclear weapons can be built using highly enriched uranium. Iran has pursued both paths to the bomb, hoping that at least one of the programs would succeed. Although the Ibn-e Heysam Research and Laboratory Complex's production facilities are impressive on paper, the uranium enrichment program using laser isotope separation technology has not been successful. LIS technology, which has not been mastered by many of the most developed countries, is probably beyond Iran's technical and scientific capacity. The need to keep the research secret further inhibits Iran's scientific growth in the nuclear field. Tehran may continue research on advanced laser technology, however, because it has military applications other than uranium enrichment.

Iranian attempts to acquire the capability to weaponize a fissile material stockpile have been equally rudimentary. Although Iran has some equipment which could be used in a weaponization effort, it lacks much of the sophisticated dual-use measurement equipment that building a nuclear weapon requires. Furthermore, given its lack of technical experience, Iranian nuclear weapon designs would be limited to simple fission devices that are low yield (about 15 kilotons), heavy, and cumbersome. However, Tehran does have the technical capability to produce the nonnuclear components of the weaponization package. The University of Tehran's electrical-related research institutes could be used to develop some of these components.

Sharif University of Technology

Tehran's Sharif University of Technology is an important nuclear procurement front and R&D center. Western intelligence officials allege that the Physics Research Center (PHRC) is the site of attempts to produce fissile material and the German intelligence agency Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) lists it as an Iranian procurement front.¹⁴¹ The PHRC is where Iran has tried to buy or build uranium enrichment centrifuges since at least the early 1990s. Such activities likely involve key personnel at Sharif, including: president Saed Sohrabpour; Abdullah Afshar, vicepresident of research; Davood Rashtchian, chemical engineering department chair; Hossein Zadeh, metallurgical engineering department chair; and Abbas Anvari, physics department head.¹⁴²

Following a strategy similar to Iraq's and Pakistan's nuclear development programs, Iran has attempted to acquire a uranium enrichment capability by purchasing centrifuge components piecemeal from Western European suppliers. Tehran established a network of front companies to procure dual-use and prohibited items, with Sharif University as the intended destination. As part of this program, they have used design information for Urenco G-1 and G-2 type centrifuges which the BND said was obtained through Pakistan.¹⁴³

In 1991, Sharif University officials tried to buy specialized ring magnets from the German firm Thyssen, but were rebuffed because the end-user was not specified.¹⁴⁴ The officials then approached Germany's Magnetfabrik Bonn (MFB) about "alnico" (a combination of aluminum and nickel) type ring magnets, which can be used in gas centrifuges.¹⁴⁵ When questioned, MFB officials admitted that they had sold Iran ferritic ring magnets since 1993, but denied the deals included either alnico magnets or Sharif University.¹⁴⁶ The MFB officials added that Germany's Federal Export Control Office (BAFA) approved the ferretic ring magnet deal because the devices could not be used for enriching uranium. Also in 1991, Germany's Leybold corporation negotiated the sale of a vacuum arc furnace with Said Kareem Ali Sonhani, an official at the Iranian embassy in Bonn.¹⁴⁷ Leybold further negotiated the sale of vacuum pumps to a university in Tehran from 1990 to 1991, although these may not have been delivered.¹⁴⁸ Another supplier of the Iranian program is the company Karl Schenck of Darmstadt, which sent at least one balancing machine to Sharif University before canceling the rest of the order.¹⁴⁹ The balancing machine, which can be used to produce gas centrifuges, was sent after Schenck was assured in writing that it would not be used for military purposes.

Iran procured equipment for its gas centrifuge development program from other Western suppliers as well. In 1991, several British firms sent Sharif University a supply of fluorine gas, which is used to make UF₆ to feed a centrifuge plant.¹⁵⁰ In August of that year, Reza (Ray) Amiri and Mohammed (Don) Danesh were arrested for selling to Iran an oscilloscope purchased from the U.S. firm Tektronix.¹⁵¹ U.S. federal prosecutors allege that Amiri and Danesh also sent Iran logic analyzers and pulse generators.¹⁵² Swiss companies may have supplied Iran with gas centrifuge technology in 1991 as well.¹⁵³ Additionally, Iran acquired electrical discharge machinery (EDMs) from the Swiss firms AGIE and Charmilles Technologies in 1993.¹⁵⁴ EDMs cut heavy metals with a high degree of accuracy and can be used to produce gas centrifuge components and to fabricate nuclear fuel.

These activities raised concerns that Tehran has an active nuclear weapons program and is seeking gas centrifuge technology. The proposed Russian supply of an enrichment plant (see Bushehr) heightened this concern. However, Russia has denied that its contract to complete work at Bushehr has anything to do with the supply of centrifuges.¹⁵⁵ Russia has the world's largest centrifuge enrichment capability which uses a relatively unsophisticated design, meaning that Iran could conceivably reverse-engineer them or gain clandestine assistance for its centrifuge program. The proposed centrifuge deal was especially worrisome considering the poor economic situation in Russia and the existence of many unused centrifuges and centrifuge components there.¹⁵⁶

In addition to the PHRC, Sharif University has other centers that conduct R&D potentially applicable to a nuclear weapons program. The Electronics Research Center, headed by Mahmoud Tabiani, conducts research of electronic circuit and systems communication, as well as design and development of microcomputers.¹⁵⁷ It has a staff of 12 researchers and seven technicians, who could work on the non-nuclear electronic parts of a nuclear weapon.¹⁵⁸

Assessment:

Iranian activities at Sharif University, including attempts to acquire equipment that could be used to build gas centrifuges, is a clear indication that Tehran has an active nuclear weapons program. Despite these efforts, evidence suggests that Iran does not yet have a centrifuge enrichment facility, even on a laboratory-scale. While Tehran has made some progress, it does not possess sufficient quantities of vital production equipment and materials such as maraging steel, and the program appears to have stalled since 1993. The tightening of export controls in supplier countries following revelations that Iraq was close to building a nuclear weapon has greatly hindered Iran's ability to acquire this material. Even if Tehran were able to build a small enrichment facility, operating the complex centrifuges may be beyond Iran's scientific and technical capability without external assistance, at least over the short-term. External assistance from a knowledgeable partner such as Russia or China, however, could allow Iran to build and operate an experimental-scale enrichment facility.

The focus of Tehran's current program is on developing and bench-testing gas centrifuges; these activities are likely being conducted at Sharif University.¹⁵⁹ These efforts do not specifically violate Tehran's safeguards obligations because they have not reached the threshold of having to be reported to the IAEA. It is not likely that Iran has a supply of UF₆ gas or has enriched uranium in centrifuges, which require reporting under Iran's safeguards agreements. If it were to build a lab-scale enrichment facility or to enrich uranium, such activities would have to be reported to the IAEA.

Iran could attempt to build a clandestine enrichment plant separate from its safeguarded facilities once it masters centrifuge technology. This would be a long-term objective, as Tehran is years away from having the capability to build even a small, safeguarded, centrifuge plant. In addition to building and operating the centrifuges themselves, a secret enrichment facility would require an unsafeguarded supply of UF₆ gas. Iran does not yet have even a safeguarded UF₆ conversion plant (see Isfahan), nor does it have the ability to build a clandestine one. In short, Tehran will not have the capability to build an unsafeguarded uranium enrichment plant using gas centrifuges for many years, unless it receives large amounts of clandestine foreign assistance.

Applied Research Center of Iran (MTK Iran)

The Applied Research Center of Iran, which is also known as MTK Iran, is affiliated with the Ministry for Heavy Industries and the Iranian Defense Research Organization (IDRO). Located in Tehran, the facility is listed as an official research center and conducts R&D on steel alloy production, processing non-ferrous metals, corrosion resistant technology, and metal casting.¹⁶⁰

Assessment:

Although the technologies MTK Iran develops have civilian applications, many could also be used in a military program. In particular, developing the ability to produce maraging steel and corrosion resistant

alloys could allow Iran to manufacture materials used to build uranium enrichment centrifuges. Although it is unclear how much progress Iran has made in these efforts, the 1996 seizure of maraging steel in the U.K. (see NISCO) suggests that Iran does not yet have the capacity to produce the high-strength alloy in sufficient quantities.

Azad University

Azad University has a HT-6B tokamak fusion research reactor, which was supplied by the Chinese Academy of Sciences' Institute of Plasma Physics under a February 1993 agreement.¹⁶¹ In 1994, Chinese technicians assisted with the installation and initial operation of the reactor.¹⁶²

According to former AEOI head Reza Amrollahi, Iran plans to build a second tokamak at an undisclosed location.¹⁶³

Assessment:

The HT-6B tokamak is a fusion research reactor which uses magnetic fields to confine and heat deuterium and tritium plasma fuel. As part of their normal operations, most tokamaks remove and recycle small amounts of tritium, a vital nuclear weapon component. Such a device would give Iranian technicians experience working with fusion technology, which is potentially applicable to a thermonuclear weapon design program.

Institute for Studies in Theoretical Physics and Mathematics

Established by the AEOI in 1989, this Tehran-based center researches theoretical, particle, and high energy physics applications.¹⁶⁴ The institute is primarily a training facility for Iranian nuclear scientists, and may be known as the Jabit bin al-Hayyan Laboratory.¹⁶⁵

Assessment:

This institute could provide training in the fundamentals of nuclear science for Iranian technicians and researchers. Although the school is not directly involved in a nuclear weapons program, it could train those who conduct such activities.

Yazd Province

Iran's attempts to mine and mill uranium ore have largely been conducted in the Saghand region of Yazd province. In 1985, AEOI specialists located over 5,000 t (metric tons) of uranium in the desert region of eastern Yazd province, making it one of the biggest deposits in the Middle East.¹⁶⁶ They also found 4,000 tons of molybdenum, a mineral which is mixed with steel to make hardened alloys that have nuclear applications. Although numerous allegations claim there is an operational uranium mine and mill nearby, IAEA inspectors visited Saghand in 1992 but found only a small uranium ore drilling rig that was at least five years from production.¹⁶⁷ Any AEOI uranium mining and milling activities would likely be assisted by University of Yazd experts, including: Jalil Shahi, chancellor; Mohammad Ali Barkhordari, dean of engineering; and Amir Hussein Koohsari, head of mining engineering.¹⁶⁸

Having failed to indigenously mine and mill uranium on a large scale, Iran has sought foreign assistance with these efforts. China's Beijing Research Institute of Uranium Geology (BRIUG), a division of the CNNC, helped Iran explore for uranium deposits.¹⁶⁹ The AEOI also tried to buy \$18 million worth of machine-tools from INVAP, but the deal was blocked by Argentine President Carlos Menem in February 1992 due to nonproliferation concerns.¹⁷⁰ The machinetools were part of a contract for a pilot-scale uranium mill and a pilot-scale fuel fabrication plant.¹⁷¹ According to U.S. intelligence reports, Tehran received further advice and assistance about mining and milling uranium ore from Russia.¹⁷² This assistance may be continuing despite Moscow's assurances to the contrary. It is not clear, however, whether the Russian assistance is controlled by the central government or whether it is being provided by rogue individuals and Minatom bureaucrats.¹⁷³

Due to the province's remote location and the presence of nuclear-related equipment, opposition groups have claimed that more nefarious activities are being conducted in the area. The Mojahedin-e Khalq resistance group claims that there is a major IRGC nuclear research center located underground in tunnels near the uranium mines. According to the Iraqi-based group, "the [Revolutionary] Guard Corps operates one of the regime's largest secret nuclear research centers which has been built underground near the city of Yazd."¹⁷⁴

Assessment:

While allegations of secret nuclear facilities in Yazd can not be substantiated, reports of uranium mining and milling development activities appear valid. Iranian efforts to mine the province's vast uranium deposits have not born fruit, forcing Tehran to seek external assistance. Although Argentina blocked cooperation from one of its firms, China and Russia have either been unable or unwilling to do likewise. Further

assistance will likely allow Tehran to acquire the capability to mine natural uranium ore and mill it into a powder form called yellowcake (U₃O₈) within a few years. The yellowcake could then be fabricated into heavy water reactor fuel or converted into uranium hexafluoride gas for use in a uranium enrichment plant. If Tehran continues plans to build a UF₆ conversion facility at Isfahan, it would need a steady supply of yellowcake. Iran could probably complete a uranium mine and mill before the UF₆ facility becomes operational, but if it does not, Tehran could use yellowcake it acquired from South Africa in the 1970s.¹⁷⁵

Tabas

Located northeast of Saghand, Tabas is the alleged site of a secret nuclear reactor built with Chinese and North Korean assistance. North Korea is allegedly helping to build the reactor under the direction of General Myong-Rok.¹⁷⁶

Assessment:

There is no open-source information to verify these claims. If North Korea is providing Iran with military assistance at a location in Tabas, it is likely for the production of ballistic missiles or conventional weapons.

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US Senate

Iran Freedom and Support Act of 2004 (Introduced in Senate)

S 2681 IS - 108th CONGRESS - 2d Session

To establish a program to support a transition to democracy in Iran.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

July 16, 2004

Mr. SANTORUM (for himself and Mr. CORNYN) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

A BILL

To establish a program to support a transition to democracy in Iran.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the 'Iran Freedom and Support Act of 2004'.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress makes the following findings:

- (1) The people of the United States have long demonstrated an interest in the well-being of the people of Iran, including through the work of missionaries whose work in Iran dates back to the 1830s.
- (2) Famous Americans such as Howard Baskerville, Dr. Samuel Martin, Jane E. Doolittle, and Louis G. Dreyfus, Jr., made significant contributions to Iranian society by furthering the educational opportunities of the people of Iran and improving the opportunities of the less fortunate citizens of Iran.
- (3) Iran served as a key ally of the United States following World War II and through the late 1970s serving as an important regional ally and a key bulwark against Soviet influence.
- (4) In November 1979, following the arrival of Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi in the United States, a mob of students and extremists seized the United States Embassy in Tehran, Iran, holding United States diplomatic personnel hostage until January 1981.
- (5) Following the seizure of the United States Embassy, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, leader of the repressive revolutionary movement in Iran, expressed support for the actions of the students in taking American citizens hostage.
- (6) Despite the historic victory of Mohammad Khatami in the presidential election of May 1997, an election which Khatami won with 69 percent of the vote and in which an estimated 91 percent of the electorate participated, control of the internal and external affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran is still exercised by the courts in Iran and the Revolutionary Guards, Supreme Leader, and Council of Guardians of the Government of Iran.
- (7) The election results of the May 1997 election and the high level of voter participation in that election demonstrate that the people of Iran favor economic and political reforms and greater interaction with the United States and the Western world in general.
- (8) Despite the election of President Khatami and the outreach of the Clinton administration to ease sanctions and to promote people-to-people exchanges, Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Militant Clerics' Society, the Islamic Coalition Organization, and Supporters of the Party of God have all opposed efforts to open Iranian society to Western influences and have opposed efforts to change the dynamic of relations between the United States and Iran.
- (9) For the past two decades, the Department of State has found Iran to be the leading sponsor of international terrorism in the world.
- (10) In 1983, the Iran-sponsored Hezbollah terrorist organization conducted suicide terrorist operations against United States military and civilian personnel in Beirut, Lebanon, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of Americans.
- (11) Intelligence analysts and law enforcement personnel have linked Iran to attacks against American military personnel at Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia in 1996 and to al Qaeda attacks against civilians in Saudi Arabia in 2004.

(12) Iran has provided a safe haven and a base of operations for terrorist groups, including al Qaeda, Islamic Jihad, and Ansar al Islam, and to terrorist leaders, including Abu Musab al Zarkawi, Zayman al Zawahiri, and members of the bin Laden family.

(13) Iran currently operates more than 10 radio and television stations broadcasting in Iraq that support violent actions against United States and coalition personnel in Iraq.

(14) The current leaders of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and Hashemi Rafsanjani, have repeatedly called upon Muslims to kill Americans in Iraq and install a theocratic regime in Iraq.

(15) The United States intelligence community believes the Government of Iran is pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons program.

(16) The Government of Iran has failed to meet repeated pledges to arrest and extradite foreign terrorists in Iran.

(17) The United States Government believes that the Government of Iran supports terrorists and extremist religious leaders in Iraq with the clear intention of subverting coalition efforts to bring peace and democracy to Iraq.

(18) The Ministry of Defense of Iran confirmed in July 2003 that it had successfully conducted the final test of the Shahab-3 missile, giving Iran an operational intermediate-range ballistic missile capable of striking both Israel and United States troops throughout the Middle East and Afghanistan.

SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD IRAN.

It is the sense of Congress that it should be the policy of the United States to support regime change for the Islamic Republic of Iran and to promote the transition to a democratic government to replace that regime.

SEC. 4. ASSISTANCE TO SUPPORT TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN IRAN.

(a) IN GENERAL- The President is authorized to provide assistance to foreign and domestic pro-democracy groups opposed to the non-democratic Government of Iran, including the award of grants to qualified pro-democracy radio and television broadcasting organizations.

(b) ELIGIBILITY FOR ASSISTANCE- Financial assistance may only be provided under this section to individuals, organizations, or entities that have—

(1) officially renounced the use of terrorism;

(2) pledged to adhere to nonproliferation regimes for nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and materiel;

(3) pledged to support the destruction of all prohibited stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction in Iran; and

(4) supported the adoption of a democratic form of government in Iran.

(c) POLITICAL ASSISTANCE-

(1) IN GENERAL- The President is authorized to provide assistance to support foreign and domestic pro-democracy groups opposed to the non-democratic Government of Iran that—

(A) are dedicated to democratic values;

(B) show a commitment to human rights, equality of women, and freedom of religious worship;

(C) demonstrate a commitment to fostering equality of opportunity; and

(D) support freedom of the press, freedom of speech, and freedom of association.

(2) FUNDING- The President may provide assistance under paragraph (1) using-- (A) funds available to the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and National Endowment for Democracy (NED); and (B) amounts authorized to be appropriated under subsection (g).

(d) NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT- The President shall notify the Committees on Foreign Relations and Appropriations of the Senate and the Committees on International Relations and Appropriations of the House of Representatives at least 15 days in advance of each obligation of assistance under this section in accordance with the procedures under section 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2394-1).

(e) COORDINATION OF POLICY- In order to ensure maximum coordination among Federal agencies, the President shall appoint a senior member of the National Security Council as special assistant to the President on Iran matters.

(f) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON DIPLOMATIC ASSISTANCE- It is the sense of Congress that --

(1) contacts should be expanded with opposition groups in Iran that meet the criteria under subsection (b);

(2) support for transition to democracy in Iran should be expressed by United States representatives and officials in all appropriate international fora;

(3) official meetings with representatives of the Government of Iran should be terminated;

(4) efforts to bring a halt to the nuclear weapons program of Iran, including steps to end the supply of nuclear components or fuel to Iran, should be intensified, with particular attention focused on the cooperation of the Government of Russia with that nuclear weapons program; and

(5) officials and representatives of the United States Government should strongly and unequivocally support indigenous efforts in Iran to call for a national referendum on the form of government in Iran, including drawing international attention to the violations by the Government of Iran of human rights, freedom of religion, freedom of assembly, and freedom of the press.

(g) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS- There is authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State \$10,000,000 to carry out activities under this section.

SEC. 5. DESIGNATION OF DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION ORGANIZATIONS.

(a) INITIAL DESIGNATION- It is the sense of Congress that, not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President should designate at least one democratic opposition organization as eligible to receive assistance under section 4.

(b) NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT- At least 15 days before designating a democratic opposition organization as eligible to receive assistance under section 4, the President shall notify the Committees on Foreign Relations and Appropriations of the Senate and the Committees on International Relations and Appropriations of the House of Representatives of the proposed designation.

SEC. 6. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize or otherwise approve of the use of the Armed Forces of the United States in carrying out activities under this Act.

White House

Press gaggle

By Scott McClellan – 20 July 2004

[...] Q Is there an active investigation going on into whether or not Iran in some way helped al Qaeda's -- the hijackers? Is there an active investigation?

MR. McCLELLAN: I don't know that I would describe it that way. I would describe it that -- you heard from the acting director of the CIA, Director McLaughlin, on Sunday, when he said that there is no evidence to suggest that there was any official involvement between Iran and the September 11th attacks. The President said yesterday that we will continue to look at it. We want to see what the September 11th Commission reports on this issue. It's a story where -- that has evolved over time. It's something that obviously you want to continue to take a look at. But I think Director McLaughlin made it clear there was no evidence of any official involvement between Iran and the September 11th attacks.

Q So you wouldn't say it's an active investigation. It's not like it's something that you're actively pursuing?

MR. McCLELLAN: The President -- I don't think anyone has described it that way. The President said we will continue to look at it. That's what he said. [...]

White House

Press briefing

by Scott McClellan – 21 July 2004

[...] Q With regard to Iran, more reports have been coming out about their possible links to terrorism and 9/11 and so forth. Is there any second guessing going on in the White House that maybe the administration should have been tougher with Iran and less tough with Iraq?

MR. McCLELLAN: I think we are being tough with Iran. If you'll recall, the President in his -- I believe his 2002 State of the Union address talked about Iran, he talked about North Korea, he talked about Iraq. What September 11th taught us was that we must confront threats before they fully materialize. And this President is confronting the threats that we face around the world. There are different ways and different strategies for confronting different threats. We are working to get Iran to abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons right now. That has been a multilateral process to keep the pressure on Iran and encourage them that they need to pursue a different approach. And we continue to call on Iran to abandon their nuclear program.

Q Any response --

MR. McCLELLAN: Well, we have made some progress in the sense that the multilateral -- through the multilateral process. The international community recognizes the importance of getting Iran to stop its pursuit of nuclear weapons. And so we're continuing to move forward to address that threat.

We have also spoken about Iran's continued support for and harboring of terrorists, particularly Hezbollah. We've also called on Iran to turn over those al Qaeda leaders that are in their country to their country of origin. So there are a number of ways that we're addressing the issues and concerns we have with regards to Iran. There are serious concerns. We've also confronted the other threats that we face in this world. That's why I talked about how we're engaged in a broad war on terrorism. It's a strategy that recognizes that we must confront threats before it's too late, before they fully materialize. And that's what we're doing around the world in not only Iran, but North Korea and elsewhere. And we've been pursuing these efforts for quite some time. [...]

9/11 Commission

Excerpts relating to Iran from the 9/11 Commission report:

22 July 2004

In June 1996, an enormous truck bomb detonated in the Khobar Towers residential complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, that housed U.S. Air Force personnel. Nineteen Americans were killed, and 372 were wounded. The operation was carried out principally, perhaps exclusively, by Saudi Hezbollah, an organization that had received support from the government of Iran. While the evidence of Iranian involvement is strong, there are also signs that al Qaeda played some role, as yet unknown. [48]

Turabi sought to persuade Shiites and Sunnis to put aside their divisions and join against the common enemy. In late 1991 or 1992, discussions in Sudan between al Qaeda and Iranian operatives led to an informal agreement to cooperate in providing support—even if only training—for actions carried out primarily against Israel and the United States. Not long afterward, senior al Qaeda operatives and trainers traveled to Iran to receive training in explosives. In the fall of 1993, another such delegation went to the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon for further training in explosives as well as in intelligence and security. Bin Ladin reportedly showed particular interest in learning how to use truck bombs such as the one that had killed 241 U.S. Marines in Lebanon in 1983. The relationship between al Qaeda and Iran demonstrated that Sunni-Shia divisions did not necessarily pose an insurmountable barrier to cooperation in terrorist operations. As will be described in chapter 7, al Qaeda contacts with Iran continued in ensuing years. [52]

Though intelligence gave no clear indication of what might be afoot, some intelligence reports mentioned chemical weapons, pointing toward work at a camp in southern Afghanistan called Derunta. On November 4, 1998, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York unsealed its indictment of Bin Ladin, charging him with conspiracy to attack U.S. defense installations. The indictment also charged that al Qaeda had allied itself with Sudan, Iran, and Hezbollah. The original sealed indictment had added that al Qaeda had "reached an understanding with the government of Iraq that al Qaeda would not work against that government and that on particular projects, specifically including weapons development, al Qaeda would work cooperatively with the Government of Iraq." [109]

This passage led Clarke, who for years had read intelligence reports on Iraqi-Sudanese cooperation on chemical weapons, to speculate to Berger that a large Iraqi presence at chemical facilities in Khartoum was "probably a direct result of the Iraq-Al Qida agreement." Clarke added that VX precursor traces found near al Shifa were the "exact formula used by Iraq."¹¹⁰ This language about al Qaeda's "understanding" with Iraq had been dropped, however, when a superseding indictment was filed in November 1998. [111]

The purpose of all this training was twofold: to develop an institutional capacity for document forgery and to enable operatives to make necessary adjustments in the field. It was well-known, for example, that if a Saudi traveled to Afghanistan via Pakistan, then on his return to Saudi Arabia his passport, bearing a Pakistani stamp, would be confiscated. So operatives either erased the Pakistani visas from their passports or traveled through Iran, which did not stamp visas directly into passports. [109]

Assistance from Hezbollah and Iran to al Qaeda

As we mentioned in chapter 2, while in Sudan, senior managers in al Qaeda maintained contacts with Iran and the Iranian-supported worldwide terrorist organization Hezbollah, which is based mainly in southern Lebanon and Beirut. Al Qaeda members received advice and training from Hezbollah. Intelligence indicates the persistence of contacts between Iranian security officials and senior al Qaeda figures after Bin Ladin's return to Afghanistan. Khallad has said that Iran made a concerted effort to strengthen relations with al Qaeda after the October 2000 attack on the USS Cole, but was rebuffed because Bin Ladin did not want to alienate his supporters in Saudi Arabia.

Khallad and other detainees have described the willingness of Iranian officials to facilitate the travel of al Qaeda members through Iran, on their way to and from Afghanistan. For example, Iranian border inspectors would be told not to place telltale stamps in the passports of these travelers. Such arrangements were particularly beneficial to Saudi members of al Qaeda. [120]

Our knowledge of the international travels of the al Qaeda operatives selected for the 9/11 operation remains fragmentary. But we now have evidence suggesting that 8 to 10 of the 14 Saudi "muscle" operatives traveled into or out of Iran between October 2000 and February 2001. [121]

In October 2000, a senior operative of Hezbollah visited Saudi Arabia to coordinate activities there. He also planned to assist individuals in Saudi Arabia in traveling to Iran during November. A top Hezbollah commander and Saudi Hezbollah contacts were involved. [122]

Also in October 2000, two future muscle hijackers, Mohand al Shehri and Hamza al Ghamdi, flew from Iran to Kuwait. In November, Ahmed al Ghamdi apparently flew to Beirut, traveling-perhaps by coincidence-on the same flight as a senior Hezbollah operative. Also in November, Salem al Hazmi apparently flew from Saudi Arabia to Beirut. [123]

In mid-November, we believe, three of the future muscle hijackers, Wail al Shehri, Waleed al Shehri, and Ahmed al Nami, all of whom had obtained their U.S. visas in late October, traveled in a group from Saudi Arabia to Beirut and then onward to Iran. An associate of a senior Hezbollah operative was on the same flight that took the future hijackers to Iran. Hezbollah officials in Beirut and Iran were expecting the arrival of a group during the same time period. The travel of this group was important enough to merit the attention of senior figures in Hezbollah. [124]

Later in November, two future muscle hijackers, Satam al Suqami and Majed Moqed, flew into Iran from Bahrain. In February 2001, Khalid al Mihdhar may have taken a flight from Syria to Iran, and then traveled further within Iran to a point near the Afghan border. [125]

KSM and Binalshibh have confirmed that several of the 9/11 hijackers (at least eight, according to Binalshibh) transited Iran on their way to or from Afghanistan, taking advantage of the Iranian practice of not stamping Saudi passports. They deny any other reason for the hijackers' travel to Iran. They also deny any relationship between the hijackers and Hezbollah. [126]

In sum, there is strong evidence that Iran facilitated the transit of al Qaeda members into and out of Afghanistan before 9/11, and that some of these were future 9/11 hijackers. There also is circumstantial evidence that senior Hezbollah operatives were closely tracking the travel of some of these future muscle hijackers into Iran in November 2000. However, we cannot rule out the possibility of a remarkable coincidence-that is, that Hezbollah was actually focusing on some other group of individuals traveling from Saudi Arabia during this same time frame, rather than the future hijackers. [127]

We have found no evidence that Iran or Hezbollah was aware of the planning for what later became the 9/11 attack. At the time of their travel through Iran, the al Qaeda operatives themselves were probably not aware of the specific details of their future operation.

After 9/11, Iran and Hezbollah wished to conceal any past evidence of cooperation with Sunni terrorists associated with al Qaeda. A senior Hezbollah official disclaimed any Hezbollah involvement in 9/11. [128]

We believe this topic requires further investigation by the U.S. government.

US State Department

Iran Re-emerges as Foreign Policy Topic

Council on Foreign Relations Urges U.S.-Iranian rapprochement

By Phillip Kurata – 22 July 2004

Washington -- Iran has re-emerged as a major U.S. foreign policy topic with recommendations from the Council of Foreign Relations that Washington open a strategic dialogue with Tehran. The council's recommendations for rapprochement come in contrast to a statement from President Bush that Iran is being investigated for ties with al-Qaida terrorists.

The council's recommendations for a U.S.-Iran rapprochement were presented July 19 by Zbigniew Brezinski, former President Jimmy Carter's national security adviser, and Robert Gates, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency under the first President Bush. Brezinski and Gates were the co-chairs of the council's task force that drafted the recommendations.

Brezinski said that opening a dialogue with Iran, similar to former President Richard Nixon's rapprochement with China in 1972, would contribute to U.S. efforts to stabilize the Middle East and Southwest Asia.

"It is in this context that we are urging a policy of cautious, selected, probing, national interest-oriented engagement with Iran to see if it is possible to begin to address some of the issues in the relationship between us," Brezinski said.

"You might remember that the statement of principles between the United States and China in 1972 did not resolve any of the major issues, but pointed a way towards the resolution," he said.

Gates said that U.S. actions in Iraq, Iran's western neighbor, and in Afghanistan, its eastern neighbor, have dramatically changed the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East and Southwest Asia and may have created new opportunities for engagement with Iran.

"The task force also devoted considerable time to Iran's involvement in the conflicts of the region, particularly in Afghanistan, Iraq, and between Israelis and Palestinians," Gates said. "We believe that Iran has considerable influence in all three arenas and can play an important role in either assisting or impeding U.S. objectives."

Gates said the authors of the recommendations had no illusions about Iran's nuclear ambitions, its support for terrorist groups, its ambiguous behavior in Iraq and Afghanistan, and its violations of human rights.

But he said that efforts to bring about regime change in Iran are unlikely to succeed and the use of U.S. force against Iran is a remote possibility. Under those circumstances, Gates said, "it is better to see whether it is possible to draw Iran into contributing to regional stability rather than to be attracted by the idea of undermining the region and combating our efforts to stabilize it."

Also on July 19, President Bush said the United States is investigating links between the Iranian government and al-Qaida, including intelligence indicating that Iran may have offered safe passage to terrorists who later carried out the attacks in New York and Washington on September 11, 2001.

Bush said that U.S. investigators have found "no direct connection between Iran and the attack of September 11," but, he added, "we will continue to look and see if the Iranians were involved."

The commission investigating the 9/11 attacks has obtained intelligence showing that Iran had allowed as many as 10 of the terrorists to pass through border stations in late 1990 and early 1991 without having their passports stamped, making it easier for them to enter the United States without raising suspicions.

"I have long expressed my concerns about Iran. After all, it's a totalitarian society where free people are not allowed to, you know, exercise their rights as human beings," Bush said.

White House spokesman Scott McClellan said Iran has been high on President Bush's list of priorities since early in his administration. The spokesman said the 9/11 attacks taught the United States that it cannot wait for terrorist threats to build and fully materialize.

"That's why he's been working with the international community to get Iran to end its pursuit of nuclear weapons and to abide by the international obligations Iran agreed to. That's why we are pressing Iran to turn over those al-Qaida members in their country to their country of origin. That's why we are continuing to urge the unelected few in Iran to heed the aspirations of the Iranian people," McClellan added.

A State Department official stated that U.S. policy toward Iran has not changed and the United States continues to have well-known, long-standing policy differences with Iran.

The official said the U.S. government has "grave concerns" about Iran's support for terrorism, its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, and its "appalling human rights record."

"Our policy remains that we are willing to engage with Iran on specific issues of mutual concern, in an appropriate manner, if and when the president determines it is in our interest to do so," the official said.

US State Department

U.S. Is Safer But Not Yet Safe, Says Rice

National Security Advisor discusses 9-11 Commission's final report
23 July 2004

Washington -- National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice said in interviews July 23 with morning talk shows that she agrees with the September 11 Commission's final report assessment that the United States is safer nearly three years after the terrorist attacks, but not yet safe. [...]

The National Security Advisor addressed the issue of Iran saying, "Our intelligence shows no evidence of that the Iranians were complicit in the passage of the terrorists (September 11 hijackers) through Iranian territory. But we have said all along that we're concerned about Iran's ties to terrorism. We're working with the international community to deal with the fact that Iran is not living up to its international obligations on its nuclear program."

US State Department

State Department noon briefing

By deputy spokesman Adam Ereli – 27 July 2004

[...] QUESTION: On Iran. There has been a couple reports that Iran broke the seals on some centrifuges, as a possible step toward restarting its nuclear program. Do you know -- what does the United States know about that, and what does it say about Iran's commitment to the process with the European countries on?

MR. ERELI: I've seen those reports. I don't really have -- I'm not in a position to comment on them, other than to refer you to the IAEA, which is responsible for the issue. As far as Iran's commitment to cooperating with the IAEA, that's, I think, to put it kindly, remains an open question given its past failures to follow through on promises made to the Board of Governors. [...]

US State Department

State Department noon briefing

by deputy spokesman Adam Ereli – 28 July 2004

[...] QUESTION: Okay. Anything more on Iran since yesterday on what -- you didn't have any -- you didn't draw any conclusions on whether it's true that Iran has broken some of these seals and started working on uranium enrichment again?

MR. ERELI: Without speaking to those reports, this issue of Iran's continuation of centrifuge manufacture and assembly has been something that has been with us for the last several weeks, the last several months. It's an issue that we remain deeply concerned about. We view it as a direct challenge to the IAEA's call on Iran to suspend all enrichment related and reprocessing activities. It certainly raises questions about Iran -- other commitments Iran has made concerning its nuclear program. But, beyond that, I really don't have much more for you.

QUESTION: What raises questions? What is a direct challenge and what raises questions? These latest things or just in general? Is there anything new in what you're saying? It's what, you know, you said the same thing a month ago.

MR. ERELI: Right. And there's -- what we're seeing, the reports we're seeing now, I think, are further evidence of a continued failure to abide by commitments.

QUESTION: Do you have any high hopes for the meeting of the European troika with the Iranians tomorrow?

MR. ERELI: Well, we're consulting closely with the Europeans. I think we share the same concerns, those that I just expressed. Iran made a pledge to suspend the manufacture and assembly of centrifuges. They've gone back on that pledge. As I said, it's disturbing and a matter of concern.

We've been in contact with -- we've been in close contact with our EU-3 partners. They will be talking to the Iranians about this and we'll be following it closely and continuing our close cooperation with the EU-3 on the matter.

QUESTION: You find these talks are still useful, even though last time they extracted a promise from Iran it didn't -- it didn't come through?

MR. ERELI: I think we share a common concern and we are working well together in a multilateral context to bring the light -- to shine the light on Iran's program and to try to marshal international cooperation to get it under control. [...]

US State Department

State Department noon briefing

by deputy spokesman Adam Ereli – 29 July 2004

[...] QUESTION: Secretary Powell said that he is planning to -- suggested that the U.S. is going to refer the Iran nuclear problem to the Security Council. Is this a final position now?

MR. ERELI: The final position will be determined when the Board of Governors meets. I think, obviously, as I said yesterday, as Secretary Powell said today, we are concerned by Iran's continuing activity at a

nuclear program which we believe is for military purposes and which clearly is in violation of treaty obligations and commitments made to the international community.

This is a subject of -- that not only concerns us, but is bothersome and troubling to the other members of the Board of Governors. As you know, the EU-3 are meeting with the Iranians today to raise these issues and it will be the subject of our discussions at the next Board of Governors meeting in September. I wouldn't want to prejudge what comes out of that meeting but, obviously, things are not going, so far, the way the Board of Governors, I think, expected them to go, coming out of their previous meetings. [...]

White House

President Bush Discusses Additional Steps for Defending America and Countering Terrorism

The Rose Garden – 2 August 2004

[...] “In Iran, we are paying very close attention to Iran. We have ever since I've been in office here. We are working with our friends to keep the pressure on the mullahs to listen to the demands of the free world. And we're working with the -- hold on a second, please. Excuse me. We're working with the IAEA to keep the pressure on Iran, and the Secretary is working very closely with the foreign ministers of France, Great Britain and Germany, who are taking it upon themselves to make it clear that the demands of Europe are also equal to -- the same as the demands of the United States, that we expect there to be full disclosure, full transparency of their nuclear weapons programs.” [...]

State Department

State Department daily briefing

by spokesman Richard Boucher – 3 August 2004

[...] QUESTION: Dr. Condoleezza Rice yesterday, last night on Fox News Channel, was talking about the United States applying new pressure against Iran trying to extract the positions concerning their nuclear programs. And she seems to -- she seemed to threaten new -- certain sanctions against Iran.

I wonder why is it being, intensifying now, the -- I mean, after the call of previous U.S. officials and diplomats for a better relations or repairing the relations with Iran, we see that Congress issuing new law, you know, that -- or new bill that was condemning Iran. We see new efforts like trying to prove that the Administration is not going to repair this relationship.

On the other hand, there is an increased nervousness in the Middle East concerning the Israeli 200 nuclear bombs and its programs. Are you doing anything to assure the Middle Eastern countries along the way that you are working with different countries in order to reduce this threat of nuclear -- the nuclear threat in the Middle East, not only with Iran but other countries too?

MR. BOUCHER: Yes. I think, don't fall into the fallacy that things only happen in Washington. During all this time that you said there have been intensified calls from the United States on pressure on Iran and getting Iran to abide by IAEA standards and to get in line, Iran has been violating commitments it made, making promises and breaking them, making public statements that they were going to renew construction of centrifuge enrichment facilities, telling the IAEA they weren't going to abide by their commitments, telling the Europeans they weren't going to abide by their commitments.

So, the reason there is increasingly a reaction in Washington and other parts of the world -- you can see from the Europeans as well -- is because Iran has been, repeatedly now, saying, "Well, no, they've changed their mind. They're not going to carry out their commitments. They've changed their mind. They're not going to abide by their IAEA requirements." There's another board meeting coming up in September and the IAEA is going to have to look at that. [...]

State Department

State Department daily briefing

by deputy spokesman Adam Ereli – 9 August 2004

[...] QUESTION: Yesterday, the National Security Advisor issued pretty strong statements against Iran. Do you see that the U.S.-Iranian relations were headed toward confrontation of any kind?

MR. ERELI: I think those -- I saw those statements. They were, very, very good reiterations of our longstanding policy, which is that the United States has long been -- felt that Iran had a clandestine nuclear program for military purposes.

We have been, I think, very persistent and consistent in trying to bring that issue and problem to the attention of the international community, and over the last several years of diplomacy, that those efforts have produced important results, as evidenced by the growing importance and activism of the IAEA and the Board of Governors in confronting Iran and demanding answers about what it's doing, and as well, our commitment to continue taking the steps necessary to, you know, prevent Iran from flouting its international obligations and posing a risk to international security.

QUESTION: So you're saying that the U.S. policy will continue to be diplomacy and not force?

MR. ERELI: You know, obviously, we -- and as the National Security Advisor said, we'd never take -- are not going to take options off the table, but our focus is, and our approach is working with international partners to address this issue.

QUESTION: But, Adam, I mean, at the same time, you've been working on this diplomacy for several years, evidenced by the fact they are still trying to get the international community to take, you know, more forceful actions, such as in IAEA or the Security Council, that this diplomacy has not curbed Iran's nuclear programs. So at what point would you --

MR. ERELI: I would challenge that assertion and contend that our forceful advocacy of this issue internationally has constrained Iran and has put the spotlight on Iran in ways that would not have been the case if we had not been as active as we are. Obviously, concerns remain or we wouldn't be -- I mean, we wouldn't be where we are. But at the same time, those concerns are producing, I think, greater and greater consensus about the nature of the problem and determination to do something about it. And as the National Security Advisor said, we are determined to do something about it. [...]

White House

Press briefing

by Press Secretary Scott McClellan – 9 August 2004

[...] QUESTION: Given the National Atomic Energy Agency and the United Nations failed to actually stop Iran's nuclear weapons program, is the President willing to go it alone in dealings with Iran?

MR. McCLELLAN: Well, I think that this is a problem that the international community recognizes is a threat. The international community is confronting Iran, because of the leadership that this President has provided. It was the United States that brought our concern -- the concerns about Iran's nuclear weapons program to the international community. And the international community recognizes that this is a real threat. And that's why we are working with our friends in Britain and Germany and France on this matter. Iran needs to comply with its international obligations. We expect that at the next board meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency that there will be a very strong statement regarding Iran's continued non-compliance with their international obligations. And the international community recognizes that we cannot afford to let Iran move forward on a nuclear -- on building nuclear weapons. And so that's how -- that's where it is right now. [...]

State Department

State Department daily briefing

by deputy spokesman Adam Ereli – 10 August 2004

[...] QUESTION: Can I ask you about something else? Has U.S. confidence in its assertions that Iran is enriching uranium, a nuclear weapons program, been shaken at all by reports that enriched uranium is reaching the country from other places, like Pakistan, for black marketeers? That apparently, apparently, is what the UN agency in Vienna is determining. It may be ahead of the game here, but I wondered if you had a chance to look into those reports that people are hearing.

MR. ERELI: This is a question about reports of highly enriched uranium particles on Iranian --

QUESTION: Yeah, meaning that they themselves --

MR. ERELI: -- centrifuge workshops.

QUESTION: -- (inaudible) enrichment.

MR. ERELI: Yeah. This is, obviously, not a new report. It is something that is being investigated by the IAEA. It is a complex issue that I think will take some further investigative work and time to determine all the facts.

The Director General of the IAEA will present his next report to the Board of Governors by the end of this month, and certainly, this will be part of that report. I would note that this question of highly enriched uranium particles is but one of several troubling issues that the Board of Governors has been considering and that the IAEA is investigating. It's not just HEU, but it also involves their centrifuge program, it involves their overall enrichment program, it involves failure to cooperate with IAEA inspectors, it involves plutonium separation experiments, it involves experiments with polonium-210.

So this is a piece of a bigger picture. With regard to the specific facts of this case, it's under investigation. We look forward to the Board of -- to the Director General's report, which will include this issue, we expect, as well as a number of other outstanding issues where Iran's cooperation has not been what we think it should be.

QUESTION: So, troubling -- Iran having enriched uranium, whether it comes from Pakistan or the black market or was enriched at home, is troubling on any front because it's part of a weapons program.

MR. ERELI: I guess what -- obviously, we think Iran has a weapons program, we think the evidence points to that. What's troubling is that there are not clear, consistent answers that are provided in an open and transparent way, and that's what we're looking for.

QUESTION: As promised to the British, Germans and French.

MR. ERELI: As promised. Mm-hmm.

QUESTION: Okay. And just a fine point, when you say this will be taken up, you mean the whole issue of enriched uranium.

MR. ERELI: The issue of Iran -- of Iran's failure to abide by agreements and cooperate with the IAEA.

[...]

QUESTION: Iraq's Defense Minister is charging that Iran is supplying al-Sadr's militia in Najaf. Have you seen -- has the U.S. seen any evidence of this?

MR. ERELI: We've seen those claims and I -- we have expressed our, sort of, concern regarding this issue. And our position is that Iran has an interest in a stable and peaceful Iraq, as do the other states of the region, and as neighbors of Iraq. It is our view that Iran should use its influence toward that objective and not to take any actions that would be destabilizing or otherwise contribute to elements that are not working for unity in Iraq.

QUESTION: Why would Iran have an interest in a liberal, democratic state on its borders? Wouldn't it have more of an interest in having a neighbor that's patterned on its fundamentalist controls?

MR. ERELI: Well, again, I think that's a question --

QUESTION: I mean, you're assuming that they're goodwilled. Why do you assume they're goodwilled?

MR. ERELI: That's a question best asked to the Iranians. What we are all working for, what the international community, I think, is working for is an Iraq that is a departure from the past.

QUESTION: Sure, you are.

MR. ERELI: And we have made significant progress in that. Iraq is not a country that threatens its neighbors. It is not a country that is in a position, either because it wants to or is able, to wage war on its neighbors, as the former regime did. And as -- it would seem self-evident that Iraq's neighbors would welcome that state of affairs, where they can live in peace and prosperity with an Iraq that is committed to regional cooperation, trade and policies that help everybody.

QUESTION: I just wanted to follow up on something that you said, that you've expressed or the U.S. has expressed concern on this issue. Is it concern that this might be happening or concern that it is happening?

MR. ERELI: The United States has expressed concern with regard to suggestions that Iran is not doing everything it can to help promote national reconciliation and stability in Iraq, but not to these specific reports.

QUESTION: So when you say that Iran should use its influence toward these ends of a stable, peaceful Iraq, are you also implying they haven't?

MR. ERELI: I am expressing what the United States views as responsible actions by Iran's -- by Iraq's neighbors.

QUESTION: Have you seen those actions?

MR. ERELI: I think we have -- without passing judgment or giving Iran a grade, I think that we are watching activities closely and working with Iraq and the international community to try to bring about cooperation, both regionally and internationally, that helps Iraq, that supports the objectives of the government of Iraq, and that serves the interests of the people of Iraq. And that's our message to Iran and to any other country that is involved in the situation.

QUESTION: Adam, can I just clarify, when you said, "We have expressed our concern with regard to suggestions that Iran is not doing everything it can," et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. But did you say after that, but not in regard -- but not in relation to these new -- these latest charges?

MR. ERELI: We haven't spoken specifically to these charges of guns to Sadr militia, and I'm not in a position to, frankly, give -- accord credibility to those reports.

QUESTION: All right. You know, as I remember, this guidance, this could have been written on, like, March 20th of last year, and I think actually was. (Laughter.) Have you --

MR. ERELI: As you will notice, I am not reading from anything.

QUESTION: And there's not -- you've been saying, you've been telling -- well, you've been -- (Laughter.)

QUESTION: Let the record show that the State Department --

QUESTION: Is there any -- has there been any change in your message to Iran since the war, that they should do everything that they can to promote a stable Iraq? I mean, isn't this exactly what you've been telling them the entire time?

MR. ERELI: Are you suggesting that somehow consistency is not a good thing?

QUESTION: No, I'm trying to --

QUESTION: (Inaudible.)

QUESTION: No, I'm trying to possibly save myself some work later on.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) those stories.

(Laughter.)

MR. ERELI: Let me put it this way.

QUESTION: This message that you're giving -- that you're saying today, in response to the questions about this report, is -- this message is not at all different than what you've been saying for the past year. Is that correct?

MR. ERELI: Yes, I am reiterating our position that countries should act responsibly and use their influence for peace and stability and prosperity in Iraq, and that it's in all of our interests to do so.

QUESTION: Can I try to -- on Iraq?

QUESTION: Can I go back to -- on Iraq?

QUESTION: Yeah, not Iran, but Iraq.

QUESTION: Okay.

QUESTION: Let me try it a slightly different way. Is Iran doing any better in this regard than it's doing in its cooperation with the IAEA?

(Laughter.)

MR. ERELI: We've also made it clear that, with regard to the borders between Iran and Syria. There are continuing concerns about the movement of people and goods that are not supportive of a peaceful Iraq. And we have made the point rather consistently that both countries need to do everything they can to exercise control over their borders, and to work cooperatively with the government of Iraq to ensure that this kind of activity doesn't take place. And I would also note that that's been a subject of discussion between the leaders of Iraq and those countries.

So this is a work in progress, and our view is that it's in the long-term interests of everybody to get the situation under control. [...]

State Department

State Department daily briefing

by deputy spokesman Adam Ereli – 11 August 2004

[...] QUESTION: Do you have any reaction to Iran testing a Shihab-3?

MR. ERELI: I hadn't seen that report, no reaction, other than to underscore our continuing concern about Iran's clandestine weapons programs. We believe they're of concern and we are working with our international partners to address them. I don't have any specific reaction to this test.

QUESTION: Well, could you take the question and see if you have any more to say about it once you've looked into it?

MR. ERELI: Sure.

QUESTION: Yes, but this is far from clandestine. I mean, they announced it on state television.

MR. ERELI: Well, they've got a clandestine weapons program, which, combined with delivery systems, is a threat to stability.

[...]

QUESTION: Adam, if I can just get back quickly to Iran. Iran has extended an invitation to Prime Minister Allawi to come for an official visit. Do you have any reaction to that?

MR. ERELI: My reaction would be this is a bilateral matter between Iraq and Iran. Prime Minister Allawi has recently gone on a tour of Arab states to try to promote good relations with them. As we've been saying since the interim Iraqi government took over, we think it's a good thing for all states in the region, and Iraq's neighbors in particular, to have close, productive and positive relations with Iraq. [...]

State Department

State Department daily briefing

by deputy spokesman Adam Ereli – 17 August 2004

[...] QUESTION: Change the subject to Iran. When does the United States want to report Iran to the Security Council for its nuclear programs?

MR. ERELI: I think you're getting a little bit ahead of things. There is a report from the Secretary General -- or the Director General of the IAEA that's due at the end of this month, I think, on Iran's fulfillment of obligations and actions taken with regard to its treaty obligations, and there is a Board of Governors meeting of the IAEA scheduled in September, and that will be the place where I think the members will discuss this Director General's report, and -- as well as what actions they want to take on the basis of it.

So, again, that's the sort of process, and I'm not going to, at this point, prejudge for you where it's going to end up.

QUESTION: So, apart from the process, what's the U.S. policy or position? Does it want Iran to be referred to the Security Council?

MR. ERELI: The U.S. position is that the IAEA regulations or IAEA rules call for referral to the Security Council if -- under certain conditions, and those conditions include failure to abide by the regulations, violation of treaty commitments, engaging in activity that contravenes those treaties and IAEA regulations. So if it's determined that Iran is -- falls into that category, then it would be appropriate to refer to the Security Council.

QUESTION: So there's no specific U.S. policy; it's just whatever the IAEA --

MR. ERELI: Well, the U.S. has its views on the subject. As you know, we've been saying for a long time that -- and I think we've been slowly building a growing consensus, that Iran is engaged in a clandestine nuclear weapons program, that this program is a matter of concern to the international community, as is Iran's repeated attempts at concealment and deception, and that we are working, I think, cooperatively with the IAEA and other members to try to, I guess, bring to light Iranian activities, try to bring Iran into compliance with commitments it has made, and failure to do -- and should we fail in doing that, then -- and Iran is -- and it's determined that Iran is in violation, then refer it to the Security Council. [...]

State Department

State Department daily briefing

by deputy spokesman Adam Ereli – 18 August 2004

[...] QUESTION: Iran warned of an immeasurable response if Israel strikes on its nuclear facilities at Bushehr. How do you assess such an escalation of threats?

MR. ERELI: As not particularly helpful.

The fact of the matter is that the United States has been saying for some time -- and we believe that it's becoming increasingly clear to others -- that despite its public assertions to the contrary, Iran has a clandestine nuclear weapons program.

Our commitment, the commitment of our partners in the international community, including the EU, and the International Atomic Agency Board of Governors is to address this problem through peaceful diplomatic engagement. That is our approach in the IAEA. It's what we're working towards, and we are committed to bringing an end to this, I think, illegal and destabilizing activity.

QUESTION: Will you get this matter to the UN?

MR. ERELI: We talked about that yesterday, and the short answer was, let's wait until the September Board of Governors and look at where we are, based on the Director General's report. [...]

State Department

State Department noon briefing

by deputy spokesman Adam Ereli – 19 August 2004

[...] QUESTION: This is related, Adam. The Defense Minister of Iran, in an Al-Jazeera interview -- I believe it was yesterday -- was expressing disquiet about the U.S. military presence in Iraq, and suggesting that if Iran felt that its interests were threatened, it might take preemptive military action of its own. Anything on that?

MR. ERELI: I've seen those reports, reports of those statements. I would certainly characterize them as unwarranted concerns. Let us remember that the United Nations -- the United States forces are there as part of a multinational force at the invitation of the interim sovereign authority of Iraq, the Interim Iraqi Government, pursuant to UN Security Council resolutions, to help support the stability and security of Iraq.

So there is no cause for seeing them as threatening; rather, our view is, and we've stated it quite often, that far from seeing them as threatening, they should be seen as stabilizing and Iraq's neighbors have an interest in joining with all of us working in Iraq to ensure that those who are trying to unsettle, destabilize or otherwise work against the government of Iraq are defeated.

QUESTION: Just to clarify that. I understand that the Iranian Minister was also referring not only to Iraq, but to possible strikes against nuclear -- Iranian nuclear facilities --

MR. ERELI: By --

QUESTION: -- by Israel or by others.

MR. ERELI: I don't know what he was -- I don't know that that's true. I don't know what he was referring to. The question was: Should anyone see U.S. forces in Iraq as being threatening? And I think, quite categorically, that they should not. But as far as other comments that may or may not have been made, I don't know.

On the issue of the rhetoric concerning strikes and counterstrikes over Iran's nuclear program, I spoke to that yesterday, and I said from the United States point of view, this is a program that is of serious concern and it is something that we are committed to pursuing through diplomatic means, as evidenced by our, I think, active diplomacy through the International Atomic Energy Agency.

[...]

QUESTION: What's the U.S. view of whether Iran is providing any support to Sadr and his Mahdi army?

MR. ERELI: The U.S. view is that there are such allegations. I'm not in a position to confirm them for you. What we would say is that it's important, frankly, that the neighbors of Iraq, such as Iran, such as Syria, such as others, play a responsible role in supporting the government of Iraq and in using their influence to contribute to that country's security and stability. Certainly, arming militias who fight against the government doesn't meet that standard, but I'm not going to confirm for you whether or not that's the case.

QUESTION: While you went back to Iran, I'm going to ask another question. Included in these minister's remarks were a threat of preemptive force, and he said it's not just the U.S. who can decide to use preemption, anyone can do it, and if we feel threatened, that's what we're going to do, and he named Israel's Dimona facility specifically. Doesn't this ratchet up the rhetoric a notch, I mean, more than what we've been hearing lately? It sounds pretty provocative.

MR. ERELI: Right. I'm just not going to -- I'm not going to just chase statements from different foreign officials. I've told you what our views are. Our views are that, as far as our presence in Iraq, it's part of a multinational force sanctioned by the United Nations. Nobody should see it as threatening. And as far as Iran's nuclear program goes, it's of concern to the international community, and we think it should be dealt with peacefully and diplomatically. [...]

White House daily briefing

by Press Secretary Scott McClellan – 19 August 2004

[...] QUESTION: I have a question, and then a calendar question. The Iranian defense minister today, he said that the generals, other officials are getting nervous about the U.S. troop presence in Iraq, that the doctrine of preemption is not solely an American doctrine. I wonder what your reaction to that is?

MR. McCLELLAN: Well, I think the Iranians say a lot of things. But what the Iranian government needs to do is end its pursuit of nuclear weapons. That's what our priority is when it comes to Iran. We've made that very clear. Germany, France and the British are making it very clear to the Iranians, as well. They need to fully comply with their international obligations and abide by what they said they would do. That's where our focus is, when it comes to Iran. [...]

White House daily briefing

by Press Secretary Scott McClellan – 20 August 2004

[...] Q: On Iraq, the President of Iran has called on Muslim nations to get together and discuss what he's calling a spiritual and human catastrophe that's existing right now.

MR. McCLELLAN: The President of?

Q: Iran.

MR. McCLELLAN: Okay.

Q: And I was wondering, does the President think there's any truth to this characterization at all?

MR. McCLELLAN: I haven't seen the exact comments. Is this something recent?

Q: Well, today.

MR. McCLELLAN: I haven't seen his exact comments. But what Iran needs to do is work to help -- be helpful to the interim government in Iraq and helpful to the Iraqi people as they move to build a free and peaceful future, and not take steps that would be harmful in that respect. And I think we've made that clear. But Iran also needs to take action to end its pursuit of nuclear weapons. And so I think the Iranian government says a lot of things from time to time, but I haven't seen those specific comments. [...]

Remarks by National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice followed by question and answer to the U.S. Institute of Peace

Washington DC – 19 August 2004

Q: My question is with regard to the transatlantic relationship. It seems that one of the biggest impediments to success in the Middle East is deep divisions between the United States and our European allies as to how to deal specifically with the issue of Iraq, Iran and the (inaudible) conflict. Can you describe the state of this relationship and how would you attempt to deal with that problem?

Rice: [...] As to Iran, I think there the United States was, perhaps at one time, the state that was most concerned about Iran's activities, but others have come to that position, principally because of Iranian behavior. There is great concern that the Iranians, under the cover of civilian nuclear program, are, indeed, engaged in illegal activities, activities that are not -- that are inconsistent with its international obligations. And I think you will see that the statements that have been coming out of the European Union Three -- the French-British-German effort to deal with the Iranians -- are very consistent with what we, the United States, believe and we've been in very close contact with them. That is one of the stories, the coming together of the international community around, and insistence that Iran deal with its international obligations, and a lot of concern about it.

[...]

Q: No, I understand that. And I had this question in my head before you got to Iran.

So, how would this be translated? Do you expect that the policy that John Bolton has enunciated this week to try to isolate, to try to interdict, to stop Iran's nuclear program will get support from the Europeans? [...]

Rice: [...] On Iran, I think we've gotten very good cooperation with our European allies on Iran. Now, the problem, again, is Iran, because the European Three went to the Iranians and they thought that they had an arrangement where the Iranians were agreed to not reprocess and enrich. The Iranians have gone back on that deal. The Iranians have not been forthcoming with the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency]. We have a board meeting in September, and we will see what people want to do. But it is not for lack of consistency and lack of coherence in alliance policy -- these problems are that you have some very recalcitrant governments that have to come under even greater pressure to live up to their international obligations. But we and the Europeans have been very much united on both these fronts. [...]

State Department

State Department noon briefing

by deputy spokesman Adam Ereli – 26 August 2004

[...] QUESTION: Relating to nuclear. Russia, today, is denying that their building of the nuclear plant in Iran is facing delays and they expect it to open by 2005. Well, obviously, you've spoken to the Iranians. What concrete steps have you had talking with the Russians?

MR. ERELI: I don't know what plant you're speaking about. Are you speaking about Bushehr?

QUESTION: Yeah, and other plants.

MR. ERELI: I spoke to Bushehr early on in the week -- I would refer you to the transcript -- in which Russia agreed not to provide fuel to Bushehr pending resolution of issues before the IAEA. And as far as we understand, Russia is abiding by that agreement. [...]

State Department

State Department noon briefing

by deputy spokesman Adam Ereli – 23 August 2004

[...] QUESTION: Can I ask a different question on Israel? How seriously the U.S. is taking the threat by Iran that they have the capacity and capability of destroying Israel's nuclear and other installations? This has been in many, many press, including India Globe. So, are you in touch with Israel, or they are in touch with you, that has Israel taking this threat from Iran, and Iranians are being --

MR. ERELI: No. No, no, no, this is not a -- as I said before, as I said last week when it was asked, and I said the week before that was asked, this is a issue that we, the United States, is committed to dealing with peacefully and through diplomatic channels. That's what our diplomacy and our policy is geared toward, and I don't think it's useful or productive to get into hyperactive speculation on rhetoric.

[...]

QUESTION: Two connections, actually. One is, as far as missile technology to Iran is concerned is Chinese hand, and second, as far as the nuclear technology is concerned, Pakistan hand to Iran. So how seriously are we taking, really, this Iran, as far as they are threatening the peace in the region and around the globe?

MR. ERELI: Well, this is an issue I think we've addressed exhaustively. I don't have much more to add to what we've made clear, which is that we view Iran's clandestine nuclear weapons program as a threat. We have been working diligently over the last several years to call the world's attention to this threat. We think important progress has been made in the last, in the last year as more and more members of the IAEA have come to recognize not only the scope of Iran's program, but also the scope of its deception, and that there has been a newfound, or newly won consensus, if you will, in the international community and in the IAEA that this program is of concern, that it needs to be fully declared and that Iran needs to abide by its treaty obligations. That is the focus of the IAEA. That is what the Board of Governors has passed in four successive, unanimous resolutions. So, you know, it is an issue that has the world's attention and that the world, I think, is moving resolutely to address.

QUESTION: Do you think attention from the Iranians, this time they're taking advantage of the U.S. elections or something with the elections?

MR. ERELI: I can't speculate on Iranian motives, I could just tell you that there will be a Board of -- another Board of Governors meeting in September and there will be another meeting in November, and there will continue to be meetings regardless of whether there's an election or not, and that our -- I think our policy has been remarkably consistent over many, many years.

[...]

QUESTION: Adam, returning to Iran, there are reports today in the news that Iran and Russia are signing or are implementing further agreements to build more nuclear sites in Iran.

MR. ERELI: I can't really speak to those reports. What I can tell you is that Iran's nuclear program has obviously been a topic of discussion between us and the Government of Russia. I would note that Russia has not provided fuel for the Bushehr nuclear plant pending an agreement on the return of spent fuel already there as well as resolution of the outstanding questions and concerns that have been raised by the IAEA's investigation.

I would also note that Russia shares the concerns of the other IAEA Board members and has joined the IAEA Board of Governors in adopting four unanimous resolutions.

That's where things stand, as far as I'm aware, with Russia and the Bushehr plant.

[...]

QUESTION: I'm sorry, there's a report in a newspaper this morning that the United States has noticed some Chinese technology exports to Iran for the first time in a certain amount of time.

MR. ERELI: Yeah, I don't have any comment on specific reports. As you know, those address information that we generally don't comment on publicly. Obviously, we monitor and evaluate any reports of missile proliferation concern.

China has publicly said that it is firmly opposed to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery and they have also undertaken to take forceful measures to ensure effective implementation of existing laws. Most recently, that was stated by the Vice Foreign Minister of China.

Nonproliferation issues are a regular feature of our bilateral dialogue with the People's Republic of China. We think that they have made progress in nonproliferation, but there are concerns that remain with regard to implementation and enforcement. I think we have very forthright and frank discussions on these issues. But, again, I don't have any comments on details of specific Chinese exports. [...]

Europese Unie

Verslag van de informele Raad Algemene Zaken en Externe Betrekkingen (Gymnich)

3 en 4 september 2004 in Chateau St Gerlach

Iran

De ontwikkelingen in Iran werden alom zorgelijk geacht, m.n. het gebrek aan respect voor de mensenrechten en het teleurstellende verloop van de mensenrechten-dialogoog met dit land. De discussie richtte zich vooral op de problematiek van de nucleaire activiteiten van Iran, mede naar aanleiding van het recent gepubliceerde tussen-rapport van de IAEA. Hoewel Teheran ontkent te werken aan een nucleair wapenprogramma, bestonden daarover vele twijfels. In ieder geval hield Iran zich niet aan de eerder met het VK, Duitsland en Frankrijk gemaakte afspraken over onder andere de stopzetting van uranium-verrijking en daaraan gerelateerde activiteiten.

Door sommige sprekers werd gewezen op de negatieve gevolgen die deze ontwikkeling kan hebben voor de stabiliteit in het Midden-Oosten en het gevaar van een regionale nucleaire wapenwedloop. Voorkomen moest worden dat Iran zich zou misrekenen met betrekking tot de internationale reactie bij voortzetting van zijn activiteiten. Derhalve was van cruciaal belang om de komende periode te gebruiken om de druk op dit land op te voeren en daarbij brede, internationale steun te genereren, incl. verdere betrokkenheid van landen als de VS, Rusland en China. Iran moest krachtig gewezen worden op de noodzaak van volledige openheid over zijn nucleaire activiteiten en van actieve medewerking met het IAEA. Ook het VK, Duitsland en Frankrijk zullen daartoe gezamenlijk hun inspanningen richting Teheran voortzetten. Een uiteindelijke verwijzing van deze problematiek naar de VN-Veiligheidsraad moest geenszins worden uitgesloten.

Het Voorzitterschap zal deze boodschap de komende periode actief overbrengen, te beginnen tijdens het gesprek van de Iraanse veiligheidsadviseur Rouhani met de Minister-President en mijzelf [Minister Bot, red.] op 6 september in Den Haag. De ontwikkelingen in Iran zullen tevens verder worden besproken tijdens de RAZEB van 13 september, mede met het oog op de bijeenkomst van de IAEA-Bestuursraad van 13 tot 16 september a.s.

State Department noon briefing

by spokesman Richard Boucher – 30 August 2004

[...] QUESTION: All right, the notion -- think-tankers saying Iran's nuclear program is unstoppable -- you have a lot of things going: diplomacy, you're having help from -- getting help from three European countries. Is there still -- are there still diplomatic ways that the U.S. -- this Administration thinks perhaps you can stop that program?

MR. BOUCHER: There are still active diplomatic efforts by the United States to pressure Iran, to try to curb Iran's nuclear ambitions. I think this Administration has had notable success in terms of convincing other governments that this was a serious problem. Those of us who have been following this issue for many years know the United States for a long time has said that Iran was developing nuclear weapons and had programs devoted to nuclear weapons. And it's only been recent years that we've been able to get other countries to take those concerns and share those concerns with us so that we have now had, I think, significant action on the part of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

There have been four unanimous resolutions there. We have had now, Russia has deferred shipping nuclear fuel now for, I think, two years to the Bushehr reactor and has agreed that that should be a closed fuel cycle, but even then, that the fuel would not be provided, pending an agreement on the return of the spent fuel and a resolution of outstanding questions and concerns that have been raised in IAEA discussions.

And finally, we've worked very, very closely with the Europeans, as well, who have been raising the same concerns that we have with Iran. So there's -- a combination of factors; continues to make clear to Iran what they have to do in terms of compliance; continues to make clear to Iran that they need to live up to their own commitments as well as the responsibilities of the IAEA resolutions.

We have an IAEA meeting coming up in September, a Board of Governor's meeting in September, and I guess there will be another one in November after that. And we'll continue to work with other governments as we approach those meetings and as we see the Secretary General's reports on Iran to continue to focus attention, focus pressure on Iran, and try to bring Iran into compliance with those commitments.

QUESTION: You've mentioned the second meeting. Are you implying that the first meeting might not trigger the decision to go to the UN Security Council, or are you just explaining there are meetings in sequence?

MR. BOUCHER: I'm just explaining that there are meetings in sequence. The Board of Governors will ultimately, if Iran does not comply, have to refer this matter to the Security Council.

QUESTION: And that's where you --

MR. BOUCHER: We'll discuss with other members exactly when that should be.

QUESTION: And that's where the emphasis is now, isn't it? Because Mr. Bolton has outlined, specified a number of actions the U.S. could take, like interdiction, if necessary. But the main chance now is concerted action, isn't it?

MR. BOUCHER: Well, as we have said, as I just said, as Mr. Bolton has said, as the Secretary has said, the Board of Governors, if it decides that Iran is not complying or that there's not any further action that can be pursued, will need to refer this matter to the United Nations. We'll be talking with other governments about when the appropriate time is for that.

[...]

QUESTION: Are you satisfied with the response of the Germans, the French and the British to Libya's apparent dismissal of the agreement that was reached concerning --

MR. BOUCHER: Iran's.

QUESTION: Libya?

QUESTION: -- with Iran concerning centrifuges?

MR. BOUCHER: I don't think it's a matter of evaluating their response. They have made proposals to Iran about how one can move forward. They have made clear to Iran that they were prepared to move forward, and it's Iran who has, I think, consistently rejected their proposals and rejected their ideas, even after agreeing to some of them initially.

So it's not too surprising and I think they are finding that it's increasingly difficult to get Iran to comply with its own commitments and therefore, they're adopting a different stance on this matter and we've been working very closely with them to translate that into further action.

QUESTION: Well, the centrifuge decision on the part of the Iranians occurred about two months ago, and -- so far as I can tell there has been no -- they haven't paid any price and there have been no consequences as a result of this decision.

MR. BOUCHER: Well, to some extent, the consequences are in steps not taken -- that the Europeans had been prepared to move forward on various things that they are certainly not prepared to move forward on now, but I'll let them speak to that. We will all address this matter together at the Board meeting in September. And to the extent that they have found their proposals rejected, that Iran has violated its own commitments as well as the Board -- the standards set by the Board, I think you'll find a -- how can I say? There's a more concerted attitude by all the nations as we head into the September meeting. [...]

State Department

Remarks to the press by Secretary of State Colin L. Powell en route to Washington

1 September 2004

[...] QUESTION: Thanks I wanted to ask you about the IAEA's report on Iran today. I guess a little bit about your assessment. Does it help or hurt chances of moving this into the Council and is that still a goal? Is that the number one goal right now in dealing with Iran?

SECRETARY POWELL: I've just gotten spot reports on what it contains. I haven't read it myself yet and I haven't gotten a full analysis of it from my staff. And they're poring over it now. I think what it will say is that there are many problems with Iranian performance. I think it will also say that there are questions that remain unanswered. And at least the people that did the report, and Dr. El Baradei may not be prepared to a final conclusion as to the nature of the problem. But, I haven't really had a chance to get a full assessment of the report.

Our view is that it should have been referred to the Council long ago. It is still our position that it ought to be referred to the Council. We were of that view last November when we worked with our friends in the EU, who wanted a different approach ... wanted to take a different approach to the problem. They did and we supported that and we watched it. Now it is almost a year later, ten months later, and we still believe that the Iranians are not fessing up to everything. They still have a program that, in our judgment, is a nuclear program designed to develop, ultimately, a nuclear weapon. And unless there are assurances otherwise that the international community can count on, I think it is appropriate for it to be referred to the Security Council.

Now, that will be our position going in to the discussions on the 13th of September when the Board meets to take this issue up, as well as other issues before the IAEA. Whether there is a consensus to do that now remains to be seen. But we think we've seen enough. The world should have seen enough over the last year to come to the conclusion that it is time for it to be referred to the Security Council. But, there are a lot of discussions that will have to take place. I'll start tomorrow with the EU-3 and other members of the IAEA to get a sense of what the international consensus is. There are a number of countries, I think, that would say, "No, let's not do it yet. Let's take another look at it in November." We think there is enough now to do it, but I obviously have to hear what others have to say. But, this should have been referred before.

QUESTION: Following on that, Undersecretary Bolton suggested in a speech over the summer that diplomacy didn't seem to be working and it was ... I forget his words ... it is time to start thinking about isolating Iran rather than engaging Iran. What are your thoughts about that?

SECRETARY POWELL: Diplomacy is never working until it works. You remember the famous George Mitchell line at 788 straight days of failure on the Good Friday Agreement until Good Friday came and we had an agreement. So, I think there is still a diplomatic track here, hopefully a diplomatic solution. But, frankly, if the international community comes together and decides that it has to be referred to the Security Council, then the next question before us is: what alternatives are available to the Security Council? And we are examining what alternatives might be presented to the Security Council for its consideration if there is a referral.

John's speech, the speech you've actually described, says if this country, Iran, continues to move in this direction and it is referred to the United Nations Security Council, there has to be action taken by the Council. And we're looking at the range of possible actions of a political, economic, diplomatic and other nature that might be taken. [...]

State Department noon briefing

by spokesman Richard Boucher – 2 September 2004

[...] QUESTION: Can you bring us up to date on the diplomatic efforts to bring people around to the U.S. position that the IAEA Board of Governors should refer the Iranian nuclear issue to the Security Council?

MR. BOUCHER: The United States has been consulting actively with other members of the International Atomic Energy Agency Board in order to secure action by the Board at its upcoming meeting.

As Secretary Powell reaffirmed yesterday, we believe the Board should report Iran's non-compliance to the Security Council. There is both a legal basis and a security imperative for taking this step, as Iran has demonstrated over the last year, that it's willing to ignore the current level of international pressure to end its activities and is willing to -- and to cooperate with the IAEA.

We have been consulting actively, as I said, with other governments in Vienna, where our delegation is working with other members of the Board of Governors. We have shared our view -- our initial impressions of the report with many other governments, including the other governments on the Board, through our embassies in those nations. The Under Secretary for Science and Technology, Mr. Bolton, has maintained an active dialogue, particularly with the European members of the Board, with his counterparts. The Secretary of State has been talking with his counterparts. He spoke last weekend with German Foreign Minister Fischer about the matter. He's been -- he talked today with British Foreign Secretary Straw, and has been maintaining active communications with them.

So I think the first thing is to really draw people's attention to what the report says and to the situation that this brings us to. We've had six reports from the Director General about Iran's nuclear activity. We have long talked about that activity, have long viewed Iran's history of activity as non-compliance with its obligations, with its own commitments. That was the situation we were in starting last year when these reports started coming out.

Now, over the past year, Iran made commitments that it would suspend its programs and otherwise rectify its behavior. What this report, the sixth report now says, is that since the last report in June, Iran has notified the International Atomic Energy Agency that it's going to commence conversion activity, that it's going to continue with its centrifuge program, and that it's not going to meet the commitments that it made to the Europeans, and that it's not going to meet the requirements that have been requested four different times by the International Atomic Energy Agency Board in requesting a suspension of all enrichment activity.

So in September, as we look at this question, we are at a situation where Iran has made very, very clear not only that it's not complying, but it doesn't intend to comply, and that's where we have a difference from previous Board meetings.

And so that's the situation we want to focus people's attention on. That's a circumstance that we think requires action, as I said, both legally and as a security matter from the Board in order to pass this on to the Security Council.

QUESTION: Are you hearing any support from the EU-3, particularly Straw, this morning?

MR. BOUCHER: I wouldn't want to characterize their views at this point. I'd say the discussion is going forward. We -- as I said, first thing is to focus attention on the report and the situation that we're in now, and as we prepare for the meeting to talk about the steps that we think can and should be taken. And as the Secretary said yesterday, we need to explore this more with people and find out if consensus can be brought together at this meeting to refer the matter to the Security Council.

QUESTION: Richard, do you think that this -- as you noted, there have been six reports, and this report doesn't seem to be all that much different in the sense that, while it does say that Iran hasn't met all of its commitments, it does say that there is some progress, which, in the past, states have used as an excuse to kind of kick the can down to the next meeting. Is there something specific about this report that you think you'll be able to use to build consensus? And if not, do you have a limit of how many reports you're going to let this --

MR. BOUCHER: I thought that's what I just tried to explain. Maybe I didn't do it very well. But there is a difference between June's situation and September's situation. In June, going back to last year, the Iranians were still promising suspension, were still promising to abide by their commitments and the requirements of the Board.

During the course of this report, and this is clear in the report itself, Iran informed the International Atomic Energy Agency that it was going to resume centrifuge activity, it was going to resume conversion activity.

There's 37 metric tons of yellowcake was going to be converted into uranium hexafluoride, which is the feedstock for gas centrifuge enrichment.

And so, at this point, in September, we come not only with Iran's failure to comply with its obligations and Iran's record of noncompliance over the years, but with the Iranians making clear to the Agency, as reported by the Agency, that they did not intend to comply with the suspension of this activity, or with their promises to suspend the activity.

QUESTION: If I could follow up, though. But on the issue of progress, I mean, as I said, some countries have used like a small bit of progress that's cited in this report as a reason to kind of give it one more chance at the next meeting. I mean, do you -- obviously, you don't have an unlimited amount of patience, and at what point do you say if the IAEA isn't going to take measures, you know, we have to do something unilaterally?

MR. BOUCHER: As I said, we think there is -- we think it's time for the Board to move this matter to the Security Council, to refer -- report the non-compliance to the Security Council. We think that's amply demonstrated by the facts of this report and the history that's demonstrated in the five previous reports. That's what we'll be working towards and we'll see if others agree and whether we can form a consensus around that point.

[...]

QUESTION: Richard, forgive my ignorance about this, but Iran -- is this correct that Iran is not treaty-bound to halt the centrifuge development?

MR. BOUCHER: Again --

QUESTION: That was something that they said that they would do to the Europeans, correct? Not something that is --

MR. BOUCHER: The suspension of enrichment activity was something that they promised to the Europeans and that was a requirement of the Board in four of its resolutions. So I don't know the answer on treaty and Additional Protocol requirements in this regard, but it was something that was --

QUESTION: Well, as correct that Iran is --

MR. BOUCHER: -- specified in Board resolutions and that Iran itself has promised.

QUESTION: Right. But those resolutions don't have the force of a Treaty, and they have not signed the Additional Protocol or ratified it, correct? Even though they said they --

QUESTION: They've signed, but not ratified.

MR. BOUCHER: They've signed but not ratified it (inaudible).

QUESTION: All right. But that does not mean that they're -- that means that they're not yet bound by it.

MR. BOUCHER: As I said, there is a long history of non-compliance with their treaty obligations. [...]

State Department

State Department noon briefing

by spokesman Richard Boucher – 7 September 2004

[...] QUESTION: Iran. Diplomats, some diplomats in Vienna are saying that Iran has agreed in principle to halt the production, testing and assembly of centrifuges. Are you aware of any -- is the U.S. Government aware of any such agreement in principle? And would you find it acceptable, given the Iranians have promised to do this, and by their own omission violated those promises in the recent past?

MR. BOUCHER: Well, it -- you don't have to look back too far to find Iranian officials saying that they were going to suspend production of centrifuge and use of centrifuges, and then to find them saying that no, they were going to go ahead anyway.

One might conclude that some of these cycles have to do with the imminence of IAEA Board meetings, that we hear that they're going to do this, that or the other before a Board meeting and then somewhat afterwards, not necessarily too long, we find out that they either did not or would not or will not do those things. So what it boils down to is what we've said before. There have been six reports by the Director General on Iran's nuclear program, clandestine program, spanned almost two decades. There have been persistent reports by the Director General of violations of Iran's nuclear pledges, its promises and commitments and its treaty obligations.

Iran has a legally binding treaty obligation under the Nonproliferation Treaty to accept safeguards and verification for its nuclear activities. What's needed now is concrete action by Iran to end its pursuit of

nuclear weapons capabilities, including its pursuit of a complete nuclear fuel cycle that would give Iran that capability.

We continue to work with other countries to find a diplomatic solution to Iran's defiance of the International Atomic Energy Agency and its pursuit of nuclear weapons. We believe Iran needs to comply with its promises and with the requirements put down by the Board of Governors. But that's happened. Those requirements have been put down many times and Iran has not complied, so we do believe that it's time to look at referring this matter to the UN Security Council, and that's what we're discussing with other governments as we head towards the meeting in September.

QUESTION: You're clearly very skeptical about the idea of their making such promises, but the first part of my question was: Are you aware of their having made such promises or agreed to do this?

MR. BOUCHER: I think we're aware of the public statements that they have made. I'm not aware of any particular promise or commitment, new commitment or promise that they've made in any firm way.

Nicholas.

QUESTION: Different subject?

QUESTION: One more.

MR. BOUCHER: One more.

QUESTION: I follow, Richard, on this Iran. During the upcoming UN General Assembly meeting, do you think Iran -- this issue will be brought up before the international community in whole that what Iran is doing really does affect the world peace and it should stop?

MR. BOUCHER: Well, if brought up to the community as a whole, I suppose that would include statements and speeches that various governments might make in their General Assembly statements. That's indeed possible. The matter before the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency is referral to the UN Security Council, not so much to the General Assembly at this stage. If they decide to do that in September, then it will hit the Security Council some time later.

QUESTION: But privately what Iranians are saying to you or to the U.S., are they saying anything other than publicly?

MR. BOUCHER: I'm not aware that we've had any direct contacts on this matter. They do have contacts with a lot of people at the International Atomic Energy Agency. And as we've seen, they're trying to explain away their behavior, but the behavior has been documented multiple times and can't be overcome by new promises since past promises were not kept.

QUESTION: And one more, finally. Do you think this is as serious as North Korea? Both are similar.

MR. BOUCHER: You can't really compare one situation to the other. We are dealing with both diplomatically. We are looking at how to do that and we've got different instruments in each case. There have been different sets of requirements and promises.

What's clear is that there are examples in the world today of countries that have given up nuclear capabilities and that have adopted international standards and that are all the better for it, and we would hope that any government would follow those models.

Yeah. Okay. Iran still? Yeah.

QUESTION: When you mention that it's coming up in UN or in New York, I mean, you mean that before that there is not any diplomatic contacts, diplomatic channels with Europeans or anything about this issue, or-

MR. BOUCHER: No, quite the contrary. It's not coming up in New York unless the Board of Governors decides to send it there, and that's what we're talking to people about and we are in contact with Europeans. The Secretary has talked to all the foreign ministers last week, the three European foreign ministers last week. We've kept in touch with the Russian Government. The Secretary has kept in touch with other international figures on the matter. And we are working this in Vienna and through other governments to try to see whether there can be an international consensus to refer to the United Nations at this time. [...]

State Department

State Department noon briefing

by spokesman Richard Boucher – 8 September 2004

[...] QUESTION: On Iran, they're in talks with the EU again to freeze part of their program. Is the U.S. willing to give the European negotiating method another chance without referral?

MR. BOUCHER: I've seen various reports. I think they've also had discussions with the International Atomic Energy Agency to some extent. I think that's what some of the reports said. I think overall, though, our view,

the one I expressed yesterday, remains. There is an effort underway by Iran to confuse the issue a week before the Board of Governors meeting.

We'll have to see if all this discussion leads to real, concrete steps of compliance. What Iran has not done is to suspend all enrichment-related activities, which the Board called for in four resolutions over the past year, and which Iran itself committed at one point to the Europeans to do.

There were six reports over the last 15 months that say that Iran has deliberately violated its Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards obligations over almost two decades, consistently failed to cooperate fully with the agency over the past 18 months, continued to defy the Board's requests and defiantly abandoned its past promises to the Europeans to suspend its troubling enrichment-related activities. I think the -- given that record, it's hard for the international community to have any confidence in Iran's promises. We believe the latest promises to suspend some enrichment-related activities are made only days before the next Board of Governors meeting and are intended merely to manipulate the discussion next week, delay any serious action by the Board, and buy Iran more time to perfect its uranium enrichment program.

What is needed now is not another pledge by Iran, but rather concrete action by Iran to end its pursuit of nuclear weapons capability, including its pursuit of a complete nuclear fuel cycle that would give Iran that capability. We are continuing to work closely with allies to find a diplomatic solution to Iran's defiance. We believe such a diplomatic solution must include reporting Iran's safeguards of it's -- Iran's noncompliance with its safeguards obligations to the UN Security Council.

QUESTION: Have you noticed any wavering of anybody who was perhaps coming towards your -- coming to your side this time?

MR. BOUCHER: I think I'll let other governments define their position. We continue to talk to other members of the Board, including the EU-3, and the need -- stressing the need to find Iran in noncompliance and to refer that to the Security Council.

QUESTION: Would you characterize your support?

MR. BOUCHER: It's not really in a position at this point to characterize support. We're still days away from the meeting. We'll have to talk about what there is to support, as we get closer.

QUESTION: (Inaudible.)

MR. BOUCHER: I'm not going to try to characterize it today. We're still in discussions with other parties. We'll see what kind of support our position gets. As the Secretary said from the beginning, we'll just have to see whether there is really a consensus in the Board to do this at this point. We think it's the right step and the necessary step, at this point.

QUESTION: Richard, despite your statement that you think it's hard for the international community to have any confidence in Iran's promises and you believe Iran is engaging in this effort to confuse the issue and to manipulate sentiment ahead of the Board, you are not, however, opposing the EU-3 conducting this effort to talk to them about it because you said -- you said, we'll have to see if this leads to concrete steps. So it's fine with you for them to continue pursuing this now (inaudible) skepticism?

MR. BOUCHER: I think we've always been skeptical about the promises that Iran has made, but we've never been opposed to people talking to Iran. The focus, we think, needs to remain, as it has been in the Board, on getting the Iranians to take real steps and concrete steps and not just collecting promises again.

QUESTION: Has the U.S. been talking to South Korea about its --

MR. BOUCHER: Still on Iran?

QUESTION: No, I wasn't on Iran. Sorry.

QUESTION: Just what kind of action would you like to see from the Security Council, sanctions or just warning, or --

MR. BOUCHER: I think that's another step down the road. We obviously have to think about that and look at that, in terms of the Board, the IAEA statutes, and how the Board of Governors needs to handle this at the Agency. We think the appropriate step now for the Board of Governors is to refer it to the UN. When we get to the UN, then we'll discuss with other members of the UN what the steps are that the Security Council might take. [...]

State Department

State Department noon briefing

by spokesman Richard Boucher – 10 September 2004

[...] QUESTION: There are only a couple of shopping days left before -- for comment, before the IAEA meeting in Vienna. Do you have anything, any update on your evaluation of the EU-3 position going into the talks?

MR. BOUCHER: We are in contact with the Europeans and talking to other delegations in Vienna. As you know, the Secretary has kept in touch, himself, by telephone with some of the European colleagues. I just talked to Under Secretary Bolton, who is in Geneva for a G-8 meeting. They have been discussing Iran and nuclear developments out there in the G-8 sessions, but also, he's had meetings and talked to other delegations who are out there.

I think what -- the way he described it to me is that we do share the objective of denying Iran a nuclear weapons capability, although we've had, at various moments, different tactical approaches, or some gaps in our tactical approaches. He feels his discussions out there have been productive, that we've made some progress in closing the gaps over how to proceed next, and that we'll continue to have those discussions as we near and undertake the session of the Board of Governors.

But he made very clear we are all very much of the mind that Iran cannot be allowed to develop nuclear weapons, that the International Atomic Energy Agency has a very important role to play in that regard, and that all our nations want to support the Board of Governors and its resolutions.

QUESTION: You said that you've made some progress in closing the gaps. Does that mean that the EU-3 or any of its members share your desire to report Iran at this meeting?

MR. BOUCHER: I'm not, at this point, able to really describe their position for them. We'll have to see as we approach the session, though, what kind of proposals are made in terms of resolutions and how we can work those to come up with a joint position.

QUESTION: But you did say that you had made some progress in closing the gaps. And without reference to the, specifically to the EU-3, is anybody coming closer to your position that it should be reported in September?

MR. BOUCHER: Again, we feel like we're making progress in our discussions. I am not able to characterize those in terms of accepted this, accepted that, accepted that, or the particular position about referring it to the United Nations. "We'll see" is the only answer you can give at this stage. There are discussions going on, and we remain in touch with many of the other members of the Board of Governors, in addition to the consultations that Under Secretary Bolton is having.

There is not a text yet and people know our position. We're talking to other delegations and this is going to have to start to come together in Vienna. And that's when we -- when the session starts and when we start discussing resolutions, that's when we'll find out whether we do have other people at that position.

QUESTION: Well, your position has not changed, correct?

MR. BOUCHER: Our position has not changed.

QUESTION: Well, then what is the basis -- if other people aren't coming closer to your position, then what is the basis for your statement that you're closing the gaps?

MR. BOUCHER: All I can tell you is that's the feeling that Under Secretary Bolton has after he's had his direct discussions with other nations. He's also done a press conference out there. I don't know if he went into more detail than this. [...]

State Department

Interview with Colin Powell on NBC's Weekend Today with Campbell Brown

10 September 2004

MS. BROWN: If I can begin on the issue of Iran and its nuclear ambitions, do you have any hope of getting this matter before the UN Security Council?

SECRETARY POWELL: I think eventually it has to go to the UN, as long as Iran keeps behaving the way it has been behaving. The international community has expectations of Iran. We don't want to see Iran become another nuclear power. We have enough. We're trying to get rid of nuclear weapons. And so, Iran has made a promises to the IAEA, it has obligations, and it also has made promises to the European Union through their three foreign ministers.

And we believe that if they have not satisfied our concerns, the matter should be referred by the IAEA to the Security Council. There is an IAEA meeting next week, where it will be brought up. We have seen some movement in the discussions that we've had with our European colleagues that would suggest everybody is now taking this perhaps a little more seriously. [...]

Press Conference by John Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations

G8 Seniro Group Meeting - Geneva, Switzerland – 10 September 2004

[...] We also discussed today regional questions, regional nonproliferation issues, including Iran and North Korea and others. I thought that was a very productive meeting. I had a chance to have bilateral consultations with a number of other countries, particularly on the subject of Iran, and the upcoming IAEA Board of Governors meeting. The objective that the United States has been pursuing has been to insure that Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapons capability, and that is an objective shared by all of the G-8 countries as reflected in the G-8 leaders' statement issued at Sea Island. So there is no disagreement on our broad objective, no disagreement.

What we have tried to do here today, and yesterday in particular, was to close the tactical gap that has existed between the United States and what we called the EU-3: Britain, France, and Germany. I think that I can say that we made progress in that regard here in Geneva. We have not completely closed the tactical gap, but I think discussions will continue over the weekend and then into next week and we will see what we are able to do.

The overall objective of insuring that Iran does not acquire nuclear weapons capabilities is not at issue. All of us are agreed on that. So we are pleased that we have made the progress we did in closing the tactical gap and we look forward, hopefully, to making some more.

[...]

QUESTION: If you could just say where these discussions are going to continue over the weekend, whether it is here or it is in Vienna? Could you give any more details on exactly how this gap has been narrowed, what specifically...

UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: I think the discussions will be in cyber space and over the telephone in a variety of different locations. I don't really want to get into the specifics because the questions of closing the tactical gap I think are best addressed in private consultations, but that is clearly our objective. I think the EU-3 and others share that objective. We have a ways to go, I don't want to overstate this, I don't want to create any misimpressions. We are not finished yet but I do think that we have made some progress the past couple of days.

[...]

QUESTION: You said you did not want to go into too many details about the outstanding gap, but could you just say what is the outstanding issue, please?

UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: I think that the position of the United States for quite sometime during the last five meetings of the Boards of Governors of the IAEA, five meetings, and now going into the sixth meeting, has been that the clandestine Iranian nuclear weapons program poses a threat to international peace and security, and that threat crosses the jurisdiction of the Security Council which should take the matter up.

The EU-3 and others have been pursuing a different route. I think the Iranians in the past six or so weeks have demonstrated that they do not intend to carry through with the premise of the EU-3 deal. The EU-3 are still working that issue. That has been the tactical difference between us. How we handle the Iranian program with respect to the Security Council. Our view, and I think it is the view of the EU-3 as well, is that if we can close the tactical gap we can increase the likelihood that we can achieve our overall objective which is to preclude the Iranians from achieving nuclear weapon status. That is really what we want to focus on and that is what we have been discussing here the past couple of days.

QUESTION: Is it going to be possible to have the Board of Governors' vote next week that Iran is in violation of the NPT? Is that still reasonable?

UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: Well, the dynamic in the Board has demonstrated in the past five meetings a very strongly negative attitude on Iran's nuclear weapons program, finding repeated instances of lack of Iranian cooperation, of obstructing IAEA inspectors, not disclosing important aspects, changing their story from month to month, and I think that there are clearly extensive questions about the Iranian program that remain unanswered. As I say, it has been our consistent view throughout this process that we should have the Iranian program referred to the Security Council. But the IAEA Board is a political process, we will see what happens next week.

There is a difference, I think between our stating what our position is and what has been achievable in the IAEA Board. That is one reason among many why we are working as hard as we are and that the EU-3 are

working as hard as they are to close the tactical gap and why we are pleased with the progress we have made here the past couple days.

QUESTION: I'd like to ask you if the Board does not come out with some kind of an agreement that the United States agrees with, if Iran still refuses to have inspections, would you push for sanctions at the Security Council, and what form are these sanctions likely to take?

UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: Let me just say that the issue of what the Security Council does or might do when the question of the Iranian nuclear weapons program comes before it is one that we have considered very carefully, and consulted with a number of governments about. It is not the case that bringing Iran to the Security Council automatically results in the imposition of sanctions. If it were in fact that easy, we would in very different circumstances. What we are saying is that Iran program, amounting as it does to a threat to international peace and security, is of sufficient gravity that we want to put the Iranian program at center stage, in the world spot light, in the forum of the Security Council, the principal political body of the United Nations, the body of the United Nations charged with dealing with threat to international peace and security. We think, just politically, the international dynamic would change dramatically if Iran were in center stage in New York.

The question of what happens after that is largely in Iran's hands. If they were to truly give up the pursuit of nuclear weapons, there is a way to deal with that, and I think we demonstrated that in the case of Libya, but the first step is to get this into the Security Council where the Iranians are going to have to explain to the whole world what exactly it is they are up to.

[...]

QUESTION: Those countries who disagree with bringing the Iranian issue to the Security Council say that it will only make the program go further underground and less accessible. What is your opinion on that? And are there any channels of communications open between Washington and Tehran on this?

UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: Well, we have communications with Iran on a number of issues -- Afghanistan, events in Iraq -- not through me personally but through other mechanisms, and those are entirely appropriate, as we have had communication in the case of humanitarian disasters and so on. The issue of what Iran's reaction would be to having their nuclear weapons program placed on the agenda of the Security Council I think is something that of course we are interested in, but if the reaction were as you suggest, I think that would be strongly corroborative of the weapons-oriented nature of the program and contrary to their public assertions that it is simply for civil nuclear power. If they have nothing to hide, it is very easy to demonstrate. That has not been the pattern of behavior they've followed.

[...]

QUESTION: Two questions. First, don't you think there is a double standard when you deal with Iran and you deal with Israel, first of all?

UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: No

[...]

QUESTION: Second, if the United States doesn't get support, you said you still have a ways to go with this move to put Iran in front of the Security Council. What do you see U.S. action would be?

UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: Well, I try to take it one BOG meeting at a time - Board of Governors, we call it the BOG. I take it one BOG meeting at a time. This is our sixth BOG meeting. We think the proper outcome is to go to the Security Council. We are going to keep our persuasive arguments running and we will see what happens. When we come to the end of this BOG, then we'll evaluate and decide where to go from there.

[...]

QUESTION: On your trip to Israel, Prime Minister Sharon gave a rather strong interview to the Jerusalem Post this week which recalled the 1981 attack, at least in the minds of commentators, on Iraq. Is this going to be involved in the possible Israeli reaction to Iranian developments, is that going to be part of your talks in Israel?

UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: Well, I don't know what Prime Minister Sharon said. I think the focus of the talks is going to be on the upcoming IAEA board meeting and I'll just leave it at that.

QUESTION: Sir, could you explain to me why it isn't a double standard, Iran and Israel? I can't get the real logic.

UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: Sure. Iran provides support for terrorists. It has been on the United States' list of state sponsors of terrorism for any number of years. It is conducting a nuclear weapons development program in violation of its obligations under the Nonproliferation Treaty, and it is conducting a very extensive program to increase the range and accuracy of its ballistic missiles, and has demonstrated, we think, that it is a threat to international peace and security. And I think the case of Iran is very different from

the case of Israel. It is discrimination when you treat two like things in a dissimilar fashion. And it is also discrimination when you treat two unlike things in the same fashion. [...]

IAEA

Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors

by IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei – Vienna, 13 September 2004

[...] *Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran*

You have before you a detailed progress report on the Agency's verification work in Iran. The report deals with two interrelated but distinct sets of issues — the first related to the Agency's verification of Iran's compliance with its legal obligations under its NPT safeguards agreement, and the second related to the Agency's monitoring of Iran's voluntary undertakings to suspend enrichment related and reprocessing activities, as confidence building measures requested by the Board.

Regarding the first set of issues, as you can see from the report, the Agency is making steady progress in understanding the nature and extent of Iran's nuclear programme, and no additional undeclared activities on the part of Iran have come to light during this period. Iran has continued to act as if its additional protocol were in force. The Agency has gained access to requested locations. Iran has also provided new information in response to Agency requests, although in certain instances the process needs to be accelerated. While in some cases information has been provided promptly, in other cases information has regrettably been provided so late that it has not been possible to include an assessment of it in this report.

I am pleased to note that as a result of the Agency's investigations, some previously outstanding issues — namely Iran's declared laser enrichment activities and Iran's declared uranium conversion experiments — have reached the point where any further follow-up needed will be carried out as part of routine safeguards implementation.

As I mentioned in my report to the June Board, two issues remain central to understanding the extent and nature of Iran's nuclear programme.

Regarding the origin of uranium contamination found at various locations in Iran, as mentioned in the report, I should note that some progress has been made — in part due to the cooperation provided by other States — towards ascertaining the source of the high enriched uranium (HEU) found at the Kalaye Electric Company and Natanz. From the Agency's analysis to date, it appears plausible that this HEU contamination may not have resulted from enrichment of uranium by Iran at these locations. However, we are continuing to pursue the identification of sources and reasons for such contamination, as well as the source of the low enriched uranium (LEU) contamination found in various locations in Iran, including on domestically manufactured components.

The Agency has also gained a better understanding of Iran's efforts to import, manufacture and use centrifuges of both the P-1 and P-2 design; however, further investigation is needed, inter alia, to confirm Iran's statements regarding the absence of P-2 centrifuge related activities in Iran between 1995 and 2002. This will require additional information on the part of Iran, and further cooperation by other States, as well as by companies and individuals that were involved in the illicit procurement network.

With regard to confidence building measures that the Board requested be in place until certain conditions are met, as you are aware, Iran in June reversed some of its earlier decisions regarding the suspension of some enrichment related activities. I have continued to stress to Iran that, during this delicate phase while work is still in progress to verify its past nuclear programme, and in light of serious international concerns surrounding that programme, it should do its utmost to build the required confidence through the Agency.

I would urge Iran therefore to continue to accelerate its cooperation, pursuing a policy of maximum transparency and confidence building, so that we can bring the remaining outstanding issues to resolution within the next few months and provide assurance to the international community. This is clearly in the interest of both Iran and the international community and should trigger a broad dialogue on many of the underlying issues. I would also urge those States from which components or materials may have originated to continue their cooperation with the Agency. I should note that their cooperation is indispensable to the Agency's ability to bring some of the important outstanding issues to closure.

On a related note, I should mention that the Agency has been making progress in investigating the illicit procurement network responsible for supplying nuclear material and equipment, and in verifying some of the statements made by Iran and Libya in connection with this network. I will provide more information to the Board about the results of this investigation upon its completion. [...]

Transcript of the Director General's Press Statement on IAEA Inspection in Iran, Libya & the Republic of Korea

IAEA Headquarters, Vienna – 13 September 2004

[...] Q: Dr. ElBaradei, do you think that November should be the end of the process for Iran?

A: Well, I never set any deadline. It depends on co-operation. It depends on the kind of co-operation we get from Iran, the kind of co-operation we get from other Member States, which is also indispensable to our ability to understand some of the issues. So, it is an open process and we finish when I believe that we are finished.

[...]

With regard to Iran, again as I mentioned to the Board, I made a clear distinction between two types of responsibilities. We assume one is ensuring compliance by Iran of its legal obligation under the Safeguards agreement and the Additional Protocol, and there I am pleased to note, that we are making steady progress in understanding the nature and extent of Iran's nuclear programme. Some of the issues like laser, like conversion, we have again reached a point when additional work would be conducted as part of our routine, verification activities.

With regard to the central issue of enrichment in Iran, again we are making some progress particularly with regard to the contamination. As you saw, I reported, it is plausible, according to our analysis that enrichment did not take place at Kalaye or at Natanz, however we still need to do much more work with regard to the contamination, to make sure that there is no undeclared enrichment in Iran, or undeclared nuclear material there. With regard to the advanced centrifuges, again we are making progress but we still need further information to make sure, to confirm or validate Iran's statement that nothing has happened in the period between 1995 to 2002. The other set of issues that we are dealing with is the confidence building measures that have been requested by the Board for Iran to suspend enrichment related and reprocessing activities until assurances have been provided by me to the Board and until the Additional Protocol has been fully applied. There again, I reported that while we can assure the Board that there is no enrichment per-se, Iran has reversed some of its earlier decision with regard to testing or producing some enrichment components. I clearly, calling on Iran, as well as many Board Members that at this delicate phase, while we are still verifying Iran's past programme, it is in the interest of Iran to do its utmost to continue to pursue a policy of full transparency and to show full co-operation, full and active co-operation, for us to be able to resolve the remaining issues in the next few months and provide the required assurances to the international community. To me this should be a precursor, or a trigger for a broader dialogue on many of the underlying issues that are under discussion between Iran and the Europeans, in particular, and the international community in general. So, that's where we are on some of the issues that we are facing this week. There is obviously a lot of discussion among Board Members on resolutions to respond to my report, but these discussions are at quite an early stage.

Q: Has Iran indicated to you today that they have again partially suspended centrifuge assembly and construction?

A: I have been in discussion, as I have mentioned, with Iran, the European 3, the United Kingdom, Germany and France, and I have also been in discussion with Iran, urging them to go back into full suspension, the discussion is still ongoing. I still hope that within this week, maybe some positive results can come out of these discussions. That's obviously part of the discussion Iran is conducting with the three Europeans as part of their discussion with regard to the content of the resolution, which is being discussed. However, in my view, and I made that very clear to Iran, they have everything to benefit by showing full transparency, to try to establish as much confidence as possible at this delicate stage, I think this would be, as I said, could be the beginning of a broader dialogue which would allow a political settlement of this issue.

Q: Why is the IAEA conducting verification activities in Iran and not Israel?

A: It's a question I have answered so many times – the Agency has a clear cut jurisdiction, a mandate. Our mandate is to verify nuclear programmes of countries that are party to the NPT. Iran is a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as well as another 184 non-nuclear weapons states. Some other countries like Israel, India, Pakistan as well as the five weapons states, are not party to, are not subject to our verification. India, Pakistan and Israel are not party to the NPT and while I would like, in the future, to see everyone subject to comprehensive verification, right now, the Agency have no jurisdiction or mandate to do such verification. So it is not a question of double standards, it is a question of mandate and jurisdiction that is entrusted by the international community to the Agency.

[...]

Q: (Inaudible)

A: Well it is delicate because the international community, as I mentioned in my report, is clearly concerned about the nature of the Iranian programme and we'd like to clarify any doubts surrounding that programme as early as possible. The programme has also a history of being undeclared for many years so it was difficult for us to reconstruct that programme and it is also part of the problem that there are international concerns about that programme, so it is a delicate stage because we are making progress, but we would like bring our investigation to a closure and yes, I still am of the view that should I get full co-operation, not only by Iran but, I have said, there is an increasing co-operation on the part of Iran, but I'd like to see co-operation also by countries that provided equipment, that provided components. This is crucial to our understanding of some of the issues, like contamination, for example. On the assumption that everybody will give us a hand, I would like to see some of these issues clarified by the end of the year.

Q: (Inaudible)

A: Our role is to present the facts to the Board of Governors. I have presented the report, which I think is very clear, in terms of where we are today, what we have done with regard to Iran's compliance with its safeguards' obligations, what we have done in terms of monitoring confidence building measures, requested by the Board. What is going to be the Board's reaction, is something, clearly for the Board and it is not for me to express views on. [...]

State Department

Powell Says Iran Apparently Moving Forward with Nuclear Program

Says U.S. is urging U.N. Security Council to address Iranian nuclear issue
13 September 2004

Secretary of State Colin Powell says Iran appears to be moving forward with its nuclear program, which could lead to the development of nuclear weapons.

"[I]t is for that reason that we have been applying pressure to the international community through the IAEA to refer this matter to the United Nations Security Council," Powell said at a stakeout after a television appearance on Fox News Sunday September 12.

Following is an excerpt from Powell's comments at the stakeout:

'QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, on Iran. Are you willing to set a deadline for Iran to comply regarding its nuclear weapons program or nuclear programs? And, if so, would this be ahead of the IAEA meeting in November?

SECRETARY POWELL: There is an IAEA meeting that begins tomorrow, and we are in consultations with our friends in the European Union and with other members of the IAEA Board of Governors to see what actions should be taken. We believe that Iran should meet its obligations to the IAEA and the commitments it made to the European foreign ministers who have been in negotiations with Iran.

I hope that Iran will act in a responsible way. But our information suggests that Iran is moving forward with a nuclear program that could lead to the development of nuclear weapons, and it is for that reason that we have been applying pressure to the international community through the IAEA to refer this matter to the United Nations Security Council. And this will be a subject of discussion at the IAEA meeting beginning next week, this coming week, and of course, there is another IAEA meeting in November. We'll just have to see how all these meetings turn out.'

State Department

State Department noon briefing

by spokesman Richard Boucher – 14 September 2004

[...] QUESTION: Okay. Pakistan has approved a nuclear arms control bill following the Khan work, or scandal between North Korea and Iran. Meanwhile, Mr. ElBaradei wants to -- says that his report won't be done until November -- the report on Iran, and you're looking to have that done before November. Why the problems with that?

MR. BOUCHER: Okay. We're sort of out of sequence. I owe some people Syria questions and some people North Korea questions. Now we're getting to Iran.

QUESTION: Okay, sorry.

MR. BOUCHER: First of all, the Director General has reported to the International Atomic Energy Agency Board a number of times on Iran's activities. It's very clear from those activities and from what Iran, itself, has said that Iran is not living up to commitments that it made to the world, to the European nations, and specifically in writing and various times and is not living up to the requirements of the International Atomic Energy Agency Board when they asked for a complete suspension of activity.

And Iran even promised a suspension, but it was not carried out. So at this point it is clear that not only did Iran have a covert nuclear program for almost two decades, but even their more recent promises that they'd made to reassure the international community have not been carried out. So they've violated their obligations and their commitments.

That has been the substance of the reports that we've gotten from the Director General, repeatedly. I'm sure he will continue to report information as he finds it and as he sees it. But that's why we think at this point we have come to -- it's time to move the matter forward to the Security Council, and that's what we're discussing with others in Vienna.

There's resolutions that have been drafted that people are discussing in Vienna. We're working on that. We do think it is important to focus on this matter in Vienna and to have a resolution that makes clear how seriously the international community takes these matters. [...]

UK Lords Hansard

Iran

Column 1177-1180 - 15 September 2004

Lord Corbett of Castle Vale: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question standing in my name on the Order Paper. In doing so, I remind your Lordships that I am the chairman of the British Committee for Iran Freedom.

The Question was as follows:

To ask Her Majesty's Government whether the government of Iran are complying with their undertaking of October 2003 to suspend all nuclear activities until an inspection has been completed by the United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency.

The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean): My Lords, Her Majesty's Government are very concerned at the resumption of uranium enrichment activities by Iran, which are a contravention of our understanding of the undertaking given in October 2003 to suspend all enrichment and reprocessing activities.

Lord Corbett of Castle Vale: My Lords, I thank my noble friend for that response. Will she acknowledge that attempts at a constructive dialogue by my right honourable friend and others with the mullahs has led only to lies, deception and broken promises about the existence of the nuclear research and its real purpose? The regime's ability to enrich uranium means that Iran has the ability to make nuclear weapons. Will the Government support moves to refer Iran's non-compliance with its nuclear obligations to the UN Security Council, so that it can consider imposing sanctions on a regime which wants to add nuclear weapons to its menacing brand of religious fundamentalism?

Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean: My Lords, I cannot agree that the policy of constructive dialogue has resulted only in what my noble friend describes as lies. It has exposed what is happening in Iran in terms of enrichment and processing activities. We all want to see an end to those activities. As my noble friend will know, this is a matter which is, as we speak, under active discussion in Vienna by the IAEA. I suggest to my noble friend that it is right for us to go through these discussions in Vienna and see what comes out of them before we take a decision about the appropriate moment, should such a moment arise, to refer the matter to the United Nations.

Lord Howell of Guildford: My Lords, while it appears, regrettably, that the agreement with the European Union three last year has now been repudiated by the Iranian Government, does the Minister nevertheless agree that with Dr El Baradei of the IAEA that it would be a mistake to rush into a deadline now on halting enriched uranium procedures? Does she also agree that we should be cautious about pushing ahead with sanctions for the very reasons that my noble friend Lord Lawson gave a few minutes ago in a different context?

Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean: My Lords, we need to be clear that the Iranians have not repudiated the agreement. We are very concerned that they are not living up to the agreement, but I would not wish in any way to encourage a repudiation of an agreement by letting that point go. However, I agree strongly with the noble Lord that we cannot be in the business of setting artificial deadlines. At the same time, although Dr El Baradei has said that, he has also said:

"It is essential for the integrity and credibility of the inspection process that we are able to bring these issues to a close within the next few months".

So while agreeing that it is right not to have a deadline which might be set for other, artificial reasons, we must also be very clear that this cannot be an open-ended process.

Lord Phillips of Sudbury: My Lords, I agree with what the Minister has said so far, but does she agree with what Dr Hans Blix, the erstwhile UN inspector in Iraq, said in this palace last week? He said that the best way forward in dealing with the Iran issue, if I can call it that, was to get the international community, especially the United States, to press for a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Middle East that would, of course, embrace Israel's nuclear weaponry.

Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean: My Lords, it is indeed the policy of the United Kingdom Government to press for a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Middle East. However, I remind the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, that the Iranians are signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, whereas the Israelis are not. The Iranians have also given undertakings that they will sign the additional protocol allowing for inspections, but as yet they have not done so.

The fact is that the IAEA, which is the guardian of the NPT, under the chairmanship of Dr El Baradei, has raised questions that the Iranians have not yet answered satisfactorily. We need to go through that process. There are, in addition, the additional undertakings that were made to the three European countries in October last year.

Lord Temple-Morris: My Lords—

Lord Hannay of Chiswick: My Lords—

Noble Lords: Cross Bench.

Lord Davies of Oldham: My Lords, it is the turn of the Cross Benches.

Lord Hannay of Chiswick: My Lords, does the Minister agree that if we are to give consideration—we may be forced to—to using more sticks to persuade the Iranians to comply with their obligations, we also need to focus on carrots? It really is important to try to get into a dialogue on the widest possible basis, including the United States, to address some of their security concerns. Can the noble Baroness say anything about the proposals which the press report the Iranian Government to have made about those wider issues? Does she agree that it is a little odd that the United States seem to talk to the North Koreans, but when they are asked to talk to the Iranians, they describe it as rewarding bad behaviour?

Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean: My Lords, it certainly is no secret that United States policy as regards engagement with Iran is different from United Kingdom policy. We have a relationship with Iran; we have a diplomatic relationship. My right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary has visited Iran five times in the past three years, and I regularly receive Iranian visitors. There are undoubtedly security concerns regarding Iran which have to be addressed, and I agree with the noble Lord's point about carrots as well as sticks. The fact is, opportunities are open to Iran, such as a trade and co-operation agreement, if it is able to satisfy us all—not only those in the IAEA, but those in the European Union—about the NPT and that it is fulfilling the undertakings that were made to ourselves, the French and the Germans only in October last year.

Lord Temple-Morris: My Lords, does the Minister agree that these are very important matters, potentially and actually? There are two important ingredients: one of them is speed, and the other is unity. As to speed, will the Government do their utmost to ensure that, if Iran does not comply, the November deadline for reference to the United Nations is adhered to? As to unity, does the Minister agree that it is vital that Iran clearly realises, and that it is made very clear to it, that it cannot divide the European three, one from the other? In this instance, it is most important that those three are not divided from the United States.

Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean: Yes, my Lords, I agree with much of that, and I thank my noble friend for the work that he undertakes in trying to create better understanding between us and the Iranian people. However, I shall add a cautionary word to what my noble friend said.

In talking about November as a deadline, we should not create the kind of artificial deadlines that the noble Lord, Lord Howell of Guildford, mentioned. There is a great deal of pressure in the international community to move the issue out of the IAEA and into the Security Council. There are those who wish to take longer in discussions in order to ensure that we have exhausted all possibilities before taking what would be a very important step in terms of profile and international relations. It is not always a question of going forward in a

progressive way, if, at any point, the Iranians then decide to repudiate, for example, the NPT. Then we would be in a very difficult position. International negotiation is a delicate business, as your Lordships will know. Even as we speak, discussions are under way in Vienna, and I am sure that we all wish them success.

Lord Wallace of Saltaire: My Lords, does the Minister agree with the statement in today's International Herald Tribune that,

"the United States, Israel and Iran all have an interest"—

in terms of domestic politics—

"in pushing the situation toward a showdown"?

Would the Minister also accept that a deadline of 31 October might have a complex relationship with the US presidential election? Given that the British Government want to encourage domestic politics to develop in a more progressive direction in Iran, how do we manage this immensely difficult issue in which our major allies are pushing us to take a harder line than we wish?

Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean: My Lords, we manage that by doing what we believe to be right. It is always interesting when the noble Lord has been going through his newspapers in the way that he does, but the judgment that he quoted is superficial. I understand where it comes from, because it can always be argued that it is better to be in contention in order to justify one's own position and that there is no better time than when interesting prospect of elections lies ahead. However, those who are serious judges of what is happening would come to the conclusion that it is in nobody's interests to have a showdown over this issue, which is immensely serious.

Iran is in focus at the moment, but we know of a number of other countries that are not going through an IAEA process because they have not signed up for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. We do not wish to demonstrate to those other countries that signing up to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has some serious downsides, if we can avoid doing that. So a great deal of delicacy is needed in approaching what is going on. We are going to have a serious problem if we do not resolve these issues in the way to which we have set our hand. I commend to your Lordships the entirely sensible way in which my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary has decided to approach the issue.

Tweede Kamer

Algemeen Overleg Vaste Kamercommissies voor Europese Zaken en voor Buitenlandse Zaken

21501-20 – nr. 257 - 16 juni 2004 – verslag vastgesteld 29 juli 2004

[...]

De Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken: [...] Bij een stemming in de IAEA-Board of Governors heeft Nederland bepleit om Iran onder druk te blijven zetten om opheldering te geven over zijn nucleaire programma. Nederland is dus vóór een stevige resolutie. Doorverwijzing naar de Veiligheidsraad is op dit moment nog niet aan de orde, maar wordt niet uitgesloten. Eerst zal echter de voortgangsrapportage van het IAEA afgewacht worden. Overigens is de dialoog tussen de EU en Iran over de mensenrechten onlangs hervat. Er is een groot aantal individuele gevallen aan de orde gesteld, maar de Iraanse autoriteiten zijn niet erg geneigd om tegemoetkomingen te doen. De Europese Raad zal zich hier dan ook opnieuw over uitspreken. Desgevraagd zegt de minister dat de druk die de drie grote lidstaten op Iran hebben uitgeoefend, tot enige verbetering van de mensenrechtensituatie heeft geleid en dat de grote drie dat, indien nodig, opnieuw zullen doen.

[...]

Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Beantwoording van de heer Bot, minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, op vragen van het lid Wilders (VVD) over hernieuwde schending van afspraken door Iran over het stopzetten van haar nucleaire wapenprogramma (ingezonden 2 augustus 2004)

DVB/NN-343/03 – 16 augustus 2004

Vraag 1

Is het waar dat het Iraanse bewind zijn verboden nucleaire wapenprogramma sinds enkele weken heeft doorgezet en dat de bouw van haar uraniumverrijkingfaciliteit weer is begonnen? 1) Wat vindt u van de voortdurende onbetrouwbaarheid van Iran met betrekking tot haar wapenprogramma's?

Antwoord: Iran heeft op 22 juni jl. laten weten zich niet langer te zullen houden aan de afspraak met Frankrijk, het Verenigd Koninkrijk en Duitsland om zijn programma's gericht op de verrijking van uranium op te schorten. De Iraanse opstelling baart de regering zorg.

Vraag 2

Wat is tijdens de besprekingen tussen Iran, Frankrijk, het Verenigd Koninkrijk en Duitsland deze week de inzet van de Europese Unie? Zijn de besprekingen tussen Iran en het Verenigd Koninkrijk, Frankrijk en Duitsland eigenlijk besprekingen tussen de EU en Iran of tussen de drie genoemde Europese landen en Iran? 2) Wat is de rol van het Nederlands EU- voorzitterschap bij deze besprekingen?

Antwoord: De besprekingen met Iran worden gevoerd door het Verenigd Koninkrijk, Frankrijk en Duitsland, en zijn dus geen besprekingen tussen Iran en de EU, maar tussen Iran en deze drie landen. Er is daarom bij deze besprekingen geen sprake van de inzet van de Europese Unie als zodanig. Het Nederlandse EU-voorzitterschap heeft dan ook geen directe rol bij deze besprekingen. Op strikt vertrouwelijke basis heeft de regering wel kennis genomen van de inhoud van deze besprekingen. Dat neemt niet weg, dat Nederland zich, vanuit de positie van EU-voorzitter, ervoor zal inspannen, dat de EU als zodanig zijn zorg over de recente ontwikkelingen op krachtige wijze aan Teheran kenbaar zal maken.

Vraag 3

Bent u bereid om als EU-voorzitter het Verenigd Koninkrijk, Frankrijk en Duitsland te vragen om Iran via een veroordeling in de VN-veiligheidsraad tot stopzetting van haar wapenprogramma te dwingen? Bent u ermee eens dat de druk die het Internationaal Atoomenergie Agentschap op Iran uitoefent niet genoeg is en dat de tijd is gekomen om de zaak in de VN-veiligheidsraad ter tafel te brengen, het 'uiterste middel' dat u ook al eerder suggereerde? 3) Zo neen, waarom niet?

Antwoord: Het Verenigd Koninkrijk, Frankrijk en Duitsland bepalen niet gedrieëlijk of de VN-veiligheidsraad Iran veroordeelt en tot stopzetting van zijn nucleaire programma dwingt.

Een van de mogelijke procedures waarlangs het dossier Iran aan de VN-Veiligheidsraad kan worden voorgelegd is een besluit van de Board of Governors (BoG) van het Internationaal Atoomenergie Agentschap (IAEA) dat Iran in overtreding is van zijn waarborgovereenkomst. Tot dusverre werd een dergelijk besluit niet genomen. Wel werden drie resoluties aangenomen met kritiek op Iran, en een oproep aan dat land volledig mee te werken aan het IAEA-onderzoek naar het Iraanse nucleaire programma. Dat onderzoek loopt nog steeds en brengt nog steeds nieuwe feiten aan het licht. Eind augustus wordt een nieuwe interim-rapportage van IAEA Directeur-Generaal ElBaradei verwacht.

Tenzij DG ElBaradei in zijn komende rapport reeds zou concluderen dat Iran in overtreding is, geeft de regering er de voorkeur aan de verdere uitkomsten van het IAEA-onderzoek af te wachten. Door te vroeg de zaak aan de Veiligheidsraad door te geleiden zou een belangrijke methode van waarheidsvinding in gevaar kunnen worden gebracht, met mogelijk nadelige gevolgen voor de uiteindelijke besluitvorming door de Veiligheidsraad.

Noten: 1) "Iran dicht bij maken kernbom", Algemeen Dagblad, 28 juli jl.; 2) "Effort to Curb Iran's Nuclear Ambitions on Allies' Agenda" Washington Post 28 juli jl.; 3) Tweede Kamer, 21501-02 en 29213, nr. 561, pagina 14 en Algemeen Overleg non-proliferatie 1 juli 2004 (verslag nog niet gepubliceerd)

Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Antwoord van de heer Bot, minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, op vragen van het lid Wilders (VVD) over de vermeende relatie tussen Iran en Al Qaeda naar aanleiding van het Amerikaanse 9/11 rapport (ingezonden 26 juli 2004)

DPZ-364/04 – 17 augustus 2004

Vraag 1

Bent u bekend met de berichten "9/11 Panel Links Al Qaeda, Iran", "9/11 Commission Finds Ties Between al-Qaeda and Iran", "Iran was basis voor Al Qaeda", en "9/11'-commissie wijst richting Iran"? 1)

Antwoord: Ja.

Vraag 2

Hoe schat u de contacten tussen Iran en Al Qaeda in? Is er daadwerkelijk sprake van een samenwerking tussen de Iraanse inlichtingendiensten, Iraanse douane en het Al Qaeda netwerk? Is er ook sprake van een samenwerkingsverband tussen de door Iran gesteunde terroristische organisatie Hezbollah en Al Qaeda? Zo ja, deelt u de mening dat dit onaanvaardbaar is?

Antwoord: De regering heeft geen inzicht in de precieze banden tussen Al Qaida en Iran. Wel heeft Iran zelf herhaaldelijk aangegeven dat personen die verdacht worden banden te hebben met Al Qaida onder huisarrest worden gehouden. De regering heeft geen informatie over banden tussen Al Qaida en Hezbollah. Er bestaat overigens, zoals bekend, reeds lang zorgen over de opstelling van Iran in de strijd tegen het terrorisme. Dit is, naast proliferatie, mensenrechten en de opstelling in het Midden-Oosten vredesproces, één van de zorgpunten van de Europese Unie ten aanzien van Iran. De EU spreekt Iran hierop aan en heeft bepaald dat zij voor ontwikkeling van de relaties tussen EU en Iran, waaronder ook de onderhandelingen over een Handels- en Samenwerkingsakkoord, voortgang op deze vier zorgpunten verwacht.

Vraag 3

Wanneer zal het eerder door een Kamermeerderheid bepleite verbod op de politieke tak van de terroristische organisatie Hezbollah nu eindelijk verwezenlijkt worden, gelet op het feit dat u reeds in december 2003 aangaf dit te zullen onderzoeken? 2)

Antwoord: De regering heeft de Kamer toegezegd om de inlichtingendiensten een nader onderzoek in te laten stellen naar de relatie tussen de politieke en terroristische takken van Hezbollah. Zodra dit onderzoek gereed is, zal de regering de Kamer aangeven welke beleidsconsequenties zij aan de uitkomsten hiervan verbindt.

Vraag 4

Is het waar dat Iran een deel van het leiderschap van Al Qaeda herbergt, onder wie een van de zonen van Osama Bin Laden? Waarom heeft Iran deze individuen niet uitgeleverd aan de Verenigde Staten? Deelt u de mening dat, indien dit waar is, dit onacceptabel is?

Vraag 5

Bent u bereid, indien de in de vorige vragen gestelde informatie juist is, op korte termijn als voorzitter van de Europese Unie Iran op krachtige wijze op diplomatiek en politiek niveau deelgenoot te maken van het feit dat u de contacten tussen Iran en Al Qaeda onaanvaardbaar vindt? Welke consequenties moet een en ander naar uw mening hebben voor de relatie tussen Nederland, respectievelijk de Europese Unie, en Iran?

Antwoord: Zie antwoord op vraag 2.

Noten: 1 Washington Post 26 juni jl., Time 16 juli jl., Financieel Dagblad 20 juli jl., Trouw 21 juli jl.; 2 Aanhangsel Handelingen, vergaderjaar 2003–2004, pagina 2727.

Tweede Kamer

Algemeen Overleg van de Vaste Kamercommissies voor Buitenlandse Zaken en voor Economische Zaken van 1 juli 2004 over onder andere ontwikkeling van nucleaire wapens

29200V – nr. 100 – 1 juli 2004 - vastgesteld 31 augustus 2004

[...]

De Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken: [...] Recentelijk is door de raad van bestuur van de IAEA besloten om de druk op Iran te handhaven en aan te blijven dringen op verdere opheldering rond de nucleaire activiteiten. Iran heeft aangegeven dat het de activiteiten op het gebied van uraniumverrijking hervat, tot groot ongenoegen van de EU. De vraag is wanneer de zaak moet worden voorgelegd aan de VN-Veiligheidsraad en sancties aan de orde zijn. Het Nederlands standpunt is dat sancties instrumenten zijn die pas aan het einde van een traject moeten worden ingezet. Vooralsnog moeten andere instrumenten beproefd worden. In september zal de directeur-generaal van de IAEA opnieuw een rapport uitbrengen. Afhankelijk van de inhoud van dat rapport moet beoordeeld worden of Iran zijn verplichtingen niet nakomt en of de zaak aan de Veiligheidsraad moet worden voorgelegd. Tot die tijd moet de druk op Iran worden gehandhaafd en moeten de besprekingen over het handelsakkoord worden uitgesteld.

De minister geeft in reactie op vragen aan dat Iran niet in alle opzichten meewerkt met de IAEA. Naar verwachting zal de IAEA dan ook bevinden dat zaken verborgen worden houden. De Veiligheidsraad zal naar aanleiding daarvan gepaste maatregelen kunnen nemen. De samenwerking tussen de EU en de VS op dit punt is nauw geweest, maar de VS oriënteren zich de komende tijd op voor de presidentsverkiezingen en trekken wat terug van het toneel van het Midden-Oosten.

[...]

Tweede Kamer

Vragen van het lid Van Velzen (SP) aan de staatssecretaris van Economische Zaken over levering Nederlandse onderdelen ten behoeve van kernwapenindustrie

2030420930 - Ingezonden 9 september 2004

1. Klopt het dat in de afgelopen jaren aan Pakistan, India, China, Iran en/of Israël uitvoervergunningen voor dual use-goederen zijn afgegeven die in de nucleaire industrie gebruikt kunnen worden? Is er ook aan andere hier niet genoemde landen geleverd? Zo ja, welke?¹

2. Om welke goederen gaat het precies? Wanneer zijn die leveranties gedaan? Kunt u een volledig overzicht geven tot op de dag van vandaag?

3. In welke gevallen zijn er geen eindgebruikersverklaringen afgegeven? Waarom is dat gebeurd?

[...]

10. Klopt het dat Iran grafietelektroden in Nederland heeft aangeschaft? Klopt het dat geoordeeld werd dat deze elektroden te klein zijn voor atoomwapens, zoals een deskundige in Twee Vandaag het stelde?² En dat daarom wel een exportvergunning is verleend, maar geen eindgebruikersverklaring? Waarom is er dan wel een exportvergunning afgegeven?

11. Deelt u de mening dat de leveranties «geen relatie met militair gebruik» hebben?
12. Deelt u de mening dat dual use-goederen met nucleaire toepassingsmogelijkheden niet aan landen geleverd mogen worden die het non-proliferatieverdrag niet hebben getekend? Zo ja, op welke wijze gaat u dat regelen? Indien neen, kunt u dat toelichten?

Noten: 1 Uitzending Twee Vandaag, 7 september jl.; 2 Zie noot 1.

Tweede Kamer

Vragen van het lid Van der Laan (D66) aan de staatssecretaris van Economische Zaken over export van nucleaire materialen naar Israël en Iran

2030420950 - Ingezonden 9 september 2004

1. Bent u ervan op de hoogte dat bij export van nucleaire materialen naar Israël en Iran in sommige gevallen géén eindgebruikerverklaring is gevraagd, zoals blijkt uit een onderzoek van Twee Vandaag?¹
2. Deelt u de mening dat de eindgebruikerverklaring niet alleen verplicht, maar ook buitengewoon gewenst is nu het gaat om twee landen die geen VN-wapeninspecteurs toelaten en die de non-proliferatieverdragen niet hebben getekend? Zo ja, waarom worden juist deze landen dan vrijgesteld van de verplichting tot het verstrekken van eindgebruikerverklaringen?
3. Hoe wordt de export naar Israël en Iran gecontroleerd nu eindgebruikerverklaringen ontbreken? Vindt er fysieke controle plaats? Indien dit niet het geval is, hoe kunt u dan garanderen dat de geëxporteerde producten niet zullen worden verwerkt in nucleaire wapens?
4. Waarom wordt er, zoals blijkt uit het onderzoek van Twee Vandaag, vanuit het Ministerie van Economische Zaken géén informatie verstrekt over zowel gebruikers als leveranciers van de nucleaire producten in kwestie?
5. Deelt u de opvatting dat het voor Nederland van publiek belang is dat er inzicht is in de manier waarop voorkomen wordt dat nucleaire onderdelen worden gebruikt voor de vervaardiging van wapens? Indien de informatie om goede redenen vertrouwelijk moet blijven kunt u dan aangeven wat die redenen zijn en of u bereid bent de Tweede Kamer in vertrouwen te informeren?
6. Hoe kan het dat de Tweede Kamer geen toegang heeft tot de informatie waarover het onderzoek van Twee Vandaag wel kon beschikken?
7. Is de Nederlandse praktijk in overeenstemming met Europese afspraken? Welke stappen worden door het Nederlands voorzitterschap genomen om in Europees verband toe te zien op naleving van de non-proliferatieafspraken?

Toelichting:

Deze vragen dienen ter aanvulling op eerder vragen terzake van het lid Van Velzen (SP), eveneens ingezonden 9 september 2004, (vraagnummer 2030420930).

Noot: 1 Tv-uitzending Twee Vandaag, 7 september jl.

TIJDLIJN EN CITATEN

22 juli

Het rapport van de Amerikaanse onderzoekscommissie 9/11 Commission komt uit, met ondermeer stukken over de rol van Iran in de aanloop naar de aanslagen van 11 september 2001.

23 juli

National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice zegt in een interview: “Our intelligence shows no evidence of that the Iranians were complicit in the passage of the terrorists (September 11 hijackers) through Iranian territory. But we have said all along that we're concerned about Iran's ties to terrorism. We're working with the international community to deal with the fact that Iran is not living up to its international obligations on its nuclear program.” (US State Department, U.S. is safer but not yet safe, says Rice, 23 July 2004)

1 augustus

Iran meldt dat de bouw van uraniumverrijkingscentrifuges hervat is, maar dat er nog geen uranium verrijkt wordt en dat dit geen onderdeel is van plannen om kernwapens te produceren.

2 augustus

President Bush zegt in een briefing: “We're working with the IAEA to keep the pressure on Iran, and the Secretary is working very closely with the foreign ministers of France, Great Britain and Germany, who are taking it upon themselves to make it clear that the demands of Europe are also equal to -- the same as the demands of the United States, that we expect there to be full disclosure, full transparency of their nuclear weapons programs.” (White House, President Bush Discusses Additional Steps for Defending America and Countering Terrorism, 2 August 2004)

9 augustus

Fragment uit de dagelijkse briefing van het State Department:

“QUESTION: So you're saying that the U.S. policy will continue to be diplomacy and not force?

MR. ERELI: You know, obviously, we -- and as the National Security Advisor said, we'd never take -- are not going to take options off the table, but our focus is, and our approach is working with international partners to address this issue.” (State Department, State Department noon briefing, 9 August 2004)

17 augustus

Fragment uit de dagelijkse briefing van het State Department:

“MR. ERELI: [...] As you know, we've been saying for a long time that -- and I think we've been slowly building a growing consensus, that Iran is engaged in a clandestine nuclear weapons program, that this program is a matter of concern to the international community, as is Iran's repeated attempts at concealment and deception, and that we are working, I think, cooperatively with the IAEA and other members to try to, I guess, bring to light Iranian activities, try to bring Iran into compliance with commitments it has made, and failure to do -- and should we fail in doing that, then -- and Iran is -- and it's determined that Iran is in violation, then refer it to the Security Council.” (State Department, State Department noon briefing, 17 August 2004)

19 augustus

National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice zegt in een optreden voor het U.S. Institute of Peace: “On Iran, I think we've gotten very good cooperation with our European allies on Iran. Now, the problem, again, is Iran, because the European Three went to the Iranians and they thought that they had an arrangement where the Iranians were agreed to not reprocess and enrich. The Iranians have gone back on that deal. The Iranians have not been forthcoming with the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency]. We have a board meeting in September, and we will see what people want to do. But it is not for lack of consistency and lack of coherence in alliance policy -- these problems are that you have some very recalcitrant governments that have to come under even greater pressure to live up to their international obligations. But we and the Europeans have been very much united on both these fronts.” (State Department, Remarks by National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice followed by question and answer to the U.S. Institute of Peace, 19 August 2004)

30 augustus

Fragment uit de dagelijkse briefing van het State Department:

MR. BOUCHER: “Well, as we have said, as I just said, as Mr. Bolton has said, as the Secretary has said, the Board of Governors, if it decides that Iran is not complying or that there's not any further action that can be pursued, will need to refer this matter to the United Nations. We'll be talking with other governments about when the appropriate time is for that.” (State Department, State Department noon briefing, 30 August 2004)

1 september

Secretary of State Colin Powell zegt tijdens een persconferentie: “Our view is that it should have been referred to the Council long ago. It is still our position that it ought to be referred to the Council. We were of that view last November when we worked with our friends in the EU, who wanted a different approach ... wanted to take a different approach to the problem. They did and we supported that and we watched it. Now it is almost a year later, ten months later, and we still believe that the Iranians are not fessing up to everything. They still have a program that, in our judgment, is a nuclear program designed to develop, ultimately, a nuclear weapon. And unless there are assurances otherwise that the international community can count on, I think it is appropriate for it to be referred to the Security Council.

Now, that will be our position going in to the discussions on the 13th of September when the Board meets to take this issue up, as well as other issues before the IAEA. Whether there is a consensus to do that now remains to be seen. But we think we've seen enough. The world should have seen enough over the last year to come to the conclusion that it is time for it to be referred to the Security Council. But, there are a lot of discussions that will have to take place. I'll start tomorrow with the EU-3 and other members of the IAEA to get a sense of what the international consensus is. There are a number of countries, I think, that would say, "No, let's not do it yet. Let's take another look at it in November." We think there is enough now to do it, but I obviously have to hear what others have to say. But, this should have been referred before.” (State Department, Remarks to the press by Secretary of State Colin L. Powell en route to Washington, 1 September 2004)

7 september

Fragment uit de dagelijkse briefing van het State Department:

MR. BOUCHER: “We continue to work with other countries to find a diplomatic solution to Iran's defiance of the International Atomic Energy Agency and its pursuit of nuclear weapons. We believe Iran needs to comply with its promises and with the requirements put down by the Board of Governors. But that's happened. Those requirements have been put down many times and Iran has not complied, so we do believe that it's time to look at referring this matter to the UN Security Council, and that's what we're discussing with other governments as we head towards the meeting in September.” (State Department, State Department noon briefing, 7 September 2004)

8 september

Premier Sharon van Israël zegt er niet aan te twijfelen dat Iran kernwapens ontwikkelt: “That is their intention, and they are doing it by deception and subterfuge, using this cover or that. This is completely clear. [...] I don't see that [international pressure] against them is enough to stop them from obtaining nuclear weapons. And that is a very big danger.” Hij voegt toe dat Israël is "taking measures to defend itself". (Guardian, UK sets Iran deadline to end nuclear bomb work, 9 September 2004)

10 september

Secretary of State Colin Powell zegt in een interview: “I think eventually it has to go to the UN, as long as Iran keeps behaving the way it has been behaving. The international community has expectations of Iran. We don't want to see Iran become another nuclear power. We have enough. We're trying to get rid of nuclear weapons. And so, Iran has made a promises to the IAEA, it has obligations, and it also has made promises to the European Union through their three foreign ministers.

And we believe that if they have not satisfied our concerns, the matter should be referred by the IAEA to the Security Council. There is an IAEA meeting next week, where it will be brought up. We have seen some movement in the discussions that we've had with our European colleagues that would suggest everybody is now taking this perhaps a little more seriously.” (State Department, Interview with Colin Powell on NBC's Weekend Today with Campbell Brown, 10 September 2004)

Under Secretary of State John Bolton zegt tijdens een persbriefing bij de G8-bijeenkomst in Geneve: “I think that the position of the United States for quite sometime during the last five meetings of the Boards of

Governors of the IAEA, five meetings, and now going into the sixth meeting, has been that the clandestine Iranian nuclear weapons program poses a threat to international peace and security, and that threat crosses the jurisdiction of the Security Council which should take the matter up.

The EU-3 and others have been pursuing a different route. I think the Iranians in the past six or so weeks have demonstrated that they do not intend to carry through with the premise of the EU-3 deal. The EU-3 are still working that issue. That has been the tactical difference between us. How we handle the Iranian program with respect to the Security Council. Our view, and I think it is the view of the EU-3 as well, is that if we can close the tactical gap we can increase the likelihood that we can achieve our overall objective which is to preclude the Iranians from achieving nuclear weapon status. That is really what we want to focus on and that is what we have been discussing here the past couple of days.” (State Department, Press Conference by John Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, 10 September 2004)

12 september

Secretary of State Colin Powell zegt na een televisie-interview: “I hope that Iran will act in a responsible way. But our information suggests that Iran is moving forward with a nuclear program that could lead to the development of nuclear weapons, and it is for that reason that we have been applying pressure to the international community through the IAEA to refer this matter to the United Nations Security Council. And this will be a subject of discussion at the IAEA meeting beginning next week, this coming week, and of course, there is another IAEA meeting in November. We'll just have to see how all these meetings turn out.” (State Department, Powell Says Iran Apparently Moving Forward with Nuclear Program, 13 September 2004)

13 september

Director-General Mohammed ElBaradei van de IAEA zegt bij de start van de Board of Governors-bijeenkomst tijdens een persconferentie: “With regard to Iran, again as I mentioned to the Board, I made a clear distinction between two types of responsibilities. We assume one is ensuring compliance by Iran of its legal obligation under the Safeguards agreement and the Additional Protocol, and there I am pleased to note, that we are making steady progress in understanding the nature and extent of Iran’s nuclear programme. Some of the issues like laser, like conversion, we have again reached a point when additional work would be conducted as part of our routine, verification activities.

With regard to the central issue of enrichment in Iran, again we are making some progress particularly with regard to the contamination. As you saw, I reported, it is plausible, according to our analysis that enrichment did not take place at Kalaye or at Natanz, however we still need to do much more work with regard to the contamination, to make sure that there is no undeclared enrichment in Iran, or undeclared nuclear material there. With regard to the advanced centrifuges, again we are making progress but we still need further information to make sure, to confirm or validate Iran’s statement that nothing has happened in the period between 1995 to 2002. The other set of issues that we are dealing with is the confidence building measures that have been requested by the Board for Iran to suspend enrichment related and reprocessing activities until assurances have been provided by me to the Board and until the Additional Protocol has been fully applied. There again, I reported that while we can assure the Board that there is no enrichment per-se, Iran has reversed some of its earlier decision with regard to testing or producing some enrichment components. I clearly, calling on Iran, as well as many Board Members that at this delicate phase, while we are still verifying Iran’s past programme, it is in the interest of Iran to do its utmost to continue to pursue a policy of full transparency and to show full co-operation, full and active co-operation, for us to be able to resolve the remaining issues in the next few months and provide the required assurances to the international community. To me this should be a precursor, or a trigger for a broader dialogue on many of the underlying issues that are under discussion between Iran and the Europeans, in particular, and the international community in general. So, that’s where we are on some of the issues that we are facing this week. There is obviously a lot of discussion among Board Members on resolutions to respond to my report, but these discussions are at quite an early stage.” (IAEA, Transcript of the Director General’s Press Statement on IAEA Inspection in Iran, Libya & the Republic of Korea, 13 September 2004)

15 september

Iran kondigt aan dat binnen enkele maanden uraniumverrijking zal gaan hervatten.

De VS lobbyen voor een stevigere IAEA-resolutie tegen Iran dan de door Duitsland, Frankrijk en het Verenigd Koninkrijk voorgestelde tekst.

KRONIEK 2004

januari	Lord Robertson vertrekt als Secretaris-Generaal van de NAVO
1 januari	Ierland neemt voorzitterschap EU over
1 januari	Einde Nederlands voorzitterschap OVSE
1 januari	Verenigde Staten nemen voorzitterschap G8 over
20 januari - 26 maart	Eerste sessie Conference on Disarmament, Geneve
21-25 januari	World Economic Forum, Davos
6-7 februari	Annual Munich Security Conference, München
20 februari	Parlementsverkiezingen Iran
27 februari	Bezoek Schröder aan Washington
maart	Parlementsverkiezingen Spanje
1 maart	Ministeriële bijeenkomst VS-EU, Washington
8 maart	IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, Wenen
14 maart	Presidentsverkiezingen Rusland
2 april	Bezoek Colin Powell aan Duitsland en België
2 april	Informele bijeenkomst NAVO Ministers van Defensie
5 april	Parlementsverkiezingen Indonesië
5-23 april	UN Disarmament Commission, jaarlijkse bijeenkomst, New York
9-16 april	Bezoek Dick Cheney aan China, Japan en Zuid-Korea
15 april	Parlementsverkiezingen Zuid-Korea
26 april – 7 mei	NPT PrepCom, New York
mei	Bijeenkomst Chemical Weapons Convention, Den Haag
1 mei	Toetreding diverse landen tot de Europese Unie
10 mei -25 juni	Tweede sessie Conference on Disarmament, Geneve
juni	Verkiezingen Europees Parlement
juni	Parlementsverkiezingen Japan
5-6	Bezoek George W. Bush aan Frankrijk
8-10 juni	G-8 Summit, Sea Island, Georgia
14 juni	IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, Wenen
28-29 juni	NAVO-top, Istanbul
1 juli	Nederland neemt voorzitterschap EU over
19-30 juli	Biological Weapons Convention, expert meeting, Geneve
september	Start Algemene Vergadering Verenigde Naties, New York
26 juli – 10 september	Derde sessie Conference on Disarmament, Geneve
13 september	IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, Wenen
20-24 september	IAEA General Conference, Wenen
27 september	IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, Wenen
2 november	Presidentsverkiezingen Verenigde Staten
25 november	IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, Wenen
6-10 december	Jaarlijkse bijeenkomst Biological Weapons Convention, Geneve

FACTS AND REPORTS

Eerder verschenen in de reeks PENN – NL Facts and Reports:

1. US unilateralism – official foreign comments
 2. Veiligheidsvraagstukken en de verkiezingen – standpunten van de politieke partijen
Relevante delen van de partijprogramma's van de Nederlandse politieke partijen, plus citaten van politici op het terrein van oorlog en vrede.
 3. Transatlantic relations – recent developments
Overzicht van recente ontwikkelingen in de transatlantische betrekkingen, met name binnen de NAVO, mede naar aanleiding van uitspraken in de State of the Union.
 4. Ontwikkelingen betreffende kernwapens en de Nederlandse politiek – briefing paper
Periodiek overzicht van ontwikkelingen rond kernwapens in de internationale en nationale politiek, met uitgebreide hoeveelheid bijlagen.
 5. Nucleaire vraagstukken – standpunten van de Nederlandse regering en de Tweede Kamer
Overzicht april 2001 – april 2002
 6. Crisis in de OPCW – de verwijdering van directeur-generaal Bustani
Documenten en artikelen over het ontslag van directeur-generaal Bustani van het OPCW
 7. Prepcom van het NPV – nucleaire ontwapening stopt
Verklaringen en rapporten van staten en ngo's tijdens de Prepcom van het NPV
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Informatie over het Verdrag van Moskou, ontwikkelingen daaromheen en commentaar erop
 9. Joint Strike Fighter – achtergrondberichten
 10. Konfrontatie in Zuid-Azië – de kernwapenwedloop tussen India en Pakistan
Basisgegevens over de nucleaire strijdkrachten en doctrines van India en Pakistan, Nederlandse wapenexport en wapenexportbeleid en een oproep om een nucleair treffen te voorkomen
 11. Massavernietigingswapens in het Midden-Oosten (1) – Egypte, Israël, Syrië
Basisinformatie over de proliferatie van nucleaire, biologische en chemische wapens in Egypte, Israël en Syrië en verklaringen van de Nederlandse regering hierover
 12. Amerikaans unilateralisme II – officiële reacties
 13. Aanval op Irak – de kwestie van de massavernietigingswapens; feiten, documenten en overwegingen
 14. Aanval op Irak (2) – recente ontwikkelingen
 15. Documenten First Committee Verenigde Naties 2002 – resoluties, verklaringen, rapporten
 16. De NAVO-top in Praag – documenten
 17. Aanval op Irak (3) – het inspectieregim
 18. Internationaal veiligheidsbeleid Verenigde Staten – officiële documenten en reacties van de regering
 19. Veiligheidsvraagstukken en de verkiezingen (2) – standpunten van de politieke partijen (update 2003)
 20. Korea, de tweede crisis
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 23. De andere crises - Informatie over het Amerikaans nucleair beleid, missile defense, de Conference on Disarmament en de recente ontwikkelingen rond Noord-Korea, Iran en India en Pakistan.
 24. Aanval op Irak (6) – de slachtoffers
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 26. Teststopverdrag Artikel XIV Conferentie – de kwestie van de Amerikaanse minikernwapens
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 30. Iran – Documentatie massavernietigingswapens
 31. Twee proliferatiecrises – Iran en Noord-Korea
 32. Begroting Buitenlandse Zaken – Proliferatievraagstukken
 33. Irak (8) – De massavernietigingswapens
 34. Irak (9) – De casus belli
 35. Proliferatie – recente ontwikkelingen
 36. VS nucleair beleid – recente ontwikkelingen
 37. Proliferatie (2) – recente ontwikkelingen
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