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IRAN (3A)
Recente ontwikkelingen

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COMMENTAAR

Inleiding

De ontwikkelingen rondom Iran zijn van groot belang, omdat ze een voorbeeld zijn voor de manier waarop met landen wordt omgegaan die mogelijk kernwapens gaan ontwikkelen. Deze twee dossiers (39A en 39B) geven een overzicht, enerzijds van de reeks officiële verklaringen van de Amerikaanse, Europese en Iraanse regeringen over deze zaak, anderzijds een beeld van de manier waarop de Engelstalige media er over rapporteerden. Het allesbepalende raamwerk waarbinnen deze discussie plaatsvindt is dat van de horizontale proliferatie: het gevaar dat een nieuw land - Iran - kernwapen zou gaan bouwen. Door deze inperking blijven buiten beschouwing:

- de voortgaande nucleaire wapenwedloop van de vijf officiële en de drie onofficiële kernwapenstaten,
- de gevaren voor een beperkte of algemene kernoorlog die daardoor nog steeds bestaan
- de betrokkenheid van zogenaamde niet-nucleair bewapende staten zoals de lidstaten van de NAVO door het handhaven van een nucleaire doctrine en de middelen om die toe te passen
- de inherente tegenstrijdigheid van het NPV

Deze punten zijn allen door ons elders aan de orde gesteld. Doordat de aandacht gevestigd wordt op (mogelijke) kernbewapening elders, wordt die van de bestaande kernwapenstaten ontzien dan wel totaal buiten de thematiek van horizontale proliferatie gehouden. De politieke aandacht wordt dan gefixeerd op het verhinderen van nucleaire bewapening van andere staten, of op zijn gunstigst, het opruimen van de gevolgen van de nucleaire wapenwedloop van vroeger in de kernwapenstaten. Verdragsmatige verplichtingen tot nucleaire ontwapening komen in deze context niet aan de orde. In de Engelstalige (en ook Nederlandstalige) verslaggeving over de affaire Iran zal men dan ook tevergeefs zoeken naar verwijzingen over de eigen atombewapening, laat staan de verplichtingen die daarvoor van belang zijn.

Iran en de Non-Proliferatie Verdrag verplichtingen

Het NPV is in de kern een overeenkomst waarin de kernwapenstaten beloven om op termijn nucleair te ontwapenen mits de niet-kernwapenstaten beloven om geen kernwapen of kernwapentechnologie aan te schaffen. Centraal (art 4) is verder de garantie voor volledige toegang tot nucleaire technologie voor vreedzaam gebruik. Aangezien deze grotendeels hetzelfde is als die voor de bouw van kernwapens brengt dit een ernstig probleem met zich mee. Elke ondertekenaar kan de technologie opbouwen om kernwapens te maken zonder het verdrag te overtreden, bijvoorbeeld door de het opzetten van verrijkingsinstallaties met gebruik van ultracentrifuge technologie. Verrijkt uranium kan vervolgens worden gebruikt in een kerncentrale maar ook voor de bouw van een kernbom. Dit was het cruciale gegeven in de onderhandelingen tussen de EU3 (Frankrijk, Verenigd Koninkrijk en Duitsland) en Iran. Deze situatie was een goede illustratie van de dubbelzinnigheid van formele diplomatie en machtspolitiek. Formeel had Iran immers volledig gelijk: het had (bijna) niets misdaan, hoogstens misleidende of onvolledige informatie gegeven over de precieze aard van haar verrijking activiteiten. De toezeggingen van september 2003 aan de EU3 waren politiek, en werden dit jaar weer ingetrokken. De G8, IAEA en EU3 hebben vervolgens een aantal eisen gesteld waaronder instemming met additionele inspectieregimes en het volledig stopzetten van de verrijking activiteiten. Iran regeerde weer met escalerende stappen, zoals het op gang brengen van de eerste productiefase voor de verrijking van uranium.

In de westerse media werd dit conflict steevast weergegeven als zijnde strijdig met de NPV verplichtingen. Dat was misleidend, en werd versterkt in bijv het Nederlandse parlementen door vragen opmerkingen van de heer Wilders en Ormel (zie de verslagen van de kamerdebatten in deze en vorige afleveringen van F&R).

Machtspolitiek

In de machtspolitieke wereld was iets anders aan de gang: de belangrijkste gebeurtenis was de oorlog tegen Irak, op valse gronden: de productie en ingebruikname van massavernietigingswapens door de Iraakse regering. In die *casus belli* kwestie was er sprake van twee mechanismen: de inlichtingendiensten die slechte of onvolledige informatie dan wel analyses leverden aan de politiek. En de rol van de Amerikaanse regering, daarin gesteund door een aantal bondgenoten, die hoe dan ook op oorlog uit was. Deze zelfde mechanismen kunnen bij Iran weer een rol gaan spelen, zeker nu de tweede regering Bush de oorspronkelijke neoconservatieve koers lijkt voort te zetten. Ook de Iraanse regering heeft diverse keren uitspraken gedaan die er op wijzen dat men niet zal wachten totdat men wordt aangevallen.

Daarnaast bestaat in elk van zulke gespannen situaties altijd het risico dat een actie-reactie patroon gebaseerd op misinterpretaties van de intenties en grenzen van de tegenstander, op gang komt. Dit is enigszins vergelijkbaar met de aanloop naar de Eerste Wereldoorlog in juli 1914: de "kanonnen van augustus".

Tenslotte is de regionale geopolitieke situatie belangrijk: Iran bevindt zich binnen het slagbereik van twee kernwapen staten (Pakistan en Israël) en de nucleaire vuist van de Amerikaans strijdkrachten. Ten westen

ligt een bijzonder sterke Amerikaanse bezettingsmacht in Irak, ten noordoosten een kleinere strijdkracht in Afghanistan. Die situatie, gecombineerd met het belang van de oliebronnen in de regio, betekent dat het Iraanse kernwapenpotentieel een onderdeel is van veel grotere problemen. De drie belangrijkste EU landen, die het belang van Europa vertegenwoordigen in de zin dat men een vreedzame oplossing wil, hebben nu een barrière opgeworpen tegen de escalatie dynamiek van de Amerikaans-Iraanse confrontatie.

De EU3-Iran afspraak

De afspraken die gemaakt zijn betreffen het staken van de verrijgingsprocessen en het opzetten van verificatiemechanismen daarvoor. Daarnaast zullen besprekingen worden gevoerd om tot verdergaand afspraken te komen. (zie de gerapporteerde tekst van de overeenkomst op 14 november). Deze afspraken kunne op den duur leiden tot het volledig afzien door Iran van verrijkingstechnologie. Het blijft de vraag of Iran, gezien haar regionale positie, niet de mogelijkheid wil openhouden om alsnog snel een bom te bouwen. Maar de overeenkomst biedt een mogelijkheid voor een diplomatieke oplossing.

Hierdoor wordt het immers mogelijk voor de vergadering voor de bestuursraad van het internationaal atoomagentschap (IAEA) om op 25 november overeen te komen dat de zaak Iran niet naar de Veiligheidsraad hoeft te gaan. Daarmee zullen bijna alle lidstaten akkoord gaan, behalve één, de VS, die nog steeds kan dwarsliggen. De eerste reacties van de State Department lieten de mogelijkheid open om alsnog de gang naar de Veiligheidsraad te eisen.

Zo een stap zou niet een multilaterale zijn, zoals dat wordt voorgesteld in de Tweede Kamer, maar een tussenstap naar unilateraal optreden. Een veto van China of Rusland tegen verdergaande maatregelen zou immers onvermijdelijk zijn. Gezien de opstelling van de Amerikaanse regering betreffende 'pre-emptive war', zou een verder escalatie bijzonder waarschijnlijk worden. Daarin zou vermoedelijk Israël een centrale rol spelen, gezien de leverantie van speciale bommen, geschikt om diep ingegraven doelen te treffen, aan dat land door de VS. De gevolge van de regio kunne allen maar slecht zijn.

De diplomatie en remmende rol van de EU en de mate waarin ze het Amerikaanse beleid kan afremmen, is dus van beslissend belang.

Redactie Facts and Reports

DOCUMENTEN

United Nations General Assembly

Statement by H.E. Dr. Kamal Kharrazi, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran
24 September 2004

[...] In this context, one particular area that requires resolute action by the international community is the existence and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As the only victim of the unbridled use of these weapons in recent years, Iran feels very strongly about the absolute imperative of a collective and rule based multilateral campaign to eradicate all these weapons and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons as an interim measure. This must be done by the universal application of disarmament and non-proliferation instruments in a comprehensive and non-discriminatory manner. The relevant multilateral instruments must become truly universal and the rights and obligations of all must be scrupulously enforced. Access to technology for peaceful purposes is the only true incentive for the universality of these instruments. At the same time, the legitimate disarmament and non-proliferation concerns of the international community must be addressed through transparency and vigorous application of monitoring mechanisms. Iran has always been prepared to contribute actively to this global effort. While we insist on our right to technology for peaceful purposes, we have and will leave no stone unturned in order to provide assurances of our peaceful intentions.

Iran has been in the forefront of efforts to establish a zone free from weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. This initiative which has received the repeated approval of this august Assembly and the Security Council has been systematically obstructed by Israel's intransigence and its rejection of all multilateral instruments, regrettably with impunity. All countries of the region and beyond are unanimous in considering Israeli arsenal, including its weapons of mass destruction, combined with its policy and record of aggression and state terrorism as the single greatest threat to regional and global peace and security. Israel cannot hide these facts behind smoke screens. It is time for the international community to show its resolve to maintain the credibility of multilateral disarmament instruments by taking action to compel Israel to comply. [...]

US State Department

Interview with Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage by journalists from NATO countries
27 September 2004

[...] QUESTION: Okay, this is, talking about the (inaudible) and I'd like to ask a question about Iran.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Sure.

QUESTION: So the West has presented intelligence on Iran trying to produce nuclear weapons.

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Right.

QUESTION: Now, is this intelligence resting on less shaky places than some of the intelligence you had about Iraq, as a whole? And is there a case for preemptive strikes in the near future?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Well, let me say the obvious, that any President of the United States, just as a president for any other country always has all options on the table and it would be bad business to remove any options.

Having said that, we're very content with the pace of our ongoing discussions with the international community about the Iranian nuclear program. We had a pretty good statement out of the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] during this month of September. We're looking forward to the November Board of Governors meeting. And our view is that we'll keep the international spotlight, led by our European friends, on Iran and the need for Iran to come clean with their program, or else we have the ability to refer this to the Security Council for a discussion, at least, of possible sanctions.

So we're very content with the direction and the pace of those discussions. And we're content with the leadership of our European friends on this, particularly the EU-3 [the United Kingdom, France and Germany]. [...]

US State Department

State Department noon briefing

by spokesman Richard Boucher - 29 October 2004

[...] QUESTION: Richard, there was a Federal Register notice this morning that 14 individuals and entities are being sanctioned for violating export control laws, vis-à-vis Iran. I was wondering if you could give any details on what they did. And also, some of the entities mentioned are this -- were repeatedly sanctioning them: NORINCO in China, Changgwang Sinyong. Does it do any good to pile these sanctions on? Or does it achieve anything more to sanction them over and over?

MR. BOUCHER: Let me take a minute here and make sure I understand how much I've already read in the Federal Register because I can give you the 15-minute answer or I can give you the shorter one. We'll give you the shorter one.

The entities that we imposed sanctions on today: seven Chinese entities; two Indian entities; and one each in Belarus, North Korea, Russia, Spain and Ukraine. These are penalties that are imposed, effective September 23rd pursuant to the Iran Non-Proliferation Act of the year 2000.

There was credible information that these entities had transferred one of several categories of items to Iran since January of 1999. That would be equipment listed on multilateral export lists, items that have a potential of making a material contribution to weapons of mass destruction of cruise or ballistic missiles, items on U.S. national control lists for weapons of mass destruction or missile reasons.

The penalties apply to the entities themselves and not to countries or governments. The penalties basically prohibit U.S. transactions, U.S. Government transactions with these entities and do not permit any new licenses or -- to be issued and actually suspend previous licenses that might have been issued for items that are controlled, high-technology items controlled by the United States. The imposition of these sanctions brings to 23 the number of entities that have been subject to sanctions under this Act. Some of these companies have been subject to sanctions multiple times, as you note.

In many cases, the imposition of successive sanctions, one on top of the other, the main effect is to extend the period of time that the entity would be subject to sanctions for. But it is a requirement of law that we make these determinations and impose sanctions. And somebody who has been doing something more recently deserves to suffer the consequences for a longer period of time, so it sort of makes sense that if you impose the same sanctions again and again you're basically extending the period of penalty for an extension of the period of activity.

QUESTION: Can you be any more specific as to what the -- what it was that these companies are -- these entities are believed to have transferred -- I mean, and I'm willing to settle even for missile technology or components or WMD material -- I mean, or is it both?

MR. BOUCHER: It can be one or the other, or both. It's --

QUESTION: Well, can you say which?

MR. BOUCHER: No, I can't go through -- I can't identify in any particular case what it was they might have transferred. But it is missile technology, things -- items that contribute to weapons of mass destruction.

QUESTION: And the Spanish company is one which has, I don't believe, been subject to these kind of -- Telstar?

MR. BOUCHER: Yeah, that's my understanding, too.

QUESTION: Is it unusual at all for --

MR. BOUCHER: I'm told that the Belarus, the Indian and the Spanish entities are new, and I'm not --

MR. CASEY: Russia, not Belarus.

MR. BOUCHER: Oh, Russian?

MR. CASEY: Russia.

MR. BOUCHER: Russian, Spanish and Indian entities are new.

QUESTION: Do you recall the last time a company and a NATO ally has been hit with these kind of sanctions, not just for Iran but for --

MR. BOUCHER: Under this particular act or the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act or others? I can't -- I don't have it all in my head at this point, but I think there have been in the past.

QUESTION: You wouldn't say that it is unusual?

MR. BOUCHER: The fact is, this law applies internationally and globally.

QUESTION: I realize that, but --

MR. BOUCHER: If we find somebody in whatever place that's violating the law, shipping equipment and technology --

QUESTION: But there are provisions, especially in this --

MR. BOUCHER: -- then we apply the law.

QUESTION: Yeah, but the people have been -- the companies that do business with or have done business with countries like Iran and Libya have in the past been spared.

MR. BOUCHER: Different laws have different provisions and they're applied in different ways.

QUESTION: Right. So you don't want to say that it is unusual for --

MR. BOUCHER: I wouldn't want to say that without knowing what I was talking about.

QUESTION: All right, fair enough. [...]

US State Department

State Department noon briefing

by deputy spokesman Adam Ereli – 1 October 2004

[...] QUESTION: Yes, the UN wants to visit the Iranian nuclear site and they're going to do this, I guess, maybe not as thorough as the IAEA. But do you have any comments regarding this, with respect to the debates last night with both President Bush and John F. Kerry?

MR. ERELI: I don't know what visit you're speaking about?

QUESTION: An on-site inspection.

MR. ERELI: Through the IAEA or through the UN?

QUESTION: No, through the UN.

MR. ERELI: I'm not familiar with that visit. I mean, clearly, the IAEA has called upon Iran to allow immediate on-site visits and inspections and that's what Iran has committed to. So we would certainly look to Iran to fulfill those pledges when the IAEA and its staff want to see things.

As far as our approach to Iran goes, I don't really have any comment on the debates. My only comment would be to repeat for you, reiterate for you what our longstanding position is, and that is that Iran, by its policies of supporting terrorism, pursuing weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, and their opposition to the peace process represent, we believe, a problem, a threat that needs to be addressed. We are working through the international community and our partners in the international community to do that. Our efforts with the IAEA to confront and deal with Iran's clandestine nuclear weapons program, I think, is a good example of that, and we'll continue to pursue our diplomatic, multilateral response to that problem. [...]

US State Department

State Department noon briefing

by deputy spokesman Adam Ereli – 5 October 2004

[...] QUESTION: A related topic. A senior Iranian official claims that Iran has a missile with a range of 2,000 kilometers. Do you have any reason to believe that that's true and do you have any comment on the claim?

MR. ERELI: I'm not going to -- I'm not in a position to confirm to you the range cited. Obviously, that deals with intelligence matters, which we don't discuss.

Obviously, the United States has had and continues to have serious concerns about Iran's missile programs. As you know, we view Iran's efforts to further develop its missile capabilities as a threat to the region and to the United States interests, and all the more so in light of its ongoing nuclear program.

With specific reference to this report, it's well known that Iran has had an active missile program for almost two decades, that Iran has been in the late stages of developing the Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile and that it has been working on longer range systems. So it is -- these kinds of long-range missiles which have been the subject of reports has been an active area of Iranian weapons development for some time, has been a concern of ours for some time. And international cooperation with likeminded countries is important to take steps to address these efforts, and that's where we're focusing our efforts. [...]

White House

White House daily briefing

by Press Secretary Scott McClellan – 6 October 2004

[...] QUESTION: A top nuclear official says Iran has converted a few tons of raw uranium into gas needed for enrichment. Are you aware of that?

MR. McCLELLAN: We've made it very clear what Iran needs to do. And Iran needs to come clean and fully comply with its international obligations. Iran needs to stop its pursuit of nuclear weapons. They agreed to suspend their enrichment and reprocessing. And they need to abide by those rulings. They agreed to the additional protocol, and they need to meet their commitments. And so the international community is speaking very clearly to Iran that if they continue in the direction that they are going, then we will have to look at what additional action may need to be taken, including looking to the United Nations Security Council. [...]

US State Department

State Department noon briefing

by deputy spokesman Adam Ereli – 6 October 2004

[...] QUESTION: Adam, there are reports from next door in Iran that -- and I guess it's a fine government there -- they're saying that they've got 37 tons of yellowcake ready for enrichment and it's enough to make five bombs, and the IAEA is, I guess, throwing their hands up, they can't go much further with the government there.

And also, do you think the position that the IAEA is also taking with North Korea is also justified?

MR. ERELI: Two questions. Number one, on the question of 37 tons of yellowcake, we've spoken to this before. Clearly, 37 tons is not a test, as Iran suggests; it's a production run. I would remind you that at the September board meeting of the Board of Governors meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency, they passed a resolution that said Iran should immediately suspend all enrichment activities, including the production of feed material. It comes as no surprise that, once again, Iran is defying the board and is producing uranium hexafluoride feed material.

There is no peaceful use for this enriched uranium, and at the present time, in our view, it clearly indicates that Iran is continuing its efforts in a nuclear weapons program. And this is -- these are all issues which the Board of Governors will have to take under advisement in its November board meeting.

QUESTION: Just to -- on that, that guidance is verbatim from about a week and a half ago, I think.

MR. ERELI: Right. And I don't think the news is --

QUESTION: There's nothing new.

MR. ERELI: I don't think the news that is being reported today is different from what was reported a week and a half ago.

QUESTION: Well, can you -- this is -- can you just refresh me? It was during the UN General Assembly that this --

MR. ERELI: This was September 21st.

QUESTION: That guidance dates from September 21st.

MR. ERELI: Mm-hmm.

QUESTION: Thanks.

MR. ERELI: And on North Korea, you know, we agree with Dr. ElBaradei that North Korea's nuclear programs are a concern and we agree with -- we share his disturbance that North Korea continues to ignore the calls of the international community to end its nuclear programs.

We continue to believe that the best way to do this, to address the problem of North Korea's nuclear programs, is through the multilateral diplomacy of the six-party talks. We remain disappointed that North Korea has not returned to the table for the next round. We've got a proposal on the table that we think goes a long way toward addressing this problem and we certainly look forward to having the opportunity to act on that proposal in the future.

QUESTION: And, by contrast, are you encouraged by the Government of Brazil for an open invitation to the IAEA and others to view their --

MR. ERELI: You know, I would caution against speaking of lumping all these topics together because they're very different in their scope, they're very different in their details. Brazil has a good record of cooperation with the IAEA. Their program is, in almost every -- in every respect, different than North Korea's and Iran's, and I think the Secretary has spoken to this on his visit to Brazil. There is good movement between the IAEA and Brazil. It's just a completely different kind of relationship. [...]

US State Department

State Department noon briefing

by spokesman Richard Boucher – 7 October 2004

[...] QUESTION: Yeah. Do you have any comment on the apparent agreement reached between the IAEA and Brazil? It doesn't require 100 percent transparency on the part of the Brazilians. And doesn't this set a bad precedent given your quest for 100 percent transparency and cooperation on the part of Iran with the --

MR. BOUCHER: Did they announce some kind of agreement?

QUESTION: No, well, you know, it's -- people are talking. People are talking about it in Vienna.

MR. BOUCHER: Our understanding from the Brazilians is that they have had discussions with the IAEA. They felt that they had made progress in sort of establishing the principles by which they can do this

inspection in a way that's very consistent with what the IAEA has done elsewhere, that they are going to have visits by IAEA technical experts or team in about 10 days or so, and that needs to be done in order to work out the details.

But as we have pointed out, the International Atomic Energy Agency has worked out agreements around the world that ensure transparency and yet ensure protection of proprietary technology and things like that. So we're confident this can be worked out. We're confident the Brazilians want to work it out and we're confident the International Atomic Energy Agency wants to work it out. So we'll just have to wait and see and let them do the work that they know how to do and that they need to do.

QUESTION: Do you know whether the Secretary raised his concerns about Iran in the discussions with the Brazilians?

MR. BOUCHER: We discussed -- the Secretary discussed, in public as well, the issues involved with the IAEA. He made clear that we saw no comparison between Brazilian nuclear power programs and the kind of covert weapons program that Iran has been undertaking for years or the kind of renunciation of inspections, the kind of renunciation of the IAEA that North Korea has been engaged in. Those are not comparable situations and nobody should confuse them.

QUESTION: Yet, you don't want to give the Iranians anything they can seize onto?

MR. BOUCHER: No, but the Board has made very clear to the Iranians what the requirements are and that when it comes to Iran, given their history, given their history of covert activities which we think can only be intended to make nuclear weapons, the Board has said to the Iranians you shouldn't have any uranium enrichment at all. For the Iranians it's not a question of proprietary technology, it's a question of what Iran has committed to, what the Board has asked them to do and what makes sense in their own environment. And there is no reason for Iran to have uranium enrichment activities and that has been made clear.

[...]

But that doesn't mean we're neglecting Iran and North Korea. As you know, we have very active efforts underway with other countries, multilaterally, through diplomacy, peacefully, to try to bring about situations where Iran and North Korea's -- Iran and North Korea no longer pose any threat to their neighbors and to the world, in terms of their programs for weapons of mass destruction.

So you may need to deal with all these things, but you don't necessarily deal with each of them the same way. [...]

Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Antwoorden van de heer Bot, minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, op vragen van het lid Wilders (Groep Wilders) over de onwil van Iran om de uraniumverrijking te staken en het dreigement van Iran niet mee te werken aan IAEA-inspecties (ingezonden 23 september 2004)

DVB/NN-423/04 – 7 oktober 2004

1. Heeft u kennisgenomen van het bericht “Teheran botst hard met atoomagentschap”?¹

Antwoord: Ja.

2. Is het waar dat Iran de eis van het Internationaal Atoomagentschap (IAEA) om al zijn activiteiten op het gebied van uraniumverrijking te staken, heeft afgewezen? Wat is uw oordeel daarover? Deelt u de mening dat deze handelwijze van Iran laakbaar en onaanvaardbaar is?

3. Is het waar dat Iran ook heeft gedreigd geen inspecties meer toe te laten indien het IAEA deze kwestie aan de VN-Veiligheidsraad voorlegt? Wat is uw oordeel daarover? Deelt u de mening dat een dergelijke Iraanse dreigement niet door de beugel kan?

Antwoord: Iran heeft bekendgemaakt een aanvang te maken met de conversie van ‘yellow cake’ naar uraniumhexafluoride, de basisgrondstof voor ultracentrifugeverrijking. Het is tevens waar dat Iran ermee heeft gedreigd geen inspecties meer toe te laten indien het IAEA deze kwestie aan de VN-Veiligheidsraad voorlegt. De regering betreurt deze Iraanse stappen.

4. Bent u thans bereid – als lid van Board of Directors van het IAEA en als Voorzitter van de EU – op zeer korte termijn al het mogelijke te doen om de handelwijze van Iran op dit punt te laten veroordelen door zowel de EU als de VN-Veiligheidsraad?

Antwoord: De vraag naar doorverwijzing naar de VN Veiligheidsraad wordt actueel bij de aanstaande bijeenkomst van de IAEA Board of Governors op 25 en 26 november a.s. Bij de afgelopen bijeenkomst van de Board of Governors op 18 september is een resolutie aangenomen waarin DG IAEA El Baradei wordt verzocht te rapporteren over het IAEA onderzoek en Iraanse medewerking daaraan in de laatste twee jaar, alsmede over de naleving door Iran van de waarborgovereenkomst met het IAEA. Daarnaast wordt

rapportage gevraagd over naleving van de oproep van de IAEA Board of Governors aan Iran om alle verrijkingen – en opwerkingsgerelateerde activiteiten op te schorten.

De resolutie stelt tot slot dat de Board of Governors zich in november zal beraden over nadere stappen. De inspanningen van de internationale gemeenschap, waaronder Nederland in zijn rol van lid van de Board of Governors en voorzitter van de EU, richten er zich thans op Iran te bewegen te voldoen aan de in de resolutie gestelde eisen.

Noot: 1. de Volkskrant, 20 september jl.

US State Department

State Department noon briefing

by spokesman Richard Boucher – 12 October 2004

[...] QUESTION: You're aware of reports today out of Vienna of people saying that, that you guys are now considering possible incentives to Iran to stop its uranium enrichment activities. I'm just wondering if you can say (a) whether it's true, whether it's correct that you are doing that; (b) if there are, in fact, talks this week here on that issue; and (c) if there are, why the change in -- or the apparent -- why is there an appearance of a change from your insistence that it go to the Security Council?

MR. BOUCHER: No, yes, and no.

Okay.

QUESTION: No, there isn't? Yes, there is a meeting? And --

MR. BOUCHER: First, I think we have to start with -- the basic fact is that the United States, the governments of the United Kingdom, France and Germany, as well as other members of the G-8, and indeed, the international community share the objective of ending Iran's program to build the capability of producing fissile material for nuclear weapons. And we have been working with those governments in the International Atomic Energy Agency's Board of Governors to try to move this forward, try to get Iran to comply with the requirements of the Board of Governors.

The Board of Governors has passed five resolutions since September 2003 calling on Iran to cooperate fully with the agency's ongoing investigation, to ratify promptly a safeguards-strengthening additional protocol, and to suspend immediately all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities.

The most recent resolution, the one we adopted on September 18th, also made clear that Iran must heed these requirements before the International Atomic Energy Agency Board meets again in November.

So what we're doing now is to examine how to get Iran to meet those requirements. The Europeans, as I think you have seen the reporting of their meetings that they had Monday with the General Affairs and External Relations Council, have said that they are discussing how to get Iran to comply with its requirements, and indeed with the promises that Iran had previously made to some of these European nations.

We are having a meeting on Friday with G-8 partners and something called Senior Officials Group of the G-8. Basically, for our part, it will be Glyn Davies, Deputy Assistant Secretary in our European Bureau, and Under Secretary for Technology John Bolton, who will meet with European counterparts, with G-8 counterparts.

What do I have it, -- right? T, what does T stand for?

QUESTION: Arms Control.

MR. BOUCHER: Arms Control, Under Secretary for Arms Control, sorry. He's known in the building as T, which stands for arms control. The Under Secretary John Bolton will be meeting with them, along with representatives of the European Bureau, and since the Europeans have been discussing how to get the Iranians to comply, we look forward to hearing their ideas about how to move forward.

I think it's important to remember the United States has always felt and continues to feel very strongly that Iran's history of covert activity, Iran's history of developing programs that are designed to produce nuclear weapons requires that these -- that this matter be referred to the UN Security Council for action. And so, one of the things we'll discuss on Friday is to hear from the Europeans about their ideas about how to get Iran to comply with the requirements, and we also would expect to discuss what to do, what the next steps might be, were we to refer this to the UN Security Council.

QUESTION: But I don't understand. How did you get from the point where -- I mean, in your position, all right, it's not a question of how to get Iran to comply, how to induce them to comply, it's just simply that they should comply. They have to. They must comply. Why -- I don't -- when did --

MR. BOUCHER: Making clear to Iran that they have to comply is one way of getting them to comply. I mean, the point is to get Iranian compliance.

QUESTION: And you just said that there have been five separate resolutions since September 2003.

MR. BOUCHER: And the Iranians haven't done it.

QUESTION: Yeah. So --

MR. BOUCHER: And so, the last resolution said that they must heed the requirements and requests of the resolution before the Council -- before the Board of Governors meets again in November. So that's what we're focusing on, and that's what the Europeans are focusing on, how to get the Iranians to comply with those resolutions before the Board meets again in November. The United States' position has been and remains that this matter deserves -- needs to be referred to the UN Security Council.

QUESTION: So you're not willing to consider any -- or to acquiesce to any potential incentives that the Europeans or other -- or your other partners in the G-8 might offer?

MR. BOUCHER: I think the Europeans have already -- always made clear that the relationship between Iran and the European Union was hampered and was held back by Iran's behavior on this and other matters. So I suppose that is a point they will continue to make to the Iranians, but I'd refer you to them for an understanding of their discussions.

QUESTION: No, I'm asking what the U.S. position is.

MR. BOUCHER: Our position is this matter needs to be referred to the UN Security Council.

QUESTION: Well, some of the reporting out there suggests that you want to circumvent the Security Council in an effort that, if Iran doesn't cooperate, that there would be kind of a set of various countries imposing unilateral sanctions, whereas some members of the Security Council might veto such sanctions. But are you saying that you're committed to working -- are you --

MR. BOUCHER: Our view is this matter needs to be referred to the Security Council. Now, that doesn't prevent countries from taking steps, nor does it prevent one of the issues that we think does need to be discussed, is how the Security Council could deal with the issue or it to be referred there.

QUESTION: I take it you're not wanting to say whether the U.S. thinks that incentives are a good idea in this context.

MR. BOUCHER: I don't think at this point it's a matter for us to address. The Europeans have been talking about their approach, their package, their discussions that they intend to have with the Iranians about what they might say. And they, as I said, have always made clear that there are certain aspects, certain benefits in the EU relationship with Iran that wouldn't happen without Iranian compliance. So we'll hear what they put together, we'll hear them out, and talk together with them about how to move Iran into compliance with the Board of Governors' requirements, or what to do if the matter needs to be referred to the United Nations.

QUESTION: Is it two separate matters? Is it one -- what you're saying that it's okay for the Europeans if they want to discuss possible incentives for the Iranians, but as far as the U.S. is concerned, there would never be incentives on the table.

MR. BOUCHER: I think you'll have to check with the Europeans as far as what they're -- you know, what their package will involve, whether it's anything new or whether it's just the -- what they've always made clear, that there were certain benefits in the relationship that wouldn't happen without action by Iran on nuclear and other matters.

As for the United States' position, I think we've made very, very clear that Iran needs to take action on the nuclear issue. Our view is that it should be referred to the UN Security Council. That's where we think the next steps are.

QUESTION: Right. But you could also -- I mean, that's the stick. There could also be potential carrots that are dangled out there, and are you saying that, in U.S. eyes, that's not something that would be on the table?

MR. BOUCHER: I'm not here to dangle anything today, no.

QUESTION: But are you saying that the U.S. would not provide any incentives? What the Europeans want to do is their own prerogative?

MR. BOUCHER: No. They're going to come and tell us what kind of package and discussions they've been having and we'll hear them out. We'll see what they have today and we'll have a discussion. We'll have -- I think the simplest description I can give you of Friday's meetings is a chance to share ideas about how to bring Iran into compliance with the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors, and to share ideas about how the Security Council might take up the issue, should it be referred to the Security Council.

QUESTION: But Richard, it sounds like the same old, same old. Why do you need to meet here in Washington --

MR. BOUCHER: I didn't write the news story saying there was great new stuff out there.

QUESTION: No, but why? Why do you need to meet with your Europeans counterparts here --

MR. BOUCHER: Because we have been discussing these matters, the matter of Iran, with the Europeans on a very consistent basis, very thoroughly all along. It's been a subject of close consultation at all levels.

Under Secretary Bolton, as you know, goes frequently to Europe, discusses Iran with his counterparts. The Secretary of State frequently discusses it with his counterparts. It was a subject of discussion at the G-8

meeting that they held in New York when the Secretary was up for the UN. And the G-8 discussed this matter of how to get Iran to comply. And those discussions are on a continuing basis.

We have facing us, facing Iran, the need to comply before the November meeting. And as we approach that date ourselves, we're going to keep in touch with them and talk to them about how we can face that issue together -- make sure the Iranians understand the need to comply.

QUESTION: Richard, is it the U.S. position that regardless of what Iran does between now and November 25th it should be referred to the Security Council?

MR. BOUCHER: The U.S. position is that Iran's past behavior merits referral to the UN Security Council.

QUESTION: So regardless of what they do between now and then --

MR. BOUCHER: The position is that it merits referral to the Security Council. I'm not going to predict at this point that Iran will or will not do anything.

QUESTION: Exactly. So --

MR. BOUCHER: Past, past experience --

QUESTION: I'm not asking if --

MR. BOUCHER: -- would indicate they won't.

QUESTION: Right, okay. Well, fair enough, but I mean, without predicting anything, just right now, you think that --

MR. BOUCHER: Right now our position is that this needs to be referred to the UN Security Council.

QUESTION: And you don't see -- then that won't change?

MR. BOUCHER: I'm not looking to change that, no.

QUESTION: No, but -- the point -- your point is that regardless of what Iran does between now and the 25th --

MR. BOUCHER: You're asking me to predict the future.

QUESTION: -- its past behavior --

MR. BOUCHER: Merits --

QUESTION: -- merits --

MR. BOUCHER: Its past behavior merits referral to the UN Security Council.

QUESTION: So no matter what, you want it to go to the UN Security Council?

MR. BOUCHER: Its past behavior merits referral to the Security Council.

QUESTION: So is it correct that no matter what, you want it to go to the Security Council?

MR. BOUCHER: It's correct to say that its past behavior merits referral to the Security Council. The only point is I -- this has been our position for every meeting that we've had so far. That is our position going into November. I'm sure it will be our position and that's as best I can answer your question.

QUESTION: Well, it's not a very straightforward answer. I know that your position is that it should be -- it's past time for it.

MR. BOUCHER: I'm just saying it my way instead of your way. I don't see much difference.

QUESTION: Okay. Well, so I'm not wrong in saying that then?

(Laughter.)

MR. BOUCHER: I'm not wrong in saying what I say. You can account for your own words.

QUESTION: Can we move on?

MR. BOUCHER: Yeah. [...]

US State Department

Keynote Address of the 60th Anniversary Dinner of the School of Advanced International Studies [SAIS] The Johns Hopkins University

by Secretary of State Colin L. Powell – Washington, DC – 13 October 2004

[...] There are many challenges that we still face. Proliferation is a problem. Iran and North Korea are problems. We are using diplomatic means and political means to try to resolve these problems. Foreign policy in the 21st century means using all of the tools at your disposal. The President's first choice is diplomacy, political action. He also knows that in order for diplomacy and politics to work, it must be backed up with strength -- our political strength, our economic strength, the strength of our military -- and we must not be afraid to act when it is necessary to do so to protect our friends and our allies, and he will not fail to act when it is so necessary. [...]

US State Department

State Department noon briefing

by spokesman Richard Boucher – 13 October 2004

[...] QUESTION: And has the Secretary done any -- telephoning usually is what he would do -- done anything to be in touch with higher up officials in these various capitals about this proposition which came in, I understand yesterday, on a piece of paper?

MR. BOUCHER: Well, the discussion needs to proceed at the level of senior officials and political directors. That's where the G-8 works issues together: nonproliferation issues, political issues, issues of their relationships of importance to them. The impetus for this discussion comes from the Secretary's discussion with G-8 foreign ministers in September, and comes from the efforts that the Europeans are making to look at what they can do to get the Iranians to comply with their obligations to the International Atomic Energy Agency.

It has been a frequent subject of discussion between the Secretary and his counterparts. He is not making any particular phone calls in anticipation of this particular meeting, but it's an ongoing effort both at the ministerial level and at the more detailed sort of level that is going to be worked on Friday.

QUESTION: Are you concerned -- on a policy level -- are you concerned that if something is set in play it would vitiate or at least work against the U.S. determination to get this issue to the Security Council?

MR. BOUCHER: The point, I think, that everybody has made -- the G-8 countries, the European 3 and the United States -- is that Iran needs to comply with its own commitments and the requirements of the IAEA Board. That, that is the only thing that would vitiate the process, that would change the process. Iraq -- Iran is either going to comply with the requirements or it's not. If it doesn't, if it continues not to, we continue to believe -- I wouldn't even put an "if" on it, I'd just say "punct." We continue to believe that Iran's past behavior merits referral to the Security Council.

So, but I think every -- if Iran came around and did what they're being asked to do, everybody would take that into account.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) Iraq, because if the Europeans get something in action, either genuinely or ingenuously, couldn't the Iranians seize on that and start some sort of a dialogue? And then how would you -- maybe I'm looking too far ahead -- how could you then go to the UN and expect the same Europeans who are negotiating with Iran to support a decision?

MR. BOUCHER: Again, like -- we're not going to jump seven steps down the road and predict failure and wimping out and all that sort of stuff quite yet. The point, I think --

QUESTION: But you will at some point? (Laughter.)

MR. BOUCHER: If it happens, we'll deal with it. Where we are now and where I think the Europeans are now, and they have made this clear as well, is that Iran needs to comply with the requirements and the commitments that it's made. Okay? And so that's what this discussion is about. This discussion is not about how to engage in some extended dialogue.

The September International Atomic Energy Agency Board meeting said, "We are looking for reports; we're looking for action before the November meeting by Iran to meet these requirements." The Europeans have said they're looking for action to meet these requirements. If that action doesn't take place, then it is likely that other countries will be more supportive of the U.S. goal, which is to move this matter to the Security Council.

And so, on Friday, we're going to discuss -- hear from the Europeans on the work they have been doing on how to get the Iranians to comply, and we're going to discuss with them, further, what to do if, in the Security Council, if there is agreement in November to refer it there.

QUESTION: All right, I'll let it go.

MR. BOUCHER: Yeah.

QUESTION: I have one more question, which I've kind of forgotten now. But you don't -- do you expect Friday to be a kind of decisive meeting, or do you think you'll just be in listening mode in terms of listening to some of the ideas that the European has, or do you expect a course of action to be determined?

MR. BOUCHER: Yes.

QUESTION: To be a decisive meeting?

MR. BOUCHER: No, I also consider it to be a listening mode to terms of working on the course of action.

If you look at how this issue has evolved; the decisive points are when Iran is faced with a decision of whether to comply or not. And so in terms of the political decision to make clear to Iran that they must comply, I would say that was made at the September Board of Governors meeting and reinforced by the G-8 ministers dinner in New York. That fundamental political decision has already been made that the period we're in now is one of telling -- making clear to Iran that they need to comply and how they must comply.

The meeting on Friday, then, becomes sort of the working implementation of that about how do you do that, and it may decide how do you go forward, but the kind of big political decision you were asking about I

think has pretty much already been made by the ministers when they got together and said between now and November we need to make very clear to Iran that they need to comply.

QUESTION: But it surely won't be an indecisive meeting?

MR. BOUCHER: Never.

QUESTION: Can I --

MR. BOUCHER: Let's do one or two others and then I'll come back. [...]

US State Department

Remarks to the U.S. Global Leadership Campaign

by Secretary of State Colin L. Powell – Washington, DC – 14 October 2004

[...] We have worked hard with our friends in Asia to put together a six-party arrangement to deal with the challenge of nuclear weapons in North Korea and the potential for the North Koreans to develop even more than they may have now. We think they have, perhaps, one or two. We're not sure if they have developed or built any more. Why should it be solely a U.S. problem? Why isn't it a problem for Japan and for Russia, and for China and South Korea? They're North Korea's neighbors.

And so, we have brought this six-party framework together and gotten even the North Koreans to agree that the Peninsula should be denuclearized. And now we have to have the patience and the fortitude to stick with that plan and keep pressing forward until we find a way to satisfy the concerns of the parties and denuclearize the Korean Peninsula.

And we're doing the same thing with respect to Iran, working with our friends in the European Union, working with the international community, working with the IAEA to persuade Iran that they have to accommodate the needs, the demands, the expectations of the international community to make sure that they are only interested in power and nothing more, and we have our suspicions that they're interested in quite a bit more. [...]

US State Department

State Department noon briefing

by spokesman Richard Boucher – 14 October 2004

[...] QUESTION: Richard, I have a question. Extensively, you spoke about the Iranian nuclear reactor within the last day or two, and also Secretary Powell has extensively spoken concerning that, and Russia today say that they have finished work on the nuclear reactor and are waiting for a signed agreement with Tehran with respect to the spent fuel rods, returning them to Russia at each juncture when they're spent.

Does Russia have any responsibility in this interim period, and especially if it slips beyond November? In other words, would the nuclear scientists in Tehran just start using that reactor to enrich the fuel without any safeguards?

MR. BOUCHER: Well, but slow down. They can't enrich fuel unless they get the fuel, and the import of what you're telling me is the Russian announcement -- I haven't seen it myself, but I do know that has been Russian policy now. And as you know, we've worked hard for a long time with the international community to get people to understand our concerns about development of the Iranian nuclear program.

The Russians have, in the past, had a lot of cooperation there, cooperation that we thought was being used as a cover for nuclear weapons activities; and progressively, over time, the Russians have cut off some of those specific exchanges and they've now adopted a position, which we think is a very positive one, which is that they are willing to supply fuel for the reactor only if it's under international standards and safeguards and, second of all, that the fuel will be returned to Russia after it was spent.

And so it's another example, really, of where the international community does share our concerns about Iran and has come to share our concerns about Iran. And it's another example of the kind of benefits and opportunities that the Iranians are missing out on by not cooperating with the international community on nuclear safeguards and controls.

QUESTION: Do you have new guarantees from Russia that the new fuel rods, unused, are inactive and not at that facility now?

MR. BOUCHER: I think, well, I don't know the exact status of the facility. I wasn't aware that there were any fuel rods there at this point.

QUESTION: I don't know.

MR. BOUCHER: Yeah. [...]

US State Department

State Department noon briefing

by spokesman Richard Boucher – 15 October 2004

[...] QUESTION: Can we get into the Iran nuclear meeting a little bit?

MR. BOUCHER: No, the meeting is still going on and you can't get into it.

QUESTION: Well, who's there? What countries are there?

MR. BOUCHER: Everybody is there. All the G-8 political directors are there, all the G-8 senior officials are there.

QUESTION: And who is presiding? Who is in charge of the U.S.? There's this question whether Armitage was.

MR. BOUCHER: Mr. Armitage stopped by at the beginning of the meeting to welcome people and talk a little bit to them, and the meeting is being run by Under Secretary Bolton and Deputy Assistant Secretary Glyn Davies of the European Bureau.

QUESTION: Okay.

MR. BOUCHER: Okay.

QUESTION: Richard, when you say presumably the G-8 is there, the EU is there as a G-8 observer, not necessarily a member of the G-8, but are the Dutch there as the president of the G-8?

MR. BOUCHER: I didn't eyeball everybody in the room. It's a standard G-8 configuration and that involves various European representatives.

[...]

QUESTION: Can we go back to Iran?

MR. BOUCHER: Yep.

QUESTION: There are reports out of Vienna that they're seeking security guarantees in order to end their enrichment program. Do you have anything on that?

MR. BOUCHER: I have no idea what the Iranians are seeking. I haven't seen any statements like that, but I think it's quite clear what they need to do to live in harmony with the rest of the international community, and that's comply with the requirements of the Board of Governors.

[...]

QUESTION: The European plan discussed in the G-8 meetings, any details about it?

MR. BOUCHER: I'm sorry? The --

QUESTION: Concerning Iran. The European plan.

MR. BOUCHER: Yeah. No, any information on what the Europeans are proposing that they do would have to come from the Europeans. And anyway, the meeting is still going on now so I don't have much I can say.

QUESTION: Okay. [...]

US State Department

Interview with Secretary of State Colin L. Powell

USA Today Editorial Board – 18 October 2004

[...] The only other place I touch on, because it's of such topical interest, and that has to do with Iran. Similarly, in Iran, we are concerned about their [nuclear weapons] program. We've been concerned since we came in. President Bush identified this early on. It took us a while to persuade the Russians and the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] and other members of the international community that there was a challenge here, that they were moving in the direction of a nuclear weapons program. It's still our judgment; not everybody agrees with us. But everybody does agree that they have been doing things that are inconsistent with their obligations under their IAEA commitments and NPT [the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty], and we have been supportive of our European Union, the three foreign ministers -- France, Germany and the United Kingdom -- as they have tried to find a solution.

We believe it should have been referred to the Security Council a year ago, but we have worked with our European friends as they have tried to find a solution that would perhaps avoid that; I don't think they can, but we're willing to let them try. They were here on Friday, the political directors of the G8 [Group of Eight industrialized nations], and we talked about it some more, following up from the dinner I had with the G8 in

New York at the time of UNGA, and we gave them, you know: you want to go try again, be our guest. But we can't keep putting this off, and we believe November is the time to refer it to the Security Council if Iran has not come into complete compliance with what their obligations are. [...]

Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Kamerbrief inzake Iran

DAM-597/04 – 18 oktober 2004

Met verwijzing naar uw verzoek van 13 oktober 2004 met kenmerk 204-100 om een brief over Iran en de daarbij meegezonden vragen van het Lid Karimi en de toezegging tijdens het algemeen overleg op 7 oktober over de RAZEB van mijn collega voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking inzake nadere informatie over Iran, bericht ik u als volgt. Een deel van de informatie in deze brief ging u reeds toe in de brief met het verslag van de RAZEB van 11 oktober jl.

De situatie in Iran is - na het algemeen overleg van 7 oktober inzake de RAZEB - als onderwerp aan de RAZEB-agenda toegevoegd, mede in het licht van besprekingen over Iran in G-8 verband. Zoals bekend is het EU-beleid ten aanzien van Iran een beleid van constructieve betrokkenheid ter ondersteuning van het hervormingsproces in dit land. Centraal hierbij staat de kritische opstelling van de EU ten aanzien van een viertal zorgpunten: Irans nucleaire programma, de mensenrechtensituatie, de strijd tegen terrorisme en de opstelling ten opzichte van het Midden-Oosten vredesproces.

In het kader van dit beleid - en met het oog op de cruciale bijeenkomst van de IAEA-Bestuursraad op 25 november a.s. - waren ministers het er bij de RAZEB over eens dat indien Iran zijn activiteiten die verband houden met verrijking van uranium zou opschorten, zoals eerder toegezegd, de EU een concreet stimuleringspakket zou aanbieden. Opties die hierbij in overweging worden genomen zijn bijvoorbeeld hervatting van de onderhandelingen over een Handels- en Samenwerkingsakkoord en versterkte samenwerking op gebieden als terrorismebestrijding, drugs, cultuur en onderwijs en wetenschap. Tegelijkertijd waren de ministers het erover eens dat een gebrek aan samenwerking met het IAEA en de weigering om de verrijkingsactiviteiten op te schorten zou moeten leiden tot verwijzing van deze kwestie naar de VN-Veiligheidsraad. Over deze aanpak, inclusief de concrete invulling van het genoemde stimuleringspakket en mogelijke sancties, zal de komende weken nader worden gesproken. Het overleg binnen zowel de EU als met de G-8 landen, waaronder de VS, bevindt zich nog in een verkennende fase.

De regering is van mening dat de ernst van de situatie vraagt om een krachtige en eensgezinde aanpak van de internationale gemeenschap. De EU onderhoudt hierover dan ook regelmatig contacten met landen als de VS, Rusland en China, en zal op basis van een door HV Solana op te stellen boodschap ook nader contact zoeken met derde landen - met name de landen die zitting hebben in de IAEA-Bestuursraad - met het verzoek om ondersteuning.

Tijdens de IAEA-Bestuursraad van 25 november a.s. zal - mede op basis van een nieuw rapport van de Directeur-Generaal van het IAEA, El Baradei - worden besloten of en in hoeverre Iran heeft voldaan aan de vereisten van de IAEA-resolutie van september jl. en of dat aanleiding geeft om de kwestie door te verwijzen naar de VN-Veiligheidsraad. Artikel IV van het Non-Proliferatieverdrag kent verdragspartijen in beginsel het recht op onderzoek naar, productie en gebruik van nucleaire energie voor vreedzame doeleinden toe. Echter, in de IAEA-resolutie van 18 september jl., die door de EU volledig is gesteund, werd Iran opgeroepen om als vertrouwenwekkende maatregel alle verrijkings-gerelateerde activiteiten onder verificatie van het IAEA op te schorten. Bovendien werd van Iran verlangd dat het de in oktober 2003 gedane toezeggingen om verrijkings- en opwerkingsgerelateerde activiteiten op te schorten, nakomt. Afgelopen juni bracht Iran het IAEA ervan op de hoogte voornemens te zijn uitvoering van dit laatste besluit deels op te schorten. In het meest recente IAEA-rapport over Iran constateert het Agentschap "*steady progress towards understanding Iran's nuclear programme*" en stelt het voorts dat nader onderzoek nodig is om volledig inzicht te krijgen. Het IAEA dringt bij Iran aan op volledige medewerking en transparantie. De genoemde resolutie van september jl. roept Iran voorts op het Additioneel Protocol te ratificeren. Additionele Protocollen bij met de IAEA afgesloten Waarborgenovereenkomsten versterkten de inspectiemogelijkheden van het IAEA.

De toegenomen aandacht voor de nucleaire activiteiten van Iran, en een eventuele intensivering van de economische en andere samenwerking indien Iran besluit tot opschorting van de nucleaire activiteiten, doet op geen enkele wijze af aan de inzet van de EU te komen tot een verbetering van de mensenrechtensituatie in Iran. Zoals ook uiteengezet in de Raadsconclusies van 11 oktober jl. bestaat er grote zorg over de voortgaande ernstige schendingen van de mensenrechten in Iran. De tijdens het Nederlandse Voorzitterschap uitgevoerde evaluatie van de Mensenrechtendialoog met Iran schetst een tamelijk somber beeld. Afgezien van een zekere mate van openheid ten aanzien van VN-mechanismen, is op geen van de onderwerpen die de EU als prioriteit voor de dialoog heeft aangemerkt sprake geweest van merkbare vooruitgang. Op sommige terreinen, zoals de uitoefening van burgerrechten en politieke vrijheden, viel eerder achteruitgang waar te

nemen sinds de parlementaire verkiezingen in februari jl. De Raad van 11 oktober jl. concludeerde dan ook dat er dringend behoefte is aan een hernieuwd en aantoonbaar engagement van Iraanse zijde. De Raad bevestigde belang te hechten aan de mensenrechtendialoog en toonde bereidheid om met Iran te bespreken hoe de effectiviteit van deze dialoog kan worden verbeterd.

Daarnaast worden de Iraanse autoriteiten door het EU-Voorzitterschap, (zowel in Teheran als in Den Haag), regelmatig aangesproken op concrete mensenrechtenproblemen in Iran. Met name ontwikkelingen ten aanzien van de positie van christenen, Baha'i, journalisten en ter dood veroordeelde minderjarigen hebben bijzondere aandacht. Zo is in juli het proces van de verdachte van de moord op de Canadees/Iraanse fotojournaliste mw. Kazemi namens de EU nauwgezet gevolgd. Toen op de tweede dag van het proces de Nederlandse ambassadeur in Teheran de toegang tot de rechtszaal werd ontzegd, heeft het Nederlandse Voorzitterschap een verklaring uitgegeven waarin de gang van zaken tijdens het proces werd afgekeurd.

Voorts heeft Nederland, zowel bij het Iraanse ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken als bij de rechterlijke macht, bij herhaling namens de EU geïntervenieerd ten behoeve van een jongen die wegens doodslag op een schoolgenoot op 15-jarige leeftijd ter dood was veroordeeld en op 18-jarige leeftijd dreigde te worden geëxecuteerd. Ook andere gevallen van doodstraffen voor minderjarigen, waaronder de executie van het 16-jarige meisje Atefeh Rajabi, zijn aan de orde gesteld. De daarbij van Iraanse zijde verkregen reacties zijn in zoverre bemoedigend, dat nu in dergelijke gevallen van executie lijkt te worden afgezien.

Ook bilateraal is bij herhaling onze zorg aan de Iraanse ambassadeur overgebracht over doodstraffen voor minderjarigen, arrestaties van journalisten of van hun familieleden, arrestaties van christenen en discriminatie van Bahai's. De effecten daarvan zijn moeilijk meetbaar, maar feit is dat vrijwel alle gearresteerde christenen na korte tijd weer zijn vrijgelaten, evenals de vader van de naar Nederland gevluchte journalist Motallebi. Dat neemt niet weg dat van dergelijke arrestaties een intimiderende werking uitgaat.

Ten slotte zet het Nederlandse Voorzitterschap de activiteiten voort ter voorbereiding op co-sponsoring door de EU van een Canadese resolutie over de mensenrechtensituatie in Iran in de Derde Commissie van de AVVN.

Nederland en de EU zullen zich actief blijven inzetten voor de naleving van de mensenrechten in Iran.

US State Department

The Bush Administration's Forward Strategy for Nonproliferation

by John R. Bolton, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security
Chicago, Illinois – 19 October 2004

[...] North Korea and Iran

Libya is a powerful precedent that a state can surrender WMD without a regime change. This message puts in stark relief the obfuscation of the North Korean and Iranian governments in the face of international pressure to "come clean" [i.e., admit what they have done] and give up their nuclear programs. While we are working diplomatically on both fronts to keep the pressure on -- with Six Party Talks in the North Korean context and the International Atomic Energy Agency investigation in the Iranian context --- our ultimate objective is to ensure these programs do not come to full fruition.

We cannot let Iran, a leading sponsor of international terrorism, acquire nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them to Europe, central Asia and the Middle East, and beyond. Without serious, concerted, immediate intervention by the international community, Iran will proceed down that road. While we work to bring this issue to the U.N. Security Council, we are simultaneously pursuing other measures to bring a halt to Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons, including PSI efforts, worldwide diplomatic efforts including with Russia, the supplier of Iran's Bushehr reactor, and improved enforcement against exports to Iran.

With North Korea, the approach is different again. Sadly, the leader of North Korea has not made that strategic choice to move away from the destructive legacies of the past and place his people first. He still fails to recognize what Libya determined -- that his pursuit of weapons of mass destruction makes North Korea less, not more, secure. We have a framework for negotiations with the DPRK in place: the Six-Party Talks. While the Six-Party Talks are a means to an end, we still believe it is the best venue at this time to realize the shared goal of all countries participating --- namely, a Korean Peninsula permanently free of nuclear weapons ... [...]

Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Antwoorden van de heer Bot, minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, op vragen van het lid Karimi (Groen Links) over de levering door de Verenigde Staten aan Israël van mogelijk te Iran in te zetten 'slimmere bommen' (ingezonden 1 oktober 2004)

DVB/NN-446-04 – 19 oktober 2004

1. Heeft u het bericht gelezen dat de Verenigde Staten 5000 zogenaamde 'slimme' bommen - waaronder 500 bunker busters - willen leveren aan Israël?¹ Kunt u de Kamer informeren over de informatie die de Amerikaanse minister van Defensie aan het Amerikaanse Congres heeft gegeven ter onderbouwing van deze militaire transactie?

Antwoord: Ja. De door het Amerikaanse ministerie van Defensie aan het Amerikaanse Congres verstrekte (openbare) notificatie over de mogelijke verkoop van onderhavige munitie treft u bijgevoegd aan. De notificatie is gepubliceerd op <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/>.

2. Zijn u Israëlische plannen, ideeën en voornemens bekend over een aanval op nucleaire installaties in Iran?
3. Wat is de positie van de EU ten aanzien van de geuite bedreigingen van Israël tegen Iran, gezien de koers die de EU vaart ten aanzien van het Iraanse nucleaire programma?

7. Zijn bij u andere plannen van de Verenigde Staten of Israël bekend over een eventuele militaire actie tegen Iran? Hebben de leden van de Verenigde Staten administratie of van de Israëlische regering zich in gesprekken met elkaar geuit over een eventuele aanval op Iran dan wel van voorbereidingen op een dergelijke aanval?

Antwoord: Nee. Mij zijn dergelijke plannen en dreigementen niet bekend.

4. Hoe beoordeelt u de transactie tussen de Verenigde Staten en Israël in het licht van uw pleidooi voor een versterkt multilateralisme, ook als het gaat om non-proliferatiezaken?

Antwoord: Het betreft een voorgenomen bilaterale transactie van conventioneel militair materieel. Ik beschik niet over informatie die aanleiding geeft een verband te leggen tussen deze leverantie en mijn pleidooi voor een 'versterkt multilateralisme'.

5. Deelt u de mening dat de positie van zowel het International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) als de Verenigde Naties (VN), als waakhond voor een wereldwijde non-proliferatie, in zijn geheel wordt uitgehold op het moment dat de Verenigde Staten aan Israël (dat zelf een kernwapenstaat is en geen partij is bij het non-proliferatie verdrag) bommen leveren ten behoeve van een aanval op Iran?

6. Bent u bereid deze zorgwekkende ontwikkelingen, die leiden tot een verhoogde escalatie en een intensievere wapenenwedloop in het Midden-Oosten, te agenderen bij uw EU-collega's? Bent u tevens bereid bij de administratie van de Verenigde Staten te pleiten van deze transactie af te zien omdat deze transactie een escalatiekoers betekent en de IAEA voor de voeten loopt?

Antwoord: Zoals ik in het antwoord op vraag 2, 4 en 7 reeds heb aangegeven zijn mij geen plannen bekend voor een aanval op Iran en beschik ik evenmin over informatie dat de door u genoemde leverantie met dat doel is gedaan. Overigens blijft de regering Israël oproepen zo spoedig mogelijk tot het Non-Proliferatie Verdrag toe te treden als niet-kernwapenstaat.

De situatie in het Midden-Oosten is regelmatig onderwerp van gesprek met mijn EU-collega's. Daarbij komen alle relevante thema's aan de orde. Zo ook de spanning tussen Israël en zijn Arabische burens en Iran.

8. Zullen de activiteiten van het Nederlandse fregat dat in het kader van de operatie Enduring Freedom naar de Straat van Hormoez is uitgezonden zich richten op voorbereidingen ten behoeve van acties tegen Iran?

Antwoord: Neen.

Noot: 1. NRC Handelsblad, 22 september jl.

US State Department

State Department noon briefing

by spokesman Richard Boucher – 20 October 2004

[...] QUESTION: Do you any newer view of the proposal the Europeans are going to make to Iran, some goodies to get them to do what they promised to do a long time ago, halt the enrichment of uranium?

MR. BOUCHER: No, I don't. I don't --

QUESTION: Tomorrow's the day.

MR. BOUCHER: That's our understanding. They told us on Friday they would be making their -- they would be talking to the Iranians this week. It's a European proposal. You'll have to ask them about it.

QUESTION: What's your view of the European proposal, which I presume that you -- well, what's your view of the --

MR. BOUCHER: Our view is that it's a European proposal, that it's for them to describe, for them to make. We haven't bought on, signed on or endorsed it, but we know they're going to do it, and they like -- and, as allies, we've kept each other informed of what we're doing, what our views are.

Our view remains the same: that Iran has shown, unfortunately, no sign of compliance with the requirements of the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors; they have shown a long-term effort to -- a long-term effort not to comply with the requirements of the safeguards and other agreements; and therefore, they need to be referred to the UN Security Council.

QUESTION: Right. But in this package that the Europeans shared with you, there is the provision for, if -- for giving Iran light-water reactor technology and other assistance in that way, if they come into compliance. And this appears to be strikingly similar to the kind of deal that you guys had with the North Koreans, which didn't work out. So I'm just wondering if you -- do you have similar concerns about the Iranians following through on their end of the bargain with the Europeans as you obviously have with the North Koreans and the Agreed Framework?

MR. BOUCHER: A couple of things to say: First of all, to repeat once again, this is a European proposal. What's in it, what they're going to propose, what they're going to say, is up to them, and they're going to tell you if anybody is going to tell you.

Second of all, I don't think the two circumstances are comparable, North Korea and Iran, because the histories are different, and although the pattern, to some extent, the pattern of violations of commitments and agreements is similar. But they are situations -- each has to be handled on its own merits and its own fashion based on a lot of different factors.

But third of all, I would say that the fundamental premise of the question is true, that we have long had concerns about Iran's acquisition of nuclear capability, of nuclear technology, because for many years we have seen a confirmed pattern of noncompliance with safeguards; we have seen the use of nuclear exchanges, nuclear technology, in order to develop what we can only describe is a nuclear weapons program. And therefore, we have been concerned and would remain concerned about Iran acquiring new capability and -- new capability in nuclear technology areas.

QUESTION: Okay. So your general proliferation concerns, though, are not or are spiked by the prospect of Europeans running around handing out light-water reactor technology?

MR. BOUCHER: Once again, if you think the Europeans are running around handing out light-water reactor technology, first of all, you'll have to get that confirmed by the Europeans.

QUESTION: I'm not asking for your confirmation. We already know this out of Vienna. I'm not -- so I'm asking for you to comment.

MR. BOUCHER: You're asking me to comment on something that I don't think --

QUESTION: I'm asking you to comment on something that you were presented with last week on Friday that you have seen.

MR. BOUCHER: And we're not going to be the vehicle for talking about what they presented to us.

QUESTION: I'm not asking -- they already talked about it, Richard. It's out.

MR. BOUCHER: They have not talked about it, as far as I can tell. I think there was --

QUESTION: You have not seen reports on --

MR. BOUCHER: I have seen a wire service report that pretends -- purports to quote from a paper that the Europeans have. Okay? Now, the wire service in this case may be correct and it may not be, but --

QUESTION: Well, I think you've probably seen several wire service reports.

MR. BOUCHER: I've only seen one. I'm sure all the wires have it by now. What I'm trying to tell you, Matt, is that I'm not here to comment on something the Europeans may be presenting because what the Europeans present and versus -- you know, drafts versus thoughts versus things they talk to us about versus things they might actually present tomorrow to the Iranians may -- I don't know exactly what they are going to present. We'll hear back from them after they do it.

But the bottom line for us has been and continues to be that the problem is Iran. The problem is Iran's noncompliance. The problem is that Iran, whatever the Europeans present, has had a consistent pattern of noncompliance and shows no inclination or effort to break that pattern of noncompliance, and that the issue needs to remain in focus, that the issue is not what might the Europeans be prepared to do if Iran were to comply fully, but is Iran going to comply fully or not, and I'm afraid the U.S. view is based on experience, based on the history of Iran.

Our view is that any discussion at this point of what might happen if the Iranians complied is probably pretty hypothetical because, consistently, the Iranians have shown a pattern of not being willing to comply and of not being willing to be transparent and open about their intentions and programs.

QUESTION: Do you think it's possible that the Europeans are going to go in tomorrow and present the Iranians with something different than they told you they were going to do? Because that strikes me as being, you know, a little bit distrustful.

MR. BOUCHER: I don't know what their final proposal is going to be. I would expect it to be very similar to what they briefed us on, yes. But I can't confirm on their behalf what they're really going to present.

QUESTION: And you're, but you're not -- and you're saying that it's strictly a European proposal. Are you suggesting that the United States has no interest in this?

MR. BOUCHER: We obviously have an interest. We are friends and allies, we're cooperating in all these matters, but it is a European proposal and not one that we have --

QUESTION: Right, but then, so I don't understand how you can say you don't have any opinion about it. I think it's a --

MR. BOUCHER: I didn't say we didn't have any opinion. I said that the -- our opinion is the problems with the Iranians, still, and that we're not at the point of trying to comment one way or the other on what the Europeans might provide.

QUESTION: I mean, one likely scenario is that the Iranians could agree in principle to some parts of the proposal, but not comply once again. How do we avoid the merry-go-round of not complying?

MR. BOUCHER: Because the issue, as framed by the International Atomic Energy Agency Board in September, is that Iran needs to comply and show evidence of real compliance before the next Board meeting in November; otherwise, the Board will have to make the decision of referral to the UN Security Council. That's the decision that we have put forward and one that we long ago supported.

And therefore, we realize there may be varying statements coming out of the Iranians in this up-and-coming period. I think what the Europeans have made clear, what we have made clear, what we all made clear together as the G-8 in Sea Island, was that the Iranians must bring their program into conformity with all the NPT safeguards and obligations that they have and all the IAEA Board requirements. And in September, we made clear in the resolution at the Board, Iran had to do that before the next meeting in November.

QUESTION: So regardless of what happens with the European proposal, the Iranians still have to do that?

MR. BOUCHER: The United States, the Europeans, the Board of the IAEA, remain united that the Iranians still have to meet all the requirements of the Board, and remain united behind the resolution that was passed in September that that needs to be done; the Iranians need to do that before the November meeting. So regardless of what people might say, regardless of what people might offer or float with the Iranians, the issue, fundamentally, comes down to: Is Iran going to meet all these requirements by the next Board meeting? And that's something that, as I said, history and experience guide us in our predictions.

Yeah.

QUESTION: If U.S. policy toward Iran is eventually successful and Iran comes into compliance, does the U.S., in principle, accept that they can have a light-water reactor?

MR. BOUCHER: That is so hypothetical that I would not want to say anything at this point --

QUESTION: Hypothetical about the U.S. policy being successful? That's what you're goal is.

MR. BOUCHER: I realize that's what our goal is, but we are also realistic enough to understand that Iran has shown no willingness or indication that it would comply with these requirements. And, unfortunately, that noncompliance persists to this day.

QUESTION: So your message to them is that they can't have -- you object to them having a light-water reactor?

MR. BOUCHER: Our message has been twofold, threefold, fourfold, I don't know. Anyway, all of the things that I have just said to you: First of all, that the issue is Iranian compliance. Whatever they say, whatever is offered, whatever is discussed, the issue is Iranian compliance with all the requirements.

Second of all, that we have been and remain concerned about Iran acquiring new technologies and capabilities in the nuclear area.

Third of all, I think we've made clear over the years that we don't see the economic or any other rationale for a country like Iran to try to generate power with nuclear energy, given that they, you know, we have often said that they flare off way more gas every year than they could get energy from nuclear power plants of the kind that they're talking about.

So we fundamentally have concerns about Iran acquiring more nuclear technology and capability, but the issue that we face is if Iran is going to comply. And at this point, Iranian compliance doesn't seem likely or in the cards, based on Iran's history and their current expressions and things that they're saying and doing right now. So if they do comply, then we'll face that situation and deal with it accordingly.

QUESTION: So it sounds as though the United States does not believe that Iran should have even a civilian nuclear power program because you say that it doesn't need it. Correct?

MR. BOUCHER: We have said they don't need it.

QUESTION: Right. And so therefore they shouldn't have one.

MR. BOUCHER: No, I've said exactly what I just said, and I'm not going to try to start speculating about things that are not coming to pass at this point.

QUESTION: Well, but your comment suggests that you would be opposed to them getting -- that you have concerns about them acquiring any kind of nuclear technology, including -- and that would include things for civilian power production. So I'm just -- and which would necessarily include a European offer, were there one, for a light-water reactor, which then means that you are opposed to the Iranians having any kind of nuclear power plant.

MR. BOUCHER: I think I'm not -- you're taking this four steps down the road. If, one day, we can stand up here and say, look, the Iranians have complied with all the requirements of the IAEA, that they have met the requirements of the Board, that they have ended their nuclear enrichment programs, that they have, you know, done everything that they ever promised people and then broke promises on, then I'll be happy to entertain questions about what kind of nuclear technology they should or should not acquire. But I just think we're so far from that point that it doesn't do us a whole lot of good to speculate on that at this point.

QUESTION: Just to understand the U.S. policy, is the U.S. policy goal limited to only having Iran comply, or is it broader that Iran should be denuclearized the way that's your policy with North Korea?

MR. BOUCHER: The U.S. goal has been and continues to be that Iran should comply with all the requirements of the NPT in terms of obligations and safeguards, that Iran should promptly and fully comply with its commitments and with all IAEA Board requirements. It's not only the U.S. goal; it's the G-8 goal that we stated together at Sea Island.

QUESTION: And it's no broader than that?

MR. BOUCHER: That's the exact terms that we put it in. [...]

US State Department

State Department noon briefing

by spokesman Richard Boucher – 21 October 2004

[...] QUESTION: Different subject. The meeting in Vienna was held today. I guess it's probably a bit early, but I'll try anyway.

MR. BOUCHER: Early?

QUESTION: No, you haven't -- in fact, you said the Europeans would get --

MR. BOUCHER: The Europeans meetings, the meetings between the Europeans and the Iranians evidently have taken place in Vienna. We have seen a bit of press reporting at this point. I'm sure the Europeans, while the Europeans have been in touch in recent days, and I'm sure they will be in touch either today or tomorrow, and we'll hear more from them about the meeting again.

But the important thing about the meeting is what the Iranians say now or after they consult as to whether or not, yes or no -- are they going to comply with the requirements of the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Directors? Are they going to carry out their obligations, or not? And that's what we'll be looking for.

I don't know if it'll come today. I don't know if it'll come tomorrow. Unfortunately, history would lead us to think the answer is going to be no.

QUESTION: Are you concerned that the way this is being presented may not lend itself to yes or no, but to, "Let's talk about it again next week, and the week after, maybe the week after that." (Inaudible) for a delay?

MR. BOUCHER: I think we'll all be able to judge -- well, we'll all be able to judge the kind of circumstances and statements in which responses come out. Is it a yes? Is it a yes is a much, even simpler question than, is it yes or no. And if it's not a yes, and it's not a yes by November, then clearly we'll be facing a situation in the Board where everybody knows that Iran has failed to comply and, as the Board said in September, the matter should be referred further to the UN Security Council. I think it'll, you know, that's the question. The question is on the Iranian side.

As far as the clarity of the Europeans, nothing could have been clearer than what the G-8 said collectively in June, and I think what the Europeans themselves have made clear, that whatever the elements of their package that they are insisting on full, on Iran meeting fully its obligations and requirements from the Board. Yeah.

QUESTION: When you said you need a clear answer by November, did you mean November 25th, the board meeting, or the beginning of November?

MR. BOUCHER: Well, we think it should have come by last November, but the board meeting is set up in such a way that the -- I think the board -- the Director General has to report and then the countries will face it at the board meeting on the 25th. [...]

US State Department

Interview with Secretary of State Colin L. Powell

On the Tony Snow Show – 22 October 2004

[...] MR. SNOW: All right, and a final question here: Iran. Anything we can do?

SECRETARY POWELL: We are waiting to get a report back from our European friends who met with the Iranians yesterday in Vienna. And what they essentially said to the Iranians is, you've got to stop your enrichment activity. You've got to suspend it for a long period of time or cease it, but you can't keep moving in this direction without risking further action on the part of the international community.

We believe that further action is required now and the matter should be referred by the International Atomic Energy Agency to the Security Council. And we think it's in Iran's best interest to move away from these programs and enjoy the benefits that will come from having better standing within the international community.

MR. SNOW: All right.

SECRETARY POWELL: And we hope that that's what they will decide to do. But you know, they are also a difficult country to understand or to reason with in such matters, and the international community stays engaged. [...]

US State Department

Interview with Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage

with Saad Mohammad of Kuwait News Agency – 22 October 2004

[...] MR. MOHAMMAD: Mr. Secretary, let me move to Iran, the nuclear issue. And apparently that the Europeans are, they've started talks with Iran and they have their own proposal. Now, does the United States accept this proposal, recognize this proposal?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: We consulted with them. The Europeans friends came here and we had a meeting of the political directors. We saw what they were suggesting. We are skeptical of it, but we'll be glad to have them go make their presentation. They were going to do it anyway. Come back and they've indicated they'll inform us and then we'll see if there's anything in it. I think we're skeptical, I think they're a little skeptical. But we have to await the results. Our view is quite clear: An Iran with a nuclear weapons program, and we do believe that they have a nuclear weapons program, a program that is destabilizing to the region and, indeed, to the world. And she shouldn't ought to be behaving that way.

MR. MOHAMMAD: Do you see Iran as an imminent threat to the Gulf region after the downfall of Saddam Hussein?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: I was heavily involved in the Defense Department during the '80s, and I was spending the majority of my time with Kuwaiti and Saudi and Jordanian, many friends, and they were telling me constantly about the threat. Now, if they feel a threat, and they're the ones in the immediate neighborhood, then I think we should feel a threat.

We would like an Iran that was not a threat to our neighbors and had no hegemonistic attitudes. We do keep an eye on it. But as I say, we consult quite often with all our friends in the Gulf and we hear a lot about Iran. [...]

US State Department

Interview with Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage

by Salameh Nematt of Al Hayat – 25 October 2004

[...] MR. NEMATT: Any progress on the Iran nuclear front? Signs from Iran that it might be accepting the European deal?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Well, I've seen some leaks to that regard, but I think we have to let the Europeans go back on the 27th to Tehran and receive the answer of the Iranians, and then we'll be glad to listen to what the EU-3 has to say. We remain skeptical of the Iranians, as you know -- that I trust you know. I'd be surprised if you didn't know.

[...]

MR. NEMATT: Do you have assurances from the Israelis they won't intervene militarily in Syria or Iraq -- Iran, with relationship to the nuclear -- ?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: No sovereign country is going to unilaterally give up their right to self-defense, period.

MR. NEMATT: So the answer is no, you have no assurances?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: The answer is, I would not ask them or expect them to. No country unilaterally give up their rights to self-defense. Now, having said that, we have a very close relationship with Israel and would expect Israel to consult with us if anything were going to happen, but we have not asked Israel to give up its unilateral right to self-defense.

MR. NEMATT: Did they communicate their concern that they might -- that they feel threatened by the Iranian, you know, launch the new missile on (inaudible)?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Well, I think it's not just Israel that feels threatened. I think many countries in the Gulf have historically been threatened from Iran and do feel threatened. I think many minds in Europe are coming to the view that Iran, if allowed to develop nuclear weapons and delivery systems, which she already apparently has, is a threat to European interests. So don't put Israel alone in that. [...]

US State Department

State Department noon briefing

by spokesman Adam Ereli – 26 October 2004

[...] QUESTION: Did you see anything interesting in Iran's latest hint that it might stop enriching uranium in the right circumstances?

MR. ERELI: It would be really speculative at this point. There will be a meeting with the EU-3 and Iran in Vienna tomorrow, I believe, and we will look forward to hearing about the outcome of that meeting from our European friends and seeing what happens. [...]

US State Department

State Department noon briefing

by spokesman Richard Boucher – 27 October 2004

[...] QUESTION: It looks like the EU-3 and Iran are talking, failed to reach agreement on Iran halting its nuclear program, but they're going to continue talking and Iran says it might consider an indefinite freeze. Do you want to --

MR. BOUCHER: Well, that's more of a readout of the talks than we've gotten so far, and more than I've seen in the wire services. I think I've only seen the briefest of comments at this point from the participants. We will look to hear from the participants from the EU-3 about their discussions today with the Iranians in Vienna.

We had talked to them extensively after the first meeting that they had in Vienna, and we look forward to talking to them after this one. So we'll hear more from them, I'm sure, in coming days.

As you know, our view has been that Iran's enrichment programs; its past activities justified a referral to the United Nations. That remains our position. At this point, we have not seen anything different, but -- in terms of Iranian commitments or behavior and we, we'll have to see how the meeting went today, but I think it's a little too early to start making judgments based on this particular meeting.

QUESTION: Well, can you weigh in on the idea of a freeze of the enrichment program? I mean you've been willing to consider that in North Korea, why wouldn't it be applicable for Iran?

MR. BOUCHER: Because they're different places. They're different places, they're different programs. They've been done in different ways. And we have made clear, in North Korea's case; a freeze is merely a step to elimination. In Iran's case, you can ask the Europeans in more detail of what they were asking for.

But I think if you look at the Board of Governors resolutions, the Board of Governors, the whole Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency has asked for Iran for an indefinite suspension of all enrichment activities. And that is what, in fact, Iran had previously agreed to, and subsequently gone back on its word. So that doesn't change what the Board of Governors has asked for because that, in the Board of Governors' view, including ours, is the only way that the international community can have some clarity about Iranian intentions, some clarity that Iran is no longer conducting the kind of nuclear weapons programs it has conducted in the past. [...]

US State Department

Interview with Secretary of State Colin L. Powell

by Ron Insana of CNBC – 27 October 2004

[...] MR. INSANA: The other hot spot, again, not only for the financial markets but for the world, Iran, seems to be approaching a point where we could find ourselves at a critical moment -- the Europeans trying to cut a deal with them to suspend their enriched -- uranium enrichment program. We can't tell if they're willing to agree. And the Israelis presumably are getting very itchy, we are told, some time this winter, to take steps that would eliminate the possibility of Iran having nuclear weapons.

Where are we? How close to a real problem? Would the U.S. support Israeli action to do something in that regard?

SECRETARY POWELL: You know, first of all, Iran is moving in the direction of a nuclear weapon. They are putting together a program that could produce such a weapon. I don't think it's something they can do overnight or in the next several months, as some people suggest. It's going to take them time.

But we have been working with the international community, the IAEA, to report this matter to the Security Council, and we have been working with our friends in the European Union, the EU-3, as they are called, France, Germany and the United Kingdom, to get the Iranians to come into compliance with their IAEA obligations and to do what they said they would do when they came into an agreement with the European Union last year. The European Union has now gone back to the Iranians, and we'll see what the Iranians say.

But I think it's time for this matter to be reserved -- reversed -- excuse me -- referred to the Security Council for it to be considered there. It is not in the interests of the region or the world for Iran to be moving in this direction. And there's a lot of speculation and horror stories and other stories about what this might lead to in the way of crisis, and part of that speculation is that the Israelis might do something or not do something. I have no information on that and I think the whole world, to include Israel, is trying to find a diplomatic and peaceful solution to this problem. [...]

Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Antwoord van de heer Bot, minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, op vragen van het lid Ormel (CDA) over reikwijdte ballistische raketten Iran

288 – 28 oktober 2004

1. Bent u ervan op de hoogte dat de Iraanse ex-president Rafsanjani bekend heeft gemaakt dat Iran de beschikking heeft over ballistische raketten met een reikwijdte van tweeduizend kilometer?¹

Antwoord: Ja

2. Acht u deze mededeling van Rafsanjani betrouwbaar?

Antwoord: Ja. Er heeft inmiddels een proeflancering plaatsgehad.

3. Deelt u de mening dat, indien de bewering van Rafsanjani op waarheid berust, dit een zeer verontrustende ontwikkeling is, zeker gezien het feit dat Iran met de nieuwe ballistische raketten Israël, Zuidoost-Europa en Amerikaanse militaire bases in het Midden-Oosten kan bereiken?

Antwoord: Het feit dat Iran over wapens met een dergelijk bereik beschikt, is verontrustend (zie ook het antwoord op vraag 5).

4. Kunt u aangeven om hoeveel raketten het gaat en waar deze gestationeerd zijn? Zo neen, bent u bereid hier onderzoek naar te (doen) verrichten en de Tweede Kamer hierover zo spoedig mogelijk te informeren?

Antwoord: Het is niet bekend om hoeveel raketten het gaat en waar deze zijn gestationeerd. Er wordt onderzoek gedaan naar de status van het Iraanse ballistische rakettenprogramma, zie ook het jaarverslag over 2003 van de Militaire Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst. Er zullen gezien de aard van dit onderzoek geen mededelingen worden gedaan aan de Kamer. Wel zal zondig de Commissie voor de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten op de hoogte worden gebracht.

5. Bent u bereid de Iraanse autoriteiten om opheldering te vragen over het feit dat Iran over verbeterde Shahab-raketten beschikt en bent u voorts bereid uw bezorgdheid over de beschikking van Iran over deze raketten uit te spreken?

Antwoord: Iran wordt regelmatig gewezen op de zorg die het Iraanse raketprogramma baart, met name vanwege de regionale dreiging die daarvan uitgaat en de mogelijk destabiliserende effecten die dit programma in dat verband zou kunnen hebben.

6. Welke relatie ziet u tussen de Iraanse informatie over deze ballistische raketten en de bij het International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) bekende informatie over nucleaire proliferatie in relatie tot het Iraanse nucleaire programma?

Antwoord: Het IAEA-onderzoek richt zich met name op het Iraanse nucleaire programma, en heeft geen feiten aan het licht gebracht die duiden op een relatie met het Iraanse raketprogramma.

Noot: 1. De Telegraaf, 7 oktober jl.

US State Department

State Department noon briefing

by spokesman Richard Boucher – 28 October 2004

[...] QUESTION: About Iran. Has Secretary Powell talked to any of the EU-3, and have they shared with him that the talks are going to resume on November 5th?

MR. BOUCHER: The Secretary hasn't gotten any direct phone calls from his counterparts, but we've certainly been in touch at other levels, both through our mission in Vienna and directly with some of the people back in Washington who work with the EU-3. And so we're starting to get reports from them about their conversations with the Iranians yesterday. We do understand they'll be meeting again soon. And we'll just leave it at that for the moment. I don't think there is anything new to report from our side. [...]

US State Department

State Department noon briefing

by spokesman Richard Boucher – 29 October 2004

[...] QUESTION: Well, somehow, the European talks with Iran have slipped off the scope. There's nothing coming from there and I wondered if you got a report from them and some sort of a size-up of -- is it what we see that Iran is saying? You know, no total suspension of enrichment?

MR. BOUCHER: I've seen a lot of different statements from the Iranians, most of them saying that they're not going to suspend or end these programs. The Europeans have had some discussions with the Iranians, now two sets of discussions. We have been hearing from the Europeans. We've talked to them. We've heard about their meetings. They will continue to conduct these meetings and have another meeting soon, we expect, but at this point I really don't have anything to report. There is no particular commitment from the Iranians that I'm aware of that's been made.

QUESTION: Commitment --

MR. BOUCHER: As we've always said, the issue is whether Iran commits to do what is required by the IAEA Board, and at this point they're just not.

QUESTION: No, I meant immediately. They are --

MR. BOUCHER: Well, they are apparently going to meet again soon. That's what we're told.

QUESTION: And you have no -- do you have any --

MR. BOUCHER: I'm not going to be able to brief on their meetings if they're not doing it.

QUESTION: Well, not on the meetings. I mean, don't you think this is sort of, some sort of a slowdown process to prevent a final judgment?

MR. BOUCHER: The fact of the matter is that in September the IAEA board said when we come to the November meeting we want to have a definitive report on whether Iran is or is not meeting the Board's requirements. That is the expectation that we will all have. Iran needs to agree to that and we need to -- it needs to be able to put the IAEA in a position to verify and report it.

So yes, time is running out on the Iranians, but at the same time these discussions will continue and we will see where we are in November, whether or not Iran has met the requirement. That's the issue and it's a simple issue, as far as we're concerned.

QUESTION: Okay, a senior Iranian official is quoted in Tehran as saying that he thinks that even if you do eventually refer the matter to the Security Council, there's maybe a ten percent chance that Iran would actually face sanctions. Do you want to try to disabuse him of that notion or do you agree that if it goes to the Security Council there will probably just be a lot of thinking and then no sanctions?

MR. BOUCHER: First of all, there's a lot of different things the Security Council can do with it once it gets it. I would just -- I don't know who this senior official is, whether he's named or unnamed.

QUESTION: I don't have the name. I'm sorry.

MR. BOUCHER: Okay. But in any case, I would say that at least some of the Iranian Government seemed to have gone to great lengths to argue against referral to the Security Council for over a year. And I guess there are many, perhaps, others in Iran, in Tehran, that are more concerned than this particular gentleman.

Tammy.

QUESTION: Is the U.S. aware of the offer that the IAEA has reportedly made to Iran to guarantee a supply of fuel for their reactors? And what's your reaction to such a move?

MR. BOUCHER: I don't know that -- I think you'll have to check with the IAEA as to whether there's a particular offer on their behalf. It has been a feature of the discussions that, as you know, the Russians, in terms of their supply of fuel, the Europeans, in terms of how they have discussed, I think, in public, their potential cooperation with Iran, and the IAEA, that in order to reassure the world that Iran's not going to conduct enrichment activities that lead to the possibility of nuclear weapons, the best way to do that is to have a supply in of fuel and a of taking back of spent fuel. That's the arrangements the Russians have proposed for the power plants that they're building, so -- and it's always been our understanding that the IAEA would have a role in whatever is worked out with Iran, whatever Iran needs to do. I mean, Iran, even if it's referred to the Security Council, the IAEA still has a role in verifying, describing, looking at what is going on in Iran and trying to get -- to ascertain whether or not Iran is meeting its commitments. So -- I guess we saw the report this morning that sort of stems from the logic of everything we've seen, but it doesn't -- I'm not in a position to say that there's a particular offer like that being made.

QUESTION: Do you happen to know if experts, American experts, feel secure that there can be verification of uranium enrichment so as to discern the point at which the intensity of the enrichment packed -- moves into the weapons preparation stage? You have to get its confidence --

MR. BOUCHER: That's not what we're thinking about. The IAEA Board has asked --

QUESTION: No, I know.

MR. BOUCHER: -- has demanded of Iran that it suspend all enrichment activity, period. That's the standard we expect Iran to meet, because of these concerns that anything short of that would still leave a lot of concerns on our part and the part of others that Iran was continuing to pursue a weapons program. [...]

Tweede Kamer

Verslag van een wetgevingsoverleg – behandeling begroting Buitenlandse Zaken

29800 V - 1 november 2004

[...] De heer **Ormel** (CDA): [...] Laten wij ook niet naïef zijn ten opzichte van Iran. Dit land voorziet Hezbollah van directe steun. Dit land infiltreert in Irak en zorgt voor terreur en talloze doden. Dit land schendt op grote schaal de mensenrechten en het zal niet nalaten om terroristen die het gemunt hebben op de grote satan Amerika en de kleine satan Israël, te steunen. Nu staat dit land op het punt om uranium te verrijken, waardoor het de wereld kan chanteren. De CDA-fractie beschouwt het niet voldoen aan voorwaarden van de IAEA door Iran als uitermate zorgwekkend. Iran heeft te voldoen aan de verplichtingen van het Non-proliferatieverdrag dat het heeft medeondertekend.

Drie EU-lidstaten hebben onderhandeld met Iran en hebben economische banden willen verstevigen in ruil voor de belofte dat geen uranium verrijkt wordt. Ik bespeur de schaduw van Chamberlain. Iran gaat hier niet op in. Ayatollahs zijn niet te vertrouwen en het is uitermate triest dat het Iraanse volk zucht onder dit fundamentalistische regime. De CDA-fractie vraagt de toezegging van de minister dat hij zal pleiten om Iran voor de Veiligheidsraad te brengen, indien uit het IAEA-rapport blijkt dat Iran niet aan de verplichtingen van het Non-proliferatieverdrag voldoet.

De heer **Koenders** (PvdA): Ik dacht even dat ik de heer Wilders hoorde spreken. De heer Ormel had het namelijk over de geest van Chamberlain, de ayatollahs en ik weet niet wat allemaal. Het was in ieder geval niet best. Ook wij maken ons natuurlijk zorgen over het nucleaire programma in Iran. Toch wil ik een aantal verduidelijkingen horen van de heer Ormel. Ten eerste zegt hij dat Iran het Non-proliferatieverdrag op het ogenblik overtreedt. Volgens mij is dat niet het geval. Ik vraag mij af waar hij dat op baseert. Heeft hij geheime inlichtingen of is er iets anders waar wij verder niets van weten? Ik wil dus graag weten waar hij de stelling die hij vandaag heeft betrokken, vandaan haalt. Ten tweede vindt de heer Ormel het wellicht ook zinnig om de Nederlandse regering nu in het licht van uitlatingen vanuit Iran -- ik erken overigens dat die negatief zijn -- te verzoeken om te bezien in hoeverre de onderhandelingen die gevoerd worden in het kader van de indamming van Iran, nog een stukje verder gevoerd kunnen worden. Ter derde wil ik hem vragen of

hij het met mij eens is dat de oorlog in Irak de positie van Iran aardig versterkt heeft en waarom hij destijds niet met ons is opgetrokken toen wij zeiden dat dit een van de grote risico's was van de oorlog.

De heer **Ormel** (CDA): In antwoord op uw eerste vraag kan ik zeggen dat er sporen van verrijkt uranium zijn gevonden in Iran. Iran bouwt een ondergrondse kerncentrale in Natans die tegen allerlei bommen bestand is. Iran heeft een kerncentrale in Bushehr. Iran houdt grootschalige oefeningen rond Natans. Iran heeft daar luchtverdedigingswapens opgesteld. Wees toch niet naïef, mijnheer Koenders.

De heer **Koenders** (PvdA): Laten wij nou niet beginnen over naïviteit, want dat ken ik al van Irak. Toen hadden wij precies dezelfde discussie en toen werd ik ook voor naïef versleten, terwijl er later inderdaad geen wapens bleken te zijn. Ik ben helemaal niet naïef over Iran. Ik vraag u gewoon precies waar Iran het Non-proliferatieverdrag heeft overtreden. Alle feiten die u noemt, zijn ernstig en behoren ook serieus te worden geagendeerd door de Europese ministers. Daar waar het IAEA echter zelf heeft aangegeven dat Iran het Non-proliferatieverdrag op dit moment niet overtreedt, vraag ik u nogmaals waar u de informatie vandaan haalt dat dit wel het geval is.

De heer **Ormel** (CDA): De heer El Baradei, voorzitter van het IAEA, waarschuwt niet voor niets voortdurend.

De heer **Koenders** (PvdA): Ik krijg graag antwoord op mijn zeer concrete vraag. Ik heb de heer El Baradei opgevoerd. Ik heb zelfs gezegd dat hij wellicht in aanmerking komt voor de Nobelprijs. Op welke punten overtreedt Iran het non-proliferatieverdrag?

De heer **Ormel** (CDA): Er zijn sporen van verrijkt uranium gevonden.

De heer **Koenders** (PvdA): Mag dat niet?

De heer **Ormel** (CDA): Iran kan niet duidelijk maken waar die sporen vandaan komen.

De heer **Koenders** (PvdA): Dan zijn wij al een stuk verder. Wij vinden beiden dat dit moet worden aangegeven. Via inspecties en het uitoefenen van druk zullen wij daarover helderheid moeten krijgen. U moet echter niet nu al, op grond van feiten die u niet kent, zeggen dat Iran het non-proliferatieverdrag overtreedt. Als u dat doet, komen wij in een verkeerde spiraal terecht. Wij hebben dezelfde zorgen, maar wij moeten ons wel aan de feiten houden. U begint al met het verdraaien van de feiten.

De heer **Ormel** (CDA): Er zijn genoeg feiten bekend, mijnheer Koenders. U moet niet naïef zijn.

Mevrouw **Karimi** (GroenLinks): In deze discussie moeten wij ons baseren op feiten. Er is een plausibele verklaring voor de sporen van het verrijkt uranium, namelijk dat die afkomstig zijn van Pakistan. Ik heb echter een andere vraag. U zegt dat dit dossier naar de Veiligheidsraad moet, maar wat dan?

De heer **Ormel** (CDA): Als blijkt dat Iran doorgaat met het verrijken van uranium en dus echt een bedreiging vormt, moeten sancties worden overwogen.

Mevrouw **Karimi** (GroenLinks): Voor welke sancties pleit u dan?

De heer **Ormel** (CDA): Dat is aan de Veiligheidsraad.

Mevrouw **Karimi** (GroenLinks): De CDA-fractie vindt dat al op 25 november gepleit moet worden voor overdracht van dit dossier aan de Veiligheidsraad.

De heer **Ormel** (CDA): Als het IAEA op 25 november constateert dat er niets aan de hand is en dat Iran aan zijn verdragsverplichtingen voldoet, is dat natuurlijk uitstekend. Als echter opnieuw blijkt dat Iran niet aan zijn verplichtingen voldoet, moet de zaak worden doorgeleid naar de Veiligheidsraad.

Mevrouw **Karimi** (GroenLinks): Met welke bedoeling? U bent politicus. U neemt stelling namens de grootste regeringspartij. Ik neem aan dat u erover heeft nagedacht. Wat wilt u bereiken? Wat moet de Veiligheidsraad dan doen?

De heer **Ormel** (CDA): Je gaat niet zo maar met een dossier naar de Veiligheidsraad. Dat in dat verband gesproken wordt over de zaak-Iran betekent al wat. Vervolgens kunnen er wellicht sancties tegen dit land worden ingesteld.

Mevrouw **Karimi** (GroenLinks): Kan dan niet hetzelfde gebeuren als bij Noord-Korea? Toen heeft het IAEA de zaak doorverwezen naar de Veiligheidsraad, maar heeft de raad geen sancties opgelegd. Het gevolg daarvan was een verzwakking van de positie van het IAEA. U bent met mij van mening dat het zeer belangrijk is dat het Iraanse regime niet de beschikking heeft over atoomwapens. Dat is het doel. Daartoe moeten de inspecties verscherpt en versterkt worden. Daarvoor hebben wij de Veiligheidsraad niet nodig, maar daartoe moet het IAEA versterkt worden.

De heer **Ormel** (CDA): Wij vinden dat de zaak Iran in de Veiligheidsraad besproken moet worden. Op de uitkomsten daarvan lopen wij nu niet vooruit.

Mevrouw **Karimi** (GroenLinks): Dat slaat nergens op. U bent toch niet naïef? Alleen als het effect heeft, moet een dossier naar de Veiligheidsraad gestuurd worden. Als dat geen effect heeft, kan het zelfs averechts werken, namelijk leiden tot verzwakking van het IAEA en versterking van het Iraanse regime. Wellicht worden dan ook nog de mogelijkheden tot inspectie verminderd, omdat Iran de deur sluit voor de inspecteurs. Dan bent u begonnen met de "Irakisering" van Iran en zijn wij verder van huis.

De heer **Ormel** (CDA): Het regime in Iran vindt het niet prettig als er geen contacten meer zijn met de rest van de wereld. Dat kunnen wij via de Veiligheidsraad bereiken. [...]

Ook Noord-Korea moet stoppen met pogingen om de wereld te chanteren met een kernwapen.

[...]

De heer **Van Baalen** (VVD): [...] Ten slotte baart het nucleaire programma van Iran ons grote zorg. Hetzelfde geldt voor een mogelijke verspreiding van kernwapens en de mensenrechtensituatie in dat land. De tijd komt dat de Veiligheidsraad van de VN handelend zal moeten optreden. Wat betreft de ondersteuning van de vrije media in Iran ondersteun ik graag de nog uit te spreken van mijn collega Karimi.

[...]

De heer **Van Bommel** (SP): [...] Ik wil enkele woorden wijden aan de verspreiding van massavernietigingswapens. In mei aanstaande zal er opnieuw een grote toetsingsconferentie worden gehouden over het non-proliferatieverdrag. Nederland heeft dit jaar voor een motie van de New Agenda Coalition in de First Committee van de VN gestemd. Wij waarderen deze stap voorwaarts, maar er is veel meer inspanning van Nederland nodig. Om effectief indruk te maken op landen zoals Noord-Korea en Iran is het nodig dat de bestaande kernwapenstaten stappen tot kernontwapening nemen. Daarbij mag geen tijd verloren gaan om de dreiging van nieuwe internationale crises te voorkomen. De Europese mensenrechtendialoog met Iran leidt niet tot concrete verbetering in de mensenrechtensituatie in dit land. Absoluut voorkomen moet worden dat mensenrechten een ruilmiddel worden in het gelegitimeerde streven naar indamming van kernwapenstaten, ook in het geval van Iran. Hoe ziet de regering de verplichting tot kernontwapening van artikel 6 uit het non-proliferatieverdrag? Is de regering bereid daarin stappen te nemen voor kernwapens van de NAVO? Is de regering bereid op te roepen de strategische doctrine van de NAVO te herzien om de verwijdering van Amerikaanse tactische kernwapens uit Europa te bepleiten, een verbod op kernwapens op het grondgebied van de nieuwe NAVO-leden in te stellen en van Europa een kernwapenvrije zone te maken? Deze stappen zijn naar onze mening nodig om tot een effectieve beheersing van massavernietigingswapens te komen. Het is al te gemakkelijk om alleen maar met het beschuldigende vingertje naar anderen te wijzen.

[...]

Mevrouw **Karimi** (GroenLinks): [...] Het Iraanse nucleaire programma houdt de gemoederen bezig. Als één groep geprofiteerd heeft van de chaos in Irak, dan zijn het de Iraanse hardliners. Er is een enorme verslechtering van de mensenrechten. De hardliners in Iran buiten de Westerse aandacht voor hun nucleaire programma en de chaos in Irak handig uit. Zij dwingen het Westen tot concessies. De EU vaart helaas een zigzagkoers. Eerst moest Iran terecht het additionele NPV-protocol ondertekenen en strengere inspectieregimes toelaten. Het protocol is getekend en de inspecties zijn ook toegelaten, maar het protocol is nog niet geratificeerd. Er had maximale druk op het nieuwe parlement uitgeoefend moeten worden. Een scherp inspectieregime door de IAEA is het enige adequate antwoord. Waarom is dat pad verlaten? Wat te doen als de hardliners doorzetten en niet buigen voor het “wortel en stok-verhaal” van de EU? De kwestie naar de Veiligheidsraad verwijzen? En dan? Welke effectieve sancties zijn mogelijk? Wat gebeurt er als Iran weigert de inspecteurs toe te laten. Dat is pas een rampscenario. Een duurzame oplossing voor Iran ligt in het versterken van de democratie en het respect voor de mensenrechten. De minister moet de Iraanse bevolking als bondgenoot hebben. Voorkom dat de hardliners sterker worden. Initiatieven van de democratisch gezinde groepen moeten ruim worden gesteund.

[...]

De heer **Wilders** (Groep Wilders): [...] Het eerste voorbeeld is Iran. Het heeft ongeveer de slechtste staat van dienst van alle regimes in het Midden-Oosten. De mensenrechten worden geschonden, bij de verkiezingen zijn door verschrikkelijke machinaties hervormingsgezinde politici buiten de deur gehouden, de houding ten opzichte van het vredesproces in het Midden-Oosten is net zo abject als eerder en het land heeft de internationale gemeenschap al eerder belogen en bedrogen rond de verrijking van uranium. Hoewel het formeel nog niet is aangetoond, moet je toch naïef zijn om te denken dat het niet voor militaire doeleinden is bedoeld.

En wat doet de Europese Unie, met Nederland als voorzitter? Wat doet de IAEA, waar Nederland zitting heeft in de board of governors? Wat doet, kortom, de internationale gemeenschap? Die draait met een mogelijke veroordeling van het land door de Verenigde Naties en ontwikkelt nota bene een stimuleringspakket voor dat land. Een stimuleringspakket voor Iran! Als Iran zijn militaire nucleaire ambities opgeeft, wordt het beloond met mooie relaties met Europa en kan er zelfs een handelsverdrag worden gesloten.

Dat is naar mijn mening de wereld op zijn kop en perverse politiek pur sang. Het land, Iran, liegt en bedriegt en krijgt een cadeautje als het belooft dit niet meer te doen, in plaats van dat het wordt gewantwoord en veroordeeld. Ik vergelijk het met het volgende fictieve voorbeeld: het is alsof de Kamer, indien minister Bot de Kamer bewust zou misleiden en verkeerd informeren, geen motie van wantrouwen tegen hem zou indienen, maar een mooie villa aan zee en een dikke Mercedes voor hem zou kopen en zou zeggen dat hij die mag houden, als hij belooft de Kamer nooit meer verkeerd te informeren. Nu gun ik hem dat wel, maar het is natuurlijk niet de manier waarop wij met elkaar zouden moeten omgaan. Ik vind dat verkeerd. Ik heb daar

geen woorden voor en ik hoop dat Iran snel wordt veroordeeld door de VN-Veiligheidsraad en dat de minister ervoor zorgt dat dit ook snel gebeurt.

[...]

Minister **Bot**: [...] Dat brengt mij bij Iran. Voorkomen moet worden dat Iran zich buiten elke discussie plaatst en verantwoordelijkheid blijft afwijzen. De EU maakt zich grote zorgen over de ontwikkelingen in Iran. Op dit moment gaat de aandacht vooral, maar zeker niet uitsluitend, uit naar het nucleaire dossier. Wij staan momenteel op een kruispunt. Deze maand zullen wij beslissen hoe wij verder gaan. Vervolgen wij het IAEA-spoor, maar dan wel met volledige medewerking van Iran of verlaten wij deze lijn en volgen wij het Veiligheidsraad-spoor, met alle onzekerheden van dien? Mevrouw Karimi heeft daar ook op gewezen. De lijn van de Europese Unie is helder. Wij geven Iran nog een laatste kans om het geschonden vertrouwen te herstellen en mee te werken. Frankrijk, Duitsland en het VK, met steun van de EU, spreken Iran op dit moment aan met nieuwe voorstellen om een eind te maken aan nucleaire verrijkings- en opwerkingsactiviteiten in ruil voor de hernieuwde dialoog over het handels- en samenwerkingsverdrag. Deze uitgestoken hand moet Teheran beantwoorden. Als dat zo is, moet de EU ook bereid zijn daar iets tegenover te stellen. Zo niet, en komt de IAEA later deze maand opnieuw tot de conclusie dat volledige medewerking van Iran zou uitblijven, dan is de tijd van “carrots” voorbij en ligt verwijzing naar de Veiligheidsraad in de rede. Verschillende leden gaven aan, de kwestie Iran onmiddellijk aan de Veiligheidsraad te willen voorleggen. Ik wijs erop dat daarvoor wel een meerderheid moet zijn in de bestuursraad van de IAEA. De kans dat er een meerderheid komt, is aanmerkelijk groter als duidelijk is dat Iran een laatste reële kans heeft gekregen. Het feit dat op dit moment de aandacht wat meer uitgaat naar het nucleaire dossier betekent niet dat er geen belang meer wordt gehecht aan de overige drie zorgpunten. Integendeel, ook de Iraanse opstelling ten aanzien van het vredesproces in het Midden-Oosten en op het gebied van terrorisme en mensenrechten blijf ik nauwkeurig en met grote zorg volgen.

[...]

De heer **Ormel** (CDA): Voorzitter. De minister zegt dat Iran nog een laatste kans wordt geboden door de drie EU-landen die onderhandelen met Iran. Is het niet zo dat Iran die laatste kans al heeft weggevuurd? Is het niet zo dat Iran al heeft gezegd: wij doen er niet aan mee? Is het niet ook zo dat het Iraanse parlement afgelopen weekend massaal heeft gestemd voor het verrijken van uranium?

Minister **Bot**: Dat is een interessante discussie. Uiteraard heb ook ik daarvan kennisgenomen. Tezelfdertijd blijkt dat in de contacten tussen de drie EU-landen en de regering van Iran een ander geluid wordt gehoord. Dat is het dilemma waar wij op het ogenblik voor staan. In het openbaar maakt Iran met veel geluid duidelijk: wij gaan gewoon door en wij laten ons daar niets aan gelegen liggen. Intern, in de discussies met de regering, wordt echter aangegeven dat men nog steeds bereid is na te denken over de opschorting, de “suspension”. Dat moet natuurlijk wel een “suspension” zijn die op “cessation” uitloopt. Dus niet alleen opschorting, maar uiteindelijk een permanente opschorting.

Zolang de discussie gaande is en het rapport van de IAEA dat op 25 november zal verschijnen, nog niet is gepubliceerd, wil ik dit allemaal afwachten. Dit rapport bestaat uit twee delen. Het ene deel betreft het vaststellen van en het andere deel betreft de kwestie van de opschorting. Ik heb al gezegd dat er een meerderheid van de board van de IAEA nodig is om dit soort besluiten te nemen. Het is op dit moment niet duidelijk wat precies de positie van de Iraanse regering zal zijn. Aan de ene kant zijn er de uitspraken van het Iraanse parlement en aan de andere kant de tegenstrijdige signalen die ons bereiken van de kant van de regering en de heer Rohani, die hier is geweest en met wie ik zeer uitvoerig contact heb gehad.

De heer **Ormel** (CDA): Ik begrijp het precaire onderhandelingsproces en dat u daardoor nu niet te veel mededelingen kunt doen. Als de Iraanse autoriteiten op 25 november niet voldoen aan wat de IAEA verwacht, bent u dan bereid om te pleiten voor een doorgeleiding naar de Veiligheidsraad?

Minister **Bot**: Het wordt dan bijna onvermijdelijk om dat te doen. Zoals gezegd, ik vind de dreiging met de Veiligheidsraad een zeer belangrijke incentive. Ik wil zowel de carrots als de stick in stand houden om ervoor te zorgen dat de opschorting daadwerkelijk geschiedt. Zoals mevrouw Karimi al heeft gezegd, is het van het grootste belang dat de inspecties van de IAEA kunnen doorgaan, dat er inderdaad een opschorting plaatsvindt en dat wij in dialoog kunnen blijven met Iran over andere elementen, zoals de mensenrechten, het terrorisme en het proces in het Midden-Oosten.

De heer **Van Bommel** (SP): Voorzitter. Hier openbaart zich mogelijk een interessant verschil van mening tussen de minister en de CDA-fractie. De CDA-fractie zei eerder vandaag dat de ayatollahs niet te vertrouwen zijn. U wilt wel onderhandelen, al is het niet rechtstreeks met de ayatollahs. Maar u weet evenals ik dat de ayatollahs feitelijk achter het bestuur van Iran zitten. Deelt de minister de opvatting van de CDA-fractie dat de ayatollahs niet te vertrouwen zijn?

Minister **Bot**: Ik heb als regering alleen te maken met de regering. Ik laat mij dus ook niet uit over de ayatollahs. Het is voor mij belangrijk of de Iraanse regering op een gegeven ogenblik toezegt dat zij bereid is tot een opschorting over te gaan van de verrijkingsactiviteiten, wat dan gecontroleerd wordt door de IAEA. De heer Rohani heeft bij zijn bezoek hier toegezegd dat de inspecteurs in dat geval ongelimiteerd toegang

hebben. Er is een traditioneel protocol ondertekend en de inspecteurs mogen zelf bepalen waar ze gaan inspecteren. De heer Rohani heeft ook gezegd dat Nederland, als het mensen wil sturen om te gaan controleren, dat vooral moet doen. Ik vind het een heel belangrijk element dat wij kunnen blijven controleren. Het is belangrijk dat voortdurend gecheckt kan worden of er tot opschorting wordt overgegaan. Wij kunnen dan ook de drie andere elementen in dialoog met elkaar blijven bespreken.

De heer **Van Bommel** (SP): Voorzitter. Met de kennis van het bewind in Iran stel ik in ieder geval vast dat de minister de uitspraak van het CDA niet onderschrijft en dat hij in dialoog en onderhandeling blijft met het bewind in Teheran. Dat lijkt me een verstandige zet, want je kunt daar alleen via onderhandeling iets bereiken.

Minister **Bot**: Ik spreek mij niet uit over het CDA, want ik geloof dat het CDA dat niet gezegd heeft. Ik geloof dat ook het CDA de lijn volgt dat wij in gesprek moeten blijven, als de opschorting door de regering bevestigd wordt. Ik vind dit een verstandige lijn, die de regering in ieder geval graag wil volgen.

Mevrouw **Karimi** (PvdA): Voorzitter. Bij mijn weten is de heer Rohani een ayatollah. De minister heeft dus met ayatollah Rohani gesproken.

Ik heb verder nog een vraag. In hoeverre is de eis die gesteld wordt ten aanzien van opschorting van de verrijking van uranium een extra eis, waarbij de Iraanse regering zich kan beroepen op het internationale recht op het NPV, waarbij zij internationaal-rechtelijk gezien gelijk heeft?

Minister **Bot**: De regering kan zich beroepen op het NPV. Aan de andere kant heeft zij vorig jaar toegezegd dat zij zou overgaan tot opschorting en dat we dat zouden mogen controleren. Wij houden Iran aan deze uitspraak. Wij houden Iran aan de toezegging die ze zelf heeft gedaan.

Tezelfdertijd erkennen wij als het ware theoretisch het recht om te verrijken. Dat laat het NPV ook toe. Ik zie daar geen contradictie. Het gaat ons om de daadwerkelijke opschorting van de verrijkingsactiviteiten, waarbij wij een aantal aanbiedingen hebben gedaan, zoals dat wij voor het verrijkingsmateriaal zullen zorgen. Minister Lavrov heeft recent tijdens zijn bezoek herhaald dat Rusland bereid is om zowel te leveren als voor de opwerking te zorgen. Het aspect dat zij zelfs reactoren mogen hebben, als zij vinden dat het voor de energievoorziening noodzakelijk is, dat is allemaal in kannen en kruiken, maar de Iraanse regering moet zich alleen houden aan wat zij zelf heeft toegezegd.

Mevrouw **Karimi** (GroenLinks): Dat begrijp ik, maar het allerbelangrijkste is dat de deur niet dicht gaat voor de inspecties. Het gaat de fractie van GroenLinks erom dat het regime geen beschikking heeft over een atoombom. Daarvoor hebben wij maar één adequaat instrument, en dat zijn de inspecties. De vraag is in hoeverre er eisen worden gesteld, terwijl zij zich heel stoer, met enorme steun van de bevolking, kunnen onttrekken aan de inspecties die nodig zijn om te verhinderen dat zij de beschikking krijgen over een atoombom.

Minister **Bot**: Ik ben het helemaal met u eens. Het gaat ons erom dat er geen verrijkingsactiviteiten plaatsvinden die kunnen leiden tot nuclear grade verrijkt uranium. Dat neemt niet weg dat wij ook weer niet zo naïef zijn dat wij hen niet willen houden aan hun eigen toezegging, omdat wij dan een dubbele zekerheid hebben. Als zij niet verrijken, kunnen zij ook niet verrijken voor wapens en dan hebben de inspecteurs van het IAEA volledig toegang. Het beleid van het IAEA is om ze te houden aan die toezegging en tegelijkertijd te erkennen dat zij dit recht altijd behouden, maar dat het niet nodig is. Zij hebben zelf toegegeven dat dit niet nodig is. Daarvoor hebben wij een aantal maatregelen genomen en toezeggingen gedaan, zoals het zelf leveren van verrijkt materiaal en dat weer terugnemen om het op te werken.

[...]

De heer **Van Ormel** (CDA): Wij hebben ook over Iran gesproken. De minister had het uitvoerig over de "carrot and stick-diplomacy". Ik zou het in rond Nederlands de "worstdiplomatie" willen noemen en vraag me af wie nu wie een worst voorhoudt: houden wij Iran een worst voor of houdt Iran óns een worst voor? Eerlijk gezegd, vrees ik het laatste. Ik ben niet gerustgesteld door de antwoorden van de regering, dat wij blijven praten met dit verderfelijke regime, dat wij ze wat geven en dat wij dan weer iets van hen terugkrijgen. Ik zie dit erg als een worst. Vandaar de volgende motie:

*M

De Kamer,

gehoord de beraadslaging,

overwegende dat in Iran aan verrijking van uranium gerelateerde activiteiten plaatsvinden;

overwegende dat er zorgen zijn dat Iran zich niet houdt aan de waarborgovereenkomst waarbij Iran partij is;

roept de regering op, indien het IAEA tijdens zijn bijeenkomst op 25 november 2004 eenzelfde conclusie trekt, ervoor te pleiten dat deze kwestie wordt doorgeleid naar de VN-Veiligheidsraad,

en gaat over tot de orde van de dag.

De **voorzitter**: Deze motie is voorgesteld door de leden Ormel, Van Baalen en Van der Laan. Naar mij blijkt, wordt zij voldoende ondersteund. Zij krijgt nr. 17 (29800V).

[...]

Minister Bot: [...] De motie over het IAEA op stuk nr. 27 interpreteer ik als volgt. Als het IAEA in november concludeert dat Iran doorgaat met verrijkgingsgerelateerde activiteiten of dat het zijn verplichtingen onder de waarborgenovereenkomst met het IAEA niet naleeft, dient de kwestie te worden doorverwezen naar de VN-Veiligheidsraad. Ik beschouw dat als ondersteuning van mijn beleid. De Bestuursraad heeft op 18 september jl. Iran in een resolutie opgeroepen om de waarborgenovereenkomst met het IAEA volledig na te leven en pro-actief samen te werken met het IAEA, het additioneel protocol te ratificeren en als vertrouwenwekkende maatregel alle verrijkgingsgerelateerde activiteiten op te schorten, hetgeen zou moeten worden geverifieerd door het IAEA. Mocht het IAEA in zijn rapportage in november concluderen dat Iran geen gevolg heeft gegeven aan de resolutie, dan ben ik bereid op 25 november te stemmen voor doorverwijzing van de kwestie naar de VN-Veiligheidsraad. [...]

IAEA

Statement To the Fifty-Ninth Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly

by IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei – 1 November 2004

[...] *Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran*

The IAEA has continued to devote considerable attention to the implementation of safeguards in the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the IAEA Board of Governors has adopted several resolutions relevant to Iran's past undeclared nuclear programme and its failure over an extended period of time to meet many of its obligations under its safeguards agreement. The Board has urged Iran, inter alia, to cooperate fully with the Agency in the verification process.

Since February 2003, when the IAEA started its verification of Iran's undeclared programme, the Agency has made steady progress in understanding its nature and extent. Last December, Iran signed an additional protocol and has been acting as if the protocol were in force, pending its ratification. Iran's earlier interactions with the Agency were regrettably marked by the provision of information that was at times changing, contradictory, and slow in coming, a situation that led to repeated expressions of concern by the Board. Iran's cooperation since that time, however, has improved appreciably. IAEA inspectors have been provided access to requested locations, and Iran has provided information requested by the Agency — although in some cases Iran's response has continued to be slow.

As a result of the Agency's investigations, some issues have reached the point where any further follow-up needed will be carried out as part of routine safeguards implementation. One issue remains central to understanding Iran's nuclear programme: namely, the extent and nature of Iran's uranium enrichment activities. Additional investigation is still ongoing, and I expect to be able to provide a comprehensive report on progress to our Board of Governors later this month.

As of November of last year, the IAEA Board of Governors has also asked the Agency to monitor Iran's voluntary suspension of enrichment related and reprocessing activities. However, Iran has reversed some of the suspension measures initially undertaken in November 2003, and the Board has called on Iran again to suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities as a confidence building measure. I have continued to stress to Iran that, in light of serious international concerns surrounding its nuclear programme, it should do its utmost to build confidence through these voluntary measures. I have also asked Iran to pursue a policy of maximum transparency, so that we can bring the outstanding issues to resolution and, over time, provide the required assurance to the international community. This is clearly in the interest of both Iran and the international community and should, in my view, lead to a dialogue among all interested parties with a view to reaching a comprehensive settlement of all the underlying issues. [...]

Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Brief minister met het verslag van de Raad Algemene Zaken en Externe Betrekkingen

21510-02 – nr. 589 – 2 november 2004

[...] Iran

De Ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken zullen zich tevens buigen over de situatie in Iran. Hierbij zal de nadruk liggen op recente ontwikkelingen met betrekking tot het nucleaire programma van Iran, die zich thans in een cruciale fase bevinden. Mede naar aanleiding van besprekingen in G-8 kader hebben vertegenwoordigers van Duitsland, Frankrijk en het VK («EU3») – en het Raadssecretariaat – op 21 en 27 oktober jl. overleg gevoerd met Iran over een pakket van maatregelen dat tot doel heeft Iran tot uitvoering van de eisen zoals gesteld door het Internationale Atoomenergieagentschap (IAEA) te bewegen. De RAZEB van 11 oktober jl. stemde

in met de door de EU3 voorgestelde globale aanpak. Deze besprekingen met Iran zijn moeizaam en vooraansnog zonder resultaat verlopen, maar in een constructieve sfeer. De dialoog met Iran is hiermee opnieuw op gang gebracht. Indien Iran meewerkt – en met name al zijn verrijgings- en opwerkingsgerelateerde activiteiten op door het IAEA verifieerbare wijze opschort, is de EU bereid tot het aanbieden van een pakket van stimuleringsmaatregelen, zoals hervatting van de onderhandelingen over een Handels- en Samenwerkingsakkoord. Indien Iran weigert, zal de EU doorverwijzing van de kwestie naar de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties steunen.

De ernst van de situatie vraagt om een krachtige en eensgezinde aanpak zijdens de voltallige internationale gemeenschap. Op 25 november zal de Bestuursraad van de IAEA besluiten of Iran heeft voldaan aan de vereisten van de resolutie die de Bestuursraad op 18 september jl. unaniem aannam. De EU3 zal worden uitgenodigd verslag te doen van de voortgang van de onderhandelingen met Iran.

Ministerie van Economische Zaken

Antwoorden van mevrouw Van Gennip, Staatssecretaris van Economische Zaken, op de vragen van het lid Van Velzen (SP) over levering Nederlandse onderdelen ten behoeve van kernwapenindustrie (nr. 2030420930, ingezonden 9 september 2004).

310 – 3 november 2004

1. Klopt het dat in de afgelopen jaren aan Pakistan, India, China, Iran en/of Israël uitvoervergunningen voor dual use goederen zijn afgegeven die in de nucleaire industrie gebruikt kunnen worden? Is er ook aan andere hier niet genoemde landen geleverd? Zo ja, welke?

2. Om welke goederen gaat het precies? Wanneer zijn die leveranties gedaan? Kunt u een volledig overzicht geven tot op de dag van vandaag?

3. In welke gevallen zijn er geen eindgebruikersverklaringen afgegeven? Waarom is dat gebeurd?

Antwoord: Ja. De bijlage bij deze brief geeft een overzicht van de afgelopen 10 jaar van alle exporten van zulke dual-use goederen, althans goederen die gecontroleerd worden op basis van de afspraken in de Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), naar alle landen buiten de Europese Unie die zelf geen lid zijn van de NSG. Bij de afgifte van vergunningen voor kleine grafiëtcilinders is, in gevallen waarbij vanwege vorm en volume van het grafiët geen proliferatierisico bestond, afgezien van de eis tot het overleggen van een eindgebruikersverklaring (zie ook het antwoord op vraag 10).

Ten aanzien van de bijlage kan nog het volgende worden opgemerkt. De kolommen van de tabel geven aan het registratienummer van de vergunningaanvraag, het bestemmingsland, het jaar van afgifte van de vergunning, de goederenpost in het Handboek Strategische Goederen en een goederenomschrijving. In de tabel zijn ook enkele globale vergunningen opgenomen voor de uitvoer van bovengenoemde grafiët cilinders. Voor uitvoer naar landen, zoals Iran, die zijn uitgezonderd van de toepassing van deze globale vergunningen dienen per transactie individuele uitvoervergunningen aangevraagd te worden. In de tabel zijn om verwarring te voorkomen vergunningen die verlengd zijn en dus betrekking hebben op een reeds vermelde transactie niet opgenomen.

Ten slotte treft u in het overzicht twee verschillende goederenpost aanduidingen bij een en dezelfde goederenbeschrijving aan. Dit is het gevolg van een omnummering van de goederenlijst van de Dual-Use verordening in 1998.

[...]

10. Klopt het dat Iran grafiëtelektroden in Nederland heeft aangeschaft? Klopt het dat geoordeeld werd dat deze elektroden te klein zijn voor atoomwapens, zoals een deskundige in Twee Vandaag het stelde? En dat daarom wel een exportvergunning is verleend, maar geen een eindgebruikersverklaring? Waarom is er dan wel een exportvergunning afgegeven?

Antwoord: Met betrekking tot uitvoer naar Iran zijn twee vergunningen voor een en dezelfde beoogde leverantie afgegeven. Het betrof een aantal kleine grafiëtelektroden ten behoeve van vonkverspanen in de vliegtuigindustrie. Gezien de vorm en de grootte was het duidelijk dat deze elektroden niet bruikbaar waren voor een nucleaire reactor en dus geen proliferatierisico vormden. Om die reden is niet gevraagd om het overleggen van een eindgebruikersverklaring.

De omschrijvingen op de controlelijsten zijn zo specifiek mogelijk. Dat wil zeggen dat getracht wordt alléén de proliferatiegevoelige goederen onder controle te brengen. Dit is echter niet altijd mogelijk. Grafiët als materiaal staat onder andere op de controlelijst vanwege mogelijke toepassing in een grafiëtkernreactor. Voor een dergelijke reactor zijn echter vele tonnen stapelbare grafiët nodig. Om die reden is in de richtlijnen van de Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) een limiet voor leveranties van maximaal 1200 kg per jaar per exporterend land opgenomen. Bij het opstellen van de Europese Dual-Use verordening, Vo. (EG) nr. 1334/2000, is echter besloten deze limiet voor wat betreft de vergunningplicht niet over te nemen. Zo wordt

immers voorkomen dat landen grafiert in hoeveelheden die nog net onder de limiet vallen, buiten het zicht van de overheid bij verschillende leveranciers gaan bestellen.

11. Deelt u de mening dat de leveranties “geen relatie met militair gebruik” hebben?

Antwoord: De uitdrukking “geen relatie met militair gebruik” is in het antwoord aan de medewerker van (toen nog) *Netwerk* niet gebruikt. Daarin werd gesproken van “geen relatie met nucleair gebruik”.

12. Deelt u de mening dat dual use goederen met nucleaire toepassingsmogelijkheden niet aan landen geleverd mogen worden die het non-proliferatieverdrag niet hebben getekend? Zo ja, op welke wijze gaat u dat regelen? Indien neen, kunt u dat toelichten?

Antwoord: Niet-NPV-staten ontvangen nu al geen nucleaire goederen van de landen die zijn aangesloten bij de Nuclear Suppliers Group. Waar het om reguliere dual-use goederen als bijvoorbeeld een draaibank, die wordt toegepast in allerhande productieprocessen, is er geen reden om bij voorbaat af te zien van levering. Voorwaarde is dat voldoende zekerheid verkregen wordt dat de goederen de opgegeven civiele bestemming krijgen.

De Nederlandse overheid is niet zelfstandig in staat vast te stellen dat een bepaalde Staat niet aan de NPV-verplichtingen voldoet (“non compliance”). Dat is een zaak van de IAEA, de inspectie-organisatie van het NPV. Indien er aanwijzingen voor “non compliance” bestaan, dan zullen alle aanvragen op het betreffende land onder een vergrootglas gelegd worden, maar is er in dat stadium nog onvoldoende grond voor een algeheel embargo op civiel toegepaste dual-use goederen. Stelt de IAEA eenmaal “non compliance” vast, dan kan deze organisatie de VN-Veiligheidsraad adviseren om sancties op te leggen. Zulke internationale sancties kunnen ook betrekking hebben op dual-use goederen.

Ministerie van Economische Zaken

Antwoorden van mevrouw Van Gennip, Staatssecretaris van Economische Zaken, op de vragen van het lid Van der Laan (D66) over export van nucleaire materialen naar Israël en Iran (nr. 2030420950, ingezonden 9 september 2004).

311 – 3 november 2004

1. Bent u ervan op de hoogte dat bij export van nucleaire materialen naar Israël en Iran in sommige gevallen géén eindgebruikersverklaring is gevraagd, zoals blijkt uit een onderzoek van *Twee Vandaag*?

Antwoord: Zoals in de begeleidende brief over het exportcontrolebeleid is aangegeven, wordt standaard om een eindgebruikersverklaring gevraagd, tenzij aan de betreffende uitvoer in feite geen proliferatierisico verbonden is (zie ook het antwoord op vraag 3). In het geval van de aanvragen op Israël zijn in tegenstelling tot wat in de rapportage van *Twee Vandaag* is gemeld wel eindgebruikersverklaringen gevraagd en ook verkregen.

Deze verklaringen waren echter niet door de Israëlische overheid gewaarmerkt en werden daarom naar Nederlandse maatstaven niet als volwaardige eindgebruikersverklaringen beschouwd. Reden waarom de eindgebruiker daarnaast ook IIC's (International Import Certificate) moest overleggen. Die nuance kwam in de reactie van EZ op vragen van de betrokken journalist niet goed uit de verf.

In het geval van Iran is op basis van de aard van de goederen wel afgezien van de eis tot het overleggen van een eindgebruikersverklaring.

2. Deelt u de mening dat de eindgebruikersverklaring niet alleen verplicht, maar ook buitengewoon gewenst is nu het gaat om twee landen die geen VN wapeninspecteurs toelaten en die de non-proliferatieverdragen niet hebben getekend? Zo ja, waarom worden juist deze landen dan vrijgesteld van de verplichting tot het verstrekken van eindgebruikersverklaringen?

Antwoord: Van enige structurele vrijstelling voor Iran of Israël voor het verstrekken van eindgebruikersverklaringen is en was geen sprake. Er bestaat geen internationale of multilaterale verplichting voor landen om bij exportcontrole eindgebruikersverklaringen te hanteren, maar in de praktijk doet Nederland dit bijna in alle gevallen (zie ook de antwoorden op de vragen 1 en 3). Anders dan in de vraag wordt gesuggereerd is Iran wel partij bij alle non-proliferatieverdragen en laat dit land ook inspecteurs van het IAEA (de inspectie-organisatie van het NPV) en de OPCW (de inspectie-organisatie van het CWC) toe.

3. Hoe wordt de export naar Israël en Iran gecontroleerd nu eindgebruikersverklaringen ontbreken? Vindt er fysieke controle plaats? Indien dit niet het geval is, hoe kunt u dan garanderen dat de geëxporteerde producten niet zullen worden verwerkt in nucleaire wapens?

Antwoord: Over de specifieke in de uitzending van *Twee Vandaag* genoemde gevallen kan het volgende worden gezegd. In het geval van Iran betrof het twee vergunningen voor een en dezelfde beoogde leverantie. Het betrof een aantal kleine grafietelektroden ten behoeve van vonkverspanen in de vliegtuigindustrie. Gezien de vorm en de grootte was het duidelijk dat deze elektroden niet bruikbaar waren voor een nucleaire reactor en dus geen proliferatierisico vormden. Om die reden is niet gevraagd om het overleggen een eindgebruikersverklaring en is ook niet overwogen om fysieke controles uit te voeren.

De omschrijvingen op de controlelijsten zijn zo specifiek mogelijk. Dat wil zeggen dat getracht wordt alléén de proliferatiegevoelige goederen onder controle te brengen. Dit is echter niet altijd mogelijk. Grafiet als materiaal staat onder andere op de controlelijst vanwege mogelijke toepassing in een grafietkernreactor. Voor een dergelijke reactor zijn echter vele tonnen stapelbare grafiet nodig. Om die reden is in de richtlijnen van de Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) een limiet voor leveranties van maximaal 1200 kg per jaar per exporterend land opgenomen. Bij het opstellen van de Europese Dual-Use verordening, laatstelijk Vo. (EG) nr. 1334/2000, is echter besloten deze limiet voor wat betreft de vergunningplicht niet over te nemen. Zo wordt immers voorkomen dat landen grafiet in hoeveelheden die nog net onder de limiet vallen, buiten het zicht van de overheid bij verschillende leveranciers gaan bestellen.

Voor wat betreft Israël ging het om zes vergunningen voor levering van koolstofvezels over een periode van enkele jaren (1997-2000). Deze leveringen betroffen in alle gevallen dezelfde eindgebruiker in de vliegtuigindustrie. Deze eindgebruiker heeft voor alle leveranties eindgebruikersverklaringen verstrekt die echter niet door de overheid waren gewaarmerkt. Op ons verzoek heeft eindgebruiker daarom ook nog voor alle zendingen een gewaarmerkt Internationaal Import Certificaat (IIC) overlegd. De hoeveelheid en de aard van het materiaal waren in overeenstemming met dat opgegeven eindgebruik (reparatie en onderhoud van zowel civiele als militaire vliegtuigen).

Informatie van de inlichtingendienst (AIVD) betreffende de afnemer gaf aan dat geen banden bekend waren met een massavernietigingswapenprogramma. Wel werd in december 1999 in nieuwe inlichtingen gerefereerd aan een betrokkenheid van de vliegtuigindustrie bij het Israëlische raketprogramma. Hoewel de koolstofvezels in kwestie niet op de controlelijst staan van het MTCR, het exportcontroleregime op het terrein van raketten, is toch om opheldering aan het Israëlische bedrijf gevraagd. Aangezien een nadere toelichting uitbleef, is het de exporteur toegestaan het lopende contract uit te dienen, maar is geen toestemming meer verleend voor levering van nieuwe hoeveelheden van dit materiaal aan deze afnemer. [...]

Raad van de Europese Unie

Europese Raad van Brussel – Conclusies van het voorzitterschap

14292/04 – 5 november 2004

[...] Iran: nucleaire kwesties

38. De Europese Raad heeft de lopende contacten met Iran over het Iraanse nucleaire programma besproken. Hij bevestigde dat hij zich zal inzetten om de weg te effenen voor een duurzame, op samenwerking gebaseerde langetermijnrelatie met Iran, met politieke, commerciële en technologische dimensies.

39. Hij benadrukte dat hij belang hecht aan het opbouwen van vertrouwen in de vreedzame aard van het Iraanse nucleaire programma, dat transparantie nodig is en dat de resoluties van de Raad van beheer van de IAEA moeten worden nageleefd. Een volledige, duurzame opschorting van alle verrijkings- en opwerkingsactiviteiten op vrijwillige basis zou de weg openen voor besprekingen over langetermijnsamenwerking die beide partijen voordelen biedt.

40. Hij bevestigde dat de Europese Unie en haar lidstaten actief betrokken zullen blijven – met name door de inzet van Frankrijk, Duitsland, het Verenigd Koninkrijk en de hoge vertegenwoordiger - met als doel vooruitgang te boeken inzake de Iraanse nucleaire kwestie vóór de vergadering van de Raad van beheer van de IAEA, die op 25 november 2004 begint.

41. De Europese Raad besloot dat, indien de huidige contacten tot een bevredigende oplossing leiden, de onderhandelingen over een handels- en samenwerkingsovereenkomst moeten worden hervat zodra de opschorting is geverifieerd. [...]

US Department of State

State Department noon briefing

by spokesman Richard Boucher – 5 November 2004

[...] QUESTION: The EU-3 is meeting with Iran today. Now, I know that you're not directly involved in the negotiations, but you do keep in touch with the Europeans. Have you, prior to this meeting, reinforced your view that there shouldn't be any kind of compromise with Iran given that it's negotiations; it's give and take?

MR. BOUCHER: Well, we do keep in touch with the Europeans and for that reason we know the EU-3 meeting is still going on with the Iranians. I think we have made very clear our view, they have made very clear their view and the Board of Governors has made very clear its view at the International Atomic Energy Agency that Iran needs to comply with the requirements of the Board. The Europeans are talking to Iran about how Iran can do that, should do that, must do that. The proof will be whether Iran does it or not. So that's what we're looking for.

QUESTION: So is it fair to say that you wouldn't accept any deal that fell short of the Iranians indefinitely suspending enrichment --

MR. BOUCHER: I think it's clear to say what the Europeans have said, what we have said, what the Board of Governors have said: that Iran must meet all of those requirements.

[...]

QUESTION: Another one on Iran, please. With your effort in Iran and nuclear bomb is concerned, according to a report I have seen, one, it's a pretty dangerous regime there in Iran and they can have a nuclear bomb within a year. Do you have any comment on that?

MR. BOUCHER: I don't have any estimates for you, but we certainly expressed for many years now our very strong concern about Iran's nuclear programs as well as many other dangerous behaviors that they have engaged in. And we are, I think, gratified the international community has come together over the last year or two to make clear to Iran that they have to stop these covert nuclear programs, that they have to abide by the requirements of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

QUESTION: But are you satisfied that IAEA and the UN is doing whatever the best they are --

MR. BOUCHER: Well, we're working with all of the countries that are involved and I think various countries are trying in various ways. We have made the point, again and again, the international community needs to be very clear on these requirements, as it has been now, and needs to take the appropriate action if, at the end of November, we find that Iran has not come into full compliance. That appropriate action, as we have said many times, is to refer to the United Nations Security Council and have the Council then take up the issue. [...]

US Department of State

Interview with Secretary of State Colin L. Powell

by Hubert Wetzels and Guy Dinmore of Financial Times – 8 November 2004

[...] QUESTION: On the transatlantic cooperation side, we have the news this weekend of the EU-3 negotiations with Iran.

SECRETARY POWELL: Yeah, mm-hmm.

QUESTION: And it does appear that they've reached or are close to reaching an agreement whereby Iran would freeze but not for the moment indefinitely suspended uranium enrichment program. The U.S. never seemed hugely enthusiastic about this. They just had one press conference that said the U.S. did not endorse this plan. What is your response now to this partial agreement in the making?

SECRETARY POWELL: Well, we don't have an agreement yet. I had conversations over the weekend with some of my European colleagues and we're waiting to see exactly what the agreement is. There are many reports about an agreement. We haven't seen it yet. The only thing we are enthusiastic about achieving is end to Iran's nuclear weapons ambitions and over the last three years we have done a great deal to put heat and light on this issue.

When we started three years ago, everybody thought we were overplaying our hand and being very aggressive and unilateralist about Iran's programs. Over the past three years, the world has now seen that Iran is doing things that surprised the international community and shouldn't have been doing. And so we were able to get the Russians to be more circumspect about providing fuel for the reactor at Bushehr. We've gotten the IAEA more energized and our European Union colleagues, in the form of the three foreign ministers, began an active role in the fall of 2002 -- 2003, excuse me, to try to see if they could find a solution.

When we met with the European Union 3, a few weeks back, before they made their latest overture to the Iranians, we said, fine, go ahead, you know, we believe it's time to refer this thing to the Security Council, but if you want to make another run at it, fine, go ahead -- without us putting our name on the approach because it was an EU-3 approach, not a U.S. approach and not a total EU approach. We thought it best for them to continue the work that they were doing with our knowledge and with appreciation for their efforts, but without an endorsement of the specific proposal.

They have now gone forward and we'll wait to see what the Iranian reaction is to the proposal. There are still some outstanding issues, at least as of this morning, and we're waiting to hear more.

I'm sorry, go ahead.

QUESTION: I know it's slightly hypothetical, but if the reports are true and they're close to an agreement, do you think on the basis of your conversations that the U.S. would accept and give up the idea of referring Iran to the Security Council?

SECRETARY POWELL: I can't say that yet because everybody is talking about an agreement and there's a great deal of press reporting about agreements and endorsements of an agreement, but I haven't seen this agreement yet and we're waiting to get more information back from the EU-3. And after we've gotten it back, we'll make a judgment. I think it has to be an agreement that really does solve the problem and not another agreement that doesn't solve the problem and gives the Iranians a way to slip away from referral again.

I think the EU-3 realized that the commitments they got from the Iranians in the fall of 2003 and the early part of 2004 didn't do the job because the Iranians essentially said, well, we suspend it, now we unsuspend it. And so we have to see what it is the EU-3 have been able to achieve in this round. And so I'd be reluctant to hypothesize along with you as to what might or might not happen later in the month until we actually see the agreement. And I hope we will have a little more information on it within the next 24 hours.

QUESTION: The next 24 hours?

SECRETARY POWELL: I hope.

QUESTION: One more question on the EU-3 proposal. Would you say that it was helpful to the EU to make this proposal, in the sense that it allows or might allow Iran to drive a wedge between the EU and the U.S. and play the two sides against one another?

SECRETARY POWELL: We have felt for a year that it should go to the Security Council, but that was not a consensus view or a uniform view within the IAEA. And to the extent that the EU-3 wanted to continue to work the problem and see if they could find a solution, we said, fine, go ahead. But we have felt for a long time now, the last seven meetings -- six meetings with the IAEA, that it should have been referred to the Security Council.

Now, the Iranians have been doing everything they can to avoid that referral, but what they need to do to avoid the referral and to solve the problem is to come into complete compliance with their obligations, stop hiding things, and to make a firm commitment to the proposals laid out by the EU-3. If all that is done, then we will have to examine then to see whether, in our judgment, this resolves the matter.

There's a basic question here: Do you believe or not that Iran is moving toward a nuclear weapon? Do you believe that they are doing all this and sort of hiding things and moving things around simply because they want to have civilian nuclear power?

Our judgment is they've been moving toward a nuclear weapon. Not everybody shares that judgment. And we're not going to abandon that judgment because we think it's a well-supported judgment and we have to make sure that anything that is done by the EU-3 or anyone else deals not just with, you know, some potential nuclear power plant problem, but the fact that this is a government that seems to have made, in our mind anyway, a commitment to go forward toward a nuclear weapon.

QUESTION: A quick follow-up on Iran. About a year ago, Richard Armitage told Congress that regime change was not U.S. policy. Do you think it's possible, in a second administration, given that you're going to be sitting across the table with the Iranians later this month at Sharm el-Sheikh that a second, the next administration could talk more directly to Iran on certain issues?

SECRETARY POWELL: Well, we'll have the first opportunity to talk to the Iranians at the Sharm el-Sheikh meeting and we'll see what develops. I think the nuclear issue is an important one to resolve in one way or another, but there are other aspects of Iranian behavior that are troubling -- support for terrorist activity -- and we'll just have to see whether or not there are openings here or not.

Regime change is not something that I've heard discussed, although I hear it speculated about a great deal in the papers. So what Mr. Armitage said is accurate. [...]

US State Department

State Department noon briefing

by spokesman Richard Boucher - 8 November 2004

[...] QUESTION: Thanks. The Europeans say that they are close to a deal with Iran and they've obviously been in pretty constant touch with the United States. Is there anything in the agreement that makes you less skeptical than you have been in the past that the Iranians will actually stick to it? Is this not just some kind of tactic to get past the IAEA Board meeting and then go back to their old habits?

MR. BOUCHER: Well, I think at this point the answer is, we'll have to see. The Europeans have, indeed, stayed in touch with us and we've stayed in touch with them. At this point, I think I've seen a statement from the Iranian side that they have an agreement, but I haven't seen such a statement from the European side. So I think they still remain in contact. They certainly -- the Europeans -- have been in contact with us. We've gotten some information on where they stand with the Iranians, but not a complete readout on the terms that might be under discussion at this precise point.

What I do think is true is that we and the Europeans continue to agree on the fundamentals that the -- Iran needs to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency; it needs to meet its nonproliferation obligations; and it needs to suspend fully and immediately all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities. The question of where they stand, where Iran stands when we get to the Board meeting, is the important one. Will Iran have complied at that point with the requirements of the IAEA Board? Will the IAEA be in a position to verify that or to say that they are engaging in the verification of that kind of promise and activity? And that's where ultimately we shall see not only if Iran and the Europeans are able to reach agreement on how Iran can comply with the Board's requirements, but whether the IAEA was able to verify that and whether the IAEA is able to report that to the Board. So we'll be watching the whole thing as it unfolds. I'm sure we'll be hearing more from the Europeans in coming days. But at this point it's not -- I don't think we'll be in a position to try to offer some kind of judgment, because ultimately it's what Iran does that matters, not just what they might agree to.

Yeah.

QUESTION: And what it does has to be verified by the IAEA?

MR. BOUCHER: Has to be full compliance, and that has to be full compliance in a manner that the IAEA can verify.

QUESTION: Did you notice the remarks of the Chinese Foreign Minister Li in which he said that he doesn't think that this matter should be referred to the UN Security Council?

MR. BOUCHER: I didn't notice those particular remarks. I think that has been a position the Chinese Government has taken. I think what matters for all of us, ultimately, is where do we stand when we get to the Board meeting: Is there an agreement and is it being implemented?

QUESTION: New subject?

QUESTION: Can we stay on Iran?

MR. BOUCHER: Yeah.

QUESTION: Can you confirm that the United States sent the European negotiators a letter saying -- reminding them that if the deal -- if there's no deal struck, then they're expected to help have Iran referred to the Security Council?

MR. BOUCHER: I don't think I can get into any particular exchange, but we've had a variety of exchanges with Europeans in writing and orally through various channels and discussions with them about this. And I think -- as I said, I think we do agree on the fundamentals: Iran needs to comply fully, and if Iran doesn't comply fully then the Board's going to have to consider what action to take. And as you know, the United States has always felt that should be referral to the UN Security Council. We felt that was warranted even last year. [...]

IAEA

Iran-EU Agreement on Nuclear Programme

(As reported 14 November 2004 by Mehr News Agency) - 14 November 2004

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Governments of France, Germany and the United Kingdom, with the support of the High Representative of the European Union (E3/EU), reaffirm the commitments in the Tehran Agreed Statement of 21 October 2003 and have decided to move forward, building on that agreement.

The E3/EU and Iran reaffirm their commitment to the NPT.

The E3/EU recognize Iran's rights under the NPT exercised in conformity with its obligations under the Treaty, without discrimination.

Iran reaffirms that, in accordance with Article II of the NPT, it does not and will not seek to acquire nuclear weapons. It commits itself to full cooperation and transparency with the IAEA. Iran will continue to implement the Additional Protocol voluntarily pending ratification.

To build further confidence, Iran has decided, on a voluntary basis, to continue and extend its suspension to include all enrichment related and reprocessing activities, and specifically: the manufacture and import of gas centrifuges and their components; the assembly, installation, testing or operation of gas centrifuges; work to undertake any plutonium separation, or to construct or operate any plutonium separation installation; and

all tests or production at any uranium conversion installation. The IAEA will be notified of this suspension and invited to verify and monitor it. The suspension will be implemented in time for the IAEA to confirm before the November Board that it has been put into effect. The suspension will be sustained while negotiations proceed on a mutually acceptable agreement on long-term arrangements.

The E3/EU recognize that this suspension is a voluntary confidence building measure and not a legal obligation.

Iran and the European Union reaffirm the commitments of they signed on October 21, 2003 and decided to move forward building on that agreement. High Representative of the European Union led by France, Britain and Germany recognize Iran's rights under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) exercised in conformity with its obligations under the treaty without discrimination, part of the agreement signed in Tehran said.

Iran reaffirms that in accordance with Article II of the NPT, it does not and will not seek to acquire nuclear weapons. It commits itself to full cooperation and transparency with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran will continue to implement the Additional Protocol voluntarily pending ratification.

"To build further confidence, Iran has decided, on a voluntary basis, to continue and extend its suspension to include all enrichment related and reprocessing activities, and specifically:

- the manufacture and import of gas centrifuges and their components;
- the assembly, installation, testing or operation of gas centrifuges; and
- work to undertake any plutonium, separation, or to construct or operate any plutonium separation installation, and all tests or production at any uranium conversion installations.

The IAEA will be notified of this suspension and invited to verify and monitor it. The suspension will be implemented in time for the IAEA to confirm before the November Board that it has been put into effect. The suspension will be sustained while negotiations proceed on a mutually acceptable agreement on long-term arrangements," it said. "The E3/EU recognize that this suspension is a voluntary confidence building measure and not a legal obligation."

Sustaining the suspension, while negotiations on a long-term agreement are underway, will be essential for the continuation of the overall process. In the context of this suspension, the E3/EU and Iran have agreed to begin negotiations, with a view to reaching a mutually acceptable agreement on long-term arrangements. The agreement will provide objective guarantees that Iran's nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes. It will equally provide firm guarantees on nuclear, technological and economic cooperation and firm commitments on security issues.

A steering committee will meet to launch these negotiations in the first half of December 2004 and will set up working groups on political and security issues. The steering committee shall meet again within three months to receive progress reports from the working groups and to move ahead with projects and/or measures that can be implemented in advance of an overall agreement. "In the context of the present agreement and noting the progress that has been made in resolving outstanding issues, the E3/EU will henceforth support the Director General of IAEA Board as he considers appropriate in the framework of the implementation of Iran's Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol."

"The E3/EU will support the IAEA Director General inviting Iran to join the Expert Group of Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle," the agreement said. Once suspension has been verified, the negotiations with the EU on a Trade and Cooperation Agreement will resume. The E3/EU will actively support the opening of Iranian accession negotiations at the World Trade Organization (WTO).

Irrespective of progress on the nuclear use, the E3/EU and Iran confirm their determination to combat terrorism, including the activities of Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups such as Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MeK). They also confirm their continued support for the political process aimed at establishing a constitutionally elected government in Iraq.

IAEA

IAEA Director General Report on Iran Nuclear Verification Sent to Agency's Board

Media Advisory 2004/13 – 15 November 2004

IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei this week circulated his latest report on the Agency's nuclear verification in Iran to the IAEA's Member States. The 35-member IAEA Board of Governors will consider the report at its next meetings beginning in Vienna 25 November. Unless the IAEA Board decides otherwise, the document's circulation is restricted and it cannot be released to the public.

The report addresses recent IAEA inspections and verification work in Iran, as well as Iran's decision on uranium enrichment under an agreement with the European Union. The agreement was concluded following

meetings between officials of Iran, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and European Union. The unofficial text of the Iran-EU agreement has been reported by news agencies.

UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Iran – Jack Straw welcomes signature of nuclear agreement

15 November 2004

The Foreign Secretary said on 15 November 2004:

'I welcome Iran's decision to support the agreement negotiated between the United Kingdom, France, Germany (the E3) and the Office of the EU High Representative and Iran in Paris on 6 November 2004. We believe that the conclusion of this agreement can both allow for confidence-building in respect of Iran's nuclear programme and represent a significant development in relations between Europe and Iran.

'It is essential now for the agreement to be implemented in full. We look forward to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reporting to the Board of Governors' meeting commencing on 25 November that Iran's voluntary suspension of all enrichment and reprocessing activities is in place as provided for in the agreement; and to the IAEA continuing to monitor the ongoing suspension.

'The UK, France, Germany, the EU High Representative and Iran have committed to commencing negotiations on a long-term agreement in the first half of December. These negotiations will cover political and security issues, technology and co-operation, and nuclear issues. There will be twin objectives for this process: to give us long-term objective guarantees that Iran's nuclear programme is purely for peaceful purposes; and to make progress on in a range of economic, technical and security issues where concrete co-operation and dialogue would reflect a genuine and important step in Iran's full engagement with the international community.'

White House

White House daily briefing

by Press Secretary Scott McClellan – 15 November 2004

[...] QUESTION: Scott, what's the White House response to Iran's latest offer on the handling of its nuclear material?

MR. McCLELLAN: Well, we are staying in touch with our European friends, the British and French and Germans, who have worked on this agreement. I expect we'll have more to say once we have the opportunity to learn more about the specific details. I think our position, though, is very well-known. But, again, it's something we will be discussing with our European friends.

QUESTION: Let me follow up on that. You've known for some days, if not weeks, what's in this agreement. Isn't it at least a step in the right direction, even if you're not ready to --

MR. McCLELLAN: We don't know the specific details of the agreement. I'm not even sure that the Europeans have gone out and spoken about the agreement. I've seen some comment from Iran and from the IAEA. We always stay in close contact with them, and now we are in the process of trying to find out more specific details about this agreement. I think it's very clear what our views are. Iran needs to fully comply with its obligation; Iran needs to suspend all its enrichment and reprocessing activities; Iran needs to adhere to the additional protocol and Iran needs to fully comply with the International Atomic Energy Agency. And I think these are discussions that the Europeans were having with Iran, and they've had quite some time to comply.

QUESTION: I guess I'm a little puzzled, though, because you've been telling us that we're working closely with the Germans and the others in the EU who have taken the lead on this, but yet we don't know enough to say whether it's even a step in the right direction?

MR. McCLELLAN: Well, we like to have the full details before us before we go out and make comments about it. And we're continuing to find out the specific details of the agreement. You haven't even heard from the Europeans at this point, Mark, so I'm not sure why you're confused about it. [...]

US State Department

State Department noon briefing

by spokesman Richard Boucher – 15 November 2004

[...] QUESTION: The Secretary made some --

MR. BOUCHER: He did.

QUESTION: -- statement about Iran that sounded upbeat. The last 24 hours the prospects had improved. What was he referring to?

MR. BOUCHER: I think there's been news on Iran. We don't have it pinned down at this point so I think we all need to be a bit careful at this moment. We have heard, and I think seen confirmed, that Iran has presented a letter to the International Atomic Energy Agency that says they are going to comply with the requirements. That remains to be examined, I would say.

We're looking to hear from our European friends who have been pursuing this with the Iranians to get more detail from them, and we look forward to doing that. I think we'll hear from some of their diplomats in Washington today, so we'll hear more from them today.

And of course, ultimately, the question remains: Are they making commitments and are they carrying out commitments? And so we'll also be looking to the International Atomic Energy Agency to be able to verify the commitments on suspension and to be able to report, we hope, if the Iranians really do comply, that the IAEA would be able to report at the Board meeting, the IAEA would be able to report at the Board meeting that Iran was complying with the requirements of the Board, and that finally, in the final analysis, is the question that will matter when the time comes for the Board meeting.

QUESTION: You mean halting enrichment?

MR. BOUCHER: There were a number of requirements of the Board. The chief one is suspending all enrichment activity, and that is something that we would expect the International Atomic Energy Agency to verify and we will see if the Agency is in a position to report to the Board of Governors when they meet in late November that Iran has not only made the commitment but is carrying out.

QUESTION: All right, last question from here on this. A letter. Has the U.S. seen the letter? Have the allies seen the letter? Have the allies given you a summary of the letter?

MR. BOUCHER: I think the allies have seen the letter. I'm not sure if the U.S. has a copy quite yet. But we need to -- we certainly look forward to sitting down with the Europeans and hearing from them in some detail about how these commitments are made and expressed, and to make sure that they indeed are the kind of commitments that the Europeans were seeking, that we were all seeking from the Iranians to really comply with the requirements of the Board of Governors.

Arshad.

QUESTION: Is it fair then to say that absent effective monitoring and verification systems in place, more Iranian promises really don't mean very much to you? And secondly, why is there any reason to believe -- the Iranians seem to make a lot of promises right before IAEA Board meetings; why is there any reason to believe this is anything other than that past pattern of making promises before IAEA Board meetings?

MR. BOUCHER: Well, I think that's why we are making clear this needs to be more than promises. This needs to be promises made and promises implemented, and the implementation is to make -- is to put the IAEA in a position to verify it and to be able to report to the Board so that the Agency can report to the Board that these promises are being implemented.

QUESTION: Do you have any reason to believe -- I mean, even if you don't have a copy of the letter, you must have had conversations with the EU-3 about its contents. Do you believe it contains monitoring and verification mechanisms?

MR. BOUCHER: I think it has been the understanding of all the parties that that would have to be part of the arrangement that Iran is being asked to accept, and I think there are reports that Iran has accepted the entire arrangement. But as I said, it bears a certain degree of scrutiny by all of us, the Europeans first, and us with them as well, to make sure that Iran is really making firm commitments that can be verified.

QUESTION: When do you think you'll have seen the letter gotten a full --

MR. BOUCHER: I expect we'll hear a lot more from the Europeans during the course of the day today in Washington, in terms of our meetings with their representatives here, and by -- I don't know if there will be more (inaudible) after that or not, but it will be fairly complete, I'd say. Steve.

QUESTION: Do you have any sense of whether the suspension is sustained or permanent or indefinite? And do you also understand that it covers every kind of enrichment activity?

MR. BOUCHER: I think those are the kind of details and questions one needs to ask as one looks at the commitments that are being made and to make sure that those, indeed, are effective commitments.

Yeah. Nicholas.

QUESTION: Richard, what does that mean when it comes to your insistence previously that Iran be referred to the Security Council after this meeting on Monday in Vienna?

MR. BOUCHER: Well, I don't want to get ahead of the game right now. Our view has been and remains that given Iran's past behavior that Iran needed to be referred to the Security Council. For years and even

decades, they had a covert nuclear program that was hidden and constituted, in our view, a clear violation of their commitments.

If they're trying to correct those violations now by some new promises, first you need to see those promises verified, and second of all, we need to discuss with others at the Board, in that case, what the appropriate action is. But at this moment, given that our information has not changed and whatever commitments there are have not been verified and reported to the Board as verified, our view has not changed at this point. Yeah.

QUESTION: But does that mean that on next Monday in Vienna you would still insist that whatever happens, Iran be referred, or are you going to wait until after the meeting?

MR. BOUCHER: I don't think the Board meeting is next Monday in Vienna. I think it's --

QUESTION: It's on the 25th. Sorry. It's on the 25th. Sorry.

MR. BOUCHER: -- couple of weeks, yeah, a couple of weeks away, ten days away.

QUESTION: So, to you that's enough time to actually verify that, and by the time of the meeting, have a better idea?

MR. BOUCHER: I'm not -- you'd have to ask the agency what their capabilities are, but one would hope that they would be able to start this work and give us a more complete report based not only on promises and statements but actual observations that they can make. [...]

White House

White House daily briefing

by Press Secretary Scott McClellan – 16 November 2004

[...] QUESTION: My question is on Iran. In the last few days, Canadian government -- Canadian Ambassador to the U.N., had some kind of resolution on Iran that there is a concern about human rights situation in Iran. And now we are dealing about these nuclear weapons, or Iran can make a nuclear bomb in a year and all that. Where do we stand on this resolution and all the --

MR. McCLELLAN: On the nuclear issue?

QUESTION: Nuclear and human rights issue.

MR. McCLELLAN: Well, we have a number of concerns that we've expressed over time regarding Iran. You mentioned two of them. And certainly their support for terrorism has been a concern, as well.

And in terms of the nuclear issue, we have supported and continue to support the efforts of our European friends. There has been a positive step, but it is only a first step. There are other steps that need to be taken to reach our shared objective when it comes to Iran. And it is important that Iran now move forward on implementation of the agreement. We will have to see what they do in regards to moving forward on that agreement. The proof of the agreement will be in the implementation.

We will continue to be in close contact with our European allies on their efforts to advance the common objective we have, which is to make sure that Iran does not develop a nuclear weapon. It's very clear what they need to do. Iran needs to fully comply with the IAEA. They need to adhere -- ratify and adhere to the additional protocol. And they need to suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities. We've been very clear in that regard.

The way to move forward on this was laid out by the IAEA board of governors. They laid out a framework for moving forward. And now it's important that the IAEA be able to verify Iran's implementation of the agreement by the next board meeting, which is scheduled for November 25th and 26th. So that's where we are. [...]

US State Department

State Department noon briefing

by spokesman Richard Boucher – 16 November 2004

[...] QUESTION: On Iran. You have always emphasized that it is important to verify that anything that Iran agreed to regarding the suspension of its uranium. They seem to be saying they will do the suspension, but only close to the date of the next Board meeting, so it doesn't seem to give you time to do any verification. Does that concern you?

MR. BOUCHER: Well, we'll have to see where we are at that moment. It is very important not only that Iran reach agreement and make promises, as they have, but that the International Atomic Energy Agency be able to verify the suspension, particularly the suspension of all uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing

activities. The proof of any agreement is its implementation, and we want to see that the Director General is able to report to the IAEA Board that this step and others are being implemented at the time of the meeting. So we would encourage all parties to get on with this work. We have -- looking for the report that the Director General will be able to give us at the time of the meeting, and it is very important that he be able to report that the Agency has begun to verify the suspension.

QUESTION: Have you gotten a detailed readout on the --

MR. BOUCHER: Yeah, we've heard more from the Europeans. We had a visit yesterday from some people from their embassies in Washington, the EU-3. We've talked to people in capitals. We've also talked to people in Vienna. I think you may have all seen the agreement that they reached with Iran; it's on the web.

But as I said, this is a useful step, and we all know the Europeans have gone out, as they said they would, after the G-8, reached an agreement on what was necessary for Iran to build confidence in the world that they were not developing a nuclear weapon, so they went out and they pursued this with Iran. The Iranians have said they agree now to a suspension of all reprocessing activities and enrichment activities, but it remains to be verified and reported, and that's what we're really looking for.

QUESTION: So why is it a useful step?

MR. BOUCHER: Again, sort of based on the premise, better to have somebody agree to something than not agree to something, but it really doesn't make a difference until it's implemented and verified, and that's what counts.

QUESTION: And do you have any -- just one last one on this. I mean, even though the people who agreed to it have often broken their word?

MR. BOUCHER: That's why in this case; even more one would say that verification and sustainability are the two most important aspects of this because we have seen agreements before where Iran has made promises that weren't kept. Iran has a whole history of what's been reported to the Board previously, 18 years of covert activities that were not disclosed. So it is very important that this be, as I said -- that it be verified and that it be sustained over time.

QUESTION: Are you -- I'm sorry, I did say that was the last one, but one more occurred to me on this.

MR. BOUCHER: Okay.

QUESTION: Are you troubled at the prospect that this agreement may undercut what has been your longstanding position that you'd want to refer Iran to the Security Council at the next Board meeting?

MR. BOUCHER: We still think that there is a solid basis for that. We'll see where other people are when we get to the meeting. But I think it's important to remember that this is the seventh report now that the Secretary General is providing us on Iran's activities, that they have documented in the previous six reports Iranian breaches of its obligations and its commitments. That remains the case, and it is important for everybody to remember that. Whether people will be ready to refer things or move forward in that direction, we'll have to see when we get to the meeting. And that, one has to say, depends first and foremost on whether Iran is implementing these commitments and suspending all activity in a verifiable way. [...]

US State Department

State Department noon briefing

by deputy spokesman Adam Ereli – 17 November 2004

[...] QUESTION: This Iranian opposition group, the National Councils of Resistance of Iran, claims the Iranian regime moved nuclear equipment to another undisclosed military location in the Lavizan district of Tehran, and that the Ministry of Defense is involved in this, in a new -- in an active nuclear weapons program. Do you -- have they contacted you, do you know anything about this?

MR. ERELI: This is a report from the National Council of Resistance of Iran, which I would remind everybody is an alias, we've designated as an alias, of the Mujahedin-e Khalq, a Foreign Terrorist Organization. We do not have contact with NCRI or with the MEK. We are not in a position to evaluate the credibility of this report.

There have been reports, however, from -- similar reports in the past, however, which have proven to be -- which the IAEA has substantiated, which have proven to be true. Therefore, it is our hope that as the IAEA continues its investigation into Iran's nuclear program that it will take all credible information about Iran's nuclear activities into account, including these reports, and then investigate them seriously.

QUESTION: But, I mean, you don't have to have direct contact with the group to see the reports. Are you going to be investigating the claims that they're making?

MR. ERELI: Well, you asked were we in contact with the group.

QUESTION: Well, yeah -- no, I understand.

MR. ERELI: So it was in response to that I said we are not in contact. It is the responsibility of the IAEA to follow up on reports like this, to determine whether Iran is conducting covert nuclear activity. There have been reports like this in the past, and the IAEA has been able to, because of its activities, to substantiate them. So given, I think, that track record, we think it's important that when information like this does come to light that it be taken seriously and looked into. Yes.

QUESTION: Can I ask one more?

MR. ERELI: Sure.

QUESTION: I know that they're a terrorist group and you're not in regular contact with them --

MR. ERELI: In contact at all.

QUESTION: Well, okay. Well, you know, if they have information that could provide useful to you, why not? I mean, you're certainly in contact with some of the state sponsors of terrorism.

MR. ERELI: We think, well, that's a different -- first of all, it's a different animal. Contact with states as sovereign entities is different than contact with organizations that sponsor terrorist activities and that are involved in terrorist attacks. That's number one. Number two, we believe that the appropriate means for dealing with reports such as these is through the established international mechanisms, which, in this case, is the IAEA. [...]

BERICHTEN

AFP

US senator urges US to confront Iran on nuclear weapons program

23 September 2004

WASHINGTON (AFP) - A prominent Democratic senator urged the Bush administration to directly engage Iran over its suspected nuclear weapons program and that preemptive military force should not be ruled out.

"I don't want to saber rattle, but I wouldn't take anything off the table," said Senator Joe Lieberman, who made an unsuccessful run for the Democratic presidential nomination this year.

Lieberman added that the use of force should be a last resort, and expressed hope that a consistent US-European diplomatic approach "will make that never even a topic of active serious consideration."

But he told defense reporters Iran "is on a path to develop a very significant nuclear weapons program" and is working hard to develop missiles with ranges capable of striking targets in Europe as well as the Middle East.

"If it were up to me, I would try to get the United States in direct communication with the Iranian leadership but on a very tough, tough basis -- let's decide what the future is going to be," he told defense reporters here.

"You have to marshal diplomatic support with the UN, but in the end they've got to feel we're really serious about this for them to stop the development of nuclear weapons, which in my opinion they are on a headlong course to develop," he said.

Iran's clerical regime insists its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes, and that it does not seek to develop nuclear weapons.

Defying UN pressure, President Mohammad Khatami has said Iran will not give up uranium enrichment efforts, which could be used to produce bomb-making material.

Reuters

Pressed Over Nuclear Arms, Iran Slams US, Israel

by Irwin Arief - 24 September 2004

UNITED NATIONS (Reuters) - Iran, under fire on suspicion of secretly seeking nuclear arms, accused the United States on Friday of "lawless militarism" in Iraq and called Israel the biggest threat to peace in the Middle East.

"The attack against Iraq was illegal," Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi told the U.N. General Assembly, thanking U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan for publicly stating the same in a television interview last week.

The invasion was an example of "increasing lawless militarism," involving "the use of brute and unsanctioned military force to achieve some political goals, albeit desirable goals," said Kharrazi, explaining that his country, which fought an eight-year war with its neighbor, had "benefited greatly by the removal of Saddam Hussein."

Kharrazi said Israel, which is widely believed to have nuclear weapons but declines to acknowledge them, had systematically thwarted U.N. efforts to make the Middle East a nuclear-free zone.

"All countries of the region and beyond are unanimous in considering the Israeli arsenal, including its weapons of mass destruction, combined with its policy and record of aggression and state terrorism, as the single greatest threat to regional and global peace and security," he said.

"Israeli cannot hide these facts behind smoke screens. It is time for the international community to show its resolve to maintain the credibility of multilateral disarmament instruments by taking action to compel Israel to comply," he said.

The United States accuses Iran of using a domestic nuclear energy program as a cover for developing nuclear arms and wants the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency to send the matter to the U.N. Security Council for possible sanctions.

Britain, France and Germany are pressing Tehran to renounce any weapons-related activities in return for cooperation on peaceful nuclear energy and closer economic ties.

But Iran instead said this week it had begun processing raw uranium for enrichment, a preliminary step to making a bomb.

Washington also accuses Iran of fueling attacks on U.S. targets in Iraq and backing anti-Israeli Hizbollah guerrillas in southern Lebanon.

But Kharrazi sought to turn the tables on his critics, calling his country "a victim of terrorism" and urging a more collective global fight against the scourge.

"No state can even come close to doing it alone," he said.

AFP

Iran's cooperation conditional on full right to nuclear technology

25 September 2004

TEHRAN (AFP) - Iran is ready to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on condition it has complete rights to use peaceful nuclear technology, Iran's nuclear negotiator Hassan Rowhani was quoted as saying by the state news agency IRNA.

Meanwhile, another senior official, Hossein Moussavian, warned that Iran could resume enrichment of uranium "tomorrow," if it wanted to.

"Tehran is ready to completely cooperate with international pacts in the nuclear field, on condition it is fully granted its legitimate and national rights regarding peaceful nuclear technology," Rowhani said during a meeting with South African ambassador Yusof Saluji.

Rowhani will head to South Africa on Sunday to hold talks on security issues, mutual cooperation and nuclear issues.

In a resolution passed on September 18, the IAEA called on Iran to halt its uranium enrichment-related activities, a part of the nuclear fuel cycle that can be directed to both energy and weapons purposes.

Nuclear fuel cycle work, including enrichment, is permitted under the Non-Proliferation Treaty if it is for peaceful purposes, but the IAEA wants such activities stopped pending the completion of its more than 18-month-old investigation.

Iran suspended enrichment itself last year, but has continued to advance on other parts of the fuel cycle.

Moussavian, in an interview with the student news agency ISNA, said Tehran wanted to pursue dialogue and could envisage maintaining the enrichment suspension for several more months.

"But we will not accept a halt" to enrichment -- only a suspension, for a specific and brief period.

He said the country's "final decision on this should be decided within a week."

The resolution from the board of the UN nuclear watchdog also gives Iran until November 25 to clear up suspicions over its activities. Failure to do so could see the country referred to the UN Security Council for possible sanctions -- something the United States has been pushing for.

But Moussavian warned that referring the matter to the Security Council "will cost the G-8 dearly," a reference to the world's seven most highly industrialized nations and Russia.

He said Iran would do "an about face in its nuclear policy, on its application of the additional protocol to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and could even go beyond that," an apparent threat to pull out of the treaty altogether.

He said Iran did "not currently have plans to break off dialogue" with the Europeans, while the Americans are pushing for more pressure on Tehran, and called for a "solution that satisfies both parties.

"If we do not reach that, we will break off the discussions."

Reuters

Iran Says Has No Immediate Plan to Enrich Uranium

26 September 2004

TEHRAN (Reuters) - Iran assured the world again on Sunday it had no immediate plans to resume uranium enrichment, a process that can be used to develop nuclear weapons.

"Resuming uranium enrichment is not in our agenda. We are still committed to the suspension," Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi told a weekly news conference.

European countries, Russia and the U.N. nuclear watchdog have urged Iran to abandon its uranium enrichment program and threatened to take tougher actions against the Islamic state if Tehran continued to defy the call.

Iran had promised Britain, Germany and France last October it would suspend all enrichment-related activities.

But while Iran has not enriched any uranium, it had begun processing raw uranium to prepare it for enrichment -- a process that can be used to develop nuclear bombs.

"We have started some activities like building centrifuge parts. No discussion about enrichment at all," Asefi said, adding Iran would continue to refrain from injecting uranium hexafluoride gas into centrifuges which spin at high speed to produce enriched uranium.

Some Western diplomats said Europeans were losing their patience with Tehran over its atomic dossier and they might soon support U.S. demands to refer the case to the U.N. Security Council in November for possible economic sanctions.

Asefi said Iran had no fear of sanctions.

"In case of any sanctions on Iran, the international community will be harmed more than Iran," Asefi said.

The Security Council could start with a strong statement urging Iran to co-operate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), diplomats said.

The United States and some other nations believe Iran intends to use fissile material for weapons. Iran denies it, saying its nuclear program is solely for peaceful purposes.

Asefi said the only way to solve international standoff over Iran's nuclear dossier, was dialogue, not threats.

"Through talks we can make a bridge between their concerns and our legitimate rights," Asefi said.

The United States and Israel have hinted at the possibility of military action to take out Iran's nuclear infrastructure.

"Israel is not on a level to threaten Iran. As a country which has nuclear weapons, it has no right to talk about arms," Asefi said.

AFP

Bush says Iran will not get nuclear weapon

26 September 2004

CRAWFORD, United States (AFP) - US President George W. Bush says "all options are on the table" for making sure Iran dismantles its nuclear program, and that Washington will never let Tehran acquire atomic weapons.

"My hope is that we can solve this diplomatically," Bush said in a three-part interview with Fox News Channel's "O'Reilly Factor" program, excerpts of which were made public on Sunday.

"Let me try to solve it diplomatically first," said Bush. "All options are on the table, of course, in any situation. But diplomacy is the first option."

The Bush administration has charged that oil-rich Iran does not need a civilian nuclear program for energy and that Tehran is actually seeking to acquire nuclear weapons.

Asked whether the United States would let Iran develop that capability, Bush replied: "No, we've made it clear, our position is that they won't have a nuclear weapon."

"We are working our hearts out so that they don't develop a nuclear weapon, and the best way to do so is to continue to keep international pressure on them," the president said.

Iran appealed Sunday for a negotiated settlement to its standoff with the UN atomic energy watchdog but showed no inclination to abide by a resolution calling for an immediate halt to its sensitive nuclear activities.

"No negotiations with the Americans are on the agenda, but we call on the Europeans to discuss with us," foreign ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi told reporters.

Iran is under threat of being hauled before the UN Security Council amid widespread suspicions it is seeking the capacity to develop nuclear weapons.

In a resolution passed on September 18, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) called on Iran to halt its uranium enrichment-related activities, a part of the nuclear fuel cycle that can be directed to both energy and weapons purposes.

Associated Press

Bush Hopes to Use Diplomacy on Iran

by Scott Lindlaw – 28 September 2004

WACO, Texas - President Bush, preparing for this week's much-anticipated campaign debate on foreign policy, is insisting Iran will not develop a nuclear weapon on his watch.

"My hope is that we can solve this diplomatically," Bush said in a TV interview broadcast Monday. "We are working our hearts out so that they don't develop a nuclear weapon, and the best way to do so is to continue to keep international pressure on them."

Pressed on whether he would allow Iran to build a bomb, Bush said: "No, we've made it clear, our position is that they won't have a nuclear weapon."

Bush's comments on Fox News Channel's "The O'Reilly Factor" did not mark new policy. In June 2003, Bush said that "the international community must come together to make it very clear to Iran that we will not tolerate the construction of a nuclear weapon."

But Bush has not spoken out so forcefully on the matter since signs emerged recently that Iran could be on the path toward developing a bomb.

Iran defied rules set by 35 nations and announced it had started converting raw uranium into the gas needed for enrichment, a process that can be used to make nuclear weapons. While insisting its intentions are peaceful, Iran pledged to continue even if it means a rupture with U.N. monitors and an end to inspections of its nuclear facilities.

Thursday's presidential debate centers on foreign policy, and Iran is likely to come up. Bush and his Democratic challenger, Sen. John Kerry, have modest differences on how to confront the issue.

Kerry charges that Bush's Iraq policies "took our attention and our resources away" from dealing with Iran.

Kerry holds out some hope that a negotiated solution with Iran is possible. He said the United States and other nations should "call their bluff" by offering nuclear fuel for peaceful purposes, then taking back the spent fuel so it can't be used for weapons.

If that process fails, the United States could try to ensure that the International Atomic Energy Agency takes the issue to the U.N. Security Council, where Iran could face sanctions.

In 2001, Bush called Iran part of an "axis of evil," along with Iraq and North Korea. Yet, he too favors diplomacy, though his administration has been divided on how to deal with it. Some, mostly in the Pentagon, favor a tougher approach. Others, mostly in the State Department, believe some accommodation is possible with Iranian moderates.

Bush is putting the finishing touches on his debate preparation this week.

He is done sparring with mock-debate partner Sen. Judd Gregg, R-N.H., said White House communications director Dan Bartlett.

Bush planned a low-profile day at his Crawford, Texas, ranch Tuesday, "crystallizing" his thoughts on policy and sharpening zingers, Bartlett said.

The ranch has an important mind-clearing effect, he said.

"I'm sure some of the best zingers he's given have been (written) out there with a fishing pole in his hands," Bartlett said.

Reuters

No Sign of Nuke Work at Suspect Iran Site-Diplomats

28 September 2004

VIENNA (Reuters) - The analysis of soil samples taken by U.N. inspectors at Lavizan, a site in Tehran that U.S. officials suspect may be linked to an atomic weapons program, shows no sign of nuclear activity, Western diplomats said.

Satellite photos of Lavizan taken between August 2003 and May 2004 showed that Iran had completely razed Lavizan, a site which Iran said was a former military research laboratory, but which it said had nothing to do with atomic-related activities.

"The environmental samples taken at Lavizan have come back negative so far," a Vienna-based diplomat who follows the U.N. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) told Reuters. Negative means the samples contained no traces of nuclear materials.

Washington accused Iran of removing a substantial amount of topsoil and rubble from the site and replacing it with a new layer of soil, in what U.S. officials said might have been an attempt to cover clandestine nuclear activity at Lavizan.

Former U.S. ambassador to the IAEA, Kenneth Brill, accused Iran in June of using "the wrecking ball and bulldozer" to sanitize Lavizan prior to the arrival of U.N. inspectors.

But another diplomat close to the IAEA told Reuters that on-site inspections of Lavizan produced no proof that any soil had been removed at all.

The United States accuses Iran of developing nuclear weapons under cover of a civilian atomic energy program, a charge Tehran has repeatedly denied.

The IAEA has been inspecting Iran's nuclear program for two years. Although it has uncovered many previously concealed activities that could be linked to weapons activity, it has found no "smoking gun" to prove Washington's case.

AFP

Iran not seeking nuclear bomb, but will defend itself: minister

28 September 2004

NEW YORK (AFP) - Iran is not trying to build a nuclear bomb, but it has developed long and medium-range missiles to defend itself against potential threats, Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi told CNN television.

Asked if Iran was trying to develop nuclear weapons, Kharazi replied: "Not at all. We are against (a) nuclear bomb. And it's not part of our defense strategy."

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has called on Tehran to immediately halt all activities related to uranium enrichment, a process that can make the explosive material for nuclear weapons.

Kharazi said Iran wants to promote a nuclear-free Middle East and he stressed that UN weapons inspectors had not found any nuclear weapon programs in Iran.

"Iran is quite transparent. All sights are under inspection," he said.

The United States claims Iran is hiding a covert weapons development program, and wants the IAEA to bring Iran before the UN Security Council for possible sanctions.

Kharazi said Iran should not be referred to the UN Security Council "because there hasn't been a violation," but said Tehran has developed long and medium-range missiles to defend its territory.

Iran's Defence Minister Ali Shamkhani said on Saturday the army had taken delivery of a new "strategic missile" but it is unclear if the weapon is the Shahab-3 medium-range missile, acquired by the Revolutionary Guards in July.

The Shahab-3 is believed to be based on a North Korean design and is thought to be capable of carrying a one-tonne warhead at least 1,300 kilometres (800 miles), well within range of Israel and US bases in the region.

"We have to be able to defend ourselves," Kharazi said.

Asked what Tehran would do if Israel launched an air strike against the country's nuclear facilities, Kharazi replied: "We would be able to react. How we do react, I cannot tell you that."

The foreign minister said Iran had arrested "several Al-Qaeda" members, but did not detail how many alleged terrorists had been detained or what their names were.

He said they numbered in the "dozens" and that 14 "new elements" had been detained recently.

He said there was no reason to hand them over to Washington as they would be "judged and tried in Iranian courts."

Kharazi said Tehran would support a regional summit on Iraq and that Iran was not seeking to influence elections scheduled for Iraq in January.

"We are not going to influence any other nation. But what is important for us is to have a democracy, a representative government in Iraq in place."

"We hope that election would be held by the end of January so as to have that representative government in Iraq, which will be able to maintain security for itself," the minister added.

Los Angeles Times

Iran Seeks to Avoid Security Council Action

Foreign minister urges Europeans to create alternative methods of verifying that his nation is not intent on building nuclear weapons

by Maggie Farley and Tyler Marshall – 29 September 2004

NEW YORK — The Iranian government is urging European officials to establish "new mechanisms" for verifying that Tehran is not developing nuclear weapons, Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi said in an interview Tuesday.

He said the goal of any agreement with key European countries was to prevent the Bush administration from taking the issue to the United Nations Security Council — a move that could lead to punitive measures, including sanctions or, conceivably, military action against Iran.

Kharrazi made it clear that he hoped to enlist the Europeans to "help the process to be continued inside" the International Atomic Energy Agency, the U.N. body responsible for monitoring compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Iran hopes the IAEA will eventually decide that it is in full compliance with the treaty and end concerns that the country is seeking to divert enriched uranium to build a nuclear weapon.

Iran revealed two years ago that it had been secretly importing nuclear material and equipment over a period of 18 years, leading the Bush administration and many independent experts to assert that Iran is using its nuclear energy program as a cover for weapons development.

Iran denies such ambitions, and inspections by the U.N.'s nuclear energy agency have not provided conclusive evidence of an arms program, though IAEA officials say there is still "detective work to do to solve unanswered questions" about the origin of enriched uranium particles discovered in Iran.

Kharrazi said he had raised the possibility of negotiations for an inspection "contract" during recent meetings with envoys from Europe, Russia, China and nonaligned countries at the United Nations, and that there was support for the idea of working outside the Security Council.

"We are looking for some contract or mechanism that lets us continue with our right to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, including producing fuel for power plants, and on the other hand, to remove the concerns of others and assure them Iran is not going to divert [uranium] towards a nuclear weapons program," Kharrazi said. Tehran was willing to consider "any kind of verification mechanism ... to make sure there is no secret program," he added.

The foreign minister insisted that the IAEA was allowed to inspect any of Iran's facilities with 24 hours' notice and that Tehran was cooperating fully with inspectors.

Kharrazi did not specify what he wanted to see in the contract. But he said that he invited other foreign ministers to create an agreement in the same spirit as the pact Iran made with Britain, France and Germany last year in which Tehran agreed to suspend its enrichment activities in return for European technical assistance with peaceful nuclear technology. The agreement fell apart, however, after a string of revelations heightened suspicions within the Bush administration and among outside experts that Iran was seeking to produce a nuclear bomb.

After the IAEA's most recent demand that Iran stop its enrichment-related activities, Tehran immediately said it intended to resume preparing 37 tons of yellowcake uranium for enrichment.

However, in an apparent attempt to maintain diplomatic leverage, Kharrazi emphasized that his government had yet to resume reprocessing precisely because of its earlier commitments to the Europeans.

Enrichment is not prohibited under the nonproliferation treaty, nor are the board's resolutions binding. But Iran's defiance bolsters American efforts to convince European countries that Tehran intends to develop weapons and must be stopped.

When asked what the difference between the current process and a new one would be, Kharrazi said he hoped to involve more countries in creating an alternative approach, thus broadening Iran's support.

"It's a question of confidence," Kharrazi said. "When countries are involved in developing some mechanism, they feel a part of it. ... Naturally, it brings them more confidence."

Kharrazi added that Britain, France, Germany, Russia, China and nonaligned countries seemed to be open to the idea. "They are ready to negotiate on that," he said.

French and German diplomats confirmed that their ministers had discussed the issue with Kharrazi but said they wanted to see how the issue fared within the IAEA before committing to any alternative arrangement.

A senior State Department official said the Bush administration had no objection in principle to keeping the issue out of the Security Council.

"All Iran has to do is comply with the requirements of the [IAEA] board to cease enrichment," the official said.

Reuters

Blair Hopeful on Iran, N. Korean Compliance

29 September 2004

LONDON (Reuters) - British Prime Minister Tony Blair said on Wednesday the international community was closer than ever to making North Korea and Iran accept its demands to halt nuclear programs.

"A couple of weeks ago Libya finally wound up its WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) program. America has lifted sanctions. We have a better chance of getting Iran and North Korea into compliance than we have ever had," Blair told BBC radio.

Defending the decision to go to war in Iraq, Blair added: "I thought and I still think it was absolutely essential we took that step. I don't accept that containment was working."

Both Iran and North Korea, along with pre-war Iraq, were labeled by President Bush as part of an "axis of evil" and have been under pressure from the West over their nuclear programs.

North Korea canceled a scheduled September round of talks over scrapping its nuclear program in exchange for security guarantees, while the International Atomic Energy Agency has said it will take tough action if Iran defies its call to stop uranium enrichment.

Reuters

Israel Weighs 'All Options' to Stop Iran Nuke Plan

by Dan Williams - 29 September 2004

JERUSALEM (Reuters) - A military strike is among Israel's options to prevent Iran from producing nuclear weapons, Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz said on Wednesday in the latest threat by the Jewish state against its arch-foe.

Asked by a newspaper if Iranian atomic facilities could be bombed -- a tactic Israel used to destroy Iraq's main reactor in 1981 -- Mofaz said: "All options for preventing this (Tehran obtaining nuclear weapons) will be considered."

"The important thing is to stop the current (Iranian) regime reaching a nuclear option," Mofaz told Yedioth Ahronoth daily.

Iran says its nuclear program is being pursued solely to meet civilian energy needs.

But Tehran, which rejects Israel's right to exist, stirred world suspicion this month by defying calls by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) not to prepare raw uranium for enrichment -- a process that can be used to make atomic bombs.

Washington is leading diplomatic pressure on Iran to come clean on its atomic program.

"The American ... demands for invasive inspection, threat of sanctions -- appear to be the right thing to do," Mofaz said.

"On the other hand, the Iranians are doing everything possible to buy time. The question is what will happen first -- nuclear capability or a change in the regime?"

Israeli officials say Iran could produce atomic weapons by 2007, fueling speculation Israel may strike militarily first.

Widely believed to be the Middle East's only nuclear power, Israel plans to buy 500 "bunker buster" bombs from its U.S. ally that could be delivered by long-range jets and prove effective against Iran's facilities, many of which are underground.

"It is possible that Western agencies, doubtful about the success of the diplomatic effort, prefer to have Israel act in their place," the liberal Haaretz newspaper said on Wednesday. "Nobody has asked Israel to refrain from a belligerent act."

Tehran has vowed to retaliate for any such attack. Defense analysts believe it could order proxy forces to attack U.S. interests in Iraq and other Gulf states, or step up support for Palestinian militants fighting Israel.

"Iran's defense capabilities would be unable to prevent an attack (on its facilities)," said Mustafa Alani of the Gulf Research Center in Dubai. "The conclusion is that the Iranian leadership would rely basically on a 'reactive strategy'."

New York Times

Foreign Minister Says Iran Is Using Atoms for Peace

by Susan Chira - 30 September 2004

Iran's foreign minister said yesterday that Iran would never give up its right to develop nuclear technology for peaceful use, though he denied any intent to produce nuclear weapons.

The minister, Kamal Kharrazi, said at a breakfast with American journalists that relations with the United States were at a low point and charged that influential neoconservatives were urging the United States to attack Iran, seeking "regime change." The breakfast was at the residence of the Iranian ambassador to the United Nations in New York City.

But he said Iran was ready to negotiate with European countries to find a way to calm fears that it was developing nuclear weapons.

"Nobody has the right to deny Iran its right to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes," he said. "We are ready to negotiate with them on any instrument or mechanism that would remove the concern of others."

Previous meetings with European ministers have ended with no resolution; Dr. Kharrazi said no new meetings had been scheduled, and there was no agreement on any such mechanism.

Last week Iran defied the International Atomic Energy Agency by saying it was resuming the enrichment of uranium, but to produce electric power, not bombs as the United States has charged. The United States has been pushing to bring the matter before the United Nations Security Council.

Asked whether Iran had enriched all of the uranium it possessed, Dr. Kharrazi said, "I don't know, but the I.A.E.A. cameras are there."

On Iraq, Dr. Kharrazi said Iran was eager to see it hold elections as scheduled in January, even if not every city could take part - a position also held by Iraq's most influential Shiite cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who has longstanding ties to Iran. Dr. Kharrazi said he was confident that the Iraqi elections, as well as elections scheduled for Oct. 9 in Afghanistan, would be good for the entire region.

Nor was he worried that his country's interests would be threatened by elections in the two nations, which border Iran. "Democracy does not necessarily bring pro-U.S. governments," he said.

Some Pentagon officials have charged that Iran is sending money and weapons into Iraq, to prop up Shiite insurgents like Moktada al-Sadr and to increase its influence over Shiite political parties to help sway the election.

"The Pentagon is quite wrong that Iran is doing this," Dr. Kharrazi said. Instead of backing Mr. Sadr, he said, Iran had encouraged him to moderate some of his hard-line positions. The United States made a mistake in opposing Mr. Sadr, he said, because it merely swelled his popularity. And he said Iran did not need to send money, since it already wields influence in Iraq.

He predicted that the insurgency against Americans would continue, fed by the resentment of ordinary Iraqis. "Iraqis who have been humiliated somehow by the United States - and their families have been killed or tortured - are very ready to kill Americans," he said. He said the only solution would be a multinational force under the United Nations, an idea the United States has opposed.

He cited recent opinion polls showing that even in nations whose governments had been friendly to the United States, like Saudi Arabia and Egypt, a vast majority of the people are hostile to the American government. Such hostility fuels extremism, he said. Only if the United States changes policies that support Israel can it hope to win over ordinary people in the Middle East, he added.

Despite the rising tensions with the United States, Dr. Kharrazi said he believed that the American presidential election could offer an opportunity, no matter who won. "A president in office for a second term becomes more realistic," he said. "But let's wait and see who comes to office first."

AFP

Iran refuses to surrender nuclear fuel technology

3 October 2004

TEHRAN (AFP) - Iran said it has already acquired the sensitive technology to produce its own nuclear fuel and that it would be "irrational" to agree to surrender such a capability in exchange for supplies from overseas.

Foreign ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi was reacting to US Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry, who has suggested providing Iran with nuclear fuel to generate electricity if the country agreed to give up its controversial work on the nuclear fuel cycle.

"One should not put one's fate in the hands of others. It would be irrational," Asefi said.

"We have the technology and there is no need for us to beg from others. This suggestion is good for countries that do not have this technology, but we do not need their generosity and help," he added.

In a debate with US President George W. Bush, Kerry said the United States should have joined a British-French-German initiative aimed at getting Iran to agree to stop work linked to the enrichment of uranium.

Fuel cycle work for peaceful purposes is permitted under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), of which Iran is a signatory, but the process can also be used to produce the core of an atomic bomb.

But Asefi repeated the clerical regime's assertion that Iran needs to be self-sufficient when it comes to fuelling its atomic energy programme.

"What guarantees are there? Will they supply us one day, and then if they want to, stop supplying us another day?" he asked.

Iran is under threat of being hauled before the UN Security Council amid widespread suspicions it is seeking the "option" to develop nuclear weapons. The country says it only wants to generate electricity.

In a resolution passed on September 18, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which oversees the NPT, called on Iran to halt its uranium enrichment-related activities amid its ongoing investigations.

Iran suspended enrichment itself last year, but has continued to advance on other parts of the fuel cycle -- including the conversion of yellowcake (uranium oxide) to produce the feed gas for centrifuges -- and insists on its right to resume enrichment at any time.

Asefi repeated that "we have not taken a decision yet" on resuming enrichment, but cautioned the IAEA against putting too much pressure on Iran and provoking the country's powerful hardliners.

Iran's parliament, controlled by conservatives, has begun putting together a bill forcing the reformist government to buck the IAEA demand and resume enrichment -- a step certain to place Iran on a collision with the UN's nuclear watchdog.

And a senior MP said a huge majority of deputies were supportive of such a step.

"The plan to oblige the government to resume enrichment has the support of 238 deputies" in the 290-member house, Allaeddin Borujerdi, head of the Majlis foreign policy and national security commission, told reporters.

He said an eventual bill on the issue "would be certain of having a large majority" of deputies voting for it.

The conservative MP said that his commission would begin discussing the move, entitled "the bill to oblige the government to develop civilian nuclear technology", on Tuesday.

"Today the parliament showed its strength," asserted Borujerdi, who was speaking after deputies overwhelmingly voted in favour of impeaching reformist Transport Minister Ahmad Khorram.

Reuters

Iran Rebuffs Kerry Nuclear Proposal

3 October 2004

TEHRAN (Reuters) - Iran on Sunday rebuffed a proposal by U.S. presidential candidate John Kerry who has suggested supplying the Islamic state with nuclear fuel for power reactors if Tehran agrees to give up its own fuel-making capability.

Foreign ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi said it would be "irrational" for Iran to put its nuclear program in jeopardy by relying on supplies from abroad.

"We have the technology (to make nuclear fuel) and there is no need for us to beg from others," Asefi told a weekly news conference.

Washington says Iran plans to use its nuclear facilities to make atom bombs. Tehran says it merely wants to generate electricity from nuclear power.

President Bush wants Iran referred to the United Nations Security Council for possible sanctions over its nuclear program.

But Kerry says he would put Iran's intentions to the test by agreeing to supply it with nuclear fuel for its power reactors provided Tehran stopped efforts to make its own fuel and returned the spent fuel after use.

Iran has rejected repeated efforts by European countries to get it to scrap its nuclear fuel-cycle activities -- which could be used to make atomic bombs.

Asefi said Iran could not trust any deal from the West to supply it with reactor fuel.

"What guarantees are there? Will they supply us one day and then, if they want to, stop supplying us on another day?" he said.

U.S. Undersecretary of State John Bolton, in comments published in Germany's Welt am Sonntag newspaper on Sunday, stressed the Bush administration's tough line on Iran.

"We are not considering any military intervention at the moment. But our position is that we should not exclude any option from the start. Iran must understand that our policy red line is the acquisition of nuclear weapons," he said.

"The most important thing at the moment is to get Iran on to the agenda of the U.N. Security Council to demonstrate that the international community won't accept it acquiring nuclear status," he added.

Reuters

U.S. Official: No Prospect of Bargain on Iran Nukes

5 October 2004

BRUSSELS (Reuters) - The United States sees no reason to offer Iran incentives to ensure its nuclear program remains peaceful, a U.S. government official said on Tuesday.

European states want the United States to make such proposals to Tehran after the Nov. 2 U.S. presidential election to add weight to efforts by Britain, France and Germany to reach an accord with Iran and avoid a U.N. Security Council showdown.

"At this point a grand bargain is not where we are heading," said the official, who requested unanimity.

He was referring to suggestions that Washington offer Iran economic and political inducements to halt activities which Washington suspects are aimed at making the atom bomb.

"We haven't seen any Iranian recognition that (a bargain) is in their interest," the official, in Brussels for talks with EU and Canadian officials on managing the challenge of Iran, told reporters.

But he said the United States would closely follow at any future signs that Tehran could respond positively to an offer.

"That would be a new factor we would look at very seriously. We don't have that now," he said. Hardliners in the Bush administration have made it clear they would oppose offering any incentives to Tehran.

Iran has rebuffed a proposal by U.S. presidential candidate John Kerry to supply the Islamic state with nuclear fuel for power reactors if it gives up its own fuel-making capability.

Iran could be referred to the U.N. Security Council for possible sanctions if its cooperation is seen as insufficient at a Nov. 25 board meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the U.N.'s nuclear watchdog.

The talks launched by Britain, France and Germany have yielded disappointing results. There has been alarm at Iran's announcement last month that it had begun processing raw uranium for enrichment, a possible route to the bomb.

The U.S. official said there was a need to define a common approach to Iran between the United States and Europe but said it was not clear how that could be achieved at the moment.

"How do you ... elicit from Iran a readiness to engage? I don't know the answer and I don't think the Europeans do either," he said.

Reuters

ElBaradei Urges Iran to Suspend Enrichment Activities

7 October 2004

TOKYO (Reuters) - The head of the U.N. nuclear watchdog, Mohamed ElBaradei, said Thursday he hoped Iran would fully suspend its uranium enrichment-related activities and that his agency was working with it to do so.

Iran said Wednesday it had processed several tons of raw "yellowcake" uranium to prepare it for enrichment -- a process that can be used to make atomic weapons -- in defiance of the U.N. watchdog.

"Well, they are doing conversion but they are not enriching uranium," ElBaradei, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), told reporters after a meeting with Hiroyuki Hosoda, Japan's chief cabinet minister and top government spokesman.

"I am calling on them obviously to fully suspend all enrichment-related activities as a confidence-boosting measure," he added.

"We are still working with them, the Europeans are working with them and I hope we can move forward in a positive way."

Iran's president said Tehran would not give in to foreign pressure aimed at stopping what he said was a peaceful nuclear energy program, but which the United States says is a covert scheme aimed at building bombs.

An IAEA spokeswoman in Vienna said the uranium processing was being closely monitored by the watchdog to ensure that nothing would be diverted for weapons purposes.

It was unclear how much processed uranium had been produced so far, though Iran's chief delegate to the IAEA, Hossein Mousavian, indicated the amount was not large.

Iran's uranium conversion plant at Isfahan intends to process a total of 37 tons of yellowcake, which experts say could be enriched into material for up to five atomic weapons.

ElBaradei arrived in Tokyo Wednesday for a four-day visit.

The IAEA board of governors passed a resolution last month demanding Iran freeze all activities connected with uranium enrichment, including making feed material for centrifuges.

Tehran had originally promised France, Germany and Britain in October 2003 that it would suspend its entire enrichment program and all related activities. While it has yet to enrich any uranium, Iran never entirely froze the program and recently resumed key parts of it.

If Tehran fails to heed the demands, the board said it would consider possible "further steps" when it meets next month. Diplomats on the board said this included possibly referring Iran to the U.N. Security Council, which can impose sanctions.

Reuters

Iran Would Welcome Kerry Camp Proposal-Official

By Parisa Hafezi - 9 October 2004

TEHRAN (Reuters) - Iran would welcome a proposal by U.S. presidential candidate Senator John Kerry's running mate for a "great bargain" to solve the dispute over Tehran's nuclear program, a senior Iranian official said on Saturday.

Vice presidential candidate Senator John Edwards has said that Kerry, a Democrat, would be willing to supply Iran with nuclear fuel for power generation if Tehran abandons its own fuel-making capability - if Iran did not accept this offer, it would confirm Iran wanted to make an atom bomb.

Iran earlier rejected the proposal, saying it would be "irrational" for Iran to jeopardize what it says is its purely civilian nuclear program by relying on supplies from abroad.

But in an apparent policy shift, Hossein Mousavian, head of the foreign policy committee at Iran's Supreme National Security Council, said Iran would review the proposal.

"Iran welcomes any constructive proposal from any American candidate," Mousavian told Reuters in an interview. "We are willing to consider constructive proposals from Americans," he added.

But he said Iran, as a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), should be allowed to pursue its "peaceful nuclear program."

"Our legitimate right of pursuing peaceful nuclear technology should be considered," he said.

President Bush's administration says there is no point in offering incentives to Iran. Bush wants Iran referred to the U.N. Security Council for possible sanctions.

Election campaign

Mousavian said Iranian officials earlier rejected the Kerry camp proposal because they were not sure if it was part of the election campaign or a serious proposal.

He said Iran did not want to get embroiled in the U.S. election campaign. "If it is part of Kerry's election campaign ... we do not want to be part of it," he said. "Let the Americans play their game themselves."

Mousavian ruled out direct talks with Washington on Iran's nuclear program due to its "hostile" policy toward Iran.

The United States cut diplomatic ties with Iran after radical Iranian students took dozens of U.S. diplomats hostage following the 1979 Islamic revolution.

"It is because of 20 years of mistrust... Up to now, Americans have not shown any sign of good will," he said.

Mousavian called on Europeans to resist U.S. pressure and treat Tehran's nuclear dossier "fairly."

"Why they do not open a chapter of cooperation?" Mousavian said. "This issue can be solved by political talks, not by resolutions."

Iran agreed to suspend its enrichment-related activities last year after talks with foreign ministers from Britain, Germany and France. But it recently resumed key parts of it.

The IAEA board of governors passed a resolution last month demanding Iran freeze all activities connected with enriching uranium or face "tougher actions."

Mousavian said Iran considers enrichment as its "legitimate right" and would not yield to such pressures.

Iran's conservative-dominated parliament has prepared a bill that would force moderate President Mohammad Khatami's government to resume uranium enrichment.

"Parliament is concerned over whether the government is capable of guaranteeing the nations right of having peaceful technology," Mousavian said.

Reuters

Sabotage an Option Against Iran's Atomic Plans -Experts

By Dan Williams – 11 October 2004

JERUSALEM (Reuters) - Somewhere between sanctions and air strikes lurks a third option for those who seek to stop Iran's atomic program in its tracks: sabotage.

Politically deniable -- unlike failed diplomacy -- and much subtler than region-rattling military offensives, covert action of the kind used elsewhere by Israel and the United States could already be under way against the Islamic republic, experts say.

"Iran has been trying to go nuclear since the 1970s and has not yet managed," said Gad Shimron, a veteran of Israel's Mossad spy service who now writes on defense issues.

"Who's to say there has not been sabotage already, now proving its worth?"

Britain's Daily Telegraph newspaper in August quoted Bush administration officials as saying sabotage tactics were being considered for Tehran. The Jewish state has said "all options" are valid for preventing its arch-foe getting the bomb.

The United States and Israel accuse Iran of concealing a plan to build a bomb, but Tehran says its nuclear program is dedicated solely to meeting electricity demand.

Independent experts question, however, whether any disruption of Iran's supply lines through sabotage or menacing of its nuclear scientists would have a lasting effect on a network that has resisted scrutiny from the U.N. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

"Historically, sabotage has served to delay programs but has not been successful in terminating them," said Gary Samore, a former White House adviser on non-proliferation now with the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London.

He cited a Norwegian heavy water plant struck by saboteurs between 1942 and 1944 to stop the Nazis getting the bomb -- a quest finally laid to rest by Germany's defeat in World War II.

"Delay is good if, in the meantime, something conclusive happens -- either a change of regime or a successful war."

Some Middle East security experts say even delays have key strategic value in a region notorious for its instability.

Covert campaign preceded Osiraq

The precedent usually cited for a military strike on Iranian atomic sites is Israel's 1981 bombing of the Iraqi reactor at Osiraq. That move drove Saddam Hussein's nuclear program underground until it was uncovered by the IAEA in 1991.

Well before Osiraq, a quieter campaign was in full swing.

Nuclear components destined for Baghdad were blown up in a French port. An Egyptian nuclear physicist hired by Iraq was killed in his Paris hotel. Bombs exploded near an Italian firm supplying Saddam Hussein with laboratories for atomic testing.

Saddam blamed the United States and Israel for the sabotage spree. Neither country commented, but then Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin told an American interviewer he hoped France and Italy had "learned their lesson" for helping Iraq.

Tehran fears it could be next in line after U.S.-led forces toppled Saddam last year.

"The Iranians are very clear about what happened to the Iraqi nuclear program and would have learned their lessons," said Alex Vatanka, an analyst with Jane's Sentinel Security Assessments. "In terms of supply lines and technology, they are extremely unlikely to use limited sources."

Among Iran's nuclear suppliers have been North Korea, Pakistan and China, all hard for Western diplomats to monitor.

Under its 1993 Counterproliferation Initiative, Washington claimed the right to act covertly against illicit weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. But a later U.S.-led treaty, the Proliferation Security Initiative, includes Russia, which also openly provides Iran with nuclear know-how.

A question of jurisdiction

While no one accuses countries friendly to the United States of knowingly arming Iran, private citizens may not feel such constraint, a fact that could complicate sabotage attempts.

"The understanding in the intelligence world is that those individuals who help rogue regimes knowingly put themselves at risk of reprisal," said Shimron.

"An agency that wants to operate in a friendly country has to weigh the possible fallout, but usually there is enough coordination between governments to ensure that it all goes smoothly as long as no one is needlessly hurt."

Vatanka said several Iranians who acquired scientific training in the West had answered a call by Tehran to return and work on their homeland's atomic program.

A German man is also under investigation for what national media charged was an attempt to supply Iran with components for nuclear weapons.

"If the Israelis believe sabotage is the only way of stopping Iran getting the bomb, I think they will go with it, even if this ends up harming relations with Europe," Vatanka said. "The Europeans have invested enormous diplomacy in Iran, but that means little to those planning Israel's self-defense."

A new report by the Dubai think-tank Gulf Research Center says Tehran could retaliate for any sabotage on its atomic plans by ordering proxies to attack U.S. targets in the Gulf or stepping up support for Palestinian militants fighting Israel.

Reuters

U.S., Europeans Discuss Nuclear Deal for Iran

By Carol Giacomo, Diplomatic Correspondent - 12 October 2004

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The Bush administration, which has opposed deal-making with so-called "axis of evil" states, is working with Europe on a plan to use threats and incentives to persuade Iran to end sensitive nuclear activities, U.S. and European officials said on Tuesday.

A senior U.S. official described the approach as a final effort to get Tehran to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency or face punitive action at what could be a key board meeting of the U.N. watchdog agency in November.

The official told Reuters the United States was not expected to offer any specific new incentives of its own. But the administration is "willing to let the Europeans go back one more time to Iran and say 'fish or cut bait'" on demands to end bomb-related activities, he said.

Officials said Washington wants a commitment the Europeans would back sanctions if Iran insists on continuing its nuclear program.

On Monday, the European Union agreed to prepare a package of "carrots and sticks" to get Iran to comply with IAEA demands to suspend enrichment, which can be used to make atomic bomb fuel.

Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and Undersecretary of State John Bolton are to meet European officials to discuss the plan on Friday in Washington.

Election issue

Bolton is a leading U.S. non-proliferation hard-liner and whether he would go along with the plan is unclear. "I would say the jury is out until Friday," one official said. If he doesn't back the plan, the idea could falter, although Bush could overrule him.

The issue is especially sensitive in the bitter run-up to the U.S. presidential election on Nov. 2 since the EU plan would guarantee Iran access to imported nuclear fuel, something Democratic candidate John Kerry has also proposed.

Kerry has accused President Bush of letting Europe lead in trying to find a solution with Tehran as Iran's nuclear program advanced. Bush has called Iran a member of the "axis of evil," along with North Korea and pre-war Iraq.

Washington has accused Iran of secretly developing nuclear arms and failed repeatedly to persuade the IAEA to refer the issue to the U.N. Security Council for possible sanctions.

Tehran insists its program is for peaceful energy purposes only. On Tuesday, it appeared to slam the door on the EU's latest diplomatic overture.

Last year, Britain, France and Germany reached an agreement under which Iran promised to suspend nuclear fuel enrichment. Iran never entirely froze the program and recently resumed key parts of it.

The evolving EU deal combines elements under discussion for some time, including guaranteeing Iran nuclear fuel from Russia, lifting a ban on exports to Iran of civilian aircraft parts and negotiating a trade agreement with the EU.

The U.S. official played down the possibility that existing U.S. sanctions on Iran could be lifted, although he noted Washington has often held out the chance of improved ties if Iran halts its nuclear program, stops undermining the Mideast peace process and ends support for "terrorism."

If broader international sanctions are called for, U.S. officials said the deal may circumvent the U.N. Security Council, where Russia and China have vetoes. Instead, sanctions could be imposed outside the security council structure by the United States, France, Britain, Germany and Japan.

Danielle Pletka of the American Enterprise Institute said the key is not whether Iran responds to the "carrots" but whether the EU views this offer as a one-time deal.

"The fear is that both the Europeans and the Iranians will see this as a continuation of a process and dance endlessly around until the Iranians have nuclear weapons," she said.

Henry Sokolski of the Non-proliferation Policy Education Center said another EU offer to Iran undermines efforts to stop the spread of nuclear arms and the issue should go directly to the security council.

CNN

U.S. bid to resolve Iran standoff

by Andrea Koppel – 13 October 2004

WASHINGTON (CNN) -- The Bush administration says it will host a meeting of G8 diplomats this week in Washington in a bid to resolve a nuclear impasse with Iran.

Iran has until November 25 to comply with U.N. demands that it suspend uranium enrichment activities.

At the meeting, to be held on Friday, European officials told CNN they would offer Tehran "bigger sticks and bigger carrots."

They expect to present a package of possible incentives to Iran as an inducement in exchange for abandoning its nuclear ambitions.

The details of the package are still being negotiated within European capitals but incentives could include, for example, the resumption of negotiations for a trade and cooperation agreement between the European Union and Iran.

The meeting is set to take place at the U.S. State Department, and its expanded format brings major industrialized nations such as Canada, Italy, Russia and Japan into the talks.

But even before the meeting, U.S. and European officials were lowering expectations that any breakthrough would be achieved.

U.S. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said Tuesday the meeting would focus on how to bring Iran into compliance with the requirements of the U.N.'s nuclear watchdog, as well as how the Security Council might take up the issue should it be referred to them.

Another U.S. official described the meeting as nothing more than "kabuki theater" -- an opportunity to give the appearance of action, when in fact little substance was expected to be discussed.

The Bush administration has accused Iran of secretly developing a nuclear weapons program and is pushing for the matter to be referred to the U.N. Security Council where additional sanctions might be considered.

The IAEA's 35-member board of governors is expected to meet again at the end of November to discuss the issue.

To date, the Bush administration has resisted the so-called "carrot and stick" approach with Iran -- a point underscored Tuesday by the State Department.

"I think you'll have to check with the Europeans as far as what their package will involve; whether it's anything new or whether it's just what they've always made clear, that there were certain benefits in the relationship that wouldn't happen without action by Iran on nuclear and other matters," Boucher said.

In September, the head of the IAEA concluded there was concrete evidence Iran was deceiving the international community about its nuclear energy program and moving ahead with a clandestine program to develop nuclear weapons.

The U.S. has been unable to win international support for an automatic trigger to refer Iran's case to the United Nations for possible economic sanction if it does not halt its uranium enrichment program in coming weeks.

"I think we've made very, very clear that Iran needs to take action on the nuclear issue," Boucher said.

"Our view is that it should be referred to the U.N. Security Council. That's where we think the next steps are."

Reuters

Armitage: U.S. Not Yet Seeking Sanctions on Iran

13 October 2004

TOKYO (Reuters) - Iran should be "brought to account" on its nuclear program, but Washington is open to ideas other than taking it to the U.N. Security Council for sanctions, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage said Wednesday.

Diplomats have said that the European Union had agreed on Monday to prepare a package of "carrots and sticks" to get Iran to comply with demands by the U.N.'s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to suspend its uranium enrichment activities -- a process that can be used to make material for atomic bombs.

Washington is working with the EU on the plan in a final effort to get Iran to cooperate with the IAEA, but has been said unlikely to offer an new incentives of its own.

"The Iranians ... have made a decision apparently to hide, to continue to hide their program and indeed, in addition to that, they have made some very scurrilous statements publicly," Armitage told a news conference in Tokyo.

"We hold the view that Iran needs to be brought to account and we would like to move to the U.N. Security Council after the November (IAEA) board of governors' meeting," Armitage said.

"But we're open to all ideas that people have because one thing has become clear and that is that we all share -- the G8 (Group of Eight) -- the same end, the desire, and that is that Iran should be free of nuclear weapons and be transparent and let the international community have sufficient confidence that that is the case," he added.

Armitage and Undersecretary of State John Bolton will meet officials from the Group of Eight industrial countries to discuss the issue Friday in Washington.

Armitage is in Tokyo for bilateral security talks with Japanese officials and to attend an international donors conference on Iraqi reconstruction.

Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi said Tuesday that the EU could not force Tehran to give up its right to enrich uranium, dealing a blow to Europe's efforts to halt the process.

"It is wrong for them (the EU) to think they can, through negotiations, force Iran to stop enrichment," Kharrazi said.

Iran says its nuclear program is for electricity generation and says it wants to master the full fuel cycle, including enrichment, so that it does not have to rely on imported fuel.

Washington believes the program is aimed at developing atomic weapons.

Officials in Washington have said the United States wanted a commitment from the Europeans that they would back sanctions if Iran insists on continuing its nuclear activities.

Iran is preparing a large batch of raw uranium ready for enriching and has resumed building enrichment centrifuges in defiance of a previous deal with Britain, Germany and France.

The IAEA last month called on Tehran to halt such activities and said it might be sent to the Security Council if it failed to do so by the next IAEA board meeting on Nov. 25.

Associated Press

Two Japanese Convicted in Iran Scheme

15 October 2004

TOKYO - A Japanese court on Friday convicted two men of illegally exporting equipment that could be used to make missile fuel to Iran.

One man, the president of Tokyo's Seishin Enterprise Co., was given a suspended prison sentence of 2 1/2 years. The other, Seishin's former South Korea branch manager, was given a suspended 1 1/2-year prison term. The court also ordered the company to pay a \$134,000 fine.

The two were found guilty of violating foreign exchange and customs laws. The suspended sentences mean they won't go to prison unless they commit another crime during the terms of their sentences.

The court said the two men illegally exported two grinders, which can be used to produce solid fuel for rockets and missiles, to Iran in 1999 and 2000 without obtaining export permission from the government.

They were arrested in June 2003.

Exporting the grinders is restricted under international guidelines established by the Missile Technology Control Regime, a pact signed by Japan, the United States and other countries to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Washington Post

G-8 Nations to Meet on Iran

New Plan Aims to Pressure Tehran About Nuclear Ambitions

by Robin Wright and Dafna Linzer - 15 October 2004

After weeks of behind-the-scenes diplomacy, the United States will meet here today with the world's wealthiest countries to determine a strategy for giving Iran one last chance to abandon its alleged nuclear arms program or face new international pressures.

Both Democrats and Republicans increasingly believe that Iran will be the next big foreign policy flash point -- and that action may prove necessary soon after the U.S. presidential election next month, no matter who wins.

A new proposal drafted by European members of the powerful Group of Eight nations is intended to get Iran to fully agree to a plan that will prevent it from being able to convert a nuclear energy program into an arms program. The proposal includes incentives if Iran complies and punitive measures if it balks, U.S. and European officials said. If Iran accepts such a plan, it could resolve an international standoff that has persisted since Russia resumed construction of Iran's first atomic power plant, at Bushehr, in the early 1990s. The G-8 talks, hosted by the State Department, come a day after Russia and Iran announced that they have completed the Bushehr facility. Washington has charged it could be converted to the production of nuclear weapons.

Despite its heavy focus on Iraq and the domestic election, the Bush administration has agreed to look at one last overture to Iran, to be made as early as next week, because of mounting alarm over the Islamic republic's advancing capabilities and failure to follow through on an agreement to halt activities that could contribute to a weapons program.

"Iran is definitely the next big issue. It's the number one issue that any administration, be it Kerry or Bush, will have to face immediately because of the intelligence assessment that predicts Iran could have the know-how and capability as early as the summer of 2005," said a senior State Department official, who requested anonymity because of the sensitive diplomacy.

"That's a disputed intelligence claim," the official said. "But any capability in the hands of a rogue nation with a long record of supporting terror and a clear interest in challenging the U.S. and Israel makes that the clearest threat facing U.S. interests in the next administration."

Most intelligence assessments project later dates -- three to seven years -- before Iran could develop a nuclear weapon, and U.S. officials say Iran does not now have uranium or fissile material. But Tehran's failure to abide by an agreement with Britain, France and Germany last year not to work toward enriching uranium has triggered broad skepticism among Republicans and Democrats about Iran's long-range intent.

The United States is "open to all ideas" to prevent Iran from developing nuclear arms, Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage said Wednesday in Tokyo. But he warned that Washington is prepared to press for punishment if Tehran does not act.

"We hold the view that Iran needs to be brought to account, and we would like to move to the U.N. Security Council after the November board of governors meeting [of the U.N. nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency], but we're open to all ideas that people have," Armitage told reporters. He said he was returning to the United States to participate in the talks, which are scheduled to be chaired by John R. Bolton, undersecretary of state for arms control and international security.

The new initiative emerged from talks on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly last month between G-8 foreign ministers and Secretary of State Colin L. Powell. The G-8 ministers outlined a two-step proposal with a deadline pegged to the next meeting of the IAEA, in Vienna on Nov. 25, U.S. and European officials said.

Given that Britain, France and Germany did not win Iran's compliance, European members of the G-8 -- the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Japan, Italy, Russia and Canada -- are seeking a broader front. That would take away Iran's ability to play one country off another and undermine Tehran's contention that the three nations were operating under U.S. pressure, U.S. officials said.

The G-8 umbrella also would give the Bush administration cover for a new international overture and deniability that it is offering incentives to Iran, U.S. and European officials said.

The other G-8 countries will approach Iran individually, but with a single message that it immediately and permanently end uranium-enrichment and processing-related activities or face punitive international action, the officials said.

"We want to make clear to Iran that it has to comply immediately, and everyone agrees we should go to the Security Council [if it does not]. If they do, we might start talking about what we might be able to offer -- in comprehensive ways, not just economic," said a European envoy who has seen the proposal.

The plan has some support within the State Department, but the Bush administration is not eager to put its name on an offer that could help Iran avoid censure by the Security Council. While it has continually suggested that the council needs to discuss Iran's nuclear intentions, the administration has held back on stating that sanctions or other punitive measures should be placed on Tehran.

The administration yesterday played down its role. "We'll be in a listening mode," said a White House official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the impending talks. "We're going to want to talk about what next steps will be taken."

There is cautious optimism among G-8 countries about the new initiative and the growing unity on Iran policy among the world's major powers.

"Do we expect any change in U.S. policy? Probably not for the moment. But would the U.S. oppose European initiatives with Iran? Probably not either," said a second European diplomat familiar with the plan.

The first European envoy called the talks an "incredibly positive" development that reflects the administration's willingness to look beyond the potential political fallout from a deal that might appear to offer Iran any benefits on the eve of the U.S. election.

Europeans also note the growing cooperation between the United States and Russia, which have long been at odds over the Bushehr facility. To ease U.S. fears, Russia is pressing for an arrangement in which Iran would return spent nuclear fuel to Russia -- another agreement not yet signed by Iran.

Guardian

EU trio seeks US backing for Iran nuclear deal

by Ian Traynor – 16 October 2004

Senior US and European officials were locked in last-ditch negotiations in Washington last night to defuse the crisis over Iran's suspected nuclear weapons programme.

Ahead of a crucial meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna next month, the EU troika of Britain, France and Germany has drawn up a package of sweeteners in the hope of persuading Tehran to abandon its advanced uranium enrichment programme.

The Europeans, at loggerheads with Washington over how to respond to the perceived Iranian challenge, are hoping to gain US backing for the high-risk diplomatic overture.

But the US, keener to punish the Iranians than negotiate with them, is certain to drive a hard bargain for supporting the move and is insisting the Europeans drop opposition to reporting Iran to the UN security council should they fail to reach a deal with Tehran.

"The Americans need iron-clad guarantees," said a senior diplomat.

David Albright, a Washington nuclear analyst, said the US-European aim was no longer to get Iran to freeze its uranium enrichment programmes, but to abandon them altogether. "The US has to buy into this," he said.

In return for US support, the Europeans appeared to have agreed to sanctions if their plan fails.

There is a mounting sense of urgency ahead of the IAEA board meeting in Vienna on November 25.

A senior international official involved in the policy-making debate said the Iranian nuclear genie was out of the bottle and could not be put back in. Iran could only now be persuaded to forfeit some of the nuclear facilities it possesses in return for European trade and technology.

"It's too late now. The Iranians have their enrichment capability and the know-how."

Another diplomat said the stakes riding on an EU-Iran deal tacitly underwritten by Washington were high since it is expected the Iranian issue could become a US foreign policy priority as soon as the White House race is settled. "The only alternative is to take it off them [Iran] by force."

The talks in Washington are taking place in the framework of the G8 group of industrialised nations, reflecting a US move to try to impose sanctions on Iran by a body that includes the Europeans as well as Japan, Canada and Russia because Washington fears it would be unable to secure support for sanctions in the UN security council.

Earlier this year, sources said, Washington circulated a paper outlining its plans for sanctions on Iran, arguing that they should be "non-oil-based".

The Europeans want to offer Iran a trade agreement, and supply nuclear fuel for civilian reactors and other technology in return for agreement to forgo domestic uranium enrichment.

The US is sceptical that any deal will stick. The EU troika reached a similar pact with Iran a year ago, but that has been honoured only in the breach.

The difference this time, say the sources, is that the US could support the package, which would also have G8 backing. If Washington buys into the proposals, there will be strong pressure on Russia to join - important because it has just completed building a nuclear power station in Iran and is to supply the nuclear fuel.

But the US side of the negotiations is being led by John Bolton of the state department, an avowed hardliner and trenchant critic of the IAEA. Diplomats fear he could set such stiff conditions that any deal would be doomed.

Het vervolg van de berichten-sectie is te vinden in Facts and Reports nummer 39B

KRONIEK 2004

januari	Lord Robertson vertrekt als Secretaris-Generaal van de NAVO
1 januari	Ierland neemt voorzitterschap EU over
1 januari	Einde Nederlands voorzitterschap OVSE
1 januari	Verenigde Staten nemen voorzitterschap G8 over
20 januari - 26 maart	Eerste sessie Conference on Disarmament, Geneve
21-25 januari	World Economic Forum, Davos
6-7 februari	Annual Munich Security Conference, München
20 februari	Parlementsverkiezingen Iran
27 februari	Bezoek Schröder aan Washington
maart	Parlementsverkiezingen Spanje
1 maart	Ministeriële bijeenkomst VS-EU, Washington
8 maart	IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, Wenen
14 maart	Presidentsverkiezingen Rusland
2 april	Bezoek Colin Powell aan Duitsland en België
2 april	Informele bijeenkomst NAVO Ministers van Defensie
5 april	Parlementsverkiezingen Indonesië
5-23 april	UN Disarmament Commission, jaarlijkse bijeenkomst, New York
9-16 april	Bezoek Dick Cheney aan China, Japan en Zuid-Korea
15 april	Parlementsverkiezingen Zuid-Korea
26 april – 7 mei	NPT PrepCom, New York
mei	Bijeenkomst Chemical Weapons Convention, Den Haag
1 mei	Toetreding diverse landen tot de Europese Unie
10 mei -25 juni	Tweede sessie Conference on Disarmament, Geneve
juni	Verkiezingen Europees Parlement
juni	Parlementsverkiezingen Japan
5-6	Bezoek George W. Bush aan Frankrijk
8-10 juni	G-8 Summit, Sea Island, Georgia
14 juni	IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, Wenen
28-29 juni	NAVO-top, Istanbul
1 juli	Nederland neemt voorzitterschap EU over
19-30 juli	Biological Weapons Convention, expert meeting, Geneve
september	Start Algemene Vergadering Verenigde Naties, New York
26 juli – 10 september	Derde sessie Conference on Disarmament, Geneve
13 september	IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, Wenen
20-24 september	IAEA General Conference, Wenen
27 september	IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, Wenen
2 november	Presidentsverkiezingen Verenigde Staten
25 november	IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, Wenen
6-10 december	Jaarlijkse bijeenkomst Biological Weapons Convention, Geneve

FACTS AND REPORTS

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3. Transatlantic relations – recent developments
Overzicht van recente ontwikkelingen in de transatlantische betrekkingen, met name binnen de NAVO, mede naar aanleiding van uitspraken in de State of the Union.
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Documenten en artikelen over het ontslag van directeur-generaal Bustani van het OPCW
7. Prepcom van het NPV – nucleaire ontwapening stokt
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9. Joint Strike Fighter – achtergrondberichten
10. Konfrontatie in Zuid-Azië – de kernwapenwedloop tussen India en Pakistan
Basisgegevens over de nucleaire strijdkrachten en doctrines van India en Pakistan, Nederlandse wapenexport en wapenexportbeleid en een oproep om een nucleair treffen te voorkomen
11. Massavernietigingswapens in het Midden-Oosten (1) – Egypte, Israël, Syrië
Basisinformatie over de proliferatie van nucleaire, biologische en chemische wapens in Egypte, Israël en Syrië en verklaringen van de Nederlandse regering hierover
12. Amerikaans unilateralisme II – officiële reacties
13. Aanval op Irak – de kwestie van de massavernietigingswapens; feiten, documenten en overwegingen
14. Aanval op Irak (2) – recente ontwikkelingen
15. Documenten First Committee Verenigde Naties 2002 – resoluties, verklaringen, rapporten
16. De NAVO-top in Praag – documenten
17. Aanval op Irak (3) – het inspectieregiem
18. Internationaal veiligheidsbeleid Verenigde Staten – officiële documenten en reacties van de regering
19. Veiligheidsvraagstukken en de verkiezingen (2) – standpunten van de politieke partijen (update 2003)
20. Korea, de tweede crisis
21. Aanval op Irak (4) – de aanloop
22. Aanval op Irak (5) – vooravond van de aanval
23. De andere crises - Informatie over het Amerikaans nucleair beleid, missile defense, de Conference on Disarmament en de recente ontwikkelingen rond Noord-Korea, Iran en India en Pakistan.
24. Aanval op Irak (6) – de slachtoffers
25. Nucleaire vraagstukken (2) – standpunten van de Nederlandse regering en de Tweede Kamer en recent nieuws nucleair beleid Verenigde Staten - Overzicht april 2002 – mei 2003
26. Teststopverdrag Artikel XIV Conferentie – de kwestie van de Amerikaanse minikernwapens
27. G-8 en Proliferation Security Initiative – stappen naar unilaterale contra-proliferatie
28. Irak (7) – Nederland en de massavernietigingswapens
29. Proliferatievraagstukken – Standpunten van de Nederlandse regering
30. Iran – Documentatie massavernietigingswapens
31. Twee proliferatiecrises – Iran en Noord-Korea
32. Begroting Buitenlandse Zaken – Proliferatievraagstukken
33. Irak (8) – De massavernietigingswapens
34. Irak (9) – De casus belli
35. Proliferatie – recente ontwikkelingen
36. VS nucleair beleid – recente ontwikkelingen
37. Proliferatie (2) – recente ontwikkelingen
38. Iran (2A-2B-2C-2D) – recente ontwikkelingen

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