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# **ONTWIKKELINGEN BETREFFENDE KERNWAPENS EN DE NEDERLANDSE POLITIEK**

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ONTWIKKELINGEN BETREFFENDE  
KERNWAPENS EN DE NEDERLANDSE  
POLITIEK


Maart 2002

**PENN, het Project voor Europese Nucleaire Non-proliferatie**, is opgezet om:

- \* officiële discussies over de toekomst van kernwapens in Europa nauwgezet te volgen en deze te verhelderen;
- \* analyses van en commentaren op deze ontwikkelingen te publiceren;
- \* verdere maatregelen voor kernontwapening in Europa en substantiële Europese bijdragen aan kernwapenbeheersing, ontwapening en non-proliferatie te stimuleren;
- \* te ijveren voor de volledige naleving van het Non-Proliferatieverdrag door de NAVO, de Europese Unie, en haar leden;
- \* politieke belemmeringen op te werpen tegen ontwikkelingen die zouden kunnen leiden tot een Europese Unie met kernwapens;
- \* te bevorderen dat de Europese Unie en al haar leden uiteindelijk niet-nucleaire leden van het NPV worden.

Deze publikatie is mogelijk gemaakt door de W. Alton Jones Foundation

Working Group Eurobomb/PENN NL  
Obrechtstraat 43  
3572 EC UTRECHT  
THE NETHERLANDS  
TEL (+31) (0)30 271 4376  
(+31) (0)30 272 2594  
FAX (+31) (0)30 271 4759  
e-mail: k.koster@inter.nl.net  
logo: Len Munnik



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## FACTS AND REPORTS

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## STAND VAN ZAKEN

### **Antiraketschild**

Op 13 december zegden de Verenigde Staten bij monde van President Bush officieel het ABM-verdrag op, dit wordt effectief na een opzegtermijn van 6 maanden. Bush verklaarde: "Today, I have given formal notice to Russia, in accordance with the treaty, that the United States of America is withdrawing from this almost 30 year old treaty. I have concluded the ABM treaty hinders our government's ability to develop ways to protect our people from future terrorist or rogue state missile attacks." (Office of the Press Secretary, 13 December 2001).

De Russische President Putin reageerde teleurgesteld, maar niet verrast: "This step has not come as a surprise to us. But we believe this decision to be mistaken." (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Website, Statement, 13 December 2001). De Doema nam een resolutie aan in iets hardere bewoordingen: "The decision of the United States of America on unilateral withdrawal from the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of 26 May 1972 was wrong and will have a destabilising effect, because it will actually destroy the existing system of international treaties of ensuring strategic stability, which has proved highly effective, and create practical prerequisites for a new spiral of the arms race." (Parlamentskaya Gazeta, No. 17, 16 January 2002).

De Zweedse Minister van Defensie, Anna Lind, sprak op 13 februari jl in het Zweedse Parlement haar afkeuring uit over het opzeggen van het ABM-verdrag: "It is regrettable that the USA has unilaterally withdrawn from the ABM Treaty and is moving ahead with its plans for a missile defence. This development risks leading to a new arms race. Having said that, it is unacceptable that China is using the US plans as an argument for modernising and rearming its nuclear arsenals and for blocking progress in the disarmament area. The United States must now continue consultations and strive to find a solution that makes a positive contribution to disarmament and non-proliferation." [Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary Debate on Foreign Affairs, Wednesday 13 February 2002].

Ook van VN Secretaris-Generaal Kofi Annan kwam kritiek: "the annulation of this treaty may provoke an arms race, especially in the missile area, and further undermine disarmament and non-proliferation regimes (statement, 14 December 2001). Soortgelijke reacties waren te horen van Chinese en Franse zijde, terwijl prominente Democraten in de VS de stap kortzichtig, overhaast en potentieel contraproductief noemden.

Toch was de kritiek minder dan van te voren verwacht werd (James Schlesinger, The ABM Treaty's quiet demise, Washington Post, 20 February 2002). Er werd veelal opgemerkt dat het ging om een bilaterale zaak tussen de VS en Rusland. De Amerikaanse belofte een nieuw raamwerk voor samenwerking met Rusland te ontwikkelen speelde hierbij ook een rol.

Minister Van Aartsen haakte hier bij aan tijdens de behandeling van de begroting van Buitenlandse Zaken in de Eerste Kamer: "In plaats van het inmiddels door de VS opgezegde ABM-verdrag dient een nieuw strategisch raamwerk tot stand te komen, dat naast verdergaande reducties van strategische kernkoppen, tevens reguliere militaire consultaties en afspraken over raketverdediging en non-proliferatie dient te omvatten. [...] de regering hoopt dat de besprekingen tussen de VS en de Russische Federatie tot een gunstig resultaat zullen leiden en dat tot een werkbare post-ABM-relatie kan worden gekomen. In dit verband is het bemoedigend dat Rusland gematigd heeft gereageerd op de opzegging van het ABM-verdrag en dat de besprekingen met de VS over het nieuwe strategisch raamwerk worden voortgezet." (Handelingen Eerste Kamer, 5 februari 2002, EK 18-927).

Van Aartsen ziet raketverdediging binnen dit raamwerk, waaronder ook het Theatre Missile Defence, als een deel van het antwoord op bedreigingen na 11 september: "De ontwikkeling van een raketverdediging dient eveneens in dit kader gestalte te krijgen. In de brief van het kabinet van 5 juli jongstleden hebben de Minister van Defensie en ik de uitgangspunten van de regering over het thema raketverdediging uiteen gezet. Die analyse is door de situatie van 11 september niet gewijzigd, omdat de raketverdediging een deel van het antwoord op nieuwe bedreigingen kan vormen. De Nederlandse theatre missile defence inspanningen moeten bijvoorbeeld ook in die context worden gezien." (Handelingen Eerste Kamer, 5 februari 2002, EK 18-927).

Begin januari werd het belang dat de VS hechten aan missile defence nog eens benadrukt, toen aangekondigd werd dat de Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) omgevormd zou worden en opgewaardeerd zou worden tot agency-status, onder de naam Missile Defense Agency (MDA). Deze agency wordt verantwoordelijk voor het ontwikkelen van het missile defense systeem. (Department of Defense, DoD establishes Missile Defense Agency, Press Release, 4 January, 2002).

Op 25 januari werd er een anti-raket test gehouden door de Amerikaanse marine. De dummy-raket werd hierbij uit de lucht geschoten, maar recentelijk meldde de Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) dat het formaat van deze dummy-raket ruim vijf maal zo groot was als raketten die in een daadwerkelijk treffen gebruikt zouden worden (Washington Post, Group says exaggerated target used in missile test, 2 March 2002). Dezelfde groep merkte ook op dat het Pentagon dezelfde grote dummy-raketten de eerstkomende jaren bij testen wil blijven gebruiken.

### **Nuclear Posture Review en kernwapenbeleid VS**

Op 8 januari werd het Nuclear Posture Review van de Amerikaanse regering gepresenteerd. Van dit geheime document, werden enkele gedeclassificeerde onderdelen via briefings openbaar gemaakt. De belangrijkste punten die naar buiten gebracht werden zijn de volgende (US Department of State, US will rely less on strategic nuclear weapons, 9 January 2002):

- terugbrengen van het aantal strategische kernwapens die ter onmiddellijke beschikking staan van de strijdkrachten van ongeveer 6000 naar 1700 à 2200 over een periode van ongeveer 10 jaar. Het overgrote deel van die gereduceerde kernwapens wordt in opslag geplaatst (hedge), zodat ze indien nodig weer snel ter beschikking komen. (Hans M. Kristensen, The Unruly Hedge: Cold War thinking at the Crawford Summit, Arms Control Today, December 2001);
- ontwikkeling en in gebruik nemen van een anti-raketschild;
- het verkorten van de tijd die nodig is om over te gaan tot het nemen van kernproeven;
- het ontwikkelen van een 'flexibel arsenaal', waaronder de productie van mini-nukes (Physicians for Social Responsibility, Bush Nuclear Weapons Plan sets stage for new bombs, resumption of testing, 8 January 2002); deze mini-nukes zullen veel meer als daadwerkelijk inzetbare wapens beschouwd worden dan de zwaardere typen kernwapens.

De aankondiging van de verkorting van de tijd die nodig is om over te gaan tot het nemen van kernproeven, veroorzaakte enige opschudding. De Amerikaanse regering meldde dat er nog geen plannen zijn om het zelfopgelegde moratorium op kernproeven te doorbreken, maar Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton zei wel: "[...] if the strategic circumstances in the world change dramatically and a decision were made sometime down the road we'd be in a better position in terms of our testing and research infrastructure than we are now." (Press conference, Geneva, 24 January 2002). Daarbij aansluitend blijft de Amerikaanse regering tegenstander van het Kernstopverdrag (CTBT).

In antwoord op Kamervragen van Van Bommel (SP) zei Minister Van Aartsen op 29 januari jl over een eventuele hervatting van het nemen van kernproeven door de VS: "Een beëindiging van het moratorium op kernproeven zou aanzienlijke schade toebrengen aan het streven naar nucleaire non-proliferatie en ontwapening. Het zou de druk op India, Pakistan en China om af te zien van kernproeven en verdere ontwikkeling van hun kernwapenarsenaal verminderen. De kans dat de genoemde landen het kernstopverdrag zouden ondertekenen en/of ratificeren zou tevens worden verkleind." (Tweede Kamer, Aangangsel van de Handelingen 2001-2002, 568, blz. 1191).

Tijdens een hearing in februari in de Amerikaanse Senaat maakte John Gordon, hoofd van de National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), bekend dat de Nuclear Weapons Council opdracht gegeven heeft voor een studie naar de ontwikkeling van een 'penetratie-kernwapen' dat harde ondergrondse doelen kan vernietigen. Verder moet er in 2020 een nieuwe intercontinentale ballistische raket (ICBM) operationeel zijn en in 2030 een nieuwe kernwapenonderzeeër met een nieuwe ballistische raket.

Ook heeft de Amerikaanse regering 'advanced warhead concept teams' ingesteld die gaan werken aan nieuwe kernkoppen of modificaties van bestaande kernkoppen. (Washington Post, Nuclear Plans go beyond cuts, 19 February 2002). Daarnaast meldde Gordon dat er na 2005 voor een aantal kernkoppen renovatieprogramma's opgestart gaan worden, ondermeer voor B61-kernkoppen: "Some secondary components [...] show signs of aging that could affect warhead reliability, if left unchecked." (John

Gordon, Statement before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 14 February 2002). In de begroting van de NNSA voor 2002 wordt al geld uitgetrokken voor de renovatie van B61-kernkoppen: “Stockpile Maintenance (*FY 2001 \$321.7; FY 2002 \$362.5*) supports production and installation of limited life components in each weapon type, refurbishment and replacement of aging components and major refurbishment activities to extend the life of the W87 and B61.” (US Department of Energy, Budget Highlights; Fiscal Year 2002 Request, April 2001). De in Europa, waaronder de op Luchtmachtbasis Volkel, gestationeerde Amerikaanse kernwapens zijn van het B61-type.

Op 10 maart jl werd bekend dat de Amerikaanse regering in het Nuclear Posture Review ook opdracht geeft aan het Pentagon plannen op te stellen voor nucleaire aanvallen op ten minste zeven met naam genoemde landen: China, Irak, Iran, Libië, Noord-Korea, Rusland en Syrië. Ook wordt gezegd dat er rekening gehouden moet worden met de mogelijkheid dat kernwapengebruik nodig is in een toekomstig Arabisch-Israëliëse crisis en dat er plannen ontwikkeld worden voor kernwapengebruik als reactie op chemische of biologische aanvallen, evenals verrassende militaire ontwikkelingen van ongespecificeerde aard. Ook wordt er weer melding gemaakt van de ontwikkeling van nieuwe kernwapens om opslagplaatsen van biologische en chemische wapens in vijandige landen preventief te vernietigen. Met dit alles wordt de idee van kernwapens als ‘weapons of last resort’ feitelijk losgelaten. (LA Times, William Arkin, Secret plan outlines the unthinkable, 10 March 2002; Volkskrant, Bert Lanting, VS maken plannen voor kernaanvallen, 10 maart 2002). Het Department of Defense reageerde in een verklaring op deze openbaarmakingen: “The Department of Defense continues to plan for a broad range of contingencies and unforeseen threats to the United States and its allies. We do so in order to deter such attacks in the first place.” (US Department of Defense, Statement on Nuclear Posture Review, 9 March 2002).

Op 21 februari jl kondigde de Amerikaanse regering bij monde van John Bolton aan dat zij zich niet langer zou houden aan de belofte geen kernwapens te gebruiken tegen niet-kernwapen-staten. Deze zogenaamde ‘negatieve veiligheidsgarantie’ dateerde van 1978. Volgens Bolton weerspiegelt de belofte “an unrealistic view of the international situation”: “We would have to do what is appropriate under the circumstances, and the classic formulation of that is, we are not ruling anything in and we are not ruling anything out.” (Washington Times, US drops pledge on nukes, 22 February 2002).

### **Onderhandelingen VS-Rusland**

Amerikaanse en Russische delegaties kwamen bijeen in Washington op 15 en 16 januari jl. Daar werd besloten een aantal werkgroepen op te zetten, ondermeer om de reducties van de kernwapenarsenalen te volgen. (US Department of State, U.S., Russian Defense Officials Conclude Early Arms Talks, 16 January 2002). In tegenstelling tot eerdere berichten lijken de Verenigde Staten ook bereid alsnog een afspraak vast te leggen over deze reducties, een uitdrukkelijke wens van Rusland. Douglas Feith, Under Secretary Of Defense For Policy: “We would consider an agreement that would deal with the subject of the offensive force reductions from the point of view of making sure that we understand each other's force structure and our plans for our force structure. And if we can come up with measures that will promote that understanding, reduce the dangers of misunderstanding or miscalculation about that, we'd be willing to consider an agreement on that.” (Department of Defense, News Briefing, 16 January 2002).

Aan de andere kant wordt in het Nuclear Posture Review gezegd: “In the event that US relations with Russia significantly worsen in the future, the US may need to revise its nuclear force levels and posture. (LA Times, William Arkin, Secret plan outlines the unthinkable, 10 March 2002).

### **NAVO**

Op 13 december 2001 reageerde Lord Robertson, secretaris-generaal van de NAVO op het opzeggen van het ABM-verdrag door de Verenigde Staten: “NATO welcomes the pledge of the United States of America to develop a new framework of cooperation with Russia to enhance stability and re-inforce cooperation on security issues, including dramatic reductions in strategic nuclear weapons.” [NATO Press release (2001)177, 13 December 2001).

De NAVO-ministerraad voor Defensie van 17 en 18 december 2001 onderstreepte de uitgangspunten van het in 1999 in Washington vastgestelde Strategisch Concept: “[...] we reaffirmed the principles

underpinning these [nuclear] forces as set out in the Alliance's Strategic Concept. [...] We emphasised again that nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO continue to provide an essential political and military link between the European and North American members of the Alliance."

Verder wordt de door de presidenten Bush en Putin aangekondigde reductie van operationele kernwapenarsenalen verwelkomd en steun uitgesproken voor het moratorium op kernproeven: "We welcomed President Bush's decision to reduce over the next decade the number of US operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons to between 1,700-2,200 and President Putin's statement that Russia intended to reduce its strategic nuclear weapons 'in kind'. We reaffirmed our determination to strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and to contribute to the implementation of the conclusions of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. We continue to support the existing moratoria on nuclear testing." [NATO Press release (2001)170 – 18 December 2001].

In antwoord op Kamervragen over de opvolging van de F-16 bevestigde de Nederlandse regering dat het de bedoeling is om de Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) de huidige NAVO nucleaire taak te laten overnemen. (Tweede Kamer 26 488, Behoeftestelling vervanging F-16, nr. 9, Lijst van vragen en antwoorden, vastgesteld 7 maart 2002). Dit betekent dat de Amerikaanse kernwapens die op Volkel gestationeerd zijn, en die zoals eerder vermeld gerestaureerd worden, ook met de opvolger van de F-16 gebruikt kunnen worden. De Joint Strike Fighter is overigens niet standaard geschikt voor kernwapengebruik. De Amerikaanse luchtmacht heeft echter al aangekondigd een aantal JSF's wel nuclear-capable te willen maken (NRDC Nuclear Notebook, US Nuclear Forces 2001, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, March/April 2001).

Informatie over recente spanningen tussen de Verenigde Staten en de Europese NAVO-lidstaten is te vinden in: Werkgroep Eurobom, Transatlantic Relations, Facts and Reports nr. 3, maart 2002.

### **Proliferatie**

India voerde zowel op 12 december 2001 als op 25 januari jl een rakettest uit. Op 12 december werd een langeafstandsversie van de Prithvi grond-grondraket gelanceerd. De test verliep succesvol. De raket, met een bereik van 250 kilometer, is bedoeld voor gebruik door de luchtmacht en is volgens Westerse experts geschikt voor het dragen van een kernkop. [International Herald Tribune, India conducts 'flawless' missile test, 13 December 2002).

De test van 25 januari betrof een korteafstandsversie van de nuclear-capable middellangeafstandsraket Agni, met een bereik van 700 km en de mogelijkheid om een kernkop van 1000 kg te dragen. Indiase claims dat de test niet provocatief was of specifiek op een land was gericht, werden door Pakistan veroordeeld. Volgens Indiase militaire bronnen is de nieuwe versie van de Agni-raket ontwikkeld om Pakistaanse nucleaire doelen diep in de woestijn van de provincie Baluchistan te kunnen raken. [Jane's Defence Weekly, Rahul Bedi, India test-fires new Agni missile variant, 6 February 2002).

Een Russische wetenschapper, die in Iran gewerkt heeft, gaf opening van zaken over de situatie met betrekking tot de ontwikkeling van ballistische raketten in Iran. Volgens Vadim Vorobei zijn de Iranese mogelijkheden veel beperkter dan Iran wil doen voorkomen en zijn Amerikaanse angsten overdreven. Hij twijfelt aan de veronderstelling van de VS dat Iran over 5 à 10 jaar in het bezit zal zijn van een intercontinentale ballistische raket (ICBM): "Their progress is very slow." Deze mening wordt gedeeld door de Israëlische expert op het gebied van strategische zaken, Gerald Steinberg van het Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs: "The Iranian program is not developing as quickly as the Iranians have claimed, and Israeli and American assessments expected." (International Herald Tribune, Michael Dobbs, Theran's quest for ballistic missiles, 14 January 2002).

Deze berichten werden ook bevestigd door Israëlische inlichtingenbronnen. Volgens hen blijft Iran tegen hindernissen aanlopen bij de ontwikkeling van de Shahab 3 ballistische middellangeafstandsraket (MRBM), ondanks uitgebreide steun van Noord-Korea en Rusland bij het ontwikkelingsprogramma. Halverwege januari ontplofte een Shahab 3-raket vlak voor een geplande flight test. (Jane's Defence Weekly, Steve Rodan and Duncan Lennox, Shahab 3 suffers test launch setback, 20 February 2002).

### **Proliferatie: Irak**

Irak ligt hevig onder vuur, van met name de Verenigde Staten en het Verenigd Koninkrijk, om weer VN-wapeninspecteurs toe laten in het land. Voor het eerst sinds lange tijd vonden, ondermeer hierover gesprekken plaats tussen Irak en de Verenigde Naties (Washington Post, Colum Lynch, Annan to

press Bagdad on weapons inspectors, 26 February 2002). In het gesprek tussen VN Secretaris-generaal Kofi Annan en de Irakese Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken Naji Sabri, drong Annan erop aan dat Irak voldoet aan VN-resoluties over de ontmanteling van biologische, chemische en nucleaire wapens. Volgens VN-bronnen was het te vroeg om te bepalen in hoeverre Irak bereid zou kunnen zijn weer wapeninspecteurs toe te laten, maar de Britse ambassadeur bij de VN, Jeremy Greenstock, zei: “[...] the fact that there seems to be a willingness to come back in mid-April indicates Iraq wants the process to continue. That could be good news.” (Washington Post, Colum Lynch, Annan urges Iraq to permit arms inspectors’ return, 8 March 2002).

Volgens de vroegere VN-wapeninspecteur in Irak, Scott Ritter, vormt Irak absoluut geen bedreiging voor de Verenigde Staten: “Sie besitzen keine funktionierenden Massvernichtungswaffen, sie können weder Nachbarstaaten, noch Europa, Asien, die USA oder irgendjemand anders bedrohen, es gibt keine Gefahr.” Ritter zegt dat in 1998, toen de laatste wapeninspecteurs in Irak waren, er geen massavernietigingswapens en programma’s meer waren en voegt toe dat “[...] jeder, der etwas von Massvernichtungswaffen versteht, weiß, dass es albern ist, zu denken, der Irak habe diese Fähigkeit in nur drei Jahren wieder aufgebaut.” (Die Tageszeitung, Benjamin Mergelsberg, ‘Keine Gefahr für irgendjemand’, 2 März 2002).



## COMMENTAAR

De meeste van de door ons geschetste ontwikkelingen hebben te maken met unilaterale stappen die door de Amerikaanse regering genomen zijn met als doel het verhogen van de Amerikaans nationale veiligheid. Hoewel de aanslagen van 11 september hierin wel een rol spelen, was er al eerder sprake van een toename van het Amerikaanse unilaterialisme.

Het Amerikaanse veiligheidsbeleid is erop gericht om de bevolking van het Amerikaanse vasteland veilig te stellen tegen elke soort aanval en om Amerikaans belangen overal ter wereld veilig te stellen. Het eerste doel heeft vanwege de aanslag van 11 september grotere urgentie gekregen, het tweede is er altijd geweest. De omslag in het Amerikaans beleid wordt veroorzaakt door het feit dat men de Amerikaanse belangen niet meer afhankelijk wil stellen van het beleid van andere landen, ook niet dat van de bondgenoten. Zoals blijkt uit de uitspraken van Under Secretary of State Bolton (over het teststopverdrag, de biologische wapen conventie en de negatieve veiligheidsgaranties) zal de Amerikaanse regering elk veiligheidsverdrag bekijken op de vraag of de Amerikaanse veiligheid ermee gediend is. Zo niet dan zal de VS haar eigen weg volgen. Daarmee wordt in feite ontkend dat er zoiets als 'gedeelde veiligheid' bestaat: de machtspositie van de VS garandeert dat dit land ook daadwerkelijk zo een unilateraal beleid kan uitvoeren.

Het bijzonder felle debat in de NAVO over de 'oorlog tegen het terrorisme' dat getransformeerd is in een 'oorlog tegen landen met massavernietigingswapens', is een uiting van dit Amerikaanse beleid (zie voor de inhoud van dit debat onze publicatie Facts & Reports 3 – Transatlantic Relations, maart 2002).

Er zit een merkwaardige vooronderstelling in het Amerikaanse beleid: namelijk dat zowel het terrorisme als de proliferatie van massavernietigingswapens met louter militaire middelen kan worden gewonnen. Wat betreft de landen met massavernietigingswapens wordt door de VS in de Nuclear Posture Review gewerkt met een lijst van potentiële doellanden: Rusland, China, Iran, Irak, Noord-Korea, Syrië, Libië.

Het doel van het beleid is om onder bepaalde omstandigheden deze landen aan te vallen, eventueel met kernwapens (inhoud van het Nuclear Posture Review zoals onthuld door Wiliam Arkin in artikel Los Angeles Times van 9 maart 2002). Daarbij wordt er vanuit gegaan dat men een mogelijke aanval met massavernietigingswapens en hun draagsystemen kan verhinderen door een aanval met kernwapens op de installaties en infrastructuur die te maken heeft met de productie en inzet van die wapens.

De negatieve gevolgen van zo een Amerikaanse kernwapeninzet worden daarbij voor lief genomen:

- de landen die zich totnogtoe aan de diverse verdragen, vooral het NPV, hielden, worden nu aangemoedigd om net als de VS nucleair te bewapenen.
- er zal altijd bijkomende schade zijn, waardoor delen van de burgerbevolking worden getroffen.
- er zal een politieke reactie volgen van delen van de bevolking tegen elk Amerikaans optreden.
- andere landen op de drempel van de ontwikkeling van kernwapens, zullen nu het voorbeeld van de VS volgen en massavernietigingswapen gaan ontwikkelen. Deze zullen ze bovendien zien als een vorm van bescherming tegen het optreden van de kernwapenstaten.
- de legitimiteit van kernwapens zal sterk toenemen: als de VS deze wapens gebruikt, waarom andere landen dan niet?
- zwakkere landen zullen gezien de overmacht van de VS asymmetrische oorlogsstrategieën gaan ontwikkelen zoals die gebruikt in de aanslagen van 11 september.

In de praktijk wordt er tot dusverre weinig weerwerk gegeven door landen die wel belang hechten aan multilateraal veiligheidsbeleid. De Russische positie aangaande de ontmanteling van het ABM verdrag is formeel afwijzend, maar het was vooral de Doema die die afwijzing onder woorden bracht. Mogelijkerwijs hoopt de Russische regering nog op concessies van de Amerikaanse regering in de

onderhandelingen over reducties in strategische systemen. De geringe bereidheid om een directe confrontatie aan te gaan wijst echter op erkenning van de eigen zwakte. Zoals bekend heeft het Russische regering apparaat nauwelijks de middelen om haar kernwapenstrijdkrachten te onderhouden.

Door minister van Aartsen wordt deze terughoudendheid kennelijk gedeeld. Over de ontbinding van het ABM verdrag spreekt hij slechts de hoop uit dat Rusland en de VS tot een nieuw strategisch raamwerk zullen komen waarin verdergaande reducties geregeld worden. Dat dit raamwerk zeer waarschijnlijk het stelsel van internationale veiligheidsverdragen verder zal ondermijnen, is kennelijk geen probleem. De Zweedse minister Lind's afwijzing van het Amerikaanse (en trouwens ook het Chinese) beleid was een stuk helderder.

Twee andere kwesties trokken onze aandacht: het zo goed als wegvallen van de negatieve veiligheids garanties door recente Amerikaanse verklaringen van onderminister Bolton (zie de Washington Times, 22 feb 2002, bijlage) waarmee het Non-proliferatie Verdrag op een fatale wijze wordt ondermijnd. Het antwoord van de minister op de vragen die hierover gesteld zijn in de kamer op 27 februari is van groot belang.

Tenslotte is het, gezien de recente Amerikaanse verklaringen, twijfelachtig of het '13 stappen plan' van de slotverklaring van de evaluatie conferentie van het NPV van 2000 nog wordt uitgevoerd door de NAVO lidstaten. Die belofte werd in het zogenaamde 'paragraaf 32' rapport, dat in december 2000 werd aangenomen door de NAVO ministerraad, gedaan.

## VRAGEN

1. Welke plek neemt Theatre Missile Defence, en in het bijzonder de Nederlandse betrokkenheid daarbij, in de context van de strijd tegen terrorisme, zoals deze zich na 11 september 2001 ontwikkeld heeft?
2. Is het juist dat de Amerikaanse marine in een anti-raket test een dummy-raket gebruikt heeft die veel groter is dan raketten die in een daadwerkelijk treffen gebruikt zouden worden? (zie bijlage: Washington Post, Group says exaggerated target used in missile test, 2 March 2002)
3. Zijn er tegenstrijdigheden tussen het beleid zoals dat in het Nuclear Posture Review van de Verenigde Staten tot uiting komt en de nucleaire strategie van de NAVO?
4. Deelt de Nederlandse regering de mening van de Verenigde Staten dat het nodig is nucleaire aanvalsplannen te ontwikkelen tegen de zeven in het Nuclear Posture Review met naam genoemde landen, te weten China, Irak, Iran, Libië, Noord-Korea, Rusland en Syrië? Kan de regering voor elk van deze landen een risicoanalyse geven op grond waarvan zij de mogelijkheid van eventueel kernwapengebruik tegen deze landen beoordeelt? Acht de regering het waarschijnlijk dat deze landen een directe dreiging voor de Nederlandse veiligheid zullen vormen? Zo ja, hoe?
5. Hoe beoordeelt de regering de Amerikaanse plannen om nieuwe nucleaire aanvalsplannen tegen Rusland te ontwikkelen in het licht van onderhandelingen tussen de Verenigde Staten en Rusland om tot een nieuw strategisch raamwerk te komen na de eenzijdige opzegging van het ABM-verdrag door de Verenigde Staten?
6. Hoe beoordeelt de regering de plannen van de Verenigde Staten om nieuwe kernwapens te ontwikkelen om opslagplaatsen van chemische en biologische wapens preventief te ruimen? (zie bijlage: LA Times, William Arkin, Secret plan outlines the unthinkable, 10 March 2002)
7. Hoe beoordeelt de regering de plannen van de Verenigde Staten om plannen te ontwikkelen voor kernwapengebruik als reactie op verrassende militaire ontwikkelingen van ongespecificeerde aard? (zie bijlage: LA Times, William Arkin, Secret plan outlines the unthinkable, 10 March 2002)
8. Is het uitgesloten dat de Amerikaanse kernwapens op Volkel ingezet worden voor doelen of in situaties die in het Nuclear Posture Review van de Verenigde Staten genoemd worden, waarbij het ook door de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken gehanteerde begrip van kernwapens als 'weapons of last resort' feitelijk wordt losgelaten?
9. Is het juist dat de in Europa gestationeerde Amerikaanse kernwapens gerenoveerd worden, ondermeer om hun levensduur te verlengen? Hoe verhoudt deze levensduurverlenging zich tot verplichtingen onder het NPV om tot kernontwapening over te gaan?
10. Is het juist dat het de bedoeling is dat de opvolger van de F16 de nucleaire taak overneemt? Betekent dit dat de regering voor de levensduur van zo'n opvolger de Nederlandse nucleaire taak wenst te handhaven?
11. Hoe beoordeelt de regering de uitspraken van de voormalige VN-wapeninspecteur in Irak, Scott Ritter (zie bijlage: Die Tageszeitung, Benjamin Mergelsberg, 'Keine Gefahr für irgendjemand', 2 März 2002), dat Irak voor wat betreft massavernietigingswapens geen enkel gevaar voor wie dan ook vormt?

## **AANBEVELINGEN**

De bondgenoten van de VS zien zich voor een cruciale keuze gesteld, die voortvloeit uit het unilateralisme van de Amerikaanse regering. Aanvaarding van het Amerikaanse beleid betekent aanvaarding van de afbraak van het stelsel van internationale verdragen die de afgelopen jaren beperkingen oplegde aan de kernwapenwedloop. De inhoud van het 'nieuwe strategisch raamwerk' dat het oude stelsel van verdragen moet vervangen is onbekend. Voorop staat immers de noodzaak voor de VS om haar beleid niet te laten inperken. Zoals een Amerikaanse opiniemaker het formuleerde: verdragen zijn een manier om de strategische vrijheid van de VS en dus haar belangen te begrenzen. De richting van het Amerikaanse beleid is duidelijk. De vraag is of het mogelijk is om het te keren of bij te sturen.

De huidige Europese terughoudendheid over het Amerikaanse beleid wekt verwarring in de hand. De oppervlakkige tegenstand die tot dusverre aan de Amerikaans ontmanteling van het internationale verdragenstelsel wordt opgevoerd, maakt de situatie erger. De VS zien het stilzwijgen immers als goedkeuring. Daarom is openlijke afkeuring van het Amerikaanse beleid van groot belang.

## **BIJLAGEN**

### Antiraketschild

- White House – Remarks by the President on National Missile Defence
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation - A Statement Made by Russian President Vladimir Putin on December 13, 2001, Regarding the Decision of the Administration of the United States of America to Withdraw from the Antiballistic Missile Treaty of 1972
- Statement of UN Secretary General - Secretary-General regrets United States decision to withdraw from ABM Treaty
- James Schlesinger – The ABM Treaty’s quiet demise (Washington Post)
- US Department of Defense, DoD establishes Missile Defense Agency
- Group says exaggerated target used in missile test (Washington Post)

### Nuclear Posture Review en kernwapenbeleid VS

- US Department of State – US will rely less on strategic nuclear weapons
- Hans M. Kristensen – The Unruly Hedge: Cold War thinking at the Crawford Summit
- Physicians for Socaill Responsibility – Bush Nuclear Weapons Plan sets stage for new bombs, resumption of testing
- John Bolton – Press conference, Geneva, 24 January 2002
- Admiral James O. Ellis, Jr., USN - Basic terminology of the Nuclear Posture Review
- Nuclear plans go beyond cuts (Washington Post)
- John Gordon – Statement before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate (relevant parts)
- William Arkin – Secret plans outline the unthinkable (LA Times)
- US Department of Defense – Statement on Nuclear Posture Review
- Nicholas Kravov – US drops pledge on nukes (Washington Times)

### Onderhandelingen VS-Rusland

- US Department of State – US, Russian defense officials conclude early arms talks
- US Department of Defense – News Briefing, 16 January 2002

### NAVO

- NATO – Press release (2001)177 – Statement by Secretary-General Lord Robertson
- NATO – Press release (2001)170 - Final Communiqué - Ministerial Meeting of the Defence Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group held in Brussels on 18 December 2001

### Proliferatie

- India conducts ‘flawless’ missile test (International Herald Tribune)
- Rahul Bedi – India test-fires new Agni missile variant (Jane’s Defence Weekly)
- Michael Dobbs – Theran’s quest for ballistic missiles (International Herald Tribune)
- Steve Rodan and Duncan Lennox – Shahab 3 suffers test launch setback (Jane’s Defence Weekly)

### Proliferatie: Irak

- Colum Lynch – Annan to press Bagdad on weapons inspectors (Washington Post)
- Colum Lynch – Annan urges Iraq to permit arms inspectors’ return (Washington Post)
- Benjamin Mergelsberg – ‘Keine Gefahr für irgendjemand (Die Tageszeitung)

## **Antiraketschild**

The White House  
Office of the Press Secretary  
December 13, 2001

### **Remarks by the President on national missile defense**

The Rose Garden

**The President:** Good morning. I've just concluded a meeting of my National Security Council. We reviewed what I discussed with my friend, President Vladimir Putin, over the course of many meetings, many months. And that is the need for America to move beyond the 1972 Anti Ballistic Missile treaty.

Today, I have given formal notice to Russia, in accordance with the treaty, that the United States of America is withdrawing from this almost 30 year old treaty. I have concluded the ABM treaty hinders our government's ability to develop ways to protect our people from future terrorist or rogue state missile attacks.

The 1972 ABM treaty was signed by the United States and the Soviet Union at a much different time, in a vastly different world. One of the signatories, the Soviet Union, no longer exists. And neither does the hostility that once led both our countries to keep thousands of nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert, pointed at each other. The grim theory was that neither side would launch a nuclear attack because it knew the other would respond, thereby destroying both.

Today, as the events of September the 11th made all too clear, the greatest threats to both our countries come not from each other, or other big powers in the world, but from terrorists who strike without warning, or rogue states who seek weapons of mass destruction.

We know that the terrorists, and some of those who support them, seek the ability to deliver death and destruction to our doorstep via missile. And we must have the freedom and the flexibility to develop effective defenses against those attacks. Defending the American people is my highest priority as Commander in Chief, and I cannot and will not allow the United States to remain in a treaty that prevents us from developing effective defenses.

At the same time, the United States and Russia have developed a new, much more hopeful and constructive relationship. We are moving to replace mutually assured destruction with mutual cooperation. Beginning in Ljubljana, and continuing in meetings in Genoa, Shanghai, Washington and Crawford, President Putin and I developed common ground for a new strategic relationship. Russia is in the midst of a transition to free markets and democracy. We are committed to forging strong economic ties between Russia and the United States, and new bonds between Russia and our partners in NATO. NATO has made clear its desire to identify and pursue opportunities for joint action at 20.

I look forward to visiting Moscow, to continue our discussions, as we seek a formal way to express a new strategic relationship that will last long beyond our individual administrations, providing a foundation for peace for the years to come.

We're already working closely together as the world rallies in the war against terrorism. I appreciate so much President Putin's important advice and cooperation as we fight to dismantle the al Qaeda network in Afghanistan. I appreciate his commitment to reduce Russia's offensive nuclear weapons. I reiterate our pledge to reduce our own nuclear arsenal between 1,700 and 2,200 operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons. President Putin and I have also agreed that my decision to withdraw from the treaty will not, in any way, undermine our new relationship or Russian security.

As President Putin said in Crawford, we are on the path to a fundamentally different relationship. The Cold War is long gone. Today we leave behind one of its last vestiges.

But this is not a day for looking back. This is a day for looking forward with hope, and anticipation of greater prosperity and peace for Russians, for Americans and for the entire world.

Thank you.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation  
Information and Press Department  
Daily News Bulletin, December 14, 2001

**A Statement Made by Russian President Vladimir Putin on December 13, 2001, Regarding the Decision of the Administration of the United States of America to Withdraw from the Antiballistic Missile Treaty of 1972**

The US Administration today announced that it will withdraw from the 1972 ABM Treaty in six months' time.

The Treaty does indeed allow each of the parties to withdraw from it under exceptional circumstances. The leadership of the United States has spoken about it repeatedly and this step has not come as a surprise to us. But we believe this decision to be mistaken.

As is known, Russia, like the United States and unlike other nuclear powers, has long possessed an effective system to overcome anti-missile defense. So, I can say with full confidence that the decision made by the President of the United States does not pose a threat to the national security of the Russian Federation.

At the same time our country elected not to accept the insistent proposals on the part of the US to jointly withdraw from the ABM Treaty and did everything it could to preserve the Treaty. I still think that this is a correct and valid position. Russia was guided above all by the aim of preserving and strengthening the international legal foundation in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation of mass destruction weapons.

The ABM Treaty is one of the supporting elements of the legal system in this field. That system was created through joint efforts during the past decades.

It is our conviction that the development of the situation in the present world dictates a certain logic of actions.

Now that the world has been confronted with new threats one cannot allow a legal vacuum to be formed in the sphere of strategic stability. One should not undermine the regimes of non-proliferation of mass destruction weapons.

I believe that the present level of bilateral relations between the Russian Federation and the US should not only be preserved but should be used for working out a new framework of strategic relations as soon as possible.

Along with the problem of anti-missile defense a particularly important task under these conditions is putting a legal seal on the achieved agreements on further radical, irreversible and verifiable cuts of strategic offensive weapons, in our opinion to the level of 1,500-2,200 nuclear warheads for each side. In conclusion I would like to note that Russia will continue to adhere firmly to its course in world affairs aimed at strengthening strategic stability and international security.

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SG/SM/8080  
14 December 2001

**Secretary-General regrets United States decision to withdraw from ABM Treaty**

Following is the text of a statement issued today by the Spokesman for Secretary-General Kofi Annan:

The Secretary-General has noted with regret the decision of the United States to withdraw unilaterally from the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. The ABM Treaty has served for many years as a cornerstone for maintaining global peace and security and strategic stability.

He is concerned that the annulation of this treaty may provoke an arms race, especially in the missile area, and further undermine disarmament and non-proliferation regimes. He calls upon all States to explore new binding and irreversible initiatives to avert such unwelcome effects.

Washington Post

## The ABM Treaty's Quiet Demise

By James Schlesinger

Wednesday, February 20, 2002; Page A15

It's astonishing that there has been so little commentary on the prospective end to the ABM Treaty, which until recently was heralded as "the cornerstone of strategic stability" and the indispensable barrier to a renewed arms race. The eulogies have been surprisingly few -- a few dissents. The dire predictions have not been forthcoming. The intriguing question, as Sherlock Holmes might say: Why didn't the dog bark?

It's really quite simple. Defenders of the ABM Treaty had earlier undermined their own position, and it was just a matter of time before the logical consequences followed. In 1999, supporters of the ABM Treaty joined opponents in embracing the National Missile Defense Act. The vote in the Senate was 97 to 3. President Clinton signed that legislation. Thus, it was more than national policy, it was the law that the United States would deploy a missile defense "as soon as is technologically possible."

What the act revealed was that the technology was not in hand and had to be pursued vigorously. But the ABM Treaty had been specifically designed to impede the development of such technology. It prohibited the effective pursuit of technologies requiring deployment on the sea, in the air or in space. By a strict interpretation, it even prevented the development of the sensors, notably in space, that would be essential for an effective ballistic missile defense.

In the face of a new law mandating deployment of a missile defense as soon as "technologically possible" there appeared to be no alternative to abandoning those very barriers to technology that were the essence of the ABM Treaty. The treaty would have to be sharply modified or abandoned.

The Clinton administration only partially accepted this reality. It insisted that the treaty must be preserved, yet at the same time it sought to persuade the Russians to make modest changes in it. In that it was unsuccessful. The Bush administration, wholly committed to deploying ballistic missile defenses, sought far more vigorously to persuade the Russians, who were now somewhat more forthcoming -- but insufficiently so. They insisted, for example, that they be allowed to closely monitor the development of our technology. So, if the administration was serious, it had no choice but to withdraw. President Bush cut the Gordian knot.

What have been the reverberations? Scarcely any. Though many in Russia felt bruised by the decision, the Russians issued only the mildest of protests. (They have more important issues on the negotiating platter.) President Vladimir Putin indicated he felt the decision was "mistaken," but added that it was "not unexpected." He gave assurances to his people that this was "no threat to the national security of the Russian Federation." He commented that the world had changed in the years since the treaty, and pledged Russia's cooperation in seeking "new frameworks" to deal with proliferation. Rather than kicking off a bilateral arms race, the Russians and the Americans agreed further to reduce offensive forces.

The mild Russian reaction deflated the sometimes hysterical protests from the treaty's supporters abroad. European governments, which had denounced President Bush throughout the spring for undermining strategic stability, had the ground cut out from under them. They had been relying on a vehement Russian reaction and the prospect of a renewed arms race to buttress their position. The Chinese will continue in their methodical strategic buildup. Here at home there has been this remarkable silence.

What, as they say, are the "lessons"? Arms control agreements are not forever. Strategic conditions change. The bipolar world of the '70s and '80s is gone -- thus the feared two-sided competition to deploy additional offensive vehicles did not reappear. Rather than being "the cornerstone of strategic stability," the treaty turned out to be more like the cornerstone of arms control theology. As the treaty over time became less relevant, it was defended with increasing passion.

Where do we stand now? Striking down the treaty as a barrier to development of necessary technology represents an acknowledgment that the technology for missile defense is not now in hand. Thus, any deployment remains a considerable distance off. Only time will tell what is feasible. The conviction on



which this decision was based -- that ballistic missile defenses are within reach and that a system that is both effective and cost-effective will be deployed -- still remains to be demonstrated.

*The writer has served as secretary of defense, secretary of energy and CIA director. He testified in favor of the ABM Treaty in 1972.*

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US Department of Defense

### **DoD establishes Missile Defense Agency**

Press release no. 008-02

4 January 2002

Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld announced this week the redesignation of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) as the Missile Defense Agency (MDA). Consistent with the president's emphasis on missile defense, the secretary also provided direction necessary to meet the top four priorities for the United States in this important mission area. These are:

- To defend the United States, deployed forces, allies and friends from ballistic missile attack.
- To employ a Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) that layers defenses to intercept missiles in all phases of their flight (i.e. boost, midcourse, and terminal) against all ranges of threats.
- To enable the Services to field elements of the overall BMDS as soon as practicable.
- To develop and test technologies, use prototype and test assets to provide early capability, if necessary, and improve the effectiveness of deployed capability by inserting new technologies as they become available or when the threat warrants an accelerated capability.

Elevating BMDO to agency status recognizes the national priority and mission emphasis on missile defense. The current director of BMDO, Air Force Lt. Gen. Ronald T. Kadish, will assume the title of director, Missile Defense Agency. He will continue to report directly to Edward C. "Pete" Aldridge Jr., undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. The secretary has tasked Aldridge with the responsibility of implementing his direction and will look to the Senior Executive Council for oversight of missile defense activities. Also, the full and cooperative efforts of the military Services, Joint Staff and defense agencies are essential.

The overall objectives for missile defense include: establishing a single program to develop an integrated missile defense system; assigning the best and brightest people to this work and applying a capability-based requirements process for missile defense

The MDA is charged with developing the missile defense system and baselining the capability and configuration of its elements. The military departments will procure and provide for missile defense operations and support.

News media points of contact are Cheryl Irwin, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Public Affairs, at (703) 697-5331, and Lt. Col. Rick Lehner, MDA External Affairs, at (703) 697-8997.

The secretary's memo and related documents are on the web at:

<http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2002/d20020102mda.pdf> .

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Washington Post

### **Group Says Exaggerated Target Used in Missile Test**

*By Bradley Graham*

Washington Post Staff Writer

Saturday, March 2, 2002; Page A12

A test five weeks ago of a ship-based system for shooting down ballistic missiles used a target that was much larger than the North Korean or Chinese warheads that the weapon is intended to engage in actual combat, according to a report by a scientific research group.

In the test, an interceptor fired from a Navy cruiser knocked an Aries target missile out of the sky about 300 miles northwest of the Hawaiian island of Kauai.

The event was heralded by Pentagon officials and missile defense proponents as a promising advance in the development of sea-based anti-missile systems. As the first flight of the ship-launched interceptor, the Jan. 25 experiment marked the Navy's entry into a field dominated up to now by land-based systems.

But an analysis by the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) said the single-stage Aries target was about five times longer and roughly one-third wider than warheads on the North Korean Nodong, Chinese M-9 and other medium-range missiles that the Navy system is supposed to be able to attack. The test target's bigger size, the report said, made it easier to track and hit.

The critique represents the latest in a series of commentaries from scientific groups and other missile defense skeptics calling attention to the lack of operational realism in the Pentagon's testing program. Defense officials have acknowledged heavy reliance on surrogates and artificial elements in the flight trials, but they say the testing is still at an early stage and will become more realistic.

Under President Bush, the Pentagon has embarked on a broad missile defense test program, pursuing not just the system of land-based interceptors advanced by the Clinton administration but also ship-launched interceptors, airborne lasers and space-based weapons.

At issue is how much can be concluded from the initial experiments about the likely operational effectiveness of any of these technological approaches.

Missile defense skeptics contend that the tests provide little evidence of ultimate viability. Pentagon officials argue that even the early, relatively simple experiments have great value.

"Over the past year, we have made considerable progress in demonstrating key missile defense technologies and integration concepts," Lt. Gen. Ronald T. Kadish, director of the Missile Defense Agency, said in testimony last week before two House Armed Services subcommittees. Among the successes he cited was the January test, in which he said the Pentagon "took a significant step forward and broke new ground."

But the UCS report, a copy of which was obtained by The Washington Post ahead of release on Monday, said the relatively large Aries target facilitated the intercept. The report also cited Pentagon plans to continue using such targets in tests for several years.

"This raises the issue of what the tests tell you about capability in real-world scenarios," said David Wright, a UCS physicist who wrote the report.

Based on pictures of the Aries taken by the interceptor shortly before impact, the report also concluded that the interceptor struck the target in the middle rather than in the warhead. "So that it would not have destroyed the warhead had it been a real interception," the report said.

The January experiment was not even intended to score an intercept, said Lt. Col. Rick Lehner, a spokesman for the Missile Defense Agency, but to demonstrate primarily the interceptor's guidance and navigational capabilities.

He faulted the UCS study for "applying test criteria well above what is prudently possible at this stage of the development program."

## **Nuclear Posture Review en kernwapenbeleid VS**

US Department of State  
9 January 2002

### **U.S. Will Rely Less On Strategic Nuclear Weapons, Reduce Arsenal - Greater focus due on conventional arms, missile defense**

*By Merle D. Kellerhals, Jr.  
Washington File Staff Writer*

**Washington** -- The United States intends to rely less on strategic nuclear weapons and more on conventional, precision-guided arms and deployment of a missile defense shield in its sharply revised nuclear security posture, a Pentagon official says.

At a Pentagon briefing January 9, the assistant defense secretary for international security policy revealed unclassified portions of the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which outlines a post-Cold War concept of deterrence including a cut in the U.S. arsenal to 1,700-2,200 operationally deployed nuclear weapons over 10 years period from about 6,000 now in the inventory. The highly classified report had been sent to Congress for review January 8.

"We are trying to achieve these reductions without having to wait for Cold War arms-control treaties, and placing greater emphasis both on missile defense capabilities and also on the development of advanced conventional capabilities," said Assistant Secretary J.D. Crouch.

However, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld told news media the review "certainly does not recommend nuclear testing. Any indication of that would be incorrect." The review recommends continuing the self-imposed 1992 U.S. moratorium on nuclear weapons testing.

"The president is observing the moratorium and has said so," Rumsfeld said. "Any country that has nuclear weapons has to be respectful of the enormous lethality and power of those weapons, and has a responsibility to see that they are safe and reliable."

However, Crouch said the U.S. Energy Department is planning on accelerating its test-readiness program so that future underground nuclear testing can be accomplished, should it be needed. And Crouch also said the Bush administration continues to oppose ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

The plan to reduce the U.S. nuclear strategic arsenal to well below 6,000 warheads was previously proposed by President Bush and elaborated on during recent negotiations on the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty with Russian President Vladimir Putin in November. Putin also has pledged to reduce the Russian nuclear arsenal well below 6,000 warheads.

Bush announced December 13 that the United States was withdrawing from the ABM Treaty in six months in order to permit continued research, testing and eventual development of a limited missile defense system.

Crouch said the review calls for the approximately 4,000 excess nuclear warheads not to be destroyed, but rather placed in storage, where they can be retrieved and reactivated on short notice.

"There will be reductions as a result of our planning," he said.

The United States has already announced it will destroy 50 Peacekeeper intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in an arrangement under the still-unratified START II treaty.

The NPR, chartered in October 1993, is designed to be a comprehensive review of U.S. strategic nuclear policies, doctrine, force structure, command and control, operations, supporting infrastructure, safety, security, and arms control. The congressionally mandated report also examines the selection of targets, stockpile levels, and new and potential threats to the United States and its allies and interests worldwide.

The U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal is composed of a triad of nuclear submarine-launched ICBMs, ground-launched ICBMs from dispersed missile silos and nuclear bombs delivered by a fleet of long-range bombers.

"We will continue to maintain a balanced nuclear force triad, but at a much smaller or reduced level," Crouch said.

The review is but one of three key reviews conducted by the Pentagon since the Bush administration took office January 20th. The other two studies were the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and a review of quality-of-life issues for U.S. military personnel and their families.

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Arms Control Today  
December 2001

## **The Unruly Hedge: Cold War Thinking at the Crawford Summit**

Hans M. Kristensen

President George W. Bush's announcement on November 13 that the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal will be reduced to 1,700-2,200 deployed warheads over the next 10 years raises important questions about the need for transparency of nuclear arsenals in the 21st century. No sooner had Bush said that the cuts involved "reducing and destroying the number of warheads to get down to specific levels" than national security adviser Condoleezza Rice corrected the record: "I believe that what the president was referring to is [that] we will not have these warheads near the places at which they could be deployed. In other words, they will truly not be deployable warheads. In that sense, their capability will not be accessible to the United States."

This glitch in the Bush administration's first attempt to outline its new nuclear policy is no insignificant matter. It comes only a few weeks before Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld is expected to announce the results of a review of nuclear forces and policy, and it indicates that the Bush administration will continue what is known as the "hedge," a reserve of thousands of nuclear warheads permitted by arms control treaties that mandated the destruction of launchers but not warheads. The hedge is not included in the future "operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads" referred to by Bush, but it nonetheless makes up an increasing portion of the total stockpile.

This article presents new information about the hedge that has recently been declassified and released under the Freedom of Information Act. Newly available documents demonstrate that the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), which is responsible for U.S. nuclear forces, repeatedly warned during the 1990s that increased transparency of the nuclear arms reduction process was more important after START II than new cuts, suggesting that Bush's inclusion of only operationally deployed strategic warheads in the new round of cuts is unwise because it will contribute to the hedge and therefore the opacity of U.S. forces.

Although the details of Bush's cuts will not become known until Rumsfeld completes the Nuclear Posture Review in December, the size of the remaining force also suggests that the reductions largely follow already established force structure analysis conducted by STRATCOM back in the early to mid-1990s. This means that President Bush's "new strategic framework" is based on the old strategic assumptions about the triad, credible deterrence, and counterforce targeting that guided Cold War nuclear policy.

### **Origins of the Hedge**

The hedge of thousands of active and inactive nuclear weapons that the United States maintains outside arms control agreements and public scrutiny was conceived in the late 1980s and formally approved by the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review. All of the warheads in the hedge, which are maintained at various levels of readiness, are retired warheads from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Treaty and the 1991 START I accord, which required destruction of delivery vehicles (bombers and missiles) but not warheads.

The hedge—composed of an "active reserve" and an "inactive reserve"—has grown substantially as START I has been implemented, and it continues to grow as the United States makes other changes to its nuclear force posture. For example, the United States currently deploys 18 Trident nuclear submarines, each of which carries 24 Trident I or Trident II missiles with eight warheads per missile, for a total of 3,456 warheads. The Navy has finally begun to implement the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review by reducing the number of submarines to 14, and it plans to decrease the number of warheads

per missile to five to stay below the START II limit of 1,700 SLBM warheads. Most of the surplus warheads will not be destroyed but rather will be moved to the hedge.

The warheads in the hedge are designed to serve several purposes. Some are designated as replacements for warheads destroyed each year in routine reliability and safety tests. More are intended to safeguard against catastrophic failure of operationally deployed weapons. For example, one force structure study published by Strategic Air Command in September 1991 described three ways that a leg of the U.S. nuclear triad could fail: a communications failure could force U.S. ICBMs to “ride out” a full attack; a breakthrough could make the ocean transparent to satellites, thus rendering submarines and their missiles vulnerable; or a design flaw in the Minuteman III or Trident II missiles or their associated warheads could render the systems inoperable. In any of these cases, reserve warheads from the hedge would be used to replace defective warheads or to compensate for the loss of a delivery system by increasing loadings on other launch platforms.

Most warheads in the hedge, however, are intended to provide the capability to increase the size of the operational arsenal quickly by “reconstituting” or “uploading” retired warheads onto nuclear missiles and bombers in case Russia returns to a hostile regime or some other threatening nuclear power appears on the horizon. Central to this concern has been the “breakout” potential that U.S. nuclear planners say Russia has because of its large warhead production capacity, which probably exceeds 1,000 warheads per year. The United States halted warhead production in 1992 (although small-scale reproduction was started in 1999) and has since determined that the service life of its modern warheads can be safely extended to maintain a reliable and enduring arsenal. Russian warheads, in contrast, were designed for a shorter life with less capability for extension, requiring a larger ongoing production capacity. Therefore, as Russia evolved from “the Evil Empire” to a partner and as arms control treaties dramatically reduced the size of deployed strategic nuclear forces, the United States saw the hedge as a prudent precaution against a dangerous and uncertain future.

However, no sooner had the Nuclear Posture Review endorsed the hedge than its contradiction with other U.S. policy goals became apparent. Following talks in 1994, President Bill Clinton and President Boris Yeltsin agreed in May 1995 to negotiate agreements aimed at increasing the “transparency and irreversibility” of nuclear arms reductions, a step that likely would entail subjecting each side’s nondeployed arsenals to international scrutiny and mandating that nondeployed warheads be destroyed so that a rapid reconstitution of nuclear forces would no longer be possible.

This decision was made for several reasons. Partly it was due to concerns over the safety of Russian nuclear weapons and fissile material. The United States was anxious to learn what happened to the thousands of nuclear warheads Russia removed from operational status and to prevent dismantled nuclear weapons or fissile materials from being stolen or bought by “rogue” states, such as Iran, or terrorist organizations. The commitment to transparency and irreversibility was also prompted by increasing international pressure on the two superpowers to do more to fulfill their disarmament obligations under Article VI of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Clinton and Yeltsin issued their statement only two days before the end of the critical NPT review and extension conference in New York, where the nuclear powers were eager to assemble enough support for the indefinite extension of the treaty.

However, at the same time as he was working to open Russia’s nuclear infrastructure to greater scrutiny, President Clinton had also issued Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 37, a secret document that established four “first principles” to guide arms control efforts for nuclear reductions beyond START II: deterrence, stability, equivalence, and the hedge. Thus, despite the public pledge to pursue “transparency and irreversibility” in nuclear arms reductions, PDD-37 also endorsed a reserve of unaccountable nuclear warheads that could preserve the U.S. ability to reverse its nuclear arms reductions quickly.

This contradiction in U.S. policy was magnified when PDD-37 reached STRATCOM, where commander-in-chief Admiral Henry D. Chiles directed the Policy and Doctrine Branch to prepare a paper that outlined STRATCOM’s position on post-START II arms control. The resulting white paper was approved by the Strategy and Policy Division on September 16, 1996, and used the four “first principles” in PDD-37 to formulate five objectives for U.S. arms control efforts after START II:

- Protect U.S. strategic nuclear delivery vehicle force structure. There are currently no new platforms planned, so it's important to retain as many of the existing ones as possible. Hedge
- Retain U.S. warheads at a level consistent with war-fighting needs. Deterrence
- Minimize the impact of those Russian systems, [deleted], that pose the greatest threat to U.S. interests. Deterrence, Stability
- Reduce and eliminate U.S. and Russian non-deployed warheads and fissile materials. Equivalence, Stability
- Address non-strategic nuclear forces as part of the overall effort to stem the proliferation threat. [deleted]. Equivalence, Stability

The STRATCOM white paper assumed that “warhead elimination must be the centerpiece of post-START II arms control, and should come before further force structure reductions occur,” and the fourth objective called for reducing and eliminating nondeployed warheads. At the same time, however, the first objective emphasized the importance of retaining as many of the existing “delivery platforms” as possible to “ensure adequate hedge capability.” The reason for this inconsistency was that, as a nuclear war-fighting command, STRATCOM not surprisingly viewed the arms control process as a means of achieving strategic advantages. Cold War or not, STRATCOM’s foremost concern was to ensure that the United States would triumph in a nuclear clash. To that end, the hedge served to safeguard U.S. nuclear superiority, while transparency and warhead elimination helped bring Russian weapons under greater control.

Thus, throughout the early and mid-1990s, the U.S. government and military faced a conflict between the desire to lower the overall number of nuclear weapons and improve relations with Russia while maintaining some sort of insurance against potential future challenges.

Today, the role of the hedge in protecting U.S. security by insuring against a vast Russian nuclear rearmament is less important, both because of a warming in U.S.-Russian relations and because of a contraction of Russia’s arsenal. Although Russia’s current inventory of unaccountable warheads is even larger than that of the United States, its arsenal is likely to shrink dramatically over the next decade. Of an estimated 20,000-25,000 nuclear warheads, some 9,000 are considered operational (5,600 strategic and 3,500 tactical), with approximately 13,500 warheads awaiting dismantlement. Unless significant numbers of Russian warheads are refurbished, remanufactured, and returned to operational forces, the stockpile may shrink to as few as 1,000 strategic and several hundred tactical warheads within the next 10 years.

With a Russian “breakout” becoming less likely, and concern that rogue states or terrorists could acquire warheads or fissile material increasing, a large reserve of unaccountable U.S. warheads is a growing liability to national security. If a large proportion of the U.S. arsenal remains opaque, it will be extraordinarily difficult to convince Russia to open its stockpile to inspection, especially in the absence of a more formal arms reduction agreement. U.S. interests would then be threatened as thousands of Russian warheads are removed from service to storage facilities whose security may have been weakened over the last decade by Russia’s poor economy. The result could be a failure to bring Russian unaccountable nuclear warheads and fissile material under control.

President Bush’s initiative to reduce only operational strategic nuclear forces will move thousands of U.S. warheads into the unaccountable hedge categories, and it completely ignores the proportionally increasing number of nonstrategic nuclear warheads. This perpetuates a dangerous transformation of the U.S. stockpile. Before START I, about 5 percent of the total stockpile was in the inactive category, but the current trend is that deployed (accountable) strategic warheads are a shrinking fraction of the stockpile. Present plans for the START II stockpile could increase that ratio to a 1:1 ratio, with the reserve constituting as large a stockpile as the deployed stockpile. Over the next 10 years, this trend could transform the composition of the U.S. nuclear stockpile to a predominantly clandestine posture, in which less than a quarter of all warheads are accountable.

Rather than bringing greater transparency to the nuclear arms reduction process when it is most needed, President Bush’s apparent continued endorsement of the hedge decreases transparency, undercutting incentives that Russia would have for disclosing the status of its thousands of non-operational tactical nuclear warheads.

The Bush administration's aversion to a new formal nuclear-reductions agreement and its focus on operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads is also inconsistent with STRATCOM advice. In the past few years, STRATCOM—a strong proponent of a hedge force and of maintaining a nuclear war-fighting advantage over Russia, as indicated above—has repeatedly and publicly emphasized the importance of greater transparency and irreversibility of nuclear arms reductions. In connection with his nomination as commander-in-chief of STRATCOM, Vice Admiral Richard W. Mies stated in a written response to the Senate Armed Services Committee in June 1998:

Further reductions in strategic delivery systems beyond START III should be complimented by more comprehensive considerations of increased stockpile transparency, greater accountability and transparency of non-strategic/tactical nuclear warheads, limitations on production infrastructures, third party nuclear weapon stockpiles, the impact on our allies, and the implications of deploying strategic defensive systems. [With fewer weapons, these issues] become more complex and sensitive. Whereas at existing START I/II levels our deterrent forces are relatively less sensitive to "cheating."

Even after President Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive 4 in early 2001, which ordered a review of U.S. nuclear offensive and defensive postures, STRATCOM continued to stress the need for transparency. Admiral James Ellis, the current head of STRATCOM, told the Senate Armed Services Committee in September that, as reductions to low levels are implemented, "issues such as disparity in non-strategic nuclear forces, transparency, irreversibility, production capacity, aggregate warhead inventories, and verifiability become more complex and more sensitive."

Whether the upcoming Nuclear Posture Review reflects STRATCOM's appeal will be apparent when the results are announced before the end of the year. So far, however, Bush's cuts appear to favor protection of the hedge over greater transparency and irreversibility of nuclear arms reductions.

## **Conclusions**

The Crawford summit promised a new era in U.S.-Russian relations, but with respect to nuclear policy issues it fell far short of expectations. Rather than moving toward a true "new strategic framework" that takes arms control beyond the Cold War paradigm, President Bush seems to be regressing to an early 1990s mentality that requires the United States to prepare for possible Russian rearmament, even as the president proclaims America's new and growing friendship with Russia.

Indeed, even the size of the president's proposed reductions ring of Cold War conflict. In the early 1990s, STRATCOM analysis established a "preferred force structure" that protected a triad of modern and flexible nuclear forces in a "stable nucleus," while gradually reducing excess operational weapons. The analysis was the basis for START II, the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review, and the START III framework, which called for a 2,000-2,500 warhead level. This same thinking seems to be underlying Bush's policy. Bush says that the goal continues to be to maintain a credible deterrent, but a continued deployment of about 2,000 warheads indicates that STRATCOM will adhere to the same concepts of triad, counterforce targeting, and flexible response as it did a decade ago. "I can guarantee you," former STRATCOM commander-in-chief General Eugene Habiger said during an interview in 1998, that "our analysis and assessment will be based on an analysis of the threat, if you will, potential for threat, and not just on 'well, 1,500 or 2,000 looks about right.'"

Bush's cut of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 1,700-2,200 is not deep enough or different enough to indicate a shift in nuclear policy of the magnitude that he alluded to in his May 2001 speech at the National Defense University. His announcement provoked a tepid response from President Vladimir Putin, who issued only a vague promise that Russia would "try to respond in kind." The summit simply reaffirmed how deeply rooted in Cold War nuclear planning the United States continues to be.

Bush's pledge indicates that, despite its frequent criticism of arms control, the Bush administration has not moved beyond the most significant shortcoming of treaties: the fact that they have counted only operational strategic warheads while ignoring reserve warheads and non-strategic weapons. This means that thousands of non-operational nuclear warheads placed in reserve and thousands of tactical nuclear weapons continue to be unaccounted for by the arms reduction process. If Bush wants to move nuclear arms control out of the Cold War, he must end the distinction between operational and non-operational warheads and seek ceilings on total warheads.

The hedge is a dangerous signal of intent that connotes deceit in our relations with Russia. There seems to be no better way to undermine the very trust that President Bush has said should be the basis for a new U.S.-Russian strategic relationship than to keep thousands of nuclear warheads hidden in secret bunkers in case it turns out that Russia needs to be destroyed after all. If Bush wants to transform our strategic relations with Russia, he must make the entire stockpile accountable.

President Bush could have used the November summit with Putin to increase the transparency and irreversibility of the nuclear arms reduction process. Instead he seems to have taken a step back from the START III framework and complicated efforts to reduce the currency of nuclear weapons in the U.S.-Russian relationship. There now rests a great responsibility with the forthcoming Nuclear Posture Review to create clarity and transparency on the nuclear posture.

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Physicians for Social Responsibility

### **Bush nuclear weapons plan sets stage for new bombs, resumption of testing**

Nuclear Force Changes Indicate Shift to War-Fighting Weapons, Endangers National Security and Public Health, Physicians Say

For Immediate Release - January 8, 2002  
Contact: Martin Butcher 202-667-4260

Washington, DC - Today when Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld sends the long-awaited Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) to Congress, he will be taking a dangerous step. The Administration's plan - originally articulated in President Bush's May 1, 2001 speech at National Defense University - would streamline our nuclear arsenal into a war-fighting force, seek the opportunity to design and build new nuclear weapons, and abandon a ten-year-old moratorium on nuclear weapons testing.

The NPR also includes reductions in the strategic nuclear arsenal from its current levels of roughly 6,000 weapons down to the 1,700-2,200 level discussed during the President's summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

"These reductions are welcome, but still retain the main warplan for the destruction of Russia," said Martin Butcher, Director of Security Programs for PSR. "It's simply bizarre to have as the main rationale for our strategic nuclear forces the destruction of an ally in the war on terrorism."

In May, the President spoke of the need for the development of a so-called 'flexible' arsenal. Information leaked this week about the classified Nuclear Posture Review confirms that this 'flexible arsenal' is code for the production of war-fighting 'mini-nukes' designed for use in regional conflicts - especially to counter chemical and biological weapons. This dangerous policy of nuclear brinkmanship brings the reality of a full-scale war into frightening focus.

This is fully reflected in the NPR, which according to leaked statements, calls for the development of new nuclear weapons. Other leaked information revealed that Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld will ask Congress for new bunker busting weapons as those used in Afghanistan have proved inadequate. A recent DoD document entitled Report to Congress on the Defeat of Hard and Deeply Buried Targets called for new nuclear weapons to be developed for this task. It seems the NPR now confirms that.

"The Nuclear Posture Review package put forward by the Bush administration will reshape the nuclear arsenal from one intended primarily for deterrence to a force intended primarily for war-fighting," said Robert K. Musil, Ph.D., Executive Director and CEO of PSR. "The sword of the mini-nuke and the shield of missile defense will be a dangerously destabilizing factor for global security."

Worse, the administration will seek to revive nuclear weapons test explosions at its Nevada Nuclear Test Site. The first President Bush imposed an end to full scale underground nuclear test exposures in 1992 and the moratorium has been maintained ever since. With all America's allies in NATO now signatories to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, any move to restart testing for new nuclear weapons development would cause major international tension.

"The administration has withdrawn from the ABM Treaty, and disrupted the work of the Biological Weapons Convention. Now it seeks to destroy the CTBT, and fatally damage the Non-Proliferation



Treaty," said Butcher. "The NPT, which has been fundamental to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, was only renewed in 1995 on condition of a US promise to end nuclear testing. It seems the Bush administration is intent on destroying this vital Treaty, and dealing a severe blow to US security all to please the nuclear weaponeers at Los Alamos and other labs."

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US Department of State

**The Honorable John R. Bolton**  
**Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security**  
**United States Department of State**  
**Palais des Nations**  
**Geneva, Switzerland**  
**January 24**

**John R. Bolton:** Thank you very much. It's a pleasure to be back. I hope that you all received copies of the text of the statement that I just read in the CD. In the interest of time because I know we're a little bit late here, I won't repeat that other than to say that it was intended as a general and comprehensive statement of our administration views on arms control. Obviously I covered a lot of ground that's not necessarily on the direct agenda of the CD. But I felt that it was important at the opening of this year's CD to give that kind of overview, and that's one reason it was as broad as it was. But I'd be pleased at this point to take any questions about the statement or the CD or whatever's on your mind.

**Question:** If I could ask your view on CTBT, which you didn't make any reference to today. Do you feel that CTBT is still viable in the current context of the world? Does the U.S. have any plans at all -- two years, three years, five years from now -- to resume testing?

**Bolton:** As President Bush said during the 2000 Presidential election campaign, he opposes the CTBT and we have no plans to seek Senate action on it as part of the nuclear posture review the Department of Defense recently concluded that there was a decision to try and upgrade our testing infrastructure so as to make it possible to test in a relatively earlier time if a decision were made. This is been widely misunderstood. I'd appreciate the opportunity to correct it. We are going to continue to follow the moratorium on testing that President Bush announced. This is simply one way of being able to reduce the level of operational nuclear warheads with some feeling of assurance that if the strategic circumstances in the world change dramatically and a decision were made sometime down the road we'd be in a better position in terms of our testing and research infrastructure than we are now. We continue to review the safety and reliability of the current stock of warheads. That's something that's very high priority for the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy, to be sure that the deterrent remains safe and reliable for ourselves and our allies. But, as I say, we have no plans to seek Senate action on the Treaty.

**Q:** Could you elaborate more on what you said in your statement on the Iraqi case concerning violations of NPT?

**A:** I think it's very clear in the three years since Iraq has completely excluded the U.N. Weapons Inspectors that they've been making efforts with respect to a number of weapons of mass destruction including attempting to acquire a capability in nuclear weapons. That's one obvious violation of their NPT commitments. That's one of the reasons why we have tried for so long to get the U.N. Inspectors back into Iraq. The head of UNMOVIC, Hans Blix, the former head of IAEA, was just in Washington to meet with Secretary [of State Colin] Powell and others, including myself. The problem with Iraq and its resistance to resolution 687 and its unwillingness to comply with its international obligations, remains a very serious issue for the U.S. and I think for everyone.

**Q:** On biological weapons, I'd like to come back to the argument that you considered the BWC protocol flawed and counterproductive but then the U.S. will present a number of new proposals which will focus on national export controls, nationally criminalizing activity and things like that. How much more productive could that be if you leave it to the nations concerned including the rogue states relying on their good will to do all this, especially since you said in a recent speech in

Washington, if I am not mistaken, that this disarmament conference is like a get together of the police and the Mafia trying to discuss a safer world.

**A:** I think I said "to discuss their shared interest in law enforcement" actually, something like that. The measures that you referred to that I elaborated in the speech have already been presented. We began to consult with our friends and allies on them last summer in the run up to the BWC RevCon in November and I might say that we thought that they enjoyed very widespread support and hoped that had the RevCon come to a conclusion it would have endorsed them. I don't think that they alone solve the fundamental problem of non-compliance with the BWC, which is one of the reasons that we felt that the draft protocol that had been under negotiation was counterproductive. I think it diverted people's attention from what the real issue was. The real issue is that while the overwhelming majority of states are in compliance with the BWC, there are a number that simply have lied about the commitments that they have undertaken. I think it is one of our priorities to insist on compliance with international obligations that nations have undertaken and by focusing on the issue of non-compliance you can more precisely see just exactly where the problem is. And looking at the states that are in violation of the BWC and are seeking other forms of weapons of mass destruction, it is striking to see the coincidence between that list of nations and the list of nations that are states sponsors of terrorism in the more conventional sense. So I think we have a fairly discreet group of countries that are both pursuing weapons of mass destruction and have been aiding international terrorism and I think that as part of the global campaign against terrorism, as President Bush has made clear, we are going to be addressing that in the months and years ahead.

**Q:** You've made reference to Iraq and North Korea but no reference to Iran. What's the reason for that? You say that the U.S. insists on holding accountable states that violate the non-proliferation commitments. What sort of accountability structure do you have in mind?

**A:** This is like *déjà vu* all over again: why did you name those two countries and not several others just as we had this discussion at the time of the Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference. The cases of Iraq and North Korea I think are particularly important now because they are the subject of not just the NPT Treaty Commitments, but other International commitments, the Agreed Framework in the case of North Korea and the series of the U.N. resolutions in the case of Iraq, which are intended to bring ultimately both those countries in compliance. They're countries that are both subjected to additional enforcement mechanisms, if you will, in addition simply to their underlying commitments under the NPT. There is no doubt that there are other countries that are also in violation of the NPT. But for the purpose of today's conference I wanted to stress those two because of the particular circumstances that I just mentioned. All I can say, in terms of naming other ones, stay tuned, I'm sure their time will come.

**Q:** And the accountability structure?

**A:** What we are trying to do is make clear that if you focus on non-compliance with existing treaty obligations, there ought to be ways, whether through our own action, through actions with like-minded governments, or coalitions of the willing, to make it clear to violators of the various arms control agreements that we are not simply going to allow the behavior to continue. Now I don't mean to indicate that there are specific plans in mind, but what I do mean to say is that the time in which countries could sign an international agreement like the Biological Weapons Convention and lie about their performance under it, and get away with it, hopefully is over.

**Q:** Two specific questions. First your comments on CTBT. With the CTBT being dead and with the U.S. now going slower, completely silent on this, will FMCT negotiations have any teeth? Would parties to the CD take FMCT talks seriously when the U.S. is no longer interested in CTBT. Second **Question:** what do you mean by civilized nations?

**A:** I think that the merits of an FMCT treaty stand on their own. I don't think they are linked to CTBT, and I think as I indicated in the statement, it's one of the objectives of Ambassador Javits and our delegation here to try and break through the gridlock that the CD's been in for the past six or seven years, and see in particular if it's possible to make progress on CTBT. It does indicate to us that one of the reasons that we are, as I think we all are, concerned about the situation on the subcontinent, is that we don't have a strategic framework, a policy framework, for dealing with the question of India and Pakistan's nuclear capabilities post-1998. The CTBT and the NPT obviously didn't do anything to slow it down since neither state was a party to the NPT. But it is a matter of high priority for the United

States. Secretary Powell has been to the region twice most recently, and then a couple months ago as well. These are issues that we will undoubtedly be focusing on.

With respect to your second question on the definition of civilized states, I will simply leave it for today's purposes as saying that all those states that are not engaged in sponsoring, aiding or harboring terrorists, and the implication, as President Bush has said repeatedly, is even states that have been supporters or harborers of terrorists in the past can change their behavior. That's part of what global campaign is about not simply the multifaceted steps financial, law enforcement, intelligence sharing, military, political and others, but helping to convince states that their long term best interest lies in abjuring terrorism and the pursuit of the weapons of mass destruction entirely.

**Q:** In the plenary just now both Iraq and North Korea responded to your statements and both countries said that delegations from the International Atomic Energy Agency had visited their country recently and did not seem to have any problems. And North Korea accused the United States of not leaving up to the agreement that it signed with North Korea in 1994 and not building the two large reactors and saying that because of problems between the Congress and the administration deliveries of heavy oil that were promised had been delayed causing difficulties. Could you respond to those questions?

**A:** Let me do North Korea first. The fact of the matter is that North Korea has been in violation of its NPT obligations ever since it signed the agreed framework. It has not, to this day, permitted the IAEA sufficient access for the IAEA even to make a baseline determination of what materials and technology North Korea has. Let alone the kind of verification and analysis that the IAEA needs to be able to do to determine how much fissile material the North has. So, it is just a fantasy to say that North Korea has been cooperating with the IAEA. The United States has been in compliance with the agreed framework to the extent we can be, dealing with the regime like the one in Pyongyang. We are going to continue to try and work with Japan and South Korea to bring the North Koreans into compliance with their obligations to what they committed to in 1994. Time is running out and I think they are beginning to understand that. And as far as Iraq goes, why anybody takes what they say seriously I'm not sure I understand. If they are so confident about what they said here today, they ought to let the U.N. weapon inspectors in and allow them and IAEA to have full access countrywide, no game preserves, no sealed off areas, as they have for the past several years.

**Q:** If I could follow up, you said time is running out on the 1994 framework agreement, could you elaborate on that? The North Koreans, if I recall correctly, are saying that it's the U.S., Japan and South Korea that are not doing what was agreed to in terms of providing the light water reactor.

**A:** The agreement in Article 4 very specifically says that before the key elements to the reactors are delivered, North Korea has to come in full compliance with the NPT and their IAEA safeguards agreement. If you look at the time involved with how much is required to construct the reactors and to bring them fully into operation, and lay it next to the amount of time that IAEA will need to do the kind of professional job that they will do to verify whether in fact North Korea has made a complete baseline declaration and they have been able to do all their analyses, in order for those to come together, IAEA and its inspectors and the work it needs to do, needs to begin moving at a very rapid pace in the very near future. If that bubble of IAEA activity doesn't start in time, then the bubble underneath it of finishing the light water reactors won't be finished in time. But it would be clear after seven or eight years of not really facing that kind of time pressure, that if North Korea does not comply with the requirements of the IAEA, that it will be unambiguously North Korea in noncompliance. If they comply, then we will comply as well.

**Q:** Where you make a reference here to the CD having to face up to new threats by terrorist groups to acquire weapons of mass destruction, do you have any specific proposal in mind for this particular CD outside the framework of the bilateral weapons the NPT or the chemical weapons. Are there other things here in Geneva that they should be considering?

**A:** The main purpose of that remark and several other things I said was in response to the kind of comments, I'm sure if you have been listening to the remarks in the plenary session, you've heard people say it has been seven years of gridlock or some other say six years of gridlock, or five years of gridlock, but there isn't a lot of disagreement that the CD has not been performing up to its potential for quite some period of time. I think that there are a lot of issues that could be profitably be discussed in the kind of form the CD represents and I'm hoping that we can get some new thinking going. That's one way to break through the gridlock. Other ways would be for other governments to allow

negotiations on the feasible material cut off treaty and so on. But I think it's time if the possibility is going to exist for the CD to be more productive, this is really the time to get moving on it.

**Q:** Can you throw some light where the U.S. stands on anti-satellite weapons? Your statement doesn't indicate anything about it.

**A:** My statement did say: we support the Outer Space Treaty and we have been concerned for quite sometime with threats that might be posed to our communications infrastructure and the satellite networks that we have in space. If you have not read the Rumsfeld Commission Report on the use of space, I think that's definitely something that could certainly tell you a lot about current thinking at the Defense Department. But as I said in my prepared remarks, we don't see any need for further agreements with respect to space at this point.

Thank you very much!

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Washington Post

### **Nuclear Plans Go Beyond Cuts**

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The Bush administration is studying the development of a new generation of nuclear weapons and strategic delivery systems at the same time it has announced its intention to sharply reduce the number of operationally deployed U.S. nuclear warheads.

The Nuclear Weapons Council, made up of officials from the Defense and Energy departments, has ordered a three-year study into developing a nuclear-tipped, earth-penetrating weapon that can destroy hardened underground targets. The administration has also established "advanced warhead concept teams" at the nation's three nuclear weapons laboratories to work on new warheads or warhead modifications.

Both initiatives were proposed in a year-long study, the Nuclear Posture Review, conducted under the direction of Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and approved by President Bush last month. But they were only made public Thursday in congressional testimony by retired Gen. John A. Gordon, head of the National Nuclear Security Administration, which manages the country's nuclear weapons complex.

Some groups are criticizing the Bush administration's plans. "Not since the resurgence of the Cold War in Ronald Reagan's first term has there been such an emphasis on nuclear weapons in U.S. defense strategy," said the Natural Resources Defense Council, an environmental group that specializes in analyzing U.S. nuclear weapons programs.

At the time the Nuclear Posture Review was released, officials focused attention on its proposals for large-scale reductions in the number of nuclear warheads. Bush announced in November that the United States will reduce the number of deployed warheads from its current level of 6,000 to between 1,700 and 2,200 within 10 years. But instead of destroying most of the warheads, the administration plans to put them in storage where they could be reactivated.

In an appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Gordon said the Nuclear Weapons Council study on a bunker-penetrating warhead is examining two possible designs, one by the Los Alamos National Laboratory and the other by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

Gordon also said the studies "would proceed beyond the 'paper' stage and include a combination of component and subassembly tests and simulations."

The National Nuclear Security Administration workload, at least for the next 10 years, is overwhelmingly devoted to refurbishing nuclear warheads for the land-based Minuteman III ICBM, the sub-launched Trident SLBM, the air-launched cruise missile and versions of the B-61 nuclear bomb. The one new warhead planned for dismantlement is the W-62, the original warhead on the first 500 Minuteman III missiles, but disassembly of those warheads is not expected to begin until late in this decade, Gordon said.

To support this workload, the Nuclear Posture Review calls for almost doubling the capacity of the Nuclear Security Administration's Pantex plant outside Amarillo, Tex., to handle 600 warheads a year, up from today's 350, according to a report issued last week by the Natural Resources Defense Council. According to the council's report, the posture review also calls for a new land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) to be operational in 2020, a new sub-launched ballistic missile and new strategic submarine by 2030 and a new heavy bomber by 2040.

Gordon said the review calls for accelerating work on development of a new plant to produce plutonium pits, the part of a thermonuclear weapon whose atomic explosion acts as a trigger mechanism.

In addition, Gordon said, there would be an expansion and modernization of the Y-12 plant at Oak Ridge, Tenn., which handles highly enriched uranium as well as the other radioactive materials for thermonuclear weapons. An additional \$15 million has been allocated to prepare the Nevada Test Site to resume testing within a year's time, although Gordon said the Bush administration still supports the moratorium on underground testing.

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### **Statement of John A. Gordon**

Under Secretary for Nuclear Security and Administrator,  
National Nuclear Security Administration  
U. S. Department of Energy  
Before the Committee on Armed Services  
U.S. Senate, 14 February 2002

[...]

First, the NPR reaffirms that nuclear weapons, for the foreseeable future, will remain a key element of U.S. national security strategy. As a result, NNSA must continue to assure the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. Our stockpile stewardship program is designed to do just that, and to do so in the absence of nuclear testing.

Second, the NPR reaffirms the stockpile refurbishment plan agreed previously between DoD and NNSA, which calls for three warhead refurbishment programs—the W80, the W76 and the B61—to begin later this decade. As a result, NNSA must press ahead with its efforts to reverse the deterioration of its nuclear weapons infrastructure, restore lost production capabilities, and modernize others in order to be ready to begin those refurbishments on schedule.

[...]

### **Role of the Nuclear Weapons Enterprise in Achieving Defense Policy Goals**

Let me elaborate more on these matters starting from "first principles." Four key defense policy goals were articulated in the Quadrennial Defense Review and later reaffirmed in the NPR. Briefly, the goals are to:

- *assure* allies and friends by demonstrating the United States' steadiness of purpose and capability to fulfill its military commitments,
- *dissuade* adversaries from undertaking military programs or operations that could threaten U.S. interests or those of allies and friends,
- *deter* threats and counter coercion against the United States, its forces and allies, and
- *defeat* any adversary decisively and defend against attack if deterrence fails.

In seeking to meet these goals, the NPR has established as its centerpiece a "New Triad" of flexible response capabilities consisting of the following elements:

- non-nuclear and nuclear strike capabilities including systems for command and control,
- active and passive defenses including ballistic missile defenses, and
- R&D and industrial infrastructure needed to develop, build, and maintain nuclear offensive forces and defensive systems.

Perhaps more so than in any previous defense review, this concept of a New Triad reflects a broad recognition of the importance of a robust and responsive defense R&D and industrial base in achieving our overall defense strategy. The ability of our modern defense industrial base to bring advanced defense technology rapidly to the field is well respected internationally among both friend and foe. The breadth and scope of the U.S. strategic modernization program of the early 80's, including the potential of a Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) then in the very early stages of R&D, was key to causing President Gorbachev in the late 1980's to seek an end to strategic competition with the West and an end to the Cold War. The U.S. defense R&D and industrial base, including the nuclear weapons complex of national laboratories, production plants, and test sites that supported development of sophisticated warheads with build rates exceeding 1,000 weapons per year, permitted that modernization program to take place and was a major factor in reassuring allies (who depend on the U.S. nuclear umbrella), in dissuading, that is, convincing the Soviet Union that arms competition with the United States was futile, and in deterring aggression.

Many modern military capabilities evolved from the legacy of the Manhattan Project, characterized by the massive application of science and technology to the problem of developing and producing the atomic bomb and leading to later efforts across a range of military systems. It was not only nuclear and conventional forces that provided deterrence during the Cold War, but the latent potential—reflected in our defense scientific, technical and manufacturing base—to design and develop ever more advanced and capable military systems, and the ability to produce them in great quantities if need be.

Now that the Cold War is over, how can the nuclear weapons enterprise act both to reassure allies, and to dissuade or deter future adversaries? An enterprise focused on sustainment and sized to meet the needs of a smaller nuclear deterrent can provide capabilities to respond to future strategic challenges. A future competitor seeking to gain some nuclear advantage would be forced to conclude that its buildup could not occur more quickly than the U.S. could respond. Alternatively, an ability to innovate and produce small builds of special purpose weapons, characteristic of a smaller but still vital nuclear infrastructure, would act to convince an adversary that it could not expect to negate U.S. nuclear weapons capabilities. The development and subsequent modification of the B61-7 bomb—converting a few of them into B61-11 earth penetrator weapons—is a case in point.

Thus, it is not only in-being forces, but the demonstrable capabilities of the defense scientific, technical and manufacturing infrastructure, of which a responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure is a key part, including its ability to sustain and adapt, that provides the United States with the means to respond to new, unexpected, or emerging threats in a timely manner. This has served to reassure allies and friends, dissuade adversaries from strategic competition with the U.S., and underpin credible deterrence in a changing security environment.

[...]

### **Respond rapidly and decisively to stockpile “surprise” or to changes in the international security environment.**

The NPR highlighted the importance of a robust and responsive defense R&D and industrial base as a key element of the New Triad. Here we refer to the ability of the enterprise to anticipate innovations by an adversary and to counter them before our deterrent is degraded, and its resilience to unanticipated events or emerging threats—all the while continuing to carry out the day-to-day activities in support of the enduring stockpile. Unanticipated events could include the catastrophic failure of a deployed warhead type. Emerging threats could call for new warhead development, or support to DoD in uploading the responsive force.

[...]

*New warhead design, development and initial production:* New or emerging WMD threats from rogue states make it difficult to predict future deterrence requirements. If the U.S. is to have a flexible deterrent, it must be able to adapt its nuclear forces to changing strategic conditions. Adaptation and modernization of forces, including implementation of new technologies, will enable us to continue to achieve deterrence objectives more efficiently even as we move to significantly lower force levels. Our goal is to maintain sufficient R&D and production capability to be able to design, develop, and begin production on the order of five years from a decision to enter full-scale development of a new

warhead. To achieve this goal, we must work with DoD to determine and prioritize potential weapons needs over the long term. In certain cases, it may be appropriate to design, develop and produce a small build of prototype weapons both to exercise key capabilities and to serve as a “hedge,” to be produced in quantity when deemed necessary.

**Quantity production of new warheads:** While there are no plans to increase the size of the stockpile, we must have flexibility to respond to various scenarios. Our goal is to maintain sufficient production capacity to be able to produce new warheads in sufficient quantities to meet defense requirements without disrupting ongoing refurbishments. In this connection, refurbishment demands starting later in this decade, and continuing until about 2014, are expected to dominate production capacity. If necessary, we would work with DoD to adjust production priorities.

#### **Stockpile Refurbishments—Meeting our commitments to DoD**

The NPR reaffirmed the current stockpile refurbishment plan jointly agreed by NNSA and DoD, including the “block upgrade” concept which provides flexibility to adjust the plan to evolving weapons numbers.<sup>4</sup> The plan calls for all eight warhead types in the enduring stockpile to be refurbished over the next 25 years. Near-term efforts focus on four warheads: the W87 (ICBM), the B61-7/11 (gravity bomb), the W80 (Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM), Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM) and Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM-N)), and the W76 (Trident SLBM).

[...]

- **B61-7/11 (Bomb):** Some secondary components in the B61-7/11 show signs of aging that could affect warhead reliability, if left unchecked. B61-7/11 refurbishment, scheduled to begin in FY’06, will include secondary refurbishment and replacement of some foam support, cables, and connectors.

[...]

#### **Enhanced Test Readiness**

President Bush supports a continued moratorium on underground nuclear testing; nothing in the NPR changes that. Over time, we believe that the stewardship program will provide the tools to ensure stockpile safety and reliability without nuclear testing. But there are no guarantees. It is only prudent to continue to hedge for the possibility that we may in the future uncover a safety or reliability problem in a warhead critical to the U.S. nuclear deterrent that could not be fixed without nuclear testing.

Based on a 1993 Presidential directive, NNSA currently maintains a capability to conduct an underground nuclear test within 24 to 36 months of a Presidential decision to do so. Test readiness is maintained principally by the participation of nuclear test program personnel in an active program of stockpile stewardship experiments, especially the subcritical experiments carried out underground at the Nevada Test Site (NTS).

During the NPR, two concerns were raised about our test readiness program. First, a two to three year readiness posture may not be sustainable as more and more experienced test personnel retire. Not all techniques and processes required to carry out underground nuclear tests are exercised with the work carried out at the NTS. As experienced personnel retire, it will become more difficult to train new people in these techniques, further degrading test readiness. This argued for an approach in which key capabilities required to conduct nuclear tests are identified and exercised regularly on projects making use of a variety of nuclear test-related skills. Second, the current two to three year posture may be too long. If we believed that a defect uncovered in the stockpile surveillance program, or through new insight gained in R&D efforts, had degraded our confidence in the safety and/or reliability of the W76 warhead—the warhead deployed on Trident submarines and comprising the most substantial part of our strategic deterrent—the ability to conduct a test more quickly might be critically important.

To address these concerns, the NPR endorsed the NNSA proposal to enhance test readiness by reducing the lead-time to prepare for and conduct an underground nuclear test.







Los Angeles Times

Nuclear warfare

### **Secret Plan Outlines the Unthinkable**

By WILLIAM M. ARKIN

William M. Arkin is a senior fellow at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in Washington and an adjunct professor at the U.S. Air Force School of Advanced Airpower Studies

March 10 2002

WASHINGTON -- The Bush administration, in a secret policy review completed early this year, has ordered the Pentagon to draft contingency plans for the use of nuclear weapons against at least seven countries, naming not only Russia and the "axis of evil"--Iraq, Iran, and North Korea--but also China, Libya and Syria.

In addition, the U.S. Defense Department has been told to prepare for the possibility that nuclear weapons may be required in some future Arab-Israeli crisis. And, it is to develop plans for using nuclear weapons to retaliate against chemical or biological attacks, as well as "surprising military developments" of an unspecified nature.

These and a host of other directives, including calls for developing bunker-busting mini-nukes and nuclear weapons that reduce collateral damage, are contained in a still-classified document called the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which was delivered to Congress on Jan. 8. Like all such documents since the dawning of the Atomic Age more than a half-century ago, this NPR offers a chilling glimpse into the world of nuclear-war planners: With a Strangelovian genius, they cover every conceivable circumstance in which a president might wish to use nuclear weapons--planning in great detail for a war they hope never to wage.

In this top-secret domain, there has always been an inconsistency between America's diplomatic objectives of reducing nuclear arsenals and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, on the one hand, and the military imperative to prepare for the unthinkable, on the other.

Nevertheless, the Bush administration plan reverses an almost two-decade-long trend of relegating nuclear weapons to the category of weapons of last resort. It also redefines nuclear requirements in hurried post-Sept. 11 terms.

In these and other ways, the still-secret document offers insights into the evolving views of nuclear strategists in Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld's Defense Department.

While downgrading the threat from Russia and publicly emphasizing their commitment to reducing the number of long-range nuclear weapons, Defense Department strategists promote tactical and so-called "adaptive" nuclear capabilities to deal with contingencies where large nuclear arsenals are not demanded.

They seek a host of new weapons and support systems, including conventional military and cyber warfare capabilities integrated with nuclear warfare. The end product is a now-familiar post-Afghanistan model--with nuclear capability added. It combines precision weapons, long-range strikes, and special and covert operations.

But the NPR's call for development of new nuclear weapons that reduce "collateral damage" myopically ignores the political, moral and military implications--short-term and long--of crossing the nuclear threshold.

Under what circumstances might nuclear weapons be used under the new posture? The NPR says they "could be employed against targets able to withstand nonnuclear attack," or in retaliation for the use of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, or "in the event of surprising military developments."

Planning nuclear-strike capabilities, it says, involves the recognition of "immediate, potential or unexpected" contingencies. North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria and Libya are named as "countries that could be involved" in all three kinds of threat. "All have long-standing hostility towards the United States and its security partners. All sponsor or harbor terrorists, and have active WMD [weapons of mass destruction] and missile programs."

China, because of its nuclear forces and "developing strategic objectives," is listed as "a country that could be involved in an immediate or potential contingency." Specifically, the NPR lists a military

confrontation over the status of Taiwan as one of the scenarios that could lead Washington to use nuclear weapons.

Other listed scenarios for nuclear conflict are a North Korean attack on South Korea and an Iraqi assault on Israel or its neighbors.

The second important insight the NPR offers into Pentagon thinking about nuclear policy is the extent to which the Bush administration's strategic planners were shaken by last September's terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Though Congress directed the new administration "to conduct a comprehensive review of U.S. nuclear forces" before the events of Sept. 11, the final study is striking for its single-minded reaction to those tragedies.

Heretofore, nuclear strategy tended to exist as something apart from the ordinary challenges of foreign policy and military affairs. Nuclear weapons were not just the option of last resort, they were the option reserved for times when national survival hung in the balance--a doomsday confrontation with the Soviet Union, for instance.

Now, nuclear strategy seems to be viewed through the prism of Sept. 11. For one thing, the Bush administration's faith in old-fashioned deterrence is gone. It no longer takes a superpower to pose a dire threat to Americans.

"The terrorists who struck us on Sept. 11th were clearly not deterred by doing so from the massive U.S. nuclear arsenal," Rumsfeld told an audience at the National Defense University in late January.

Similarly, U.S. Undersecretary of State John R. Bolton said in a recent interview, "We would do whatever is necessary to defend America's innocent civilian population .... The idea that fine theories of deterrence work against everybody ... has just been disproven by Sept. 11."

Moreover, while insisting they would go nuclear only if other options seemed inadequate, officials are looking for nuclear weapons that could play a role in the kinds of challenges the United States faces with Al Qaeda.

Accordingly, the NPR calls for new emphasis on developing such things as nuclear bunker-busters and surgical "warheads that reduce collateral damage," as well as weapons that could be used against smaller, more circumscribed targets--"possible modifications to existing weapons to provide additional yield flexibility," in the jargon-rich language of the review.

It also proposes to train U.S. Special Forces operators to play the same intelligence gathering and targeting roles for nuclear weapons that they now play for conventional weapons strikes in Afghanistan. And cyber-warfare and other nonnuclear military capabilities would be integrated into nuclear-strike forces to make them more all-encompassing.

As for Russia, once the primary reason for having a U.S. nuclear strategy, the review says that while Moscow's nuclear programs remain cause for concern, "ideological sources of conflict" have been eliminated, rendering a nuclear contingency involving Russia "plausible" but "not expected."

"In the event that U.S. relations with Russia significantly worsen in the future," the review says, "the U.S. may need to revise its nuclear force levels and posture."

When completion of the NPR was publicly announced in January, Pentagon briefers deflected questions about most of the specifics, saying the information was classified. Officials did stress that, consistent with a Bush campaign pledge, the plan called for reducing the current 6,000 long-range nuclear weapons to one-third that number over the next decade. Rumsfeld, who approved the review late last year, said the administration was seeking "a new approach to strategic deterrence," to include missile defenses and improvements in nonnuclear capabilities.

Also, Russia would no longer be officially defined as "an enemy."

Beyond that, almost no details were revealed.

The classified text, however, is shot through with a worldview transformed by Sept. 11. The NPR coins the phrase "New Triad," which it describes as comprising the "offensive strike leg," (our nuclear and conventional forces) plus "active and passive defenses," (our anti-missile systems and other defenses) and "a responsive defense infrastructure" (our ability to develop and produce nuclear weapons and resume nuclear testing). Previously, the nuclear "triad" was the bombers, long-range land-based missiles and submarine-launched missiles that formed the three legs of America's strategic arsenal.

The review emphasizes the integration of "new nonnuclear strategic capabilities" into nuclear-war plans. "New capabilities must be developed to defeat emerging threats such as hard and deeply-buried

targets (HDBT), to find and attack mobile and re-locatable targets, to defeat chemical and biological agents, and to improve accuracy and limit collateral damage," the review says.

It calls for "a new strike system" using four converted Trident submarines, an unmanned combat air vehicle and a new air-launched cruise missile as potential new weapons.

Beyond new nuclear weapons, the review proposes establishing what it calls an "agent defeat" program, which defense officials say includes a "boutique" approach to finding new ways of destroying deadly chemical or biological warfare agents, as well as penetrating enemy facilities that are otherwise difficult to attack. This includes, according to the document, "thermal, chemical or radiological neutralization of chemical/biological materials in production or storage facilities."

Bush administration officials stress that the development and integration of nonnuclear capabilities into the nuclear force is what permits reductions in traditional long-range weaponry. But the blueprint laid down in the review would expand the breadth and flexibility of U.S. nuclear capabilities. In addition to the new weapons systems, the review calls for incorporation of "nuclear capability" into many of the conventional systems now under development. An extended-range conventional cruise missile in the works for the U.S. Air Force "would have to be modified to carry nuclear warheads if necessary." Similarly, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter should be modified to carry nuclear weapons "at an affordable price."

The review calls for research to begin next month on fitting an existing nuclear warhead into a new 5,000-pound "earth penetrating" munition.

Given the advances in electronics and information technologies in the past decade, it is not surprising that the NPR also stresses improved satellites and intelligence, communications, and more robust high-bandwidth decision-making systems.

Particularly noticeable is the directive to improve U.S. capabilities in the field of "information operations," or cyber-warfare. The intelligence community "lacks adequate data on most adversary computer local area networks and other command and control systems," the review observes. It calls for improvements in the ability to "exploit" enemy computer networks, and the integration of cyber-warfare into the overall nuclear war database "to enable more effective targeting, weaponeering, and combat assessment essential to the New Triad."

In recent months, when Bush administration officials talked about the implications of Sept. 11 for long-term military policy, they have often focused on "homeland defense" and the need for an anti-missile shield. In truth, what has evolved since last year's terror attacks is an integrated, significantly expanded planning doctrine for nuclear wars.

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US Department of Defense  
Press release 113-02 – 9 March 2002

### **Statement on Nuclear Posture Review**

We will not discuss the classified details of military planning or contingencies, nor will we comment on selective and misleading leaks.

The Nuclear Posture Review is required by law. It is a wide-ranging analysis of the requirements for deterrence in the 21st century. This review of the U.S. nuclear posture is the latest in a long series of reviews since the development of nuclear weapons. It does not provide operational guidance on nuclear targeting or planning.

The Department of Defense continues to plan for a broad range of contingencies and unforeseen threats to the United States and its allies. We do so in order to deter such attacks in the first place.

Of particular significance in the new Nuclear Posture Review is President Bush's decision to reduce operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons by two-thirds, a decision made possible by the new strategic relationship with Russia.

This administration is fashioning a more diverse set of options for deterring the threat of WMD. That is why the Administration is pursuing missile defense, advanced conventional forces, and improved intelligence capabilities.

A combination of offensive and defensive, and nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities, is essential to meet the deterrence requirements of the 21st century.

For more information, see the [Nuclear Posture Review foreword](#) and the Jan. 9 DoD news [briefing transcript](#) and accompanying [briefing slides](#) .

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Washington Times  
22 February 2002

## **US drops pledge on nukes**

By Nicholas Kralev

The Bush administration is no longer standing by a 24-year-old U.S. pledge not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states, a senior administration official said yesterday.

Washington is "not looking for occasions to use" its nuclear arsenal, John Bolton, undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, said in an interview.

But "we would do whatever is necessary to defend America's innocent civilian population," he said.

In case of an attack on the United States, "we would have to do what is appropriate under the circumstances, and the classic formulation of that is, we are not ruling anything in and we are not ruling anything out," Mr. Bolton said.

"We are just not into theoretical assertions that other administrations have made," he said in reference to a 1978 commitment by the Carter administration not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states unless they attack the United States in alliance with nuclear-armed countries.

On June 12 that year, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance made the following statement on behalf of President Carter, which became known as "negative security assurances": "The United States will not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon state party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or any comparable internationally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear explosive devices, except in the case of an attack on the United States, its territories or armed forces, or its allies, by such a state allied to a nuclear-weapon state, or associated with a nuclear-weapon state in carrying out or sustaining the attack."

In 1995, Warren Christopher, the first secretary of state in the Clinton administration, reaffirmed Washington's commitment. Along with the pledges of the other four permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, who are all nuclear powers, it became part of a resolution, which the council adopted April 11, 1995.

But Mr. Bolton said such promises reflect "an unrealistic view of the international situation."

"The idea that fine theories of deterrence work against everybody, which is implicit in the negative security assurances, has just been disproven by September 11," he said. "What we are attempting to do is create a situation where nobody uses weapons of mass destruction of any kind."

Mr. Bolton spoke a day after returning from Moscow, where he led the second round of arms-control negotiations that are expected to produce an agreement on nuclear cuts in time for President Bush's visit to Russia in May.

The undersecretary said the "negative security assurances" never "came up" in the discussions with the Russians. Washington has never had a no-first-use nuclear policy but Moscow did until the mid-1990s. Mr. Bolton's remarks displeased some arms-control analysts yesterday, who said that such significant U.S. government statements as the "negative security assurances" should not be repudiated.

"These assurances are important in order to maintain the integrity and credibility of the nonproliferation regime. Repudiation can have a negative effect on international security," said Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association.

The nonprofit organization's publication, Arms Control Today, discussed the issue in an interview with Mr. Bolton earlier this month.

Although Washington's official position on using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states has remained unchanged until now, "both Democratic and Republican administrations have maintained ambiguity to maximize the credibility of the U.S. nuclear force," Mr. Kimball said.

Only a year after the Clinton administration reaffirmed Mr. Carter's pledge, Defense Secretary William Perry said on April 26, 1996: "If some nation were to attack the United States with chemical weapons, they have to fear the consequences of a response from any weapon in our inventory. ... We could have a devastating response without use of nuclear weapons, but we would not forswear that possibility."

John Holum, Mr. Bolton's predecessor at the State Department under Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, said yesterday that the Bush administration's position to ignore the 1978 commitment would not affect the strategic balance of power but might send a wrong message overseas.

"It doesn't make the use of weapons of mass destruction more or less likely, but it's reflective of the administration's negative view of international treaties," Mr. Holum said.

He noted that there was an "extensive debate" in the Clinton administration on whether it's "responsible" to rely on nuclear weapons to combat potential biological and chemical attacks, but a decision was made to maintain "ambiguity."

Mr. Bolton said there has been "no formal review" of Mr. Vance's statement by the Bush administration, "nor are we going to undertake a review of every official statement made by secretaries of states in the past five administrations."

## Onderhandelingen VS-Rusland

US Department of State  
16 January 2002

### **U.S., Russian Defense Officials Conclude Early Arms Talks Delegates agree to series of working groups**

*By Merle D. Kellerhals, Jr. Washington File Staff Writer*

**Washington** -- U.S. and Russian defense officials are setting up a series of working groups to foster cooperation in verifying reductions of nuclear arsenals, in exchanging data on technology, and in joint antiterrorism efforts, Under Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith says.

"We agreed to set up a number of working groups to cover various areas of our common interest to see if we can identify new types of cooperation and agreements," Feith said January 16 during a special Pentagon briefing.

The delegations -- led by Feith, under secretary for defense policy, and General-Colonel Yuriy Nikolayevich Baluyevskiy, the first deputy chief of the Russian general staff -- held discussions January 15 and 16 in Washington as part of broader diplomatic initiatives between the United States and Russia. These discussions are expected to lead to recommendations for later talks between Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov.

Eventually, the negotiations are expected to lead to a summit in May or June between President George Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg, Russia.

Feith said the talks also focused on transparency and predictability measures in arms control, but without resorting to what he referred to as the formalized, tortuous style of Cold War agreements between the United States and the former Soviet Union, which tended to institutionalize a kind of hostile relationship.

"We're not looking to get echoes of that, and we're not looking to recreate arms control-style negotiations or agreements," he said. "We do think there are useful things that we can do so that the possibilities of misunderstanding about each other's force structures are reduced, and that's what we are driving at when we talk about transparency and predictability."

Feith said the United States is not ruling out anything as to the form agreements with Russia might take, but wants what is most effective in enhancing cooperation.

Baluyevskiy, however, said during a joint briefing he was "talking about a legally binding document" to codify specific nuclear arms reductions. He said Russia was "happy with the specific number within the region of 1,700 to 2,200 warheads" the United States pledged in November to achieve within a decade. Putin, in talks with Bush at the time, also pledged to respond in kind to warhead reductions in a range of 1,500 to 2,200.

Baluyevskiy also said "we are for irreversibility of the reduction of the nuclear forces. The warheads dismantled from the carriers should be destroyed and eliminated."

The United States, on the other hand, said in its newly released Nuclear Posture Review that the nuclear warheads removed from the strategically deployed U.S. arsenal would be placed in storage and could be retrieved and reactivated on short notice.

And Baluyevskiy said Russia considers the United States withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty a mistake. The Russian Duma passed a resolution January 16 condemning the United States for withdrawing from the treaty, saying the pullout was destabilizing "since it effectively ruins the existing highly efficient system of ensuring strategic stability and paves ground for a new round of the arms race."

However, Feith said the process of improved relations between Russia and the United States has been greatly accelerated by the September 11th terrorist attacks.

"We are not hostile. What we are looking to do with the Russians is develop a view of security that allows us to work together to deal with threats that face both of us and not be thinking of each other as the enemy," Feith said. "The world has changed, and the old way of thinking about strategic stability is just not applicable anymore."

J.D. Crouch, assistant secretary of defense for international security policy, said that as part of this greater cooperation there will be "regularized data exchanges" on technology. What it will not become, though, is "verifying limits of an arms control treaty," he said.

Feith said the goal of these negotiations and working groups "is that we can create a normal relationship with Russia, the kind of relationship that we have with countries all around the world, where they have conventional and in some cases nuclear capabilities, but we have the kind of quality of relationship with them that we don't think that our security requires us to balance our forces against theirs."

"That's why, when we talk about measures of predictability or cooperation or transparency with the Russians, we're doing it based on this new concept, not based on the old balance-of-nuclear-terror ideas from the Cold War," he said.

Copies of transcripts of the joint media availability between Feith and Baluyevskiy, and Feith's separate Pentagon briefing, can be obtained on the Internet at:

[http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2002/t01162002\\_t0116fba.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2002/t01162002_t0116fba.html) and

[http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2002/t01162002\\_t0116fcb.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2002/t01162002_t0116fcb.html)

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## **Department of Defense DoD News Briefing**

Wednesday, January 16, 2002 - 2 p.m. EST

Douglas Feith, Under Secretary Of Defense For Policy - Special Briefing On The Visit By First Deputy Chief Of The Russian General Staff General-colonel Yuriy Nikolayevich Baluyevskiy  
Also Participating Was J.D. Crouch, Assistant Secretary Of Defense For International Security Policy

**Feith:** Good afternoon. I assume that many of you, if not most of you, were at the discussion that we just had outside with General Baluyevskiy, so I don't know if I need to start with any preliminaries. But I'll simply say that we just concluded our two days of meetings with the Russian delegation, and we have explored the range of issues that we've been discussing for the last six or seven months in creating a new U.S.-Russian relationship. The meetings focused on practical ideas for cooperation between the United States and Russia in a number of areas: counterproliferation, offensive nuclear force reduction, transparency and predictability measures, military technical cooperation, which would include things like cooperating in the field of missile defense, counter-terrorism work, which as you all know we've been engaged in with the Russian Federation since September 11th. And we agreed to set up a number of working groups to cover various areas of our common interest to see if we can identify new types of cooperation and agreements that we might want to develop and record and recommend up for possible consideration by, in the first instance, the ministers -- Secretary Rumsfeld and Minister Ivanov -- and then up to the presidents for their meeting in May.

With that, I'll be happy to take your questions.

**Question:** Your reference to transparency and all that there sounds like provisions of START I. So is it possible and have you discussed and is it likely that you might just take those provisions and duplicate them in some form to cover new arrangements?

And secondly, when you talk about nonproliferation, of course, the Iran bell goes off in my head. Did you get on their case again, which would have been about the 12th time over the last several years about their technology transfers to Iran?

**Feith:** The ideas about predictability and transparency are going to draw on established arrangements like START I, as you suggested. But we're not confining ourselves to START I.

And we have -- there's a willingness to look at everything afresh, and there are ideas, I think, that we're going to be developing, that don't exist in any previous arrangements, any previous arms control agreements. We are not thinking of what we're doing as an exercise in arms control. We're -- we think of the Cold War-style arms control as related, as institutionalizing the kind of hostile relationship that the United States and the Soviet Union had in the Cold War. And we're not looking to get echoes of that, and we're not looking to recreate arms control-style negotiations or agreements.



We do think that there are useful things that we can do so that the possibilities of misunderstanding about each other's force structures are reduced, and that's what we are driving at when we talk about transparency and predictability.

**Q:** Does that mean, then, that the agreements you're talking about -- (inaudible) -- closer to being joint communiqués rather than legally binding documents? And would one of those agreements deal with actual numbers of operationally deployed offensive weapons, the size of the responsive force, very specific things like that?

**Feith:** We had discussions about what kind of form an agreement might take, and there's a long list of forms that agreements that the United States has entered into with other countries has taken, from the most formal, like treaties, down through executive agreements and memoranda of understanding and joint communiqués and joint statements and the like.

Our view is, we are interested in exploring what it is we can agree on that would be useful, that would contribute to the interests of both countries.

Once we decide what it is that we've agreed on, we will pick the appropriate forum for it. We're completely open-minded on the subject, and we're not ruling anything in, we're not ruling anything out. We're taking a very pragmatic approach.

**Q:** I'm sorry, I asked a two-part. Did you talk to the Russians about transfers to Iran?

**Feith:** I don't want to get into details and the substance of our discussions. I just want to -- I'd rather keep it a little more general.

**Q:** But can you just say that you've discussed Iran? I mean, you said you discussed missile defense, so why can't you say if the topic of Iran came up?

**Feith:** We discussed in general terms the danger that weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorist organizations or state sponsors of terrorism would pose.

**Q:** Can we say that you and Mr. Baluyevskiy agreed to disagree on this issue of American plans not to destroy but to stockpile some portion of American strategic nuclear warheads?

**Feith:** No, I wouldn't say that. We didn't get to the point of even agreeing to disagree. What we did was we laid out a concept of how we could work and set up a structure for exploring areas of cooperation and agreement in a number of fields.

**Q:** Would one of these working groups be working on this issue?

**Feith:** The issue of offensive nuclear force reductions?

**Q:** Sure.

**Feith:** What I was referring to before on promoting transparency and predictability would relate to the offensive nuclear force reductions.

**Q:** Does this mean that a bilateral nuclear arms reduction agreement is on the table? Is this something you're considering or would consider?

**Feith:** As I said, we would consider an agreement that would deal with the subject of the offensive force reductions from the point of view of making sure that we understand each other's force structure and our plans for our force structure. And if we can come up with measures that will promote that understanding, reduce the dangers of misunderstanding or miscalculation about that, we'd be willing to consider an agreement on that.

**Q:** The areas in which we don't agree, these issues seem to be very important for the Russians. How will you keep those from getting in the way of the relationship?

**Feith:** We have been building a relationship with the Russians on a very practical basis. We have a number of areas where we are working together. Clearly, the event -- the attack on September 11th has accelerated the process of Americans and Russians working together to deal with threats that face both countries.

And what we have been cultivating with the Russians is a new way of looking at international strategic stability. We've been suggesting that the old concept -- the Cold War concept that strategic stability for us is fundamentally a matter of protecting ourselves against Russia or against the Soviet Union, and that that's -- and their view is protecting themselves against us -- that that is no longer the way to think about strategic stability in the world today, because the United States and Russia are not enemies. We are not hostile. And the threats that we face are not primarily each other -- I mean, arguably, they're not each other at all. The threats that we face are threats from terrorist organizations or from third parties that -- some of them are actual, like the terrorist threat that we're dealing with right now, and some of them are potential and will depend on how the world develops.

What we are looking to do with the Russians is develop a view of security that allows us to work together to deal with threats that face both of us and not be thinking of each other as the enemy. And it's a process. The -- there is an enormous investment that people have made over decades in Cold War thinking. And there is, as you all know, a "priesthood" that has focused on arms control notions and strategic stability concepts during the Cold War. And it is very hard for people who have invested decades of intellectual energy and, for that matter, emotional energy, in these kinds of strategic concepts, to abandon them and think about these issues in a new way.

But the world has changed, and the old way of thinking about strategic stability is just not applicable anymore. And if there was much of a debate of -- about that six or seven months ago, there shouldn't be much now, since September 11th.

And yet we find in the United States and in Russia there's a certain amount of "old" thinking that needs to be either addressed or navigated around in order to create the kind of cooperative new relationship that I think many people on the Russian side and on the American side want to achieve.

**Q:** What's the status of START II now? And also, could you give some examples of the kinds of measures that you're thinking of that could lead to predictability and transparency?

**Feith:** Well, why don't I let Dr. Crouch address those?

Crouch: Well, as you know, START II is not in force. And I think that that -- that's a position that's recognized on both the American side and the Russian side. And our Nuclear Posture Review was conducted in the context of START II not being in force, and the nuclear levels to which we are going to be reducing go far below the levels that would have been required under START II. So in that context, I mean, I think we have sort of moved beyond START II, is probably the best way to -- setting it aside and have moved beyond it.

In terms of transparency and predictability, we start with the foundation of the START I verification regime, and we're going to try to build on that in a series of additional arrangements and agreements, things that could include more detailed exchanges of information, visits to particular sites, additional kinds of inspections, additional kinds of activities at sites that would be able to give more confidence, and particularly that are more applicable to the approach of verifying reductions of operationally deployed systems. We're now -- we are now, you know, looking at sort of a truth-in-advertising approach here, which is that the number of weapons we're trying to verify, if you will, are the exact numbers of weapons that will be on these systems.

Now we're not going to be able to do that within -- in extremely specific ways. But I think that we're going to be able to provide confidence to the Russians -- and they will be able to provide confidence to us -- that our forces are in this range of 1,700 to 2,200 operationally deployed systems. We envision regularized data exchanges. We envision cooperative -- what we call in the business "cooperative measures," things that we might be able to do that they could observe with their national technical means and things they could do that we could observe with our national technical means -- so essentially expanding the range of these activities in a way where both sides can have greater confidence as we move forward.

But you know, the key distinction here, from our standpoint, is that we don't see this as verifying limits of an arms control treaty. What we're trying to do here is develop a more cooperative relationship, where we on a regular basis are exchanging information on these things in the way that we exchange information with other friends and allies.

**Q:** Would the predictability part of it include measures or agreements on a schedule for reducing nuclear weapons?

**Feith:** We -- yes, we would intend to have a general understanding -- we've begun the process by developing the Nuclear Posture Review, and we briefed the Russians on it. We would expect to have a general understanding of where we're going to be going with our force posture and making sure that the Russians understand it.

But the key point is -- and it's -- it can't be emphasized enough -- the premise of this exercise is different from the premise of arms control exercises in the Cold War. The premise of this exercise is not that we have to balance our forces or categories of our forces against corresponding categories of forces on the Russian side. That's not what we're doing. It's -- we do not believe that our security hinges on having these numbers balanced against those numbers of this type of system or their type of system. That's just not the concept. If we are not enemies and if we are not threatening each other and - - even better -- if we are cooperating, then we are moving toward a situation where we do not view

their forces as a threat to us. There are other countries in the world that have substantial military forces, and nobody dreams of saying that the United States should be balancing our forces against those of Country A, Country B, or Country C.

And our hope is that we can create a normal relationship with Russia, the kind of relationship that we have with countries all around the world, where they have conventional and in some cases nuclear capabilities, but we have the kind of quality of relationship with them that we don't think that our security requires us to balance our forces against theirs. That's the goal. And that's why, when we talk about measures of predictability or cooperation or transparency with the Russians, we're doing it based on this new concept, not based on the old balance-of-nuclear-terror ideas from the Cold War.

**Q:** It seems, though, that you might be -- it seems you might be alone in that. From what we heard from the Russian general outside, they do want those nuclear weapons to be permanently eliminated, and they do seem to want the precepts of the NTR codified somehow in something that's legally binding. So what's keeping you from doing that, if this is what they want and you have such a cooperative relationship?

**Feith:** I'm glad you used the term "permanently eliminated," because there is a big misunderstanding about this point. There were arms control agreements during the Cold War that were praised enthusiastically for having reduced nuclear arms. SALT I, START I, the INF -- well, the INF treaty is, I guess, is another example where none of those agreements required the destruction of warheads. And there's been a lot of talk that what we're proposing in reducing operationally deployed weapons is somehow not as thorough-going a reduction as what was accomplished by arms control agreements in past decades. It's not so. And I think it is important that people be straight on this.

People are now focused on a new issue, and they're criticizing the reductions that we're talking about even though that same criticism could have been leveled against various people's favorite arms control agreements in the past. We are doing something significant in reducing operationally deployed warheads -- operationally deployed systems.

And this issue about permanent reduction is, I think, a red herring.

**Q:** But that's what he said he wanted. I mean, that's in -- "We are following the principle that all nuclear weapons should be destroyed" is a direct quote from what he said. So if you have this new cooperative relationship, why not give them what they want?

**Feith:** We have discussions with the Russians on a range of issues. There are some things that they're interested in, and principles that they want to promulgate, and there are other things that we're interested in and principles that we want to promulgate, and some of the things we disagree with and some of the things we agree with. And we're going to be trying to develop a clearer understanding of the things that we agree on and move forward from there.

[...]

## NAVO

NATO Press release (2001)177, 13 December 2001

### **Statement by the Secretary General of NATO, Lord Robertson**

Today, President Bush announced that the United States of America is withdrawing from the 1972 Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty between the United States and the then Soviet Union. In line with its commitment to maintain close consultations with Allies, the United States briefed the North Atlantic Council this afternoon.

The United States explained that today's decision is in the context of the development of appropriate means to counter new security challenges and terrorist threats such as weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

NATO welcomes the pledge of the United States of America to develop a new framework of cooperation with Russia to enhance stability and re-inforce cooperation on security issues, including dramatic reductions in strategic nuclear weapons. We look forward to continuing our close consultations on these issues.

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NATO Press release (2001)170, 18 December 2001)

### **Final Communiqué - Ministerial Meeting of the Defence Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group held in Brussels on 18 December 2001**

1. The Defence Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization met in Ministerial Session in Brussels on 18 December 2001.

[...]

6. At our Nuclear Planning Group meeting, we reviewed the status of NATO's nuclear forces and addressed a number of related issues. Noting the fundamentally political purpose to preserve peace and prevent coercion and any kind of war, we reaffirmed the principles underpinning these forces as set out in the Alliance's Strategic Concept. Given new security challenges of an unprecedented nature, we have particular reason to reaffirm our complete trust in, and steadfast commitment to, the strength and validity of the transatlantic link in our Alliance, which guarantees equal security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. We emphasised again that nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO continue to provide an essential political and military link between the European and North American members of the Alliance.
7. We appreciated information by the United States Secretary of Defense on ongoing exchanges between the United States and the Russian Federation on a new strategic framework. We fully support developments that are designed to foster cooperation based on shared interests and to enhance strategic stability and non-proliferation cooperation. We welcome the results of President Bush's 13-14 November meetings with President Putin and expressed our expectation that the atmosphere of confidence and cooperation in matters of global security and strategic stability fully pervade the Alliance's relationship with Russia, including the exchanges on nuclear weapons issues.
8. Deterrence and defence along with arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation will continue to play a major role in the achievement of the Alliance's security objectives. We welcomed President Bush's decision to reduce over the next decade the number of U.S. operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons to between 1,700-2,200 and President Putin's statement that Russia intended to reduce its strategic nuclear weapons "in kind". We reaffirmed our determination to strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and to

contribute to the implementation of the conclusions of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. We continue to support the existing moratoria on nuclear testing.

9. In these times of heightened security awareness, we take pride in the outstanding safety and security record regarding NATO's nuclear weapons. We reaffirmed our standing commitment to the highest standards of safety and security of these weapons and emphasized, again, that NATO's nuclear weapons are safe and secure in every aspect.
10. We expressed great satisfaction with the encouraging progress in exchanges with the Russian Federation on nuclear weapons issues under the auspices of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, in particular on nuclear-related confidence and security building measures proposed by NATO. We agreed that a near-term focus of these discussions on nuclear weapons safety and security issues is in our mutual interest. Agreement by both sides on the value of these exchanges and on the desirability of meetings of nuclear experts is a constructive development towards improved transparency, predictability and growing mutual trust between NATO and Russia in this important field.

## **Proliferatie**







## **Proliferatie: Irak**

Washington Post

### **Annan urges Iraq to permit arms' inspectors return**

By Colum Lynch

Special to The Washington Post

Friday, March 8, 2002; Page A29

UNITED NATIONS, March 7 -- U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan appealed to Iraqi Foreign Minister Najji Sabri today to permit the return of U.N. weapons inspectors in a bid to avert a military confrontation between Iraq and the United States.

In his first direct talks with a representative of the Iraqi government since President Bush demanded the return of U.N. inspectors in November, Annan made it clear that Baghdad has no choice but to comply with U.N. resolutions requiring the elimination of its nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs, according to U.S. and U.N. officials. He also pressed Iraq to account for Kuwaitis who disappeared during the Persian Gulf War in 1991.

"I wouldn't want to see a widening conflict in the region," Annan said before beginning the discussions. "I would want to see a situation where we are able to solve our differences diplomatically and that Iraq comes into compliance."

While there was no indication that Iraq would agree to allow inspectors back in the country, U.N. diplomats said Sabri was more conciliatory than his predecessor, Mohammed Saeed Sahaf, who subjected Annan last year to a litany of Iraqi grievances. Annan agreed to a request by Sabri to resume the discussions next month, after the March 27-28 Arab League summit in Beirut.

Annan also made a commitment to assist in the search for Iraqi prisoners of war lost during the Gulf War. Iraq agreed to return some of the property it stole from Kuwait during its 1990 occupation of that country.

The Bush administration remains deeply skeptical about Iraq's intention to comply with the U.N. demands.

On the eve of today's talks, U.S. officials released evidence allegedly showing that Iraq has been converting dump trucks bought through a U.N. humanitarian program into military vehicles, in violation of U.N. sanctions.

"It was perfectly clear that Iraq is not ready to comply with U.N. resolutions," Ric Grenell, a spokesman for the U.S. mission to the United Nations, said after the meeting.

A statement issued by Annan's spokesman, Fred Eckhard, characterized the discussion as "frank and useful." Sabri described the meeting as "positive and constructive."

Eckhard said the "Iraqi side raised a number of specific concerns, such as lifting of sanctions, 'no-fly' zones and establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East."

Iraq says that it has already met its obligation to eliminate its banned weapons programs and that the Security Council is obliged to end the 11-year-old embargo. It also maintains that the United States and Britain have no legal grounds for conducting air strikes against Iraqi anti-aircraft batteries in their enforcement of the no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq.

Although Iraq continues to reject the legitimacy of U.N. inspectors, the Iraqi delegation listened to a briefing by Hans Blix, the organization's top weapons inspector, on the structure and goals of the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission. Blix sought to assure the Iraqis that the inspectors would be "impartial" and would not be used to spy on the Iraqi government, according to diplomats.

While Annan cited signs of "flexibility on the part of Iraq" before the talks began, U.N. diplomats said it is too soon to judge whether Iraq would be prepared to allow inspectors back into the country for the first time in three years.

"It's much too early to make a judgment on whether this is for real," said Jeremy Greenstock, Britain's ambassador to the United Nations. "But the fact that there seems to be a willingness to come back in mid-April indicates Iraq wants the process to continue. That could be good news."

Some analysts said Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's decision to send his envoy to today's talks was simply a ploy to buy time. "Saddam will keep the diplomatic track alive without having to do anything . . . and he'll continue to try to divide the Security Council," said Charles Duelfer, the former deputy chairman of the U.N. Special Commission, the precursor of Blix's commission. "He's going to wait and see if the United States is really serious about moving against the regime."

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Die Tageszeitung, 2 März 2002

### **Keine Gefahr für irgendjemand!"**

Der frühere UN-Waffeninspekteur Scott Ritter sieht keine Bedrohung durch den Irak. Das Land habe keine Massenvernichtungswaffen mehr

Taz: In der letzten Zeit gab es in Amerika immer mehr Bedenken wegen möglicher Massenvernichtungswaffen oder Anthrax-Programmen im Irak. Ist der Irak eine Bedrohung für die USA?

Scott Ritter: Nein. Wir sollten uns darüber Sorgen machen, und der beste Weg, diese Sorgen zu beseitigen, ist, die Waffeninspektoren zurück in den Irak zu bekommen, damit sie ihre Arbeit tun können. Aber eine Gefahr für die nationale Sicherheit der USA, die aus einer Erneuerung der Massenvernichtungswaffen resultiert, gibt es absolut nicht.

Taz: Der Irak verfügt also nicht über biologische Massenvernichtungswaffen?

Ritter: Sie verfügen nicht mehr über die Waffenprogramme, die es 1991 im Irak gab, die 1996 von den Waffeninspektoren zerstört wurden und 1998 endgültig als nicht mehr existierend bestätigt wurden. Wenn der Irak etwas wieder aufgebaut hat, seit die Waffeninspektoren 1998 den Irak verließen, wurde es von niemandem herausgefunden. Kein Informationsdienst konnte glaubwürdig belegen, dass der Irak die Waffenprogramme wieder aufbaut. Und das bedeutet: Wenn sie etwas entwickelt haben, dann ist das extrem klein. Das ist hypothetisch, wir wissen nicht einmal, ob sie diesen Weg gegangen sind. Wir wissen, dass wir die Fabriken zerstört haben, und ich sehe den Irak nicht als Bedrohung.

Taz: Die Entwaffnung des Irak war allerdings notwendig?

Ritter: Ja, denn wenn der Irak über Massenvernichtungswaffen verfügen würde, wäre er eine Bedrohung für die gesamte Welt. Aber wie ich schon sagte: Sie besitzen keine funktionierenden Massenvernichtungswaffen, sie können weder Nachbarstaaten, noch Europa, Asien, die USA oder irgendjemand anders bedrohen, es gibt keine Gefahr.

Taz: Aber Ihr Team konnte den Irak nie vollständig entwaffnen.

Das ist richtig, wir haben es nie geschafft, den Irak vollkommen zu entmilitarisieren. Wir erreichten ein Level von 90 bis 95 Prozent Abrüstung, was bedeutet, dass der Irak 5 bis 10 Prozent der verbotenen Waffen behalten hat. Es ist aber ein großer Unterschied, ob man den Abfall von alten Waffen besitzt oder tatsächlich funktionierende Programme erhält. Machen wir einen Vergleich: Angenommen, wir verbieten Autos und ihre Herstellung. Wir zerstören die Fabriken und die gesamte Produktionsfähigkeit, wir vernichten fast jedes Auto, das es gibt, und alle Autowerkstätten und Parkplätze. Aber der Irak behält illegal 100 Autos. Also suchen wir nach diesen Autos. Wir sind ziemlich gut und können 50 dieser Autos vernichten, aber der Irak hat noch immer 50 Autos. Jetzt finden wir die Reifen dieser Autos und dann die Türen. Wir finden alles außer den Kühlern, den Stoßstangen und den Blinkern. Hat der Irak alle Autos aufgegeben? Die Antwort ist nein. Sie haben noch Kühler, Stoßstangen und Blinker. Hat der Irak funktionierende Autos? Nein. So ist es auch mit den Massenvernichtungswaffen.

Taz: Nun ist es aber weit über drei Jahre her, dass der letzte UN-Waffeninspekteur auf irakischem Boden war. Ist es denn nicht möglich, dass der Irak in diesem Zeitraum neue Waffen entwickelt hat?

Ritter: Benutzen wir noch einmal den Autovergleich: Der Irak hat also noch Kühler, Stoßstangen und Blinker, die Fabriken haben wir aber zerstört. Können sie ein Auto aus einem Kühler, der Stoßstange und den Blinkern wachsen lassen? Nein. Sie müssen Fabriken bauen, sie brauchen die Ausrüstung zur Herstellung. Woher können sie das bekommen? Das ist nicht möglich! Und jeder, der etwas von Massenvernichtungswaffen versteht, weiß, dass es albern ist, zu denken, der Irak habe diese Fähigkeit in nur drei Jahren wieder aufgebaut. Es würde zehn Jahre dauern und Milliarden von Dollar

verbrauchen. Es ist absolut absurd, wenn man sagt: "Aber wir wissen nicht, was im Irak passiert." Ja, es ist richtig, wir wissen nicht, was passiert. Aber wir wissen, was man benötigt, um Massenvernichtungswaffen anzufertigen. Und der Irak hat diese Fähigkeit nicht.

Taz: Und das bedeutet, dass er keine Gefahr für Amerika ist?

Ritter: Keine Gefahr für irgendjemand!

Interview: Benjamin Mergelsberg