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## FACTS AND REPORTS

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Kernwapenzaken

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## COMMENTAAR

In mei vindt de vijfjaarlijkse toetsingsconferentie van het Non-Proliferatie Verdrag plaats in New York. De vorige toetsingsconferentie was in 2000, toen een slotdocument werd aangenomen waarin aangedrongen werd op een systematisch stappenplan (de zogenaamde 13 stappen) naar nucleaire ontwapening. Sindsdien is de wereld aanzienlijk onveiliger geworden. Naast de vanzelfsprekende gevaren verbonden aan het handhaven van immense nucleaire strijdkrachten (het gaat om duizenden kernkoppen die beheerd worden door acht kernwapenstaten: VS, Rusland, Verenigd Koninkrijk, Frankrijk, China, India, Pakistan en Israël) is er ook sprake van proliferatie – de verspreiding van militaire wapen technologie naar steeds meer staten, inclusief die die het NPV ondertekend hebben (alle landen behalve India, Pakistan en Israël). Wil het NPV in stand blijven, dan moeten beide pilaren van het verdrag – nucleaire ontwapening in overeenstemming met artikel VI, en de verhindering van proliferatie (art I en II) in gelijke mate aan de orde komen in New York. Het ziet er echter niet naar uit dat dit zal gebeuren.

Deze zorgen zijn doorgedrongen tot een aantal parlementen. In België, Duitsland, het Verenigd Koninkrijk, Australië en het Europees Parlement is het verdrag uitgebreid aan de orde gekomen. Het debat in het Verenigd Koninkrijk raakt aan de meeste relevante argumenten voor en tegen kernbewapening. In België werd eind april een verstrekkende oproep voor serieuze stappen naar nucleaire ontwapening aangenomen. Opvallend daarbij was een expliciete oproep voor de verwijdering van de Amerikaanse kernwapens van Belgische bodem (officieel wordt de aanwezigheid van deze kernwapens, in het kader van het NAVO nucleaire beleid, bevestigd noch ontkend). In Duitsland werd door de oppositionele liberale partij FDP eind april een resolutie ingebracht waarin de verwijdering van de Amerikaanse kernwapens geëist wordt. De SPD-Groenen regering wil deze stap echter niet nemen.

In Nederland vond op 26 april een debat over de toetsingsconferentie plaats, waarvan het verslag nog niet beschikbaar is. In de vorige F&R werden de Nederlandse ontwikkelingen bij elkaar gebracht.

Redactie Facts and Reports

# VERENIGD KONINKRIJK

## House of Lords

### **Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: UK Compliance**

Column WA157-WA158 – 21 February 2005

**Lord Judd** asked Her Majesty's Government:

What action they are taking together with other nuclear weapon states to honour their commitments under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to move towards disarmament and to undertake specific measures to fulfil those commitments. [HL1289]

**Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean:** The UK is committed to all its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), including under Article VI, and has a very good record on disarmament. We have reduced the total explosive power of our nuclear forces by over 70 per cent since the end of the Cold War and have a stockpile of less than 200 operationally available warheads. Only one Trident submarine is on deterrent patrol at any time. It is normally on several days notice to fire and its missiles are not targeted at any other state.

The Conference on Disarmament (CD) based at the United Nations in Geneva, is the designated permanent multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community. The priorities for nuclear disarmament were agreed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference: the negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty at the CD, which the UK actively supports, and signature and ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, which the UK ratified in 1998. We have also been conducting studies into the verification of nuclear disarmament and intend to publish a report on these studies as well as statements detailing progress on all the articles of the NPT at the NPT Review Conference in May.

**Lord Judd** asked Her Majesty's Government:

What arrangements they are making to reaffirm their previous commitments not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states. [HL1290]

**Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean:** The United Kingdom stand by the security assurances given to non-nuclear weapon states in our letter of 6 April 1995 to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and noted in Security Council Resolution 984 of that year. We reaffirmed these commitments at the Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2000 and intend to do so again at the review conference to be held in May 2005. The UK also stand by the security assurances we have given in the protocols we have ratified to nuclear weapon-free zone treaties.

**Lord Judd** asked Her Majesty's Government:

What action they are taking together with the United States, the Russian Federation, and other states to ensure that practical arrangements are in place to reduce the risk of accidental war, including a schedule for de-alerting their strategic nuclear weapons. [HL1291]

**Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean:** The UK have implemented a range of significant de-alerting measures. As announced in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review only one Trident submarine is on patrol at any one time, carrying a reduced load of 48 warheads and with a reduced state of alert. The submarine's missiles are not targeted and it will normally be at several days "notice to fire". A variety of procedural and technical means ensure that it is impossible for a single person to initiate the launch sequence for a UK nuclear weapon.

In their joint statement at the 2000 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the five recognised nuclear weapon states declared that none of their nuclear weapons is targeted at any state.

**Lord Judd** asked Her Majesty's Government:

What action they are taking to promote a pledge by the United Nations Security Council to take collective action in response to a nuclear attack or threat of nuclear attack on a non-nuclear weapon state. [HL1292]

**Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean:** The United Kingdom stand by the security assurances in our letter of 6 April 1995 to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and noted in Security Council Resolution 984 of that year. This reaffirmed the UK's intention, as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, to seek immediate Security Council action to provide assistance to non-nuclear weapon states party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty that are victims of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used. The United Kingdom would also be prepared to take appropriate measures in response to a request from the victim for technical, medical, scientific or humanitarian assistance. We reaffirmed these commitments at the Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2000 and intend to do so again at the review conference to be held in May 2005.

**Non-Proliferation Review**

Column 399WH-423WH – 8 March 2005

**Jeremy Corbyn (Islington, North)** (Lab): I welcome you to the Chair, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I also thank Mr. Speaker for selecting this issue for debate. The non-proliferation treaty review conference is due to be held in New York in May.

First, I should declare an interest. Before everyone gets too excited, I should say that I do not have shares in BAE Systems, Boeing or anything like that. I am, however, a lifetime member of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. I am also the chairman of the parliamentary group on CND, although it is not yet been declared an all-party group, and we are awaiting Tory Members to make up the numbers. Finally, I am a vice-chairman of CND and a member of its national council.

The issue could not be more important for the future of the world. Nuclear weapons have been a cloud over us all throughout my lifetime and the lifetimes of everybody in the Chamber, and that has been the case ever since the first bombs were exploded in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. Efforts were constantly made to obtain some degree of disarmament through controls, test bans and the various arguments that were put forward internationally. The non-proliferation treaty of 1970 was seen as an enormous step forward and a way to get us out of the dangers of a nuclear holocaust. The five declared nuclear weapons states—the United States, the then Soviet Union, Britain, France and China—all agreed to the treaty, which would do two things. First, it would prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear technology outside the five nuclear states. Secondly, those five states would, in the longer term, disarm. In other words, we would begin to see the end of nuclear weapons.

The conference this May is part of the five-yearly review process, and this debate is intended to allow hon. Members to express their views about it. Above all, however, the Minister will be able to tell us what stance the Government will take at the review conference and whether we shall see a development of the exciting statement that was made after the 2000 conference.

Before I go into that, however, we should reflect for a moment on the proliferation that has taken place since 1970. Several states now have nuclear weapons; some of them have a delivery capability, and many would have the ability to manufacture many more nuclear weapons if they were minded to do so. This year's conference is therefore not simply a five-yearly review: it is an important watershed. Are we to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons by following the two pillars of the 1970 treaty—disarmament by the five states plus disarmament by non-declared nuclear weapons states?

We should remember that one pariah state developed nuclear weapons and gave them up. Under apartheid, South Africa developed nuclear weapons, but with the end of apartheid and the installation of the African National Congress Government under Nelson Mandela, it renounced them and helped to make the continent of Africa nuclear-free. We should applaud South Africa for that and recognise that the moral stature that it enjoys in the world is the product not only of the end of apartheid, but of the fact that it is not threatening anybody.

**Tony Lloyd (Manchester, Central)** (Lab): May I ask my hon. Friend to make a similar point about Argentina? At one time, it had at the least plans to move towards nuclear weapons, but it gave them up because it realised that, rather than making Latin America more peaceful, nuclear weapons would massively destabilise relations with Brazil and, indeed, around the globe. So, Argentina also deserves some credit.

**Jeremy Corbyn** : Absolutely; that is a good point, which I endorse. Argentina, too, was developing a capability, although I do not think that it had got as far as South Africa. However, it gave up that capability.

Other states have been less promising in that respect. We know that Israel has developed nuclear weapons and that it has a delivery capability and an advanced missile system. We know that because Mordecai Vanunu had the courage to tell the truth about Israel's nuclear weapons and subsequently spent the best part of two decades in prison as a result. He is still under control orders in Jerusalem, which we hope will be lifted on 21 April. He will then be free to come to the House and tell us the truth about the nuclear threat in that region.

Of the other countries that have nuclear weapons, India and Pakistan are in negotiation about no first use and, I hope, possible long-term disarmament, although when President Musharraf addressed a meeting in the House, which I and many colleagues attended, I was not encouraged by his remarks about nuclear weapons. Given the poverty in India and Pakistan, it is unconscionable that either country would spend the resources that are required for developing a nuclear delivery system when they should be developing education, housing, health and all the necessary social developments in their countries.

Clearly, North Korea has developed nuclear weapons and, tragically, has withdrawn from the NPT system. I hope that the negotiations by all the countries involved will bring North Korea back. The Minister's colleague, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, my hon. Friend the Member for Harlow (Mr.

Rammell), is not here today, but he went to North Korea to engage in that discussion. I hope that his efforts will be redoubled, so that there is no prospect of another war breaking out on the Korean peninsula.

The issue of Iranian nuclear weapons is discussed loudly, principally by the Pentagon and others, although Mohamed el-Baradei, the United Nations weapons inspector, has made several visits to Iran and has confirmed that he thinks that it has ceased the development of enriched uranium that could lead to the development of weapons-grade material and that it is taking part in negotiations. I hope that, when the Minister replies, he can tell us that he supports that process, too, and that we will continue engagement with Iran to ensure that there is no development of nuclear weapons in the area, and that we will have no more of the bellicose statements from either President Bush or Secretary of State Rice in which they seem to be overtly threatening Iran. Surely enough life has already been lost in Iraq, without threatening Iran. Disarmament must be the order of the day.

Mohamed el-Baradei, the UN weapons inspector, made some interesting comments in the run-up to the NPT. He said:

"It is clear that recent events have placed the NPT and the regime supporting it under unprecedented stress, exposing some of its inherent limitations and pointing to areas that need to be adjusted".

He then proposed seven steps that would strengthen the NPT regime and, with it, world security. He said:

"Some of the needed fixes can be made in May, but only if governments are ready to act."

Those steps, which would not require amending the treaty, include a five-year moratorium on building new facilities for uranium enrichment, plutonium separation and materials that can be used for nuclear weapons production. He went on:

"There is no compelling reason for building more of these proliferation-sensitive facilities. The nuclear industry already has more than enough capacity to fuel its power plants and research facilities".

We should listen carefully to Mohamed el-Baradei because he has important things to say, more so because he was not listened to properly about Iran and has put a huge effort into Iraq and North Korea. He is a force for good in the world and a force for peace. He should be treated with the respect that he deserves.

Item 6 of the final document that was referred to at the 2000 conference states:

"An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under article VI."

That was a very welcome statement. The declaration put forward a series of proposals that included:

"Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally; increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities . . . reduction of **non**-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives . . . Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems; a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination",

and

"The engagement as soon as appropriate of all nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons."

Those are important items, and important to remember as we go to that conference, which will take place just a few weeks before the 60th anniversary of the explosion of the world's first nuclear weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945.

In some ways, the conference ought to be held in Hiroshima. Those who believe that nuclear weapons provide security, safety or a solution of any kind to the world's problems should think for a moment of all those who died in 1945, of all the resources that have been wasted since then on developing nuclear weapons and of those who continue to die from the cancerous fallout from those explosions or from nuclear tests that have taken place since 1945.

The British Government have to face up to some serious, very important questions; any British Government would have to. We are signatories to the 1970 treaty, therefore we should not be developing any new nuclear weapons. I understand that the Trident submarine system is coming to the end of its usable life. I should like to hear a declaration from the British Government that when that happens, the system will not be replaced and that we see it as our obligation under the 1970 treaty, to which we adhered, to get rid of our nuclear weapons at that stage.

Work is going on at Aldermaston on what I believe to be the preparatory development of a new generation of nuclear weapons. I should like to hear from the Government about that work, about what weapons are being developed and about the United States' participation in that process. We are required by the treaty to pursue a nuclear-free world, so are we developing a new generation of nuclear weapons and prepared to start the development of a new delivery system or are we going to play our part in nuclear arms reduction? It is all very well for us to lecture the rest of the world on the danger of nuclear proliferation and on how bad nuclear weapons are—it is a danger, and they are appalling—yet we ourselves are developing them and continuing to develop and hold them.

I recognise that the number of nuclear warheads has been reduced. However, I also recognise that under the NATO umbrella we have our own weapons that are theoretically independent of the United States. Under the NATO treaty

system, nuclear weapons are also held in **non**-declared countries such as Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany, because they are part of the NATO command structure. We need to be clear about how that fits with what we are trying to achieve.

I want others to take part in this debate, so I shall conclude by drawing attention to the preparatory work for this year's conference in New York, which gives us an enormous opportunity to move forward. There was a great deal of hope around after the 2000 conference. In his contribution to that conference, my right hon. Friend the Member for Neath (Mr. Hain), then a Foreign Office Minister, made it clear that he saw Britain as on the fast track towards disarmament and as playing our full part in that.

We have not heard such welcome statements from the Secretary of State for Defence or any Defence Ministers since 2001. Indeed, the Secretary of State for Defence indicated that there were circumstances in which he would be prepared to authorise the use of nuclear weapons by this country, ending the no first use policy. I hope that we will hear something clear to the effect that that is no longer the case and that we would not be prepared to use nuclear weapons under such circumstances. I also hope that, given all the insecurities that have existed in the world from September 2001 onwards—the wars in Afghanistan and in Iraq and all that has gone with them—we will ask ourselves the obvious question: what good are nuclear weapons in any of those circumstances? Do they not just threaten the destruction of this planet and eat up valuable resources that could be better used on something else, and should we not say that we intend to get rid of them? I hope that the British Government are prepared to take that step.

This subject has dominated the Labour party for a long time, and as we move towards the NPT conference and the possibility—I hope that it is only a possibility—of the development of a new generation of nuclear weapons, I suspect that it will become much more of a centre-stage political issue. It is up to this House to declare its views on the matter before the conference. I get the feeling that the majority of the public in this country have had enough of the losses brought about by the wars in which we have recently been involved, and have no stomach or wish for getting involved in preparation for the destruction of this planet, which is what nuclear weapons could bring about.

Many people have campaigned on the issue with great principle and verve for many years. Many have given up lives and careers to do so. Mordecai Vanunu is only one; many others, including Joseph Rotblat, have done a great deal. We should listen carefully to what they have to say, and use this opportunity to move in the direction of a more peaceful globe, not a world at war.

**Dr. Julian Lewis (New Forest, East) (Con):** It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Islington, North (Jeremy Corbyn), who, as he says, has had a lifelong commitment to the cause of the abolition of nuclear weapons. I have had almost as long a commitment to the cause of nuclear deterrence and this country's retention of nuclear weapons. We have debated the subject many times. Although it was styled as a debate on the nuclear non-proliferation treaty review conference, when I saw that he was fortunate enough to have obtained this debate—on which I congratulate him—I knew that I could rely on him to go into the broader issues of whether Britain, in particular, should continue to possess nuclear weapons. I hope to follow his example of not out-speaking my allotted time, so I shall straight away address some of his points.

The hon. Gentleman asked us to think about Hiroshima and all the lives that were lost, but one point that is often overlooked is that Hiroshima was probably the first ever example in the atomic age of a nuclear-free zone. The western allies faced the question of what they were going to do to end the war; the bloody campaign was scheduled to continue, and a full-scale invasion of Japan would have cost many more lives than the bombing of Hiroshima did. When that was being considered, what would the allies have had to think about if the Japanese held atomic weapons of their own? I am not saying that I would have wanted the Japanese to hold atomic weapons, but the fact is that when one side has atomic or nuclear weapons, it completely alters the situation if its actual or potential adversary possesses them too.

The hon. Gentleman referred to wars such as in Afghanistan, and others that are undoubtedly below the nuclear threshold. I can recall debating these matters with the CND 20 years ago, and in those days the argument was, "What on earth does Britain want nuclear weapons for? They didn't do us any good in the Falklands." My response now is what it was then: just because a given antidote to a particular deadly disease does not work against all sorts of other diseases, that is no good reason to throw it away. Nuclear weapons are not a deterrent to all forms of aggression, but the nuclear deterrent undoubtedly works against certain forms of aggression that exist when one country has weapons of mass destruction and another does not.

Let us consider the question of our treaty commitments under article 6 of the nuclear **non**-proliferation treaty. That is often said by unilateral nuclear disarmers to commit us to a nuclear-free world and to the abolition of our nuclear weapons. Well, yes it does, but only in a way that encompasses such ideal goals as the abolition of all weapons worldwide, and of war in particular. If there were a practical policy to which we could all sign up, and if we could all march up to the lectern and raise our hands and vote one thing out of existence, I am sure that we would all agree that war was top of the list. We would love to vote conflict out of existence, we would love to vote nuclear war out of existence and we would love to vote conventional war out of existence. However, if we cannot do it all at once, we have to ask ourselves whether we are making the world a safer or a more dangerous place by voting

one of those elements out of existence before the others. The case of those of us who have argued for 20 years or more in favour of the nuclear deterrent, is that in a world in which wars continue to happen, the abolition of nuclear weapons in the hands of the democracies and in those of worldwide society, would make the world a safer place for conventional warfare.

Let us return to the example of Hiroshima. Did the fact that nuclear weapons did not exist until 1945 make the world a safer place? Possibly, the 50 million people who were killed on both sides, including victims of the holocaust and other innocent civilians, would, if they but had a voice, disagree with the proposition. In reality, nuclear weapons can sometimes make the world more dangerous, and sometimes they can make it safer. Who would really argue now that in the situation that we faced for half a century—confrontation between the totalitarian Soviet bloc and the western democracies—the prescription of the CND should have been followed; the west and NATO should have abandoned the nuclear deterrent and left the Soviet Union with a monopoly of nuclear weapons? I remember the great debates about the deployment of Cruise and Pershing missiles, when it was said that we were five minutes from Armageddon, four minutes from Armageddon, a minute and a half from it or whatever time the nuclear clock was supposed to be ticking off; I remember all those apocalyptic statements. However, in the end what got rid of the nuclear weapons was multilateral negotiations, compounded by a change in the political system in the Soviet Union.

They say that all simple speeches should have a single main point, and I have come to the single main point of this one. That is that it is not the weapon systems per se that matter, it is the nature of the political systems of the countries that possess them.

Look what happened when we came to the end of the cold war. Did the Russians suddenly abolish all the nuclear weapons that we had been so fearful of for so many years? Of course they did not. But we suddenly stopped being anything like as fearful of them as we had been for such a long time. That was because Russia took great strides towards democracy. The only reason why subsequently—so long as Russia remains, as we hope that it will, on the democratic road—we are fearful of the Russian nuclear arsenal is the danger that those weapons could somehow leach out from Russian control into that of other societies and groups with no commitment to democratic principles. Then we would be concerned once again.

Therefore, the real answer to the question is not to ask, in some false egalitarian way, how we can lecture the dictatorships of the world that they should not have nuclear weapons when we keep our own. The answer is simple; I certainly do not have a problem with it. It is that they are dictatorships and we are a democracy. Nuclear weapons are good in the hands of democracies faced with dictatorships in the world; they are bad in the hands of dictatorships, as are other potential means of waging war. I have no difficulty at all in saying that Britain giving up nuclear weapons would not make a scrap of difference to whether a dictatorship continued to possess them. In those debates for so many years, I challenged again and again those who said that we should give up our nuclear weapons with the simple question: "Who are you saying would follow our example? Name a specific country." Nobody ever did.

**Tony Lloyd:** I am listening to the hon. Gentleman very carefully. Would he accept that, according to his logic—ignoring the issue of dictatorship and non-dictatorship because we are clear that North Korea is a dictatorship—it is highly unlikely that North Korea will invade the United States but it is not improbable that there could be circumstances in which the United States used military power against the North Koreans? Does the hon. Gentleman agree that his logic, alas, is that North Korea secures its future by developing a nuclear weapon? Would he advise the North Korean regime to pursue the nuclear option?

**Dr. Lewis:** I am afraid that the hon. Gentleman is falling into precisely the trap that, as I was saying, people who subscribe to his point of view continually fail to avoid. I do not need to advise North Korea. North Korea will do what it considers to be in its best interests. If it genuinely believes that it is at risk from being invaded by the United States, and if it has nuclear weapons, which apparently it has, nothing on earth—certainly no advice from the likes of me or, dare I say it, from him—will persuade it to abandon them.

I return briefly to what the non-proliferation treaty actually says. Article VI states:

"Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date".

Most people would say that we have done that. I do not believe that most people would say that we, at any rate, are involved in a nuclear arms race, given the reductions that have been made. The article continues:

"and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."

The article therefore commits us to a disarmed world in the same breath as it commits us to a nuclear disarmed world. I long for the day when we have worldwide disarmament of every sort, because that will imply that there has been a revolution in the minds of man and that we no longer want to kill each other when we have the chance. Unfortunately, as we know from our own history and from present-day conflicts, the minds of man have not undergone that revolution. Until they do, people who do not want to be killed will have to defend themselves and deter attack.

**Jeremy Corbyn:** The hon. Gentleman is describing an appalling prospect for the human race. Does he believe, however, that some people learn to live in peace and harmony with each other, that not everyone around the world kills each other, and that most countries have survived perfectly well without nuclear weapons?

**Dr. Lewis:** Absolutely. I would even go so far as to say that most people subscribe to those views. Unfortunately, we have a perfect analogy in crime, particularly murder, in our own society. Most people in civilised societies do not approve of crime, and certainly do not approve of murder. However, the reality is that if enough people in domestic society are willing to commit murder, then domestic society must be able to prevent it, deter it, and if necessary, punish it. The same applies in international society.

In conclusion, Iran and Iraq were mentioned. It is too early to say what the final outcome will be of the war in Iraq, which I supported before, during and after it was carried out, but the signs are that for all the criticisms that were made of President Bush and for all the dire predictions of the impossibility of bringing any form of democracy to the middle east, the effect of those elections in Iraq is already beginning to resonate throughout the other countries of the middle east.

Progress of a sort has recently been made in the Lebanon, which I doubt we would have seen had it not been for recent events, particularly the successful elections, in Iraq. I believe that there is hope for the world of surviving the nuclear threat. That hope does not depend on making the mistakes that were made way back in the 1930s when people wrongly believed that aerial bombardment would destroy civilisation, and were therefore determined to limit the weapons and, in a sense, abolish the war. They limited the weapons, but they did not abolish the war. Instead, they brought it about. The way to limit the threat of nuclear weapons is to promote the spread of democracy. If democracy spreads, the nuclear problem will take care of itself.

**Dr. Gavin Strang (Edinburgh, East and Musselburgh) (Lab):** We all agree that we are discussing an important subject, and I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, North (Jeremy Corbyn) on initiating this debate. As he reminded us, the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons—the NPT—came into operation in 1970. The hon. Member for New Forest, East (Dr. Lewis) also referred to the treaty, which originated during the cold war. Looking around, I see other colleagues who took part in similar debates during that period; some of us had most of our adult political lives during the cold war.

I wish to make a simple point, which is not intended to be a response to the previous speaker. At the time when the SS20s and the cruise missiles were being deployed, we were justified in being very worried that there might be a nuclear exchange. It might first occur at the theatre level, but most of us were convinced that, if such a nuclear exchange occurred in Europe, it could quickly escalate to a major all-out nuclear attack. Of course, that would have been Armageddon; the survivors really would have envied the dead. It is worth acknowledging that we are now free of that threat, which is a tremendous advance. Whatever the problems facing us—I shall refer to them shortly—the fact is that that threat and fear is behind us, because the cold war is over.

New problems have arisen since the end of the cold war. Recently, there was the 9/11 attack in the United States of America in 2001. As a result, there has been a huge focus on the need to counteract international terrorism. Our Government and other western Governments, including that of the US, have certainly taken such a focus. Furthermore, this week is the first anniversary of the Madrid train bombing. I shall not be drawn into some of the arguments advanced by the hon. Member for New Forest, East, but I point out that there is an issue in relation to the possibility of a terrorist organisation eventually getting its hands on weapons of mass destruction; in the long term, there must a risk of al-Qaeda or another such organisation getting hold of a dirty nuclear bomb. In that context, I simply wish to make reference to the proliferation security initiative, which is intended to interdict the movement of WMD-related materials. Importantly, the group of 11 states involved includes the United States, France and the United Kingdom.

I was quickly going to list some of the pluses and minuses of the period since the NPT came into operation, and particularly the '90s and beyond. My hon. Friend the Member for Islington, North covered some of them, and I shall not repeat what he said, but I was glad that he referred to the achievement of the African National Congress in South Africa; we should always acknowledge that that incoming Government made a tremendous decision.

It is not all gloom; we also have the strategic arms reduction treaties, START 1 and START 2. It is fair to say that START 2 has not yet fully delivered. Instead of START 3, we have the strategic offensive reduction treaty or SORT, on which I know that some Members might wish to comment, because in several respects it does not offer as much as we would have liked. The particular treaty I wish to highlight is the comprehensive test ban treaty or CTBT, which the United Nations General Assembly adopted in 1996 and which France, Russia and the UK have ratified. That is important, because the five official nuclear states must ratify it before it comes into operation. It has not yet come into operation because neither China nor the US has ratified it, but it is an important treaty, and I hope that it will come into force.

My hon. Friend referred to the minuses. There are lots of them; not least, they include the fact that the five official nuclear states—those that existed when the NPT was established—have been joined by what they official call nuclear-capable states: Israel, India and Pakistan. In the context of Pakistan, there was the worrying revelation that AQ Khan, who was a senior scientist and manager of the Pakistani nuclear programme, was part of a network that



was involved in selling nuclear weapon know-how and materials to other countries. It is a negative development when any new country develops nuclear weapons, and it is a positive development when any country gives up nuclear weapons, as South Africa did. I could touch on Iran and North Korea, as my hon. Friend did, but I will move on, because I know that some of my colleagues want to take part in the debate.

Given the run-up to the last two NPT conferences in 1995 and 2000, I think that there is a feeling in many countries, which is shared by many people, that the world has not delivered sufficiently and that nuclear weapon states in particular have not delivered enough. The treaty was a bargain struck in 1970 between nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states that nuclear weapon states would be allowed to keep nuclear weapons on the basis that they would get rid of them and help non-nuclear weapon states to develop nuclear power peacefully.

As a reflection of many non-nuclear countries' frustration with the lack of progress, the new agenda coalition of eight states was set up in the 1990s. That was an important development, as the coalition is a positive force for nuclear disarmament. In 1999, at the General Assembly of the UN, it called on nuclear weapon states to "make an unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the speedy and total elimination of their nuclear arsenals and to engage without delay in an accelerated process of negotiations, thus achieving nuclear disarmament to which they are committed under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons".

That resolution was carried by 111 votes to 13, with 39 abstentions.

The new agenda coalition has called for the negotiation of a general convention banning all nuclear weapons, using the model of the 1983 chemical weapons convention. As hon. Members recognise, there is currently an implicit understanding that France, the UK and China will be let off the hook a bit until the US and Russia further reduce their arsenals. Much as we want those arsenals to be reduced, we may well have to consider other ways in which to get better responses from nuclear weapon states and to have more impact on the situation.

I look forward very much to hearing what my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary has to say. I have no doubts about his personal commitment to ensuring that the British Government do their best to achieve progress. Indeed, I think that we all recognise that the present Government have made some progress. The British permanent representative to the UN conference on disarmament, which is the main disarmament body and is based in Geneva, set out some of the things done in the preparatory committee for the fourth conference last year. I am sure that my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary will add to what he said, but I point out that the UK has provided working support for a fissile material cut-off treaty, which would be an important advance if we could achieve it.

We have a long way to go. My hon. Friend the Member for Islington, North has a long-standing, consistent interest in this matter, and there is a general consensus on the Government side, even if it does not extend to the other side of the House, that we need to give this matter high priority and that more needs to be achieved, not least at the conference. It is remarkable that the 1995 and 2000 conferences came out quite well in the end, although there was a lot of pessimism in the preceding years. The same might happen with the next conference; I certainly hope that it will be successful, but as important, if not more so, is what happens afterwards.

**Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. John McWilliam):** Before I call the hon. Member for Aberdeen, North (Mr. Savidge), it might be for the convenience of the Chamber for me to indicate my intentions. If there is a Division in the main Chamber, I will suspend the sitting for 15 minutes.

**Mr. Malcolm Savidge (Aberdeen, North) (Lab):** I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, North (Jeremy Corbyn) on securing the debate, on his thought-provoking speech and on the work that he has done over many years in raising this highly important issue.

There is common agreement that the British Government are right to want to use their presidency of the G8 and the European Union to tackle two of the great world problems: climate change and global poverty. However, it could be said that proliferation is possibly an even more crucial issue facing us this year. The recent report of the UN high-level panel warned us that

"We are approaching a point at which the erosion of the non-proliferation regime could become irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation."

It said that—despite the fact that, in some ways, one could say that until now the non-proliferation regime has been remarkably successful at limiting proliferation. Indeed, ironically, the invasion of Iraq showed that the nuclear non-proliferation treaty plus containment diplomacy were much more successful than most of us had expected. Iraq had probably abandoned its nuclear weapons programme and abolished its weapons of mass destruction by the mid-1990s.

Some apologists for that war claim that it has been successful in putting pressure on countries such as Libya. I find that a difficult argument to follow, because I think that Libya was already showing signs of constructive engagement since the negotiations on Lockerbie. It could at least as easily be argued that countries such as North Korea and Iran might see the risk of a US invasion as a reason for wanting to develop a nuclear deterrent.

Iran and North Korea reflect one of the weaknesses of the existing treaty. First, the treaty assumed that civil nuclear production and military nuclear production can be separated. In practice, there is an increasing possibility of dual use. The same centrifuges that are used to enrich material up to civil nuclear use might further be used to achieve the enrichment to weapons-grade material. That is so even when one is applying the additional protocol. As my

right hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh, East and Musselburgh (Dr. Strang) said, Iran and Libya also illustrate the tremendous danger that was represented by the A.Q. Khan network and the possibility of nuclear weapons coming from a nuclear black market and their being used not only by states but by terrorists.

The second great weakness in the treaty is the situation of the de facto nuclear weapons states—India and Pakistan, and particularly Israel, because it is a catalyst to proliferation in the middle east.

In the eyes of many countries, the third great weakness has been the position of the nuclear weapons states. There has been a perceived lack of commitment on their part to pursuing nuclear disarmament and particular concern about the position of the Bush Administration. One must have considerable sympathy for the leaders of the new agenda coalition states when they said that the Bush Administration seem to be treating the treaty more as if it were an à la carte menu from which they could pick the bits that they liked than a proper international treaty.

The review conference of 2000 was a considerable success, not least because Britain played a very constructive role in bringing together some of the nuclear weapons states and the non-nuclear weapons states. There was an action plan, which contained 13 steps. Various people are to blame, but I must say that the Bush Administration are particularly to blame for having virtually discarded that. They have abolished the anti-ballistic missile treaty and are refusing to make any progress towards the comprehensive test ban treaty. They share blame with China for the fact that the production of fissile materials ban has been stalled in arguments over the possibility of weapons in space. The Moscow treaty is widely perceived as not doing nearly enough to produce irreversible and verifiable reductions in nuclear weapons.

Then, of course, there is the worrying talk about producing new nuclear weapons systems, including ones that would make nuclear weapons more usable, thus breaking the nuclear taboo that has been common to all states for several decades. There is also talk of breaking the negative security assurances that we give to **non**-nuclear weapons states. That is also worrying, because it gives the impression that there is something arbitrary and capricious about the way in which the Administration regard not only bits of the treaty but the designating of states as to whether or not they are entitled to nuclear weapons. We need not an arbitrary but a fair system of international rule of law by treaty if we are to build a stable world.

**Mr. Andy Reed (Loughborough)** (Lab/Co-op): My hon. Friend speaks eloquently and with a great deal of knowledge on the subject. He has come to the crux of the problem. Even the Government's strategic defence review of 2004 discussed ending nuclear weapons. They have said that if it is possible "to include British nuclear weapons in any negotiations, without endangering our security interests, we shall do so."

Part of the problem is that, despite the fine words said in 1995 and 2000—and possibly again in 2005—the crux is the enforcement and the signals sent out to countries in between those words. What does my hon. Friend propose that we can do to ensure that many of the things that he has talked about are put into place on the ground between the conferences, rather than just having the fine words every five years?

**Mr. Savidge**: I will answer that later on. There are one or two proposals that I would like to touch on and I am conscious of the time.

**Mr. Deputy Speaker**: Order. The hon. Gentleman said later on. The Member raising the debate ought to have an opportunity to hear a proper reply from the Minister. I have no power to impose time limits, but a couple of Members are trying to catch my eye before the winding-up speeches. Would the hon. Gentleman bear that in mind when he thinks about later on?

**Mr. Savidge** : I will try to do that.

Obviously, there have been some hopes that the Bush second term might prove to be slightly more conciliatory. I have to say that the announcement yesterday of the appointment of John Bolton, who could be described as one of the most virulent and outspoken opponents of arms control and the United Nations, as the US ambassador to the United Nations bodes very ill for the future of the treaty and of the planet.

The UK needs to play a constructive role, as we did in the previous review. Some states will obviously go to the conference purely to try to be disruptive by criticising the United States. The United States needs to be persuaded to be more flexible. We have to oppose absolutely any suggestion by the US that the agreements of 1995 and 2000 can be regarded as history. Allowing a new Administration of any state to ignore everything that that state has agreed in the past breaks down not only the NPT but the whole basis of international law. We must try to reinforce the NPT and the previous agreements of 1995 and 2000 and try to preserve as many of the 13 steps as possible.

Many positive proposals have been put forward by Dr. el-Baradei, as mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, North, by some of the NGOs and by various of the states, such as the new agenda coalition. We will not make much progress on the CBTB, but we should at least try to get agreement to maintain a moratorium on testing. We should try to get the fissile material ban through and agree to Dr. el-Baradei's proposal to try to modify reactors to reduce the flow of production of weapons-grade material. We need to strengthen the additional protocol, bring in the de facto states and take firm action with states that withdraw from the NPT.

The nuclear weapons states must abandon the idea of new nuclear weapons programmes. We must make some proper progress towards nuclear disarmament by strengthening treaties such as the Moscow treaty or going well beyond them. Other countries should listen positively to what Britain has done in de-alerting nuclear weapons. It is

absurd that so long after the end of the cold war we should have nuclear weapons on a hair-trigger. We need to develop the work that Britain is doing to improve verification, reduce the role of nuclear weapons in strategic thinking, strengthen the negative security assurances and the International Atomic Energy Agency, and try to extend nuclear-free zones, which now cover most of the Southern Hemisphere.

In 2000, Britain played a positive role in bringing the states together. I hope that in 2005—a far more difficult and dangerous time—we can also act as a bridge between the different states. The stakes could not be higher. If the NPT breaks down and there is proliferation and nuclear arms racing, we could face not only nuclear terrorism in future decades or centuries, but regional nuclear war or even major nuclear war, which, in a worst-case scenario, could endanger the very survival of the human species.

**Tony Lloyd (Manchester, Central) (Lab):** I also congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, North (Jeremy Corbyn) on securing this debate. The hon. Member for New Forest, East (Dr. Lewis) took up the almost classical position, but—I hope that he will forgive me for saying this—the world has moved a little on since the days of the cold war.

**Jeremy Corbyn :** Not in New Forest, East.

**Tony Lloyd :** I am told that New Forest, East has not moved on since it was founded by William the Conqueror. That gives it its own charm, but does not bring it into the 21st century.

There are important reasons why we should debate the issue, not simply—and rightly—because of the run-up to the review conference this year. As my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, North pointed out, during the next Parliament this country will probably have to consider its future as a nuclear power. I do not think that my hon. Friend the Minister will tell us on this occasion what decisions are being prepared. However, it is important in considering such matters to recognise that the world is moving to higher levels of security, or insecurity. Currently, there is a strong thesis that suggests that the proliferators are in the ascendancy and that those who argue against proliferation are losing the battle.

It is worth restating the fact that one of the commitments of the nuclear states under the NPT was to de-escalate tensions, and seek more stability and security. Over the past few years Britain has played a part in that and, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh, East and Musselburgh (Dr. Strang) said, in some respects we have made real progress. However, it would be difficult to argue that the collective world of **non**-nuclear powers has been given the signal that the nuclear powers have been keen to move forward.

For example, one of the major drivers in the near future might be serious movements by the United States to adopt its strategic defence initiative. That programme could be a vehicle for vertical proliferation, by which I mean that it could encourage existing nuclear states to upgrade their nuclear stocks. I do not speak for or against China, but it is the obvious example. China's nuclear doctrine has always included the capacity to do serious damage to a number of north American cities in the event of nuclear attack by the United States. There are enough deterrents in place, but if the Chinese felt that they could no longer achieve that, the obvious answer would be to increase massively the number of decoy missiles and the number of active warheads available. The knock-on effect of that on China's neighbours, principally India, could be profound. India may choose to respond; and if it did, Pakistan would up the ante, and so on. Proliferation will take place among the nuclear states if we do not actively seek to de-escalate.

We face real and different dangers nowadays—that is the flaw in the cold war logic. My hon. Friends referred to A.Q. Khan as driving proliferation. As we know, that proliferation has extended to other non-nuclear states, as has by now been well demonstrated. The problem is not just unfortunate: it is a serious flaw in the mutually assured destruction canon and means that there are now states that have been drawn, by their internal logic, into that proliferation agenda. We know, for example, that if Iran were to move along the road towards nuclear weapons, it would have a profound effect on its neighbours. Israel, as a nuclear weapons state in any case, might want to respond in some way—not, it is to be hoped, militarily, but in any case by increasing security.

However, those two drivers might have an impact on countries such as Turkey, with the prospect, perhaps, of a country such as Turkey or Saudi Arabia seeking nuclear weapons. The idea of a country with the political instability of the present Saudi Arabia becoming a nuclear weapons state is not the cheery matter that the hon. Member for New Forest, East would have us believe; it would be incredibly destabilising for the whole of the middle east. There is a real question about a Saudi Government in the future perhaps being replaced by what the hon. Gentleman himself described as non-democrats. Nuclear weapons would be catastrophic in those hands, and we should realise that.

The other big difference that is now apparent is proliferation not just to previously non-nuclear states but to non-state actors—terrorists. That is the real challenge for us all, because the most likely driver for that process is the Soviet legacy of nuclear stocks in Russia. In addition to that, there is capacity in the furtive world of nuclear proliferation for sideways leakage in a way that, from the point of view of a proliferating Government, may seem orderly—missiles in North Korea or, in the past, nuclear technology in Pakistan. It may leak into the hands of organisations such as al-Qaeda. That is a phenomenally dangerous prospect for the world, so there are strong and cogent reasons, in a situation as potentially unstable as the present, to re-examine our nuclear doctrines—our nuclear theologies, so to speak—and bring them forward into the 21st century. Britain can play a key role in that

context and has done so at critical points in the past. The Government, with a genuine commitment to seeking more stable levels of security, may not be prepared to take the great leaps that were argued for in the past. Perhaps we are living in an era in which it would be sensible to take incremental steps forward. However, Britain could take the lead in arguing for those incremental steps, which could make the world considerably safer.

Part of what I am talking about might involve, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh, East and Musselburgh mentioned, the fissile material cut-off treaty. It would be very significant if we could make progress with that. It would be very significant if the United States and China could make progress on the test ban treaty. A big flaw in the existing NPT structure, although it is very difficult to reorganise, is the role to be assigned to the nuclear states that are outside the treaty provision—India, Pakistan and Israel. It is far more sensible for them to be brought into the framework so that they can play a constructive rather than destructive role.

I hope that the Government will consider—it is vital in the context not just of Iran but of proliferation around the world—that it would not be ridiculous to give Iran some military guarantees against attack. Those need not be military guarantees for all circumstances, but guarantees against attack, and particularly nuclear attack. It would not be unreasonable to tell the Iranians that we recognise that, with two nuclear near-neighbours, the world could give some guarantees.

Whether the Iranians would believe the guarantees would always be a matter for negotiation, but there are practical steps that a well-disposed British Government, which I believe we have, could take part in to move us away from the current increasing insecurity of the planet, and towards increasing security. There will not, perhaps, be the great romance of the clashes of the days of the cold war, but instead a rather miserable future for parts of the world, if not the world, if we allow nuclear proliferators to proceed not just with proliferation of nuclear weapons but with their use. There could be a much better world if we moved the agenda towards greater stability.

**Mr. Deputy Speaker:** I remind hon. Members that the Minister needs a decent chance to reply. There is half an hour, and there will be a Division shortly, but the time will be added on.

**Mr. Michael Moore (Tweeddale, Ettrick and Lauderdale) (LD):** I congratulate the hon. Member for Islington, North (Jeremy Corbyn) on securing the debate.

The exchanges during the opening contributions lifted the debate on to a philosophical plain, although the picture painted by the hon. Member for New Forest, East (Dr. Lewis) was rather depressing. I hope that his analysis is wrong. He might be in danger of drawing the wrong conclusions from the recent Iraq war and its effects on democracy in the middle east. I do not intend to get drawn into that issue, as I would be out of order; perhaps we shall debate it on another occasion.

The non-proliferation treaty is the cornerstone of efforts to rid the world of the dangers of nuclear weapons. In the 1990s, there was a great deal of confidence that substantial progress was being made in eliminating the threats of nuclear war, but the growth of international terrorism and the exposure of the international nuclear bazaar run by A.Q. Khan dented that optimism somewhat and shook any complacency out of the system.

The review conference comes at a crucial time; not only has the context of nuclear weapons discussions changed, but the activities of key states such as North Korea and Iran are giving us cause for concern. It would be inappropriate for us to ignore some of the important steps in nuclear disarmament that have been taken in recent years. The UK Government deserve continued recognition for the serious steps that have been taken: the withdrawal of the RAF's freefall nuclear weapon; the reduction to a single nuclear weapons delivery system in Trident; and a 70 per cent. overall reduction in the explosive power of the UK's military capabilities. The Government also signed up to the comprehensive test ban treaty in 1998, and they have undoubtedly played a significant and leading role in international diplomacy, not least in their work with France and Germany in relation to Iran.

Elsewhere, as others have said, South Africa renounced its illegal nuclear weapons programme, setting an important precedent a decade ago, and Libya's more recent disposal of its capability was a welcome step forward. Against those welcome developments, there are some real difficulties to consider. At the heart of the NPT is the tension between the five nuclear weapons states that wish to prevent proliferation in other states and, increasingly, non-state actors and the remaining 184 signatories that are willing to thole being outside the club on the understanding that real disarmament among the five will proceed.

Previous review conferences have experienced all the difficulties associated with that basic problem. In 2000, the conference eventually made some progress with the agreement to the so-called 13 steps. That highlighted, among other things, the need to bring the comprehensive test ban treaty into force, preserve the anti-ballistic missile treaty and adopt new verification procedures. The United States of America has rejected the first of those propositions and has withdrawn from the second, and we still await details of how the verification capabilities are to be enhanced. Meanwhile, states such as India, Pakistan and Israel continue to be weapons capable and are showing few signs of volunteering their systems for disarmament. North Korea taunts the world about its intentions, and Iran is engaged in a dangerous game of bluff.

Whatever historical perspective is taken on the possession and usefulness, or otherwise, of nuclear weapons, there can be no escape from the central deal at the heart of the NPT. The **non-weapon** states will allow the five nuclear

states to possess their weapons on the basis of article VI, which demands the cessation of the arms race at an early date, and of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. Alongside that central issue are the security concerns, legitimate or otherwise, real or imagined, of those who possess or aspire to possess nuclear weapons; allusion has already been made to Iran. Equally, the nuclear weapon states themselves and others have a common interest in enhancing the verification procedures in order to ensure that non-state actors, as the jargon has them—international terrorists, as we might fear them—do not gain access to the technology and capability. The existence of AQ Khan's network suggests that we might be a bit off the pace, and real progress is needed on all sides at the conference to help us all catch up.

I hope that the Minister will tell us what he believes are the main features on the agenda at the conference. There is no doubt that we need to see some progress on the CTBT. We also need to see whether there is any prospect of a fissile material cut-off treaty. The welcome nuclear arms reductions of the early 1990s have been mentioned, and we need to ensure that they continue.

We must also recognise that the anti-proliferation efforts of the United States and others will gain enhanced credibility if those countries are seen to participate in the whole nuclear disarmament process and not just in the bits that concern them most.

**Dr. Lewis:** Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

**Mr. Moore:** If the hon. Gentleman would not mind, I would like to conclude my comments.

Alongside those issues, some serious institutional matters must be addressed; we see them day in, day out in the international press. The most important point, however, is surely that the political will exists to ensure that the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency and others are not undermined.

I have always believed in multilateral nuclear disarmament and I retain that view very strongly. My concern is growing, however, that the process is stalled. Without further progress on disarmament, we shall not only fail to achieve the ultimate objective of a nuclear-free world, but increase the risks of proliferation and fail to equip ourselves to verify the state of nuclear capabilities throughout the world. As a nuclear weapons state, this country bears a particular responsibility and must take a lead at the conference in re-establishing some momentum in the disarmament process. The stakes have rarely been higher.

**Mr. Mark Simmonds (Boston and Skegness) (Con):** I fear that my remarks will be interrupted by the Division bell, but before they are, let me join others in congratulating the hon. Member for Islington, North (Jeremy Corbyn) on securing the debate. He has been a doughty, consistent and passionate advocate of unilateral nuclear disarmament, although I, like my hon. Friend the Member for New Forest, East (Dr. Lewis), would be just as passionate in disagreeing with his perspective. None the less, he has maintained a level of consistency of which he should be proud.

Given the Government's commitment to non-proliferation and the current active negotiations with Iran, which the Foreign Secretary is taking up with his German and French counterparts, the UK's participation in the review conference should be significant. The review is a real opportunity to test parties' commitment to the three pillars of the NPT—non-proliferation, disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

The geopolitical climate has changed immeasurably since the last review in 2000. We have seen the horrific events of 11 September in New York and the rise of international terrorism. We have seen the case for war in Iraq based on inaccurate intelligence about weapons of mass destruction. North Korea has withdrawn from the NPT and recently withdrawn from multilateral talks, subsequently claiming that it already has nuclear weapons. Iran appears to be misleading the IAEA and the international community over its apparently peaceful nuclear programme. Such events have underlined the importance of the non-proliferation treaty and of the IAEA continuing to work towards preventing nuclear proliferation and reducing nuclear arms throughout the world.

Unlike several hon. Members in the Chamber, Conservative Members are not anti-nuclear, and I recognise the many benefits that nuclear technology has given the world because of its ability to create large amounts of relatively clean energy. Like my hon. Friend the Member for New Forest, East, I recognise that nuclear weapons played an important strategic role during the cold war years. The mutual threat between the two relatively rational adversaries ensured that nuclear weapons were never used. The non-proliferation treaty has subsequently played an important role in gradually downsizing our nuclear arsenals and preventing other countries from building new weapons through the strategic arms reduction treaties and, more recently, the strategic offensive reductions treaty. Indeed, that fact was recognised by the hon. Member for Islington, North and the right hon. Member for Edinburgh, East and Musselburgh (Dr. Strang).

The hon. Member for Islington, North was right to say that countries without nuclear weapons have been concerned for some time that nuclear powers are not progressing under article VI to reduce nuclear arsenals, and that there is a resistance to disarmament, despite disarmament being a stated objective of the treaty. I am sure that some hon. Members in the Chamber today would argue that that is not so. Indeed, the United States, the Soviet Union and more recently Russia have worked very hard through various treaties to reduce their nuclear warheads to secure a satisfactory resolution of at least part of article VI of the original treaty.

We accept that, in a utopia, the globe would be free of nuclear weapons, but proliferation must be controlled, and reductions through bilateral treaties between the United States and Russia must continue before the UK commences disarmament discussions. That must happen only when the Government of whichever political party are convinced that our national security will not be undermined.

Unfortunately, the debate must take place against a threat posed by nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction that may be greater now than it has been for some considerable time. I was intrigued by the comments made by the hon. Member for Manchester, Central (Tony Lloyd), who seemed to be arguing that the world is now a safer place than it was during the cold war.

**Tony Lloyd** *indicated dissent.*

**Mr. Simmonds:** He is shaking his head, which I am pleased to see.

The danger came with the break-up of the Soviet Union and the transfer of nuclear technology and fissile materials. Rogue states and non-state actors—terrorists—can now obtain nuclear technology and fissile materials with the intention of holding the world to ransom.

Sadly, rogue states and non-state parties are not the only ones who pose a problem. Unfortunately, as has already been mentioned, India, Pakistan and Israel refuse to join the NPT, which has led to many difficulties in enforcing the regime. Israel's status as the only nuclear power in the middle east prevents that most dangerous area of the world from becoming a nuclear-free zone. Thankfully, the India-Pakistan situation appears to have stabilised in recent years, but there is always the possibility of a crisis developing. I want all three states to be encouraged to join the NPT to help them to join the international community in this area.

Furthermore, the activities of the Pakistani scientist Qadir Khan show that Pakistan's refusal to comply with the wider implications of the treaty has created a significant problem, which became clear when Libya's decision to dismantle the nuclear programme revealed a clandestine market in nuclear material. Although some states have refused to sign the NPT altogether, other states— Iran and North Korea are the two most obvious ones—used it as a cover for the development of nuclear weapons.

Although all signatories of the NPT are entitled to use nuclear fuel for peaceful purposes, Iran's huge wealth of natural resources makes its large-scale nuclear programme cause for concern. Despite what the hon. Member for Islington, North says, Iran has continued to mislead the IAEA over its acquisition of centrifuge technology and enrichment, which, with modern-day technology, is not necessary for the pursuance of domestic nuclear capabilities. It also refused to allow nuclear inspectors to visit parts of a key military complex at Parchin only 10 days ago.

North Korea is another country that has flouted the NPT—indeed, it has withdrawn from it—since the previous review meeting. The hon. Member for Aberdeen, North (Mr. Savidge) argued that the North Koreans have acquired a nuclear capability because of the threat of an invasion by the United States. I argue that that is not the case, evidenced by the fact that, again following Libya's welcome disarmament, it was clear that North Korea sold uranium hexafluoride to Libya for the enrichment of nuclear weapons.

**Mr. Savidge:** I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving way in a very interesting speech. I did not suggest for a minute that that was North Korea's sole purpose for acquiring a nuclear capability; I said that that might be an influence on such states.

**Mr. Simmonds:** I am grateful for that clarification.

There are two main problems with North Korea. First, it is creating regional instability. The Minister will know of the domestic debate in Japan that questions whether it is right that Japan should be the only major power without nuclear weapons when North Korea has gone nuclear and South Korea wants to go nuclear. That political situation in Japan is causing great consternation. Secondly, rogue states with nuclear weapons and fissile material may provide nuclear weapons on the black market to non-state actors who could create dirty bombs and mayhem in many towns and cities throughout the world.

Clearly, some distinct factors need to be resolved at the review conference, which is to take place in May. The NPT needs to be strengthened to prevent the spread of technology and knowledge. Steps must be taken to secure military and civilian nuclear materials and technology in every country, including Britain, in order to avoid materials going missing. That is particularly appropriate for the ex-Soviet states.

A number of key areas need to be discussed and decisions must be taken. There is the issue of the comprehensive test ban treaty; can the Minister update us on his view of the position of the United States and China? There is the ban on the production of fissile material. Does that relate just to existing stockpiles, or only to future production? That subject was mentioned by the hon. Member for Aberdeen, North. Countries that withdraw from the NPT should immediately be referred to the United Nations Security Council.

Nuclear suppliers should consider limiting the supply of enrichment and reprocessing plants to those states that already possess them. We should discuss creating a special committee of the International Atomic Energy Agency board of governors that would focus intensively on safeguards to ensure that nations comply with their international obligations. We should consider allowing only those states that have signed the additional protocols to import civilian nuclear programmes.

We should discuss raising inspection programmes for additional protocols. Many states have signed up to the additional protocols, but have not yet ratified them. That includes significant players, such as Russia, Iran, Uganda, Niger and Mexico. It is clear that the technology for proliferating resistant nuclear energy systems exists. Enrichment and reprocessing are not necessary for nations seeking to harness nuclear energy for peaceful means. That technology must be shared and facilitated, and there must be verification to ensure that those who are genuinely trying to benefit from nuclear energy and to facilitate the provision of it for peaceful purposes do not transfer technology across for military means. There should also be discussion of the adoption of an additional protocol to ensure that states and parties are unable to divert fissile material to secret weapons programmes.

The 2005 conference needs to succeed. In an ever-more dangerous world, members of the responsible international community need to stand together—both those with nuclear weapons and those without. It was not anticipated that the previous review, in 2000, would be a success, but I give credit to the Government: through hard work and a willingness to take a strategic view and to compromise, they played a major role in ensuring that it was a success. Whatever political party is in government in May when the review takes place, Britain needs to play a full and constructive role in the meeting.

**The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr. Chris Mullin):** I welcome the debate, and thank my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, North (Jeremy Corbyn) for initiating it. As others have said, he has a long and distinguished record of interest in this most important issue. We have seen a number of familiar faces today, and heard a number of familiar arguments, but they are no less interesting for having been heard before. As my hon. Friend said, these arguments are fundamental to the future of the human race, and it is right that we should be debating this subject.

I believe that we have a good story to tell, as I think hon. Members on both sides have acknowledged. I shall try to set out a bit of it in a moment, but my hon. Friend asked one or two questions, so I shall try to deal quickly with those first. He asked about our policy towards Iran. It is well known that our policy is to continue engagement, along with two European Union Foreign Minister colleagues. In fairness, President Bush has said that he supports this approach.

*Sitting suspended for Divisions in the House.*

*On resuming—*

**Mr. Mullin:** My hon. Friend asked about our plans for replacing Trident. As I am sure he knows, no decision has yet been taken, but we are keeping our options open. A decision will need to be taken during the next Parliament. He asked what is going on at Aldermaston and whether it is consistent with the NPT. My advice is that what is happening is consistent with the treaty and that the modernisation of facilities at Aldermaston and the decommissioning of those no longer required, of which we have made no secret, is an ongoing programme of work to meet safety, regulatory and operational requirements. Were there to be significant developments, we would, of course, inform Parliament.

The hon. Member for Boston and Skegness (Mr. Simmonds) asked about the comprehensive test ban treaty and the position of the United States and China. I do not speak for the Governments of the US or China, but I am not aware of any change in their position. We believe that they should both ratify.

The nuclear non-proliferation treaty is the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime. We remain fully committed to the treaty and we participate actively in the review process. The treaty is strong; it has the widest membership of any arms control treaty and retains the wholehearted support of the United Kingdom and the majority of the international community. We want universal membership, although that may not be achievable in the current circumstances. We are also committed to strengthening the treaty to face new challenges.

Several hon. Members have asked what we want out of the review conference that will take place soon. The UK's main goal will be to emphasise the need for greater efforts in the non-proliferation and compliance parts of the treaty. Recent events have shown that a number of states continue to seek clandestine nuclear weapons programmes and also that individuals are willing to assist them in the proliferation of sensitive materials and technology. The treaty must therefore be strengthened and the political will generated to prevent such action.

The treaty remains at the core of our nuclear counter-proliferation policy. It has proved successful in limiting the number of countries deciding to develop nuclear weapons. It provides the essential underpinning to maintain international cohesion when addressing the challenges posed by Iran and North Korea, as it did recently in respect of Libya's nuclear programmes. It also serves to strengthen the controls on the transfer of sensitive technology, without which progress in the International Atomic Energy Agency and other forums would become more difficult.

During the review conference, we will outline the considerable progress that we had made on nuclear disarmament. It says in my briefing document that that was not often acknowledged, but the main Opposition party, the Liberal Democrats and Labour Members have acknowledged today that the UK's record on disarmament is good. The United Kingdom has made considerable progress on the 13 practical steps towards nuclear disarmament that were agreed at the previous review conference five years ago. For example, we are working on a programme to develop UK expertise in verifying the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons internationally. It is a three-part exercise, which sets out the methodologies for the verification of nuclear disarmament.

We will focus at the review conference on monitoring the nuclear warhead complex. We shall also summarise the range of technologies and approaches that have been researched during the five-year programme. The work will provide the basis for methodologies that could be used in a verification regime for a future disarmament treaty. We will publish a consolidated paper on that work at the conference. The United Kingdom remains fully committed to all aspects of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, including global and verifiable nuclear disarmament. We have a good record of fulfilling our NPT obligations on nuclear disarmament. The hon. Member for Tweeddale, Ettrick and Lauderdale (Mr. Moore) spelt out some of the measures that we have taken, but I shall describe them in slightly more detail.

We have withdrawn and dismantled the RAF's freefall bomb, so Trident is now our only nuclear weapons system. We dismantled the last Chevaline warhead in 2002. We have reduced our operationally available stockpile to fewer than 200 warheads, which is a reduction of more than 70 per cent. in the potential explosive power of our nuclear forces since the end of the cold war. We have reduced the readiness of our nuclear forces: only one Trident submarine is now on deterrent patrol; it carries 48 warheads. The submarine on patrol is usually on several days' notice to fire and its missiles are detargeted.

We have signed and ratified the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty and continue to promote its early entry into force. We have placed fissile material no longer required for defence purposes under international safeguards. All enrichment and reprocessing facilities in the United Kingdom are now liable to international inspection. We have continued to press for negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. Indeed, we announced in 1995 that we had stopped the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.

We have been more transparent about our stockpiles of nuclear and fissile materials, and have begun a national historical accounting study for fissile material produced. We have signed and ratified the relevant protocols of both the treaty of Rarotonga, which is the south Pacific nuclear weapons-free zone, and the treaty of Pelindaba, the African nuclear weapon-free zone. We are also engaged in negotiations on nuclear weapon-free zones in central Asia and south-east Asia.

The Government's policy on nuclear weapons remains as set out in the 1998 strategic defence review and the 2003 defence White Paper. We are committed to working towards a safer world in which there is no requirement for nuclear weapons. We continue to play a full role in international efforts to strengthen arms control and prevent proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. However, the continuing risk from the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the certainty that a number of other countries will retain substantial nuclear arsenals means that our minimum nuclear deterrent capability, currently represented by Trident, is likely to remain a necessary element of our security for the foreseeable future. We continue to support multilateral negotiations towards mutual balanced and verifiable reductions in nuclear weapons worldwide. When we are satisfied that sufficient progress has been made to allow us to include British nuclear weapons in any negotiations without endangering our security interests, we shall do so.

It has been suggested that the non-signatory status of India, Pakistan and Israel fundamentally undermines the non-proliferation treaty. Those countries are not subject to all international non-proliferation norms. As has already been suggested, such a lack of control might, in the case of Pakistan, have contributed to the serious case of proliferation of nuclear technology through the A. Q. Khan network.

The UK continues to call on all non-signatory states to become signatories to the NPT, as non-nuclear weapon states. We are additionally pressing them to sign up to other agreements that control nuclear proliferation. We want them to join early negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty; we would like India and Pakistan to become party to the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, and Israel to ratify its accession to that treaty. We have been encouraging negotiations on a weapons of mass destruction-free zone in the middle east and look forward to the proposed conference on the issue in the near future.

We live in an uncertain world. The non-proliferation treaty faces challenges from states such as Iran and North Korea. We believe that the global community needs to strengthen the treaty by ensuring full compliance by such states. For our part, the UK is continuing to work in collaboration with the international community to ensure that Iran operates within its obligations under the treaty. We have also worked with the United States to secure Libya's agreement to renounce its clandestine nuclear weapons programme. Both of those efforts demonstrate our clear commitment to strengthening the non-proliferation regime. As part of the work, we also want to see a strengthened International Atomic Energy Agency. We are committed to spending up to £400 million over 10 years through the global partnership to help tackle the weapons legacy of the former Soviet Union. It is also intended that the work should be expanded to cover states such as Libya and Iraq.

I hope that those efforts, and others that time does not permit me to enumerate, demonstrate our commitment to building a secure and peaceful world, free from nuclear weapons. We are working towards creating a future in which the UK is secure enough to be able to disarm completely.

**Jeremy Corbyn:** In the advice that the Minister has been given, what is the legal position of Britain in developing a new generation of nuclear weapons within the terms of the NPT of 1970?

**Mr. Mullin:** My advice is that it is permitted. However, I shall write to my hon. Friend with the details.



**Motions on the NPT Review Conference**

**Nuclear abolition tour**

EDM 637 – 1 February 2005

01.02.05

59 signatures

“That this House warmly welcomes the national tour being conducted in February and March by the veteran and inveterate peace campaigner, and CND Vice-President, Bruce Kent, to draw attention to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference taking place in New York in May; supports the theme of the tour, as organised by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, to build the conditions to 'Abolish all nukes now', recognises that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has since 1968 formed the basis for a near universal non-proliferation regime, with a commitment to nuclear disarmament at the heart of this; recalls that under the NPT, the nearly 200 non-nuclear weapons states promised not to obtain nuclear weapons in exchange for disarmament by existing nuclear weapons states, which unfortunately has not been implemented despite the requirements of Article Six of the NPT upon the nuclear weapons signatory states, comprising the UK, US, Russia, China and France; recalls that, at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the nuclear weapons states made 'an unequivocal undertaking' towards nuclear disarmament and agreed on 13 steps towards disarmament; and calls upon the Government to honour this commitment.”

**President Bush and the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty**

EDM 871 – 9 March 2005

10 signatures

"That this House welcomes President Bush's statement of 7th March in support of nuclear non-proliferation and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); agrees with his observation that the NPT 'represents a key legal barrier to nuclear weapons proliferation'; notes his reaffirmation of the determination of the United States 'to carry out its treaty commitments'; agrees with his assertion that NPT parties 'must take strong action to confront the threat of non compliance with the NPT in order to preserve and strengthen the Treaty's non-proliferation undertakings'; supports his policy statement not to allow rogue states that violate their commitments and defy the international community to undermine the NPT's fundamental role in strengthening international security; therefore calls on the United States Administration to honour its commitment under Article 1 of the NPT that 'each nuclear-weapon state party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly' and thus to cancel any further collaboration on the Trident nuclear WMD system; and also calls upon President Bush to honour Article 6 of the NPT that binds each of the parties to the Treaty to undertake to 'pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament'; and calls upon the UK Government similarly to honour its equivalent commitments.”

**Non-Proliferation Treaty review conference 2005**

EDM 873 – 9 March 2005

8 signatures

“That this House recognises the overriding importance of the forthcoming Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference to be held between 2nd and 29th May; welcomes the visit to the United Kingdom of the Chairman of the Conference, Ambassador Sergio de Queiroz Duarte of Brazil; is deeply concerned about the Foreign Office's decision to rename the former Non-Proliferation Division as the Division for Counter Proliferation; is further concerned about the recent decision of the United States Administration to seek substantial budget increases for a new generation of small scale nuclear weapons; regrets that the United Kingdom has not yet implemented its unequivocal undertaking at the 2000 NPT Review Conference to work towards the total elimination of its nuclear arsenals by ruling out the replacement of the Trident

nuclear weapons system at the end of its current operational life; and urges the Government to co-operate as closely as possible with Ambassador Duarte to ensure that the 2005 NPT Review Conference reinforces the progress that was achieved at the 2000 conference.”

## House of Commons

### **Commons Hansard – written answers**

Column 1997W-1998W - 10 March 2005

#### **[...] Trident**

**Pete Wishart:** To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether arrangements are in place for the transfer of command and control functions for the Trident nuclear system to (a) the Australian Government and (b) the US Administration in the event of a nuclear attack on the UK which leads to (i) loss of communication with and (ii) the destruction of the UK Government. [221030]

**Mr. Hoon:** As my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister made clear in the answer he gave on 28 January 2003, *Official Report*, column 774W, to the hon. Member for Shrewsbury and Atcham (Mr. Marsden), the use of the United Kingdom's nuclear weapons may be ordered only by the Prime Minister. It would not be in the interests of national security to comment further on command and control arrangements for the nuclear deterrent.

**Mr. Salmond:** To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether he has assessed the merits of converting Trident nuclear submarines to carry Tomahawk cruise missiles; and if he will make a statement. [221035]

**Mr. Hoon:** No.

**Mr. Salmond:** To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what alterations would be required to enable the UK to mount current Trident nuclear warheads on cruise missiles. [221037]

**Mr. Hoon:** The nuclear warhead mounted on the United Kingdom's Trident submarine-launched ballistic missiles was designed for use only on such missiles.

Fundamental design changes would be required to enable it to function safely and effectively when mounted on a cruise missile, but no detailed assessment of such changes, or their feasibility, has been made.

**Mr. Salmond:** To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether research is being undertaken in the UK on miniaturisation of current Trident nuclear warheads. [221038]

**Mr. Hoon:** No.

**Jeremy Corbyn:** To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many nuclear warheads are deployed on Trident submarines. [221432]

**Mr. Hoon:** As announced in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review (paragraph 67), we have only one Trident submarine on deterrent patrol at a time, carrying 48 warheads.

#### **UK Nuclear Capability**

**Mr. Salmond:** To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether he has assessed the merits of mounting nuclear warheads on cruise missiles as part of the UK's current or future nuclear deterrent. [221036]

**Mr. Hoon:** For details of an assessment made in 1980, I refer the hon. Member to Defence Open Government Document 80/23, published by the then Defence Secretary in July 1980, particularly paragraphs 35–43. Subsequently, as noted by the then Defence Secretary on 18 October 1993, *Official Report*, column 34, an air-to-surface missile was considered as a possible delivery system to replace the RAF's freefall nuclear bomb. No assessment of the possibility of cruise missiles forming a part of the United Kingdom's current nuclear deterrent capability has been made under the present Administration. Paragraph 3.11 of the 2003 Defence White Paper made clear that we would keep open the range of options for maintaining a nuclear deterrent capability in future until decisions are required. [...]

## House of Commons

### **Commons Hansard**

Column 20 – 14 March 2005

#### **[...] Trident Replacement**

**Jeremy Corbyn (Islington, North) (Lab):** When he expects to announce plans for the replacement of Trident submarines. [221304]

**The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. Geoffrey Hoon):** The decision on whether or not to replace Trident is likely to be required during the next Parliament.

**Jeremy Corbyn:** I thank the Secretary of State for that answer, which is an enormous surprise. Will he take this opportunity to say that Britain will be the first of the five declared nuclear powers to declare its full adherence to the 1970 non-proliferation treaty, that Trident will not be replaced when it reaches the end of its life and that we will become the first permanent member of the Security Council voluntarily to give up our nuclear weapons, as we are bound to do under the terms of the treaty, signed 35 years ago?

**Mr. Hoon:** The non-proliferation treaty does not prevent existing member states from retaining or indeed replacing their existing nuclear capability, so I hope that my hon. Friend will study the terms of the treaty more closely in future. [...]

## House of Lords

### **Lords Hansard – written answers**

Column WA110-WA111 – 14 March 2005

#### [...] **Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty**

**Lord Hylton** asked Her Majesty's Government:

Whether they have considered the recommendations of the Atlanta consultation on the future of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; and, if so, what is their response. [HL1559]

**Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean:** We have recently received a copy of the Atlanta consultation document from the chairman of the Middle Powers Initiative, the organisation that conducted the consultation, and have had the opportunity to discuss its recommendations with him. We do not intend to make a more formal response.

**Lord Hylton** asked Her Majesty's Government:

Whether an agenda has yet been agreed for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference in May 2005; whether they wish to add items to the agenda; if so, which; and whether states possessing nuclear weapons, who are not parties to the NPT, will be invited to attend. [HL1560]

**Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean:** The last session of the preparatory committee for the 2005 review conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) did not finalise all the procedural arrangements for the NPT and did not agree an agenda. It is now for the review conference in May to consider and agree on this issue. The UK made no proposals for items to be added to the draft agenda which was discussed at the last meeting of the preparatory committee. It is for the review conference to decide whether any state not party to the treaty, and which has applied for observer status to the Secretary-General of the conference, may be granted that status.

**Lord Hylton** asked Her Majesty's Government:

To what extent each of the parties to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has implemented the priorities agreed at the 2000 NPT review conference. [HL1561]

**Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean:** We are not in a position to say to what extent other signatories to the treaty have implemented the steps agreed in the 2000 final document. However, many states' parties have issued reports on their activities within the framework of the NPT strengthened review process as agreed in 1995. The United Kingdom will be making a national statement, including on our progress on treaty related issues, at the review conference in May.

**Lord Hylton** asked Her Majesty's Government:

Whether each of the parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty have matched the Government's reduction of 70 per cent in the explosive power of their nuclear weapons since the end of the Cold War; and, if not, what steps they are taking to persuade them to do so. [HL1562]

**Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean:** We are proud of our record on disarmament and the substantial reduction in our own nuclear explosive power since the end of the Cold War. It is for other states to comment on their own nuclear weapons policy, but we continue to support mutual and balanced reductions in the numbers of nuclear weapons worldwide. Progress on nuclear disarmament by states parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty will be discussed at the treaty's forthcoming review conference, to take place in New York from 2 to 27 May. The UK will participate fully in all aspects of the conference. [...]

## House of Commons

### **Commons Hansard – written answers**

Column 221W-223W - 15 March 2005

[...] **Hiroshima/Nagasaki (Commemoration)**

**Jeremy Corbyn:** To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether commemorations are planned in August to mark the 60th anniversary of nuclear explosions at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. [221646]

**Mr. Rammell** [*holding answer 14 March 2005*]: The UK has no plans at present to hold separate commemorative events. We do however fully sympathise with the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The UK is committed to working towards a world free of nuclear weapons, in order to prevent the possibility of a repetition of the terrible events of August 1945.

[...]

**Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty**

**Llew Smith:** To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs pursuant to the oral answer of 1 March 2005, *Official Report*, column 805, which parts of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (a) recognise the United Kingdom as a nuclear state and (b) legally allow the United Kingdom to hold nuclear weapons. [221887]

**Mr. MacShane:** The United Kingdom, along with China, France, Russia and the United States, are recognised as nuclear weapon states under Article IX.3 of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. It states that "a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967." All other states parties are therefore recognised as non-nuclear weapon states. All states parties must comply with their treaty obligations set out under the treaty articles. These include the obligation under Article VI to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control". [...]

House of Commons

**Commons Hansard – written answers**

Column 264W – 16 March 2005

[...] **Nuclear Proliferation Treaty Review**

**Mr. Blizzard:** To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what his priorities are for the forthcoming Nuclear Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in May. [221640]

**Mr. Hoon:** The United Kingdom's goals for the Review Conference are to make the case for stronger and more effective counter-proliferation measures and to emphasise the importance of compliance with the Treaty. We will do this in the context of emphasising the UK's good record on nuclear disarmament. The UK will produce for the Review Conference the concluding part of three reports of the studies that MOD and AWE have conducted on the verification of nuclear disarmament since the 2000 Review Conference and those involved in the studies will make a presentation on them.

**Nuclear Warheads**

**Mr. Salmond:** To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many vehicles are available exclusively to transport nuclear materials related to the United Kingdom nuclear weapons programme. [222053]

**Mr. Hoon:** 10 vehicles are available to transport nuclear materials related to the United Kingdom nuclear weapons programme. This fleet comprises of two types of vehicle: the Truck Cargo Heavy Duty Mk 2, which is used to transport nuclear weapons, and the High Security Vehicle, which is used to transport Special Nuclear Materials. [...]

House of Commons

**Commons Hansard – written answers**

Column 268W-269W – 16 March 2005

[...] **Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

**Keith Vaz:** To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what steps are being taken by the Government to comply with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of **Nuclear Weapons**. [221694]

**Mr. Hoon:** The United Kingdom is fully committed to and in full compliance with its obligations under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), including under Article VI, and has a good record on disarmament. We have reduced the total explosive power of our nuclear forces by over 70 per cent. since the end of the Cold War and in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review we announced that only one Trident submarine would be on deterrent patrol at any one time. That submarine would normally be on several days' notice to fire with its missiles de-targeted. We

have conducted studies on the verification of nuclear disarmament since the Review Conference in 2000 and will report the concluding part of our findings to the NPT Review Conference this May. The UK has ratified and continues to support the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty without further delay and without preconditions. [...]

#### House of Commons

##### **Commons Hansard – written answers**

Column 343W – 16 March 2005

##### **[...] Nuclear Disarmament**

**Llew Smith:** To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will list the nuclear weapons in the United Kingdom stockpile which have been (a) withdrawn from service and (b) dismantled, (i) unilaterally and (ii) as a result of multilateral negotiations pursuant to United Kingdom obligations under Article six of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. [221447]

**Mr. MacShane:** The UK has unilaterally withdrawn and dismantled all its nuclear weapons except those currently in service. We are the only nuclear weapon state to have reduced our capacity to one nuclear weapon system, Trident, and retain a stockpile of less than 200 operationally available warheads. There have been no multilateral negotiations to withdraw and dismantle nuclear weapons as part of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) process. However, alongside the important unilateral steps already referred to, we have pursued the practical steps agreed by States Parties to the Treaty for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the NPT. [...]

#### House of Commons

##### **Commons Hansard – written answers**

Column 486W – 18 March 2005

##### **[...] Nuclear Weapons**

**Mr. Chaytor:** To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a statement on the UK's undertaking to work towards the total elimination of British nuclear weapons. [221455]

**Mr. MacShane:** The United Kingdom is fully committed to its disarmament obligations as a nuclear-weapon state recognised by the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), including all the undertakings agreed at the 2000 NPT review conference. We also support the agreements made at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference that called on the nuclear-weapon states to pursue systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons. We are the only nuclear-weapon state that has reduced its nuclear capability to a single weapons system and we have reduced the total explosive power of our nuclear forces by over 70 per cent. since the end of the cold war. [...]

#### House of Commons

##### **Commons Hansard – written answers**

Column 571W-572W – 21 March 2005

##### **[...] Nuclear Warheads**

**Mr. Salmond:** To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what his policy is on the transportation by air of nuclear materials related to the United Kingdom nuclear weapons programme. [222054]

**Mr. Hoon:** Within the United Kingdom, our policy is to use surface transportation for all movements of nuclear material related to the UK nuclear weapons programme. Any necessary movement by air of nuclear material outside of the UK is undertaken in compliance with the UK's International Treaty obligations and in accordance with International Air Transport Association regulations, MOD Health and Safety requirements and all statutory legislative requirements. All Ministry of Defence movements of nuclear materials are conducted only by suitably qualified and experienced personnel under procedures designed to reduce foreseeable risk in accordance with the As Low As Reasonably Practicable principle.

**Mr. Salmond:** To ask the Secretary of State for Defence which nations he has assessed as having the capacity to launch a nuclear strike against United Kingdom military bases; and which United Kingdom bases are in range of each nation's weapons. [222055]

**Mr. Hoon:** We assess that there is currently no significant threat of a nuclear strike against UK military bases. We continue to monitor the nuclear capability of a number of countries. [...]

## House of Lords

### **Lords Hansard**

Column 5-7 – 21 March 2005

#### [...] **North Korea: Nuclear Weapons**

**Lord Alton of Liverpool** asked Her Majesty's Government:

What is their response to the admission by the government of North Korea that they possess nuclear weapons and to that Government's failure to re-engage in the six-nations talks.

**The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean):** My Lords, Her Majesty's Government continue to share the deep concern of the international community about the development of nuclear weapons programmes by North Korea. We believe that North Korea is not justified in suspending its participation in the six-party talks. We continue to urge the North Korean regime to reconsider and, in the interest of its own people, to rejoin the talks so that a fourth round can take place soon.

**Lord Alton of Liverpool:** My Lords, does the Minister share the view expressed by Condoleezza Rice this weekend in Beijing that China will be pivotal in persuading Kim Jong-il's regime to return to the six-nation talks? Does she agree also that the threat posed to North Korea's neighbours is probably equal only to the threat posed to the rest of the world when North Korea acts as quartermaster? North Korea sold uranium hexafluoride to Pakistan that, in turn, was sold on to Libya, and, by such deeds, it endangers the security of the rest of the world by sourcing material to failed states and to terrorist organisations. Does the Minister agree that it is crucial that North Korea make the strategic choice that Condoleezza Rice called for this weekend to abandon its nuclear ambitions and return to the six-nation talks, if it is to be spared remaining as a beleaguered, dangerous and isolated pariah state?

**Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean:** My Lords, I agree with most of that, but perhaps I may try to put it in the right context. It is obvious that China has an enormously important role to play as the host of the six-nation talks, but other nations also have their part to play. The noble Lord will know that North Korea has indicated a willingness to return to the six-party talks, but on certain conditions. Those conditions of course relate to the United States of America. I do not believe that those conditions are reasonable; I merely point out to the noble Lord that that is where the North Koreans are focused.

As for threats, the North Koreans are indeed selling too much of the material overseas. One of the major problems with that is that an increasing part of the North Korean economy depends on those sales of nuclear material and missiles.

**Baroness Cox:** My Lords, is the Minister aware that, in April 2004, Pyongyang issued at least two wartime work guidelines that covered all aspects of the conduct of a total war, and that the DPRK has since committed to a major strategic build-up, which is seriously destabilising the Korean peninsula? Would she therefore agree that there might be an urgent need for creative initiatives to engage Pyongyang in constructive regional developments that might reduce its anxieties and pre-empt its own possible intention of a pre-emptive military strike to prevent what it sees as its potential destruction?

**Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean:** Yes, my Lords. Of course, that is exactly one of the issues that could be discussed were North Korea to return to the six-nation talks. Those talks were meant to cover not just the concerns of the rest of the world about North Korea's nuclear capability but the security concerns that North Korea has expressed.

It is worrying that when the North Korean Government withdrew from the six-party talks they said that they were doing so for "an indefinite period" and that they were taking measures,

"to bolster . . . nuclear weapons arsenal"

and,

"to manufacture nukes for self-defence"

against the US's "hostile policy". So, it is a very difficult question. We need to re-engage with North Korea precisely to address those points.

**Lord Howell of Guildford:** My Lords, if, as seems all too likely, the North Koreans, who are running a horrible regime, with public executions and all sorts of other horrors, refuse to come back into the six-nation talks, and if the Chinese, despite their assurances to Condoleezza Rice, fail to use their weight to push the North Koreans, is

there an alternative strategy to the effect that North Korea should be put into a kind of total economic isolation to bring it to its senses? Do the British Government support that?

**Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean:** My Lords, the noble Lord was right when he spoke about the horrible nature of the North Korean regime. We discussed that in February last year in some detail.

We need for the moment to concentrate on the mechanisms that have been agreed with China and the others in the six-party talks to try to get the North Koreans back into discussions. At the moment, I do not think that Her Majesty's Government will rule out any action to persuade the North Koreans that they really must come back to the talks, in the interests as much of their own people as of the peace of the region.

**Lord Clarke of Hampstead:** My Lords, does my noble friend recall the recent visit of two very brave North Korean women, who gave evidence to the House about the inhumane treatment of people who escape from North Korea into China? They spoke about the rigid and inflexible attitude of the Chinese Government and the enforcement of repatriation. Would the talks, if ever they take place, include references to that?

**Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean:** My Lords, the six-party talks do not cover human rights issues. Those are being dealt with through the United Nations. My noble friend is right to refer to the visit of the defectors, and I can tell him that on 4 April two other defectors from North Korea are to pay a visit to London. My honourable friend Mr Rammell will be talking to them about their experiences. My honourable friend is also going to Geneva next week to address a meeting on North Korea together with the UN special rapporteur on human rights in North Korea, Professor Vitit Muntarbhorn. As I say, these issues are being addressed not through the six-party talks, but through the mechanisms of the United Nations.

**Lord Wallace of Saltaire:** My Lords, does the Minister accept that we should not overestimate British interests and British influence over what happens within North Korea? The most important thing is for Britain, together with her European allies, to support the six-party talks—which involve those most directly affected by the deteriorating situation in North Korea—but otherwise to work through the United Nations?

**Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean:** My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord, but that is not because of any sense of disengagement from the six-party talks; rather it is that those who are principally concerned are the prime movers on this issue. On 11 February, one day after the suspension by the North Koreans of their participation, we issued a statement to say how much we regretted that move. Moreover, on the same day Luxembourg, as the holder of the EU Presidency, also issued a statement expressing regret at their withdrawal from the talks and urging them to return to the discussions. I think that we have a clear perspective on our role in this. It is one of strong support for the six-party talks, but we do not see ourselves as one of the prime movers. That role is taken quite rightly and properly by those who are most directly affected. [...]

## House of Commons

### **Commons Hansard**

Column 238WH-245WH - 22 March 2005

#### **[...] Weapons of Mass Destruction**

3.33 pm

**Mr. Malcolm Savidge (Aberdeen, North) (Lab):** In some ways, this debate should be considered in the context of two previous Westminster Hall debates. The first took place on 18 January 2000, when we looked ahead to the new millennium and the issue of weapons of mass destruction. We need to consider how we have moved forward in the past five years. The second debate, which took place on 8 March 2005, was secured by my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, North (Jeremy Corbyn). We examined the nuclear non-proliferation treaty review. I mention that if only to try to minimise the repetition of points made by me and by others in that debate, for which the same Minister was present.

**Mr. Deputy Speaker :** The same Deputy Speaker as well.

**Mr. Savidge :** And the same Deputy Speaker.

I also want to concentrate on the relevant section of the United Nations Secretary-General's high-level panel report, "A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility", to which the Secretary-General responded yesterday.

I said in the debate on 18 January 2000 that I felt insufficient media attention was given to this subject, although it has received considerably more subsequently. Initially, that was in part due to the all-party group on global security and non-proliferation, which was established that same week.

The Foreign Affairs Committee, in a report that year on weapons of mass destruction, said:

"Media interest in nuclear weapons and arms control treaties was boosted in March 2000 when Michael Douglas, UN Goodwill Ambassador, urged Members of Parliament to encourage the Prime Minister to take a leading role in preserving arms control regimes."

It said also that while the British and international media coverage had "eye-catching headlines", it gave serious coverage to the issue, which was followed up in a further meeting that we had with the then UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, Jayantha Dhanapala.

More permanently, the issue has also featured highly as a result of the terrible events of 9/11. Although they did not involve WMD, they brought to our attention the threat of WMD and terrorism. It is a matter of common consent that they are a major problem and one about which our worries have increased since 2000.

As I have said before, it is important that we use careful definitions in relation to WMD and terrorism, particularly as they can be used as a pretext for war. As many people have said, the term "WMD" contains the danger that, although it is a useful phrase, it blurs the difference between the threats posed by different forms of weapon. The radiological weapon, or dirty bomb, is sometimes included in this area. As the high-level panel's report says, it should perhaps be described as a weapon of mass disruption in that it would probably cause comparatively few fatalities, but could lead to a large part of a city being uninhabitable for a while.

The vast majority of chemical and biological threats would also not cause mass fatalities. A lot of loose talk is used in relation to lethal materials such as ricin, which have not been put into a weaponised form that could be used to kill a large number of people at the same time. Similarly, it should be remembered that the worst case analysis of an anthrax attack on Washington was based on a highly sophisticated weaponised version of that agent being used.

However, one cannot rule out the possibility of serious biological attacks if, for example, someone wished to cause indiscriminate death on a large scale and distributed a virus in a hub airport. There is also the possible danger, as the report indicates, of biotechnology or genetic manipulation enabling things of a much more serious nature to occur. In general, it is true of nuclear weapons that we can say, as the report does, that any use would be catastrophic.

On terrorism, it is perhaps important to define the terms we use, because while all terrorism is heinous—the high-level panel correctly condemns all forms of terrorism—it is probably true that the majority of political terrorists would not find it in their own interest to cause massive fatalities. However, they might find that something such as a dirty bomb would be in their interests.

It is only the absolutist, unconditional, apocalyptic groups of the type that the Prime Minister described shortly after the events of 9/11 that would want to kill very large numbers of people. We think primarily of al-Qaeda, but we should not think just of Islamic fundamentalism, as can be seen from the examples of the Aum sect or Timothy McVeigh. We should also recognise that we cannot rule out the possibility that political terrorist groups can become absolutist terrorist groups, be it through fanaticism or frustration.

If we are to reduce chemical and biological terrorist risks, we need to get far better control of the stocks that exist, particularly in the former Soviet Union. As the high-level panel says, we need to apply the chemical weapons convention and set about trying to destroy all chemical weapons by the target date of 2012. We also need to seek to establish, through negotiation, a biological and toxic weapons convention with proper verification.

**Llew Smith (Blaenau Gwent) (Lab):** I recently asked the Foreign Secretary in a written question if he would "list each multilateral negotiating forum in which United Kingdom nuclear weapons are under discussion pursuant to ... Article 6 of the ... non proliferation treaty."

My hon. Friend the Minister for Europe, answering on behalf of the Foreign Secretary, stated:

"None." —[*Official Report*, 10 March 2005; Vol. 431 c.2002W.]

Does my hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen, North (Mr. Savidge) agree that that puts the United Kingdom in breach of its obligations under article 6 of the NPT? It states:

"Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament".

**Mr. Savidge :** With my hon. Friend's permission, I would rather leave it to the Minister to say what the Government's position is on that.

**Llew Smith :** Will my hon. Friend give way?

**Mr. Savidge :** I am sorry, but I am short of time.

The greatest immediate threat is from nuclear weapons. The high-level panel indicated that there is a real possibility of terrorists producing a simple gun-type nuclear device, whereby the combination of two amounts of highly enriched uranium could produce a bomb roughly similar to that which the South African Government produced during the apartheid era. The panel suggests that the use of such a weapon in a major city could lead to the deaths of anything from tens of thousands of people to more than one million.

One need only imagine the scenario of, say, a suicide bomber in a van in London taking out the whole of Westminster, Whitehall and Buckingham palace. If they chose the state opening, for instance, they would destroy not only the buildings, but the people, which would decapitate the state. One can picture similar scenarios in different capitals. An attack in Washington during the State of the Union address could take out the Executive, the Congress and the judiciary. One can repeat that example for various capitals, whether of dictatorships or democracies. Such an attack could devastate a country and cause panic worldwide. Modern capitals cannot ban



vehicles from their centre, so it is therefore in the common interest of all countries, of whatever type, that we co-operate to reduce that threat.

It is important that we reduce proliferation both of nuclear materials and among states and non-state actors. The high-level panel report indicates that the nuclear non-proliferation treaty has enjoyed considerable success, with only eight definite nuclear weapons states—with the possible addition of North Korea—over 40 years, as compared with the much higher number that most experts predicted beforehand.

However, the "atoms for peace" strategy, as Eisenhower put it, has had problems. Civil nuclear energy and military production were assumed to be completely separate, but we now know that they can have considerable dual use. We must therefore beware of the fact that the nuclear power industry produces not only materials that terrorists could use, but targets that they could attack.

The report also indicates that as many as 40 of the 60 states that now have nuclear power are suspected of being able to produce nuclear weapons fairly rapidly. It warns of the risk of a cascade of proliferation. We must therefore recognise the basic risks in the nuclear power industry. However, on the assumption that it will continue to expand, we must certainly try to reduce reprocessing and enrichment, ensure the use of low-enriched uranium rather than highly-enriched uranium, enforce the additional protocol and increase security in the ways discussed at the International Atomic Energy Agency conference that the Government hosted in London last week.

We must also have the utmost control. It is not satisfactory that Sellafield cannot account for significant quantities of weapons-grade material, not only because of the risk of material that is not being properly checked being passed to terrorists: how can we answer if a country such as Iran claims that it cannot account for significant amounts of such material? Will we find that acceptable?

I repeat the appeal that Senator Sam Nunn made when he spoke at the conference and here in Parliament: when the UK is to try to persuade the G8 to deal with the problems of climate change and global poverty, we should also insist that we fulfil the promises made at the G8 meeting in Canada to give proper financial support to the threat reduction programme of decommissioning. That is vital in and of itself, but it is important also because not fulfilling past pledges gives little meaning to the commitments that we make at future G8 meetings. Furthermore, the four issues of poverty, climate, weapons of mass destruction and terrorism are crucially interlinked as we try to build a safer world.

The report makes many other constructive suggestions, which I shall not go into because of time and because some were covered in our debate on the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, but I repeat the one major claim made on the nuclear weapons states. We should not abandon the 13 steps that were agreed at the NPT review conference in 2000 and we should give evidence of good faith as to our commitments, including those under article 6, as my hon. Friend the Member for Blaenau Gwent (Llew Smith) indicated.

The report comments on the A. Q. Khan threat of black market distribution of such materials and suggests that the proliferation security initiative deserves support in that respect. The only caution that one should offer is to be wary of precipitate military action, because that can obviously be dangerous, in which context it is correct that the world community is thinking of diplomacy to address the difficult situations with Iran and North Korea.

We should also not forget that there are worse dangers than nuclear terrorism, such as regional nuclear war. Only two or three years ago, India and Pakistan faced terrible risks. There was an acute danger at that time, and we should give our fullest support to the leaderships of both countries, including the past and present Government of India, in their work in the peace process. I am sure that they would say that a number of other countries, especially the US and the UK, played a crucial, positive role in helping to defuse that dangerous situation. However, we must face the fact that if there is more proliferation, further risks of regional war may increase.

There is also the risk of accidental nuclear war. It is surely insane that, this long after the end of the cold war, there are thousands of nuclear weapons, exceeding any possible rational defence or deterrence requirement of any country involved. It is even more insane that so many weapons are on hair-trigger alert. The United Kingdom has set an example by de-alerting, and we should urge other nuclear weapons states to follow it.

I stress the views in the report of the high-level panel, but one cannot ignore the fact that there are different views abroad in the world today. There are influential voices in the United States—neo-conservatives and other hawks—who, in their most extreme version, take a view of US national sovereignty that opposes international treaties, arms control and the United Nations. Such commentators take the view that military might rather than common security should be the basis of defence and that aggression should take preference over diplomacy. Also, they talk of pre-emptive and preventative war. The Project for the New American Century talks of seeking US military dominance throughout the century. There are also plans for new nuclear weapons, and the military-industrial complex seems to be even more powerful than when General Eisenhower coined the phrase.

Such voices give frighteningly different visions from that espoused by George Bush senior of a new world order. Indeed, I would suggest that such views are very different from the mainstream tradition of both the Democratic and Republican parties. If such counsels prevail, we will surely increase rather than reduce the risks we face, and we may even face the risk of global nuclear war, whether before or after the end of the century, which could endanger humanity as a whole.

In a world where nuclear weapons cannot be disinvented, and if we are to have a more secure future, we need to strengthen the United Nations and international treaties and progressively to develop a fair system of international governance and law whereby conflict can be resolved without resort to war. That might seem an impossibly distant vision for a human race whose entire history and culture have been dominated by war, but it shows the scale of the challenge we face.

3.50 pm

**The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr. Chris Mullin) :**

My hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen, North (Mr. Savidge) raises an important subject, in which I know he has a long-term interest. As he said, he took part in the debate on similar matters that occurred here two weeks ago. We all agree that weapons of mass destruction pose one of the biggest threats to the security of the United Kingdom and its interests, at home and abroad.

My hon. Friend referred to the recommendations of the UN high-level panel. That is a body which has our support and we are already acting on many of its recommendations. I shall also deal at this stage with his point about Sellafield. He made a point that I do not suppose he would want to press too seriously, comparing the situation in Sellafield with that in Iran. UK civil nuclear facilities, unlike those in Iran, are fully open to International Atomic Energy Agency inspection, so there can be no doubt about our willingness to co-operate fully and answer any questions that the international community may have, although I note his point.

The main threat is the use of WMD by states and terrorists against the UK or against British economic interests.

**Llew Smith :** On the question of weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons, going back to a previous job held by the Minister and a far more important one, editor of *Tribune*, I know that he was a supporter of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, if he was not a member. With that in mind, does he agree that there are no circumstances that justify the use of nuclear weapons? While I am on my feet, I ask him to answer the question that my hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen, North (Mr. Savidge) refused to answer on the non-proliferation treaty.

**Mr. Mullin :** I shall have to come back to my hon. Friend on the point about the non-proliferation treaty; I shall drop him a note about that. As he said, I was an undistinguished editor of *Tribune* and it is extremely difficult to foresee any circumstances in which nuclear weapons could be used. That, I think, given my current incarnation, is about as far as I can go.

**Llew Smith :** My question was not whether the Minister could foresee any circumstances. I asked whether he accepts that under no circumstances could the use of nuclear weapons be justified. This is a Government position and I assume, as the Minister is part of the Government, that he has no problems answering that particular question.

**Mr. Mullin :** I know what my hon. Friend is attempting to do: he wants somehow to separate me from the rest of my Government colleagues, and I decline, if he will forgive me, to go any further down that road.

I spoke about how the main threat is the use of WMD by states and terrorists against the UK or against British economic and strategic interests overseas. We are addressing the production and trafficking of WMD-related material by states, companies and individuals, and working to guard against less obvious risks such as the use of higher education courses in the UK and elsewhere by individuals seeking to acquire technology for proliferation purposes.

Limiting the threat posed by WMD requires coherent policies to detect, deter, check and roll back programmes for the development of WMD and related delivery systems in countries of concern such as North Korea and Iran. We are deeply concerned about North Korea's decision to suspend participation in the six-party talks and its claim of an enhanced nuclear capability. We urge North Korea to re-engage and support the efforts of the US, China, Russia, Japan and South Korea to that end.

We also have serious concerns about Iran's nuclear programme. Following our agreement with Iran, we—along with colleagues from France, Germany and the European Union—are engaged in discussions with Iranian officials. We want a long-term agreement that will provide objective guarantees that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes. The steering committee established under the agreement is meeting tomorrow to review progress.

**Mr. Savidge :** Can my hon. Friend tell us whether there is any truth in the reports in the press last week that Iran suggested a joint project with the United States so that the US could be reassured about its programme?

**Mr. Mullin :** I am not aware of any.

Given such clear threats, we must strengthen international co-operation against the proliferation and the use of WMD. We must at all costs maintain an effective multilateral regime. As I said when we debated this subject two weeks ago, the nuclear non-proliferation treaty remains the cornerstone of nuclear non-proliferation. It is a strong treaty, with the widest membership of any arms control treaty, and it retains the wholehearted support of the UK and the vast majority of the international community.

However, recent events have shown that a number of states continue to pursue clandestine nuclear weapons programmes and that there are individuals willing to assist them by providing sensitive materials and technology. The treaty must, therefore, be strengthened.

**Llew Smith :** Will the Minister give way?

**Mr. Mullin** : If my hon. Friend will forgive me, I have only a few minutes left and I am unlikely to get to the end of my speech. I shall happily have a discussion with him after the proceedings are over.

We have no wish to reopen the treaty, but we need stronger measures to address non-compliance. We also want to build support for new measures to combat the spread of sensitive technology. We want to ensure that sensitive nuclear items are not exported to states that may use them for weapons purposes or allow them to fall into terrorist hands.

We are working with partners to make the necessary amendments to the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines. We are also working to put into effect the principles set out in the written statement to the House of 25 February 2004 from my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary, which said that states that fail to comply with their IAEA safeguards obligations should forfeit access to enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technology.

As regards biological and chemical weapons, we continue to work towards universal adherence to the chemical weapons convention and the biological and toxin weapons convention, in particular to include states such as Egypt, Syria and Israel. This year marks the 80th anniversary of the Geneva protocol against the use of chemical and biological warfare and the 30th anniversary of the biological and toxin weapons convention. The UK will chair this year's annual meetings, where we will be discussing such issues as codes of conduct for scientists. As president of the G8, we will follow up on a range of earlier suggestions on tackling biological threats.

A stronger international framework is essential, but not sufficient in itself, as I am sure my hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen, North will agree, to meet the proliferation threat. We want greater practical engagement in counter-proliferation by other states and regional groups. We played a major role in the formulation and unanimous adoption of UN Security Council resolution 1540, adopted on 28 April 2004, which was the first to address the threat posed by WMD proliferation. It obliges all countries to introduce robust legislation to tackle the threat. We welcome work done by the UN Secretary-General's high-level panel.

We are also committed to supporting the G8's global partnership and the proliferation security initiative. We contribute £36.5 million to the global partnership, which deals with dismantling nuclear submarines; safe and secure storage of over 20,000 spent nuclear fuel assemblies; the safe destruction of Russia's chemical weapons stocks; and new employment opportunities for former nuclear scientists and engineers in the former Soviet Union. Over a 10-year period, we expect to invest about \$750 million.

The UK strongly supports the May 2003 proliferation security initiative to prevent trafficking in weapons of mass destruction and related technology by states and terrorist groups or criminal networks. Export control is only as strong as its weakest link. We must ensure that multilateral export control regimes are effective and that progressive proposals are not unreasonably held back by one or two states. We must also keep such controls proportionate and simple to administer. In addition to those international efforts, we must act effectively at home.

The first line of defence is an effective outreach programme to alert industry and academic institutions to the possibility that UK technology could help proliferators and to raise awareness of export legislation. The Export Control Act 2002 includes a range of measures aimed at preventing WMD technology from falling into the wrong hands. We should never underestimate the potential threat posed by WMD, but the Government believe that such threats can be minimised through effective multilateralism and concerted domestic efforts. Counter-proliferation will remain a key priority for us and we shall continue to take the lead in promoting a strong international response.

## House of Lords

### **Lords Hansard**

Column WA34-35 – 23 March 2005

#### [...] **Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty**

**Lord Dykes** asked Her Majesty's Government: What steps they will take to ensure that the May 2005 review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty balances obligations on the existing nuclear powers, including the United States, India, Pakistan and Israel, with those of prospective nuclear powers. [HL1820]

**Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean**: The Government are strongly committed to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which is the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The treaty strikes a balance between non-proliferation, disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. The obligations taken on by nations becoming a state party to the treaty apply equally to the nuclear weapon states and the non-nuclear weapon states. The UK delegation to the review conference will work to strengthen all three pillars of the treaty. The delegation will stress the need for a stronger and more effective counter-proliferation regime. We will emphasise the importance of compliance with the treaty and will promote the adoption of safeguards. We will emphasise too the UK's good record on nuclear disarmament, and will produce a final report of the studies that we have conducted on the verification of nuclear disarmament.

The UK supports universalisation of the treaty. However, the non-signatories to the treaty, India, Pakistan and Israel, have no obligations to fulfil in respect to it, and the review conference is not in a position to put obligations upon them. [...]

#### House of Commons

##### **Commons Hansard – written answers**

Column 887W-888W – 23 March 2005

##### **[...] Non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference**

**Mr. Simmonds:** To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what bilateral discussions have taken place between the Government and (a) the United States, (b) the Russian Federation, (c) China and (d) France regarding the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in New York in May. [223322]

**Mr. MacShane:** We have had contact with a number of countries, including those mentioned, in the run up to the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference.

**Mr. Simmonds:** To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what discussions have taken place with the International Atomic Energy Agency regarding the proliferation of nuclear weapons by non-state actors. [223331]

**Mr. MacShane:** The Government hosted an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Conference in London from 16 to 18 March to discuss the nature of the threat of nuclear terrorism and to take forward the agenda on nuclear security. The United Kingdom, through contacts at meetings such as this in London, through its delegation to the IAEA in Vienna, and through the UK Governor who sits on the IAEA Board of Governors, remains in close touch with all aspects of the IAEA's important work. [...]

#### House of Commons

##### **Commons Hansard – written answers**

Column 1091W – 4 April 2005

##### **[...] Pakistan**

**Llew Smith:** To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what assessment he has made of the request by the chairman of Pakistan's Atomic Energy Commission to the nuclear security conference in London that the nuclear suppliers group lift controls on the export of dual-use nuclear technology to Pakistan. [223748]

**Mr. MacShane:** Countering the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology is a key priority of the Government. Given that Pakistan remains outside the Non Proliferation Treaty, and has placed very few nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, it is difficult for suppliers to be confident that transfers of dual-use nuclear technology will not contribute to a nuclear explosive activity. Any lifting of these controls would require amending the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines, which would need the unanimous agreement of all 44 Participating Governments.

The UK's position on the export of Nuclear Dual Use items remains as set out by my hon. Friend the then Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Mr. Bradshaw) in reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Edmonton (Mr. Love) on 15 March 2002, *Official Report*, columns 1298–1300W. It states, inter alia, that:

"We will continue to deny all export licence applications (ELAs) for items listed on the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Dual use list to nuclear and nuclear related end users in India and Pakistan". [...]

#### House of Commons

##### **Commons Hansard – written answers**

Column 1093W – 4 April 2005

##### **[...] Weapons (Non-proliferation)**

**Pete Wishart:** To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what steps his Department is taking to assist the G8 in its aims on non-proliferation of chemical, biological, radioactive and nuclear weapons, with particular reference to source material for such weapons; and if he will make a statement. [223790]

**Mr. MacShane:** We are committed to using the UK's Presidency to take forward the Action Plan on Non-Proliferation agreed by G8 Leaders at the Sea Island Summit in June 2004. In particular, we are working to ensure that new measures are put in place to limit the spread of sensitive nuclear technology to states that may seek to use them for weapons purposes, or allow them to fall into terrorist hands. Another priority is to promote co-ordination between governments and international organisations to counter the threat of bioterrorism. At the same time, we are working to ensure that the commitment of both G8 partners and other countries to the Global Partnership against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction leads to the continued effective implementation of collaborative projects to address legacy proliferation risks in partner countries in the Former Soviet Union. [...]

#### House of Commons

##### **Commons Hansard – written answers**

Column 1209W – 4 April 2005

##### **[...] British Nuclear Deterrent**

**Mr. Weir:** To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make it his policy to remove the British nuclear deterrent from the Clyde. [218369]

**Mr. Hoon:** We have no plans to change basing policy for the UK's nuclear deterrent force.

**Mr. Weir:** To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will rule out the acquisition of battlefield nuclear weapons for use by British forces. [218370]

**Mr. Hoon:** Battlefield nuclear weapons are not required by the Government's policy on nuclear deterrence.

**Mr. Weir:** To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will rule out the use of UK nuclear weapons on a first strike basis. [218371]

**Mr. Hoon:** The United Kingdom Government would be prepared to use nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances of self-defence. We would not use our weapons, whether conventional or nuclear, contrary to international law.

A policy of no first use of nuclear weapons would be incompatible with our and NATO's doctrine of deterrence, nor would it further nuclear disarmament objectives. We have made clear, as have our NATO allies, that the circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated are extremely remote. Our overall strategy is to ensure uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor about the exact nature of our response, and thus to maintain effective deterrence. [...]

#### House of Commons

##### **Commons Hansard – written answers**

Column 1234W – 4 April 2005

##### **[...] Non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference**

**Mr. Simmonds:** To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what steps the Government are taking to encourage Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty signatory states to sign and ratify additional protocols; and whether it is his policy that adherence to additional protocols should be set as the standard for verifying compliance with the Treaty. [223330]

**Mr. MacShane:** The Government uses every opportunity bilaterally and multilaterally to encourage universal acceptance of the International Atomic Energy Agency Additional Protocols (AP) and for recognition that, together with the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, the AP is now the nuclear verification standard. We would like to see the AP accepted as a future condition of supply of sensitive nuclear materials.

##### **Nuclear Proliferation**

**Llew Smith:** To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs in what circumstances he would make public information received from friendly foreign intelligence services on nuclear proliferation activities. [224010]

**Mr. Straw:** Intelligence information is made public only in exceptional circumstances, and in the case where it has been received from a foreign security or intelligence service this would be done only with their agreement. [...]

#### House of Commons

[...] Iran

10. **Mr. Geoffrey Clifton-Brown (Cotswold)** (Con): If he will make a statement on the progress of the EU negotiations with Iran about Iran's nuclear programme. [224393]

**The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr. Jack Straw)**: Representatives of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, the EU High Representative, the European Commission and the Luxembourg EU presidency met an Iranian delegation in Paris on 23 March. The meeting was the latest in a series launched by the Paris agreement of 15 November 2004. All sides remain committed to agreeing long-term arrangements, as envisaged in the Paris agreement.

**Mr. Clifton-Brown**: I thank the Foreign Secretary for that answer. However, bearing in mind the Government's use of intelligence over Iraq, how can we trust their assessment of Iran's weapons of mass destruction?

**Mr. Straw**: We have made no published assessment based on intelligence about Iran and we have no plans to do so. The international community is concerned about Iran not because we have seen incontrovertible evidence that it has a nuclear weapons programme, but because of what is plainly on the record in the reports of the director general and the board of the International Atomic Energy Agency—namely, that Iran, over a period that goes back 20 years, has failed to comply with its safeguard agreements to give notice to the IAEA of all areas in which it was pursuing dual-use nuclear programmes. That is the basis on which we, in the so-called E3, have been taking forward the negotiations. I hope and believe that they are tough and will produce an acceptable solution.

**Mr. Tam Dalyell (Linlithgow)** (Lab): We should acknowledge the great personal effort that the Foreign Secretary has put into our relations with Iran by going to Tehran, but, to be fair to the Iranians, is not it also true that they have suspended all nuclear activity over the past 18 months? Is it not the case that, on 23 March, Condoleezza Rice put forward some pretty positive ideas? Are they acceptable to the British Government? Do the Government stand by the commitment that there will be no military action against Iran? Is there some divergence from the French over attitudes to Iran in that they are more favourable towards having more positive relations than perhaps we are?

**Mr. Straw**: My hon. Friend asks me several questions. First, if I may, I should like to pay tribute to him because it is his last Foreign and Commonwealth Office Question Time and probably his last three days as a Member of this House after 42 years, including the past four years as Father of the House. My hon. Friend has been a good friend to me. He is a great parliamentarian, who will be remembered for his commitment to Parliament. He provides a fine example, which all should follow, whatever position they hold. I commend his work in Parliament and wish him well for the future.

I shall take my hon. Friend's questions in reverse order. He asked whether there was any divergence between us and France; there is not. Some have long suggested that there is such a divergence of view. The disappointment for some in Iran and some in the United States is that the United Kingdom, France and Germany have clearly kept together.

On military action, I have made it clear beyond peradventure that we can conceive of no circumstances in which military action against Iran would be justified. I cannot be clearer than that—[*Interruption.*] Do not forget what?

**Mr. John Bercow (Buckingham)** (Con): Do not forget the word "gravamen".

**Mr. Straw**: On the issue of the offers made by Condoleezza Rice on 23 March, we welcome those and they are a product of the negotiations. The real importance of the announcements made by the United States Government on 23 March was that they had moved from a position of some detachment about the E3 process to one of active support. Some of the things that we want to give to the Iranians we can only give to them if the US also does so. That is what we have now got, with the United States commendably agreeing not to block Iran's application for membership of the World Trade Organisation and to provide Iran with much-needed aircraft spares.

**Sir Teddy Taylor (Rochford and Southend, East)** (Con): Is the Foreign Secretary aware that while many of us criticise the Government for many things, a lot of us would like to pay tribute to him for his enormous efforts to maintain co-operation with Iran on the difficult nuclear issue? Does he accept that real progress is now being made, with access to all the appropriate centres at which such activities take place? Will he carry on with the good work, which is helping to maintain a situation that is desperately important for stability in the middle east?

**Mr. Straw**: I am grateful for the comments of the hon. Gentleman, who has taken such an interest in this issue over many years. It has helped me, and us, to know that there is wide support for our efforts to secure a peaceful solution to Iran's problems. Iran is not the easiest country with which to negotiate. It has made progress, however, and has suspended its reprocessing and uranium enrichment activities, which is of great importance in order to ensure, as provided by the Paris agreement, that there are objective guarantees that Iran does not have a nuclear weapons programme. Although I am clear that negotiations will continue to be difficult, I look forward to their satisfactory conclusion. [...]

## House of Commons

### **Commons Hansard – written answers**

Column 1329W-1330W – 5 April 2005

#### **[...] Nuclear Proliferation**

**Llew Smith:** To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what assessment he has made of the report Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Expert Group Report, submitted to the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, INFCIRC/640, 22 February; and whether he plans to adopt its recommendations in United Kingdom submissions to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in May in New York. [224003]

**Mr. MacShane:** The report represents a preliminary assessment of the options for strengthening the proliferation resistance of the civil nuclear fuel cycle, while assuring supply of fuel for peaceful civil nuclear purposes: We believe it is a valuable contribution to the debate. We will, as the report recommends, be investigating the practicality, feasibility and usefulness of the approaches it sets out. We will continue to take an active part in the debate.

**Llew Smith:** To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs pursuant to the oral answer of 1 March 2005, *Official Report*, column 805, on Iran, which part of Article 2 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty allows the United Kingdom to hold nuclear weapons. [224044]

**Mr. MacShane:** My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary, in answer to my hon. Friend's oral question of 1 March, stated that the United Kingdom was allowed to hold nuclear weapons under Article 2 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and that non-nuclear weapon states were defined as such by Article IV of the Treaty. The correct position on the definitions of the articles and our obligations under the treaty articles is set out in my reply to my hon. Friend on 15 March 2005, *Official Report*, columns 222–23W.

**Llew Smith:** To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether the United Kingdom has made representations to any non-nuclear weapons states in respect of the development or operation of (a) spent nuclear fuel reprocessing plants, (b) uranium enrichment plants and (c) separated plutonium stores. [224045]

**Mr. MacShane:** The UK, as a State Party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), upholds the inalienable right of non-nuclear weapon states to the peaceful use of nuclear energy under Article IV of the Treaty, in conformity with Articles I and II of the Treaty. The UK also seeks to uphold, and is committed to, all other Articles of the Treaty. It actively participates in and promotes, in the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and other relevant for a such as the G8, compliance with the international nuclear non-proliferation obligations set out in the NPT and other international instruments.

[...]

#### **Uranium Enrichment Facilities**

**Mr. Simmonds:** To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what assessment he has made of the possibility of limiting uranium enrichment and reprocessing plants to countries that already have the facilities. [223320]

**Mr. MacShane:** The Government is committed to ensuring that sensitive nuclear items, such as enrichment and reprocessing plants, which have clear proliferation potential, are not exported to states that may seek to use them for weapons purposes.

Recognising this, the UK is committed to strengthening the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines, which control the export of such equipment, with a series of tough criteria that a recipient state must adhere to in order to receive such transfers. This will provide suppliers of nuclear items with adequate assurances that transferred items will not be used for non-peaceful purposes. The criteria are relevant whether or not the recipient state is in possession of equipment and reprocessing facilities. [...]

## House of Commons

### **Commons Hansard – written answers**

Column 1491W – 6 April 2005

[...] **Jeremy Corbyn:** To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what his assessment is of the production of enriched uranium by the government of Iran; whether he has assessed Iran as being in breach of the non-proliferation treaty as a result of such production; and if he will make a statement on UK relations with Iran. [224589]

**Mr. MacShane:** The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has reported extensively on Iran's past nuclear activities, including on some enrichment of uranium to low levels. Iran agreed to suspend all its enrichment-related

activities under the so-called "Paris Agreement" of 15 November 2004. This suspension has been verified by the IAEA.

Iran's past enrichment activities were not declared to the IAEA at the time, as Iran was obliged to do under its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, pursuant to its obligations under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

Our policy towards Iran is one of constructive, but critical, engagement. We maintain a robust dialogue on issues of concern, such as Iran's nuclear programme; human rights record; approach to the fight against terrorism; and attitude to the middle east peace process. [...]

## House of Commons

### **Commons Hansard – written answers**

Column 1777W-1778W – 7 April 2005

#### [...] **Non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference**

**Mr. Chaytor:** To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether he will attend the forthcoming Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. [221359]

**Mr. MacShane** [*holding answer 21 March 2005*]: My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary will not be present at the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference in May, but he has asked John Freeman (the UK Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament) to head the UK delegation.

**Mr. Simmonds:** To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what assessment he has made of whether there is a need to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation treaty to ensure that signatory states are not able to exploit the treaty by obtaining nuclear technology under the guise of a peaceful civilian nuclear energy programme. [223321]

**Mr. MacShane:** The United Kingdom supports the efforts being made by a number of bodies to consider how to ensure that nuclear technology acquired under Article IV of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) cannot be diverted to weapons programmes, either while a state is still party to the treaty, or following withdrawal from it. We hope to continue this discussion at the upcoming NPT review conference in May, and are working towards an outcome which strengthens the non-proliferation regime to deal better with these challenges.

#### **Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty**

**Llew Smith:** To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what response he (a) has made and (b) plans to make to the request by his Indian counterpart on 28 March that the nuclear weapons states party to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty agree to irreversible and verifiable cuts in their nuclear arsenals as a condition of India signing the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. [224694]

**Mr. MacShane:** The Government, including Ministers, have frequent contact with their Indian counterparts and are familiar with India's views on nuclear proliferation matters, including Natwar Singh's speech at the Conference on "Emerging Nuclear Proliferation Challenges" held in Delhi on 28 March. The Government were not represented at this conference and is not intending to make a response to Mr. Singh's speech. Mr. Singh's speech gives no indication that India is willing to become a State Party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which, by the terms of the treaty, they can only do as a non-nuclear weapon state. [...]



# BELGIË

## Belgische Senaat

### **Mondelinge vraag van de heer Lionel Vandenberghe aan de minister van Landsverdediging over «de herstructurering van het Amerikaanse leger overzee en de invloed hiervan op de andere NAVO-lidstaten»**

nr. 3-280 – 1 april 2004

**De voorzitter.** – De heer Marc Verwilghen, minister van Ontwikkelingssamenwerking, antwoordt namens de heer André Flahaut, minister van Landsverdediging.

**De heer Lionel Vandenberghe (SP.A-SPIRIT).** – Zes maanden geleden stelde ik de minister over dit thema al een mondelinge vraag. Intussen zijn er twee nieuwe elementen in het dossier.

Op dinsdag 9 maart bracht de Amerikaanse generaal James L. Jones een bezoek aan de senaatscommissie Buitenlandse Betrekkingen. De generaal antwoordde op mijn vragen over de nucleaire strategie van de NAVO dat het aantal kernwapens in Europa significant zal worden verminderd, onder meer omdat de strategische waarde van die kernwapens vandaag anders is dan tijdens de Koude Oorlog. Hij verwees hiermee impliciet naar de evaluatie van de Amerikaanse militaire aanwezigheid overzee en naar de herstructureringsplannen van het Pentagon in dat kader. In een persbericht van 25 maart stelt het Amerikaanse ministerie van Defensie dat de eerste fase van het onderzoek is afgerond. Momenteel zouden er gesprekken lopen met de bondgenoten om het plan in zijn definitieve vorm te gieten.

Is de regering op de hoogte van de evaluatie die de VS heeft gemaakt wat zijn militaire aanwezigheid in Europa en in België betreft? Werden daarover rechtstreeks met de federale overheid of in het kader van de NAVO gesprekken gevoerd? Zijn daarover rechtstreeks met de federale overheid of in het kader van NAVO gesprekken gepland? Heeft die evaluatie invloed op de nucleaire taken die België in de NAVO vervult, meer bepaald op de aanwezigheid van kernwapens in ons land? Is de regering bereid om in het kader van die evaluatie het engagement opgenomen in het regeerakkoord, uit te voeren, namelijk jegens de VS te pleiten voor een vernieuwd Atlantisch Bondgenootschap, gebaseerd op een aantal duidelijke krachtlijnen, waaronder de vermindering van het aantal NAVO-kernwapens?

**De heer Marc Verwilghen,** minister van Ontwikkelingssamenwerking. – Minister Flahaut bevestigt dat binnen de NAVO overleg heeft plaatsgevonden tussen de VS en de geallieerde landen. Gelet op een zowel politieke als militaire transatlantische verbondenheid wenst de alliantie een duidelijk verminderde, maar in de nieuwe strategische omgeving voldoende geachte nucleaire capaciteit in Europa te behouden.

De informatie over het aantal nucleaire wapens in de NAVO en hun locatie, is om begrijpelijke redenen van veiligheid, geheim. Minister Flahaut wenst niet in te gaan op enige speculatie in dat verband. De Belgische regering heeft de verbintenis opgenomen in het regeerakkoord, inmiddels uitgevoerd.

**De heer Lionel Vandenberghe (SP.A-SPIRIT).** – Ik had verwacht dat de minister zou antwoorden dat de nodige beslissingen genomen zijn maar geheim moeten blijven. Het heeft me verbaasd dat generaal Jones in de senaatscommissie impliciet bevestigd heeft dat in Kleine Brogel ...

**De voorzitter.** – De generaal heeft niet over Kleine Brogel, maar in het algemeen gesproken.

**De heer Lionel Vandenberghe (SP.A-SPIRIT).** – Hij heeft gezegd dat het Pentagon een evaluatie zou maken en dat er binnenkort een verklaring zou volgen. Ik denk dat we nog een paar keer op inspectie zullen moeten gaan in Kleine Brogel!

Wat me vooral heeft verbaasd is dat generaal Jones impliciet heeft toegegeven dat die kernwapens verouderd zijn. Ik zal de minister bij een volgende gelegenheid vragen wat er aan de hand is met de kernkoppen in Kleine Brogel.

## Belgische Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers

### **Vraag nr. 80 van de heer Dirk Van der Maelen van 30 april 2004 (N.) aan de vice-eerste minister en minister van Buitenlandse Zaken - Non-proliferatie resolutie van de Verenigde Staten in de VN-Veiligheidsraad**

14 juni 2004

Op 24 maart 2004 heeft de Verenigde Staten in de VN-Veiligheidsraad een voorstel van resolutie neergelegd waarin alle lidstaten van de VN worden opgeroepen om meer inspanningen te doen met betrekking tot preventie van nucleaire proliferatie en terzake nationale maatregelen te nemen. Nogal wat NGO's en ook niet-permanente leden van de VN-Veiligheidsraad hebben fundamentele kritiek geuit op de resolutie.

Omdat de resolutie zwijgt over de bestaande NPTverplichtingen en de eventuele ontplooiing van nieuwe kernwapens, rijzen er nogal wat vragen.

1. Heeft u zich vergewist van de inhoud van de resolutie en deelt u de bekommernissen van NGO's, experts en een aantal niet-permanente leden van de Veiligheidsraad ?
2. Bent u van mening dat deze resolutie in overeenstemming is met het internationaal recht, dan wel dat recht dreigt te ondergraven ?
3. Bent u de mening toegedaan dat alle ondertekenaars van het NPT-verdrag prioritair de aangegane engagementen moeten nakomen?
4. Vindt u niet dat de EU-landen moeten streven naar een meer evenwichtige resolutie die respect vraagt voor de verbintenissen van het NPT-Verdrag?

**Antwoord van de vice-eerste minister en minister van Buitenlandse Zaken van 10 juni 2004, op de vraag nr. 80 van de heer Dirk Van der Maelen van 30 april 2004 (N.) :**

1. Aangaande het onderhandelingsproces

Op 28 april 2004 heeft de VN-Veiligheidsraad unaniem resolutie 1540 aanvaard inzake proliferatie van massavernietigingswapens. De Verenigde Staten hadden op 24 maart 2004 een tekstvoorstel terzake verspreid onder de permanente leden van de Veiligheidsraad.

De aanvaarding van zulke resolutie stond hoog op de agenda van talrijke staten. Naast de Verenigde Staten hadden ook Frankrijk en het Verenigd Koninkrijk zich in die zin uitgesproken. Rusland en China namen actief deel aan de consultaties. Het tekstvoorstel waarover de permanente leden een overeenkomst bereikten werd vervolgens voorgelegd aan de andere leden van de Veiligheidsraad in een breed consultatieproces.

Ook het EU-voorzitterschap heeft het ontwerp becommentarieerd en suggesties geformuleerd.

Na deze consultaties werd ten slotte een consensus bereikt binnen de Veiligheidsraad.

2. Aangaande de inhoud van de resolutie en specifieke bekommernissen

a) De resolutie beantwoordt aan een algemeen aanvoelen dat de dreiging van proliferatie van massavernietigingswapens al onze aandacht verdient.

Een bijzondere uitdaging vormen met name pogingen tot het verwerven van massavernietigingswapens door zogenoemde «non-state actors», terroristische en criminele organisaties.

Ze roept de VN-lidstaten onder meer op wetgevende maatregelen te nemen opdat terroristische en criminele organisaties verhinderd worden in het bezit te komen van materialen geschikt voor het vervaardigen van massavernietigingswapens (biologische, chemische en nucleaire wapens). Een Comité van de Veiligheidsraad wordt opgericht voor de duur van twee jaar. Uiterlijk binnen zes maanden dienen alle VN-lidstaten aan dit comité te rapporteren over de stappen die zij gezet hebben of zullen zetten om de resolutie uit te voeren.

b) De resolutie ondergraaft geenszins het internationaal recht, maar vormt veeleer een aanvulling op de bestaande bindende engagementen met voorstellen voor effectieve maatregelen ter ondersteuning van de naleving ervan. Ze benadrukt weliswaar het non-proliferatieaspect van de VMDproblematiek, omwille van acute en recente onrustwekkende ontwikkelingen op dat vlak, maar stelt helemaal niet de ontwapeningsengagementen in vraag. De tekst stelt immers expliciet dat ze op geen enkele wijze de bestaande regimes waartoe de landen zijn toegetreden kan of wil wijzigen, met name het verdrag op het verbod van chemische wapens, het verbod van biologische wapens, het non-proliferatieverdrag, het verdrag aangaande de fysieke bescherming van nucleaire materialen en de (niet-bindende) IAEA gedragscode aangaande de veiligheid en beveiliging van nucleaire materialen.

Bovendien moedigt de resolutie alle VN-lidstaten aan tot volledige naleving van de ontwapeningsverdragen en akkoorden waardoor zij gebonden zijn. Ons land had, tesamen met de EU-partners, hierop aangedrongen.

c) De Belgische regering voert overigens aangaande het non-proliferatieverdrag een beleid dat een evenwicht zoekt tussen de non-proliferatieverplichtingen, het recht op vreedzaam gebruik van nucleaire materialen en de ontwapeningsengagementen in artikel VI van het verdrag. Deze aanpak ligt aan de basis van de verschillende initiatieven die ons land heeft ontwikkeld op dit domein, weze het in het kader van de Ontwapeningsconferentie of tijdens het huidige voorbereidende proces op de Opgvolgingsconferentie van het Non-proliferatieverdrag voorzien in 2005. De ervaring heeft trouwens ten overvloede aangetoond dat enkel een evenwichtige uitvoering van de gemaakte afspraken, die destijds zelf het voorwerp vormden van zorgvuldige afwegingen tussen diverse vaak ver uit elkaar liggende standpunten, de grondslag kunnen vormen van een behoud en versteviging van het NPT en de eraan verbonden regimes.

d) De operationele elementen zoals hierboven geschetst sluiten eveneens aan bij de strategie van de Europese Unie ter bestrijding van de proliferatie van massavernietigingswapens, aangenomen door de Europese Raad in Thessaloniki in juni 2003.

Ook de Europese Unie is zich bewust van de noodzaak om concrete stappen te ondernemen in de strijd tegen deze proliferatie die immers een van de ernstigste bedreigingen van de internationale stabiliteit en veiligheid vormt. Dit werd door het EU-voorzitterschap, namens de lidstaten, nog benadrukt en onderbouwd met voorbeelden uit de concrete tenuitvoerlegging van het Actieplan van de EU op dit gebied. De EU heeft dan ook de resolutie van de Veiligheidsraad verwelkomd en aangekondigd concreet te zullen bijdragen tot de realisatie van de daarin vervatte doelstellingen en taken.

**Voorstel van Resolutie betreffende de verspreiding van nucleaire technologieën en nucleair materiaal**

ingediend door mevrouw Muriel Gerkens (Ecolo) en de heer Patrick Moriau (PS)

Doc 51 1234/001 – 22 juni 2004

**Toelichting**

DAMES EN HEREN,

De non-proliferatiegedachte maakt een crisis door. De afgelopen vijftien jaar heeft Pakistan, dat in 1998 zijn eerste tests met een atombom uitvoerde, in het geheim zijn nucleaire militaire technologie doorgespeeld aan ten minste drie landen: Libië, Iran en Noord-Korea.

Libië zou onder andere tientallen miljoenen dollars hebben betaald om de plannen te verwerven voor een atombom die China in de jaren zeventig al aan Pakistan had geleverd. Met Noord-Korea ruilde Pakistan zijn eigen nucleaire knowhow voor de Koreaanse knowhow inzake ballistische raketten. Zo ontstond met betrekking tot massavernietigingswapens een samenwerkingsprogramma dat meer dan vijftien jaar duurde.

Gary Samor, deskundige bij het in Londen gevestigde International Institute for Strategic Studies, bestempelt wat Pakistan doet als het ergste voorbeeld van proliferatie in de wereldgeschiedenis ( Libération van 9 februari 2004). A. Q. Khan, de «vader van de Pakistaanse atombom», heeft begin 2004 toegegeven dat hij jarenlang heeft meegewerkt aan de verspreiding van nucleaire technologie en zelfs van nucleair materiaal.

Mohammed El Baradei, directeur-generaal van het Internationaal Agentschap voor Atoomenergie (dat werkt onder auspiciën van de Verenigde Naties en dat 136 landen vertegenwoordigt), heeft op 12 februari 2004 in de New York Times verklaard dat:

- «zonder koerswijziging, de wereld zich in de vernietiging stort»;
- «het non-proliferatieverdrag moet worden verbeterd ».

Bij andere gelegenheden heeft hij verklaard dat:

- «het geval van dokter Khan slechts het topje van de ijsberg is»;
- «er een complex en zeer geavanceerd ondergronds netwerk bestaat, met actoren die actief zijn op een zwarte nucleaire markt»;
- «het gevaar voor een atoomoorlog nog nooit zo groot is geweest als vandaag».

Het vraagstuk van de verspreiding van nucleaire technologie en nucleair materiaal is dus sinds enkele weken uitgegroeid tot een van de grote internationale dossiers en moet al onze aandacht opeisen. De Pakistaanse kwestie is zeer verontrustend. Van in het begin is het Pakistaanse kernprogramma in de grootste onduidelijkheid gehuld geweest. Er is nooit controle op uitgeoefend door een burgerregering. Bovendien is Pakistan niet toegetreden tot het non-proliferatieverdrag (NPV), dat de hoeksteen vormt van de mondiale non-proliferatieregeling. Inmiddels is duidelijk geworden dat het Pakistaanse kernprogramma maar tot ontwikkeling is kunnen komen dankzij de steun van Westerse bedrijven en officiële instanties. Jammer genoeg treft ook België schuld.

Dokter Khan heeft een bijkomende opleiding gevolgd aan de universiteit van Leuven (KUL), waar hij het diploma van burgerlijk ingenieur heeft behaald. Hij zou verscheidene malen het Studiecentrum voor Kernenergie (SCK) in Mol hebben bezocht. Pakistaanse wetenschappers hebben in het SCK stages gelopen. Het bedrijf Belgonucleaire, waarin het SCK een participatie van 50 % had (én nog steeds heeft), zou belangrijke contracten met Pakistan hebben gesloten.

In maart 1986 zou een Belgische delegatie onder leiding van de directeur-generaal van het SCK een bezoek hebben gebracht aan het Pakistan Atomic Energy Committee (PAEC) en zou ze contact hebben gehad met medewerkers van dokter Khan. Drie jaar daarvoor had een Nederlandse rechtbank dokter Khan veroordeeld wegens diefstal van de schema's van centrifuges die bestemd waren voor de verrijking van uranium.

In februari 1987 schreef de heer René Constant, de toenmalige directeur-generaal van het Nationaal Instituut voor Radio-Elementen in Fleurus, een brief aan de – eveneens toenmalige - minister van Economische Zaken

Philippe Maystadt: « Toute personne bien informée connaît le danger inhérent à une collaboration intense avec un pays tel que le Pakistan. (...) Il s'agit sur papier de programmes civils, mais nous savons à quel point les technologies [civiles et militaires] s'interpénètrent et sont indissociables. (...) plusieurs des personnes rencontrées au Pakistan par la mission belge étaient directement impliquées dans les programmes militaires pakistano-libyens.»

De waarschuwingen van René Constant vonden weinig weerklank. Nog datzelfde jaar vertrok een officiële Belgische delegatie op handelsmissie naar Pakistan. De delegatie stond onder leiding van de toenmalige minister van Buitenlandse Handel Herman De Croo en was vergezeld van vertegenwoordigers van Belgatom (dochter van

Belgonucleaire en van Tractebel). Eveneens datzelfde jaar bracht de toenmalige minister van Buitenlandse Zaken Leo Tindemans een officieel bezoek aan Pakistan.

In 1998 hielden België en Duitsland op verzoek van de Nederlandse Economische Controledienst de uitvoer tegen van verdacht materiaal naar Pakistan door een Nederlands bedrijf. De illegale handel in kernmateriaal duurt dus voort.

In juli 1999 gaf de Belgische regering haar fiat voor de uitvoer van Belgische nucleaire technologie naar Pakistan (dossier Alstom/Kanupp). De regering die kort daarna aantrad, hield die uitvoer begin september 1999 tegen, maar een en ander toont aan dat er nog steeds intense handelscontacten bestaan tussen de Pakistaanse nucleaire sector en Belgische bedrijven.

Er rijst dus een gigantisch veiligheidsprobleem: een land dat beschikt over een atoombom en over een uitgebreide knowhow op nucleair gebied, heeft onderdak verleend (of doet dat wellicht nog steeds) aan een complex en geavanceerd netwerk van operatoren die actief zijn op een zwarte nucleaire markt. Wie kan zeggen dat die netwerken géén contact hebben gehad met misdaadorganisaties? Wie kan met zekerheid bevestigen dat die netwerken zijn ontmanteld? Vergeten we bovendien niet dat geen enkele inlichtingendienst ze heeft kunnen blootleggen. Ze werden immers indirect ontdekt, doordat Libië onlangs een opener beleid is gaan voeren. Welke garanties hebben we dat er géén nieuwe netwerken van illegale handel in nucleaire technologie kunnen ontstaan?

Het blijkt duidelijk dat ons land een gewichtige rol heeft gespeeld in de ontwikkeling van de Pakistaanse nucleaire sector. Ook in een recent verleden zijn er nog onrustwekkende pogingen ondernomen om Belgisch nucleair materiaal te leveren aan Pakistan.

De uitvoer van nucleaire technologie en nucleair materiaal vereist niet alleen een uitvoervergunning, maar ook de toestemming van de minister die bevoegd is voor energie en die zijn of haar toestemming pas kan geven na een advies terzake van de Commissie van advies voor de niet-verspreiding van kernwapens (CANVEK). Die commissie bekleedt dus een sleutelpositie in de strijd tegen de verspreiding van kernwapens. De controle op de uitvoer is in handen van de economische inspectie (FOD Economie, KMO, Middenstand en Energie). Voorts werd een reeks taken inzake de strijd tegen de verspreiding van kernwapens toevertrouwd aan het Federaal agentschap voor nucleaire controle. Het lijkt echter te ontbreken aan enige structurele en systematische coördinatie tussen de werkzaamheden van de CANVEK, de economische inspectie en het Federaal Agentschap voor nucleaire controle.

Bovendien is er kennelijk geen sprake van samenwerking met de inlichtingendiensten, waarvoor in deze dossiers nochtans óók een rol is weggelegd.

Derhalve rijzen verschillende vragen:

- wie in ons land heeft in het verleden meegewerkt aan de ontwikkeling van de Pakistaanse nucleaire sector?
- beschikken we vandaag over alle mogelijke waarborgen dat onze wetgeving inzake non-proliferatie wordt geëerbiedigd? is er voldoende coördinatie tussen de verschillende, terzake bevoegde instanties?
- volgen de inlichtingendiensten dat dossier voldoende?

Gelet op het belang van het dossier moet elk land zijn verantwoordelijkheid op zich nemen en er alles aan doen om de strijd tegen de verspreiding van kernwapens op te voeren. Dag geldt zeker voor ons land, als men bedenkt welke rol het gedurende decennia in dit dossier heeft gespeeld en welke nucleaire knowhow het heeft opgebouwd.

Na het SCK-schandaal heeft een onderzoekscommissie zich in 1988 gebogen over de nucleaire dossiers, maar het onderdeel over de non-proliferatie en de samenwerking met Pakistan zijn toen slechts summier aan bod gekomen.

Aan de vooravond van de - voor 2005 geplande - onderhandelingen over een nieuw verdrag inzake de niet-verspreiding van kernwapens (waarbij het de bedoeling zou moeten zijn de controlemaatregelen aan te scherpen) heeft het Europees Parlement op 26 februari 2004 een resolutie betreffende de nucleaire ontwapening aangenomen (B5-0101/2004). In die resolutie:

- herinnert het Parlement eraan dat de Europese Unie de totale afschaffing van de kernwapens beoogt en dat ze van de landen die - al dan niet aangegeven - kernwapens bezitten, verwacht dat zij zich actief voor die doelstelling inzetten en dat zij verdere stappen zetten naar de reductie en de uitbanning van de kernwapens;
- vraagt het Parlement de lidstaten met aandrang specifiek aandacht te besteden aan «nieuwe initiatieven op het gebied van nucleaire ontwapening en aan de revitalisering van de VN-ontwapeningsconferentie»;
- verzoekt het Parlement «alle landen, en met name de kernwapenlanden, geen steun te verlenen aan landen die streven naar de verwerving van nucleaire wapens of andere nucleaire explosieven, noch hen tot koop aan te zetten».

Het is van belang rekening te houden met al die aspecten waaruit, zowel internationaal als Europees – de wil blijkt om de strijd aan te binden tegen de verspreiding van kernwapens. Om die reden behoort ook de verontrustende kwestie van de eventuele betrokkenheid van België bij de uitbouw van de Pakistaanse nucleaire sector te worden onderzocht.

Bijgevolg zijn wij van mening dat het raadzaam ware een inventaris op te maken van de Belgische samenwerking met Pakistan in de nucleaire sector, alsook de betrokken diensten door te lichten.

Dit voorstel van resolutie moet een eerste aanzet zijn tot een uitklaring van die kwestie, doordat de regering erin wordt gevraagd voormelde inventaris op te maken en binnen zes maanden aan de Kamer van volksvertegenwoordigers te bezorgen.

### **Voorstel van resolutie**

DE KAMER VAN VOLKSVERTEGENWOORDIGERS,

- A. gelet op het Verdrag inzake de niet-verspreiding van kernwapens;
- B. gelet op het Verdrag tot oprichting van de Europese Gemeenschap voor Atoomenergie;
- C. gelet op de Overeenkomst tussen de Republiek Oostenrijk, het Koninkrijk België, het Koninkrijk Denemarken, de Republiek Finland, de Bondsrepubliek Duitsland, de Helleense Republiek, Ierland, de Italiaanse Republiek, het Groothertogdom Luxemburg, het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, de Portugese Republiek, het Koninkrijk Spanje, het Koninkrijk Zweden, de Europese Gemeenschap voor Atoomenergie en de Internationale Organisatie voor Atoomenergie ter uitvoering van artikel III, leden 1 en 4, van het Verdrag inzake de nietverspreiding van kernwapens;
- D. overwegende dat Pakistan, dat sinds 1998 over een atoombom beschikt, betrokken is in de illegale handel in nucleaire technologie;
- E. overwegende dat Pakistan zijn nucleaire technologie en know-how deels dankzij België heeft verworven;

VRAAGT DE REGERING,

- I. een inventaris op te maken van de samenwerking op nucleair vlak tussen België en Pakistan, waarbij bijzondere aandacht moet uitgaan naar het Studiecentrum voor Kernenergie en de Belgische bedrijven die in die sector actief zijn;
- II. die inventaris binnen zes maanden na de goedkeuring van deze resolutie aan de Kamer van volksvertegenwoordigers te bezorgen.

*Status: in behandeling in de Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers*

### Belgische Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers

#### **Vraag van de heer Koen T'Sijen aan de minister van Landsverdediging over "de modernisering van de WS3-bunkers op Kleine Brogel"**

nr. 3601 – 15 september 2004

01.01 **Koen T'Sijen** (sp.a-spirit): De Amerikaanse luchtmacht heeft met het bedrijf *Atlantic CommTech* een contract afgesloten om twaalf kernwapenopslagplaatsen in Europa te moderniseren, waaronder ook Kleine Brogel. De modernisering wordt betaald uit het algemeen NAVO-budget.

Kan de minister die informatie bevestigen? Klopt het dat de modernisering de opslag van kernwapens tot 2018 mogelijk maakt? Welke houding heeft België aangenomen bij de beslissing om de bunkers te moderniseren? Welke instanties waren daarbij betrokken?

Op grond van welke bilaterale akkoorden is een dergelijke operatie mogelijk? Kunnen deze akkoorden worden herzien? Heeft de minister daartoe al enig initiatief genomen? Is de modernisering niet in tegenspraak met het regeerakkoord, dat voorziet in een vermindering van het aantal kernwapens in ons land?

01.02 Minister **André Flahaut** (*Nederlands*): De NAVO heeft recent een modernisering van de harde software voor de nucleaire opslagcapaciteit in Europa goedgekeurd. Deze opslagplaatsen worden geregeld gemoderniseerd om te voldoen aan de strengste veiligheids- en beveiligingsnormen. Om die reden heeft België geen bezwaar tegen deze operatie. De VS zijn in NAVO-verband bevoegd voor deze materie, en hebben dus het recht hiervoor contracten af te sluiten. België draagt bij aan deze operatie via zijn bijdrage aan de algemene NAVO-begroting.

De modernisering staat los van de bilaterale akkoorden, omdat ze NAVO-installaties betreft. België heeft niet de bedoeling om zijn verantwoordelijkheden in NAVO-verband te ontlopen. De NAVO heeft zijn nucleair arsenaal al met 85 procent verminderd sinds het einde van de Koude Oorlog. Als dit onderwerp opnieuw ter sprake komt, zal België de doelstellingen van het regeerakkoord verdedigen.

01.03 **Koen T'Sijen** (sp.a-spirit): Heeft de minister er een idee van wanneer de operatie precies zal plaatsvinden?

01.04 Minister **André Flahaut** (*Nederlands*): Dat zal ik opzoeken.

### Belgische Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers

## **Vraag van de heer Koen T'Sijen aan de minister van Buitenlandse Zaken over "de Belgische houding ten aanzien van de resolutie van de New Agenda Coalition"**

nr. P547 – 28 oktober 2004

08.01 **Koen T'Sijen** (sp.a-spirit): Mijnheer de voorzitter, mijnheer de minister, collega's, morgen ligt er in het First Committee van de Verenigde Naties een resolutie over verdere nucleaire ontwapening ter stemming voor. De resolutie werd ingediend door de New Agenda Coalition, een coalitie van een zestal landen, en heeft op dit moment toch een zeker belang. Ik weet ook wel dat het First Committee van de Verenigde Naties een babbelclub is, maar op dit moment liggen de zaken anders.

In het verleden heeft België zich bij deze resolutie doorgaans onthouden, wellicht omwille van voorzichtige diplomatieke redenen.

Vandaag zijn er echter enkele belangrijke redenen om dat niet te doen. Een eerste reden is de paragraaf in de resolutie die verwijst naar de vermindering van de niet-strategische nucleaire wapens. Ik lees dat als: Kleine Brogel.

Een andere belangrijke reden is dat we aan de vooravond staan van de toetsingsconferentie van het non-proliferatieverdrag, in 2005. Aan de vooravond van zo'n conferentie is het van belang dat België een ernstig diplomatiek signaal geeft door deze resolutie mee te ondersteunen. Uw Nederlandse collega, de heer Bot, heeft in de Nederlandse Tweede Kamer verklaard deze resolutie mee te zullen ondersteunen. Ik geloof dat het ook de eerste keer is dat Nederland dat zal doen.

Mijn concrete vraag: wat zal de houding van België zijn wanneer deze resolutie ter stemming voorligt? Was er overleg met landen binnen de Europese Unie of binnen het kader van de NAVO? Zijn er misschien andere initiatieven die wij kunnen nemen in het kader van de nucleaire ontwapening?

08.02 **Minister Karel De Gucht**: België heeft steeds een zeer proactieve rol gespeeld in de non-proliferatie. We hebben trouwens samen met Nederland en Noorwegen een werkdocument voorgelegd over de centrale uitdagingen inzake nucleaire non-proliferatie en ontwapening. Dat werkdocument heeft trouwens inspirerend gewerkt op de landen van de New Agenda Coalition: Brazilië, Egypte, Ierland, Mexico, Nieuw-Zeeland, Zuid-Afrika en Zweden. De resolutie die nu door hen werd voorgelegd in de eerste commissie van de Algemene Vergadering sluit trouwens aan bij de voorstellen uit ons werkdocument en bevat daartoe een aantal werkbare oplossingen.

Het is mijns inziens dan ook normaal dat wij deze resolutie zullen steunen en dus goedkeuren. Het is een resolutie die oproept tot de universalisering van het non-proliferatieverdrag en de ratificatie van het Kernstopverdrag, met een versnelling van het nucleair ontwapeningsproces, een reductie van de arsenalen van de tactische nucleaire wapens en het afzien van de ontwikkeling van eventuele nieuwe types van nucleaire wapens. Deze resolutie dringt ook aan op een snel opstarten van de onderhandelingen in de VN-Ontwapeningsconferentie en onderstreept het belang van de principes van onomkeerbaarheid, transparantie en efficiënte verificatie.

Wij zullen deze resolutie steunen. Ik denk dat deze resolutie komt op een zeer belangrijk moment: één van de heetste politieke hangijzers in de komende maanden zal net die non-proliferatie zijn, met name voor Iran. Er groeit momenteel een groot conflict in Iran, dat bijzonder schoorvoetend ingaat op de grote bemiddelingspoging die wordt ondernomen door Frankrijk, Duitsland en Engeland teneinde een oplossing te vinden voor wat zich op het militaire vlak in Iran thans afspeelt.

In de komende weken, op 21 november als mijn geheugen mij niet in de steek laat, moet dit worden besproken binnen het Internationaal Atoomagentschap. Het valt niet uit te sluiten dat er daarna een escalatie komt met een behandeling in de Veiligheidsraad en wat daar eventueel kan op volgen. Iran stelt zich immers inderdaad vrij weigerachtig op ten opzichte van de toch vrij genereuze bemiddelingspoging die vanuit Europees oogpunt wordt ondernomen.

De resolutie komt op een geschikt moment want ik vrees eerlijk gezegd dat de internationale actualiteit in de volgende zes maanden zal worden overschaduwed door de discussie over het al dan niet nucleaire programma van Iran.

08.03 **Koen T'Sijen** (sp.a-spirit): Mijnheer de minister, ik ben zeer verheugd met uw antwoord. Ik vind dit een belangrijke diplomatieke stap. Ik ben ook blij dat België in de voorbereidende fase aan de kar heeft getrokken om die resolutie af te stemmen op de discussie over de non-proliferatie.

Belgische Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers

### **Voorstel van resolutie betreffende het beleid inzake non-proliferatie en nucleaire ontwapening**

ingediend door de heren Dirk Van der Maelen, Patrick Moriau, Koen T'Sijen, Melchior Wathelet en de dames Muriel Gerkens, Nathalie Muylle, en Hilde Vautmans – 12 januari 2005

## **Toelichting**

Kernwapens vormen één van de ernstigste bedreigingen van de mensheid. Om dit gevaar te bezweren werd getracht met het non-proliferatieverdrag de situatie te bevriezen om vervolgens door stapsgewijze ontwapening te komen tot een kernwapenvrije wereld. De indieners van deze resolutie zijn van mening dat ook een klein land als België een diplomatieke rol hierbij kan spelen, zoals reeds werd bewezen bij het landmijnenverdrag.

In mei 2005 vindt in New-York de NPT Review conferentie plaats, waar de naleving van het non-proliferatieverdrag wordt getoetst en verdere stappen worden afgesproken ter uitvoering van dit verdrag.

Dit non-proliferatieverdrag ligt de jongste jaren fel onder vuur. India, Pakistan en Noord-Korea hebben in het laatste decennium kernwapens ontwikkeld. Iran is er mogelijk ook aan begonnen, terwijl Israël, buiten het NPTkader, al meer dan 30 jaar kernwapens bezit. Een netwerk van illegale handel in nucleair materiaal werd ontdekt. De geloofwaardigheid van het verdrag wordt ook ondergraven door het trage tempo van de nucleaire ontwapening.

De kans is reëel dat bepaalde landen dit verdrag opzeggen, zoals gebeurd door Noord-Korea, of minstens niet meer naleven. Daarom lijkt het ons nodig het belang van dit verdrag en onze daaruit voortvloeiende verbintenissen te bevestigen. Om dit verdrag in stand te houden vragen wij de regering diplomatieke inspanningen te leveren op deze Review conferentie. Om de geloofwaardigheid van dit verdrag en de bijbehorende toetsingsconferentie te behouden, is een resultaat nodig, onder de vorm van een duidelijke agenda voor ontwapening.

Het non-proliferatieverdrag staat niet op zich en de versterking ervan hangt samen met het voeren van een coherente politiek gericht op nucleaire ontwapening en non-proliferatie in andere fora zoals de NAVO en de EU.

De overwegingen in de resolutie geven de internationale context en de gemaakte afspraken weer in het kader van de toetsingsprocedure die is bepaald in het nonproliferatieverdrag.

De Kamer bevestigt haar verbondenheid aan het verdrag en vraagt de regering bij te dragen aan de totstandkoming van een striktere ontwapeningsagenda op de volgende NPT Review conferentie.

Eveneens wordt de regering gevraagd om een hiermee coherent beleid te voeren in andere fora zoals de NAVO en de EU, en worden daartoe een reeks concrete voorstellen gedaan. Deze resolutie bouwt voort op de resolutie bij de NPT Review Conference die werd aangenomen door Kamer in 2001 en op de engagementen die werden opgenomen in het regeerakkoord.

Dirk VAN DER MAELEN (sp.a-spirit); Patrick MORIAU (PS); Koen T'SIJEN (sp.a-spirit); Melchior WATHELET (CDH); Muriel GERKENS(ECOLO); Nathalie MUYLLE (CD&V); Hilde VAUTMANS (VLD)

## **Voorstel van resolutie**

DE KAMER VAN VOLKSVERTEGENWOORDIGERS,

A. overwegende dat in april-mei 2005 een nieuwe toetsingsconferentie plaatsvindt van het nonproliferatieverdrag ( NPT Review Conference);

B. overwegende dat tijdens de vorige toetsingsconferentie van het non-proliferatieverdrag in 2000 het slotdocument werd aanvaard met consensus en daarbij akkoord werd gegaan met de volgende praktische stappen:

– het belang en dringendheid van handtekeningen en ratificaties, zonder oponthoud of voorwaarden en volgens de grondwettelijke procedures, om een snelle inwerkingtreding te verwezenlijken van het Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty;

– een moratorium op kernproeven tot aan de inwerkingtreding van dit verdrag;

– de noodzakelijkheid van onderhandelingen in de Conference on Disarmament voor een niet-discriminerend, multilateraal, internationaal en effectief verifieerbaar verdrag dat de productie verbiedt van splijtbaar materiaal voor kernwapens of andere nucleaire explosieve tuigen.

Dit verdrag moet in overeenstemming zijn met de verklaring van de speciale coördinator in 1995 en het daarin vervatte mandaat en het moet zowel nucleaire ontwapening als nucleaire non-proliferatie in overweging nemen.

Aan de Conference on Disarmament wordt gevraagd om een werkprogramma op te stellen dat de onmiddellijke start bevat van onderhandelingen. Na vijf jaar zou men deze moeten kunnen sluiten;

– de noodzakelijkheid om binnen de Conference on Disarmament een gepaste ondergeschikte structuur op te richten die zich moet bezighouden met nucleaire ontwapening.

De Conference on Disarmament wordt gevraagd om een werkprogramma op te stellen dat de onmiddellijke oprichting omvat van een dergelijke structuur;

– het onomkeerbaarheidsprincipe toe te passen op nucleaire ontwapening en ook op nucleaire en andere verbonden wapenbeheersings- en reductiemaatregelen;

– de kernwapenstaten ondubbelzinnig te laten streven naar de volledige eliminatie van hun nucleaire arsenalen.

Alle verdragsluitende staten zijn daartoe verplicht in artikel VI;

- START II snel in werking te laten treden en volledig te implementeren en START III zo snel mogelijk te sluiten. Het behoud en de versterking van het ABMverdrag als hoeksteen van strategische stabiliteit en als basis voor verdere reducties van strategische offensieve wapens, in overeenstemming met haar bepalingen;
  - de voltooiing en implementatie van het trilateraal Initiatief tussen de VS, de Russische federatie en het IAEA;
  - alle kernwapenstaten moeten stappen nemen die leiden tot nucleaire ontwapening. Deze vergroot de internationale stabiliteit en is gebaseerd op het principe van onverminderde veiligheid voor allen;
  - de kernwapenstaten moeten verdere inspanningen leveren om hun kernwapenarsenalen unilateraal te verminderen;
  - meer transparantie van de kernwapenstaten over hun kernwapencapaciteiten en de implementering van akkoorden ingevolge artikel VI en als een vrijwillige vertrouwenwekkende maatregel ter bevordering van nucleaire ontwapening;
  - de verdere reductie van niet-strategische kernwapens, gebaseerd op unilaterale initiatieven die integraal deel uitmaken van de nucleaire wapenverminderingen en het ontwapeningsproces;
  - concrete overeengekomen maatregelen om de operationele status van kernwapensystemen verder te verlagen;
  - een kleinere rol voor kernwapens om het risico te minimaliseren dat deze wapens ooit zullen worden gebruikt en het vergemakkelijken van hun totale eliminatie;
  - zo snel mogelijk alle kernwapenstaten te betrekken bij het totaal elimineren van hun kernwapens;
  - zo snel als praktisch mogelijk splijtbaar materiaal dat is bestempeld als niet meer nodig voor militaire doeleinden onder IAEA of ander relevant internationaal toezicht te plaatsen en de opslag te regelen van dergelijk materiaal voor vredelievende doeleinden om ervoor te zorgen dat dergelijk materiaal permanent buiten militaire programma's blijft;
  - het herbevestigen van het uiteindelijke doel van de inspanningen van staten in het ontwapeningsproces met name de algemene en volledige ontwapening onder effectieve internationale controle;
  - het opstellen van regelmatige rapporten, binnen het raamwerk van het versterkte NPT toetsingsproces, door alle verdragsluitende staten over de implementatie van artikel VI en paragraaf 4 (c) van de Beslissing uit 1995 over «Principes en doelstellingen voor nucleaire nonproliferatie en ontwapening» en de Advisory Opinion van het Internationaal Gerechtshof op 8 juli 1996 in acht nemend;
  - de verdere ontwikkeling van verificatiecapaciteiten om zeker te zijn van de naleving van nucleaire ontwapeningsakkoorden voor een wereld zonder kernwapens;
- C. overwegende dat de uitvoering van het nonproliferatieverdrag en de tijdens de toetsingsconferentie in 2000 afgesproken stappen, gebrekkig bleek in de voorbije jaren;
- D. overwegende dat het voortbestaan van het nonproliferatieverdrag en de strikte naleving ervan noodzakelijk is voor de internationale vrede en veiligheid;
- E. overwegende dat India, Pakistan en Israël het nonproliferatieverdrag niet hebben ondertekend en kernwapens hebben ontwikkeld, Noord-Korea uit het nonproliferatieverdrag is gestapt en kernwapens heeft ontwikkeld, Iran mogelijk kernwapens ontwikkelt en in elk geval in gebreke bleef bij zijn aangifte- en verificatieverplichtingen;
- F. overwegende dat een netwerk van illegale handel in nucleaire materialen gerund door de Pakistaan Abdul Qadeer Khan aan het licht kwam;
- G. overwegende dat de directeur-generaal van de IAEA, de heer El-Baradei stelt dat verdergaande maatregelen nodig zijn voor non-proliferatie en voor nucleaire ontwapening om het non-proliferatieverdrag in stand te houden; dat hij daarbij enerzijds maatregelen voorstelt om verificatie en controle op de civiele kernenergie te versterken en illegale handel te bestrijden in nucleair materiaal; dat hij anderzijds een stappenplan voorstelt voor nucleaire ontwapening en dat hij stelt dat «We must abandon the unworkable notion that it is morally reprehensible for some countries to pursue weapons of mass destruction yet morally acceptable for others to rely on them for security - and indeed to continue to refine their capacities and postulate plans for their use.»;
- H. overwegende dat artikel 6 van het nonproliferatieverdrag stelt: «Elk van de partijen bij dit verdrag verbindt zich ertoe, te goeder trouw onderhandelingen te voeren omtrent doeltreffende maatregelen met betrekking tot spoedige beëindiging van de nucleaire bewapeningswedloop en tot nucleaire ontwapening en omtrent een verdrag inzake algemene en volledige ontwapening onder strenge en doeltreffende internationale controle.»;
- I. overwegende dat het Internationaal Gerechtshof in zijn Advisory Opinion van 8 juli 1996 stelt : «Er bestaat een verplichting om te goeder trouw onderhandelingen te voeren en tot een einde te brengen welke leiden tot nucleaire ontwapening in al haar aspecten onder strenge en doeltreffende internationale controle.»;
- J. overwegende de resolutie van de Kamer van 18 mei 2000 inzake nucleaire ontwapening en de houding van België op de toetsingsconferentie van het nonproliferatieverdrag;
- K. overwegende dat het regeerakkoord stelt als één van de krachtlijnen voor het NAVO-beleid: «de vermindering van het aantal kernwapens; de NAVO kan hiertoe bijdragen door geen kernwapens op te stellen in de nieuwe NAVO-lidstaten en door het kernwapenarsenaal verder af te bouwen in de huidige NAVO-landen; de regering zal binnen de NAVO pleiten voor meer transparantie over de nucleaire strategie;»;



L. overwegende dat er op de toetsingsconferentie van het non-proliferatieverdrag in 2005 slechts resultaten zullen worden geboekt als er in de diverse fora waar deze thema's aan bod komen een coherent beleid wordt gevoerd voor non-proliferatie en nucleaire ontwapening;

M. bevestigt haar verbondenheid aan het nonproliferatieverdrag;

VRAAGT DE FEDERALE DE REGERING:

1. alle inspanningen te doen om het nonproliferatieverdrag te behouden en de naleving te verzekeren in al haar aspecten;
2. op de toetsingsconferentie van het nonproliferatieverdrag (NPT Review Conference) in 2005 te komen tot een striktere ontwapeningsagenda en concrete afspraken te maken voor de komende vijf jaar;
3. een beleidsplan op te stellen voor nucleaire ontwapening en non-proliferatie met betrekking tot de inspanningen in de diverse internationale fora;
4. erop toe te zien dat initiatieven voor non-proliferatie ook een duidelijke ontwapeningscomponent bevatten;
5. ervoor te zorgen dat binnen de NAVO, conform de afspraken op de toetsingsconferentie van het nonproliferatieverdrag van 2000, praktische stappen worden overwogen voor nucleaire ontwapening;
6. bij de NAVO initiatieven ter sprake te brengen in verband met:
  - a. de herziening van strategische doctrines;
  - b. de graduele terugtrekking van de Amerikaanse tactische kernwapens uit Europa met het oog op het realiseren van artikel 6 NPT;
  - c. het toepassen van het onomkeerbaarheidsbeginsel via het juridisch bindend maken van de niet-aanwezigheid van kernwapens in de nieuwe lidstaten van de NAVO;
  - d. het opzetten van een kernwapenvrije zone, bestaande uit alle niet-kernwapenstaten in Europa;
  - e. een verdergaande transparantie dan de huidige praktijk;
7. binnen de EU:
  - a. in het kader van het beleid ter bestrijding van de verspreiding van massavernietigingswapens dit beleid te ondersteunen, dit actief mee te ontwikkelen ondermeer door nucleaire ontwapening en de in Europa aanwezige massavernietigingswapens ter sprake te brengen en de voorgestelde maatregelen inzake handel in nucleair materiaal en mogelijke dragers van kernwapens zo snel mogelijk uit te voeren;
  - b. in het kader van het gemeenschappelijk veiligheids- en defensiebeleid initiatieven te nemen om elke rol van kernwapens in dit beleid uit te sluiten;
8. om op en in de voorbereiding van de toetsingsconferentie van het non-proliferatieverdrag van 2005 initiatieven te ondersteunen in verband met:
  - a. de versterking van het verdrag over het verbod op kernproeven (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)) en de ratificatie ervan;
  - b. het onderhandelen van een verdrag dat de verdere productie verbiedt van splijtstof voor kernwapens;
  - c. de herziening van strategische doctrines;
  - d. interim-maatregelen om accidenteel afvuren van kernwapens te voorkomen;
  - e. verificatie, transparantie en vertrouwenwekkende maatregelen;
  - f. het opzetten van kernwapenvrije zones;
  - g. het opnemen van de negatieve veiligheidsgaranties in een bindend juridisch instrument;
  - h. de bestrijding van illegale handel in nucleair materiaal;
9. om in andere multilaterale organisaties initiatieven gericht op non-proliferatie en nucleaire ontwapening te ondersteunen en te nemen.

Belgische Senaat

### **Voorstel van resolutie betreffende de Conferentie over het non-proliferatieverdrag 2005**

Ingediend door de heer François Roelants du Vivier – 16 februari 2005

#### **Toelichting**

Sinds het einde van de Koude Oorlog staat de strijd tegen de verspreiding van massavernietigingswapens, de kernwapens in het bijzonder, centraal op de veiligheidsagenda van de belangrijkste internationale instanties. De meest in het oog springende voorbeelden daarvan zijn de dossiers inzake Irak en Noord-Korea, de groepering van het sovjet-arsenaal op Russisch grondgebied, de verlenging voor onbepaalde duur van het non-proliferatieverdrag (NPT) in 1995, de Indiase en Pakistaanse kernproeven in 1998, de toegenomen vrees voor niet-conventionele terroristische aanvallen na de aanslagen van 11 september 2001, en de vragen bij de relevantie van de Amerikaanse inlichtingen over het Iraaks wapenarsenaal in 2003-2004.

Als voornaamste internationale wetgevende instantie, zowel wat betreft de uitwerking van juridische normen als het toezicht op de naleving ervan, moet de Veiligheidsraad de verantwoordelijkheid dragen die het Handvest van de

Verenigde Naties hem heeft toegewezen : in een verklaring van 31 januari 1992, stelt de Veiligheidsraad dat de proliferatie een « bedreiging vormt voor de vrede en de internationale veiligheid in de zin van hoofdstuk VII van het Handvest ».

Na de eerste Golfoorlog (1991) komt de strijd tegen de proliferatie van kernwapens dan ook in een stroomversnelling dank zij een aantal successen :

— tussen 1990 en 1995 ondertekenen 38 Staten, waaronder Frankrijk en China, de 14 voormalige Sovjetrepublieken, Zuid-Afrika en Argentinië het NPT; in december 1994 zijn alleen India, Pakistan en Israël geen partij bij het Verdrag;

— de inspectie- en controlemaatregelen van het IAEA (Internationaal Agentschap voor Atoomenergie) worden in 1992 en 1997 aangescherpt (aanvullend protocol van het IAEA) om een routinecontrole om te vormen tot een intrusiecontrole;

— de Groep van Nucleaire Exportlanden (NSG), die in 1978 is opgericht, verscherpt zijn regels inzake de export van kerntechnologie, door een volledige controle door het IAEA in te voeren en een lijst op te stellen van gecontroleerd materiaal voor duaal gebruik;

— ten slotte heeft de nucleaire ontwapening grote vooruitgang geboekt dank zij de Start I en Start II-verdragen die de Russische en Amerikaanse arsenalen beperken tot 3000 en 3500 kernkoppen en intercontinentale meerkoppige raketten (ICBM MIRV) verbieden; de Fransen en de Britten verminderen ook hun kernarsenaal; er komt een feitelijk moratorium op kernproeven;

— het Verdrag van Bangkok over de nucleaire ontwapening in Zuidoost-Azië en het Verdrag van Pelindaba over de nucleaire ontwapening van Afrika worden gesloten.

Al die maatregelen samen, waarvan sommige nadien nog aangescherpt worden (de inspectie- en controlemaatregelen van het IAEA) of integendeel geschrapt (de afschaffing van de ICBM-kernkopraketten), die op de herzieningsconferentie (RevCom) van het NPT zijn samengebracht, vormen een hoogtepunt in de strijd tegen de nucleaire proliferatie.

Sindsdien moet men echter met enige bezorgdheid vaststellen dat de verlenging voor onbepaalde duur van het NPT in 1995 een halt heeft toegeroepen aan die dynamiek :

— het Start II-verdrag, dat de Doema laattijdig geratificeerd had, wordt nietig verklaard door de terugtrekking van Rusland als antwoord op de opzegging van het ABM-verdrag door de Amerikanen (13 december 2001),

— het Verdrag tot algehele uitbanning van kernproeven (CTBT) is nog niet in werking getreden,

— de onderhandelingen voor het Verdrag inzake het verbod om splijtstoffen te produceren voor militair gebruik zijn sinds augustus 1998 nooit echt van start gegaan;

— Noord-Korea heeft in april 2003 gebruik gemaakt van zijn recht om uit het NPT te stappen,

— de verwarring rond het Iraakse kernwapendossier heeft vragen doen rijzen over de kwaliteit van de inlichtingen en de rol van de inspecteurs,

— de onzekerheid betreffende de Iraanse ambities en het uitblijven van een regionale analyse van de nucleaire proliferatie blijven verontrustend,

— de Ontwapeningsconferentie van Genève ligt al vijf jaar stil.

Al die gebeurtenissen brengen de dynamiek van de nucleaire ontwapening in gevaar.

1. De herzieningsconferentie van 1995 : de verlenging voor onbepaalde duur van het NPT :

Het NPT, de juridische hoeksteen van de nucleaire non-proliferatie en ontwapening, werd ondertekend op 1 juli 1968 (inwerkingtreding : 5 maart 1970). Artikel X.2 ervan bepaalt : « vijftig jaar na de inwerkingtreding van het verdrag, wordt een conferentie bijeengeroepen om te beslissen of het verdrag voor onbepaalde tijd in werking blijft, dan wel verlengd wordt voor een of meer bijkomende termijnen van bepaalde duur ».

Die conferentie vond plaats van 17 april tot 12 mei 1995. Er werden verschillende juridische en politieke beslissingen genomen, en een overeenkomst werd bereikt over een resolutie betreffende het Midden-Oosten.

A. De juridische beslissing betreft de verlenging voor onbepaalde duur van het TNP (NPT/CONF.1995/32/DEC.3).

B. Twee andere beslissingen hebben een belangrijke politieke invloed omdat zij beschouwd worden als een tegenprestatie voor de landen die geen kernwapens bezitten :

— de versterking van het onderzoeksproces van het Verdrag (NPT/CONF.1995/32/DEC.1) : een voorbereidend comité (PrepCom) wordt elk van de drie jaren vóór de vijfjarige onderzoeksconferentie gehouden; elk comité duurt twee weken en kan behalve procedurekwesties ook zaken ten gronde behandelen; dat moet leiden tot aanbevelingen voor de vijfjarige conferentie die een retrospectieve en prospectieve balans moet opmaken van de uitvoering van het NPT, aangeven welke factoren de toepassing ervan bevorderen en toezien op de algemene gelding ervan.

— Een lijst van doelstellingen (NPT/CONF.1995/32/DEC.1) die de inzet moet vormen van toekomstige onderhandelingen over ontwapening en non-proliferatie. Uit de vorderingen in de afhandeling van die punten kan dan concreet afgeleid worden hoever het staat met het non-proliferatieproces.

Die doelstellingen zijn de volgende :

1. universele gelding van het NPT;

2. nucleaire ontwapening, maar zonder kader noch tijdschema; het behoud van de moratoria op de kernproeven en het sluiten van het CTBT ten laatste in 1996; onmiddellijke onderhandelingen en het spoedig sluiten van een verdrag inzake de stopzetting van de productie van splijtstoffen voor militaire doeleinden;
3. kernvrije zones, met een bijgevoegde verklaring die oproept om een kernvrije zone in het Midden-Oosten op te richten;
4. de veiligheidswaarborgen in resolutie 984 van de Veiligheidsraad moeten opgenomen worden in een internationaal verdrag;
5. verscherpte controles van het IAEA via de « 93+2 »-onderhandelingen;
6. de erkenning en universele toepassing door de conferentie van de integrale controle op de nucleaire transfers naar Staten die geen kernwapens bezitten;
7. het herbevestigen van het recht op een vreedzaam gebruik van kernenergie, opgenomen in artikel VI van het NPT.

2. De herzieningsconferentie 2000 (24 april tot 19 mei 2000) :

Begin 1999 loopt het ontwapeningsproces spaak. Tijdens de twee voorgaande jaren heeft de ontwapeningsconferentie van Genève haar werkprogramma niet stopgezet. De enige beslissing die in 1999 is genomen, is de oprichting van twee *ad hoc*-comités betreffende de negatieve veiligheidswaarborgen en het CTBT. De voorbereidende comités van 1997, 1998 en 1999 hebben weliswaar enkele procedurekwesties kunnen regelen en ook inhoudelijke kwesties zijn ter sprake gebracht, evenwel zonder enige vooruitgang te boeken inzake ontwapening, het verdrag betreffende de splijtstoffen en de oprichting van een kernvrije zone in het Midden-Oosten. Met andere woorden zijn de voorbereidende comités niet bij machte geweest de nieuwe bevoegdheden die hen in 1995 werden toegekend, te benutten.

Dat falen is te verklaren door de internationale context : het optreden van de NAVO in Kosovo en de vertraging in de goedkeuring van Start II door Rusland, de moeizame betrekkingen tussen de VS en China na het bombardement van de Chinese ambassade in Belgrado en de onthullingen van het verslag-Cox over de Chinese nucleaire spionage, de publicatie van een nieuw strategisch concept voor de NAVO, de Amerikaanse plannen voor een rakettschild en het opzeggen van het ABM-verdrag, de gevechten in Kasjmir en de publicatie van de Indiase doctrine inzake kernwapens, de spanningen tussen de beide Korea's, de impasse in het dossier-Irak in de Veiligheidsraad en het niet-ratificeren van het CTBT door de Amerikaanse Senaat.

De vijfjarige onderzoeksconferentie van het NPT 2000 was dus de gelegenheid om vast te stellen wat de stand is van het non-proliferatiebeleid en welke debatten daarover in de internationale gemeenschap gevoerd worden. Die conferentie heeft weliswaar waarborgen kunnen bieden over de betrouwbaarheid van de internationale non-proliferatiemaatregelen maar heeft ook de opkomst van niet-staatsgebonden actoren vastgesteld, alsmede de aanhoudende problemen in een aantal onbesliste debatten betreffende de proliferatie en de kernontwapening.

De conferentie heeft op 20 mei 2000 *in extremis* overeenstemming kunnen bereiken over een einddocument (NPT/ONF.2000/28), waarin 13 verbintenissen vervat zijn :

1. Een zo spoedig mogelijke inwerkingtreding van het CTBT;
2. Het behoud van de unilaterale moratoria op kernproeven in afwachting van de inwerkingtreding van het CTBT;
3. Trachten een consensus te vinden binnen de ontwapeningsconferentie om een werkprogramma goed te keuren, dat leidt tot het openen van onderhandelingen betreffende het verdrag inzake het verbod op de productie van splijtstoffen;
4. Werken aan de oprichting van een aanvullende instantie binnen de ontwapeningsconferentie om de nucleaire ontwapening te behandelen;
5. Toezien op het beginsel van de onomkeerbaarheid van de nucleaire ontwapening;
6. De kernmogendheden aanzetten om zich tot een volledige nucleaire ontwapening te verbinden;
7. Start II snel uitvoeren, Start III afsluiten en het ABM-verdrag versterken;
8. Het trilaterale initiatief tussen de VS, Rusland en het IAEA afronden en uitvoeren, waardoor het IAEA de overschotten van splijtstoffen beheert na de ontmanteling van kernwapens;
9. Zich verbinden tot :
  - a) het voortzetten van unilaterale beperkingen van kernwapens;
  - b) een grotere transparantie van de militaire kernmiddelen;
  - c) het voortzetten van de beperkingen van tactische kernwapens;
  - d) het nemen van maatregelen om het operationele statuut van kernwapens te beperken;
  - e) het beperken van de rol van de kernwapens in de veiligheidsstrategieën;
  - f) het werken aan een zo spoedig mogelijke uitbanning van alle kernwapens.
10. Maatregelen nemen om ervoor te zorgen dat splijtstoffen die geen militair nut meer hebben onder toezicht van het IAEA of een andere internationale controle-instelling geplaatst worden zodat die stoffen altijd buiten militaire programma's blijven;
11. Herbevestigen dat de conferentie voorstander is van een algemene en volledige ontwapening onder internationaal toezicht;

12. Regelmatig verslagen publiceren betreffende de uitvoering van artikel VI van het NPT;

13. De nodige controlemiddelen uitwerken om toe te zien op de naleving van de ontwapeningsovereenkomsten.

Al die punten zijn ingegeven door het beginsel van een gelijke veiligheid voor allen en een versterking van de internationale stabiliteit. Het einddoel van een algemene en volledige ontwapening wordt opnieuw bevestigd en het thema van de ontwikkeling van de controlemogelijkheden duikt op.

Achter die verklaringen en akkoorden schuilt echter een veel minder harmonieuze strategische realiteit : de overeenstemming die na 4 weken onderhandelingen werd bereikt gaat niet gepaard met een eensgezinde visie op de toekomst van de non-proliferatie en de ontwapening. Zowel op het vlak van de antiraketdefensie en het ABM-Verdrag, als op het vlak van de toekomst van de ontmanteling van kernwapens of de behandeling van proliferatiegevallen, lijken de besluiten van de conferentie niet aan te sluiten bij de internationale en strategische realiteit.

Alle ambitieuze verklaringen ten spijt, lijkt een daadwerkelijke uitvoering van de 13 punten binnen een redelijke termijn onwaarschijnlijk : de standpunten van de Staten in de ontwapeningsconferentie blijven wat ze waren en de Staten die niet zijn toegetreden tot het NPT, achten zich geenszins gebonden door wat in New York beslist is. Het vooropgesteld verband tussen ontwapening en non-proliferatie, dat de basis vormt van het NPT, blijft moeilijk om te zetten in de realiteit : de kernmachten blijven vasthouden aan de voordelen van het afschrikkende effect en treden onvoldoende op tegen schendingen van het NPT, en de Staten die geen kernwapens bezitten, willen het NPT gebruiken om de ontwapening te versnellen en voordeel te halen uit de technologische transfers voor een vreedzaam gebruik van kernenergie. Ten slotte heeft men in 2000 de kwestie van de schendingen van het verdrag door Irak en Noord-Korea bijna volledig buiten beschouwing gelaten.

3. 2000-2004 : balans van de *Arms Control* en voorbereiding van de NPT-Conferentie van 2005.

In de ruimste zin van het woord stagneert het begrip arms control, heden ten dage, dat in volle koude oorlog is ontstaan en in de laatste drie decennia van de 20ste eeuw vaste vorm heeft gekregen. De begrippen ontwapening en non-proliferatie raken uitgehold en liggen onder vuur wat betreft de onderhandelingsprocedure die is vastgelegd in het einddocument van de eerste buitengewone zitting van de Algemene Vergadering van de Verenigde Naties over de ontwapening in 1978, en wat betreft hun grondbeginselen zelf (blokkering door de verplichtingen inzake controlemaatregelen en ratificaties), alsook wat betreft hun onvermogen om de verdragsluitende staten een grotere veiligheid te waarborgen (schending van de verplichtingen van het NPT).

a) Het SORT-verdrag (Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty) :

Op 24 mei 2002 ondertekenen de presidenten Bush en Poetin in Moskou een verdrag waarmee de Verenigde Staten en Rusland zich ertoe verbinden om in de komende 10 jaar twee derde van hun strategische aanvalswapens te ontmantelen. Na afloop van die termijn, dus op 31 december 2012, zouden aan beide zijden niet meer dan 1700 à 2200 operationele kernladingen opgesteld mogen staan. De partijen behouden een grote keuzevrijheid inzake middelen om die doelstelling tijdig te halen en kunnen de samenstelling en de structuur van hun strategische aanvalswapens zelf bepalen op grond van de overeengekomen algemene vermindering van dat type kernkoppen (artikel 1). Kernkoppen die uit de operationele dragers verwijderd worden, kunnen worden bewaard, aangezien SORT geen verplichting inhoudt om kernwapens te vernietigen volgens een tijdschema dat in geen enkele tussenstap voorziet. Ook de controleprocedures zijn minimaal. Er wordt verwezen naar Start I (dat in 2009 vervalt) en een bilaterale commissie die tweemaal per jaar moet vergaderen. Ten opzichte van Start en het ABM-Verdrag is de uittredingsprocedure vereenvoudigd (opzegging van drie maanden zonder noodzakelijke verantwoording).

b) In oktober 2002 geeft Noord-Korea toe dat het zijn kernprogramma heeft voortgezet via uraniumverrijking, waarmee het zijn verbintenissen van 1994 verbreekt, in ruil voor de levering van brandstof en de bouw van twee lichtwaterreactoren door de KEDO (Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization). Noord-Korea heeft de inspecteurs van het IAEA de deur gewezen en de bewakingscamera's op de sites weggenomen om nadien aan te kondigen dat het uit het NPT stapt. Sindsdien hebben besprekingen tussen de twee Korea's, Japan, China, Rusland en de Verenigde Staten plaatsgevonden, totnogtoe zonder enig resultaat.

c) Tussen augustus 2002 en mei 2003 is men dank zij onthullingen over het Iraanse kernprogramma meer te weten gekomen over de activiteiten op de sites van Arak (productie van zwaar water voor een plutoniumproductiereactor, Ispahan (productie van uraniumhexafluoride) en Natanz (uraniumverrijking), de bouw van centrifuges nabij Teheran (Kalaye Electric Company), de uraniumwinning in de provincie Yazd en de experimenten met methoden voor de plutoniumwinning en het onderzoek naar uraniumverrijking met lasers. Een lichtwaterreactor van 1 000 megawatt (Busher-1) moet in 2005 klaar zijn met de hulp van Rusland. De raad van Gouverneurs van het IAEA heeft op 29 november positief gereageerd op de beslissing van Iran om alle activiteiten met betrekking tot de verrijking van uranium te staken, een beslissing die echter tijdelijk is en juridisch niet bindend.

d) De zaak-Khan : de laatste twee decennia hebben Pakistaanse deskundigen hun hulp en technologische kennis (uraniumverrijking met centrifuges) aangeboden aan Noord-Korea, Libië, Maleisië, Irak en Iran. Die onthullingen tonen aan dat de meest geavanceerde industrielanden niet de enige zijn die cruciale elementen voor kernactiviteiten kunnen vervaardigen. Die nieuwe industrielanden zijn echter geen lid van de Groep van nucleaire exportlanden en beschikken niet over de onmisbare middelen voor een strenge controle van de export van gevoelige technologie. De

internationale gemeenschap heeft met resolutie 1540 van de Veiligheidsraad van 28 april 2004 gereageerd op die toestand.

e) De aankondiging van de Libische regering op 19 december 2003 dat zij afziet van massavernietigingswapens is aangevuld met een met Londen en Washington onderhandelde overeenkomst om alle geheime programma's aan de Verenigde Staten voor vernietiging over te dragen en alle overblijvende splijtstoffen aan Rusland voor verbranding.

f) Het optreden van de NAVO

Het nieuwe strategische concept van de NAVO is aangenomen tijdens de Atlantische Raad te Washington op 24 en 25 april 1999 in het kader van het vijftigjarig bestaan van het Noord-Atlantisch Verdrag. Hoewel het beginsel van de *no first use* van kernwapens niet officieel aangenomen is, wordt het in de feiten gekoppeld aan de staat van non-alarm van de kernmachten, aan het begrip last resource dat de NAVO in juni 1990 heeft aangenomen, aan het begrip waarborg van negatieve veiligheid van resolutie 984 van de Veiligheidsraad en aan het begrip *discriminate deterrence* of een capaciteit tegen klassieke strijdmachten. Het gebruik van atoomwapens als eerste lijkt dus alleen voorbehouden om op te treden in een scenario van afschrikking/vergelding in geval van nucleaire, biologische of chemische bedreiging van een van de lidstaten van het Bondgenootschap. Het Bondgenootschap heeft weliswaar geen juridisch bindende verbintenis aangegaan over het niet-opstellen van kernwapens in de nieuwe lidstaten maar had meermaals vóór de uitbreiding van 1997 verklaard dat het noch de bedoeling, noch het plan, noch een reden had om dat wel te doen.

Kernwapens hebben volgens de NAVO een politieke functie (het behoud van vrede en stabiliteit, het voorkomen van oorlog of andere vormen van dwang) en getuigen van de onderlinge solidariteit binnen het Bondgenootschap. « *Les armes nucléaires apportent une contribution unique en rendant incalculables et inacceptables les risques que comporterait une agression contre l'Alliance. Elles restent donc indispensables au maintien de la paix* (§ 46 van het strategisch concept van april 1999). »

Bovendien heeft het Bondgenootschap tijdens zijn laatste top in Istanboel (juni 2004) zijn steun bevestigd aan de beheersing van wapens, aan de ontwapening en de non-proliferatie. Het Bondgenootschap heeft gewezen op het belang voor alle Staten om hun verbintenissen inzake de beheersing van wapens, de ontwapening en de non-proliferatie na te komen en op de noodzaak om de internationale overeenkomsten inzake wapenbeheersing en ontwapening alsook de multilaterale maatregelen inzake non-proliferatie en controle van de export te versterken. Het Bondgenootschap heeft ook gepleit voor een versterking van het NPT en de onverkorte naleving van dat verdrag door alle verdragssluitende staten, en heeft zijn onvoorwaardelijke steun betuigd aan resolutie 1540 van de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties evenals aan de vermindering van nucleaire en radioactieve stoffen en de beveiliging ervan.

g) Voorbereiding van de NPT-Conferentie 2005

In theorie moeten de PreComs 2002 en 2003 de principes, doelstellingen en middelen bepalen om de onverkorte toepassing en de universele gelding van het NPT te bevorderen. De PreCom 2004 moest aanbevelingen formuleren voor de RevCom 2005 rekening houdend met het resultaat van de besprekingen ten gronde van de eerste twee PreComs. De lidstaten moesten dus enerzijds een consensueel verslag opstellen met tegen 2005 te onderhandelen aanbevelingen en anderzijds de regelingen voor de procedures voor 2005 en voor de organisatie van de werkzaamheden afronden.

In werkelijkheid is de Ontwapeningsconferentie niet in staat gebleken om haar agenda in december 2004 vast te leggen : sinds 1999 is over geen enkel voorstel over een werkprogramma inzake ontwapening, het splijtstoffenverdrag, de versterking van de negatieve veiligheidswaarborgen en de strijd tegen de wapenwedloop in de ruimte overeenstemming bereikt binnen de Ontwapeningsconferentie, en is geen enkele onderhandeling van start kunnen gaan.

Op de drie PreComs was er al evenmin sprake van overeenstemming : alleen de verdeling van de budgettaire lasten van de RevCom onder de Staten en de data voor de opening en de afsluiting ervan (2 tot 27 mei 2005) konden worden vastgelegd. Het voorzitterschap is toegewezen aan de Braziliaanse ambassadeur Sérgio de Querioz Duarte. Men is het echter niet eens geraakt over een gemeenschappelijk document dat de besprekingen van de drie PreComs samenvat, over een gedetailleerde agenda van de te bespreken onderwerpen binnen de RevCom, en over de lijst van documenten die de grondslag zouden vormen van het eindverslag.

Een van de kwesties die de Conferentie 2005 zal moeten behandelen, is het vinden van een nieuw evenwicht tussen meer controle en veiligheidsmaatregelen rond de splijtstofcyclus en het instandhouden van het recht op het vreedzaam gebruik van kernenergie.

Het verwerven van de volledige cyclus van uranium- en plutoniumverrijking en de opwerking van splijtstoffen zijn immers niet verboden door het NPT. Zij maken echter wel de weg vrij voor een snelle toegang tot kernwapens na het opzeggen van het NPT : moet het recht om uit het NPT te treden gepaard gaan met controlemaatregelen van het IAEA ? De ondertekenaars van het NPT moeten dus meer aandacht besteden aan het verband tussen de rechten vervat in artikel IV en de verplichtingen vervat in de artikelen I en II. De internationale gemeenschap moet middelen vinden om snel te achterhalen wanneer een burgerlijke verrijkingscyclus gemilitariseerd wordt en een beter onderscheid maken tussen het recht op het vreedzaam gebruik van kernenergie en het bezit van middelen om

kernstoffen te verrijken. Een mogelijke oplossing zou erin bestaan de productie, de levering en de opwerking van splijtstoffen toe te vertrouwen aan een internationale instantie.

Het juridisch net dat toeziet op de non-proliferatie, moet voortdurend in de gaten gehouden worden zodat een vastberaden politiek leadership de ontwikkeling ervan kan waarborgen. Schendingen van verdragen moeten de Veiligheidsraad ertoe aanzetten om de beoogde doelstellingen klaar en eenduidig te bevestigen.

De universele gelding van het NPT, de naleving en het hoofddoel ervan, de algemene en volledige nucleaire ontwapening, vereist een regionale aanpak van de veiligheid om een veiligheidsklimaat tot stand te brengen waarbij de landen oordelen dat de kosten voor de aanschaf en de ontwikkeling van kernwapens te hoog zijn en de politieke waarde ervan contraproductief is.

In Zuidoost-Azië is er één kernmacht waarvan het non-proliferatiebeleid ernstige vragen oproept, twee landen waarvan de kerninstallaties aan iedere controle ontsnappen, verschillende landen die ervan verdacht worden geheime programma's te hebben of te hebben gehad, en nog andere die de hele splijtstofcyclus beheersen en die snel opnieuw kunnen overgaan tot het militaire programma dat zij onder druk van de Verenigde Staten opgegeven hebben in ruil voor militaire waarborgen. Ook in het Midden-Oosten heerst een wederzijds onveiligheidsgevoel waardoor Staten hun conventionele aanvals- en verdedigingswapens, de draagwijdte van hun raketten en hun massavernietigingswapens ontwikkelen.

Het NPT is het enige wettelijke document waarin de kernmachten zich ertoe verbonden hebben onderhandelingen voort te zetten over doeltreffende maatregelen om tot een nucleaire ontwapening te komen. Het NPT is dus een verdrag dat enerzijds de proliferatie van kernwapens wil bestrijden, en anderzijds de verbintenis inhoudt om een algemene en volledige nucleaire ontwapening te bewerkstelligen.

De aanhoudende blokkering van het ontwapeningsproces en de moeilijkheden die de grote ontwapeningsverdragen ondervinden, wijzen erop dat de crisis in de ontwapening van bestendige aard is. De conferentie tot herziening van het NPT in 2005 zal vooral moeten handelen over de universele gelding van het NPT, de schendingen ervan door Iran en Noord-Korea, de vooruitgang in de toepassing van het ontwapeningsplan in 13 punten dat in 2000 aangenomen is, de nucleaire doctrines en de veiligheidswaarborgen, de goedkeuring van het aanvullend protocol van het IAEA en de beveiliging van kernwapens en -materiaal. Aan de hand van de concrete vooruitgang op die zes punten zal men kunnen oordelen of de NPT-Conferentie 2005 geslaagd dan wel mislukt is.

### **Voorstel van resolutie**

De Senaat,

I. Verzoekt de regering doelgerichte diplomatieke initiatieven te nemen :

A. om te zorgen voor universeel geldende beginselen van het non-proliferatieverdrag en de concrete uitvoering van alle verbintenissen ervan,

B. om meer bepaald in het kader van de voorbereiding van de Belgische aanwezigheid in de Veiligheidsraad, erop aan te dringen dat de raad een ondubbelzinnige houding aanneemt bij schendingen van het non-proliferatieverdrag,

C. om de uitvoering van het 13-puntenplan van 2000 te bevorderen, dat RevCom 2000 heeft goedgekeurd, en meer bepaald :

— de uitvoering van het verdrag tot algehele uitbanning van kernproeven,

— het inzetten van onderhandelingen en het sluiten van een verdrag inzake het verbod om splijtstoffen te produceren en tevens nu reeds een internationaal moratorium vast te leggen inzake de productie van splijtstoffen,

— toe te zien op de niet-omkeerbaarheid van de nucleaire ontwapening door het vernietigen van de kernkoppen,

— te blijven ijveren voor een vermindering van het aantal tactische kernwapens,

— voorwaarden te bepalen opdat splijtstoffen die niet meer voor militair gebruik in aanmerking komen, onder de controle van het IAEA worden geplaatst,

D. om vertrouwenschenkende maatregelen te bevorderen zoals het verlagen van het alarmpeil en de detargeting van kernwapens,

E. om de inspanningen van de internationale gemeenschap op te waarderen en te bevorderen waar die streeft naar veiligheid en naar de vernietiging van de Russische tactische kernwapens,

F. om bij te dragen aan de goedkeuring van een werkprogramma voor de Ontwapeningsconferentie in 2005,

G. om het IAEA te belasten met de controle op en de vernietiging van de voorraden aan splijtstoffen,

H. om de ondertekening en de ratificatie te bespoedigen van het aanvullend protocol van het IAEA door alle Staten die tot het non-proliferatieverdrag zijn toegetreden,

I. om te zorgen voor een stringenter inhoud en een ruimere transparantie van de regeling inzake de controle op de uitvoer van nucleaire technologie en grondstoffen, en voor een uitbreiding van de Nuclear Supplier Group met nieuwe leden,

J. om zijn steun toe te zeggen aan het initiatief van de G8-Top van juni 2004 om bij het IAEA een bijzonder comité op te richten dat meer bepaald wordt belast met het toezicht op en de beveiligingsmaatregelen bij de ontmanteling, de veiligheid van de nucleaire installaties en materieel in de voormalige Sovjet-Unie,

K. om maatregelen inzake internationale controle vast te stellen voor de kerninstallaties van landen die de procedure tot het uittreden uit het non-proliferatieverdrag hebben aangevat,

L. om een multinationale regeling uit te werken inzake de productie, de verkoop en de opwerking van splijtstoffen voor vreedzame doeleinden en zijn steun toe te zeggen aan het voorstel van de directeur van het IAEA om een moratorium van vijf jaar in te voeren voor de bouw van installaties voor de verrijking van uranium of voor de opwerking van splijtstoffen.

II. Verzoekt de regering :

Aan het Parlement de nodige maatregelen voor te stellen alsook een tijdpad voor de omzetting in de Belgische rechtsorde van de bepalingen van resolutie 1540 van de Veiligheidsraad, aangenomen op 28 april 2004 in het kader van hoofdstuk VII van het UNO-Handvest en volgens welke alle landen de volgende verplichtingen opnemen :

— « adopter et appliquer, conformément à leurs procédures nationales, des législations appropriées et efficaces interdisant à tout acteur non étatique de fabriquer, de se procurer, de mettre au point, de se posséder, de transporter, de transférer ou d'utiliser des armes nucléaires, chimiques ou biologiques et leur vecteur, en particulier à des fins terroristes, et réprimant les tentatives de se livrer à l'une de ces activités, d'y participer en tant que complice, d'aider à les mener ou de les financer,

— « prendre et appliquer des mesures efficaces afin de mettre en place des dispositifs intérieurs de contrôle destinés à prévenir la prolifération des armes nucléaires, chimiques ou biologiques et leur vecteur, y compris en mettant en place des dispositifs de contrôle appropriés pour les matières connexes, et qu'à cette fin ils doivent :

a) Élaborer et instituer des mesures appropriées et efficaces leur permettant de comptabiliser ces produits et d'en garantir la sécurité pendant leur fabrication, leur utilisation, leur stockage ou leur transport,

b) Élaborer et instituer des mesures de protection physique appropriées et efficaces,

c) Élaborer et instituer des activités appropriées et efficaces de contrôle aux frontières et de police afin de détecter, dissuader, prévenir et combattre, y compris, si nécessaire, en coopération internationale, le trafic illicite et le courtage de ces produits, en accord avec leurs autorités légales nationales et leur législation, dans le respect de leur législation et conformément au droit international,

d) Créer, perfectionner, évaluer et instituer des contrôles nationaux appropriés et efficaces de l'exportation et du transbordement de ces produits, y compris des lois et règlements adéquats permettant de contrôler les exportations, le transit, le transbordement et la réexportation et des contrôles sur la fourniture de fonds ou de services se rapportant aux opérations d'exportation et de transbordement — tels le financement ou le transport — qui contribueraient à la prolifération, ainsi qu'en établissant des dispositifs de contrôle des utilisateurs finals; et en fixant et appliquant des sanctions pénales ou civiles pour les infractions à ces législations et réglementations de contrôle des exportations. ».

Status: In behandeling in de Senaat

Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers

**Commissie voor de Buitenlandse Betrekkingen**

CRIV 51 COM 529 – 9 maart 2005

**Vraag van de heer Koen T'Sijen aan de minister van Buitenlandse Zaken over "de Amerikaanse kernwapens in Europa" (nr. 5594)**

02.01 **Koen T'Sijen** (sp.a-spirit): Mijnheer de voorzitter, mijnheer de minister, ik zou graag twee nieuwsfeiten aanhalen en daarover enkele vragen stellen.

Volgens de New York Times van 13 februari stelde generaal Jones, hoofd van European Command, informeel dat hij 'favours eliminating the American nuclear stockpile in Europe, but has met resistance from some Nato-political leaders.'

Het tweede nieuwsfeit gaat over de afgelopen weken en het rapport van Hans Christensen over US nuclear weapons in Europe. De heer Christensen is bijzonder goed geïnformeerd over het Amerikaans kernwapenbeleid in Europa, via documenten die hij op basis van de Freedom of Information-act verzamelt. Uit deze documenten zou blijken dat het Amerikaans commando in Europa eventueel eraan denkt om kernwapens in te zetten die nu in Europa gestationeerd zijn voor missies in het Midden-Oosten en dat ook het 'Nato Nuclear Planning System' melding maakt van doelwitten 'out of area'. Daarom heb ik hieromtrent enige vragen.

Zijn deze berichten correct? Zijn de Amerikaanse kernwapens nog nodig in Europa of wordt er nu terug gedacht aan de uitbreiding van het potentieel? Zal België positief antwoorden indien er een voorstel kwam om de kernwapens uit ons land te verwijderen? Welke NAVO-landen blijven vasthouden aan Amerikaans kernwapens in Europa, dus over welke 'political' leaders' gaat het volgens generaal Jones?

Wanneer zijn welke voorstellen besproken in de NAVO met betrekking tot de vermindering van Amerikaans kernwapens in Europa? Maakt de doctrine van de NAVO de inzet van kernwapens 'out of area' mogelijk en zo ja, wanneer? Laten de bilaterale akkoorden met de Verenigde Staten betreffende de nucleaire taken die België in NAVO-verband heeft opgenomen, de mogelijkheid toe van inzet van kernwapens 'out of area'?

Zijn er omstandigheden waarin de Belgische regering het gebruik van kernwapens zal toelaten na een eerste inzet van chemische of biologische wapens tegen NAVO-strijdkrachten?

Dat zijn de vragen, mijnheer de minister.

02.02 Minister **Karel De Gucht**: Mijnheer de voorzitter, collega, de nucleaire politiek van de alliantie steunt op het strategisch concept van 1999, dat zegt dat het fundamenteel doel van de geallieerde nucleaire middelen politiek is. Het komt erop aan een potentiële vijand in het ongewisse te laten over de manier waarop de geallieerden op een militaire agressie zouden antwoorden. Daarom behoudt de NAVO een voldoende, maar minimale capaciteit zonder dat deze wapens een of ander land op het oog hebben.

De Belgische regering heeft dit strategisch concept in 1999 op de Top van Washington aanvaard en zal haar verplichtingen respecteren. Aangezien de beslissingen in de NAVO bij consensus worden genomen, is een onderhandeling met en het akkoord van onze 25 partners vereist om deze politiek te wijzigen. U bent er ongetwijfeld van op de hoogte dat de nucleaire arsenalen sinds het einde van de Koude Oorlog drastisch werden verminderd. Ook werd de beslissingstermijn voor hun inzetbaarheid sterk verlengd. Tevens laten de Belgische verantwoordelijken zich in de besprekingen over nucleaire aangelegenheden in NAVO-verband leiden door de regeringsverklaring die zegt dat de NAVO kan bijdragen tot de vermindering van het aantal kernwapens door geen kernwapens op te stellen in de nieuwe NAVO-lidstaten en door het kernarsenaal verder af te bouwen in de NAVO-landen. Zij pleiten binnen de NAVO ook voor meer transparantie over de nucleaire strategie.

Om veiligheidsredenen is het niet mogelijk om in het kader van deze interpellatie grondiger op de vragen in te gaan. Ik mag er evenwel op wijzen dat premier Verhofstadt begin 2000 heeft voorgesteld om de parlementsleden die het wensen, grondiger te informeren. Dit veronderstelt uiteraard dat zij de normale confidentialiteitsvoorwaarden zouden respecteren en zich daartoe ook zouden engageren. Deze voorwaarden zijn onlosmakelijk verbonden met de verantwoordelijkheidszin die vereist is voor veiligheidsaangelegenheden.

02.03 **Koen T'Sijen** (sp.a-spirit): Mijnheer de voorzitter, ik dank de minister voor zijn antwoord. Er is een aantal zaken gezegd, maar ik heb weinig informatie over de concrete vragen gekregen. Daar wens ik wel begrip voor op te brengen.

Misschien moet er voor mogelijk overleg inzake de positionering van kernwapens en de afbouw van het arsenaal ook op worden gewezen, dit ook in het kader van de komende conferentie in mei in New York, dat de kernwapens in Europa alsmaar onbelangrijker worden. Het vergt lange tijd vooraleer ze ingezet kunnen worden en eigenlijk zijn er dus ook militaire overwegingen om ze hier niet langer te stationeren.

Dat is een bedenking die ik wil meegeven.

*Het incident is gesloten.*

## Belgische Senaat

### **Resolutie betreffende het beleid inzake non-proliferatie en nucleaire ontwapening**

Ingediend door de heer Patrik Vankrunkelsven c.s. – 13 januari 2005 / gewijzigd aangenomen in de Commissie Buitenlandse Betrekkingen en Landsverdediging op 22 maart 2005

#### **Toelichting**

Kernwapens vormen één van de ernstigste bedreigingen van de mensheid. Om dat gevaar te bezweren, werd getracht de situatie met het non-proliferatieverdrag te bevrozen, om vervolgens door stapsgewijze ontwapening tot een kernwapenvrije wereld te komen. De indieners van deze resolutie zijn van mening dat ook een klein land als België daarbij een diplomatieke rol kan spelen, zoals reeds bewezen werd met het landmijnenverdrag.

In mei 2005 vindt te New York de *NPT Review Conference* plaats, waar de naleving van het non-proliferatieverdrag wordt getoetst en verdere stappen ter uitvoering van het verdrag worden afgesproken.

Dat non-proliferatieverdrag ligt de jongste jaren fel onder vuur. India, Pakistan en Noord-Korea hebben in het voorbije decennium kernwapens ontwikkeld. Iran is er mogelijk ook aan begonnen, terwijl Israël, buiten het NPT-kader, reeds meer dan dertig jaar kernwapens bezit. Een netwerk van illegale handel in nucleair materiaal werd ontdekt. De geloofwaardigheid van het verdrag wordt ook ondergraven door het trage tempo van de nucleaire ontwapening. De kans is reëel dat bepaalde landen, zoals Noord-Korea, het verdrag opzeggen of minstens niet meer naleven.

Daarom lijkt het ons nodig het belang van het verdrag en onze daaruit voortvloeiende verbintenissen te bevestigen. Om het verdrag in stand te houden vragen wij de regering diplomatieke inspanningen te leveren op de toetsingsconferentie. Om de geloofwaardigheid van het verdrag en de bijbehorende toetsingsprocedure te



behouden, is een resultaat onder de vorm van een duidelijke agenda voor ontwapening nodig. Het non-proliferatieverdrag staat niet op zich en de versterking ervan hangt samen met het voeren van een coherente politiek gericht op nucleaire ontwapening en non-proliferatie in andere fora zoals de NAVO en de EU.

De overwegingen in de resolutie refereren aan de internationale context en de gemaakte afspraken in het kader van de in het non-proliferatieverdrag opgenomen toetsingsprocedure. De Senaat bevestigt zijn verbondenheid aan het verdrag en vraagt de regering bij te dragen aan de totstandkoming van een striktere ontwapeningsagenda op de volgende toetsingsconferentie. Eveneens wordt de regering gevraagd om een coherent beleid te voeren in andere fora zoals de EU en de NAVO, en wordt daartoe een reeks concrete voorstellen gedaan. De resolutie bouwt voort op de door de Kamer aangenomen resolutie bij de toetsingsconferentie van 2000 en op de in het regeerakkoord opgenomen engagementen.

Patrik VANKRUNKELSVEN; Lionel VANDENBERGHE; Pierre GALAND; Sabine de BETHUNE; Christian BROTCORNE; Annemie VAN de CASTEELE; Philippe MAHOUX.

### **Voorstel van resolutie betreffende het beleid inzake non-proliferatie en nucleaire ontwapening**

Tekst aangenomen door de Commissie voor de Buitenlandse Betrekkingen en voor de Landsverdediging – 22 maart 2005

De Senaat,

A. overwegende dat van 2 tot 27 mei 2005 een nieuwe toetsingsconferentie plaatsvindt in het kader van het non-proliferatieverdrag (NPT Review Conference);

B. overwegende dat tijdens de vorige toetsingsconferentie van 2000 het slotdocument bij consensus werd aanvaard en dat daarin een akkoord werd bereikt over de volgende praktische stappen :

1° het belang en de hoogdringendheid van ondertekeningen en ratificaties, zonder oponthoud of voorwaarden en volgens de grondwettelijke procedures, om een snelle inwerkingtreding van het alomvattend kernstopverdrag (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) te verwezenlijken;

2° een moratorium op kernproeven tot aan de inwerkingtreding van dat verdrag;

3° de noodzakelijkheid van onderhandelingen in de Ontwapeningsconferentie (Conference on Disarmament) voor een niet-discriminerend, multilateraal, internationaal en effectief verifieerbaar verdrag dat de productie verbiedt van splijtbaar materiaal voor kernwapens of andere nucleaire explosieve tuigen. Dat verdrag moet in overeenstemming zijn met de verklaring van de speciale coördinator in 1995 en het daarin vervatte mandaat en het moet zowel nucleaire ontwapening als nucleaire non-proliferatie in overweging nemen. Aan de Ontwapeningsconferentie wordt gevraagd om een werkprogramma op te stellen dat voorziet in de onmiddellijke aanvang van onderhandelingen en in de afronding daarvan binnen vijf jaar;

4° de noodzakelijkheid om binnen de Ontwapeningsconferentie een gepaste ondergeschikte structuur op te richten die zich moet bezig houden met nucleaire ontwapening. De Ontwapeningsconferentie wordt gevraagd om een werkprogramma op te stellen dat de onmiddellijke oprichting van een dergelijke structuur omvat;

5° de toepassing van het onomkeerbaarheidsprincipe op nucleaire ontwapening en ook op nucleaire en andere verbonden wapenbeheersings- en reductiemaatregelen;

6° de kernwapenstaten moeten ondubbelzinnig streven naar de volledige eliminatie van hun nucleaire arsenalen. Alle Verdragsluitende Staten zijn daartoe gehouden krachtens artikel VI van het non-proliferatieverdrag;

7° de snelle inwerkingtreding en volledige implementatie van het START II-verdrag (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) en het zo snel mogelijk sluiten van het START III-verdrag. Het behoud en de versterking van het ABM-verdrag (Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty) als hoeksteen van strategische stabiliteit en als basis voor verdere reducties van strategische offensieve wapens, in overeenstemming met de verdragsbepalingen;

8° de voltooiing en implementatie van het trilateraal initiatief van de VS, de Russische Federatie en het IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency);

9° alle kernwapenstaten moeten de volgende stappen zetten die leiden tot nucleaire ontwapening op een wijze die de internationale stabiliteit vergroot en gebaseerd op het principe van onverminderde veiligheid voor allen :

i. verdere inspanningen om hun kernwapenarsenalen unilateraal te verminderen;

ii. meer transparantie over hun kernwapencapaciteiten en de implementering van akkoorden met toepassing van artikel VI van het non-proliferatieverdrag en als een vrijwillige vertrouwenwekkende maatregel ter bevordering van nucleaire ontwapening;

iii. de verdere reductie van hun niet-strategische kernwapens, gebaseerd op unilaterale initiatieven die integraal deel uitmaken van het nucleaire wapenvermindering- en ontwapeningsproces;

iv. de uitvoering van de overeengekomen concrete maatregelen om de operationele status van kernwapensystemen verder te verlagen;

v. in een kleinere rol voor kernwapens voorzien om het risico te minimaliseren dat die wapens ooit zullen worden gebruikt en om hun totale eliminatie te vergemakkelijken;

- vi. zo snel mogelijk alle kernwapenstaten betrekken bij de totale eliminatie van hun kernwapens;
- 10° splijtbaar materiaal dat is bestempeld als niet meer nodig voor militaire doeleinden, moet zo snel als praktisch mogelijk onder IAEA- of ander relevant internationaal toezicht geplaatst worden en voor vredelievende doeleinden opgeslagen worden, zodat het permanent buiten militaire programma's blijft;
- 11° de herbevestiging van het uiteindelijke doel van de inspanningen van staten in het ontwapeningsproces, met name de algemene en volledige ontwapening onder effectieve internationale controle;
- 12° regelmatige rapportering door alle Verdragsluitende Staten, binnen het raamwerk van het versterkte NPT-toetsingsproces, over de implementatie van artikel VI van het non-proliferatieverdrag en van paragraaf 4 (c) van de beslissing uit 1995 over « Principes en doelstellingen voor nucleaire non-proliferatie en ontwapening », met inachtneming van de Advisory Opinion van het Internationaal Gerechtshof van 8 juli 1996;
- 13° de verdere ontwikkeling van verificatiecapaciteiten om zeker te zijn van de naleving van nucleaire ontwapeningsakkoorden voor een wereld zonder kernwapens;
- C. overwegende dat de uitvoering van het non-proliferatieverdrag en van de op de toetsingsconferentie van 2000 afgesproken stappen geïntensifieerd moet worden;
- D. overwegende dat het garanderen van het voortbestaan van het non-proliferatieverdrag en van een strikte naleving ervan noodzakelijk is voor de internationale vrede en veiligheid;
- E. overwegende dat India, Pakistan en Israël het non-proliferatieverdrag niet ondertekend hebben en kernwapens hebben ontwikkeld; dat Noord-Korea uit het non-proliferatieverdrag is gestapt en kernwapens heeft ontwikkeld; dat Iran mogelijk kernwapens ontwikkelt en in elk geval in gebreke bleef bij zijn aangifte- en verificatieverplichtingen ten opzichte van het IAEA;
- F. overwegende dat het netwerk van illegale handel in nucleaire materialen aan het licht kwam;
- G. overwegende dat volgens de directeur-generaal van het IAEA, de heer El-Baradei, verdergaande maatregelen inzake non-proliferatie en nucleaire ontwapening nodig zijn om het non-proliferatieverdrag in stand te houden; dat hij daarbij enerzijds maatregelen voorstelt om verificatie en controle op de civiele kernenergie te versterken en illegale handel in nucleair materiaal te bestrijden, en anderzijds een stappenplan naar nucleaire ontwapening voorstelt; dat hij daarbij stelt : « We must abandon the unworkable notion that it is morally reprehensible for some countries to pursue weapons of mass destruction yet morally acceptable for others to rely on them for security — and indeed to continue to refine their capacities and postulate plans for their use »;
- H. verwijzend naar artikel VI van het non-proliferatieverdrag dat luidt : « Elk van de partijen bij dit verdrag verbindt zich ertoe, te goeder trouw onderhandelingen te voeren omtrent doeltreffende maatregelen met betrekking tot spoedige beëindiging van de nucleaire bewapeningswedloop en tot nucleaire ontwapening en omtrent een verdrag inzake algemene en volledige ontwapening onder strenge en doeltreffende internationale controle. »;
- I. verwijzend naar de Advisory Opinion van 8 juli 1996 waarin het Internationaal Gerechtshof stelt dat er een verplichting bestaat om te goeder trouw onderhandelingen te voeren en tot een einde te brengen welke leiden tot nucleaire ontwapening in al haar aspecten onder strenge en doeltreffende internationale controle;
- J. verwijzend naar de resolutie van de Kamer van volksvertegenwoordigers van 18 mei 2000 inzake nucleaire ontwapening en de houding van België op de toetsingsconferentie van het non-proliferatieverdrag;
- K. overwegende dat het regeerakkoord als een van de krachtlijnen voor het NAVO-beleid vooropstelt : « de vermindering van het aantal kernwapens; de NAVO kan hiertoe bijdragen door geen kernwapens op te stellen in de nieuwe NAVO-lidstaten en door het kernwapenarsenaal verder af te bouwen in de huidige NAVO-landen; de regering zal binnen de NAVO pleiten voor meer transparantie over de nucleaire strategie »;
- L. overwegende dat op de toetsingsconferentie van het non-proliferatieverdrag in 2005 slechts resultaten geboekt zullen worden als een coherent beleid voor non-proliferatie en nucleaire ontwapening gevoerd wordt in de diverse fora waar die thema's aan bod komen;
- M. zijn verbondenheid aan het non-proliferatieverdrag bevestigend,

#### VRAAGT DE REGERING :

1. alle inspanningen te doen om het voortbestaan van het non-proliferatieverdrag te behouden en de naleving ervan in al haar aspecten te verzekeren;
2. ervoor te ijveren dat op de toetsingsconferentie van het non-proliferatieverdrag in 2005 een striktere ontwapeningsagenda wordt vastgesteld en concrete afspraken worden gemaakt voor de komende vijf jaar en na te streven dat op de Ontwapeningsconferentie een werkprogramma voor 2005 wordt goedgekeurd;
3. een beleidsplan voor nucleaire ontwapening en non-proliferatie op te stellen, met betrekking tot haar inspanningen in de diverse internationale fora;
4. erop toe te zien dat initiatieven voor non-proliferatie ook een duidelijke ontwapeningscomponent met onomkeerbaar karakter inhouden;
5. ervoor te zorgen dat binnen de NAVO, conform de afspraken op de toetsingsconferentie van het non-proliferatieverdrag van 2000, praktische stappen worden overwogen voor nucleaire ontwapening;
6. bij de NAVO initiatieven ter sprake te brengen in verband met :

- 6.1. de herziening van strategische doctrines inzake kernwapens;
- 6.2. de graduele terugtrekking van de Amerikaanse tactische kernwapens uit Europa met het oog op de naleving van artikel VI van het non-proliferatieverdrag en de vereiste diplomatieke maatregelen nemen om in de NAVO-Rusland-Raad onderhandelingen aan te vatten over de vermindering en de vernietiging van de Amerikaanse tactische kernwapens in Europa en de Russische tactische kernwapens en de beveiliging ervan, en wat dat betreft, de maatregelen te versterken die de transparantie en het vertrouwen tussen de NAVO en Rusland ten goede komen;
- 6.3. de toepassing van het onomkeerbaarheidsbeginsel inzake de niet-aanwezigheid van kernwapens in de nieuwe lidstaten van de NAVO;
- 6.4. stappen die moeten leiden tot een kernwapenvrije zone, bestaande uit alle niet-kernwapenstaten in Europa;
- 6.5. een verdergaande transparantie dan in de huidige praktijk;
7. binnen de EU :
  - 7.1. het beleid ter bestrijding van de verspreiding van massavernietigingswapens te ondersteunen en actief mee te ontwikkelen, onder meer door nucleaire ontwapening en de in Europa aanwezige massavernietigingswapens ter sprake te brengen, en in dit kader te ijveren voor de zo snel mogelijke uitvoering van de door resolutie 1540 van de UNO-Veiligheidsraad voorgestelde maatregelen inzake de handel in nucleair materiaal en mogelijke dragers van kernwapens zo snel mogelijk uit te voeren;
  - 7.2. initiatieven te nemen om elke rol van kernwapens in het kader van het gemeenschappelijk veiligheids- en defensiebeleid uit te sluiten;
8. zowel tijdens de voorbereiding van de toetsingsconferentie van het non-proliferatieverdrag van 2005 als op de conferentie initiatieven te ondersteunen in verband met :
  - 8.1. het zo snel mogelijk verlenen van de instemming door de parlementen voor het ratificeren en uitvoeren van het alomvattend kernstopverdrag (CTBT);
  - 8.2. onderhandelingen voor een verdrag dat de verdere productie van splijtstof voor kernwapens verbiedt;
  - 8.3. de herziening van strategische doctrines;
  - 8.4. interim-maatregelen om het bij ongeluk afvuren van kernwapens te voorkomen;
  - 8.5. verificatie, transparantie en vertrouwenwekkende maatregelen;
  - 8.6. het instellen van kernwapenvrije zones;
  - 8.7. het opnemen van de negatieve veiligheidsgaranties in een bindend juridisch instrument;
  - 8.8. de bestrijding van de illegale handel in nucleair materiaal;
  - 8.9. het versterken van de rol van het IAEA, bij het toezicht op en de vernietiging van de splijtstofvoorraden, het bespoedigen van de ondertekening en de ratificatie van het Aanvullend IAEA-protocol door alle Staten die toetreden zijn tot het NPT, het uitwerken van een multinationalaal systeem voor de productie, de verkoop en de opwerking van splijtstof voor strikt civiele toepassingen, en het voorstel te ondersteunen van de directeur van het IAEA om een moratorium van vijf jaar in te stellen voor de bouw van installaties om uranium te verrijken of om splijtstof op te werken;
  - 8.10. het vaststellen van internationale controlemaatregelen voor de nucleaire installaties en het nucleair materiaal van de landen die een procedure hebben aangevat om uit het NPT te stappen;
9. in andere multilaterale organisaties initiatieven te ondersteunen en ook zelf te nemen die gericht zijn op non-proliferatie en nucleaire ontwapening, vooral bij de voorbereiding van de Belgische aanwezigheid in de Veiligheidsraad, opdat deze laatste knopen doorhakt wanneer het NPT geschonden wordt.

Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers

### **Commissie voor de Landsverdediging**

CRIV 51 – COM 545 – 23 maart 2005

[...] **Samengevoegde vragen van - mevrouw Zoé Genot aan de minister van Buitenlandse Zaken over "het "out of area"- gebruik van in Europa gestationeerde Amerikaanse kernwapens" (nr. 5976)**  
 - mevrouw Zoé Genot aan de minister van Landsverdediging over "de veiligheid van de in Europa gestationeerde Amerikaanse kernwapens" (nr. 5977)

05.01 **Zoé Genot** (ECOLO): Monsieur le président, monsieur le ministre, il ressort de documents publiés aux Etats-Unis sur base du Freedom of Information Act et d'écrits dans le rapport du Natural Resources Defense Council sur les armes nucléaires américaines en Europe que le soutien apporté par les militaires américains en Europe sous commandement Eucom à leurs collègues au Moyen-Orient sous commandement CENTCOM peut également inclure l'utilisation d'armes nucléaires stationnées en Europe. Le NATO Nuclear Planning System permet également la définition de cibles "out-of-area".

Monsieur le ministre,

1. Les doctrines politique et militaire de l'OTAN permettent-elles l'utilisation d'armes nucléaires out-of-area? Si oui, dans quelles circonstances?
2. Les accords bilatéraux avec les Etats-Unis relatifs aux tâches nucléaires, que la Belgique assure dans le cadre de l'OTAN, permettent-ils l'utilisation d'armes nucléaires out-of-area?
3. Y a-t-il des circonstances dans lesquelles le gouvernement belge permettrait l'utilisation d'armes nucléaires après une première attaque chimique ou biologique contre des forces de l'OTAN?

Monsieur le président, je passe maintenant à ma deuxième question.

Monsieur le ministre, il ressort de documents publiés aux Etats-Unis sur base du Freedom of Information Act et décrits dans le rapport du Natural Resources Defense Council sur les armes nucléaires américaines en Europe qu'à peine 50% des militaires chargés de la sécurité des armes nucléaires est à même de satisfaire à la Nuclear Surety Inspection de l'Air Force (p. 72 du rapport). Cette situation pose des questions quant à la sécurité des tâches nucléaires effectuées par la Belgique dans le cadre de l'OTAN.

Mes questions sont les suivantes:

1. Quels sont les résultats à ces tests du personnel américain du MUNSS présent en Belgique? Quand ont-ils eu lieu et pour quand les prochains sont-ils prévus?
2. Quels sont les résultats du personnel belge impliqué dans les tâches nucléaires aux tests de sécurité de l'armée américaine? A quels tests et contrôles ce personnel est-il soumis? Quand les derniers tests ont-ils eu lieu et quand les prochains auront-ils lieu?
3. Quels sont les résultats du personnel belge impliqué dans les tâches nucléaires aux tests et contrôles menés par l'OTAN? A quels tests et contrôles ce personnel est-il soumis? Quand ont eu lieu les derniers tests et pour quand les prochains sont-ils prévus?

Le **président**: Madame Genot, je tiens à vous féliciter pour votre concision et la précision de vos questions.

05.02 **André Flahaut**, ministre: Monsieur le président, j'ai déjà répondu à la question il y a une ou deux semaines, mais je ferai un effort pour lui répondre, parce que c'est elle.

La politique de l'Alliance en matière nucléaire repose sur le concept stratégique adopté en 1999, en vertu duquel les moyens nucléaires alliés revêtent un caractère politique. C'est pourquoi l'Alliance maintient une capacité suffisante mais minimale, sans que ces armes visent l'un ou l'autre pays.

La Belgique fait donc preuve de solidarité envers ses partenaires de l'Alliance en mettant à leur disposition des moyens pour l'exécution des tâches nucléaires et en leur offrant les capacités nécessaires de stockage d'éventuelles armes nucléaires. Les Etats membres qui disposent d'emplacements de stockage doivent répondre, en collaboration avec les unités de l'armée américaine qui y sont établies, à des normes de qualité déterminées dans les domaines de la sécurité, de l'entraînement, des opérations et du soutien technique.

Pour contrôler le respect de ces normes, les installations de stockage sont soumises tous les 18 mois à une inspection du service général de l'armée américaine et, tous les 36 mois, à une évaluation par des équipes de l'OTAN. Pour des raisons de sécurité, je ne peux vous donner le détail de ces inspections et évaluations s'agissant des installations et des moyens belges; je peux néanmoins vous assurer qu'ils satisfont aux normes de qualité précitées.

Je tiens par ailleurs à souligner que toute utilisation de l'arme nucléaire se fera en consultation entre les alliés et au terme d'une évaluation minutieuse de la situation. Préjuger de l'utilisation ou non de l'arme nucléaire en réponse à un type particulier d'agression affaiblirait le concept stratégique de l'Alliance qui reconnaît l'ambiguïté quant à la nature de la riposte comme un élément de renforcement de la discussion.

Pour être complet, les documents parus dans la presse américaine sont déjà plus anciens; depuis lors, les choses ont sérieusement évolué, notamment quant aux contrôles de qualité et de sécurité des installations.

05.03 **Zoé Genot** (ECOLO): Monsieur le ministre, deux éléments de réponse.

Tout d'abord, si les Américains font des efforts de transparence, je regrette que nous ne puissions pas accomplir les mêmes efforts, même si c'est avec un certain décalage. En effet, c'est quand les problèmes sont résolus qu'on apprend qu'ils ont existé. Mais au moins, un effort de transparence est réalisé de la part de l'armée américaine qui reconnaît que 50% de son armée n'a pas satisfait aux tests.

Je trouve dommage que nous ne puissions pas être pleinement rassurés en ayant connaissance de la nature des tests et de leurs résultats du côté belge.

En ce qui concerne l'utilisation des armes "out of area", si je comprends bien votre réponse, il n'existe en fait aucune doctrine en la matière: on réagira au cas par cas. L'impression qu'on pouvait avoir que les armes nucléaires d'une zone étaient affectées spécifiquement à cette zone et qu'il faudrait des actes totalement spéciaux pour pouvoir les utiliser en dehors de cette zone n'a pas l'air fondée.

*L'incident est clos.*

## **DUITSLAND**

### Bundestag

#### **Schriftliche Fragen mit den in der Woche vom 1. November 2004 eingegangenen Antworten der Bundesregierung**

15/4120 – 5 November 2004

##### **Abgeordnete Hildegard Müller (CDU/CSU):**

- Trifft ein Bericht der „Süddeutschen Zeitung“ vom 21. Oktober 2004 zu, wonach die Bundesregierung bereit ist, die Lieferung von Atomtechnologie in den Iran zu unterstützen, und wenn ja, um welche Art von Atomtechnologie handelt es sich dabei?
- Wie beurteilt die Bundesregierung die Auswirkungen von Importen von Nukleartechnologie durch den Iran hinsichtlich Stabilität und Sicherheitslage im Nahen bzw. Mittleren Osten, insbesondere was die Sicherheit des Staates Israel angeht?
- Wie schätzt die Bundesregierung die langfristigen Auswirkungen ein, die ein Import von Atomtechnik durch den Iran auf die Bedrohungs- und Sicherheitslage in Europa haben könnte?

*Antwort des Staatssekretärs Dr. Klaus Scharioth vom 3. November 2004:*

Die Bundesregierung verfolgt auf nationaler Ebene die Politik des Atomausstiegs. Unbeschadet dieser nationalen Atomausstiegspolitik anerkennt die Bundesregierung das souveräne Recht eines jeden Staates, im Rahmen der internationalen Konventionen und Verpflichtungen über die zivile Nutzung der Atomenergie selbst zu entscheiden. Auch in der EU haben einige Mitgliedstaaten dazu entsprechende Entscheidungen getroffen. Frankreich und Großbritannien halten an der Nutzung der Atomenergie fest.

Die Bundesregierung steht zurzeit gemeinsam mit Großbritannien und Frankreich in intensiven Gesprächen mit dem Iran, um eine iranische Nuklearwaffenoption auszuschließen und damit einen wichtigen Beitrag zur regionalen Stabilität und Sicherheit zu leisten.

Damit geht keine Bereitschaft oder Zusage der deutschen Seite einher, Atomtechnologie in den Iran zu liefern. Die bestehende Nuklearkooperation des Iran mit Russland bezieht sich auf den Bau eines Leichtwasserreaktors.

### Bundestag

#### **Schriftliche Fragen mit den in der Woche vom 13. Dezember 2004 eingegangenen Antworten der Bundesregierung**

15/4574 – 17 Dezember 2004

[...] **Abgeordneter Norbert Barthle (CDU/CSU):** Wie bewertet die Bundesregierung die Ankündigung des russischen Präsidenten Wladimir Wladimirowitsch Putin auf einer Kommandeurstagung in Moskau, neuartige Atomwaffen entwickeln zu lassen, wie sie keine andere Atommacht im Moment habe oder in nächster Zukunft haben werde, und gegen wen sollen nach Einschätzung der Bundesregierung diese Waffen gerichtet werden?

*Antwort des Staatssekretärs Dr. Klaus Scharioth vom 13. Dezember 2004:*

Die Bundesregierung sieht alle Anzeichen für eine Aufwertung von Nuklearwaffen mit großer Sorge und setzt sich weiterhin entschieden für greifbare Fortschritte bei der nuklearen Abrüstung in Erfüllung von Artikel VI des Vertrages über die Nichtverbreitung von Kernwaffen ein. Nukleare Nichtverbreitung und Abrüstung müssen nach Auffassung der Bundesregierung Hand in Hand gehen. Zur Wahrung der Integrität und Autorität des Vertrages über die Nichtverbreitung von Kernwaffen müssen beide Ziele gleichermaßen verfolgt werden.

Bereits seit Mai 2003 hatte sich Präsident Wladimir Putin wiederholt zur Modernisierung des strategischen Arsenal der Russischen Föderation geäußert. Nach Äußerungen von offizieller russischer Seite sollen die Waffen allein Zwecken der Abschreckung dienen. Die Bundesregierung geht davon aus, dass durch die russischen Pläne die Implementierung des Moskauer Vertrages vom Mai 2002 über die Reduzierung strategischer Waffen nicht berührt ist. [...]

### Bundestag

#### **Glaubwürdigkeit des nuklearen Nichtverbreitungsregimes stärken – US-Nuklearwaffen aus Deutschland abziehen**

Druksache 15/5257 – 13. April 2005

Antrag der Abgeordneten Dr. Werner Hoyer, Harald Leibrecht, Rainer Brüderle, Ernst Burgbacher, Helga Daub, Jörg van Essen, Ulrike Flach, Horst Friedrich (Bayreuth), Rainer Funke, Hans-Michael Goldmann, Ulrich Heinrich, Birgit Homburger, Michael Kauch, Dr. Heinrich L. Kolb, Jürgen Koppelin, Ina Lenke, Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, Dirk Niebel, Günther Friedrich Nolting, Eberhard Otto (Godern), Detlef Parr, Gisela Piltz, Dr. Rainer Stinner, Carl-Ludwig Thiele, Jürgen Türk, Dr. Claudia Winterstein, Dr. Volker Wissing, Dr. Wolfgang Gerhardt und der Fraktion der FDP

Der Bundestag wolle beschließen:

Der Deutsche Bundestag stellt fest:

Im Mai 2005 tagt in New York die alle fünf Jahre stattfindende Überprüfungskonferenz des Nuklearen Nichtverbreitungsvertrages (NVV). Die gegenwärtige Krise um Nuklearwaffen-Ambitionen des Iran und Nordkoreas, aber auch die Befürchtungen, dass künftig möglicherweise weitere Staaten oder sogar internationale Terroristen Zugriff auf Nuklearwaffen erhalten könnten, machen das nukleare Nichtverbreitungsregime zu einer zentralen Säule der Sicherheit und des Friedens weltweit. Es liegt in den Händen der 188 Mitgliedsländer des Nichtverbreitungsregimes, diese wichtigste globale Abrüstungskonferenz unbedingt zu einem Erfolg zu führen.

Das NVV-Regime beruht auf drei Säulen: Verpflichtung der Mitglieder zur Nichtverbreitung, Verpflichtung der Nuklearwaffenstaaten auf Abrüstung ihrer Nuklearwaffenarsenale und Berechtigung aller Staaten zum Zugang zur zivilen Nutzung der Kernenergie. Nur wenn alle drei Prinzipien gleichberechtigt verfolgt und umgesetzt werden, behält das Nichtverbreitungsregime seine Glaubwürdigkeit.

Deutschland bekennt sich als Nicht-Nuklearwaffenstaat aktiv zur nuklearen Nichtverbreitung und zeigt bei den Bemühungen um eine Lösung der Iran-Krise, dass es bereit ist, auch bei der Frage der zivilen nuklearen Teilhabe die Verpflichtungen aus dem NVV ernst zu nehmen. Das nukleare Nichtverbreitungsregime wird aber auf die Dauer nur Bestand haben und Staaten mit potentiellen Nuklearwaffenambitionen werden sich nur dann weiter an ihre Verpflichtung halten, auf Nuklearwaffen zu verzichten, wenn auch bei der Umsetzung der Abrüstungsverpflichtung der Nuklearwaffenstaaten weitere Fortschritte gemacht werden. Dazu müssen der Atomteststoppvertrag in Kraft gesetzt und Verhandlungen über ein Ende der Produktion von spaltbarem Material für Waffenzwecke aufgenommen werden. Dazu müssen aber auch die NATO-Staaten die Bereitschaft dokumentieren, die Rolle der Nuklearwaffen in ihrer Militärstrategie zu reduzieren und weitere nukleare Abrüstungsschritte vorzunehmen.

Die USA haben bis heute fast 500 taktische Nuklearwaffen in Europa stationiert, davon etwa 150 in Deutschland. Im Rahmen der nuklearen Teilhabe ist bis heute die Bundeswehr an den Vorbereitungen zu einem Einsatz dieser Waffen beteiligt. Dabei ist die Fähigkeit zum Einsatz von taktischen Nuklearwaffen von deutschem Boden aus heute angesichts der veränderten Bedrohungslage sicherheitspolitisch nicht mehr zwingend, die gegenwärtige NATO-Strategie könne auch ohne diese Option beibehalten werden, und eine Verlegung dieser Waffen in eine rückwärtige sichere Aufbewahrung in den USA wäre im Umfeld der Überprüfungskonferenz zum NVV ein wichtiges erstes Signal, dass auch die Abrüstungsverpflichtung als integrativer Bestandteil des Nichtverbreitungsregimes ernst genommen wird.

Der Deutsche Bundestag fordert die Bundesregierung auf,

1. sich auf der anstehenden Überprüfungskonferenz zum NVV aktiv für eine Stärkung aller drei Säulen des Nichtverbreitungsregimes einzusetzen und damit zu einem Erfolg dieser wichtigen Konferenz beizutragen;
2. an ihren im Rahmen der EU-3 gemeinsam mit Frankreich und Großbritannien verfolgten Bemühungen um eine Lösung der Iran-Krise unvermindert festzuhalten und gemeinsam mit den USA nach Möglichkeiten zu suchen, wie der Iran unter Gewährung der zivilen Nutzung der Kernenergie verifizierbar von Nuklearwaffenambitionen abgebracht werden kann;
3. zur Stärkung der Glaubwürdigkeit des Nichtverbreitungsregimes und als Zeichen dafür, dass auch die Abrüstungsverpflichtung der Nuklearwaffenstaaten als integraler Bestandteil des NVV ernst genommen und nachdrücklich verfolgt wird, bei den amerikanischen Verbündeten darauf zu drängen, dass die bis heute in Deutschland stationierten taktischen Nuklearwaffen der USA abgezogen werden.

# AUSTRALIË

## Senaat

### **Senate notice paper**

9 March 2005

[...] **Leader of the Australian Democrats (Senator Allison):** To move—That the Senate—

- (a) notes the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review conference commencing on 1 May 2005 in New York and the vital importance of the NPT as an instrument of both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation;
- (b) expresses its deep concern over:
  - (i) the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and particularly those with nuclear weapons capabilities, and
  - (ii) the danger to humanity posed by the possibility that nuclear weapons could be used and at the lack of implementation of binding obligations and agreed steps towards nuclear disarmament;
- (c) calls for the full implementation of all relevant articles of the treaty including Articles I and II on non-proliferation and Article VI on the achievement of nuclear disarmament;
- (d) affirms the vital importance of the unequivocal undertaking made at the Year 2000 NPT Review conference by the nuclear weapons states, to accomplish the total and unequivocal elimination of their nuclear weapons arsenals, and of the 13 steps agreed to at that meeting;
- (e) urges the Government to:
  - (i) pursue a balanced and integrated approach on both disarmament and non-proliferation fronts at the NPT Review,
  - (ii) call on nuclear weapons states and nuclear weapons-capable states not to develop new types of nuclear weapons, or new rationalizations for their threat or use, in accordance with their commitment to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in their security policies, and
  - (iii) call for concrete agreed steps by nuclear weapons states and nuclear weapons-capable states to lower the operating status of nuclear weapons systems in their possession, as called for by Australia's L23 Path to a Nuclear Free World;
- (f) welcomes the appeal, signed by 25 Nobel prize-winners, calling on the governments of the United States of America, Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea, to support and implement steps to lower the operational status of their nuclear weapon systems in order to reduce the risk of nuclear catastrophe;
- (g) notes and strongly affirms continued efforts by the Government to secure universal adherence to, and ratification of, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; and
- (h) requests that this resolution be conveyed to the foreign ministries and United Nations (UN) missions of all participants in the NPT Review conference, the UN Secretary-General, the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Chair of the 2005 NPT Review conference, as well as the governments of India, Pakistan and Israel. [...]

## House

### **House notices**

17 March 2005

[...] **Ms Vamvakinou** to move:

That this House:

- (1) notes the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review conference commencing on 1 May 2005 in New York and the vital importance of the NPT as an instrument of both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation;
- (2) expresses its deep concern over the:
  - (a) proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and
  - (b) danger to humanity posed by the possible use of nuclear weapons;
- (3) acknowledges the significant steps taken towards nuclear disarmament since the previous NPT Review conference including the signing of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty between Russia and the United States of America in 2002 and calls for the full implementation of all relevant articles of the treaty including Articles I and II on non-proliferation and Article VI on the achievement of general and complete disarmament;
- (4) affirms the vital importance of the unequivocal undertaking made at the 2002 NPT Review conference by the nuclear weapons states, to accomplish the elimination of nuclear weapons arsenals, and of the 13 steps agreed to at that meeting;

(5) urges the Government to:

(a) pursue a balanced and integrated approach on both disarmament and non-proliferation at the NPT Review Conference,

(b) call on the nuclear weapons states and nuclear capable states not to develop new types of nuclear weapons, in accordance with the commitment to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in security policies, and

(c) call for concrete agreed steps by nuclear weapons states and nuclear capable states to lower the operating status of nuclear weapons systems in their possession, as called for by Australia's L23 Path to a Nuclear Free World;

(6) welcomes the appeal, signed by 30 Nobel prize-winners, calling on the governments of the United States of America, Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea, to support and implement steps to lower the operational status of their nuclear weapon systems in order to reduce the risk of nuclear catastrophe;

(7) notes and strongly affirms continued efforts by the Government to secure universal adherence to, and ratification of, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and urges the Government to press for the early entry into force of the CTBT; and

(8) requests that this resolution be conveyed to the foreign ministries and United Nations (UN) missions of all participants in the NPT Review conference, the UN Secretary-General, the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Chair of the 2005 NPT Review conference, as well as the governments of India, Pakistan and Israel. [...]



# EUROPEES PARLEMENT

## Europees Parlement

### **Motion for a European Parliament resolution on Non Proliferation Treaty 2005 Review Conference Nuclear Arms in North Korea and in Iran**

Adopted on 9 March 2005

- A) Taking into account and reiterating its previous resolutions on nuclear disarmament and in particular its resolution of 26 February 2004 on the Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee in May 2004,
- B) Underlining that the European Security Strategy concept and the EU's Strategy on Weapons of Mass Destruction, as adopted by the enlarged EU emphasises the importance of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament,
- C) Recognizing that all the EU Member States are States party to the NPT and two EU Member States are Nuclear Weapons States as defined in the NPT,
- D) Recalling the UN Secretary General's High-Level Panel on UN reform stating that "we are approaching a point in which the erosion of the non-proliferation regime could become irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation,

1. Reaffirms its position that the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is of vital importance for the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and for nuclear disarmament;
2. Recalls that the EU's and the NPT's ultimate objective is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and expects the declared and undeclared nuclear weapon states to engage actively with this issue and to make further progress towards reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons;
3. Calls upon the EU and its Member States - in a spirit of 'effective multilateralism' and solidarity and in pursuit of the EU Strategy Against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction - to form a common front at the NPT Review Conference in 2005, and make a positive contribution to the discussions; urges that their statements attach special importance to new initiatives on nuclear disarmament and the revitalisation of the UN Conference on Disarmament;
4. Calls upon the Council and the Member States to add further substance to their common statement that 'the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) must be preserved and - in support of the Union's Common Position on the Universalisation and Reinforcement of Multilateral Agreements in the Field of Non-proliferation of WMD and their Means of Delivery - to make a statement on the EU's Common Position and the EU Strategy at the Review Conference;
5. Calls upon the Council and the Member States to work towards the effective implementation of point 15.3. of the Final Declaration of the 2000 NPT Review Conference in order to achieve a treaty effectively banning the production of all weapons making use of fissile materials;
6. Calls upon the EU to work with its international partners, including NATO, to develop and promote the principles to prevent terrorists, or those that harbour them, from gaining access to weapons and materials of mass destruction; asks the States' parties to fulfill their commitments made in the UN Security Council resolution 1540 on non-state actors and proliferation of nuclear weapons;
7. Calls upon the Council and the Commission to set up a programme aimed at preventing the proliferation of nuclear materials, technology and knowledge in the world;
8. Calls upon all states, and nuclear weapon states in particular, not to provide assistance or encourage states which may seek to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in particular those states which are not parties to the Non-proliferation Treaty;
9. Stresses its strong belief that nuclear disarmament activity will contribute significantly to international security and strategic stability and also reduce the risk of thefts of plutonium or High Enriched Uranium by terrorists; urges the EU to support the new initiative at the international level on new nuclear dangers as proposed by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and by Mohammed ElBaradei, director of the IAEA, on the need to secure nuclear disarmament by Nuclear Weapons States both acknowledged and unacknowledged,
10. Urges the EU to work hard for the establishment of the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention, as has already been deposited at the UN and which could provide a framework of steps within a legally binding disarmament process;
11. Calls upon the Luxembourg Presidency and the Council to provide further substance by outlining how they aim to achieve their common objective in the EU WMD Strategy to 'foster the role of the UN Security Council, and enhance expertise in meeting the challenge of proliferation'; and specifically how the states parties to the NPT might retain the unique verification and inspection experience of UNMOVIC, for example by means of a roster of experts;

12. Calls upon the Council and the Commission to come forward with a proposal to persuade third states and the EU Member States, who have not done so, to sign and ratify the IAEA Additional Protocols;
13. Calls upon the Council and the Member States to clarify and step up their commitment to releasing financial resources to support specific projects conducted by multilateral institutions, such as the IAEA;
14. Calls upon the EU to propose, at the Review Conference in 2005, that the appropriate subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament be established by the UN Commission on Disarmament without further delay;
15. Calls upon the EU to develop the necessary coordination mechanisms (the EU's WMD Monitoring Unit in liaison with the EU Situation Centre) to ensure that intelligence is used to build solidarity and confidence between the Member States on WMD policy;
16. Stresses the importance and urgency of signature and ratification, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with institutional processes, to achieve the earliest possible entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty; calls on the Council and the Commission to insist on this in the dialogue with those State partners which have not yet ratified the CTBT and/or the NPT;
17. Reiterates its call upon the USA to stop the development of new generations of battlefield nuclear weapons (bunkerbusters) and to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; calls as well on the USA to clarify the situation of the quantity and strategic objectives of its tactical nuclear arsenals stationed on European bases;
18. Calls on Israel, India and Pakistan to become State Parties to the NPT;
19. Welcomes the appeal, signed by 25 Nobel prizewinners, calling on the governments of the United States, Russia, China, France, and the UK, India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea, to support and implement steps to lower the operational status of their nuclear weapon systems in order to reduce the risk of nuclear catastrophe; supports the proposal made by the High Representative for Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU for the establishment of a "nuclear free zone" in the Middle East and asks that an effort will be made to this end;
20. Renews its support for the international Mayors' campaign - initiated by the Mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki - on nuclear disarmament and recommends the international community to carefully consider the Campaign's 'Project Vision 2020', urging a scheduled program of elimination of all nuclear weapons;
21. welcomes the inclusion of Non Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction clauses in the latest EU agreements with third countries and actions plans; points out that such measures must be implemented by all the EU partner countries without exception ;
22. Stresses that the prevention of any threat to the security of any country requires a commitment by the international community; emphasises the need for stronger regional and multilateral security structures in the Middle East, the Indian sub-continent and North-East Asia in order to reduce the pressure towards nuclear proliferation and to achieve the abandonment of nuclear programmes;
23. Calls for all political and diplomatic avenues to be explored in order to secure a peaceful settlement to the conflicts linked with nuclear proliferation;

#### **on Iran**

24. Notes with concern that Hassan Rowhani, secretary of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council, reiterated on 27 February 2005 that Teheran would not give up its "right under the NPT to enrich uranium" and calls upon the Iranian authorities to stop making confusing and contradictory statements;
25. Takes note that Russia and Iran on 27 February 2005 signed a nuclear fuel supply agreement paving the way for Iran to start up its first atomic reactor in Bushehr next year and obliging Teheran to repatriate all spent nuclear fuel to Russia;
26. Calls the Council to take an initiative with the Government of the Russian Federation to obtain guarantees that its recent agreement with Iran on the delivery of nuclear material is solely intended for civilian use, and to ensure support for the EU diplomatic efforts; counts on the International Energy Agency (IAEA) to monitor closely the fuel transfers between Russia and Iran;
27. Welcomes IAEA Director Mohamad ElBaradei's declaration at the end of January 2005 about the progress being made by the agency's nuclear safeguard inspectors over the last 15 months in understanding the nature and scope of Iran's nuclear programme;
28. Reaffirms its full support for the Paris agreement of 15 November, in which Iran made the commitment to suspend its uranium enrichment programme, and to the EU 3 approach of dialogue with the Iranian authorities in order to ensure a peaceful and diplomatic solution to the nuclear issues concerning this country and calls for objective guarantees from the Iranian government as to the non-military nature of its nuclear programme;
29. Calls upon Iran to reaffirm its commitment to the NPT and to make permanent its decision to suspend uranium enrichment, thus providing lasting confidence in the peaceful nature of Iran's intentions and paving the way for a cooperative partnership between the EU and Iran; insists that the negotiations on a Trade and Cooperation Agreement should be seen in parallel with a satisfactory conclusion of the nuclear issue and the establishment of reassuring verifications measures;

30. Calls on the Council and the Commission to enter into negotiations with the Iranian authorities on the transfer of technology and know how as well as financial support for renewable energy;
31. Calls on the Iranian Parliament to conclude the parliamentary ratification of the additional protocol to the Non-Proliferation Treaty;
32. Calls on the US government to fully support the EU diplomatic approach to resolving this problem, considers this question as essential for a renewed transatlantic agenda and welcomes the recent US statement on this matter, as well as earlier assertions not to engage in preventive military action against Iran;

#### **On North Korea**

33. Is deeply concerned that North Korea on 10 February 2005 declared that it possesses nuclear weapons and suspended its participation in the six-party-talks on its nuclear programme for an indefinite period of time;
34. Notes the North Korean statement that their 'end objective is a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula' and urges it to abide by its obligations under NPT and its government and other parties involved to take concrete steps in negotiations and to adopt a constructive approach;
35. Urges North Korea to rejoin the NPT, to revoke its decision to withdraw from the six-party-talks and to allow the resumption of negotiations in order to find a peaceful solution to the crisis in the Korean peninsula;
36. Urges both North Korea and the US to enable a speedy resolution of the current crisis, initially by offering to recommence the supply of Heavy Fuel Oil in exchange for a verified freezing of the Yongbyon plant, to avoid further deterioration of the current situation;
37. Urges Council to reconsider paying Euro 4 million of suspension costs for KEDO to South Korea, taking into account that this initiative played a significant role in the recent past and recognises that it could well serve to supply conventional energy in the future;
38. Believes that the EU should support renewed efforts to enable the DPRK to renounce the further use of nuclear energy in exchange for guaranteed energy supplies;
39. Calls on Council and Commission to offer financial support for heavy fuel oil supplies to remedy North Korea's primary energy needs and asks Commission and Council to make the necessary approaches regarding EU participation in future 'Six Party Talks' at the same time making clear that 'No Say, No Pay' is a principle which the EU will follow regarding the Korean Peninsula;
40. Is aware that central to the ongoing crisis are the claims that North Korea has firstly a full fledged Highly Enriched Uranium Programme and has supplied Uranium to Libya; however, considering that neither of these claims have been substantiated, asks for a public hearing in the European Parliament to evaluate the claims;
41. Calls upon both the Council and the Commission to present a progress report to the European Parliament on the outcome of the NPT Review Conference in due time after the end of the Conference;
42. Decides to establish an official delegation to attend the NPT Review conference;
43. Invites its President to forward this resolution to the Luxembourg Presidency, the Commission, the Council, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the UN Secretary-General, to both governments and parliaments of Iran and North Korea, to all States Parties to the Convention as well as to the IAEA.

## KRONIEK 2005

1 januari	Luxemburg voorzitter EU
24 januari – 1 april	Conference on Disarmament, eerste sessie
26-30 januari	World Economic Forum, Davos
30 januari	Parlementsverkiezingen Irak
31 januari – 11 februari	Biological Weapons Convention, New York
3 februari	Ministeriële bijeenkomst EU-Australië, Luxemburg
3-10 februari	Bezoek Rice aan acht landen in Europa en het Midden-Oosten
10-21 februari	Reces UK House of Commons
11-13 februari	Munich Security Conference, München
11-21 februari	Krokusreces Nederlands parlement
12-13 februari	Bijeenkomst NAVO Ministers van Defensie, Nice
21 februari	EU Raad Algemene Zaken en Externe Betrekkingen, Brussel
21-25 februari	Bezoek Bush aan Europa (Brussel, Mainz, Bratislava, London)
22 februari	NAVO bijeenkomst, Brussel
16-18 maart	IAEA General Conference on Nuclear Security, London
18-19 maart	Informele bijeenkomst EU Ministers van Defensie, Luxemburg
22-23 maart	Europese Raad, Brussel
24 maart	Ministeriële bijeenkomst EU-Canada, Luxemburg
24 maart – 4 april	Paasreces UK House of Commons
11-28 april	Jaarlijkse bijeenkomst UN Disarmament Commission, New York
15-16 april	Informele bijeenkomst EU Ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken, Luxemburg
16 april	Bomspotting XL, België
20 april	Ministeriële bijeenkomst EU-VS, Washington
20-21 april	Informele bijeenkomst NAVO Ministers van Defensie, Vilnius, Litouwen
25-26 april	EU Raad Algemene Zaken en Externe Betrekkingen, Luxemburg
29 april – 16 mei	Meireces Nederlands parlement
2-27 mei	NPV Toetsingsconferentie, New York
5 mei	Parlementsverkiezingen Verenigd Koninkrijk
7-8 mei	Bezoek President Bush aan Nederland
10 mei	EU-Rusland bijeenkomst, Moskou
23 mei	EU Raad Algemene Zaken en Externe Betrekkingen, Brussel
26 mei – 6 juni	Reces UK House of Commons
30 mei – 15 juli	Conference on Disarmament, tweede sessie
1 juni	Referendum over de Europese Grondwet
5-7 juni	Organization of American States General Assembly, Fort Lauderdale
13-14 juni	EU Raad Algemene Zaken en Externe Betrekkingen, Luxemburg
16-17 juni	Europese Raad, Brussel
17 juni	Presidentsverkiezingen Iran
20-24 juni	International IAEA Symposium on Uranium Production and Raw Materials for the Nuclear Fuel Cycle, Wenen
1 juli	Verenigd Koninkrijk voorzitter EU
1 juli – 29 augustus	Zomerreces Nederlands parlement
1 juli – 5 september	Zomerreces Bundestag
6-8 juli	G8-top, Perthshire, Schotland
26 juli – 3 september	Zomerreces US House of Representatives
28 juli – 10 oktober	Zomerreces UK House of Commons
1 augustus – 5 september	Zomerreces US Senate
8 augustus – 23 september	Conference on Disarmament, derde sessie
13 september	Start Algemene Vergadering VN, New York
26-30 september	IAEA General Conference, Wenen
7-11 november	OPCW Conference of State Parties, Den Haag
2-5 december	OPCW Executive Council, Den Haag

## **FACTS AND REPORTS – Eerder verschenen**

1. US unilateralism – official foreign comments
2. Veiligheidsvraagstukken en de verkiezingen – standpunten van de politieke partijen  
Relevante delen van de partijprogramma's van de Nederlandse politieke partijen, plus citaten van politici op het terrein van oorlog en vrede.
3. Transatlantic relations – recent developments  
Overzicht van recente ontwikkelingen in de transatlantische betrekkingen, met name binnen de NAVO, mede naar aanleiding van uitspraken in de State of the Union.
4. Ontwikkelingen betreffende kernwapens en de Nederlandse politiek – briefing paper  
Periodiek overzicht van ontwikkelingen rond kernwapens in de internationale en nationale politiek, met uitgebreide hoeveelheid bijlagen.
5. Nucleaire vraagstukken – standpunten van de Nederlandse regering en de Tweede Kamer  
Overzicht april 2001 – april 2002
6. Crisis in de OPCW – de verwijdering van directeur-generaal Bustani  
Documenten en artikelen over het ontslag van directeur-generaal Bustani van het OPCW
7. Prepcom van het NPV – nucleaire ontwapening stopt  
Verklaringen en rapporten van staten en ngo's tijdens de Prepcom van het NPV
8. Verdrag van Moskou – détente tussen Rusland en Verenigde Staten  
Informatie over het Verdrag van Moskou, ontwikkelingen daaromheen en commentaar erop
9. Joint Strike Fighter – achtergrondberichten
10. Konfrontatie in Zuid-Azië – de kernwapenwedloop tussen India en Pakistan  
Basisgegevens over de nucleaire strijdkrachten en doctrines van India en Pakistan, Nederlandse wapenexport en wapenexportbeleid en een oproep om een nucleair treffen te voorkomen
11. Massavernietigingswapens in het Midden-Oosten (1) – Egypte, Israël, Syrië  
Basisinformatie over de proliferatie van nucleaire, biologische en chemische wapens in Egypte, Israël en Syrië en verklaringen van de Nederlandse regering hierover
12. Amerikaans unilateralisme II – officiële reacties
13. Aanval op Irak – de kwestie van de massavernietigingswapens; feiten, documenten en overwegingen
14. Aanval op Irak (2) – recente ontwikkelingen
15. Documenten First Committee Verenigde Naties 2002 – resoluties, verklaringen, rapporten
16. De NAVO-top in Praag – documenten
17. Aanval op Irak (3) – het inspectieregiem
18. Internationaal veiligheidsbeleid Verenigde Staten – officiële documenten en reacties van de regering
19. Veiligheidsvraagstukken en de verkiezingen (2) – standpunten van de politieke partijen (update 2003)
20. Korea, de tweede crisis
21. Aanval op Irak (4) – de aanloop
22. Aanval op Irak (5) – vooravond van de aanval
23. De andere crises - Informatie over het Amerikaans nucleair beleid, missile defense, de Conference on Disarmament en de recente ontwikkelingen rond Noord-Korea, Iran en India en Pakistan.
24. Aanval op Irak (6) – de slachtoffers
25. Nucleaire vraagstukken (2) – standpunten van de Nederlandse regering en de Tweede Kamer en recent nieuws nucleair beleid Verenigde Staten - Overzicht april 2002 – mei 2003
26. Teststopverdrag Artikel XIV Conferentie – de kwestie van de Amerikaanse minikernwapens
27. G-8 en Proliferation Security Initiative – stappen naar unilaterale contra-proliferatie
28. Irak (7) – Nederland en de massavernietigingswapens
29. Proliferatievraagstukken – Standpunten van de Nederlandse regering
30. Iran – Documentatie massavernietigingswapens
31. Twee proliferatiecrises – Iran en Noord-Korea
32. Begroting Buitenlandse Zaken – Proliferatievraagstukken
33. Irak (8) – De massavernietigingswapens
34. Irak (9) – De casus belli
35. Proliferatie – recente ontwikkelingen
36. VS nucleair beleid – recente ontwikkelingen
37. Proliferatie (2) – recente ontwikkelingen
38. Iran (2A-2B-2C-2D) – recente ontwikkelingen
39. Iran (3A-3B-3C-3D) – recente ontwikkelingen
40. Nucleaire vraagstukken (3) – basisinformatie en parlement  
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