

PREPCOM VAN HET NPV

Nucleaire ontwapening stopt

PENN – NL Facts and Reports Nr. 7

Juni 2002

Werkgroep Eurobom

PENN-Nederland

PREPCOM VAN HET NPV


Juni 2002

Deze publikatie is mogelijk gemaakt door
de W. Alton Jones Foundation

PENN, het Project voor Europese Nucleaire Non-proliferatie, is opgezet om:

- * officiële discussies over de toekomst van kernwapens in Europa nauwgezet te volgen en deze te verhelderen;
- * analyses van en commentaren op deze ontwikkelingen te publiceren;
- * verdere maatregelen voor kernontwapening in Europa en substantiële Europese bijdragen aan kernwapenbeheersing, ontwapening en non-proliferatie te stimuleren;
- * te ijveren voor de volledige naleving van het Non-Proliferatieverdrag door de NAVO, de Europese Unie, en haar leden;
- * politieke belemmeringen op te werpen tegen ontwikkelingen die zouden kunnen leiden tot een Europese Unie met kernwapens;
- * te bevorderen dat de Europese Unie en al haar leden uiteindelijk niet-nucleaire leden van het NPV worden.

Working Group Eurobomb/PENN NL
Obrechtstraat 43
3572 EC UTRECHT
THE NETHERLANDS
TEL (+31) (0)30 271 4376
(+31) (0)30 272 2594
FAX (+31) (0)30 271 4759
e-mail: k.koster@inter.nl.net
logo: Len Munnik



Werkgroep Eurobom
PENN/Netherlands MPI/Netherlands

FACTS AND REPORTS

Juni 2002 – No. 7

INHOUDSOPGAVE

Inleiding	2
Opening statement by Jayantha Dhanapala	3
Statements and reports	4
NGO Statements	27
Factual summary by Chairman Henrik Salander	36
U.S. objections to summary	40
Commentaar	42
Overzicht Facts and Reports	44

INLEIDING

Dit nummer van Facts and Reports biedt een selectie van de belangrijkste documenten gepresenteerd tijdens de PrepCom, de tussentijdse voorbereidende vergadering voor de evaluatie conferenties van het Non-proliferatie verdrag. Dit verdrag heeft tot doel om nucleaire ontwapening te bewerkstelligen en de verspreiding van kernwapens en kernwapentechnologie tegen te gaan (terwijl het niet-militaire gebruik van nucleaire energie expliciet wordt aangemoedigd). De bijeenkomst vond plaats van 8 tot en met 19 april in New York. Gezien de reeks recente gebeurtenissen rondom kernwapens, een reeks unilaterale stappen door de Amerikaanse regering en de aanvaarding daarvan door Rusland, leek een confrontatie over die ontwikkelingen tijdens de conferentie onvermijdelijk. Het stelsel van internationale verdragen stond immers op de helling. Dit gebeurde echter nauwelijks, behalve door middel van verhullend taalgebruik.

De zorgen die door dhr Dhanapala in zijn introductie werden uiteengezet kregen weinig weerklank in de bijdragen van de landen. Alleen de ngo gemeenschap gaf in haar bijdragen aan hoe veel achteruitgang er in feite had plaatsgevonden sedert de laatste Non-Proliferatie Verdrag evaluatie conferentie.

Ter illustratie van deze gebeurtenissen hebben we in deze bundel de inleidende opmerkingen van de heer Dhanapala, het slot commentaar van de voorzitter, de heer Salander, en de belangrijkste bijdragen van de deelnemende landen en de ngo-gemeenschap, bij elkaar gebracht. Deze informatie is van belang voor diegenen die de ontwikkelingen in de Verenigde Naties in het najaar willen volgen. Dan worden een reeks resoluties ingediend in de Algemene Vergadering die over al de zaken handelen die op de PrepCom aan de orde zijn geweest.

Tenslotte hebben we ook een paar pagina's commentaar toegevoegd.

Werkgroep Eurobom
juni 2002

OPENING STATEMENT

By Jayantha Dhanapala
Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs
8 April 2002

“[...] At the 2000 NPT Review Conference, States parties agreed on further measures to improve the effectiveness of the strengthened review process. In doing so, as reflected in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, they reaffirmed the provisions in Decision 1 adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference on "Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty".

The States parties agreed that the purpose of the first two sessions of the Preparatory Committee would be to "consider principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty as well as its universality". Furthermore, "each session of the Preparatory Committee should consider matters of substance relating to the implementation of the Treaty and Decisions 1 and 2, as well as the resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, and the outcomes of subsequent Review Conferences, including developments affecting the operation and purpose of the Treaty".

In the period since the 2000 NPT Review Conference the international political and strategic environment has changed significantly. Making progress in the area of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation is more important than ever in the aftermath of the events of 11 September 2001. These tragic events have underscored the urgency to implement effective measures to eliminate the risk of weapons of mass destruction proliferating and falling into the hands of terrorists.

As the Secretary-General stated on 1 October 2001 when addressing the General Assembly on terrorism, "...we must now strengthen the global norm against the use or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This means, among other actions, redoubling the efforts to ensure universality, verification and full implementation of key treaties related to weapons of mass destruction..."

In the aftermath of the 11 September attacks, the General Assembly not only reaffirmed multilateralism as a core principle in negotiations in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation, but also emphasised that progress is urgently needed in this area to help maintain international peace and security and to contribute to global efforts against terrorism.

At the 2000 NPT Review Conference, participants agreed that the "total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". The States parties agreed on 13 practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the Treaty and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament".

Several events in the period following the conclusion of the Review Conference have cast a shadow on the prospects for progress in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Some of these have caused the advance of the Chicago-based Doomsday Clock - a barometer of nuclear danger for the past 55 years - to seven minutes to twelve, two minutes closer to the midnight hour symbolising nuclear conflict.

Despite the strong reaffirmation of international support for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty at the 2001 Conference to Facilitate the Treaty's Entry into Force, five years after the opening for signature, it has yet to do so. Pending this entry into force, a moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions should be maintained.

Progress to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols remains slow. At the 2000 NPT Review Conference, States parties reaffirmed that IAEA safeguards are an essential component of the non-proliferation regime. Fifty-one States have yet to fulfill their obligations under the NPT Treaty to bring safeguards agreements with the Agency into force, and out of the additional protocols approved for 61 States, only 24 have entered into force.

Major efforts are needed to consolidate and strengthen the non-proliferation regime and to achieve its universality. All Parties have the responsibility to comply with the provisions in the Treaty and must be held accountable for their commitments under the non-proliferation regime. Let me remind you of the value of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, as it is the only treaty committing all parties to nuclear disarmament.”

STATEMENTS AND REPORTS

Belarus

“[...] We call upon the two nuclear-weapons states possessing the largest nuclear weapons stockpiles to sign, at the earliest, a legally binding agreement on further irreversible reduction of strategic nuclear weapons and means of their delivery, which will undoubtedly facilitate the strengthening of international security and strategic stability.

[...]

The Republic of Belarus expresses deep concern over the Nuclear Posture Review of one of nuclear-weapons states recently made public. The Review undermines the basic provisions of the NPT and envisages the development of new types of nuclear weapons, which may lead to the resumption of nuclear testing. The Review considers a possibility of preventive nuclear strikes against a list of states, including non-nuclear-weapons states. Lowering the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons and expanding the circumstances and conditions for their use create a dangerous precedent.

As a Party to the Standing Consultative Commission set up under the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles, the Republic of Belarus expresses its deep concern over the decision of the United States of America to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. The rejection of the ABM Treaty will inevitably lead to the development of new advanced systems of nuclear weapons, increased stockpiles of nuclear weapons and militarization of outer space. [...]

(Statement by Valentin Rybakov, Deputy Head of the Delegation, 9 April 2002)

Brazil

“[...]he possession of nuclear weapons cannot be accepted as a differentiating element among States. The decision made by 182 States parties to the NPT to forgo the option of nuclear weapons as instruments of security cannot live with the continued possession of nuclear weapons by the five nuclear-weapon States. Slow progress in eliminating the nuclear weapons carries with it an implicit presumption of an indefinite status.

[...]

The notification of withdrawal by one of the States Parties to the ABM Treaty might have negative consequences on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The development of a new generation of nuclear weapons is also a disturbing rumor. It appears to signal a new role for nuclear weapons. New rationales for the possession of nuclear weapons continue to be re-stated or reinforced.

The use of nuclear weapons, so it seems, is being re-rationalized.

[...]

Multilaterally negotiated legally binding security assurances must be given by the nuclear-weapons States to all non-nuclear-weapon States under the NPT. Such an undertaking should take the form of an additional Protocol to the Treaty, without prejudice to the legally-binding security assurances already given by the five nuclear-weapon States in the framework of the treaties regarding nuclear-weapon free zones.

Brazil welcomes the announcements regarding substantial reductions in nuclear arsenals. The principle of irreversibility should apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures. The fundamental principle of verification should be applied to all disarmament measures. There should be no possibility of re-deploying nuclear weapons in current non-operational status, for this would render unreliable nuclear weapon reduction figures and statistics.

[...]

The risk that terrorist organizations get hold of nuclear weapons and material is indeed a regrettable possibility that only reinforces the need to work towards the objective of nuclear disarmament. We must be careful that the discussion about the possibility of use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist groups does not result in any implicit justification for the indefinite retention of those weapons by States. [...]

(Statement by H.E Ambassador Celina Assumpção, do Valle Pereira, 8 April 2002)

Canada

“[...] The two years since we last met have seen clouds darken our outlook for success in the Thirteen Steps we planned to disarmament. The CTBT, rejected by one key state, is far from entry into force. At the Conference on Disarmament, for lack of consensus on a program of work, negotiations have begun about neither fissile materials nor negative security assurances. Further, we have not begun to deal there with either nuclear disarmament or the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Moreover, signals from some nuclear-weapon States regarding their nuclear arsenals occasion uncertainty and concern.

[...]

The NPT's inherent discrimination is acceptable only in a larger context of coherent commitment and credible progress toward disarmament. Without Article VI, the NPT would not exist. Without its fulfilment over time, the Treaty - in which non-proliferation and disarmament are mutually interdependent - will lose its seminal value. [...]"

(Notes for remarks by Christopher Westdal, Ambassador for Disarmament, 9 April 2002)

“[...] Canada's objective has been and remains the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Canada expects the nuclear-weapon States to engage actively on this issue and to make further progress to reduce and to eliminate nuclear weapons. All members of the international community have a deep and abiding stake in this process. Both bilaterally and at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) Canada has welcomed the US-Russia reductions in strategic nuclear warheads announced in November 2001 and encouraged the two parties to codify these reductions in a legally binding, transparent, verifiable and irreversible fashion.

Canada believes that progress in reducing strategic nuclear weapons alone is not sufficient. fifty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly Canada noted the need to focus on tactical nuclear weapons as well.

Canada welcomes the reduced salience of nuclear weapons and the significant reduction of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces, both conventional and nuclear, that has taken place since the end of the Cold War. Canada, as a member of NATO, continues to advocate that the Alliance play a positive role in advancing disarmament objectives, through a continuous step-by-step approach.

Canada believes that every State Party to the NPT has an interest and a responsibility to encourage the fulfilment of Article VI. [...]"

(Report on the Implementation of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 9 April 2002)

“[...] In the absence of an agreed format for reporting, Canada has chosen to submit its report to the Preparatory Committee using a simple narrative text, organised Article-by-Article. Canada is not necessarily advocating the adoption of this approach by States Party generally, or proposing the Canadian national report as a model by other states, but only illustrating one possible approach.

Although the reporting requirement pursuant to the Middle East Resolution stipulates that reports should be submitted to both Preparatory Committees and the Review Conference itself, the requirement pursuant to Article VI is silent on the question of timing, beyond indicating that reports should be "regular." Canada would favour reporting to each of the Preparatory Committees and to the Review Conference, with an opportunity provided in each of these settings for States Party to review and comment upon each others' reports.

Although there is no obligation to report on the Treaty in its entirety, Canada would favour comprehensive reporting covering all aspects of the Treaty, and in its national report this year has elected to report on all articles of the Treaty.

In the necessary discussion of format, Canada supports a loosely-defined and relatively simple common approach that balances the need for adequate and meaningful content with the desirability of keeping the procedure simple enough to facilitate compliance. [...]"

(Working paper on the issue of Reporting by States Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 10 April 2002)

China

“[...] Countries with the largest nuclear arsenals bear special and primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament and should continue reducing on a large scale their nuclear arms in a legally binding, verifiable and irreversible manner. Nuclear weapon states should continue their moratoria on nuclear explosion test, persevere in CTBT ratification and entry into force, refrain from the development of new type of nuclear weapons and provide negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapons states unconditionally.

[...]

Breach or weakening of any one treaty in the regime will impact on the states parties' confidence in the whole treaty regime. The NPT, as a treaty of principle of the regime, has its vitality closely related to other arms control treaties dealing with specific subjects. If such treaties were breached, the general targets of nuclear disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation established by the NPT would be beyond reach. [...]

(Statement by H.E. Ambassador Hu Xiaodi, Head of the Chinese Delegation, 8 April 2002)

Colombia

“[...] To finalize, Mr. President, allow me to emphasize that in 1995 we, the States parties to the NPT that don't possess nuclear weapons, accepted the indefinite extension of the Treaty, but we didn't accept the continuation indefinitely of a situation in which some States can have nuclear weapons and others don't. That is why we insist on the fulfillment of the unequivocal undertaking with the total elimination of nuclear arms given by the Nuclear Weapon States, as well as on the full implementation of the 13 practical steps agreed therein.”

(Statement by Ambassador Alfonso Valdivieso, Permanent Representative, 8 April 2002)

Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO Preparatory Commission)

“1.- On behalf of the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, I thank you for this opportunity to address you today.

(Treaty signatures and ratification)

2.-The Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference stresses "the importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the CTBT." In this context, since the NPT 2000 Review Conference until today, 10 additional States have signed the Treaty and 34 have ratified it.

3.- Further, you are, no doubt, well aware that the second *Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty* was held in New York on November 11-13, 2001. 118 States, including 74 ratifiers and 35 signatories as well as 9 non-Signatories participated. Representatives of three international organizations as well as 24 non-governmental organizations also took part. The Conference was chaired by Mexico, and Ministers from 49 countries addressed the Conference.

4.-The Conference adopted a Final Declaration which called for the early signing and ratification of the CTBT by all States that have not yet done so, refraining from acts which should defeat its object and purpose in the meanwhile. The Declaration stresses the importance of a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty as a major instrument in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

5.- This strong support is evident by the signature of the CTBT by 165 States of whom 90 States have deposited their instruments of ratification with the UN Secretary-General. This includes 31 of the 44 States whose ratification is required for Treaty entry into force, including ratifications by the nuclear-weapon States of France, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom.

6.- The Provisional Technical Secretariat works closely with the States Signatories as well as with the Coordinator State, Mexico, to follow-up the *Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty* to further Treaty understanding and advance the establishment of the global verification regime.

(The global verification regime)

7.- Steady and good progress has been made in the establishment of the International Monitoring System (IMS). Out of the 321 stations provided for in the Treaty, site surveys have been completed for 270 stations (84% of the sites). Altogether 122 stations in the four technologies have been incorporated into the verification system and 104 additional stations are under construction or in the stage of contract negotiation.

In addition, the Secretariat has begun to lay the groundwork for what will be one of its main responsibilities in the future: the operation and the maintenance of the stations.

8.- The legal framework for the work to be carried out on the territories of States hosting IMS facilities is evolving well. Appropriate legal arrangements now enable the Commission to implement its work programme at a total of 307 facilities in 75 States.

9.- A Global Communications Infrastructure (GCI), connects the IMS stations in near-real time to the International Data Center (IDC) in Vienna and the national data centers of States. IDC, which is also well-advanced in its build-up, supports the verification responsibilities of States by providing objective products and services necessary for effective global monitoring.

10.- As regards to On-Site Inspections (OSI), which are provided for in the Treaty as a final verification measure, a major achievement has been the completion of the initial draft rolling text of its Operational Manual. Work is also proceeding to finalize a Long Range Plan as a basis for training future OSI inspectors and inspection assistants. The experiments conducted successfully in 1999 and 2001 in Kazakhstan and Slovakia, respectively, have provided valuable experience by allowing the testing of OSI procedures and equipment under realistic conditions.

(Support from the States)

11.- The Commission is very grateful for the strong support of the States in the establishment of the infrastructure for the implementation of the Treaty.

12.- This support is clearly reflected in the States active participation in the meetings of the Commission and related activities, as well as their manifest preparedness to finance it. As of 2 April 2002, 90.6 % of the assessed contributions for 2001 and 53.2 % for 2002 has been collected, a very high rate for which the Secretariat is very grateful.

13.- The Commission has played the role of focal point for voluntary contributions related to CTBTO international co-operation activities. With the support of donor States, a range of activities have been implemented including *inter alia*, the provision of support to training programmes for developing countries.

14.- For its part, the Commission organizes international, regional and other workshops to deepen understanding of Treaty significance, to explore possible benefits of the application of verification technologies for scientific and civil purposes and, of course, to strengthen support for the establishment of the Treaty verification regime. The Commission has held six international cooperation workshops: in Vienna, Cairo, Beijing, Lima, Istanbul and Dakar. In 2002 two workshops are planned, in Nairobi and in Jamaica. We welcome participation of interested States.

Mr. Chairman,

15.- This brief summary just scratches the surface of the significant progress in implementing the global verification regime and in preparing for Treaty entry into force. With the active support of the community of nations, the Commission will enhance the cause and understanding of the Treaty for a safer and more secure world.”

(Statement by Liliam Ballón de Amézaga, Chief, External Relations)

Egypt

“[...] The issue of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East has high priority in Egyptian policy, particularly since all the States of the Middle East region, without exception, have become parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, leaving Israel as the only State in the region that has not yet acceded to the Treaty or placed its nuclear facilities under comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.

This imbalance, particularly in a region like the Middle East that is beset by manifest political tensions, led the parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to adopt in 1995 a resolution on the Middle East, within the framework of the majority agreement on the extension of the Treaty and cosponsored by the depositary States, namely the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States. [...]

(Report on Steps to promote the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, 19 March 2002)

European Union

“[...] The EU wishes to underline the commitment in UNGA Resolution 56/24 T where we reaffirmed multilateralism as a core principle in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation with a view to maintaining and strengthening universal norms and enlarging their scope.

[...]

We reaffirm the importance of Israel's accession to the NPT and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards.

[...]

The NPT cannot be understood without Article VI and its implementation. Disarmament and non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing. The EU will continue to encourage systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the NPT and paragraphs 3 and 4 c) of the 1995 decision on "principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament", as well as the practical steps agreed in the 2000 final document to this end. The EU remains fully committed to the implementation of the final document and calls upon all states parties to do so as well.

The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) counts 165 signatories and 90 ratifications, including all the countries who subscribe the present statement, but still the Treaty has not entered into force. While regretting this situation, we call upon all states, especially the 3 non-signatories and the 10 non-ratifying states whose ratification is required for the Treaty to enter into force, to do so unconditionally and without further delays. Pending the entry into force, we urge all states with nuclear capabilities to abide by a moratorium and refrain from any actions, which are contrary to the obligations and provisions of the CTBT. We are actively involved in promoting universal adherence to CTBT, and we will continue our efforts until the mechanisms established by the Treaty become fully operational.

[...]

We welcome the ongoing bilateral negotiations between the Russian Federation and the USA on strategic nuclear arms reduction. These negotiations constitute a very important step and any disarmament measures agreed should be swiftly embodied into a legally binding instrument with provisions ensuring irreversibility, verification and transparency.

For the first time in the NPT process, the issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons was included in a final document. We deem it an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process and look forward to the fulfilment of the commitments taken by the relevant states during the VI Review Conference. We encourage them swiftly to start negotiations on an effectively verifiable agreement on drastic reductions of these weapons.

The EU is convinced that the application of the principle of irreversibility to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures, contributes to the maintenance and reinforcement of international peace, security and stability.

[...]

The EU recognises the continuing value of the existing security assurances as provided through the Protocols of the Nuclear Weapons Free Zones and unilateral declarations of nuclear weapon states, noted by UNSC Resolution 984/1995 and reaffirmed at the VI Review Conference, for the non-proliferation regime, as confidence building measures towards non-nuclear weapon states on the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. [...]"

(Statement by H.E. Carlos Miranda, Ambassador of Spain, on behalf of the European Union, 8 April 2002)

"[...] The EU remains deeply concerned by the situation in South Asia. We continue to call upon India and Pakistan to meet all requirements set out in UNSC Resolution 1172. The EU notes that both countries have declared moratoria on nuclear testing and their willingness to participate in the negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. We call on them to take actively all necessary measures towards fulfilling their stated intention.

[...]

While we acknowledge that the primary responsibility for the reductions of their arsenals rests with the five nuclear-weapons states, it is also an obligation of all States Parties to further the implementation of Article VI of the NPT. In this regard we support the establishment within the Conference on Disarmament, as part of an overall work programme, of an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament.

[...]

For the first time in the NPT process, the issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons was included in a final document. We deem it an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process and look forward to the fulfilment of the commitments taken by the relevant states during the VI Review Conference. We encourage them swiftly to start negotiations on an effectively verifiable agreement on drastic reductions of these weapons.

[...]

The EU takes note of the US decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty and welcomes the ensuing bilateral negotiations with the Russian Federation to create a new strategic framework. We also expect that the abovementioned negotiations will further promote international stability. [...]"

(Statement by H.E. Mr. Carlos Miranda, Ambassador of Spain, 12 April 2002)

France

"[...] Pour réaliser ces grands objectifs, une coopération internationale accrue est impérative. Le TNP fédère les intérêts de tous et offre un fondement indispensable à cette coopération. Aussi, la France tient-elle à réaffirmer son soutien sans faille au Traité de Non-Prolifération. La France soutient et encourage la mise en oeuvre des objectifs du Traité comme des décisions de la Conférence d'examen et de prorogation de 1995, confortés par le Document final adopté par la Conférence d'examen de 2000. A travers cet instrument, c'est la démarche multilatérale que nous devons chercher à maintenir et renforcer. En effet, il est plus clair que jamais que les régimes multilatéraux de non-prolifération et de désarmement sont indispensables. Les obligations qu'ils comportent et les contrôles qu'ils prévoient constituent des facteurs de confiance et de prévisibilité. Dans la phase d'incertitude et d'instabilité actuelle, c'est bien la coopération, la confiance et la prévisibilité qui doivent guider nos efforts. [...]"

(Intervention de M. Hubert de la Fortelle, Ambassadeur, Représentant Permanent, 8 April 2002)

"L'article VI du Traité a conféré à la France des responsabilités particulières en tant qu'État doté de l'arme nucléaire. Elle a accepté dans le cadre de cet article de poursuivre de bonne foi des négociations sur des mesures relatives au désarmement nucléaire. Comme la non-prolifération et la promotion des usages pacifiques, le désarmement est au coeur des engagements croisés du TNP.

Ce qu'elle s'est engagée à faire, la France l'a entrepris concrètement, tout particulièrement en fondant sa politique de dissuasion nucléaire sur le principe de stricte suffisance et en réduisant son arsenal

nucléaire de manière exemplaire. Elle continue de le faire malgré un contexte stratégique international désormais marqué par des incertitudes croissantes en matière de sécurité.

[...]

La France a répondu aux préoccupations de sécurité légitimes des Etats parties au TNP non dotés de l'arme nucléaire, en mettant en oeuvre les dispositions pertinents de la décision 2 de 1995. Aux côtés des autres Etats dotés de l'arme nucléaire, elle leur a apporté, par le biais de la résolution 984 du Conseil de Sécurité, une réponse globale, collective et concrète. Ces engagements pris par la France demeurent. [...]"

(Rapport sur la Mise en oeuvre de l'Article VI et de l'alinéa c) du paragraphe 4 des principes et objectifs de 1995 concernant la non-prolifération et le désarmement nucléaires, 11 April 2002)

Germany

“Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons

1. In the past the nuclear disarmament process between the Soviet Union / Russia and the United States was primarily focussed on long-range strategic systems (SALT, START) or intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF). Non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons have so far not been covered by formal arms control agreements. However, the United States and the Soviet Union / Russia have in 1991/1992 made unilateral commitments in this field; however, these are not subject to any accountability or verification. Rumours about the deployment or redeployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe have over the last few years led to concerns in our publics.

2. There are significantly more nuclear warheads for tactical delivery systems than for strategic ones. The exact numbers are unknown; during the Cold War tens of thousands of warheads and nuclear mines were produced; and we have to assume that there are still thousands of them left today. The sheer numbers in some arsenals give rise to concerns. Non-strategic nuclear weapons are seen to pose particular risks also for other reasons: many of the warheads are presumably old and might have already exceeded their original lifespan; there are perceptions that the barriers against their use are lower compared with strategic systems; storage and deployment patterns and possible additional transportation risks as well as the often smaller size foster concerns about enhanced proliferation risks and the danger that terrorists might gain access to them.

3. The need for action was already acknowledged at the end of the Cold War. The Heads of State and Government participating in the 1990 London meeting of the North Atlantic Council concluded that "as a result of the new political and military conditions in Europe, there will be a significantly reduced role for sub-strategic nuclear systems of the shortest range. They have decided specifically that, once negotiations begin on short-range nuclear forces, the Alliance will propose, in return for reciprocal action by the Soviet Union, the elimination of all its nuclear artillery shells from Europe." The statement was followed in 1991 by the US Presidential Nuclear Initiative, a unilateral reduction commitment by President Bush, which was reciprocated by the Soviet Union and Russia in 1991 and 1992 by the announcement of commitments similar to the ones suggested by the United States. Finally in 1997 the United States and Russia agreed that in the context of START III negotiations they would explore possible measures relating to tactical nuclear systems, including appropriate confidence building and transparency measures (cf. Helsinki Agreement on START III of 22 March 1997).

4. The Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference - for the first time - contains a reference to non-strategic nuclear weapons in the so called "13 steps" ("the further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process."). Thus a specific obligation was established that the nuclear-weapon States have to live up to. As part of the overall nuclear disarmament process non-strategic weapons must be reduced in a verifiable and irreversible manner. However, recognising that their elimination will not be possible in one leap, a gradual approach is suggested, which could include the following elements:

- Reporting by Russia and the United States on the implementation of the 1991/92 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives.
 - Formalization of the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives including an agreement on appropriate verification measures which would give assurance of compliance with them.
 - In line with the December 2000 NATO Report on Options for Confidence and Security Building Measures, Verification, Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament: agreement on reciprocal exchanges of information regarding readiness status, safety provisions and safety features, and an exchange of data on US and Russian sub-strategic nuclear forces. The adoption of the four CSBMs, which are the subject of discussions in the context of the Nato-Russia relationship, should be encouraged.
 - Following a successful conclusion of the current bilateral negotiations on strategic offensive arms Russia and the United States should be encouraged to start negotiations on non-strategic nuclear weapons in order to close the existing loophole in the nuclear disarmament process.
 - The NPT Review Conference and its Preparatory Commission should be regularly informed about the progress made on the issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons.
 - In line with the requirement of reducing nuclear dangers nuclear-weapon States, which have not yet done so, should also take particular security precautions (i.a. physical protection measures for transport and storage) regarding their non-strategic nuclear arsenals. The NPT Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee should be kept duly informed about this.”
- (German Delegation, 11 April 2002)

“Attaining a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World

There is general agreement on the final goal of the process of nuclear disarmament: the total elimination of nuclear weapons. This goal was made explicit in the "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" adopted by the 1995 NPT-Review and Extension Conference. The nuclear weapon States subsequently declared in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference their "unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals" as part of the 13 practical steps to implement Art. VI NPT.

Thus the goal is clear; the question is how to achieve it. Coming to terms with this issue it might help to take a look at the essential prerequisites for a nuclear-weapon-free world.

I.

Among the prerequisites for a nuclear weapon-free world the following appear to be of particular significance:

1. A reliable database and the non-availability of weapon-grade fissile material:

In the first instance we must establish, at the appropriate time, a reliable inventory of all nuclear weapons and stocks of fissile material usable for military purposes. Only on the basis of comprehensive and reliable data will it be possible to implement the final steps towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free world. When entering a nuclear weapon-free world we must be in a position to state unambiguously that all existing nuclear weapons are destroyed. In addition, the physical non-availability of weapon grade fissile material will provide the necessary assurance that a nuclear weapon cannot be assembled in a very short time; we need to make sure that there is no easy breakout of individual States from a universal prohibition of nuclear weapons. This requirement also demonstrates the urgency of a comprehensive and coherent approach regarding the management, control and disposition of plutonium and highly enriched uranium as the key ingredients of nuclear weapons. The dimension of the problem is illustrated by the fact that existing stockpiles of weapon-usable fissile materials amount to more than 3.000 metric tons, enough to produce more than 200.000 nuclear weapons! These considerations underline the need to start negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty without delay. The unequivocal commitment to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear arsenals should also be demonstrated by a willingness to enter speedily into negotiations on an FMCT without linking such negotiations to other activities in the Conference on Disarmament. We

therefore consider it a matter of priority to renew the 1998 mandate for an ad-hoc committee on FMCT in the CD.

2. Effective verification:

Effective verification measures - based on reliable and disaggregated data - need to be put in place in order to ensure all States that all nuclear weapons are destroyed and no state maintains or is able to establish a capability, which allows it to break out of the prohibition regime at short notice. It is a truism that the smaller the remaining stocks of nuclear weapons the more significant will be the danger presented by even a small number of undetected nuclear warheads. Thus the final stages of nuclear disarmament, the reduction of the last remaining weapons will be one of the most difficult stages of the process. We therefore have to devise a far reaching and intrusive inspection regime. This regime needs to be universal, as any loophole could foster uncertainties and trigger a new arms race. The IAEA could play a key role in the universal verification of a total ban on nuclear weapons. The need for a stringent verification regime is illustrated by the fact that the technologies and the necessary know-how for the production of nuclear weapons will continue to exist even after a nuclear-weapon-free world has been established. Furthermore recent events have made us acutely aware of the difficulties to detect a clandestine programme for the production of weapons of mass destruction.

3. Nuclear disarmament and overall security:

Article VI of the NPT embeds nuclear disarmament in the broader context of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. This must not be misinterpreted as a linkage of nuclear disarmament to the achievement of general and complete disarmament. However, it must be seen as a reflection of the obvious fact that nuclear disarmament is not an end in itself but that it is to enhance overall security and stability. Nuclear disarmament must not increase the risk of large-scale conventional wars nor the revaluation of other weapons of mass destruction. It has to be made sure that the functions that are today attributed to nuclear weapons become dispersible. This relates in particular to their role in deterring being attacked by superior conventional forces or with other weapons of mass destruction. Thus the attainment of a nuclear weapon-free world must be accompanied by the pursuance of other effective arms control agreements at a global and in particular also at a regional level. The building of confidence and the establishment of a stable and verifiable balance of conventional forces at the lowest possible levels is of key importance for regional security. Over the last decades Europe has undertaken determined and successful efforts towards this end. It has established a set of mutually reinforcing arms control agreements, by which existing disparities prejudicial to stability were eliminated, a secure and stable overall balance of conventional armed forces at lower levels was established, the capabilities for launching surprise attack and initiating large-scale offensive action were removed and overall confidence in security matters has been significantly enhanced. These arms control achievements have provided a basis for the fundamental and peaceful transformation of the relationship between East and West and the development of a cooperative security order in the whole of Europe. Much also remains to be done at a global level, inter alia:

- the Chemical Weapons Convention needs to be universally adhered to and be effectively implemented;
- the Biological Weapons Convention must be strengthened by appropriate verification provisions;
- the issue of delivery means of weapons of mass destruction must be addressed; in this regard the proliferation of ballistic missiles is a particular concern;
- the risks posed by the spread of conventional armaments must be tackled.

II.

The above considerations clearly militate against sweeping demands for the immediate conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention and a fixed timetable for the abolition of nuclear weapons. Instead they underline the need for an incremental approach, which - gradually and inexorably - leads to the achievement of the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. They must not be taken as a pretext to shun further progress on nuclear disarmament. On the contrary, they demonstrate the need to redouble our efforts. Seen in this perspective the current stalemate in the CD is no longer tolerable. Germany shares the concerns about an arms race in outer space and calls for urgent efforts to be

undertaken to address this problem. However, we oppose a linkage between this issue and the FMCT and call for the establishment of an ad-hoc committee on FMCT without further delay on the basis of the 1998 mandate. This would be an important step to recreate the momentum in nuclear disarmament.

III.

The Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference spells out 13 practical steps for the systematic and progressive implementation of Article VI. This action programme remains the performance benchmark for the disarmament process. It is of paramount importance that the credibility of this process is maintained at all times and that the process progresses along the lines of the precharted course and that it remains irreversible.

Progress in the implementation of the 13 steps is urgently required. Of key importance in this regard are at this juncture inter alia

- efforts to ensure the full compliance with and universal adherence to the NPT,
- the early entry into force and implementation of the CTBT,
- the start and early conclusion of negotiations on an FMCT,
- the achievement of a binding agreement between the US and Russia on the verifiable and irreversible reduction of their strategic offensive arms, the start of negotiations on non-strategic nuclear weapons.

It is irrelevant to discuss when we will be able to attain a nuclear-weapon-free world. We should rather devote all our efforts to continued and steady progress in this direction.

IV.

Nuclear dangers are the subject of a resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly in November 2001. Such dangers are inherent in the very existence of nuclear weapons, their reduction and elimination are a crucial aspect whilst nuclear disarmament is still under way. Nuclear-weapon-States bear a particular responsibility in this regard and are accountable to the rest of the world. A key concern is the security and safety of existing stocks, their protection against theft and their safe destruction. The report "Reducing Nuclear Dangers" by the UN Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters of 25 September 2001 (Doc. No. A/56/400) contains a number of interesting ideas that could be the subject of further substantive discussion in the review process leading to the 2005 NPT Review Conference.

(German Delegation, 11 April 2002)

Holy See

"As the international community begins preparation for the 2005 Review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, my Delegation notes the deep concern that is widely felt about the state of nuclear disarmament.

At the 2000 Review, it was felt that progress was being made. The Review obtained a clear-cut commitment from the nuclear weapon states that systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI would include:

"An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all states parties are committed under Article VI."

This commitment was embodied in a list of 13 practical steps the conference unanimously agreed to take. However, the progress made in implementing the 13 steps over the past two years has been indeed discouraging. In fact, the prospects for future implementation are alarming.

As an examination of the 13 steps shows, there has not only been a lack of sufficient progress, there has been regression. Although, thankfully, there has been no nuclear testing in this period, the entry-into-force of the CTBT cannot be seen on the near horizon. The Conference on Disarmament is paralyzed. One of the parties to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty has given notice of withdrawal. Nuclear weapons are still kept on alert status. The admonition of the International Court of Justice for the completion of negotiations towards elimination is ignored.

Even more serious than the lack of progress is the overt determination of some nuclear weapon states to maintain nuclear weapons in a critical role in their military doctrines. While the international community rightly welcomes the willingness of those with the most nuclear weapons to reduce their stocks of operationally deployed warheads, what is the real effect of such unilateral disarmament when it is not made irreversible, i.e., when such stocks can be remounted again quickly?

My Delegation is deeply concerned about the old posture of nuclear deterrence that is evolving into the possibility of use in new strategies. This must be stoutly resisted. The Holy See has constantly recalled the fact that the strategy of deterrence can be envisaged only as a stage in the process aimed at disarmament, even of a progressive nature. So long as it is taken as an end in itself, deterrence encourages the protagonists to ensure a constant superiority over one another, in ceaseless race of over-arming.

The concern of the Holy See mounts in seeing the non-proliferation regime, with the NPT as its cornerstone, in disarray. The old policies of nuclear deterrence, which prevailed in the Cold War, must lead now to concrete disarmament measures. The rule of law cannot countenance the continuation of doctrines that hold nuclear weapons as essential.

There can be no moral acceptance of military doctrines that embody the permanence of nuclear weapons. That is why Pope John Paul II has called for the banishment of all nuclear weapons through "a workable system for negotiation, even of arbitration." Those nuclear weapon states resisting negotiations should therefore be strongly urged to finally come to the negotiating table.

In fact, in clinging to their outmoded rationales for nuclear deterrence, they are denying the most ardent aspirations of humanity as well as the opinion of the highest legal authority in the world. In this regard, my Delegation wishes to reaffirm its well-known position: nuclear weapons are incompatible with the peace we seek for the 21st century; they cannot be justified. These weapons are instruments of death and destruction. The preservation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty demands unequivocal action towards their elimination. Only when such a noble goal is attained can the international community be assured that nations are acting in "good faith".

My Delegation is confident that the Preparatory Committee will seize this opportunity to develop a sharpened sense of urgency to root out nuclear weapons that are the biggest threat to mankind. To keep developing weapon systems that can jeopardize the natural structure upon which all civilization rests seriously undermines the genuine quest of the family of nations to build a culture of peace for the present and future generations."

(Statement by Monsignor Franci Chullikatt, Deputy Head of Delegation, 8 April 2002)

Iran

"[...]The Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" adopted on 11 May 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference of the NPT, which extended the Treaty indefinitely, also took note of Security Council Resolution 984 on the issue as well as "the declaration of the nuclear-weapon States concerning both negative and positive security assurances" and stipulated that "further steps should be considered to assure non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. These steps could take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument.

The new proposed US doctrine on the use of nuclear weapons is in clear violation of the commitments which were made and reaffirmed to help the indefinite extension of the NPT. Under Article VI of the NPT, the "cessation of nuclear arms race" and "nuclear disarmament" constitute the undertaking of "each of the Parties to the Treaty", and it is self evident that the nuclear-weapon States have a crucial role to play in this process. The 2000 NPT Review Conference called for "an unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are committed under Article VI." It called upon them to consider "a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination. [...]"

(Statement by H.E. Mr. Hadi Nejad-Hosseinian, Ambassador and Permanent Representative, 9 April 2002)

Japan

“[...] In this regard, the Preparatory Committee should be guided by the 1995 decision on "Principles and Objectives" and the Final Document of the 2000 Conference. All States parties should recall the importance of the commitments made in these documents to further strengthening the credibility of the NPT.

States parties must work together in a spirit of solidarity from this initial phase of the review process while avoiding unnecessary confrontation and isolation of certain States. Japan organized a workshop in late February in Tokyo to facilitate the work of the Preparatory Committee in this session. I hope that the preliminary but very substantive exchanges of views that took place in the workshop will be of use for the constructive discussions I expect we shall have here in the Preparatory Committee.

[...]

Any non-compliance situation must be redressed. The problems of Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), mentioned in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, remain matters of serious concern to the international community. Japan stresses that a situation of compliance by the DPRK should be ensured at an early stage and that any suspicion of non-compliance by this party should be completely resolved. Japan also urges Iraq to accept UN and IAEA verification in accordance with the relevant UN Secretary Council resolutions.

[...]

In the twelfth of 'the thirteen steps,' States parties are requested to submit regular reports on their implementation of Article VI. Japan will submit its report at this session of the Preparatory Committee, and looks forward to all States parties, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, putting forward reports on their efforts to promote nuclear disarmament and measures they intend to take in the future.

[...]

Japan strongly supports the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the regions concerned. It has been supporting efforts among the Central Asian countries to establish such a zone in their region by, for example, twice hosting conferences in Sapporo addressing this issue. The region is becoming even more vital in the light of the current situation and recent acts of terrorism. Japan is ready to extend further cooperation and assistance to the efforts of these countries, if they wish it to do so. Also mindful of Mongolia's aspiration toward consolidating its nuclear-weapon-free status, Japan has been supporting the UN General Assembly resolutions on this subject. Japan also hosted the UN-sponsored non-governmental expert group meeting last year. [...]"

(Statement by Ambassador Yukiya Amano, Representative, 8 April 2002)

Malaysia

“[...] It is the expectation of my delegation that at this preparatory committee meeting, the nuclear weapon states parties to the Treaty will substantiate their unequivocal commitments to eliminate their nuclear arsenals. Unless we see hard evidence of this in good faith, their pledges will remain mere platitudes, thereby further undermining the non-proliferation regime.

Recent events on the disarmament front have placed a heavy strain on the viability of the Treaty. The recently released Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) by one of the Treaty nuclear weapon states would seriously undermine the consensus achieved in 2000 and place the Treaty in jeopardy. The NPR challenged the very basis of the global efforts towards the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons. Instead of meeting the unequivocal commitments agreed two years ago, the NPR is perceived as a rejection of most of the agreed 13 steps. Instead of propagating the principle of irreversibility, it advocates the retention and redeployment of many withdrawn warheads, as part of the so-called "Responsive force" of nuclear weaponry. It also rejects the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and further endorses a higher level of readiness for nuclear testing with the intention of allowing for the development of new nuclear weapon systems. It also supports the ongoing research on low-yielding nuclear warheads and targeting techniques that would penetrate deeply buried targets. This initiative will herald for the first time the actual use of nuclear weaponry in military operations

since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, with all the political and security repercussions that might entail. At the same time, we also observe, with regret, that the existing modality to negotiate and implement nuclear disarmament is being sidelined by the nuclear weapon states.

It is a matter of deep regret to my delegation that in spite of strong criticism by the international community, the doctrine of nuclear deterrence continues to hold sway in the strategic thinking of the nuclear weapons states at a time when every effort should have been directed towards the reduction and elimination of these weapons of mass destruction, thereby raising question on their real commitment to nuclear disarmament. [...]

(Statement by H.E. Ambassador Hasmy Agam, Permanent Representative, 8 April 2002)

Mexico

“[...] There are preoccupying signs of the development of a new generation of nuclear weapons and emerging approaches for ongoing justification of a future role of nuclear weapons as part of new strategies of security. These signs deteriorate nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

The negative or reticence of Nuclear Weapon States to be held accountable on the degree of compliance of their commitments and obligations as Parties to the NPT, increases the certainty that some States pretend to possess their nuclear arsenals indefinitely, weakens the international regime of non-proliferation and subtracts feasibility to the universality of the Treaty.

Undoubtedly, it is a sort of disappointment that the steps agreed upon at the 2000 NPT Review Conference have not been implemented.

[...]

Recent announcements strengthen our conviction that an international legally binding instrument should be negotiated on negative security assurances against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons among States Parties to the NPT. The Nuclear Weapon States should also assume a legally binding commitment on non-first use of such weapons. [...]

(Statement by Ambassador Gustavo Albin, Head of the Delegation Of Mexico, 9 April 2002)

Movement of Non-Aligned Countries

“In accordance with the Movement's long-standing and principled positions on nuclear disarmament, the NAM States Parties to the NPT remain fully committed to their obligations and commitments under the Treaty and the agreements reached at both the 1995 and 2000 NPT Conferences. In this regard, I wish to recall the comprehensive working paper submitted by the Movement during the 2000 Review Conference contained in document NPT/CONF.2000/18.

We remain firmly convinced that the NPT is a key instrument in the effort to halt the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this context, we recall that the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference calls on the Preparatory Committee to make recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference on these issues. All of the States Parties to the NPT should work towards a fair balance between the mutual obligations and responsibilities of the Nuclear Weapon States and Non-Nuclear Weapon States with a view to achieving the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

We reiterate our conviction that pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, efforts for the conclusion of a universal, unconditional and legally-binding instrument on security assurances to Non-Nuclear-Weapon States should be pursued as a matter of priority. The Non-Aligned Movement continues to consider the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) created by the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba as a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament. We welcome the efforts aimed at establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions of the world and call for cooperation and broad consultation in order to achieve agreements freely arrived at between the States of the region concerned. We reiterate that in the context of nuclear-weapon-free zones, it is essential that Nuclear Weapon States should provide unconditional assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all States of the zone. We urge States to conclude agreements with a view to establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones in regions where they do not exist in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the

Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament (SSOD-1) and the principles and guidelines adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission at its 1999 substantive session. In this context, we reiterate our support for Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status and consider that the institutionalization of that status would be an important measure towards strengthening the non-proliferation regime in that region.

The NAM States Parties to the NPT wish to re-emphasize the urgency and the importance of achieving the universality of the Treaty, particularly by the accession to the Treaty at the earliest possible date of those States possessing nuclear capabilities, and resolve to make determined efforts to achieve this goal. We reiterate our support for the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and to this end, we reaffirm the need for the speedy establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in accordance with the relevant General Assembly resolutions adopted by consensus and Security Council resolutions 487 (1981) and 687 (1991). We call upon all parties concerned to take urgent and practical steps towards the establishment of such a zone and, pending its establishment to call on Israel, the only country in the region that has not joined the NPT, nor declared its intention to do so, to renounce possession of nuclear weapons, to accede to the NPT without delay, to place promptly all its nuclear facilities under IAEA Safeguards and to conduct its nuclear related activities in conformity with the non-proliferation regime. We recall that the 2000 Review Conference reaffirmed the importance of Israel's accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA Safeguards, in realizing the goal of the universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East.

We also recall that the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference urged the two nuclear capable States in South Asia to accede to the Treaty as Non-Nuclear-Weapon States and to place all their nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA Safeguards.

We reiterate our long-standing principled position for the total elimination of all nuclear testing and, in this regard, wish to stress the significance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, including by all the Nuclear Weapon States which, inter alia, should contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament. We note that 165 States have signed the Treaty and 90 States have ratified it thus far.

The NAM States Parties to the NPT reaffirm the importance of achieving the universal application of the Agency's Safeguards system and urges all States which have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements to do so as soon as possible. This has been considered by the 2000 Review Conference, as one main objective, to consolidate and enhance the verification system for the nonproliferation Regime. We stress, in this regard, the importance of the IAEA's Safeguards system, including comprehensive safeguards agreements and also the Model additional Protocols. However, we do not desire to see international efforts towards achieving universality of comprehensive safeguards wither in favour of pursuing additional measures and restrictions on non-nuclear-weapon States, which are already committed to non-proliferation norms, and which have renounced the nuclear-weapons option.

[...]

The NAM States Parties to the NPT reiterate their call for the full implementation of the unequivocal undertaking given by the Nuclear Weapon States at the 2000 Review Conference to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament. We expect that this undertaking be demonstrated without delay through an accelerated process of negotiations and through the full implementation of the 13 practical steps to advance systematically and progressively towards a nuclear-weapon-free world as agreed to in 2000. Despite the expectation by the international community that the successful outcome of the 2000 Review Conference would lead to the fulfillment of the unequivocal undertaking given by the Nuclear Weapon States as well as the full implementation of the 13 practical steps, very little progress has, however, been made to this effect.”

(Working paper submitted by Indonesia on behalf of the members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 10 April 2002)

New Agenda Coalition

“[...] we wish to express our disappointment that the expectations of progress which resulted from the 2000 NPT Review Conference have, to date, not been met. There have been few advances in the implementation of the thirteen steps agreed to at that Conference.

We remain concerned that the commitment to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in security policies and defense doctrines has yet to materialize. This lack of progress is inconsistent with the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to achieve the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. Furthermore, we are deeply concerned about emerging approaches to the future role of nuclear weapons as a part of new security strategies.

Moreover, there is no sign of efforts involving all of the five nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons. On the contrary, there are worrying signs of the development of new generations of nuclear weapons.

We reaffirm that multilaterally negotiated legally binding security assurances must be given by the nuclear-weapon States to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT. Pending the conclusion of such negotiations, the nuclear-weapon States should fully respect their existing commitments in this regard.

As an interim concrete measure conducive to nuclear disarmament, all nuclear-weapon States should commit themselves to a policy of no first-use of nuclear weapons.

While deployment reduction, and reduction of operational status of nuclear weapons, give a positive signal, it cannot be a substitute for irreversible cuts and the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Formalization by nuclear-weapon States of their unilateral declarations in a legally binding agreement, including provisions ensuring transparency, verification and irreversibility, is essential.

There is concern that the notification of withdrawal by one of the State parties to the treaty on the limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile systems (ABM), the additional element of uncertainty it brings and its impact on strategic stability as an important factor contributing to end facilitating nuclear disarmament, will have negative consequences on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. It could also have grave consequences for the future of global security and create an apparent rationale for action based solely on unilateral concerns. Any action, including development of missile defense systems, which could impact negatively on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, is of concern to the international community. We are concerned about the risk of a new arms race on earth and in outer space.

[...]

In another vein, we reaffirm that any presumption of the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States is incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and with the broader goal of the maintenance of international peace and security.

[...]

(Statement by H.E Ambassador Mahmoud Mubarak, Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs for Multilateral Relations of the Arab Republic of Egypt, On behalf of the delegations of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden (New Agenda Coalition))

New Zealand

“[...] as the New Agenda working papers makes clear, a fundamental pre-requisite to promoting nuclear non-proliferation is continuous, irreversible progress in nuclear arms reductions.

[...]

It stands to reason that the best way to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of terrorists and of countries of concern is to eliminate them entirely.

Our Treaty's Review Conference in 2000 identified 13 practical steps towards nuclear disarmament. With our partners in the New Agenda group, we call for those steps to be implemented without delay. The undertaking to achieve the total elimination of nuclear arsenals was unequivocal. We want now to see practical action to make good that undertaking. [...]

(Statement by the New Zealand Ambassador for Disarmament Tim Caughley, 8 April 2002)

Nigeria

“[...] While, as we all acknowledge, the NPT continues to be the cornerstone of global nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation regime, a preliminary analysis shows that very little has been done to give practical credence to these commitments since 2000. In fact, it is particularly disturbing that on the key NPT goal of nuclear disarmament this appears to be the situation.

When the NPT was extended indefinitely in 1995 it was hoped that that bold action would be the spur to accelerated and concrete action on nuclear disarmament. Nigeria had warned at the 2000 Review Conference that it would be a mistaken view to equate the indefinite extension of the NPT with the indefinite extension of the possession of these weapons of mass destruction by the nuclear weapon states. Regrettably, this is the unfortunate reality as we are witnessing the evolution of new strategic and defence doctrines that place reliance on nuclear weapons for security. My delegation views such developments with profound concern as they totally undermine the good faith undertaking to work for the total elimination of nuclear weapons by the nuclear weapon states. [...]”

(Statement by Ambassador Eineje E. Onobu, 9 April 2002)

Norway

“[...] We attach particular importance to the unequivocal undertaking made by the nuclear-weapons-states at the 2000 Review Conference to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenal under strict and effective international control. Article VI of the NPT entails a commitment by all States Parties to the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. The progress in the implementation of the 13 steps of the Action Program has been disappointingly slow. We have to recognize that on some of the 2000 NPT commitments we have been moving in the wrong direction.

The value of our non-proliferation efforts will be limited unless they are accompanied by progress in nuclear disarmament. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is essential both in promoting nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Universal adherence to and the early entry into force of the CTBT continue to be a priority for Norway.

Self-imposed moratoria on nuclear testing are a useful measure pending the entry into force of the CTBT. The US has reaffirmed its commitment to the self-imposed moratorium on nuclear testing. Such moratoria cannot, however, replace the legally binding commitments represented by signing and ratification of the CTBT. It is of crucial importance that all states with nuclear capabilities ratify the Treaty. We welcome the ratification of the Treaty by the nuclear powers France, Russia and the United Kingdom. We urge China and the United States to follow suit.

[...]

Norway welcomes the specific inclusion of tactical nuclear weapons in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference. Every effort should be made to also reduce these arsenals as well. This class of nuclear weapons remains outside any formalized arms control treaty. The principle of legally binding, verifiable, irreversible and transparent reductions should apply with equal force to all nuclear weapons, including tactical ones.

Increased transparency by nuclear weapon-states regarding their nuclear capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament, is important. Reporting should not be considered as an option, but rather an obligation to promote transparency and hence confidence in the overall NPT regime. We need to explore ways on how to strengthen national reporting. [...]”

(Statement by H.E. Ambassador Sverre Bergh Johansen, 8 April 2002)

Philippines

“[...] The increasing gap between the haves and the have nots conflicts, particularly in the Middle East, heighten uncertainty with respect to regional and global peace and security. This makes global negotiations on nuclear disarmament more imperative, particularly when upgrading nuclear arsenals

and the possible development of new versions of nuclear weapons are concerned. Heightening regional tensions involving nuclear capable states also makes such negotiations more urgent. The uncertainty of today's security environment therefore demands even more rigorous adherence to the rule of law. The NPT process, which has taken a long and complex route, is a multilateral effort that should not be undermined. The legal commitments towards total elimination of nuclear weapons within the NPT framework are products of long and arduous negotiations. We are starting another process of reviewing how far the commitments have been achieved. This process has always been a difficult one. But we believe that the best and most meaningful solution is still the total elimination of nuclear weapons, which is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

[...]

In particular, the Philippines emphasizes the need to address the discordance in missile control regime in order to come up with a substantial limitation in strategic arms. Unilateral declarations on reductions in commissioned nuclear warheads, while very much welcome, do not ensure global security. Multilateral efforts still play a critical role in achieving international peace and security. [...]" (Statement by H.E. Enrique A. Manalo, Deputy Permanent Representative, April 2002)

Poland

"[...] Poland wishes also to underscore the importance and urgency of an early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and called upon all States who had as yet not done so to adhere to the Treaty without delay and unconditionally, especially those on the list of 44 States whose ratification was indispensable. As a State included in that list, Poland fulfilled its obligations and ratified the Treaty in 1991. [...]"

(Report on the Implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on 'Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament', 26 March 2002)

Russian Federation

"[...] Russia takes consistent steps to lessen nuclear hazard in the world and achieve final objective in the sphere of complete nuclear disarmament.

At the same time Russia is not only scrupulous in meeting her obligations under international treaties in the sphere of limitation and reduction of nuclear armaments, but also is prepared to further reduce her nuclear arms on both, bilateral basis together with the United States, as well as multilateral basis together with other nuclear States down to minimum levels corresponding to requirements of strategic stability.

[...]

As regards tactical nuclear weapons, in accordance with statements made by the President of the U.S.S.R. on October 5, 1991 and the President of the Russian Federation on January 29, 1992 Russia consistently fulfills the initiatives, which she declared unilaterally.

We would like to remind in this juncture that all nuclear weapons deployed outside Russia, have been brought back to her territory and are in the process of liquidation. In this connection we would like again draw the attention to the Russian proposal that all the nuclear weapons should be brought back to the territories of the nuclear states, to which they belong.

Russia still attaches an extraordinary importance to an unconditional fulfillment of negative security assurances given by nuclear-weapon states to non-nuclear-weapon states in 1995. This provision has been fixed in the military doctrine of the Russian Federation.

The conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is an important measure of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. We express our hope that all the countries, which possess a respective potential and whose ratification papers are of principal importance for the entry of the Treaty into force, will join the CTBT, which, as is well known, has been long ago ratified by Russia. [...]"

(Statement by the Delegation of the Russian Federation, 8 April 2002)

“[...] Having passed the test of time, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has confirmed its role as the most important instrument of deterrence against the threat of nuclear arms spread. Its action promoted the enhancement of both, regional, as well as global strategic stability.

[...]

In December 2001 the U.S. administration announced its decision to withdraw unilaterally from the 1972 ABM Treaty. On the same day the President of Russia said, that he considered such a unilateral decision as mistaken.

Our country made everything dependent upon it to maintain the Treaty. In so doing, Russia was first of all guided by considerations of maintenance and enhancement of international law foundations in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Anti-Ballistic Missiles Treaty is one of the core structures of the legal system in this area. This system was being created by joint efforts all during three decades.

We are convinced that today when the world is facing new threats, we should not allow a legal vacuum to surge in the area of strategic stability. Keeping that in mind, the present-day level of bilateral relations between the Russian Federation and the United States should be used to elaborate new framework of strategic interrelations as soon as possible. It goes without saying that the military component of this framework is connected with a prospect for the achievement of new agreements regarding further reductions and limitations of strategic arms.

Today it is quite clear that together with the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty limitations for strategic defensive arms can disappear. We are convinced that in the resulting situation it is necessary to reflect an interconnection between strategic offensive and defensive armaments in a new arrangement. Such an interconnection has already been fixed in the Joint statement of the Presidents of Russia and the U.S.A. after the results of their meeting in Genoa on July 22, 2001.

[...]

Russia, having ratified the CTBT in the year 2000, maintains the policy line of principle to promote the entry of that Treaty - the most important instrument in the area of nuclear arms limitation and enhancement of the nuclear arms non-proliferation regime - into force as soon as possible.

At the same time the situation around the entry of that Treaty into force is viewed in Moscow with concern. As the second Conference on promoting the entry of the CTBT into force, which confirmed the support of the Treaty on the part of a predominant majority of states, demonstrated, a concern prevailed in the international community regarding the attitude to the CTBT in the United States - in that nuclear power whose participation in the nuclear test ban regime is critically important for the destiny of the Treaty.

We would like to express our hope that the U.S. administration will yet reconsider its position on the CTBT. An alternative to that can become not only a crisis of the said Treaty, but also of the whole regime based on the CTBT. It should not be allowed to happen.

[...]

The Russian Federation speaks also consistently against militarization of outer space. Placement of weapon in outer space would not only mean an expansion of spheres of military competition, but also its qualitative thrust forward fraught with unpredictable consequences for the process of arms control, strategic stability and international security as a whole. We cannot agree with the arguments that putting weapons in outer space is an unavoidable fatality, which is brought about by technological progress and the logic of development of contemporary world. The outer space has once been considered as a potential source of conflicts. Happily, the world community was able to find strength of its own not to allow turning of outer space into a potential theatre of military actions, and so today it has become an arena of broad international cooperation. [...]"

(Delegation of the Russian Federation, 11 April 2002)

Switzerland

“[...] We find an *imbalance* between the lack of progress made in realising the objective of Article VI and the implementation of other aspects of the Treaty, in particular Articles 11 and III. For this reason, Switzerland continues to defend the point of view that the decision to extend the Treaty taken in 1995 *must not mean an indefinite extension of the status quo*, particularly as regards the

prerogatives of the nuclear-weapon States. The question remains more than ever of how to reestablish a balance between the implementation of the non-proliferation provisions of the treaty as a whole, and of the specific obligations of the nuclear weapon states in the field of arms control and disarmament. This imbalance *also jeopardizes the two compromises* which have made it possible to conclude, and later to extend, the NPT. The fact is that the NPT is based on a *reciprocal commitment*: a renunciation of nuclear weapons, on the part of the vast majority of States, which nevertheless retain the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in return for a commitment, on the part of States in possession of nuclear weapons, to pursue negotiations with a view to nuclear disarmament. In 1995, a *second compromise* was added to this initial reciprocal commitment: the extension of the NPT for an unspecified period in return for the adoption of the "Principles and Objectives", the establishment of a strengthened review process, and a resolution on the Middle East. These 1995 decisions are part of a package which can not be undone. [...]"

(Statement by Mr. Christian Faessler, Ambassador, 9 April 2002)

Thailand

"[...] Thailand has a policy of supporting the establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone in Southeast Asia by cooperating with countries in the region under the framework of the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty. SEANWFZ is an important component of the plan to create a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in the region. Furthermore, SEANWFZ helps support nuclear disarmament efforts and facilitates the implementation of relevant international agreements. To enhance the significance of the SEANWFZ Treaty and to ensure that it has greater impact, States Parties to the Treaty have adopted a policy of encouraging the five Nuclear Weapon States (China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States) to support the Treaty by signing its Protocol. [...]"

(Report on Implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on 'Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament', 26 March 2002)

Ukraine

"[...] The last but not least point that I'd like to dwell upon is the issue of the security assurances to be provided by the nuclear weapon states to the non-nuclear weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. We believe that credible negative security assurances in the form of an international legally binding instrument will substantially enhance the nonproliferation regime. We call upon nuclear weapon states to strictly adhere to their respective pledges, in particular in the context of the results achieved by the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences. [...]"

(Statement by H.E. Mr. Valerly Kuchinsky, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations, 9 April 2002)

United Kingdom

"[...] Having reduced our nuclear weapons to a single system at the minimum level necessary for the UK's national security, further unilateral steps we can take now without compromising that security are limited. We continue to encourage mutual, balanced and verifiable reductions in the numbers of nuclear weapons world-wide. When we are satisfied that sufficient progress has been made to allow us to include British nuclear weapons in multilateral negotiations without endangering our security interests, we will do so.

To this end, we value reductions in nuclear weapon levels achieved through unilateral and bilateral measures. Such initiatives have been highly important in the history of nuclear disarmament and the nuclear non-proliferation regime. We therefore welcome the encouraging signs from recent talks between the United States and the Russian Federation on reductions in their strategic offensive

operationally-deployed nuclear arsenals. We hope the understandings being reached in these talks will be crystallized in the near future in a bilateral agreement. [...]"
(Statement by the Acting Head of the United Kingdom Delegation, Ambassador Peter Jenkins, 9 April 2002)

"[...] Mr Chairman, there has been speculation in the press about whether the UK is still committed to the negative security assurances we gave in 1995. This speculation was echoed in statements by Non-Governmental Organisations on Wednesday. I can assure those who have concerns that these fears are groundless. I would like to take this opportunity to remind delegations that we remain fully committed to our declaration on Negative Security Assurances in April 1995, as noted in UN Security Council Resolution 984. Our policy has not changed. [...]"
(Intervention in Cluster One, Ambassador David Broucher, Head of Delegation, 12 April 2002)

"[...] I was struck during the general debate by how much emphasis is being put on Article VI, and how little, in comparison, on Articles I, II and III. We understand the importance all attach to nuclear disarmament. We share these concerns. But it is important that equal attention be given to non-proliferation and the vital role it has to play in the disarmament process. [...]"
(Intervention in specific time attached to Cluster 1, Ambassador Peter Jenkins, Acting Head of Delegation)

United States

"[...] We must work together to reinforce the NPT's prohibition on the acquisition of nuclear weapons. We must demand strict compliance with its terms and support rigorous verification and enforcement measures. Compliance with Articles II and III by non-nuclear-weapon states is essential if the goals of the Treaty are to be achieved. Violations of the NPT by Iraq and North Korea during the 1990s and their continued non-compliance with the Treaty underscore the dangers to the global community that arise from such actions.

[...]

NPT parties who would violate the Treaty must make a choice. They can either join the vast majority of parties who take their NPT obligations seriously or risk the consequences of being an outlaw nation.

[...]

Turning to Article VI, the United States has always taken this obligation seriously and has done a great deal to reduce nuclear weapons.

[...]

Declaring the advent of a new world, President Bush is determined to transform our relationship with Russia. Today, a new approach is required -- one that leaves the legacy of the Cold War behind us. In vigorously seeking to develop this new relationship, the President has sought to replace mutual assured destruction with mutual cooperation. The United States is implementing a new concept of deterrence -- one that is no longer based solely on the threat of nuclear retaliation. This means a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons, and an increased emphasis on the role of advanced conventional forces, active and passive defenses, intelligence capabilities, and a revitalized defense infrastructure. In the future, the United States will require far fewer nuclear weapons. Accordingly, President Bush has decided that the United States will reduce its operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons to a level between 1,700 and 2,200 over the next decade.

President Putin pledged that Russia would make similar reductions in its strategic forces. The United States and Russia are negotiating a legally-binding agreement that will codify these reductions. President Bush has said that he looks forward to having such a document to sign when he visits Russia in May. [...]"

(Statement by Ambassador Norman A. Wulf, 8 April 2002)

“[...] Two years ago, NPT parties assembled for the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Emerging from that Conference was a final document that included a number of conclusions related to Article VI. Regardless of any debate at this Preparatory Committee meeting over specific steps, it is clear that an underlying assumption of these conclusions is that nuclear disarmament is best approached on an incremental basis. Moreover, it is also clear that no timetable can be set for the ultimate fulfillment of Article VI or for the achievement of whatever steps may be involved in reaching that goal.

Engaging in technical or legal interpretation of the steps individually or collectively would not, in our judgment, be a useful exercise. The question that should be before us on Article VI is not whether any given measure has or has not been fulfilled, but rather: is a nuclear weapon state moving toward the overall goal? For the United States, the answer is an emphatic yes.

In brief: We have reduced our reliance on nuclear weapons; we are unilaterally reducing our operationally deployed strategic warheads to historically low levels over the next decade; and we are engaged in negotiations with Russia on legally codifying the reductions. We are also discussing appropriate transparency measures to increase confidence that these reductions are being implemented. We are actively engaged with Russia in securing nuclear materials and placing them beyond future use in nuclear weapons.

It is, of course, true that we no longer support some of the Article VI conclusions in the Final Document from the 2000 NPT Review Conference. A prominent example of this is the ABM Treaty. But as was made clear at the start of these remarks, the U.S. believes that the time for mutual assured destruction is passed. The ABM Treaty is from an era when different assumptions guided the strategic relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. Today, Presidents Bush and Putin are embarked on a new relationship. Moreover, we find it anomalous that those who profess the greatest interest in nuclear disarmament would criticize the United States for seeking to develop missile defenses that would in part reduce U.S. dependence on nuclear weapons. Moreover, as both U.S. and Russian policies demonstrate, the deployment of U.S. missile defenses is fully compatible with significant nuclear reductions.

Another example of a treaty we no longer support is the CTBT. But, as noted earlier, we continue to maintain a moratorium on nuclear testing. And last month, several senior Administration officials made clear that the United States is committed to this moratorium. The Stockpile Stewardship Program is designed to ensure the continued safety and reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons. The United States has no plans for a resumption of nuclear testing.

However, as Ambassador Wulf stated during the U.S. general debate statement -- the United States generally agrees with the conclusions of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Indeed, in May and again in December of 2001, the United States joined its NATO partners in affirming U.S. determination to contribute to the implementation of those conclusions. That is what the United States is doing and will continue to do.

Some claim that the U.S. Administration has abandoned multilateral approaches to arms control and disarmament. Nothing could be further from the truth. We support strong enforcement of existing multilateral treaties, and seek treaties and arrangements that meet today's threats to peace and stability. [...]"

(Statement by Ambassador Eric M. Javits, 11 April 2002)

“[...] The United States has concluded that the new security environment requires a different approach. The path we now follow is consistent with one that many NPT non-nuclear-weapon states have long advocated. The transformation of our relationship with Russia is being accompanied by a transformation of U.S. military forces and a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons.

The new U.S. defense strategy increases the role of advanced conventional forces, missile defenses, intelligence capabilities and the defense infrastructure. This approach is designed to provide the President with a broad array of options to address a wide range of contingencies. It will increase the nuclear threshold by giving U.S. Presidents additional non-nuclear options and defenses to deter an enemy attack.

Adopting this new approach requires no changes in current policy, doctrine, and strategy regarding the use of nuclear weapons. U.S. nuclear forces are not targeted on any state on a day-to-day basis. There

has been no change in U.S. negative security assurances policy toward NPT non-nuclear-weapon states.

The United States and its NATO allies over the past decade have adapted NATO's defense posture to the new security environment. NATO has radically reduced its reliance on nuclear weapons. Its strategy is no longer dominated by the possibility of nuclear escalation, and the circumstances in which NATO might have to contemplate the use of nuclear weapons are considered to be extremely remote. NATO has ceased to maintain standing peacetime nuclear contingency plans, and its nuclear forces no longer target any country. NATO has taken a number of steps to reduce the number and readiness of its dual-capable aircraft; readiness of these aircraft is now measured in weeks and months compared to minutes and hours as in the past. U.S. reliance on the forward deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons has been dramatically curtailed.

[...]

The United States and Russia have been discussing how to incorporate their mutual commitment to reductions in a written understanding. The United States is prepared to negotiate a legally binding instrument that would codify the deep reductions in operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads. President Bush has said that he looks forward to having such a document to sign when he visits Russia in May.

The U.S. plan for significant reductions is a unilateral policy. It will proceed independently of a written agreement with Russia. Indeed the United States has already made decisions that will lead to a first phase of reductions of approximately 1,300 strategic warheads below the START level, as counted in that Treaty.

[...]

The United States is not developing new nuclear weapons. President Bush has not directed the U.S. Departments of Defense or Energy to undertake such action. The United States has not produced new nuclear warheads in a decade. While the Bush Administration has no plans to pursue ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, it continues to observe the moratorium on nuclear explosive testing and has no plans to resume such testing. Secretary of State Powell and Secretary of Energy Abraham recently confirmed these policies in Congressional testimony. We also encourage other states to honor this moratorium. The U.S. stockpile stewardship program is designed to provide the tools necessary to ensure safety, security, and reliability without nuclear explosive testing. We also continue to participate in and fund activities related to establishment of the international monitoring system to detect nuclear explosive testing.

The United States has effective measures in place to protect against accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. We do not believe that a general "de-alerting" of all nuclear forces contributes to stability. However, substantial de-alerting of U.S. heavy bombers and NATO dual-capable aircraft has taken place.

[...]

All NPT parties have obligations under Article VI. Each Party has a responsibility to create an international environment conducive to further progress on nuclear disarmament and to work toward the goal of general and complete disarmament. Important steps that can contribute to these goals include limiting conventional weapons, working to reduce regional tensions, utilizing confidence-building measures, achieving universal adherence to and full compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and effectively curtailing terrorism capable of mass murder. The United States is engaged on these issues and it is not possible here to summarize all relevant activities. However, given the growing risk of the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons, we offer a brief summary of U.S. policies in this area.

The United States is a strong proponent of the CWC, which provides several useful tools to combat chemical warfare programs. At the end of April, the CWC will mark five years since its entry into force. It is still a young treaty. It will remain viable over the long run only if the parties take a strong stand against possible violations and utilize the provisions of the Convention to ensure maximum transparency and compliance. The United States has used the bilateral consultative provision of Article IX to address our questions and compliance concerns and believes the CWC provisions on challenge inspection can be instrumental in achieving the goals of the Convention. The United States is continuing to destroy its chemical weapon stockpiles as required under the CWC. We have met our obligation to destroy 20% of our stockpile by April 29, 2002, and we are well on our way to meeting

the 45% destruction required by April 29, 2004. Moreover, we hope to accelerate the cooperative project to construct a chemical weapons destruction facility in Russia.

[...]

Nuclear disarmament cannot be achieved in a vacuum. The global security environment is crucial. No country has devoted more time, effort and money to promoting security through nuclear disarmament than the United States. We intend to continue. This will not be done quickly or easily. To reduce the nuclear legacy of the Cold War in both the United States and Russia we will need to continue to spend billions of dollars. There should be no doubt about our determination to do so. There should also be no doubt that we will continue to work patiently and constructively with others to make progress toward the nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament goals of the NPT.

The facts set forth above demonstrate unequivocally that the United States is honoring its obligations under Article VI of the NPT.”

(Information Paper by the United States, concerning Article VI of the NPT, 11 April 2002)

“[...] The NPT has been severely tested over the past decade by Iraq and North Korea. Both willfully violated their NPT obligations. Inspections in Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War revealed a major secret effort to acquire nuclear weapons. Iraq has also produced undeclared nuclear material in violation of its NPT safeguards agreement with the IAEA. North Korea was in violation of the NPT for many years by refusing to complete the IDEA safeguards agreement required by the Treaty. Then in 1993, after the safeguards agreement finally came into force, North Korea denied an IAEA request to conduct activities necessary to confirm North Korea's declaration of nuclear material.

These countries refuse to take steps asked of them by the international community to address these violations. The United States will continue its vigorous efforts in cooperation with many other nations to bring these countries into compliance with NPT.

We also must be vigilant about other NPT parties with nuclear weapon ambitions that have not yet been found to be in violation of the Treaty. These countries can often be identified by procurement patterns for which there is no reasonable civil purpose. Any state contemplating violation of the NPT to acquire nuclear weapons must know that such an action will be met with a strong and immediate response from NPT parties. Strong political support for compliance is essential if we are to affect behavior. No would-be violator can be allowed to hide behind hollow declarations of peaceful intent. [...]

(Statement by Ambassador Eric M. Javits, Permanent Representative, 12 April 2002)

Vietnam

“[...] The decision to abrogate the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) went against the principle of irreversibility of nuclear disarmament agreements, leaving disarmament in a vacuum and could potentially lead to a renewed arms race not only on earth but also in outer space. Then the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) by a Nuclear-Weapon-State grossly deviates from the security assurances under the NPT, thus threatening not only those countries tentatively listed, but endangering other countries as well. [...]

(Statement by Ambassador Nguyen Thanh Chau, 9 April 2002)

NGO STATEMENTS

The PrepComm devoted the whole of Wednesday morning of the first week to hearing 14 NGO Statements. The exercise was convened by Reaching Critical Will, a project of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, U.N. Office, and the NGO Committee for Disarmament. The following are brief excerpts from the speeches, which make up a 59-page document at www.reachingcriticalwill.org

Political Overview

Emily Schroeder (WILPF): "While we use, and feel deeply that it is necessary to use, the language of crisis we understand that in the comfortable surroundings of this UN conference room it is difficult to connect with the nuclear dangers that face us. This is a significant problem, as the daily reality that thousands of nuclear weapons remain a hair-trigger's length from global catastrophe is so immense that instinctively we refuse to confront it. You do not have the luxury of denying the reality of the threat, burying it under layers of diplomatic language. The failure to address the continued high political value given to nuclear weapons possession and the stimulus that provides to proliferation is perilous to us all in the long run. Is it responsible to remain silent knowing full well the extent of the dangers we face?"

[...]

Western Europe, for the first time ever, faces no external or internal military threats, and yet NATO clings, without coherent justification, to the security blanket of the US nuclear umbrella. Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Greece and Turkey claim non-nuclear status while receiving nuclear weapons, and training in their use from the United States under NATO nuclear sharing policies. Such hypocrisy damages the NPT, and stimulates nations, and worse, sub-state actors, to ask why, if these countries that face no threats continue to cling to these weapons, must we foreswear them?

[...]

Without modification, current US policies will destroy the basis of global trust in the NPT, and in arms control that is essential to their success."

Rule of Law, the NPT, and Global Security

Nicole Deller (Lawyers' Committee for Nuclear Policy): "This is an age fraught with the risk of use of nuclear weapons. It is a time when the world faces climate change whose consequences could range from severe to catastrophic. There is a global economy in which a few hundred of the world's richest people have combined wealth greater than the poorest two billion, and there are vast and growing differences between haves and have-nots within and between countries. Technology makes information about these gaps easily available, as it does data about weapons of mass destruction. To take on these and other problems, coordinated local, national, regional and global actions and cooperation are necessary.

Treaties like all other tools in this toolbox are imperfect instruments. But without a framework of multilateral agreements, the alternative is for states to decide for themselves when action is warranted in their own interests, and to proceed to act unilaterally against others when they feel aggrieved. This is a recipe for the powerful to be police, prosecutor, judge, jury, and executioner all rolled into one. It is a path that cannot but lead to the arbitrary application and enforcement of law. The consequences of such a course for security will be disastrous. To marginalize the system of treaty-based international law rather than build on its many strengths is not only unwise, it is extremely dangerous. It is urgent that the world's states, including the most powerful, reject this path and make global treaties crucial instruments in meeting the security challenges of the 21st century."

Inter-Religious Representatives' Statement

Arun Elhance (World Conference of Religion for Peace): "As representatives of religions and faiths, we are appalled at the spiritual and moral corruption and bankruptcy that are implied by and reflected in the efforts by some states to develop constituencies that would accept the use of nuclear weapons. We find it abhorring that while life on earth is already threatened with extinction by thousands of

existing nuclear weapons and missiles, many on “hair trigger alert”, new weapons are still being developed or are proposed to be developed and deployed. Such developments are particularly unacceptable in a world where billions of men, women and children have yet to taste any fruits of economic development and where a majority of the world’s population struggles to survive day-by-day under inhumane conditions. We want to see all resources currently being wasted and planned to be spent on nuclear weapons to be diverted to address the urgent social, economic, environmental, and human security and human rights problems that we are confronted with as a world community.

[...]

From our side, we renew our commitment to devote the spiritual, moral, material and infrastructure resources of our organizations and communities to the service of NPT and the efforts of states and the United Nations to eliminate the threats posed by nuclear weapons, now and in the future. We commit ourselves to help materialize the positive powers of all religions and faiths to advocate for total nuclear disarmament at all levels, from local to global, at the earliest date. We pledge that through peace education and advocacy we will inform our constituencies of the dangers posed by nuclear weapons as well as the benefits to be derived humanity from their elimination. We urge the United Nations and all specialized agencies, the member states and all concerned world citizens to work with us and to call upon us for support in realizing the dream of a nuclear-free world.”

Indigenous Perspective

Richard Salvador (Pacific Islands Association of NGOs): “While the NPT seeks to address the threat posed by nuclear weapons in the world while making provision for the peaceful uses of nuclear technology in Article IV, it fails to recognize or address the disproportionate impact of these activities on indigenous people and lands. The nuclear industry continues to perpetuate on-going and systematic invasion of Indigenous People’s countries and the destruction of Indigenous lands and cultures. While the threat of use of nuclear weapons by the eight nations who hold these weapons of mass destruction serves to create a real fear in the world, in indigenous communities the existence of uranium mines, nuclear waste dumps and nuclear test sites are a daily threat to life and to the continued existence of culture.

All of these lead us to question the very notion of right to “peaceful use” described in Article IV of the NPT. Only a narrow reading, even a denial, of the real life, non-peaceful situation Indigenous communities face as they struggle to survive with the leftover poison of the Nuclear Age allows NPT States Parties to deliberate year after year about the proper “safeguarding” practices with little notice of the actual impacts of nuclear weapons production and technology on entire nations of peoples.

As previous Indigenous speakers have raised to your attention in this forum, the uses or applications or purposes or activities are only one segment within the cycle of the nuclear industry. The negotiation and decision-making processes that take place in the context of mineral exploration and commercial mining, the storage of nuclear waste, and the conducting of atomic tests which mostly take place on Indigenous lands are far from peaceful. Article IV’s reference to the “peaceful” uses, development, research and production of nuclear energy which are considered to be an inalienable right of all Member States of the Treaty need to be considered in the context of a more fundamental God-given inalienable right of human beings to life, liberty, and security.”

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

Dominique Lalanne (Stop-Essai/Abolition of Nuclear Weapons): “Although the Nuclear Posture Review notes that the US supports continued observation of the testing moratorium, ‘this may not be possible for the indefinite future’ and ‘objective judgments about capability in a non-testing environment will become more difficult.

These disclosures underscore the link between nuclear testing and continued reliance on nuclear weapons for security. They also reveal an appalling disregard of the NPT commitment to stop nuclear testing permanently. NPT member states that support nuclear disarmament and a CTBT should use every opportunity and every means at their disposal to express their concern and demand adherence to a permanent, verifiable test ban.

[...]

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea, India, and Pakistan must sign and ratify the CTBT for the treaty to enter into force. Algeria, China, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, the United States, and Viet Nam must now ratify, without further procrastination. The longer these states wait to join the Treaty, the greater the chance that some nation may begin testing and set off a dangerous international action-reaction cycle of military and nuclear confrontation. It is vital to international security that the moratorium on nuclear testing be maintained."

Nuclear Arsenals, Missiles, and Missile Defense and Space Weaponization

Regina Hagen (International Network of Engineers and Scientist against Proliferation): "We propose the following steps:

- A declaration by all nuclear states of No First-Use against other nuclear weapons states and a commitment to No Use against non-nuclear weapons states.
- Ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, preserving and strengthening the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and completing START III negotiations as necessary measures for nuclear states to fulfill their nuclear disarmament obligations in accordance to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
- Drastic reduction in nuclear weapons leading to their total elimination, including the prompt elimination of tactical nuclear weapons, an end to reliance on nuclear weapons in military planning and negotiations on a Nuclear Weapons Convention.

[...]

Instead of an expensive and futile arms race between missiles, missile defense systems and space weapons, the international community should start negotiating formal arrangements to prevent a missile race by controlling these weapons and creating an international norm against them. The negotiation process needs to identify the fundamental political and scientific issues involved in meeting the goals and provides a mechanism to tackle the problems in a systematic step-by-step manner. To resolve the problems before they become urgent, it is important to recognize the emerging dangers and risks by confidence-building measures and improved information exchange among key players. This would provide a basis for a comprehensive missile monitoring and verification system that could be extended for international control and common security in outer space.

To reduce the dangers we call for the following immediate steps:

1. Stop testing of missiles, missile defense systems and space weapons.
2. Initiate negotiations for an international treaty banning missiles and space weapons."

Consequences of Middle East Nuclear Weapons and Proliferation and Deployment

Bahig Nassar (Arab Coordination Committee for NGOs): "In the Middle East, Israel has acquired a nuclear arsenal of around 200 weapons, a fact which prompts other states of the region to seek weapons of mass destruction in order to counter the deadly threat of Israeli weapons. In addition, efforts are under way to equip the three Dolphin-class submarines provided to Israel by Germany with missiles which can carry nuclear weapons to undertake operations from the deep waters of the Mediterranean, the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. Thus, a second strike nuclear capability will be available to Israel.

[...]

Middle East countries are facing at present two grave threats: Israeli nuclear threats and US nuclear threats and military operations with conventional and non-conventional weapons, while Israeli nuclear weapons are left intact. The impending US wars against Iraq and possibly Iran and the plans to target four Middle East countries testify to this fact. Therefore this PrepCom should resolve to establish a mechanism to monitor the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East in the period leading to the 2005 Review Conference."

Challenges and Opportunities for Nuclear Disarmament in South Asia

Admiral L. Ramdas (Former Chief of the Indian Navy): “Nuclear deterrence is not likely to work in South Asia. In the case of the United States and Russia, the competition was mostly ideological and there existed ample geographic distance between the two nations. India and Pakistan, however, share a long but bitterly disputed border with a much longer and deeply seeded history of direct military confrontation with each other. In fact, recent events indicate that the possession of nuclear weapons has hardly taught caution to the two sides. The May 1999 war in the Kargil region and the massive mobilization of troops and continued clashes along the LOC early this year demonstrate that nuclear weapons have not deterred conflict between the two rivals.

In this situation, what can be done to help our world, and especially South Asia, become a safer place? This question can be divided into two sections - action at the national and regional levels and action at the local level. There are active platforms, forums and individuals in the region who continue to address these concerns within the regional and national contexts. However, the nature of the issues is such that, without continuous and active involvement with International elements, there is little hope of achieving concrete progress within any one country or region. It is within this context that we would suggest through this important organ of the United Nations the following set of actions for the international community:

- Apply appropriate pressure to de-escalate the current face-off between India and Pakistan.
- Persuade India and Pakistan to withdraw their armies to their normal peacetime locations.
- Ensure a ceasefire along the Line of Control.
- Pressurize the two nations to commence a dialogue.
- Facilitate the conclusion of a Nuclear Protocol to include risk reduction measures.
- Implement the ‘unequivocal’ commitment made in 2000 to convene an International Convention on Global Nuclear Disarmament in accordance with Article VI of the NPT.
- Encourage India and Pakistan to sign the CTBT and also to participate in FMCT.
- Prevail upon the USA to rescind from its policies with respect to the ABM treaty, missile defense, and the Nuclear Posture Review all of which run counter to the overall objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.”

Nuclear Proliferation Problems and Dangers in Northeast Asia

Randall Caroline Forsberg (Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies): “Never has there been a more clear-cut case for international arms control agreements to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction than there is in Northeast Asia today. By reinstating the ABM Treaty, or at least indefinitely postponing the planned deployment of interceptor missiles in Alaska, the United States could prevent a near-term build-up of China’s nuclear forces. In the meantime, deeper cuts in US and Russian nuclear arms could create an environment in which that build up would never occur and in which all of the current Nuclear Weapons States could make a good faith effort to move toward zero, as they have repeatedly promised to do.

Equally important, by agreeing with North Korea to a nationally-verified ban on the testing and export of missiles with a range over 200 miles — which North Korea has already accepted — the United States could completely eliminate the most imminent threat of a new state with an ICBM, which is at least a decade off; and it could further delay the more distant prospect of acquisition of an ICBM by Iran or Iraq. In other words, a missile agreement with North Korea would completely eliminate the alleged reason for developing a national missile defense for a decade and possibly much longer.

Instead of working for such an agreement, the United States is rushing to abrogate the ABM Treaty and build a national missile defense, even though there is no near-future threat of a hostile state’s ICBM; even though the country closest to posing such a threat has offered to end its missile program; and even though missile defense deployment is likely to lead to a new arms race and perhaps a new Cold War, with China replacing Russia as the designated enemy.

Rather than pursue diplomacy, confidence-building, and arms control measures to forestall potential threats and prevent proliferation, the Bush administration has thrown up new obstacles to progress in nonproliferation, first by antagonizing North Korea with the harsh rhetoric of “axis of evil” and then by releasing a “Nuclear Posture Review” which calls for further development of mini-nukes and

threatens a preemptive use of such weapons against North Korea in any future outbreak of war. This threat is a truly alarming development and one which betrays the US commitments made under both the NPT and the 1994 Framework Agreement.

Recently CIA Director George Tenet testified in a Senate hearing that North Korea is in compliance under the 1994 Agreement. It is incumbent on the United States to do its best to reverse the harm done recently and to comply with the 1994 Agreement by giving "formal assurances to the DPRK, against the threat or use of nuclear weapons" in order to avoid another nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula.

Surely the international community should not and will not sit by while the United States, piece by piece, dismantles all of the work of the global system of arms control and nonproliferation regimes built up with tremendous international effort over the past 30 years. Nowhere is the devastating impact on nonproliferation efforts likely to be greater than in Northeast Asia. We certainly cannot allow another nuclear holocaust in this region. The time has come for the international community to take a stand, to hold the United States accountable, and put its feet to the fire."

Reporting by States Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Carol Naughton (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament): "The content of reporting would be expected to incorporate two general kinds of information:

- a) Statements of policy, descriptions of implementation-related activities, and updates on the progress of treaty negotiations and implementation.
- b) Declarations concerning concrete data, such as data on nuclear weapons holdings, delivery vehicles holdings, special fissionable materials stocks and nuclear technology exports.

The fact that much of this is already available would not remove the value of having it formally reported by States parties in the NPT forum.

The greater level of detail likely to be provided by some states should encourage openness in all States. Therefore, those States willing to supply additional information should be accommodated and encouraged.

The format for NPT reporting should be standardised for all States parties and would need to be worked out by those States willing to take a lead. There are several international reporting models already in existence but the criteria must be that it is simple, clear and easy to use.

It could be broken down into topics related to each of the Treaty articles and into time periods, providing a backwards-looking component and a forwards-looking component, projecting planned future developments.

However the most important consideration is in getting the process effectively underway with flexibility to add subsequent items from future Review Conferences. To aid transparency the reports should be available as official conference documents. The UN Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA) would be the most appropriate institution to receive and compile reports submitted by States, having the experience of servicing other international bodies on arms controls. This is consistent with the 2000 Final document request."

Irreversibility and Verification

Jacqueline Cabasso (Western States Legal Foundation): "According to Webster's Dictionary, a principle is "[a] fundamental truth, law, or postulate." Irreversible means, simply, "[i]mpossible to reverse." While the principle of irreversibility obviously applies to the dismantlement of warheads, the long-term disposition of fissile materials including those removed from dismantled warheads, and the physical destruction of delivery systems, it applies equally to retention of large "responsive" forces and expanding laboratory capabilities including research, development, testing and production of both new and improved warheads and delivery systems. More fundamentally, the principle of irreversibility is a commitment not to backtrack on the Article VI obligation itself. Are the nuclear weapon States adhering to the "fundamental truth" of irreversibility? Judge for yourselves. The January 2002 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), amounts to an unequivocal rejection of most of the 13 steps agreed to just two years ago in this forum, as well as of nuclear disarmament itself. The

NPR is virtually a blueprint to ensure that any and all nuclear and related arms control and reduction measures undertaken by the United States are fully reversible for the foreseeable future...

Nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures will only be effective if they can be adequately verified, both in political and technical terms. Verification policies that will assure early detection and interpretation of information necessary for preventing prohibited activities or permitting timely response must be put in place. It is essential, in this regard, that the closure and monitoring of the nuclear weapons infrastructure in all nuclear weapons states must begin early in the process of disarmament. Nuclear weapons research, testing, and component production should be halted while reductions are in progress, not after, with nuclear weapons production and research facilities subject to intrusive verification regimes at the earliest possible time. Fissile materials accounting, for example, already a challenging task, is rendered more so by the continued fabrication and testing of weapons components in classified facilities. Early cessation of both research and production activities also makes evasion of emerging verification regimes and covert production of components or manufacturing equipment substantially more difficult. The continued pursuit of increased nuclear weapons knowledge by one state – including everything from systematization of fissile materials understanding to more rapid, flexible, and easily scaled production techniques – will be matched to a greater or lesser degree by others. The longer such activity continues prior to achievement of an abolition regime, the greater and more widespread the technical capability for breakout and the concomitant proliferation of nuclear weapons is likely to be.”

Tactical Nukes: Old and New

Alistair Millar (Fourth Freedom Forum): “Thousands of substrategic, or tactical, nuclear weapons remain in the US, some NATO nations and in Russia, unmonitored and uncontrolled by any existing treaties or codified agreements. Hundreds more are deployed in China, Israel and South Asia. Basic information about these weapons is shrouded in secrecy. Transparency and disarmament measures of all nations’ tactical weapons have to be addressed in the context of future disarmament measures and codified treaties including the nonproliferation treaty. In this way, the need for further reaching U.S.-Russian initiatives to address the safeguarding of tactical nuclear weapons arsenals goes well beyond the U.S.-Russian context and should serve as a starting point for addressing multilateral reductions. U.S./Russian cooperation on arms control, especially with the NPT, will deeply affect the global strategic outlook in the post-cold war security environment by influencing the weapons policies of other nuclear states. To reduce risks within these states, and to prevent others from attaining these weapons, the U.S., Russia and all other relevant nations must actively reduce the political status they attach to possessing nuclear weapons.

[...]

Government officials in the United States and Russia are calling for the development of new models of “low-yield” and more robust nuclear weapons. In the US they are being pressured from nuclear weapons laboratories. The US Congress has now received multi-million dollar FY2003 federal budget requests to begin development of a “Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator” and according to classified excerpts of the US Nuclear Posture Review leaked to the US media, there are demands for the development of comparatively low-yield battlefield weapons designed to increase the penetration capability of the B-61 Model II nuclear bomb configured as earth-penetrating bombs or as missiles to target deeply buried or hardened underground targets, such as bunkers and bomb shelters. There is debate among proponents of these weapons about whether the efficacy of such new tactical nuclear weapons would have to be tested. If testing such weapons would result as part their development, this would clearly undermine the objectives of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) that the United States has signed but not ratified. Regardless, of whether the development of the weapons requires testing, deployment and plans to use these weapons will lower the threshold by making nuclear weapons usable military options. For obvious reasons, the development and intent to use such weapons run contrary to the core goals the NPT, by providing, rather than reducing, incentives to other countries to develop their own nuclear weapons, and by condoning the use of nuclear weapons.”

Fissile Materials, Health and the Environment: The Hidden Costs of Military and Civilian Nuclear Programs

Biplav Yadav (Physicians for Social Responsibility): “A wide-ranging public discourse is needed within every nuclear-weapon state about the health and environmental harm that they have inflicted upon their own people. A global debate is needed about harm outside the borders of those states. Much of that harm was knowingly inflicted.

It is time for the United Nations General Assembly to establish an independent and open Truth Commission on the ravages that have been inflicted upon the world by nuclear weapons production and testing. That commission should not only examine the nature and extent of that harm, and whether and how deliberately it was inflicted; it should recommend ways in which the world’s people can hold nuclear weapons establishments accountable. It should also examine whether and to what extent the security arguments that have been claimed for nuclear weapons have been constructed with the aim of keeping people ignorant and fearful so that the weapons bureaucracies might perpetuate themselves. Such an examination would be of some considerable relevance today, given that nuclear weapons establishments are still refusing to meet their nuclear disarmament commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and that people are still getting ill and dying from the harm that nuclear weapons establishments have inflicted upon them.”

NGO Recommendations to the 2002 Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee

Merav Datan (International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War/Physicians for Social Responsibility): “1) Negative Security Assurances should be made legally binding.

Negative security assurances – that is, pledges by nuclear weapon states not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states – have featured prominently in the NPT review process and helped to secure the support of non-nuclear weapon states for the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995. It is surprising and disturbing, therefore, that officials in the United States and the United Kingdom have recently cast doubt on the validity of their own negative security assurances by making statements that seem to undermine these assurances...

The way to resolve this ambiguity and secure the confidence of non-nuclear weapon states is by making negative security assurances legally binding. The way to deal with chemical and biological weapons is through joint Security Council commitment and action, building on Security Council Resolution 984 of 1995, which affirmed the nuclear weapon states’ negative security assurances.

2) The Security Council should address nuclear disarmament.

The status and responsibility inherent in being a permanent member of the Security Council should work in favor of, not against, nuclear disarmament. China, France, Russia, the UK, and the US already enjoy political influence and prestige as a function of their Security Council membership. We call on them to put this political power to work by implementing their obligation under Article 26 and applying it to nuclear weapons. The Council is 57 years behind on a crucial element of its job description.

3) Establish a permanent secretariat for the NPT.

The NPT could be supported by a permanent secretariat based at the United Nations. At present there is no centralised mechanism where ongoing compliance with Treaty commitments can be monitored, grievances lodged, inquiries regarding compliance made, and guidance sought. As a result, progress on meeting the goals of the NPT is slowed, formal negotiations at the Review Conferences and PrepComs are delayed by disagreements over compliance issues, and efficiency in the important work of advancing the non-proliferation and disarmament commitments embodied in the NPT is hindered. NPT states parties should consider the creation of a permanent secretariat that could serve as a repository of information and as a focal point to receive, review, verify for accuracy, and properly direct complaints about non-compliance and other difficulties States parties may have with the NPT process.

[...]

4) Implement “Global Zero Alert” of nuclear weapons.

At a time when there is talk of “usable” nuclear weapons it is imperative to remember that nuclear missiles on hair-trigger alert – poised to be launched in minutes – are the front line of usability. At the 2000 Review Conference, governments signed to the NPT agreed “concrete measures” were needed to “reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems.” But the U.S. and Russia, despite being strategic partners, still keep thousands of weapons in a quick “launch-on-warning” mode. We are still one false alarm away from accidental nuclear war. And current nuclear reductions discussed by the U.S. and Russia will do little to change this dangerous situation.

What needs to be done to move us back from the brink of nuclear war? By most accounts, the U.S. and Russia are the only two nuclear powers who keep missiles primed for immediate launch. Presidents Bush and Putin should follow through on their declarations of friendship by ordering their respective militaries to abandon launch-on-warning policy – to take their nuclear weapons off line – to extend decision making time for both Presidents. This will create a critical margin of safety and set a standard for every nuclear nation: No nuclear weapons should be on high alert.

5) Explore concepts of security without nuclear weapons.

Why are nuclear weapons still with us? What alternative security concepts could persuade the Nuclear Weapons States to depart from their reliance on nuclear weapons? These questions are the subject of fourteen reports from Peace Research Institutes world-wide who met recently in Moscow at the invitation of IPPNW Sweden. The main conclusions are available in a report being distributed at this meeting. (See also <www.slmk.org>.)

The report concluded that although the Cold War is over, the nuclear weapon states still cling to their nuclear weapons, and that this addiction must be overcome. Alternative security programmes introduced in this report can facilitate such a process. In this regard the report recommends the following:

- The establishment of new defence doctrines that do not rely on nuclear weapons for deterrence or for actual warfighting.
- New co-operative and comprehensive security measures that focus primarily on the security of human beings rather than on the security of states.
- The creation of arrangements and policies that promote trust and confidence rather than fear, transparency rather than secrecy, and security “together with” rather than security “against.”
- The consideration of unilateral disarmament. Any nuclear weapon state, given the political impetus, can disarm its nuclear arsenal unilaterally. The argument demanding “balanced nuclear weapons disarmament” must be challenged.

6) Use the goal of a nuclear weapons convention to further nuclear disarmament now.

Despite the current hostile political environment regarding treaties and verification-based regimes, it is important to maintain the knowledge, expertise, and training relevant to disarmament, and to continue to develop these as well. It is also important to continue to develop and voice arguments in support of co-operative, verifiable, and irreversible approaches to security, with a view to the goal of complete nuclear disarmament despite current obstacles.

A model nuclear weapons convention was released in April 1997 as a tool to encourage debate on the political, legal, and technical requirements for complete nuclear disarmament. This debate has been followed through the Nuclear Weapons Convention Monitor, the latest issue of which contains a summary of the discussion that took place in January of this year during a Track II roundtable in Ottawa on the legal and technical aspects of complete nuclear disarmament. We encourage governments to explore the ideas presented there as a way to think past the current situation, which is characterized by acute failure of imagination.

7) Improve gender balance to further nuclear disarmament.

The gender of power and decision-making, when contrasted to the gender of poverty and the experience of violence is evidence of an unhealthy, undemocratic and unnecessarily exclusionary world. The exclusion of women from policy discourse and decision-making is almost total. The gender imbalance in this room, and the division of decision-making labour in the weaponised security environment on the intergovernmental and national levels speak volumes. Numerous consensus documents, as well as Security Council Resolution 1325, binding on all states, urge all member states

to increase the representation of women in all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions. We suggest it is time for bodies like the NPT to comply.

8) Consider collective sanctions by non-nuclear weapon states.

Together, the non-nuclear weapons states are a super power. NGOs believe that to some extent the power of NNWS solidarity has been untested beyond words on paper. As NGOs we are not required to be diplomatic, that is one of our strengths and luxuries, so if we offend when we say it is clear that a handful of nuclear weapon states have compromised the sovereignty of a great many non-nuclear weapon states, please forgive us. Threats of economic or political consequences would inevitably come from the nuclear weapon states were the non-nuclear weapon states to unite in a concrete action that would increase pressure for compliance with Article VI. Still we continue to hope for a world in which democracy, the will of the majority of people and states, can prevail. The fact that so many governments self-censor due to fear of political reprisals or are inhibited due to economic dependence, in this forum and others, is a sorry comment on the state of the world, and also on democracy and sovereignty. We salute the courage of some states who stand up and say no, despite the potential risks. We wish more of you would simultaneously demonstrate such courage, and believe that if all non-nuclear weapon states imposed an informal sanctions regime against nuclear weapon states, or perhaps a focused campaign of simply refusing to cooperate on trade, transport or visa issuance, whatever the action, the unity would provide safety and could generate that rare substance, political will.”

Role of NGO's

Though the above statements were praised by several delegates, the participatory role of NGOs in the PrepComm process is still below the role of NGOs in other U.N. fora. Whereas NGOs attending meetings of the Sustainable Development Commission and various human rights meetings have access to the ongoing processes, NGOs at the PrepComm are limited to attending only the plenary meetings and not the detailed discussions. The 2000 Review did regularize a time in the program for NGOs to make presentations, but the ability of the representatives of the 62 organizations accredited to speak to delegates or even to hear them on the specific points was severely constrained.

Thus Canada urged that the “current arrangements be built upon.” In a formal statement, Dr. Jennifer Simons, President of the Simons Foundation and, with Ernie Regehr, attached to the Canadian delegation as an NGO representative, called for more access by NGOs. She favoured “spontaneous exchanges” with NGOs to permit a wider engagement on issues. While a number of states supported the proposal, the U.S. and France threw cold water on it, announcing that they were “quite satisfied with present arrangements.”

FACTUAL SUMMARY

By chairman Henrik Salander (Sweden)

18 April 2002

“States parties reaffirmed the NPT is the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. In the current international climate, where security and stability continue to be challenged, both globally and regionally, by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of their means of delivery, preserving and strengthening the NPT is vital to peace and security.

States parties stressed their commitment to the effective implementation of the objectives of the Treaty, the decisions and the resolution of the 1995 Review and Extension Conferences and the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, adopted by consensus.

States parties further stressed that continued support to achieve universality of the Treaty was essential. They called on the four States remaining outside the Treaty - Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan - to accede unconditionally to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States, particularly those three States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. Concern was expressed about the ongoing development of nuclear weapons and missile programs in different regions, including those of States not parties to the Treaty.

It was stressed that the best way to strengthen the non-proliferation regime was through full compliance by all States parties with the provisions of the Treaty.

It was generally felt that the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 have given an even greater sense of urgency to the common efforts of all States in the field of disarmament and nonproliferation. The view was held that further strengthening and reinforcing the non-proliferation regime was imperative to prevent the use of nuclear materials and technologies for criminal/terrorist purposes. The enhancement of the non-proliferation regimes covering all weapons of mass destruction, including efforts by the IAEA, was considered to be the most important integral part of combating terrorism.

There was emphasis on multilateralism as a core principle in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation with a view to maintaining and strengthening universal norms and enlarging their scope. Strong support was expressed for the enforcement of existing multilateral treaties. The need to seek treaties and other international agreements that meet today's threats to peace and stability was underlined.

The view was expressed that the Treaty should be seen in its larger context of coherent commitments and credible progress toward nuclear disarmament. Without the fulfillment of Article VI over time, the Treaty, in which non-proliferation and disarmament are mutually interdependent and reinforcing, will lose its true value.

The importance of increased transparency with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament was stressed. It was emphasized that accountability and transparency of nuclear disarmament measures by all States parties remained the main criteria with which to evaluate the Treaty's operation.

States parties remained committed to implementing article VI of the NPT and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives of Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" and the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Disappointment was expressed in the progress made in implementing the practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the NPT and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", as agreed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. It was also noted that the goal of nuclear disarmament can best be achieved through a series of balanced, incremental and reinforcing steps.

The nuclear-weapon States informed the States parties of their respective measures taken in accordance with Article VI of the NPT, for example reductions of nuclear weapons arsenals, reduced reliance on nuclear weapons, and that new nuclear weapons are not being developed.

Concern and uncertainty was expressed about existing nuclear arsenals, new approaches to the future role of nuclear weapons, and possible development of new generations of nuclear weapons.

Strong support was expressed for the CTBT, as reflected in the Final Declaration adopted at the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT held on 11-13 November 2001. The importance and urgency of the early entry into force of the CTBT was underscored. States which have not ratified the Treaty, especially those remaining 13 States whose ratification is necessary, and in particular those two remaining nuclear-weapon States whose ratification is a prerequisite, for its entry-into-force, were urged to do so without delay. States reaffirmed the importance of maintaining a moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions. States parties noted the progress made by the CTBTO PrepCom in establishing the international monitoring system.

Concern was expressed that the decision by the United States to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, and the development of missile defense systems, could lead to a new arms race, including in outer space, and negatively affect strategic stability and international security. Hope was expressed that the US-Russia bilateral negotiations to create a new strategic framework will further promote international stability.

States parties welcomed the announcement in December 2001 that the United States and the Russian Federation had completed reductions in their nuclear arsenals required under START I. They further welcomed the continuing US-Russia bilateral negotiations on strategic nuclear arms reductions, and many expressed the hope that such efforts would result in a legally binding instrument with provisions ensuring irreversibility, verification and transparency.

The importance of further reductions in non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process, was emphasized. There were calls for the formalization of the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991 and 1992 on reducing non-strategic nuclear weapons. It was stressed that non-strategic weapons must be further reduced in a verifiable and irreversible manner. Negotiations should begin on further reductions of these weapons as soon as possible.

States parties expressed regret at the inability of the Conference on Disarmament to start negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and to establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Conference was urged to agree on a programme of work. States that have not yet done so were called upon to declare a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

The importance of arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes, under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes was stressed.

Several States parties endorsed the work being carried out under the Trilateral Initiative - involving the IAEA, the Russian Federation and the United States - in developing techniques and methodologies for placing excess nuclear materials from dismantled weapons permanently under IAEA safeguards. States parties were informed that the United States had already placed some of its fissile material under IAEA safeguards and that both the United States and the Russian Federation were working to develop practical measures for the monitoring and inspection of fissile material, including verification by the IAEA. Some States parties also noted the IAEA's safeguards experience in verifying nuclear materials and expressed the view that the IAEA could play an important role in verifying nuclear disarmament agreements.

The view was held that the attainment of a nuclear-weapon-free world should be accompanied by the pursuit of other effective arms control agreements at a global and also particularly at a regional level.

States parties recalled that regular reports should be submitted by all States parties on the implementation of Article VI as outlined in paragraph 15, subparagraph 12 of the 2000 Final Document. It was stressed that such reporting would promote increased confidence in the overall NPT regime through transparency. Views with regard to the scope and format of such reporting differed. Some States parties suggested that such reports should be submitted, particularly by the nuclear-weapon States, at each session of the Preparatory Committee, and should include detailed and comprehensive information, e.g. in a standardized format. Several States parties expressed interest in open-ended informal consultations on reporting to prepare proposals for consideration for subsequent sessions of the Preparatory Committee. Other States parties advocated that the specifics of reporting, the format and frequency of reports, should be left to the determination of individual States parties.

States parties recalled the 2000 Final Document and the request that all States parties, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, the States of the Middle East and other interested States, report through the UN Secretariat to the President of the 2005 NPT Review Conference, as well as to the Chairperson of the Preparatory Committee meetings to be held in advance of that Conference, on the steps that they have taken to promote the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East.

Support was expressed for the concept of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States in the regions concerned. The contribution of such zones to enhancing global and regional peace and security, including the cause of global nuclear non-proliferation, was emphasized. It was noted that the number of States covered by the NWFZs has now exceeded 100. The establishment of NWFZs created by the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba was considered as a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament. The importance of the entry into force of the existing NWFZ treaties was stressed. Efforts aimed at establishing new NWFZs in different regions of the world were welcomed. It was also stressed that assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all States of the zones should be provided by the nuclear-weapon States. Support was expressed for the efforts among the Central Asian countries to establish a NWFZ in their region. States parties noted that no progress had been achieved in the establishment of NWFZs in the Middle East, South Asia and other regions.

On the issue of universality, States parties reaffirmed the importance of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and recognized that the resolution remains valid until its goals and objectives are achieved. The resolution is an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Conference and of the basis on which the NPT was indefinitely extended without a vote in 1995. States parties reiterated their support for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction. States parties noted that all States of the region of the Middle East, with the exception of Israel, are States parties to the NPT. States Parties called upon Israel to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible and to place its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards. Some States parties affirmed the importance of establishing a mechanism within the NPT review process to promote the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East.

States parties expressed concern at the increased tension in South Asia and the continuing retention of nuclear weapons programmes and options by India and Pakistan. States parties urged both States to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States and to place all their nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards. States parties noted that both States have declared moratoriums on further testing and their willingness to enter into legal commitments not to conduct any further nuclear testing by signing and ratifying the CTBT. States parties called upon both States to sign the CTBT. States parties noted the willingness expressed by both States to participate in negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. Pending the conclusion of a legal instrument, States parties urged both States to commit to a moratorium on the production of such fissile material. The importance of the full implementation by both States of Security Council resolution 1172 (1998) was emphasized.

The importance of full compliance by all States parties with the provisions of the NPT was stressed. States parties remained concerned that the IAEA continues to be unable to verify the correctness and completeness of the initial declaration of nuclear material made by the DPRK. The DPRK was urged to come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. States parties expressed concern over the lack of implementation of the 1994 Agreed Framework.

States parties noted that since the cessation of the IAEA inspections in Iraq in December 1998, the Agency has not been in a position to provide any assurance of Iraq's compliance with its obligations under Security Council Resolution 687 (1991). Many States parties expressed grave concern and called for the full implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions, including UNSC resolution 1284, and for the re-establishment of an effective disarmament, ongoing monitoring and verification regime in Iraq, and hoped that UN inspectors will be able as soon as possible to resume their work in Iraq. Iraq reiterated that it is in full compliance with its Treaty obligations and maintained that the IAEA successfully carried out inspections in 2000, 2001 and 2002 pursuant to Iraq's safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

It was recalled that both the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 NPT Review Conference underscored the importance of security assurances. It was emphasized that negative security assurances, a key basis of the 1995 extension decision, remained essential and should be reaffirmed. Many States parties reaffirmed that non-nuclear-weapon States parties should be effectively assured by nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Reaffirmations were expressed of commitments under UNSC resolution 984 (1995). Many States parties stressed that efforts to conclude a universal, unconditional and legally-binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States should be pursued as a matter of priority. Some States parties were of the view that this could take the form of an additional protocol to the Treaty, without prejudice to the legally-binding security assurances already given by the five nuclear-weapon States in the framework of the treaties regarding nuclear-weapon-free zones. Pending the conclusion of such negotiations, the nuclear-weapon States were called upon to honour their commitments under the respective UNSC resolutions. Concern was expressed that recent developments might undermine commitments taken under the respective UNSC resolutions. A view was held that the issue of security assurances was linked with fulfillment of the Treaty obligations. Several States parties, including one nuclear-weapon State, emphasized the importance of a no-first use policy.

Education on disarmament and non-proliferation was considered important to strengthening disarmament and non-proliferation for future generations. In this connection, the ongoing work of the group of governmental experts which is expected to submit its report for consideration by the 57th session of the General Assembly later this fall was commended.

States parties recognized that IAEA safeguards are a fundamental pillar of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and commended the important work of the IAEA in implementing the safeguards system to verify compliance with the non-proliferation obligations of the Treaty.

States parties welcomed the efforts of the IAEA in strengthening safeguards and the Agency's completion of the conceptual framework for integrated safeguards. The importance of the Model Additional Protocol was underlined. Some drew attention to the fact that States parties must have both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in place for the IAEA to be able to provide an assurance of both non-diversion of declared material and the absence of undeclared activities or material. The goal of universality was stressed. States that have not yet concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA were called upon to do so without delay. Many States parties called on those who have not yet signed or ratified the Additional Protocol to do so as soon as possible.

It was reiterated that export controls are a key element of the non-proliferation regime under the NPT. The important work of the existing export control regimes was noted, in particular their function in guiding States parties in setting up their national export control policies. The importance of transparency in export controls was widely recognized. It was reaffirmed that nothing in the Treaty should be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Many States parties noted both the importance of combating nuclear terrorism and the many instruments available for doing this, including the physical protection of nuclear material and export controls. The IAEA's action plan on the prevention of nuclear terrorism was widely noted and supported. The Agency's work in support of States' efforts to prevent illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material was also commended.

States parties called for the strengthening of the physical protection of nuclear material, *inter alia* through a well-defined amendment of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Many States parties called on States, that have not yet done so, to accede to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Support was expressed for the IAEA's International Physical Protection Service (IPPAS).

The importance of strengthening nuclear safety, radiation protection, safety of radioactive waste management and the safe transport of radioactive materials was stressed. The IAEA's efforts in the promotion of safety in all its aspects were welcomed. States parties that have not yet acceded to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, as well as the Joint Convention of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of the Radioactive Waste Management, were encouraged to do so.

States parties emphasized that transportation of radioactive material, including maritime transportation, should be carried out in a safe and secure manner in strict conformity with international

standards established by the relevant international organizations such as the IAEA and the IMO. Some States parties called for effective liability arrangements, prior notification and consultation. Some States parties noted the conclusions on safety in the IAEA General Conference resolution GC (45) RES/10. The holding of an IAEA conference on safe transport of radioactive materials in July 2003 was welcomed by many.

States parties reiterated their strong support for Article IV of the Treaty, which provides a framework for cooperation and confidence for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In this context, States parties expressed wide support for the Technical Cooperation activities of the IAEA. It was underlined that Technical Cooperation plays an important role in further developing the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including human health, pest eradication, food and agriculture, and the environment. The importance of aligning Technical Cooperation programs with development goals and needs of the country concerned was emphasized. Several States parties stressed the importance of providing the Agency with adequate resources for these activities.”

U.S. Objections to Summary

Among the States which took the floor following the adoption of the PrepComm Report, all five NWS entered reservations. Ambassador Norman Wulf of the United States offered the most incisive critique. A transcript of his comments follows.

Ambassador Norman Wulf: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. At the outset let me express the appreciation of my delegation to you for the many contributions you have made to our work as Chairman of this first session of the Preparatory Committee. We applaud the energy, patience and good humor that you have brought to this task.

Prior to next year's meeting I am sure that all nations will reflect on our experience at this session of the Preparatory Committee. We have tried a new approach, different from that taken in the run up to the last Review Conference. We think it deserves a fair opportunity to succeed. We believe that PrepComs 1 and 2 can serve a more useful purpose than debating consensus recommendations. We also think that the content of the factual summary and the process for producing it should be consistent with the two PrepComs to be more harmonious and less controversial. We are not sure that the approach taken at this PrepCom adequately addresses these concerns nor are we convinced that the proposal put forward in the last couple of days with respect to the organization of the second PrepCom will contribute towards this goal.

Mr. Chairman, on procedural matters we have a time and location for the second and third sessions and now for the review conference itself. We extend our congratulations to Ambassador Molnar (of Hungary, who will chair the second PrepCom) and pledge to him our complete cooperation. And we understand that the leadership of the third session and the Review Conference itself will come from the nations of the Non Aligned Movement.

Also there was a thorough discussion and exchange of views on a full range of substantive issues. The meetings were well attended, and delegations heard various perspectives on matters related to the implementation of the NPT and to its universality. The IAEA provided a useful and detailed briefing on its safeguards systems and many parties submitted reports to the Chairman related to the Middle East and shared information on all aspects of the Treaty, including Article VI.

Mr. Chairman, we thank you for the factual summary of these proceedings and for making clear that this is YOUR summary and not the product of negotiations among the participants. You have made a genuine effort to summarize factually what has transpired here. Understandably, like other delegations, there are several areas where we are not satisfied. This is to be expected, since the document is your personal effort to summarize the divergent views of many parties. Only the passage of time and careful reflection will allow each of us to evaluate thoroughly your factual summary. Meanwhile, Mr. Chairman, we offer the following preliminary comments. I stress these comments are illustrative, not exhaustive.

First, we are pleased that your summary recognizes the significance for our work that many delegates attach to the events of September 11. Second, the themes of universal adherence and compliance with the Treaty, support for IAEA safeguards, the additional protocol, nuclear export controls, the Fissile

Material Cut-off Treaty, the physical protection convention and peaceful nuclear cooperation were recognized in the summary. We would have preferred more attention to the general topic of IAEA safeguards, which received only slightly more emphasis than education on disarmament and non-proliferation. While we recognize the latter issue is important, we do not believe that it is on the same par as the role of the IAEA. Moreover, peaceful nuclear cooperation, stressed in Article IV, received far too little attention, in our view.

We also would have preferred a fairer treatment of the balance between non-proliferation and disarmament. The two are mutually reinforcing. Nuclear disarmament is not, in our view, the main criteria by which to evaluate the treaty's operation.

We, as with our French colleague, were troubled by your use of the term "States Parties" in several paragraphs. Clearly it cannot be read as "All States Parties." For example, any inference in the factual summary that all States Parties at this PrepCom supported implementation of all the conclusions of the 2000 NPT Final Document is incorrect. I refer delegations to our statements both during the general debate and the special time on Article VI.

With regard to the 1995 decision on the indefinite extension, it is not correct to suggest that the legal effect of that decision is linked to political commitments on security assurances in the Middle East.

We are disappointed at the nature of the reference to the ABM Treaty. We think that many delegations now recognize that there is nothing destabilizing about the US decision to withdraw from that treaty and that the momentum towards further nuclear reductions is continuing. President Bush is determined to transform our relationship with Russia and to replace Mutual Assured Destruction with Mutual Cooperation. Success in missile defenses can indeed lead to reduced reliance on nuclear weapons, as can other measures.

Clearly some US policies related to Article VI differ from the conclusions of the 2000 Final Document. The Administration, for example, has no plans to seek ratification of the CTBT but continues to observe the moratorium on nuclear explosive testing. We ask that you not confuse media reports with US policies. During the first week of our session we offered a detailed information paper on Article VI. We again commend it to all delegates' attention.

On the issue of reporting I can only reinforce my earlier comments. The United States has a strong record of providing information throughout the review process. However, each Party should be able to decide for itself what information to provide, and how and when to do so. Increased transparency could improve the strengthened review process but only through a voluntary approach, and not with check lists and tables.

With regard to the proposal for consultations leading up to the 2003 PrepCom we have made clear for many years our strong opposition to expanding the NPT Review process beyond the PrepComs to include intercessional activities. We believe the 1995 decision on strengthening the review only contemplates establishing subsidiary bodies at review conferences, not for intercessional work. This position of ours holds regardless of the topic that is being addressed, whether that be reporting, security assurances or IAEA safeguards.

On regional issues, we think the identification of specific nations in the factual summary is not necessary. The United States has named countries in its statement, but believes the Chairman's factual summary should have been as non controversial as possible. We do not believe that all states thought it useful to name Israel in the context of the Middle East. In consultations prior to the PrepCom we consistently urged that no country should be named. We regret, specifically, the inclusion of Iraq's assertion that it is in compliance with its NPT obligations when it is so blatantly violating its obligation to permit IAEA inspections, as required by UN Security Council resolutions.

We reaffirm our strong opposition to the use of the NPT Review process to undertake negotiations on issues that should be addressed elsewhere. And our strong opposition to establishing new mechanisms such as that mentioned in the paragraph on the Middle East resolution.

Finally, on security assurances, Mr. Chairman, I want to reaffirm our opposition to the negotiation of a legally binding global assurances treaty, either as a separate treaty, or as a protocol to the NPT.

You may not think, after that statement, that I again wish to thank you for your efforts during this conference. You have conducted your task with great skill, great dedication and a sense of fair play, and we are very grateful to you for that. Thank you, Mr. Chairman."

COMMENTAAR

De eerste PrepCom na de evaluatieconferentie van het Non-Proliferatie Verdrag (NPV) die in 2000 plaatsvond, werd gekenmerkt door een merkwaardige dubbelzinnigheid. De bijeenkomst was de eerste van een reeks die tot doel had om de volgende evaluatieconferentie van 2005 voor te bereiden. Logischerwijs kwam ook de voortgang aan de orde die plaats had gevonden sinds de aanvaarding van het zogenaamde 13-stappenplan in 2000. Dit waren werkafspraken betreffende nucleaire ontwapening, zoals die betreffende het onomkeerbaar maken van nucleaire ontwapeningsstappen, het cruciale belang van het Teststopverdrag en de belofte om daadwerkelijke stappen te nemen naar nucleaire ontwapening.

Helaas stonden die afspraken al op de tocht toen ze werden aangenomen als onderdeel van het slotdocument van de NPV evaluatieconferentie van 2000. De nucleaire ontwapening stakte, de ratificatie van het Teststopverdrag was al jaren geblokkeerd door een onwillig Amerikaans Senaat. De nieuwe president Bush zette een beleid in dat gekenmerkt werd door unilateralisme: dat wil zeggen het ondergeschikt maken van afspraken vastgelegd in internationale verdragen, aan de nationale belangen van de Verenigde Staten. Zo werd de bouw van een raket schild versneld, terwijl het Anti-Balistisch Raketverdrag (ABM verdrag), waarvan de bepalingen deze bouw in de weg zaten, werd opgezegd. Ook op andere terreinen zoals de verdragen aangaande biologische en chemische wapens, werd dit beleid voortgezet.

Deze realiteit was cruciaal voor de kansen op vooruitgang tijdens de PrepCom. Hoewel er tussen de VS en Rusland besprekingen plaatsvonden die in mei 2002 uitmondde in een verdrag over reducties in strategische bewapening (zie hiervoor F&R nr. 8), was de onwil van de Amerikaanse regering om zich te onderwerpen aan afspraken die in internationale verdragen waren gemaakt een cruciaal gegeven. Zoals uit de voorgaande stukken blijkt was dit op de conferentie nauwelijks aanleiding voor grote conflicten. Integendeel, de kritiek op de Verenigde Staten speelde zich vooral af in de wandelingen van de conferentie. Vooral de Nieuwe Agenda Groep (Brazilië, Egypte, Ierland, Mexico, Nieuw Zeeland, Zuid Afrika en Zweden) gaf in hun verklaring (zie tekst) openlijk blijk van grote bezorgdheid over het gebrek aan vooruitgang in nucleaire ontwapening en keurden expliciet de ontmanteling van het ABM verdrag af.

De opstelling van de Europese Unie (zie de tekst) was zoals altijd een compromis tussen de kernwapen lidstaten (Frankrijk en het Verenigd Koninkrijk) en de EU-leden van de Nieuwe Agenda Groep (Italië, Zweden). De grenzen van deze positie werden gemarkeerd door een voorzichtig aandringen op ratificatie van het Teststopverdrag, het verwelkomen van de Amerikaans-Russische onderhandelingen en een aandringen op het opnemen van 'niet-strategische kernwapens' (zoals die op vliegbasis Volkel liggen in Nederland) in de onderhandelingen.

De NAVO-5 groep (België, Duitsland, Nederland, Italië en Noorwegen) kwam ondanks een lunch bijeenkomst niet tot een gezamenlijk document. Verrassenderwijs produceerde Duitsland wel twee informele werkdocumenten over 'niet-strategische kernwapens' en stappen naar een kernwapen vrije wereld (zie de teksten) die blijkbaar verder gingen dan een gezamenlijke opstelling van de vijf.

De kwestie van 'reporting' speelde een belangrijke rol tijdens de conferentie: Canada speelde een sleutelrol in een poging om de kernwapenstaten te binden aan rapportage procedures (over vooruitgang in de kernontwapening) en stelde expliciet dat het de bedoeling was om kernwapens volledig te elimineren. De kernwapenstaten wezen zelfs gebruik van het woord 'rapportage' af: door behendig manoeuvreren en de dreiging om de conferentie tot een voortijdig einde te brengen wist voorzitter Salander het consultatieproces op gang te houden.

Een aantal niet-gouvernementele organisaties, altijd aanwezig bij deze internationale kernwapengerelateerde conferenties, legden als officieel onderdeel van het programma een reeks verklaringen af waarin alle kritiek op het falende proces van ontwapening uiteen werd gezet (zie tekst).

In zijn opsomming (zie tekst) aan het eind van de conferentie verwees ambassadeur Salander voorzichtig naar de grote steun voor het Teststopverdrag en de afspraken die er de voorgaande jaren gemaakt waren over de te nemen stappen naar nucleaire ontwapening.

Deze verklaring was slechts een zogenaamd annex bij het officiële rapport van de conferentie waarover overeenstemming moest worden bereikt.. Desalniettemin werd de irritatie van de VS kennelijk opgeroepen, want deze reageerde weer met een aantal informele bezwaren (tekst). De meest opmerkelijke punten daarvan waren:

- nucleaire ontwapening is niet het belangrijkste criteria om de werking van het verdrag te beoordelen;
- het besluit om het verdrag onbeperkt te verlengen in 1995 was niet gekoppeld aan politieke toezeggingen over veiligheidsgaranties in het Midden Oosten;
- erkenning dat de Amerikaanse regering geen poging zal doen om ratificatie van het Teststopverdrag te bewerkstelligen;
- Israël had niet genoemd hoeven te worden in de context van het Midden Oosten;
- De VS bevestigt haar oppositie tegen het tot stand komen van een verdrag over bindende globale veiligheidsgaranties (om ondertekenaars van het NPV te beschermen tegen aanvallen door kernwapenstaten) ;

Het is ironisch dat deze bijzonder belangrijke opmerkingen niet werden gemaakt in een officieel document tijdens de conferentie maar als een informele toevoeging aan de samenvatting van de voorzitter. Daardoor werd het officiële zwijgen over het falende proces van nucleaire ontwapening voortgezet. Gezien de andere actuele ontwikkelingen op dit gebied (potentiële kernoorlog in zuid Azië, de stationering van wapens in de ruimte, de ontwikkeling van nieuwe typen kernwapens, de veranderende nucleaire doctrine van de Verenigde Staten) is het twijfelachtig of de volgende PrepCom, in Geneve in 2003, een rooskleuriger beeld te zien zal geven.

FACTS AND REPORTS

Eerder verschenen in de reeks PENN – NL Facts and Reports:

1. US unilateralism – official foreign comments
Citaten van internationale politici en diplomaten over het Amerikaans unilateralisme.
2. Veiligheidsvraagstukken en de verkiezingen – standpunten van de politieke partijen
Relevante delen van de partijprogramma's van de Nederlandse politieke partijen, plus citaten van politici op het terrein van oorlog en vrede.
3. Transatlantic relations – recent developments
Overzicht van recente ontwikkelingen in de transatlantische betrekkingen, met name binnen de NAVO, mede naar aanleiding van uitspraken in de State of the Union.
4. Ontwikkelingen betreffende kernwapens en de Nederlandse politiek – briefing paper
Periodiek overzicht van ontwikkelingen rond kernwapens in de internationale en nationale politiek, met uitgebreide hoeveelheid bijlagen.
5. Nucleaire vraagstukken – standpunten van de Nederlandse regering en de Tweede Kamer
Overzicht april 2001 – april 2002
6. Prepcom van het NPV – nucleaire ontwapening stopt
Verklaringen en rapporten van staten en ngo's tijdens de Prepcom van het NPV

Deze uitgaven zijn te bestellen door € 5,- per exemplaar (incl. verzendkosten) over te maken op rekening nummer 7549774 van Stichting AMOK inz Werkgroep Eurobom te Utrecht o/v F&R 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 of 6.