

VERDRAG VAN MOSKOU

Détente tussen Rusland en de Verenigde Staten?

PENN – NL Facts and Reports Nr. 8

Juni 2002

Werkgroep Eurobom

PENN-Nederland

VERDRAG VAN MOSKOU


Juni 2002

PENN, het Project voor Europese Nucleaire Non-proliferatie, is opgezet om:

- * officiële discussies over de toekomst van kernwapens in Europa nauwgezet te volgen en deze te verhelderen;
- * analyses van en commentaren op deze ontwikkelingen te publiceren;
- * verdere maatregelen voor kernontwapening in Europa en substantiële Europese bijdragen aan kernwapenbeheersing, ontwapening en non-proliferatie te stimuleren;
- * te ijveren voor de volledige naleving van het Non-Proliferatieverdrag door de NAVO, de Europese Unie, en haar leden;
- * politieke belemmeringen op te werpen tegen ontwikkelingen die zouden kunnen leiden tot een Europese Unie met kernwapens;
- * te bevorderen dat de Europese Unie en al haar leden uiteindelijk niet-nucleaire leden van het NPV worden.

Deze publikatie is mogelijk gemaakt door de W. Alton Jones Foundation

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Inleiding

De al maanden durende confrontatie tussen India en Pakistan heeft zoals bekend ook een nucleaire component. Beide staten bezitten substantiële kernwapen arsenalen en zullen die tijdens een conflict onder bepaalde omstandigheden inzetten. Dit gevaar voor een nucleaire oorlog heeft dan ook enige belangstelling gewekt in de Nederlandse media. Zo een associatie met een nucleaire holocaust wordt niet gelegd als men schrijft of spreekt over de kernwapen arsenalen van de Westerse wereld en Rusland. Waar er in de tachtiger jaren nog massaal werd gedemonstreerd tegen de aanwezigheid van kernwapens in ons midden (ze liggen nog altijd op Volkel vliegbasis), lijken ze nu een integraal onderdeel van ons bestaan te zijn. Er wordt dus een scherp onderscheid getrokken in de publieke perceptie tussen de kernwapens van India en Pakistan, en die van onze regeringen. Dat gevoel is nog verder versterkt door de positieve berichtgeving in de media over het zogenaamde Moskou verdrag en de afspraken over nucleaire ontwapening die daar uit voortvloeien.

Dit merkwaardige contrast leek ons afdoende reden om een nadere blik te werpen op de vermeende vooruitgang die er in de nucleaire ontwapening zou zijn geboekt. In een volgend deel van onze serie bekijken we de kwestie van de nucleaire bewapening van India en Pakistan. Hier drukken we de teksten af van het zogenaamde Moskou verdrag (24 mei 2002), de afspraak van de VS en Rusland om gedeeltelijk nucleair te ontwapenen, plus een deel van de tekst van de Nuclear Posture Review, de al eerder aan het Amerikaanse Congres gepresenteerde herziening van de nucleaire doctrine van de Verenigde Staten. Verder vindt u ook een verzameling teksten en documenten die verschenen naar aanleiding van de publicatie van deze twee documenten. Achterin vindt u een commentaar van ons.

Redactie Facts and Reports

Verdragstekst

TEXT OF THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE REDUCTIONS

The United States of America and the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,
Embarking upon the path of new relations for a new century and committed to the goal of
strengthening their relationship through cooperation and friendship,
Believing that new global challenges and threats require the building of a qualitatively new
foundation for strategic relations between the Parties,
Desiring to establish a genuine partnership based on the principles of mutual security, cooperation,
trust, openness, and predictability,
Committed to implementing significant reductions in strategic offensive arms,
Proceeding from the Joint Statements by the President of the United States of America and the
President of the Russian Federation on Strategic Issues of July 22, 2001 in Genoa and on a New
Relationship between the United States and Russia of November 13, 2001 in Washington,
Mindful of their obligations under the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31,
1991, hereinafter referred to as the START Treaty,
Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons of July 1, 1968, and Convinced that this Treaty will help to establish more favorable
conditions for actively promoting security and cooperation, and enhancing international stability,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Each Party shall reduce and limit strategic nuclear warheads, as stated by the President of the United States of America on November 13, 2001 and as stated by the President of the Russian Federation on November 13, 2001 and December 13, 2001 respectively, so that by December 31, 2012 the aggregate number of such warheads does not exceed 1700-2200 for each Party. Each Party shall determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms, based on the established aggregate limit for the number of such warheads.

Article II

The Parties agree that the START Treaty remains in force in accordance with its terms.

Article III

For purposes of implementing this Treaty, the Parties shall hold meetings at least twice a year of a Bilateral Implementation Commission.

Article IV

1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.
2. This Treaty shall remain in force until December 31, 2012 and may be extended by agreement of the Parties or superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement.
3. Each Party, in exercising its national sovereignty, may withdraw from this Treaty upon three months written notice to the other Party.

Article V

This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Done at Moscow on May 24, 2002, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

Nuclear Posture Review [Excerpts]

Submitted to Congress on 31 December 2001.

8 January 2002

Nuclear Posture Review Report

Foreword

The Congress directed the Defense Department to conduct a comprehensive Nuclear Posture Review to lay out the direction for American nuclear forces over the next five to ten years. The Department has completed that review and prepared the attached report.

Early on, we recognized that the new security environment demanded that the Department go beyond the Congressional mandate in developing a strategic posture for the 21st century. President Bush had already directed the Defense Department to transform America's military and prepare it for the new, unpredictable world in which we will be living. The result of his direction is the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Building on the (QDR) this Nuclear Posture Review puts in motion a major change in our approach to the role of nuclear offensive forces in our deterrent strategy and presents the blueprint for transforming our strategic posture.

This report establishes a New Triad, composed of:

- Offensive strike systems (both nuclear and non-nuclear);
- Defenses (both active and passive); and
- A revitalized defense infrastructure that will provide new capabilities in a timely fashion to meet emerging threats.

This New Triad is bound together by enhanced command and control (C2) and intelligence systems. The establishment of this New Triad can both reduce our dependence on nuclear weapons and improve our ability to deter attack in the face of proliferating WMD capabilities in two ways:

- The addition of defenses (along with the prospects for timely adjustments to force capabilities and enhanced C2 and intelligence systems) means that the U.S. will no longer be as heavily dependent on offensive strike forces to enforce deterrence as it was during the Cold War.
- The addition of non-nuclear strike forces--including conventional strike and information operations--means that the U.S. will be less dependent than it has been in the past on nuclear forces to provide its offensive deterrent capability.

The combination of new capabilities that make up the New Triad reduce the risk to the nation as it draws its nuclear forces toward the goal of 1,700-2,200 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads announced by President Bush on November 13, 2001.

The following is a summary of the highlights in this report.

First and foremost, the Nuclear Posture Review puts the Cold War practices related to planning for strategic forces behind us. In the decade since the collapse of the Soviet Union, planning for the employment of U.S. nuclear forces has undergone only modest revision, despite the new relationship between the U.S. and Russia. Few changes had been made to the size or composition of the strategic nuclear force beyond those required by the START Treaty. At the same time, plans and funding for sustaining some critical elements of that force have been inadequate.

As a result of this review, the U.S. will no longer plan, size or sustain its forces as though Russia presented merely a smaller version of the threat posed by the former Soviet Union. Following the direction laid down for U.S. defense planning in the Quadrennial Defense Review, the Nuclear Posture Review shifts planning for America's strategic forces from the threat-based approach of the Cold War to a capabilities-based approach. This new approach should provide, over the coming decades, a credible deterrent at the lowest level of nuclear weapons consistent with U.S. and allied security.

Second, we have concluded that a strategic posture that relies solely on offensive nuclear forces is inappropriate for deterring the potential adversaries we will face in the 21st century. Terrorists or rogue states armed with weapons of mass destruction will likely test America's security commitments to its allies and friends. In response, we will need a range of capabilities to assure friend and foe alike of U.S. resolve. A broader array of capability is needed to dissuade states from undertaking political, military, or technical courses of action that would threaten U.S. and allied security. U.S. forces must pose a credible deterrent to potential adversaries who have access to modern military technology, including NBC weapons and the means to deliver them over long distances. Finally, U.S. strategic forces need to provide the President with a range of options to defeat any aggressor.

To meet the nation's defense goals in the 21st century, the first leg of the New Triad, the offensive strike leg, will go beyond the Cold War triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and long-range nuclear-armed bombers. ICBMs, SLBMs, bombers and nuclear weapons will, of course, continue to play a vital role. However, they will be just part of the first leg of the New Triad, integrated with new non-nuclear strategic capabilities that strengthen the credibility of our offensive deterrence.

The second leg of the New Triad requires development and deployment of both active and passive defenses--a recognition that offensive capabilities alone may not deter aggression in the new security environment of the 21st century. The events of September 11, 2001 underscore this reality. Active and passive defenses will not be perfect. However, by denying or reducing the effectiveness of limited attacks, defenses can discourage attacks, provide new capabilities for managing crises, and provide insurance against the failure of traditional deterrence.

The third leg of the New Triad is a responsive defense infrastructure. Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. defense infrastructure has contracted and our nuclear infrastructure has atrophied. New approaches to development and procurement of new capabilities are being designed so that it will not take 20 years or more to field new generations of weapon systems. With respect to the nuclear infrastructure, it needs to be repaired to increase confidence in the deployed forces, eliminate unneeded weapons, and mitigate the risks of technological surprise. Maintaining our ability to respond to large strategic changes can permit us to reduce our nuclear arsenal and, at the same time, dissuade adversaries from starting a competition in nuclear armaments.

The effectiveness of this New Triad depends upon command and control, intelligence, and adaptive planning. "Exquisite" intelligence on the intentions and capabilities of adversaries can permit timely adjustments to the force and improve the precision with which it can strike and defend. The ability to plan the employment of the strike and defense forces flexibly and rapidly will provide the U.S. with a significant advantage in managing crises, deterring attack and conducting military operations.

Constructing the New Triad, reducing our deployed nuclear weapons, and increasing flexibility in our strategic posture has resource implications. It costs money to retire old weapons systems and create new capabilities. Restoring the defense infrastructure, developing and deploying strategic defenses, improving our command and control, intelligence, planning, and non-nuclear strike capabilities require new defense initiatives and investments. However, these investments can make the U.S. more secure while reducing our dependence on nuclear weapons.

The Quadrennial Defense Review established the foundation for America's post-Cold War defense strategy. Building on the Quadrennial Defense Review, the Nuclear Posture Review will transform the Cold War era offensive nuclear triad into a New Triad designed for the decades to come.

Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense

Body of the Report

"Nuclear weapons play a critical role in the defense capabilities of the United States, its allies and friends. They provide credible military options to deter a wide range of threats, including WMD and large-scale conventional military force. These nuclear capabilities possess unique properties that give the United States options to hold at risk classes of targets [that are] important to achieve strategic and political objectives." (p. 7)

However, "U.S. nuclear forces, alone are unsuited to most of the contingencies for which the United States prepares. The United States and allied interests may not require nuclear strikes." A "new mix" of nuclear, non-nuclear, and defensive capabilities "is required for the diverse set of potential adversaries and unexpected threats the United States may confront in the coming decades." (p. 7)

"Greater flexibility is needed with respect to nuclear forces and planning than was the case during the Cold War. The assets most valued by the spectrum of potential adversaries in the new security environment may be diverse and, in some cases, U.S. understanding of what an adversary values may evolve. Consequently, although the number of weapons needed to hold those assets at risk has declined, U.S. nuclear forces still require the capability to hold at risk a wide range of target types. This capability is key to the role of nuclear forces in supporting an effective deterrence strategy relative to a broad spectrum of potential opponents under a variety of contingencies. Nuclear attack options that vary in scale, scope, and purpose will complement other military capabilities. The combination can provide the range of options needed to pose a credible deterrent to adversaries whose values and calculations of risk and of gain and loss may be very different from and more difficult to discern than those of past adversaries." (p. 7)

"Advances in defensive technologies will allow U.S. non-nuclear and nuclear capabilities to be coupled with active and passive defenses to help provide deterrence and protection against attack, preserve U.S. freedom of action, and strengthen the credibility of U.S. alliance commitments." (p. 7)

"Missile defenses are beginning to emerge as systems that can have an effect on the strategic and operational calculations of potential adversaries. They are now capable of providing, active defense against short- to medium-range threats." (p. 11)

U.S. military forces themselves, including nuclear forces will now be used to "dissuade adversaries from undertaking military programs or operations that could threaten U.S. interests or those of allies and friends." (p. 9)

"Defensive systems capable of intercepting ballistic missiles may reduce the need for nuclear weapons to hold at risk an adversary's missile launchers." (p. 9)

"A modern, responsive nuclear weapons sector of the infrastructure is indispensable, especially as the size of the operationally deployed nuclear arsenal is reduced." (p. 10-11)

"The planning process [for the New Triad] not only must produce a variety of flexible, pre-planned non-nuclear and nuclear options, but also incorporate sufficient adaptability to support the timely construction of additional options in a crisis or unexpected conflict." (p. 11)

II. "CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE NEW TRIAD TO DEFENSE POLICY GOALS" (p.12)

(Assure, Dissuade, Deter, Defeat)

"**ASSURE**" — "U.S. nuclear forces will continue to provide assurance to security partners, particularly in the presence of known or suspected threats of nuclear, biological, or chemical attacks or in the event of surprising military developments. This assurance can serve to reduce the incentives for friendly countries to acquire nuclear weapons of their own to deter such threats and circumstances. Nuclear capabilities also assure the U.S. public that the United States will not be subject to coercion based on a false perception of U.S. weakness among potential adversaries." (p. 12)

"Defense of the U.S. homeland and protection of forward bases increase the ability of the United States to counteract WMD-backed coercive threats and to use its power projection forces in the defense of allies and friends." (p. 13)

"**DISSUADE**" — "Systems capable of striking a wide range of targets throughout an adversary's territory may dissuade a potential adversary from pursuing threatening capabilities. For example, a demonstration of the linkage between long-range precision strike weapons and real-time intelligence systems may dissuade a potential adversary from investing heavily in mobile ballistic missiles." (p. 12)

"Defenses can make it more arduous and costly for an adversary to compete militarily with or wage war against the United States. The demonstration of a range of technologies and systems for missile defense can have a dissuasive effect on potential adversaries. The problem of countering missile defenses, especially defensive systems with multiple layers, presents a potential adversary with the prospect of a difficult, time-consuming and expensive undertaking." (p. 13)

"The capacity of the infrastructure to upgrade existing weapon systems, surge production of weapons, or develop and field entirely new systems for the New Triad can discourage other countries from competing militarily with the United States." (p. 14)

"DETER" — "[Missile] [D]efense of U.S. territory and power projection forces, including U.S. forces abroad, combined with the certainty of U.S. ability to strike in response, can bring into better balance U.S. stakes and risks in a regional confrontation and thus reinforce the credibility of U. S. guarantees designed to deter attacks on allies and friends."

"The [defense R&D and industrial] infrastructure must provide confidence in the reliability of the nuclear stockpile and the ability of command and control structures to withstand attack. More broadly, [it] helps to enhance deterrence of aggression by supporting improved U.S. capabilities to hold at risk high-value targets in the face of an adversary's efforts to conceal, harden, and disperse them." (p. 14)

"DEFEAT" — "Composed of both non-nuclear systems and nuclear weapons, the strike element of the New Triad can provide greater flexibility in the design and conduct of military campaigns to defeat opponents decisively. Non-nuclear strike capabilities may be particularly useful to limit collateral damage and conflict escalation. Nuclear weapons could be employed against targets able to withstand non-nuclear attack, (for example, deep underground bunkers or bio-weapon facilities)." (p. 12-13)

"Missile defenses could defeat small-scale missile attacks intended to coerce the United States into abandoning an embattled ally or friend. Defenses that provided protection for strike capabilities of the New Triad and for other power projection forces would improve the ability of the United States and its allies and friends to counterattack an enemy. They may also provide the President with an option to manage a crisis involving one or more missile and WMD-armed opponents." (p. 13)

COMMAND, CONTROL, PLANNING, AND INTELLIGENCE (p. 15)

"As forces are incrementally changed to meet the New Triad force requirements, command and control (C2) becomes more critical to ensure the effectiveness of the elements of the residual force structure... Strike options will require intricate planning, flexibility, and interface with decision makers throughout the engagement process. Command and control will become more complex and the supporting systems and platforms will require augmentation, modernization, and replacement." (p. 15)

"Accurate and timely targeting information can increase both the lethality of strike capabilities and the possibilities for non-nuclear strike capabilities to substitute for nuclear weapons or provide for the timely positioning of missile defense assets." (p. 15)

DEFENSE POLICY GOALS AND RELATED NUCLEAR WEAPONS REQUIREMENTS (p. 15)

"In a fluid security environment, the precise nuclear force level necessary for the future cannot be predicted with certainty. The goal of reducing, over the next decade, the U.S. operationally deployed strategic nuclear force to the range of between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads provides a degree of flexibility necessary to accommodate changes in the security environment that could affect U.S. nuclear requirements." (p. 15)

SIZING THE NUCLEAR FORCE (p. 16)

"In setting requirements for nuclear strike capabilities, distinctions can be made among the contingencies for which the United States must be prepared. Contingencies can be categorized as immediate, potential or unexpected."

"Immediate contingencies involve well-recognized current dangers... Current examples of immediate contingencies include an Iraqi attack on Israel or its neighbors, a North Korean attack on South Korea, or a military confrontation over the status of Taiwan."

"Potential contingencies are plausible, but not immediate dangers. For example, the emergence of a new, hostile military coalition against the United States or its allies in which one or more members possesses WMD and the means of delivery is a potential contingency that could have major consequences for U.S. defense planning, including plans for nuclear forces." (p. 16)

Unexpected contingencies are sudden and unpredicted security challenges," like the Cuban Missile Crisis. "Contemporary illustrations might include a sudden regime change by which an existing nuclear arsenal comes into the hands of a new, hostile leadership group, or an opponents surprise unveiling of WMD capabilities." Ibid.

North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Libya are among the countries that could be involved in immediate, potential, or unexpected contingencies. All have longstanding hostility toward the United States and its security partners; North Korea and Iraq in particular have been chronic military concerns. All sponsor or harbor terrorists, and all have active WMD and missile programs." Ibid

"Due to the combination of China's still developing strategic objectives and its ongoing modernization of its nuclear and non nuclear forces, China is a country that could be involved in an immediate or potential contingency." (p. 16-17)

"Russia maintains the most formidable nuclear forces, aside from the United States, and substantial, if less impressive, conventional capabilities. There now are, however, no ideological sources of conflict with Moscow, as there were during the Cold War. The United States seeks a more cooperative relationship with Russia and a move away from the balance-of-terror policy framework, which by definition is an expression of mutual distrust and hostility. As a result, a [nuclear strike] contingency involving Russia, while plausible, is not expected." (p. 17)

(U) "Adjusting U.S. immediate nuclear force requirements in recognition of the changed relationship with Russia is a critical step away from the Cold War policy of mutual vulnerability and toward more cooperative relations." (p. 17)

(S) "Russia's nuclear forces and programs, nevertheless, remain a concern. Russia faces many strategic problems around its periphery and its future course cannot be charted with certainty. U.S. planning must take this into account. In the event that U.S. relations with Russia significantly worsen in the future, the U.S. may need to revise its nuclear force levels and posture." (p. 17)

OPERATIONALLY DEPLOYED AND RESPONSIVE NUCLEAR FORCES

"The operationally deployed forces are sized to provide the capabilities required to meet the U.S. defense goals in the context of immediate, and unexpected contingencies. That is, a sufficient number of forces must be available on short notice to counter known threats while preserving a small, additional margin in the event of a surprise development. The 1700-2200 warheads the United States is scheduled to deploy in 2012 would constitute the operationally deployed force." (p. 17)

"The responsive force is intended to provide a capability to augment the operationally deployed force to meet potential contingencies ... The responsive force ... retains the option for leadership to increase the number of operationally delayed forces in proportion to the severity of an evolving crisis. A responsive force need not be available in a matter of days, but in weeks, months, or even years. For example, additional bombs could be brought out of the non-deployed stockpile in days or weeks. By contrast, adding additional weapons to the ICBM force could take as long as a year for a squadron in a wing. The responsive force [also] provides a reserve from which replacements can be provided for operationally deployed weapons that evidence reliability problems."

US NUCLEAR FORCE SIZE

"Based on current projections, an operationally deployed force of 1700-2200 strategic nuclear warheads by 2012 ...will support U.S. deterrence policy to hold at risk what opponents value, including their instruments of political control and military power, and to deny opponents their war aims. The types of targets to be held at risk for deterrence purposes include leadership and military capabilities, particularly WMD, military command facilities and other centers of control and infrastructure that support military forces."

"The planned force structure for 2012 comprises 14 Trident SSBNs (with two of the 14 in overhaul at any time) 500 Minuteman III ICBMs, 76 B-52H bombers, and 21 B-2 bombers."

THE PATH FOR NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS

"A conceptual path toward an operationally deployed force of 1,700-2,200 warheads in 2012 ... eliminates Peacekeeper ICBMs, removes 4 Trident SSBNs from strategic service, and downloads weapons from Trident SLBMs, Minuteman III ICBMs; and B-52H and B-2 bombers. This will result

in 3,800 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads by 2007 (SLBM warheads for SSBNs in overhaul will not be counted as operationally deployed because those submarines are unavailable for alert patrols)." (p. 19)

"Subsequent reductions below the 3,800 operationally deployed warheads can be achieved through a variety of methods. The precise method will be determined in the course of periodic reviews the Department will conduct beginning in 2003. The Secretary of Defense will direct that these reviews be undertaken with the participation of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Commander in Chief of U.S. Strategic Forces Command, and the NNSA Administrator." (p. 19)

III. CREATING THE NEW TRIAD

"To meet the demands of the New Triad, an overhaul of existing capabilities is needed. This includes improving the tools used to build and execute strike plans so that the national leadership can adapt pre-planned options, or construct new options, during highly dynamic crisis situations." (p. 23)

"In addition, the technology base and production readiness infrastructures of both DoD and NNSA must be modernized so that the United States will be able to adjust to rapidly changing situations ...adjustments may be needed to match capabilities of the remaining nuclear forces to new missions... a need may arise to modify, upgrade, or replace portions of the extant nuclear force or develop concepts for follow-on nuclear weapons better suited is the nation's needs. It is unlikely that a reduced version of the Cold War nuclear arsenal will be precisely the nuclear force that the United States will require in 2012 and beyond." (p. 23)

"The FY04 DPG [Defense Planning Guidance] will provide guidance to coordinate and deconflict requirements for nuclear and non nuclear systems." (p. 24)

"Initiatives reflected in the proposed FY03-07 Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) include:

- *Mobile and Relocatable Targets*. DoD proposed to develop a systems-level approach, applied across the Services, for holding at risk critical mobile targets.
- *Defeating Hard and Deeply-Buried Targets*. DoD would implement a program to improve significantly the means to locate, identify, characterize, and target adversarial hard and deeply buried targets.
- *Long Range Strike*. DoD will pursue a systems level approach to defeat critical fixed and mobile targets at varying ranges, in all terrain and weather conditions, and in denied areas.
- *Guided Missile Submarines (SSGNs)*. DoD has proposed to fund the conversion of four SSBNs, withdrawn from the strategic nuclear service, to SSGN configuration.
- *Precision Strike*. Effort to increase the number of targets than can be attacked on a single mission. Elements include a "Multifunction Information Distribution System" to provide "a jam-resistant, secure, digital network for exchange of critical information for strike capabilities," a "Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile," A "Small Diameter Bomb," and the "Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle."
- *New Strike System*. "DoD will begin in FY03 to explore concepts for a new strike system that might arm the converted SSGNs. Desired capabilities for this new strike weapon include timely arrival on target, precision, and the ability to be retargeted rapidly." (p. 24-25)

Ballistic Missile Defense

"The President has stated that the mission for missile defense is to protect all 50 states, our deployed forces, and our friends and allies against ballistic missile attacks. The Department has reorganized its ballistic missile defense program. The program is pursuing missile defense based on the following guidance:

- Missile defense is most effective if it is layered; that is, able to intercept ballistic missiles of any range in all phases of their flight.
- The United States seeks effective defenses against attacks by small numbers of longer range missiles as well as defenses against attacks by larger numbers of short- and medium-range missiles.
- Missile defense systems, like all military systems, can be less than 100-percent effective and still make a significant contribution to security by enhancing deterrence and saving lives if deterrence fails." (p. 25)

“Other than the PAC-3, the United States has not yet chosen systems for deployment; that decision will depend on the evolution of both technology and the threat. The Department is exploring a wide range of alternative approaches. There are two dimensions to the missile defense program: near-term emergency capabilities; and improved variants of these capabilities leading to more robust, operational systems. Several near-term and mid-term options (2003-2008) that could provide an emergency missile defense capability are under consideration, including:

- A single Airborne Laser for boost-phase intercepts may be available for limited operations against ballistic missiles of all ranges;
- A rudimentary ground-based midcourse system, consisting of a small number of interceptors taken from the test program and an upgraded Cobra Dane radar in Alaska, could be available against longer-range threats to the United States; and
- A sea-based Aegis system could be available to provide rudimentary midcourse capability against short to medium-range threats." (p. 26)

“Based on the technical progress of these systems, the United States could deploy operational capabilities beginning in the 2006-2008 period including:

- 2-3 Airborne Laser aircraft
- Additional ground-based midcourse sites
- 4 sea-based midcourse ships
- terminal systems, able to defend against shorter range threats: PAC-3, which began deployment in 2001, and THAAD, which could be available by 2008." (p. 26)

"DOD will develop the low-orbit constellation of SBIRS-Low satellites to support missile defense. This system will provide capabilities to track enemy ballistic missiles and to assist in the discrimination of reentry vehicles and other objects in flight." (p. 28)

Command and Control Intelligence

[the Secretary of Defense] "established a Federal Advisory Committee (FAC) to conduct an independent, end-to-end review of all activities involved in maintaining the highest standards of nuclear weapons safety, security, control, and reliability." This "*End-to-End Review*" was conducted concurrently with the NPR but was not completed before the NPR deadline. While the review is not yet final, the FAC presented an "urgent preliminary finding to the Secretary subsequent to the events of September 11 identifying the need to expand the current nuclear command and control (C2) architecture to a true national command and control conferencing system." (p. 26)

"The attacks of September 11 dramatically highlighted the requirement for secure, wideband communications between fixed and mobile command centers and national decision makers. The Department is developing a secure wideband communications architecture and procedures ... The Department will initiate a satellite communications system in FY03, the *Advanced Wideband System (AWS)*, that incorporates interoperable laser communications and will be designed to meet the needs of the defense and intelligence community for wideband tactical, protected tactical (replaces Advanced EHF satellites) broadcast, and relay communications with a planned system first launch during FY09. The Department supports the effort to implement a secure, wideband capability on all strategic C2 platforms. Wideband complements, but does not replace, the requirement for assured, survivable, and enduring nuclear C2." (p. 27)

The "2001 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States" provided immediate upgrades to aircraft for national leadership, and the Department has programmed funding for additional wideband upgrades including the E-4 National Airborne Operations Center aircraft.

"Three Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) spacecraft are planned for an initial operating capability of FY08 that will provide nuclear-survivable (e.g. against high altitude electromagnetic pulse), anti-jam, low and medium data rate communications to strategic and tactical users."

"The Department will initiate in FY03 an Extremely High Frequency (EHF) communications satellites program primarily for national and strategic users requiring nuclear protected communications in the mid-latitude and polar regions with a planned first launch during FY09. Survivable, jam-resistant, secure voice conferencing among principal nuclear C2 decision makers remains essential to facilitate discussions of tactical warning and assessment, response options, and force management." (p. 27)

"... substantial investment in nuclear C2 cryptographic systems ... new nuclear C2 capabilities must be leveraged with new technologies. (p. 27)

Intelligence

"Significant capability shortfalls currently exist in: finding and tracking mobile and relocatable targets and WMD sites: locating, identifying, and characterizing hard and deeply buried targets (HDBTs); [and] providing intelligence support to Information Operations and federated intelligence operations " (p. 28)

"To provide continuous and persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance of critical regions, the Department proposes to develop in its FY03-07 FYDP a "system of systems that consists of space, airborne, surface, and subsurface capabilities. Sensors for this system will include a mix of phenomenology, allow for agile and flexible response, and operate across the electro-magnetic spectrum." (p. 28)

"New concepts for persistent surveillance - from air- and space-based platforms - including hyper-spectral imaging, are proposed in the FY03 budget. (ibid).

"Intelligence for Information Operations (IO). Information Operations targeting, weaponeering, and execution requires intelligence collection of finer granularity and depth than is currently available. The intelligence community lacks adequate data on most adversary computer local area networks and other command and control systems. Additionally, there is limited analytical capability to exploit these networks using IO tools. Investments must continue in order to upgrade and, populate the Modernized Integrated Database to enable effective IO targeting, weaponeering, and combat assessment essential to the New Triad."

Adaptive Planning (p. 29)

"The current nuclear planning system, including target identification, weapons system assignment, and the nuclear command and control system requirements, is optimized to support large, deliberately planned nuclear strikes. In the future, as the nation moves beyond the concept of a large, Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) and moves toward more flexibility, adaptive planning will play a much larger role."

"Deliberate planning creates executable war plans, prepared in advance, for anticipated contingencies. Adaptive planning is used to generate war plans quickly in time critical-situations. Deliberate planning provides the foundation for adaptive planning by identifying individual weapon/target combinations that could be executed in crises."

"For contingencies for which no adaptive planning has been done, fully adaptive planning will be required. The desire to shorten the time between identifying a target and having an option available will place significant stress on the nuclear planning process as it currently exists. Presently 12-48 hours is required to develop a plan to attack a single new target, depending on the weapon system to be employed. A more flexible planning system is needed to address the requirements of adaptive planning."

"To make the Strategic Warfare Planning System (SWPS) more responsive to adaptive planning scenarios, a comprehensive SWPS Transformation Study has been initiated and is being conducted by U.S. Strategic Command. Results will be available in late spring 2002. To meet the requirements of adaptive planning, an upgrade of the existing nuclear C2 architecture is needed.

DOD Infrastructure Issues

"DOD has identified shortfalls in current infrastructure sustainment programs for nuclear platforms. These include the following: solid rocket motor design, development and testing; technology for current and future strategic systems; improved surveillance and assessment capabilities; command and

control platforms and systems; and design, development, and production of radiation-hardened parts." (p. 30)

"In support of this effort, the **Defense Science Board Task Force on System Technology for the Future US Strategic Posture** is considering strategies for enhancing the ability of the U.S. technology base to deal with or hedge against uncertainties in the nature and timing of potential strategic threats, the capability of the technology and industrial base to respond in a timely manner, and the adequacy and responsiveness of science and technology programs related to possible future strategic capabilities. In addition, the **U.S. Strategic Command Advisory Group on Strategic Platforms** is addressing weapon system viability and nuclear force readiness." (p. 30)

The Current U.S. Nuclear Warhead Infrastructure

"Underinvestment in the infrastructure - in particular the production complex - has increased the risks that if substantial problems in the stockpile are discovered, future options to refurbish or replace existing designs will be limited. For example, although an interim pit production capability will be established later in this decade, no current capability exists to build and certify plutonium pits, certain secondary components, or complete warheads." (p. 30)

"The need is clear for a revitalized nuclear weapons complex that will: ...be able, if directed, to design, develop, manufacture, and certify new warheads in response to new national requirements; and maintain readiness to resume underground nuclear testing if required." (p. 30)

Stockpile Maintenance

"DOD and NNSA are in the preliminary stages of determining the requirements for nuclear warheads for the New Triad. As the New Triad is developed and fielded, DoD and NNSA will have to reassess how the warheads in the stockpile are characterized. At present, the warhead stockpile is divided into two categories: active and inactive:

- Active stock pile warheads are maintained in a ready-for-use configuration with tritium and other limited life components installed. They incorporate the latest warhead modifications. The active stockpile includes all deployed warheads, warheads for the responsive force, and logistics spares for each warhead type.

- Inactive stockpile warheads do not have limited life components installed, and may not have the latest warhead modifications. These warheads serve a number of purposes ranging from reliability replacements that act as a hedge against the discovery of a problem with a large number of active warheads, to the more predictable replacement of warheads consumed by quality assurance and reliability testing. This hedge is required because the United States will not have, for a decade or more, the capacity to produce certain new components for warheads. The time it would take to deploy warheads in the inactive stockpile depends on the delivery system, and availability of tritium gas and other limited-life components. These warheads or their components could also be used to provide new capabilities. This time would range from weeks in the case of bombers, to years in the case of ICBMs." (p. 31-32)

"There are almost 8,000 warheads in the active stockpile today. As the initial nuclear warhead reductions are implemented, some warheads will be transferred from the active to the inactive stockpile. For example, the removal from strategic service of the 4 SSBNs will result in the transfer of over 700 W76 warheads to the inactive stockpile. By 2012 approximately 3,000 warheads, now in the active stockpile, are planned to be transferred to the inactive stockpile or retired." (p. 32)

"Some of the W87 Peacekeeper warheads will be redeployed on Minuteman ICBMs under the Safety Enhanced Reentry Vehicle (SERV) program Each W87 warhead will displace one W62, or three W78 warheads currently deployed on Minuteman. To provide warhead diversity in the force, some SERV-modified Minuteman missiles would carry the W78 warhead. A number of W78 and W87 warheads will be retained as reliability replacements and surveillance assets to support the responsive force. In addition, the W62 will be retired by the end of Fiscal Year 2009. (p. 32)

"The active stockpiles also includes the nonstrategic nuclear weapons."

"The United States will retain an inactive stockpile of nuclear weapons. The size of that stockpile is yet to be determined. It will be driven by the capacity of the nuclear weapon complex to refurbish and dismantle weapons. For example, today the complex can process - either refurbish or dismantle - roughly 350 weapons per year. If the NNSA's proposed plan is funded, that number should increase to roughly 600 per year." (p. 32)

"A major challenge for nuclear weapons programs over the next two decades will be to refurbish, and thereby extend the life of, at least seven types of nuclear warheads" [a table lists these as B61 -3, 4, 10; B61-7, 11; W76; W78; W80-0, 1; B83-0; B83-1; W87; and W88.]

Restoring Production Infrastructure

*"Warhead Assembly and Disassembly:...*Plans are underway to expand the capacity and capability of the Pantex Plant to meet the planned workload for dismantlement and remanufacturing of existing weapons." (p. 33)

"Uranium Operations: At least seven to eight years of effort will be required to restore the capability to produce a complete nuclear weapon secondary at the Y-12 Plant in Tennessee. Qualified processes for some material and manufacturing steps are not currently in place. Plans are underway to expand the capacity and capability of the Y-12 Plant to meet the planned workload for replacing warhead secondaries, and other uranium components." (p. 33)

"Plutonium Operations: One glaring shortfall is the inability to fabricate and certify weapon primaries, or so-called "pits". Work is underway to establish an interim capability at Los Alamos National Laboratory late in this decade to meet current demand created by destructive surveillance testing on the W88 warhead. For the long term a new modern production facility will be needed to deal with the large-scale replacement of components and new production." (p. 33)

"Other Component and Material Production:... Tritium production, halted since 1988, is programmed to resume in FY03 with first deliveries to the stockpile scheduled for FY06. Additionally, warhead refurbishment plans require modern facilities at Y-12's Special Materials Complex for manufacturing unique materials." (p. 14)

NNSA Initiatives for Nuclear Weapons Programs

"As a result of the NPR, NNSA will undertake several initiatives...

Advanced Concepts Initiative:...There are several nuclear weapon options that might provide important advantages for enhancing the nation's deterrence posture: possible modifications to existing weapons to provide additional yield flexibility in the stockpile; improved earth penetrating weapons (EPWs) to counter the increased use by potential adversaries of hardened and deeply buried facilities; and warheads that reduce collateral damage. (p. 34-35)

"To further assess these and other nuclear weapons options in connection with meeting new or emerging military requirements, the NNSA will reestablish advanced warhead concepts teams at each of the national laboratories and at headquarters in Washington. This will provide unique opportunities to train our next generation of weapon designers and engineers. DoD and NNSA will also jointly review potential programs to provide nuclear capabilities, and identify opportunities for further study, including assessments of whether nuclear testing would be required to field such warheads." (p. 35)

"The [Feb. 2001 Foster] Panel recommendation that DOE/NNSA assess the feasibility and cost of reducing the time [to resume testing] to 'well below the Congressionally-mandated one year' (sense of the Congress as expressed in the 1996 Resolution of Ratification for the START II Treaty) was addressed as part of the NPR." (p. 35)

"Test Readiness is maintained principally by the participation of nuclear test program personnel in an active program of stockpile stewardship experiments carried out underground at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). There are two concerns about the current test readiness program."

"First, ... the current 2-3 year test readiness posture will not be sustainable as more and more experienced test personnel retire. Not all of the techniques and processes required to carry out underground nuclear tests - including nuclear diagnostic instrumentation, containment, design and emplacement of diagnostic equipment in a vertical shaft, drillback and radiochemical analysis are exercised with the subcritical experimentation work carried out at the NTS. As experienced personnel retire, it will become more difficult to train new people in these techniques, further degrading test

readiness. This argues for an approach in which all key capabilities required to conduct underground nuclear tests are identified and exercised on projects making use of a variety of nuclear testing related skills." (p. 35-36)

"Second, the 2-3 year posture may be too long to address any serious defect that might be discovered in the future."

"Given the certainty of surprise in the future and the broad spectrum of threats, the United States also must have the capability to understand the technological implications of nuclear weapon concepts and countermeasures tested by other states, to ensure that U.S. weapons and delivery platforms (including advanced conventional strike systems) perform effectively. If necessary, this will enable the United States to initiate research into whether it needs to develop an entirely new capability - one that is not a modification of an existing weapon - in time to address the threat." (p. 36)

"To address these concerns... NNSA proposes over the next three years to enhance test readiness by: augmenting key personnel and increasing their operational proficiency; beginning the mentoring of the next generation of testing personnel; conducting additional field experiments including additional subcritical experiments and test related exercises of appropriate fidelity; replacing key underground-test-unique components (e.g. Field Test Neutron Generators); modernizing certain test diagnostic capabilities; and decreasing the time required to show regulatory and safety compliance. DoD and NNSA will work to refine test scenarios and evaluate cost/benefit tradeoffs in order to determine, implement, and sustain the optimum test readiness time that best supports the New Triad." (p. 36)

Meeting Warhead Production Commitments to DoDA key capability that must be recovered is manufacture of plutonium pits. In addition to our efforts to establish a limited production capability at Los Alamos, NNSA will accelerate preliminary design work on a modern pit manufacturing facility so that new production capacity can be brought on line when it is needed." (p. 36)

People with Critical Skills

The DoD and NNSA will jointly support opportunities that provide end-to-end demonstration of integrated capabilities involved with warhead design, development, manufacturing, and warhead/weapon integration. A key objective is to exercise critical skills for adapting warheads to DoD weapon delivery systems; ...NNSA will include the following as goals for the new Advanced Concepts Initiative:

- Transfer of warhead design knowledge from the current generation of designers to the next generation
- Exercise of DoD/NNSA program integration skills.

Nuclear Force Sustainment and Modernization

"No plans to phase-out [dual-capable] F-15E; Phase-out F-16 once dual-capable JSF is deployed."

[Concerning ICBMs] "The focus of the Department's efforts are to extend the life of the MM III weapons system until 2020 while beginning the requirements process for the next-generation ICBM"

A comprehensive set of sustainment programs are planned or underway:

- Guidance Replacement Program (GRP)
- Propulsion Replacement Program (PRP)
- Propulsion System Rocket Engine (PSRE) life extension program ("replaces aging components in the post-boost vehicle")
- Rapid Execution and Combat Targeting (REACT) service life extension program
- Environmental Control System (ECS)
- Safety Enhanced Reentry Vehicle (SERV) program.

"The SERV program reconfigures the MM III ICBM to carry the Mk21 reentry vehicle which is currently deployed on Peacekeeper missiles." (p. 41)

"Peacekeeper deactivation will occur over a 36-month period [beginning in FY03] with missiles remaining on alert and fully mission capable throughout the deactivation period. ...The Department analyzed the role of the Peacekeeper against projected threats in the post-Cold War environment and

judged that its retirement would not have an adverse effect on the sufficiency of U.S. nuclear forces. DoD plans to retain the booster stages for potential future uses such as space launch or target vehicles." (p. 41)

"Follow on ICBM: The Air Force Systems Command (AFSPC) led the Ballistic Missile Requirements (BMR) Study (1998 to 2000) which documented a number of needs beyond the current baseline ICBM mission, such as extended range, trajectory shaping, strategic relocatable targets, and hardened deeply buried targets, that the next generation ICBM could address. The Land Based Strategic Nuclear Deterrence Mission Needs Statement (MNS) drew from the analysis done in the BMR study in documenting the need for ICBMs beyond 2020. To expand on the MNS and address alternatives for the follow on ICBM, AFSPC plans to conduct an analysis of alternatives in FY04 and FY05 with an IOC by 2018. This work will ensure the requirements generation process and the acquisition process remain on track for the future ICBM force." (p. 41)

"Trident SSBN: ...The Administration intends to convert four SSBNs from the current force of 18 submarines to carry special operations forces as well as conventional cruise missiles. Achieving this force structure also requires converting four of the eight Trident I (C-4) SSBNs to carry the Trident D-5 missile. The Navy has extended the Trident hull life to 44 years. This in turn will require the DoD to extend the service life of the D-5 SWS [Strategic Weapons System] as well. The first of the 14 Trident SSBNs remaining in service will be retired in 2029." (p. 42)

"Trident II SLBM: ... DoD will fund the D-5 Life Extension Program, which continues production of D-5 missiles, and upgrades the guidance and missile electronics systems on existing missiles. The continued production of additional D-5 missiles is needed in order to prevent a shortage of missiles in the next decade." (p. 42)

"Follow-on SSBN: ... DoD assumes the continued requirement for a sea-based strategic nuclear force. Therefore, the timeframe when the next generation SSBN will need to be deployed is about 2029 when the first of the remaining operational Trident SSBNs is planned to be retired. The Navy is currently studying two options for future follow-on SSBNs: (1) a variant of Virginia-class nuclear attack submarines (SSN); and (2) a dedicated SSBN (either a new design or a derivative of the Trident SSBN) ... If the decision is made to develop a new dedicated SSBN, a program would have to be initiated around 2016 to ensure that a new platform is available in 2029." (p. 42)

"Follow-on SLBM. A new SLBM would be needed in about 2029 to match the schedule for a follow-on SSBN. The Navy has begun studies to examine range-payload requirements and missile size, but no specific plans for a follow-on SLBM at this point other than extending the service life of the Trident D-5." (p. 42)

"Common Missile. The Department of Defense does not plan to pursue a common ICBM/SLBM ballistic missile at this time. However, the Air Force and Navy are currently cooperating in research and development on common technologies related to current and future ballistic missiles - the Guidance Applications Program (GAP), Reentry Systems Applications Program (RSAP), Propulsion Applications Program (PAP), and Technology for the Sustainment of Strategic Systems (TSSS) programs." (p. 42-43)

Heavy Bombers/Air Launched Cruise Missiles (p. 43)

Strategic Bombers. The Air Force plans to keep the current B-2 and B-52 fleet operational for another 35-40 years. An aggressive sustainment and modernization effort for both platforms is required to support this plan. In particular, upgrades to communications, avionics, processors, radar systems, displays, and navigation equipment are essential to keep the fleet affordable and operationally relevant throughout this period.

"Assured, worldwide, survivable two way connectivity between the National Command Authorities and the strategic bomber force is a fundamental element of strategic command and control. B-52s and B-2s must transition to Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellite communications in order to ensure continued Connectivity with National Command elements."

"Situational Awareness (SA) and electronic countermeasures (ECM) remain the highest priority B-52 upgrades. The inability to adapt to and counter threats, the high failure rate of SA and ECM equipment components, parts obsolescence, and a vanishing vendor base severely limit the B-52's

ability to operate in a combat environment. To that end, the Electronic Countermeasure Improvement, Situational Awareness Defense Improvement, and Low-Mid Band Jammer replacement programs are essential to ensuring the B-52 remains a viable combat asset beyond 2006."

The B-52 also requires a highly reliable and accurate navigation system to conduct worldwide tasking and nuclear weapons deliveries. The Inertial Navigation system (INS) represents the heart of the B-52 navigation suite but is reaching the end of service life and is increasingly cost-prohibitive to support. The Avionics Mid-Life Improvement program addresses this issue by replacing the INS and other obsolete B-52 avionics components required for precision navigation and weapons delivery."

Several upgrades are currently underway on the B-2. These upgrades include AHFM (Alternate High Frequency Material) which improves the ability to maintain the low observable materials of the aircraft: UHF/SATCOM upgrade; JASSM upgrade; Mk-82 Smart Bomb Rack Assembly upgrade; and Link-16 upgrade.

"Air-Launched Weapons Systems. The Air Force recently determined that its current force of cruise missiles can be sustained until 2030." (p. 43)

"Follow-on Strategic Bombers" Based on current estimates, "a new bomber will need to be operational by approximately 2040. A need for additional or improved bomber capabilities could, however, move the 'need date' closer to the present... The Air Force recently funded a science and technology effort for the Long-Range Strike Aerospace Platform-X to further explore options." (p. 43-44)

"Follow-on Air Launched Weapon Systems. There are no plans at this time for a follow-on nuclear ALCM... However, conventional cruise missile programs (such as the Extended Range Cruise Missile) are planned that could support an accelerated timetable if necessary, but would have to be modified to carry nuclear warheads."

Dual-Capable Aircraft, DoD is considering options and their associated costs to either extend the life of the dual capable F-16C/Ds and F-15Es or make a block upgrade to the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) aircraft... The Operational Requirements Document for the JSF requires that initial design permit nuclear capability to be incorporated at a later date (after IOC, currently scheduled for 2012) at an affordable price."

"Dual-capable aircraft and nuclear weapons in support of NATO. DoD will not seek any change to the current posture in FY02 but will review both issues to assess whether any modifications to the current posture are appropriate to adapt to the changing threat environment. A plan is already underway to conduct a NATO review of U.S. and allied dual capable aircraft in Europe and to present recommendations to Ministers in summer of 2002. Dual capable aircraft and deployed weapons are important to the continued viability of NATO's nuclear deterrent strategy and any changes need to be discussed within the alliance." (p. 44)

Tankers The current fleet of KC-135s will be operational for the next 35-40 years. The aging fleet will begin a long phased retirement starting in 2013 and continuing until approximately 2040. The Air Force anticipates constant upgrades to avionics, displays, and navigation equipment over the coming years. However, the current KC-135 fleet is not equipped with a survivable communications capability, limiting its effectiveness in a stressed environment. The Air Force is evaluating a follow-on tanker in conjunction with a follow-on common airframe air lift and special missions platform. The service is also considering the lease or purchase of 100 off-the-shelf 767 tankers as an interim measure prior to the need to produce the KC-X replacement platform. In developing alternatives, consideration needs to be given to the possibility that aircraft will operate in a nuclear, biological and chemical weapons environment." (p. 44-45)

Robust Flight Testing, Aging, and Surveillance. Air Force and Navy nuclear systems require robust flight-testing programs to provide operationally representative data on weapon system performance and to predict weapon system reliability and accuracy... Currently, only the D-5 missile system fulfills the required annual flight tests." (p. 45)

"Nuclear Warhead Sustainment... The active stockpile quantities will be sufficient to arm the operationally deployed and responsive nuclear force, and provide sufficient logistics spares. The inactive stockpile will consist of warhead types in the active stockpile plus the W84 and B83 Mod 0, which have no active stockpile counterparts. The W62 warhead will be retired in FY09." (p. 45)

"The NNSA has initiated a program to energize design work on advanced concepts at the three design laboratories. This initiative will be focused on evolving DoD requirements." (p. 46)

Limitations in the Present Nuclear Force

"Today's nuclear arsenal continues to reflect its Cold War origin, characterized by moderate delivery accuracy, limited earth penetrator capability, high-yield warheads, silo and sea-based ballistic missiles with multiple independent reentry vehicles, and limited retargeting capability."

"New capabilities must be developed to defeat emerging threats such as hard and deeply buried targets (HDBT), to find and attack mobile and relocatable targets, to defeat chemical or biological agents, and to improve accuracy and limit collateral damage. Development of these capabilities, to include extensive research and timely fielding of new systems to address these challenges, are imperative to make the New Triad a reality."

Defeating Hard and Deeply Buried Targets

"More than 70 countries now use underground Facilities (UGFs) for military purposes. In June 1998, the Defense Science Board Task force on Underground Facilities that there are over 10,000 UGFs worldwide. Approximately 1,100 UGFs were known or suspected strategic (WMD, ballistic missile basing, leadership or top echelon command and control) sites. Updated estimates from DIA reveal this number has now grown to over 1,400. A majority of the strategic facilities are deep underground facilities. These facilities are generally the most difficult to defeat because of the depth of the facility and the uncertainty of the exact location. At present the United States lacks adequate means to deal with these strategic facilities. A detailed report on this issue was provided to the Congress recently (Report to Congress on the Defeat of Hard and Deeply Buried Targets, July 2001). (p. 46)

"To deny the enemy sanctuary in HDBTs requires timely identification and characterization of potential targets, realistic defeat alternatives, and accurate assessment of damage done by the attack. Achieving the desired level of capability requires the integration of Service and National systems into a robust, highly responsive system of systems capable of addressing the threat. Improved command and control and intelligence in support of the New Triad will be a key enabler to address this capability shortfall." (p. 47)

"In general, current conventional weapons can only 'deny' or 'disrupt' the functioning of HDBTs and require highly accurate intelligence and precise weapon delivery - a degree of accuracy and precision frequently missing under actual combat conditions. Similarly, current conventional weapons are not effective for the long term physical destruction of deep, underground facilities. (p. 47)

"The United States currently has a very limited ground penetration capability with its only earth penetrating nuclear weapon, the B61 Mod 11 gravity bomb. This single-yield, non-precision weapon cannot survive penetration into many types of terrain in which hardened underground facilities are located. Given these limitations, the targeting of a number of hardened, underground facilities is limited to an attack against surface features, which does not provide a high probability of defeat of these important targets." (p. 47)

"With a more effective earth penetrator, many buried targets could be attacked using a weapon with a much lower yield than would be required with a surface burst weapon. This lower yield would achieve the same damage while producing less fallout (by a factor of ten to twenty) than would the much larger yield surface burst. For defeat of very deep or larger underground facilities, penetrating weapons with large yields would be needed to collapse the facility." (p. 47)

"To defeat HDBT it is necessary to improve significantly U.S. means to locate, identify, characterize, and target HDBTs. This objective also requires deliberate pre-planned and practiced missions and the development and procurement of several types of conventional earth penetrating munitions. A number of Special Operations Forces and information capabilities will need to be developed to support this goal. Investment and organization will yield a new level of capability for the stated objectives by 2007, with new technologies deployed by 2012. One effort to improve the U.S. capability against HDBTs is a joint DoD/DOE phase 6.2/6.2A Study to be started in April 2002. This effort will identify whether an existing warhead in a 5,000 pound class penetrator would provide significantly enhanced earth penetration capabilities compared to the B61 Mod 11." (p. 47)

Mobile and Relocatable Targets

"One of the greatest challenges today is accounting for the location uncertainty of mobile and relocatable targets... To respond to this challenge, collection systems and techniques that defeat adversary relocation capabilities must be developed. Sensors must also be capable of defeating camouflage and concealment efforts and detecting and exploiting new command and control systems."

"To locate successfully and maintain track on mobile targets until a weapon can be planned and executed, several enhancements need to be made to the current collection capability. Today's satellite constellation is not optimized for the current and developing mobile target challenge. Planned improvements to this constellation would provide the capability to rapidly and accurately locate and track mobile targets from the time they deploy from garrison until they return. Sensors with rapid revisit or dwell capability over deployment areas combined with automated exploitation sides are required to provide this capability." (p. 47-48)

Defeat of Chemical and Biological Agents

DoD and DOE efforts are underway to counter the asymmetric use of chemical and biological weapons (referred to as *agent defeat*). Agent Defeat Weapon (ADW) concepts are being evaluated to deny access to, immobilize, neutralize, or destroy chemical or biological weapons. Overcoming uncertainties in intelligence regarding agent production and storage locations as well as physical geometries of known facilities and contents appear to be the largest challenges. A variety of ADW concepts are currently under study, including thermal, chemical, or radiological neutralization of chemical/biological materials in production or storage facilities, as well as several types of kinetic penetrators to immobilize or deny use of those materials." (p. 48)

Improved Accuracy for Effectiveness and Reduced Collateral Damage

"Desired capabilities for nuclear weapons systems in flexible, adaptable strike plans include options for variable and reduced yields, high accuracy, and timely employment. These capabilities would help deter enemy use of WMD or limit collateral damage, should the United States have to defeat enemy WMD capabilities." (p. 48)

Nuclear Force Modernization

"The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has initiated a *Strategic Deterrent Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment* to characterize the requirements for nuclear weapon systems in the 2020 timeframe. The assessment is to be complete in early FY03." (p. 48)

"DoD, in coordination with the NNSA, will evaluate nuclear weapon options to increase weapon system effectiveness and flexibility and to limit collateral damage. Capability improvements are likely to be needed to correct the limitations of the existing nuclear forces." (p. 49)

V. NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS AND IMPLEMENTATIONS FOR ARMS CONTROL

Initial Reductions

"When these reductions [i.e. retire 50 Peacekeepers, remove 4 Trident SSBNs, and convert B-1's to solely conventional role] are complete in FY06, the number of U.S. operationally deployed strategic warheads will be reduced by about 1,300 warheads accountable under the START I Treaty (based on attribution rules at the time these decisions were made). The four Trident submarines that will be removed from service will remain accountable under the START I Treaty." (p. 51)

"The Department analyzed the role of the Peacekeeper against projected threats in the post Cold War environment and judged that its retirement would not have an adverse effect on the sufficiency of U.S. nuclear forces... Funding has been programmed, beginning in FY03, to retire these weapons in a phased approach to coincide with the Trident D-5 transition to the Pacific fleet and to retain and maintain the silos for future options. These silos, and the four Trident submarines converted to SSGNs, will remain accountable under the START I Treaty."

"Additional strategic nuclear reduction will be achieved by lowering the number of warheads assigned to the operationally deployed force. By the end of FY07, U.S. operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads should total no more than 3,800. The drawdown of the operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads will preserve force structure in that, aside from the Peacekeeper ICBM and the four Trident SSBNs, no additional strategic delivery platforms are scheduled to be eliminated from strategic service. These reductions are to be completed between FY03 and FY07, and will result in approximately a 40% reduction in number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads from the present."

Longer Term Reductions

"With regard to additional reductions beyond FY07, the United States plans to decrease the number of warheads on its ballistic missile force by "downloading." Regarding bombers, reductions will be made by lowering the number of operationally deployed weapons, i.e. those available for loading at operational bomber bases."

"Warheads that will count as operationally deployed are: for ballistic missiles, the actual number of nuclear weapons loaded on the ICBMs or SLBMs; for bombers, those nuclear weapons located in weapon storage areas at bomber bases (except for a small number of spares)."

START II Treaty

"...the Russian resolution of ratification, adopted in 2000, contains unacceptable provision contrary to the new strategic framework and establishment of the New Triad."

De-Alerting

"U.S. forces are not on "hair trigger" alert and rigorous safeguards exist to ensure the highest levels of nuclear weapons safety, security, reliability, and command and control. Multiple, stringent procedural and technical safeguards are in place to guard against U.S. accidental and unauthorized launch."

"The New Triad addresses concerns about the accidental or unauthorized launch of certain foreign forces. For example, it provides missile defenses to protect the United States, its allies, and friends against limited or unauthorized launches. It also will provide a spectrum of defensive and non-nuclear response options to an accidental or unauthorized launch, allowing the United States to tailor an appropriate response to the specific event and to limit the danger of escalation."

"The elimination of the Peacekeeper ICBM will be phased to correspond with the introduction of the Trident II (D-5) missile in the Pacific. As they are eliminated, those Peacekeeper missiles remaining during the elimination process will be kept on alert to provide a necessary contribution to the U.S. portfolio of capabilities." (p. 54)

"Following the initial phase of U.S. nuclear reductions, subsequent reductions will be achieved by downloading warheads from missiles and bombers. Force structure will be retained as the basis for reconstructing the responsive force. Delivery systems will not be retired following initial reductions and downloaded warheads will be retained as needed for the responsive force." (p. 54)

The Comprehensive Test Ban

"The United States has not conducted nuclear tests since 1992 and supports the continued observance of the testing moratorium. While the United States is making every effort to maintain the stockpile without additional nuclear testing, this may not be possible for the indefinite future. Some problems in the stockpile due to aging and manufacturing defects have already been identified. Increasingly, objective judgments about capability in a non-testing environment will become far more difficult. Each year the DoD and DOE will reassess the need to resume nuclear testing and will make recommendations to the President. Nuclear nations have a responsibility to assure the safety and reliability of their own nuclear weapons." (p. 55)

Transparency

"The START I Treaty includes provisions that provide a useful baseline of transparency for offensive strategic forces. Any additional transparency that may be useful to provide added confidence and predictability would be in the form of separate political commitments."

Verklaringen en nieuwsberichten

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Working Toward A Global Missile Defense Network

By James T. Hackett

5 May 2002

Fifteen months after taking office, President Bush's vision of defending this country and its friends and allies against ballistic missiles is coming into focus. Emerging is a plan for an integrated worldwide missile defense with multiple layers, similar to what his father had under development a decade ago, but far more advanced.

Freed from the constraints of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, Bush can take full advantage of rapid technological advances to build a global missile defense network. Advances in high-speed computers, satellite-based sensors, miniaturization, laser weapons, and satellite communications are making it possible to spot and track missiles launched anywhere on earth, and intercept them with a variety of new technologies. These advances, combined with his withdrawal from the ABM treaty, allow Bush to do what his father could not: create a worldwide missile defense internet with layers of sensors and interceptors linked by modern communications to detect and stop missiles of all ranges in all phases of flight.

The Pentagon's Missile Defense Agency, in cooperation with the aerospace industry, is developing the overarching missile defense architecture even as work moves ahead on key components. National industry teams led by Boeing and Lockheed Martin, the world's pre-eminent aerospace companies, are developing plans for the architecture.

Without the restrictions of the ABM treaty, which will be gone on June 13, both the Pentagon and industry are seeking the best and most cost-effective ways to defend against today's most dangerous weapons. The Bush administration has divided the missile defense program into three segments: boost phase, midcourse defense, and terminal defense.

Top priority today is to finish the land-based midcourse defense long in development and closest to completion. Contracts are being awarded to build silos at Fort Greely, Alas., for five prototype missile interceptors, together with their battle management, command-and-control and communications facilities.

Existing early warning radars will be upgraded and new radars will be put in place. The plan to put an X-band radar on Shemya in the Aleutian Islands may be changed to put it at sea. The end of the ABM treaty frees the Pentagon to consider sea-basing the X-band radars that are crucial to effective missile defenses, giving them a useful mobility. The Alaskan facility is to be operational in just two years, by October 2004.

These initial interceptors will be test models, but they could defend the nation in an emergency. If they prove as effective as flight tests indicate (four intercepts in six attempts), 100 or more may be deployed in Alaska, and possibly others elsewhere.

The midcourse segment also includes what used to be the Navy Theater Wide program to develop missile interceptors that can be launched from Aegis cruisers and destroyers. These will provide defenses for U.S. fleets, overseas bases and allies. But faster ship-based interceptors, linked with space-based sensors and upgraded Aegis radars, could give sea-based missile defenses a greater capability against longer-range missiles as well.

The easiest way to destroy a missile is in its boost phase, when its rocket engine is producing a hot fiery plume and it is moving very slowly. But it is also the most difficult. A slow-moving target is easy to hit, but the boost phase lasts only a few minutes and the interceptor must be very close and very fast.

Because of these difficulties, boost-phase technologies are not imminent. Closest to being operational is the airborne laser, carried in a Boeing 747 jumbo jet, which is expected to be flight-tested in 2004 and could be in service a few years later. It would be most effective against short-and medium-range missiles, not long-range ICBMs that would require it to fly deep into heavily defended enemy territory.

Other boost-phase systems that can move forward now that the ABM treaty no longer blocks their development include space-based lasers and kinetic energy interceptors. Technical difficulties put a space-based laser years, if not decades, away, but space-based kinetic energy interceptors using existing technologies could be developed more quickly. The Missile Defense Agency asked industry for ideas for space-based interceptors and is considering more than 50 proposals.

Over the years, a great deal of work has been done on terminal defense, including development of the Patriot PAC-2 used against Iraqi Scuds in Desert Storm. Terminal defense interceptors stop incoming missiles near the end of their flight. The only new interceptors currently being deployed are terminal defenses: the Israeli Arrow being fielded in Israel and the U.S. Patriot PAC-3, a brand new missile with a hit-to-kill warhead that represents a major improvement over those of Desert Storm. Now in production, PAC-3 is in operational testing by Army field units. With 11 intercepts in 13 attempts, PAC-3 is the most successful missile interceptor in the world today.

The Navy's plan for a short-range Patriot-type shipboard missile interceptor was set back when the program was canceled last year because of technical problems and cost overruns. The Pentagon now is studying options for a revised program, including the possibility of a ship-based version of PAC-3.

The PAC-3 interceptor also is the key component in the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS), being developed jointly with Italy and Germany as the replacement for the 1970s era Patriots deployed with the U.S. Army and in NATO. MEADS will be much more capable, maneuverable and deployable, and will defend a larger area, than the existing Patriots. It will go with maneuvering military forces, protecting them against aircraft and cruise missiles, as well as ballistic missiles.

A longer-range terminal defense, the Army's Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), will reach higher and farther to stop faster medium-range missiles well away from their intended targets. THAAD has been under development for years. After several missed intercepts, it hit two in a row and then was re-designed to improve reliability and performance. Flight-testing of the new version is to begin in two years. It could provide an emergency capability as early as 2005. The end of the ABM treaty means THAAD can be upgraded to provide a terminal defense against even intercontinental-range missiles.

The rapid advance of communications technology means all these interceptors and their land-and sea-based radars, wherever they are in the world, can be linked with the planned new space-based sensors known as SBIRS-High and SBIRS-Low, which the Pentagon hopes to begin launching later in the decade. Everything will be inter-netted by satellite-based laser communications with unlimited bandwidth, to produce the first truly worldwide missile defense.

The initial architecture now under development will be revised as components are modified and systems mature. Like other weapon systems, the missile defense network will be improved with block upgrades as the threat evolves and the technology develops. The end of the ABM Treaty, which has been a dead hand restraining missile defenses for three decades, now frees the government to build the best possible defense. When operational, this "system of systems" as the Pentagon calls it, could detect a missile launch anywhere on earth, track it and direct the nearest interceptors to take two shots at it. If both miss, another layer of interceptors would take two more shots. Such a global system of layered defenses would fulfill Bush's promise to defend America's friends and allies as well the American homeland.

Hackett was a national security official in the Nixon and Reagan administrations and now is a defense consultant based in San Diego.

The White House - Office of the Press Secretary

Remarks by the President upon Departure

May 13, 2002

The South Lawn

The President: Good morning.

The Press: Good morning.

The President: Today I'm pleased to announce that the United States and Russia have agreed to a treaty which will substantially reduce our nuclear arsenals to the agreed-upon range of 1,700 to 2,200 warheads. This treaty will liquidate the legacy of the Cold War.

When I sign the treaty with President Putin in Russia, it will begin the new era of U.S.-Russian relationships. And that's important. The new era will be a period of enhanced mutual security, economic security, and improved relations.

I look forward to going to Moscow to sign this treaty. It is -- it will be the culmination of a lot of months of hard work, and a relationship built on mutual trust that I established with President Putin in Slovenia.

This is good news for the American people today. It'll make the world more peaceful, and put behind us the Cold War once and for all.

Thank you all.

U.S. Department of State -Office of the Spokesman

Press Briefing on Board Plane En Route Gandar, Newfoundland

(Reykjavik, Iceland)

Secretary of State Colin L. Powell

Question: Mr. Secretary, there was an issue about storing or completely destroying warheads in the arsenal of the United States. How is that being solved in the treaty right now?

Secretary Powell: The question is, what do you do with warheads that are no longer deployed? When a warhead is -- there are many, many more warheads in the inventories of both countries than we need. Removing these from the inventory through disabling, destruction, and then finally breaking it into its final components, then disposing of the components, is a time-consuming, expensive process, and you can only do so many of them a year.

Both we and the Russians are constrained by our capacity to get rid of these. As warheads come off their launchers, as we go down and there are no longer a requirement for those warheads, they will initially be sent into storage. Some will be kept as spares or for test purposes, others will be disassembled on the way to destruction, and those judgments will be made by the two sides as they go forward.

We want to help the Russians, and you know the Nunn-Lugar program and similar cooperative threat reduction programs are intended to help the Russians get rid of this kind of capability. And I think the same philosophy applies to us. Let's not hang onto anything that we no longer need. But you do have to keep some spares. You do have to protect yourself against a technical problem that might come up in your fleet of warheads. And otherwise, I will leave it up to the Pentagon to describe how they do that, and of course it's a very sensitive and highly classified matter.

But the treaty, this new treaty, does not tell either side what they have to do with those warheads, other than they will no longer be on the launch points above 2,200. And the number is not necessarily 2,200. Each side will have to make a judgment of what number they want to settle on in that range between 1,700 and 2,200. And they have ten years. The length of the treaty is ten years. They have ten years to make this judgment.

New York Times

Treaty Offers Pentagon New Flexibility

By Michael R. Gordon

May 14, 2002

WASHINGTON, May 13 — There is a reason the nuclear arms treaty President Bush plans to sign at the coming Moscow summit meeting is only three pages long. It is intended to provide maximum flexibility to the Pentagon.

The new accord does not require the destruction of a single missile launcher or warhead. Each side can carry out the reductions at its own pace, or even reverse them and temporarily build up its forces.

The only real constraint is that each side must have no more than 1,700 to 2,200 warheads at the end of 2012. At that point, the treaty is set to expire, leaving each side free to have as many weapons as it would like unless the accord is extended.

"What we have now agreed to do under the treaty is what we wanted to do anyway," a senior administration official said today. "That's our kind of treaty."

In other words, it is a fitting agreement for Pentagon planners who are more concerned about protecting the United States' nuclear options than constraining those of the Russians. It marks a break with traditional approaches to arms control.

While arms control can be a highly technical enterprise, the logic of the Bush administration's new approach to nuclear weapons treaties is fairly simple. Throughout the cold war, the United States saw arms control as a way to contain the Soviet nuclear threat and constrain Moscow's ability to carry out a first strike.

The Pentagon's big worry was that the Soviet Union would outpace the United States in an arms race in which each side rushed to deploy new missiles and warheads. American defense officials were especially anxious about the Soviets' heavy SS-18 land-based missile, which carries 10 warheads and was code-named Satan by NATO planners.

That ability gave Washington an enormous stake in arms agreements that had strict provisions mandating weapons cuts and that forced the Russians to give up their most threatening weapons. Negotiating a ban on land-based missiles with multiple warheads like the SS-18 was a top priority for the first Bush administration.

With the end of the cold war and the collapse of the Soviet military, however, the Pentagon has a very different set of priorities. The Pentagon is counting on Russia's beleaguered economy to force a contraction in the Russian nuclear arsenal. Its primary goal now is not to constrain the Russian nuclear force but to maintain its own flexibility in planning the American one.

The Pentagon's new philosophy was spelled out in its classified Nuclear Posture Review. That study called for reducing the United States arsenal to the level of 1,700 to 2,200 — precisely the limit that the new treaty says the two sides must reach by the end of 2012. According to the study, the planned force will consist of 14 Trident missile-carrying submarines, 500 Minuteman III land-based missiles, 76 B-52H bombers and 21 B-2 bombers.

Even that force, the Pentagon says, may not be sufficient given an uncertain world or what the Pentagon prefers to call "potential contingencies." If relations with Russia or China worsen, administration officials say, the United States may need to expand its nuclear arsenal quickly.

President Bush may talk about building relations with a new Russia that is no longer an adversary, but the agreement he plans to sign is intended to keep open Washington's option to expand its nuclear arsenal if relations with Moscow sour.

Under the agreement, for example, the Pentagon expects to reduce its arsenal gradually so that it shrinks the strategic nuclear force from around 6,000 warheads today to 1,700 to 2,200 at the end of 2012, a significant cut. But if tensions rose with Moscow or China, the United States could suspend the reductions for a few years or even increase the arsenal without violating the treaty.

"In the event that U.S. relations with Russia significantly worsen in the future, the U.S. may need to revise its nuclear force level and posture," the Pentagon said in its nuclear review.

The United States is under no obligation to extend the treaty when it lapses after 10 years. The

agreement also contains an escape hatch: each side can withdraw on three months' notice. That is half the amount of time required to withdraw from the Antiballistic Missile Treaty of 1972.

Nor is there any link in the treaty to the issue of missile defenses, as Moscow once insisted.

To obtain such a degree of flexibility, the Bush administration had to make concessions. The accord will be legally binding, as the Russians have insisted. Bush administration hard-liners initially resisted doing even that, but Russia wanted a binding accord to make the nuclear balance more predictable and put some limits on the Americans.

"The Russians got a treaty, and the U.S. got its flexibility," said Ivo Daalder, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. "The U.S. can go down when it wants to, and it can go back up when it needs to. That is what Bush set out to accomplish in his new nuclear policy."

Because the Bush administration insisted on maximum flexibility in planning its arsenal, it also had to allow Moscow the freedom to plan its strategic forces. As a result, the Russians will be free to deploy new land-based missiles with multiple warheads, such as the three-warhead version of the SS-27, and to keep old ones like the SS-18.

The ban on land-based missiles with multiple warheads, which President Bush's father so actively promoted as a way to eliminate the most destabilizing weapons, has essentially been cast aside.

It is cheaper to put several warheads on a missile than to build a missile for each warhead. So this gives Moscow a cost-effective way to maintain its nuclear arsenal — or expand it should the United States field an effective missile defense.

That point has not been lost on some of the skeptics. Mr. Daalder observed, "Maximum flexibility is a two-way street."

Washington Times

Putin Hit At Home Over Treaty

By David R. Sands, The Washington Times
15 May 2002

Russian President Vladimir Putin, already under pressure at home for conceding too much to the United States in recent months, faced renewed criticism yesterday following the news of Monday's landmark deal to cut U.S. and Russian offensive nuclear weapons stocks.

The deal was not even mentioned in the leading Russian military newspaper yesterday, and several nationalist lawmakers said Mr. Putin had given up too much in his desire to strike a deal in time for next week's summit with President Bush in Moscow.

U.S. negotiators said the Kremlin dropped its previous insistence that the United States destroy the thousands of missiles to be taken out of service in the agreement. The Pentagon would like to store many of those missiles, and the four-page accord approved Monday allows the United States to do that. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said the Russian government would continue to press for the destruction of the missiles, but Moscow critics said that did not go far enough.

State Duma lawmaker Alexei Mitrofanov, a leading critic of Mr. Putin's pro-Western tilt since September 11, accused the Kremlin of "doing a favor to the United States."

"They form a shield, and we break our sword. We must reserve the right to have as many missiles as possible so that we could deploy them under every tree," he told reporters in Moscow.

While not threatening Mr. Putin's dominant political position at home, many among Russia's foreign policy and security elites have been openly unhappy with what they see as series of concessions to the West, and to Washington in particular, in recent months.

Mr. Putin reacted mildly when Mr. Bush announced a decision to pull out of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty last year and has also expressed only muted unhappiness with NATO's proposed expansion into Eastern Europe and the Baltics — long a sore point for Moscow.

The U.S.-led war on terrorism has also seen American troops deployed to areas long seen in Moscow as part of Russia's natural sphere of influence, including Central Asia and Georgia.

Mr. Putin's critics at home contend he has gotten little in return for his concessions.

"Russia has conceded a lot," Leonid Ivashov, vice president of the Moscow-based Geopolitical Studies

Academy, said this week, "but I don't see any positive response from the United States."

Hopes that a U.S. rapprochement would aid Russia's still-struggling economy have been damaged by a trade war over poultry and by Mr. Bush's decision to slap higher duties on imported steel a direct blow to Russian exporters heavily tilted toward heavy industry.

A study released last week by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies said Mr. Putin's overt support for the West in recent months carried "considerable political risks."

"Putin's policy continues to draw criticism within the security elites in Russia, partly because of the strengthened U.S. and Western military presence in Central Asia," the report noted. "While overall, Putin's audacious policies have paid off domestically and internationally, there remains a need for him to be able to demonstrate at home his gains abroad."

Making the World Safe for Nuclear Weapons

William D. Hartung, World Policy Institute

May 15, 2002

At first glance, the U.S.-Russian agreement to reduce deployed nuclear weapons by two-thirds over the next decade seems like good news. But upon closer inspection, President Bush's latest diplomatic "victory" is a dangerous, double-edged sword. Far from leaving the Cold War behind us, the new arms accord preserves the reality of "mutually assured destruction," even as it opens the door to what nuclear weapons analyst Richard Butler has described as a potential era of "unilateral assured destruction, American-style."

In expressing his support for the accord, Democratic Senator Joseph Lieberman of Connecticut inadvertently cited one of the major weaknesses of the proposed accord, noting that "both countries have enough nuclear weapons to destroy each other and most of the rest of the world, even after this agreement."

That's precisely the problem with the agreement: it doesn't go nearly far enough.

By holding fast to their capabilities for massive overkill, the United States and Russia are violating their pledge under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to make an "unequivocal undertaking" to eliminate their nuclear arsenals at the earliest possible date. This "do as I say, not as I do" approach to non-proliferation by the world's two largest nuclear powers will undermine the incentives for other nations to put aside their own efforts to develop these devastating weapons.

Looked at in the context of the Bush administration's bellicose Nuclear Posture Review, which endorses the development of new, more "usable" nuclear weapons while dramatically expanding the circumstances in which the Pentagon would consider "going nuclear" in a future conflict, the Bush-Putin accord represents a reorientation of the nuclear arms race, not a step toward nuclear disarmament.

By taking 10 years to make the proposed reductions, allowing both sides to keep thousands of their withdrawn warheads in "reserve" rather than destroying them, and giving either party the right to withdraw from the agreement on just 90 days notice, the Pentagon has preserved its ability to rapidly reverse the Bush administration's proposed reductions in the U.S. arsenal whenever it wants to, even as it continues to seek new types of nuclear weapons. Add to this the Pentagon's undiminished right under the accord to pursue a costly, multi-tiered missile defense system, and the outlines of a drive for unchallenged U.S. nuclear dominance become clear.

One clear sign that the new accord isn't a step toward disarmament is the fact that spending on the Pentagon's so-called "New Triad" -- composed of long-range strike systems, ballistic missile defenses, and a revitalized nuclear arms production complex -- is slated to increase by more than \$30 billion over the next five years.

No wonder weapons makers like Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and Bechtel are not complaining about the Bush-Putin agreement.

As one Bush administration official put it, "What we agreed to under the treaty is what we wanted to do anyway. That's our kind of treaty."

No doubt. But by failing to give anything up in pursuit of maximum "flexibility" for U.S. nuclear planners, President Bush is squandering a historic opportunity to obtain deep, permanent cuts in global nuclear arsenals.

Deeper, verifiable cuts on both sides -- to as low as 200 to 500 strategic warheads each rather than the 1,700 to 2,200 allowed in the current proposal -- would have given Washington and Moscow leverage to begin pressing nuclear-armed states like Britain, France, China, India, Pakistan and Israel (which is believed to have an undeclared arsenal of about 200 warheads) to eliminate their own arsenals. This move toward multilateral reductions would also make it much easier to get states with nuclear capabilities to agree not to aid nations like Iraq, Iran or North Korea to develop their own weapons of mass destruction.

Most importantly, at a time when the Bush administration claims that preventing global terrorism is its top priority, the new arms accord does nothing to reduce Russia's massive, poorly secured stockpiles of tactical nuclear weapons and nuclear materials.

In exchange for the U.S. "right" to keep weapons withdrawn from deployment on "active reserve," Russia is left to its own devices as to what to do with its own nuclear stockpile. But it is Russia's vast nuclear reserves -- not the modest nuclear programs of the so-called "axis of evil" states of Iraq, Iran and North Korea -- that pose the greatest danger of nuclear materials or a nuclear weapon falling into the hands of a terrorist group. It would have been well worth offering deeper reductions and limits on the administration's ill-considered missile defense program in exchange for an agreement to cooperate in destroying Russia's -- and America's -- excess nuclear weapons and materials as quickly as possible. Thankfully, the proposed Bush-Putin accord need not be the last word on nuclear arms reductions. The administration has agreed to keep talking to Moscow about the issue of destroying weapons that are withdrawn from deployment. And last week the Senate Armed Services Committee moved to slash missile defense spending by more than \$800 million and to eliminate funding for the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, a low-yield weapon designed to destroy underground bunkers. These small rays of hope need to be reinforced by a strong public outcry against the doctrine of "usable nukes" and "flexibility" in nuclear buildups, and in favor of concrete steps toward the elimination of nuclear weapons.

Once he had grasped the horrifying implications of ever having to actually use nuclear weapons, President Bush's political idol, Ronald Reagan, came to embrace the elimination of nuclear weapons as the goal of U.S. policy. But Reagan's nuclear awakening came in a radically different context. Pressed by a growing anti-nuclear movement and a reformist Soviet leader who wouldn't take no for an answer when it came to nuclear reductions, Reagan was forced to reconsider the unilateralist "peace through strength" credo that he had campaigned on.

As the 20th anniversary of the June 12, 1982 disarmament rally that brought one million people to Central Park approaches, President Bush needs to hear from the American public that his plan to make the world safe for nuclear weapons just isn't good enough. The only way to protect the American people, and the people of the world, from the threat of nuclear weapons is to take determined steps to get rid of them, once and for all.

We don't need to give our government -- or any government -- the "flexibility" to re-ignite the nuclear arms race at will.

William D. Hartung is a Senior Fellow at the World Policy Institute at the New School and the author of a forthcoming report on the role of the arms lobby in shaping the Bush nuclear doctrine (to be posted soon at www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms).

LA Times

Pro-West Putin Snubs His Public

Russia: Despite a Cold War chill at home, the president is banking on his efforts to secure Moscow's standing as a global leader.

By John Daniszewski
Times Staff Writer

16 May 2002

Moscow -- Ordinary Russians and much of the country's top military and political echelon regard the United States as an arrogant, aggressive power and remain deeply suspicious of NATO, an outlook shaped during the Cold War and little changed since, many analysts here say.

Yet President Vladimir V. Putin this week took two bold strokes designed to move his nation closer to the West. As he awaits the arrival of President Bush next week for a summit, Putin has agreed to a tighter relationship with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and to a two-thirds reduction in the two nations' offensive nuclear warheads.

What makes Putin pursue an aggressively pro-Western policy at a time when most of his people do not want anything of the kind? Political experts here say Putin is banking on the general disinterest toward the outside world now, as most Russians' priorities are fixed instead on domestic questions and their own pocketbooks. Putin hopes that his friendly overtures to the West will lead to concrete financial and strategic benefits that will rebuild Russia in the long run and firmly secure its place among the world's most powerful and respected states.

"His ratings among the Russians do not really depend that much on his foreign policies," observed Dmitri V. Trenin of the Carnegie Moscow Center think tank. "His popularity depends more on the skill of implementing economic reforms and making people's lives better."

It is true that some political opponents are trying to capitalize on Putin's alleged softness toward the West.

"An unprecedented surrender of Russia's national interests," Communist Party chief Gennady A. Zyuganov thundered Wednesday at a news conference here, referring to the arms control agreement.

Defense Minister Sergei B. Ivanov, anticipating the criticism, went out of his way to argue that Russia had not sacrificed its national interests in the accord, which is to be signed when Bush comes to Moscow. Ivanov called the pact "pragmatic and realistic."

But such attacks on Putin from the left, represented by the Communists, or from the right, including the many nationalistic-minded members of parliament, are not likely to reach a critical level for the popular president any time soon, said Ivan Safranchuk of Moscow's Center for Defense Information.

"I think Putin can parry these attacks quite easily," Safranchuk said, "in part by adopting some of the nationalists' own language."

According to Safranchuk, Putin's strategy will be to try not to draw too much attention domestically to his pro-Western steps. As long as the president moves quietly, the political cost of his actions will be minimal.

And the gains for Russia's standing in the world from Putin's policies could be immense.

"Russia has to prove to the international community why Russia is still important," Safranchuk said.

"Russia has to state why Russia is Russia, and not merely Cote d'Ivoire with weapons."

By drawing the U.S. into arms treaties and by proving that Russia can influence U.S. policies, he said, Moscow proves its weight in the world. Developing countries will get the following message about Russia: "If you have problems, call our toll-free international number," Safranchuk said.

Even more important, he said, is the message sent out to U.S. allies in Europe and elsewhere: "Look, we are now friends with the United States. That is why you have all rights to cooperate with us."

So for Putin, Safranchuk concluded, closer "Russian-U.S. relations are not the goal but the tool. It is an instrument of access to U.S. allies," with whom Russia hopes to wield influence and increase commerce.

Opposition From Elites

But Alexei G. Arbatov, a deputy from the liberal faction Yabloko in the Duma, or lower house of parliament, is not so sure that Putin will be able to maintain his pro-Western stance in the face of opposition from political elites.

Putin might pay a price in popularity for going so directly against the mood of anti-Western opinion, Arbatov said.

"Foreign policy is a subject of interest to a minority of the people and influenced by a minority," Arbatov said. "Putin's policies since Sept. 11 have created greater mistrust and counterpressure for change among this minority."

So far, Arbatov said, there is little reason to believe that the U.S. is going to reciprocate for Russia's moves toward the West. In the agreement this week to set up the new joint Russia-NATO council, for instance, it is still uncertain what questions will be referred to this body and whether it will just be a "talking shop" while important decisions are made elsewhere.

In the sphere of arms control, there is little clarity on how quickly the United States will pull warheads out of service and how many will be destroyed rather than simply stored. And Russian elites are still irked about the U.S. decision to pull out of the 1972 Antibalistic Missile Treaty and about plans to expand NATO this year by asking the former Soviet Baltic states to join.

Those Russians interested in foreign affairs "believe the West is not responding accordingly to all of Russia's efforts to cooperate," Arbatov said.

Suspicious of the West

The conclusion that Russians remain suspicious of the West was partly borne out Wednesday in a report by the Public Opinion Foundation, which surveyed 1,500 respondents from 100 locations nationwide about attitudes toward NATO. The poll found that 52% of respondents considered the alliance still a security threat to Russia, while only 24% did not.

But Trenin is among analysts who believe that Putin's position is so unassailable that he can weather any anti-Western backlash. "Since there is no real opposition to President Putin in Russia today," he said, "it is very unlikely that this criticism will mean anything."

Alexei V. Kuznetsov of The Times' Moscow Bureau contributed to this report.

Moscow Times

A Worthless Scrap of Paper

By Pavel Felgenhauer

16 May 2002

Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin have agreed to sign a treaty next week in Moscow to cut strategic nuclear weapons over 10 years from their present level of 5,000 to 6,000 warheads each to 2,200 to 1,700.

The proposed treaty is only three pages long, in sharp contrast to previous strategic arms control agreements like START I, signed in 1991, or START II, signed in 1993, that ran to hundreds of pages with appendices describing in detail verification of compliance procedures, timetables for decommissioning of specific weapons systems, precise definitions of the methods for counting warheads, etc.

A high-ranking Russian official who has access to the new draft treaty told me this week that most of the text consists of a long preamble that includes a declaration of good intent, assurances of friendship, speaks of peace on Earth and so on. The treaty per se is only half a page long (double spaced). It seems Bush this week read out the entire "treaty" to reporters virtually verbatim: "Russia and the U.S. will by 2012 have 2,200 to 1,700 warheads."

This treaty does not have any timetable for decommissioning, no definitions of what a warhead is or how to count them, no verification procedures -- no nothing. Russian sources say that Washington has supplied Moscow with some plans for future decommissioning of strategic weapons systems (e.g., 50 MX Peacemaker missiles with 10 warheads each are earmarked by the Pentagon for scrapping soon). But these decommissioning plans are not part of the new treaty and are in fact unilateral, nonbinding promises.

Washington has also vowed great openness and says it will allow the Russians full access to verify future cuts. But again the verification procedures are not stipulated in the treaty and depend only on future goodwill.

Legally speaking, in military arms control terms, the new treaty is nothing more than a worthless scrap of paper. Without any agreed procedure on how to count nuclear warheads, an entire nuclear

submarine with 20 ballistic missiles and the capability of carrying 400 nuclear devices may be counted as one "warhead" if most of its payload is temporarily stored on land.

The new treaty essentially allows Russia and the United States to cut or not as they please, to deploy new attack systems or to keep old ones. This is not arms control, but the end of arms control as it has been known for 30 years.

Of course, the new treaty will be condemned as a national sellout by many in the Russian elite. Last Sunday, Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, anticipating a wave of criticism, announced that the new treaty is only a brief outline and that some follow-ups may be negotiated. However, the possibility that Washington will continue traditional arms control negotiations is minute.

The new treaty is seen as a major victory for Washington and a defeat for the Kremlin, which wanted some substantial guarantees that planned U.S. missile defenses will not threaten Russia and that offensive nuclear cuts will be "irreversible" but got a worthless piece of paper. However, the treaty is assured of ratification in the State Duma, where Putin has a comfortable majority.

In fact some of Russia's military chiefs also support the accord. From 1997 to 2001, when Igor Sergeyev was defense minister, almost all procurement money was spent on strategic nuclear weapons. Since Sergeyev's ouster there has been a backlash against strategic nuclear weapons led by Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Kvashnin. The General Staff is planning to use the treaty to cut strategic missiles and spend its money on other projects. Strategic nuclear weapons are increasingly seen as senseless and unusable by many Russian generals. In 1999, despite strong objections from Russia, NATO bombed Yugoslavia and nuclear deterrence could not prevent it. The outcome would have been the same whether Russia had 1,500 warheads or 5,500.

The new treaty may actually turn out to be a "win" for both Moscow and Washington inasmuch as its signing signals that Russia has abandoned the cherished principle of nuclear parity with the United States -- the last vestige of former Soviet superpower status.

Now it is time the Kremlin stopped acting as a lame superpower in other fields by downsizing not only its nuclear arsenal by two-thirds but its entire military machine and reforming what's left into something more professional, so that Russia can begin to develop as a normal, civil state.

Pavel Felgenhauer is an independent defense analyst.

Russian Observer

New START Treaty Will Not Be Unalterable

17 May 2002

The new Russia-U.S. treaty on cuts in strategic offensive arms, which is expected to be signed during the Moscow visit by U.S. President George W. Bush, will be effective until December 31, 2012.

This document envisages a possibility of either its prolongation or replacement by another agreement, Strana.Ru writes, referring to a source in Russia's Foreign Ministry. The sides are supposed to continue work on extending confidence-building measures and increasing transparency in strategic arms reduction. It is envisaged in the treaty that a bilateral commission will be set up to plan new actions to promote transparency.

The Foreign Ministry source emphasized that the treaty would not be "an unalterable document" but will be "the first disarmament treaty" that Russia will sign with the Bush Administration. It will consolidate the provision that the START-1 treaty will remain effective, and control and inspections will be effected under the new treaty as well. The START-1 treaty will be in force till December 5, 2009, and it envisages a possibility of its prolongation.

BASIC Note, 22 May 2002

Bush-Putin Summit Fails to Bury the Cold War

By Ken Luongo and Ian Davis

The new nuclear arms reduction treaty to be signed by Presidents Bush and Putin is being hailed as the start of a new era in Russian-American relations. The willingness of each side to reduce its long-range nuclear warheads by two thirds in the next decade, to between 1,700 to 2,200, coupled with the imminent creation of a new NATO-Russia Council, prompted Jack Straw to note that we are witnessing “the funeral of the cold war”. But this characterization is deceptive, as the heart of the cold war nuclear danger is still beating.

At only three pages, the treaty is an important but minimalist document that significantly scales back oversized nuclear stockpiles but does not mandate permanent reductions. In keeping with the Bush administration’s desire to preserve maximum nuclear flexibility, the deal contains no requirement to destroy retired warheads, places no prohibition on missile defence systems, allows either side to return to any force level it desires after 10 years, and lets either side pull out with 90 days’ notice at any time. On the American side some of the weapons will be dismantled, but most will be placed in storage adding to an already bulging reserve stockpile.

While the danger of a nuclear exchange between Washington and Moscow may recede yet further, post Cold War security threats remain as real and pressing as ever. Top of the list of nuclear dangers is potential ‘leakage’ of fissile material from Russia’s vast and often ill-guarded nuclear weapons complex, which reportedly has enough nuclear material available for building another 40,000 nuclear weapons.

To accomplish the monumental objective of “liquidat[ing] the legacy of the cold war”, as President Bush asserted, far more attention and resources must be devoted to help Moscow keep control of its nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and technologies.

Another acute worry is the security of Russia’s arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons. Following the precedent set by the arms control negotiations of the Cold War the deal struck by Putin and Bush places no limitation on tactical nuclear weapons. Tactical or ‘substrategic’ nuclear weapons have smaller yields than strategic nuclear weapons and are designed for battlefield use. The United States has just over 1,000 of these weapons while Russia’s arsenal is not known but is believed to number between 4,000 and 12,000.

Concerns persist that the size, the lack of effective controls over their storage, and absence of a reliable inventory, make these weapons vulnerable to theft by terrorist or criminal groups. These fears have multiplied since September 11th with many analysts holding that one source of an Al-Qaeda nuclear bomb would be Russia’s arsenal of tactical nukes. A recent CIA report argued that, “The [Russian nuclear weapons] security system ... may not be sufficient to meet today’s challenge of a knowledgeable insider collaborating with a criminal or terrorist group.”

Resistance on the part of Moscow and Washington to limits on tactical nukes reflects a common feeling that these weapons still have a role to play in their respective military planning. The United States is seeking to assign new missions to its tactical arsenal, principally for use against “rogue states” who may be developing chemical and biological weapons (CBW). The US Department of Energy is currently seeking funding for a new low-yield nuclear weapon for use against underground bunkers and CBW facilities. This thinking was laid out in the recently released US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which calls for a smaller, but more flexible, US nuclear arsenal. Russia seems to be relying on these battlefield weapons more as strategic arsenals are reduced. So, while the overall number of warheads will be reduced in the short term, the missions of the remaining weapons may be expanded.

The Bush-Putin Summit offers an historic opportunity for the two presidents to further build on the post-cold war foundation of cooperative security between the United States and Russia. Sadly it seems that this opportunity will not be fully exploited this week. Given that the Russian arsenal is lying on Europe’s doorstep, Britain and the other EU Member States must now do more to assist with the improved security and safe disposal of these remaining nuclear weapons and materials. It would certainly be unwise to leave the job to Moscow and Washington alone.

Ken Luongo is Executive Director of the Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council (RANSAC) and Ian Davis is Director of BASIC.

The White House - Office of the Press Secretary

President Bush Thanks Germany for Support Against Terror

Remarks by the President to a Special Session of the German Bundestag
The Bundestag - Berlin, Germany
May 23, 2002

The President: [...] The expansion of NATO will also extend the security on this continent, especially for nations that knew little peace or security in the last century. We have moved cautiously in this direction. Now we must act decisively.

As our summit in Prague approaches, America is committed to NATO membership for all of Europe's democracies that are ready to share in the responsibilities that NATO brings. (Applause.) Every part of Europe should share in the security and success of this continent. A broader alliance will strengthen NATO -- it will fulfill NATO's promise.

Another mission we share is to encourage the Russian people to find their future in Europe, and with America. (Applause.) Russia has its best chance since 1917 to become a part of Europe's family. Russia's transformation is not finished; the outcome is not yet determined. But for all the problems and challenges, Russia is moving toward freedom -- more freedom in its politics and its markets; freedom that will help Russia to act as a great and a just power. A Russia at peace with its neighbors, respecting the legitimate rights of minorities, is welcome in Europe. (Applause.)

A new Russian-American partnership is being forged. Russia is lending crucial support in the war on global terror. A Russian colonel now works on the staff of U.S. Army General Tommy Franks, commander of the war in Afghanistan. And in Afghanistan, itself, Russia is helping to build hospitals and a better future for the Afghan people.

America and Europe must throw off old suspicions and realize our common interests with Russia. Tomorrow in Moscow, President Putin and I will again act upon these interests.

The United States and Russia are ridding ourselves of the last vestiges of cold War confrontation. (Applause.) We have moved beyond an ABM treaty that prevented us from defending our people and our friends. Some warned that moving beyond the ABM treaty would cause an arms race. Instead, President Putin and I are about to sign the most dramatic nuclear arms reduction in history. Both the United States and Russia will reduce our nuclear arsenals by about two-thirds -- to the lowest levels in decades. (Applause.)

Old arms agreements sought to manage hostility and maintain a balance of terror. This new agreement recognizes that Russia and the West are no longer enemies. (Applause.)

The entire transatlantic alliance is forming a new relationship with Russia. Next week in Rome, Chancellor Schroeder, NATO allies, and I will meet as equal partners with President Putin at the creation of the NATO-Russia Council. The Council gives us an opportunity to build common security against common threats. We will start with projects on nonproliferation, counterterrorism, and search-and-rescue operations. Over time, we will expand this cooperation, even as we preserve the core mission of NATO. Many generations have looked at Russia with alarm. Our generation can finally lift this shadow from Europe by embracing the friendship of a new democratic Russia. (Applause.)

As we expand our alliance, as we reach out to Russia, we must also look beyond Europe to gathering dangers and important responsibilities. As we build the house of freedom, we must meet the challenges of a larger world. And we must meet them together. [...]

CNN Live Today 10:00

Bush Wants Nuclear-Tipped Bunker Buster

May 23, 2002

Byline: Barbara Starr, Bill Hemmer

Bill Hemmer, CNN Anchor: As the president's, Bush and Putin, get ready to sign that historic arms reduction treaty, the Bush administration trying to increase one part of its nuclear stockpile: it wants to add a nuclear-tipped bunker buster. At the Pentagon, here's Barbara Starr.

Starr (voice-over): Underground caves and bunkers in Afghanistan shielded Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda fighters for years, until United States jets started attacking them with conventional bombs.

But no one knows how much was actually destroyed. Afghanistan is just one example of the many countries that have buried their most valuable military assets deeper than conventional weapons can reach.

Douglas Feith, Undersecretary of Defense: The special difficulties posed by deeply buried, hard targets is something that is very much at the fore of our minds.

Starr: United States intelligence estimates there are nearly 1,500 underground sites around the world hiding nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, missiles and command bunkers. The Bush administration's solution, modifying an existing aircraft launched nuclear bomb with new electronics and packaging so it can penetrate hundreds of feet of rock. But Congress is divided on funding the plan. Many believe it all amounts to a new nuclear weapon and could spark another arms race.

John Pike, Globalsecurity.org: If the United States embarks on new nuclear weapons programs, there's no way that the Russians are going to get left behind.

Starr: Critics say a modified nuclear bomb would still need to be tested, ending years of United States adherence to a test ban. The administration insists it is only improving an existing bomb.

Gen. John Gordon, Natl. Nuclear Security Admin.: We envision it as a straight modification of an existing system that's out there now, packaged in a way that could penetrate.

Starr: Physicists say a nuclear bunker buster would still generate fallout, and there are concerns that it would lower the threshold for using nuclear weapons rather than keeping them solely for deterrence.

Pike: There's no such thing as a small nuclear weapon. It's sort of like you go into a coffee shop now and it only comes in big, bigger and biggest.

Starr (on camera): Nuclear politics aside, it is physics that will limit the ability to destroy underground bunkers. Some enemy targets could be as much as 300 feet deep. One expert recently said no weapon can go that far, unless someone takes it down an elevator. Barbara Starr, CNN, the Pentagon.

The Times

Putin's 'love affair' with America turns sour at home

From Alice Lagnado in Moscow
23 May 2002

AS HE sweeps President Bush into the best seats in the Mariinsky Theatre in St Petersburg this weekend, President Putin will seem further away than ever from the millions of Russians who feel increasingly alienated by his policies.

While most Russians still have mixed emotions about their former Cold War enemy, the Russian leader is taking a highly risky gamble as he welcomes the American leader with open arms.

Two years ago even the hardliners were falling over themselves to praise Mr Putin. Lately however, Gennadi Zyuganov, the Communist Party leader, has wasted no opportunity in attacking the President's policies and his small band of supporters will be out in force to demonstrate against Mr Bush's visit, in Moscow and St Petersburg.

Yesterday Mr Zyuganov, echoing the belief of many more than the party he represents, said that he considered the expected signing of an arms treaty between the two countries to be a "betrayal of the nation" and that Mr Putin was trying to turn Russia "into a US satellite". Insiders say that only a handful of advisers and businessmen share Mr Putin's vision of the new Russia, while many senior ministers remain firmly off-message.

Even Sergei Ivanov, Russia's Defence Minister, appears to be unable to sing from the same hymn sheet. Mr Putin's plans of modernising the army have not materialised and grumblings about the American presence in Central Asia's former Soviet satellites have not been appeased.

Despite Mr Putin's attempts to present this week's planned arms agreement as a fair compromise, General Yuri Baluyevsky, a senior arms negotiator, again complained that the new deal was "unacceptable for Russia".

Many in the Duma, Russia's parliament, are also angered at what they see as Russian capitulation to the United States.

Typically, Mr Putin made no protest against the arrival of US military advisers in Georgia to train the army in fighting alleged terrorists on the border with Russia, despite a massive row in the Russian parliament.

For ordinary Russians, there is little to be pleased about. Water and heat shortages and salaries starting at \$15 (£10) a month remain a regular feature of life and further collapse of a poorly tended infrastructure will threaten Mr Putin's high ratings.

The Americans are treated with suspicion: a recent poll showed over half of Russians do not see the US as a "friendly state".

The White House – Office of the Press Secretary

Moscow - May 24, 2002

Text of Joint Declaration

The United States of America and the Russian Federation,

Recalling the accomplishments at the Ljubljana, Genoa, Shanghai, and Washington/Crawford Summits and the new spirit of cooperation already achieved;

Building on the November 13, 2001 Joint Statement on a New Relationship Between the United States and Russia, having embarked upon the path of new relations for the twenty-first century, and committed to developing a relationship based on friendship, cooperation, common values, trust, openness, and predictability;

Reaffirming our belief that new global challenges and threats require a qualitatively new foundation for our relationship;

Determined to work together, with other nations and with international organizations, to respond to these new challenges and threats, and thus contribute to a peaceful, prosperous, and free world and to strengthening strategic security;

Declare as follows:

A Foundation for Cooperation

We are achieving a new strategic relationship. The era in which the United States and Russia saw each other as an enemy or strategic threat has ended. We are partners and we will cooperate to advance stability, security, and economic integration, and to jointly counter global challenges and to help resolve regional conflicts.

To advance these objectives the United States and Russia will continue an intensive dialogue on pressing international and regional problems, both on a bilateral basis and in international fora, including in the UN Security Council, the G-8, and the OSCE. Where we have differences, we will work to resolve them in a spirit of mutual respect.

We will respect the essential values of democracy, human rights, free speech and free media, tolerance, the rule of law, and economic opportunity.

We recognize that the security, prosperity, and future hopes of our peoples rest on a benign security environment, the advancement of political and economic freedoms, and international cooperation.

The further development of U.S.-Russian relations and the strengthening of mutual understanding and trust will also rest on a growing network of ties between our societies and peoples. We will support growing economic interaction between the business communities of our two countries and people-to-people and cultural contacts and exchanges.

Political Cooperation

The United States and Russia are already acting as partners and friends in meeting the new challenges of the 21st century; affirming our Joint Statement of October 21, 2001, our countries are already allied in the global struggle against international terrorism.

The United States and Russia will continue to cooperate to support the Afghan people's efforts to transform Afghanistan into a stable, viable nation at peace with itself and its neighbors. Our cooperation, bilaterally and through the United Nations, the 'Six-Plus-Two' diplomatic process, and in other multilateral fora, has proved important to our success so far in ridding Afghanistan of the Taliban and al-Qaida.

In Central Asia and the South Caucasus, we recognize our common interest in promoting the stability, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of all the nations of this region. The United States and Russia reject the failed model of 'Great Power' rivalry that can only increase the potential for conflict in those regions. We will support economic and political development and respect for human rights while we broaden our humanitarian cooperation and cooperation on counterterrorism and counternarcotics.

The United States and Russia will cooperate to resolve regional conflicts, including those in Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh, and the Transnistrian issue in Moldova. We strongly encourage the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia to exhibit flexibility and a constructive approach to resolving the conflict concerning Nagorno-Karabakh. As two of the Co-Chairmen of the OSCE's Minsk Group, the United States and Russia stand ready to assist in these efforts.

On November 13, 2001, we pledged to work together to develop a new relationship between NATO and Russia that reflects the new strategic reality in the Euro-Atlantic region. We stressed that the members of NATO and Russia are increasingly allied against terrorism, regional instability, and other contemporary threats. We therefore welcome the inauguration at the May 28, 2002 NATO-Russia summit in Rome of a new NATO-Russia Council, whose members, acting in their national capacities and in a manner consistent with their respective collective commitments and obligations, will identify common approaches, take joint decisions, and bear equal responsibility, individually and jointly, for their implementation. In this context, they will observe in good faith their obligations under international law, including the UN Charter, provisions and principles contained in the Helsinki Final Act and the OSCE Charter for European Security. In the framework of the NATO-Russia Council, NATO member states and Russia will work as equal partners in areas of common interest. They aim to stand together against common threats and risks to their security.

As co-sponsors of the Middle East peace process, the United States and Russia will continue to exert joint and parallel efforts, including in the framework of the "Quartet," to overcome the current crisis in the Middle East, to restart negotiations, and to encourage a negotiated settlement. In the Balkans, we will promote democracy, ethnic tolerance, self-sustaining peace, and long-term stability, based on respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the states in the region and United Nations Security Council resolutions. The United States and Russia will continue their constructive dialogue on Iraq and welcome the continuation of special bilateral discussions that opened the way for UN Security Council adoption of the Goods Review List.

Recalling our Joint Statement of November 13, 2001 on counternarcotics cooperation, we note that illegal drug trafficking poses a threat to our peoples and to international security, and represents a substantial source of financial support for international terrorism. We are committed to intensifying cooperation against this threat, which will bolster both the security and health of the citizens of our countries.

The United States and Russia remain committed to intensifying cooperation in the fight against transnational organized crime. In this regard, we welcome the entry into force of the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters on January 31, 2002.

Economic Cooperation

The United States and Russia believe that successful national development in the 21st century demands respect for the discipline and practices of the free market. As we stated on November 13, 2001, an open market economy, the freedom of economic choice, and an open democratic society are the most effective means to provide for the welfare of the citizens of our countries.

The United States and Russia will endeavor to make use of the potential of world trade to expand the economic ties between the two countries, and to further integrate Russia into the world economy as a leading participant, with full rights and responsibilities, consistent with the rule of law, in the world economic system. In this connection, the sides give high priority to Russia's accession to the World Trade Organization on standard terms.

Success in our bilateral economic and trade relations demands that we move beyond the limitations of the past. We stress the importance and desirability of graduating Russia from the emigration provisions of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974, also known as the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. We note that the Department of Commerce, based on its ongoing thorough and deliberative inquiry, expects to make its final decision no later than June 14, 2002 on whether Russia should be treated as a market economy under the provisions of U.S. trade law. The sides will take further practical steps to eliminate obstacles and barriers, including as appropriate in the legislative area, to strengthen economic cooperation.

We have established a new dynamic in our economic relations and between our business communities, aimed at advancing trade and investment opportunities while resolving disputes, where they occur, constructively and transparently.

The United States and Russia acknowledge the great potential for expanding bilateral trade and investment, which would bring significant benefits to both of our economies. Welcoming the recommendations of the Russian-American Business Dialogue, we are committed to working with the private sectors of our countries to realize the full potential of our economic interaction. We also welcome the opportunity to intensify cooperation in energy exploration and development, especially in oil and gas, including in the Caspian region.

Strengthening People-to-People Contacts

The greatest strength of our societies is the creative energy of our citizens. We welcome the dramatic expansion of contacts between Americans and Russians in the past ten years in many areas, including joint efforts to resolve common problems in education, health, the sciences, and environment, as well as through tourism, sister-city relationships, and other people-to-people contacts. We pledge to continue supporting these efforts, which help broaden and deepen good relations between our two countries.

Battling the scourge of HIV/AIDS and other deadly diseases, ending family violence, protecting the environment, and defending the rights of women are areas where U.S. and Russian institutions, and especially non-governmental organizations, can successfully expand their cooperation.

Preventing the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Non-Proliferation and International Terrorism

The United States and Russia will intensify joint efforts to confront the new global challenges of the twenty-first century, including combating the closely linked threats of international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. We believe that international terrorism represents a particular danger to international stability as shown once more by the tragic events of September 11, 2001. It is imperative that all nations of the world cooperate to combat this threat decisively. Toward this end, the United States and Russia reaffirm our commitment to work together bilaterally and multilaterally.

The United States and Russia recognize the profound importance of preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction and missiles. The specter that such weapons could fall into the hands of terrorists and those who support them illustrates the priority all nations must give to combating proliferation.

To that end, we will work closely together, including through cooperative programs, to ensure the security of weapons of mass destruction and missile technologies, information, expertise, and material. We will also continue cooperative threat reduction programs and expand efforts to reduce weapons-usable fissile material. In that regard, we will establish joint experts groups to investigate means of increasing the amount of weapons-usable fissile material to be eliminated, and to recommend collaborative research and development efforts on advanced, proliferation-resistant nuclear reactor and fuel cycle technologies. We also intend to intensify our cooperation concerning destruction of chemical weapons.

The United States and Russia will also seek broad international support for a strategy of proactive non-proliferation, including by implementing and bolstering the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the conventions on the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons. The United States and Russia call on all countries to strengthen and strictly enforce export controls, interdict illegal transfers, prosecute violators, and tighten border controls to prevent and protect against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Missile Defense, Further Strategic Offensive Reductions, New Consultative Mechanism on Strategic Security

The United States and Russia proceed from the Joint Statements by the President of the United States of America and the President of the Russian Federation on Strategic Issues of July 22, 2001 in Genoa and on a New Relationship Between the United States and Russia of November 13, 2001 in Washington.

The United States and Russia are taking steps to reflect, in the military field, the changed nature of the strategic relationship between them.

The United States and Russia acknowledge that today's security environment is fundamentally different than during the Cold War.

In this connection, the United States and Russia have agreed to implement a number of steps aimed at strengthening confidence and increasing transparency in the area of missile defense, including the exchange of information on missile defense programs and tests in this area, reciprocal visits to observe missile defense tests, and observation aimed at familiarization with missile defense systems. They also intend to take the steps necessary to bring a joint center for the exchange of data from early warning systems into operation.

The United States and Russia have also agreed to study possible areas for missile defense cooperation, including the expansion of joint exercises related to missile defense, and the exploration of potential programs for the joint research and development of missile defense technologies, bearing in mind the importance of the mutual protection of classified information and the safeguarding of intellectual property rights.

The United States and Russia will, within the framework of the NATO-Russia Council, explore opportunities for intensified practical cooperation on missile defense for Europe.

The United States and Russia declare their intention to carry out strategic offensive reductions to the lowest possible levels consistent with their national security requirements and alliance obligations, and reflecting the new nature of their strategic relations.

A major step in this direction is the conclusion of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions.

In this connection, both sides proceed on the basis that the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, remains in force in accordance with its terms and that its provisions will provide the foundation for providing confidence, transparency, and predictability in further strategic offensive reductions, along with other supplementary measures, including transparency measures, to be agreed.

The United States and Russia agree that a new strategic relationship between the two countries, based on the principles of mutual security, trust, openness, cooperation, and predictability requires substantive consultation across a broad range of international security issues. To that end we have decided to:

- establish a Consultative Group for Strategic Security to be chaired by Foreign Ministers and Defense Ministers with the participation of other senior officials. This group will be the principal mechanism through which the sides strengthen mutual confidence, expand transparency, share information and plans, and discuss strategic issues of mutual interest; and
- seek ways to expand and regularize contacts between our two countries' Defense Ministries and Foreign Ministries, and our intelligence agencies.

24 May 2002

Joint Statement on Counterterrorism Cooperation

Joint Statement by President George W. Bush and President Vladimir V. Putin on Counterterrorism Cooperation

Reaffirming our commitment expressed on October 21, 2001 to fight terrorism in all its forms wherever it may occur, we commend the efforts of the worldwide coalition against terrorism since the tragic events of September 11, 2001. The member nations of the coalition must continue their concerted action to deny safe haven to terrorists; to destroy their financial, logistical, communications, and other operational networks; and to bring terrorists to justice. We note with satisfaction that U.S.-Russia counterterrorism cooperation is making an important contribution to the global coalition against terrorism.

A successful campaign against terrorism must be conducted by nations through bilateral, regional, and multilateral cooperation, and requires a multifaceted approach that employs law enforcement, intelligence, diplomatic, political, and economic actions. We stress that initiatives against terrorism must be conducted in an atmosphere of rule of law and with respect for universal human rights.

Recognizing the importance of multilateral counterterrorism efforts, such as those under the auspices of the United Nations, the Group of Eight, the European Union, the OSCE, the "Six Plus Two" group, and NATO-Russia, we encourage the further development of regional counterterrorism initiatives, including within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and its cooperation with the United States, that improve information-sharing, law enforcement cooperation, and border security. Of these institutions, we note that the UN Security Council Counterterrorism Committee plays a key coordinating role in the struggle against international terrorism. In support of regional cooperation, the United States is sponsoring a counterterrorism conference in June 2002 to include participation from the Central Asian and Caucasus states, Afghanistan, Turkey, China, and Russia.

We call upon all nations to implement fully the provisions of UN Security Council resolutions, including resolutions 1368, 1373, 1377 and 1390, directed against terrorism, the Taliban, and al-Qaida, and to become parties at the earliest opportunity to the twelve international antiterrorism conventions, including the Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. The United States supports conclusion of the Russian-proposed nuclear terrorism convention, and joins Russia in urging other nations to enlist in the efforts to resolve the outstanding issues related to the text. We call upon all nations to take steps to comply with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations on money laundering and terrorist financing. We shall work to block the financial assets of named terrorists and their organizations without delay.

We underscore the need to bring to a logical conclusion efforts to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in Afghanistan related to Usama Bin Laden, the al-Qaida organization, and the Taliban. Afghanistan should never again be a haven for terrorism. Reaffirming our support for the important role of the UN in efforts to implement successfully the Bonn Agreement, including the upcoming Loya Jirga, we share a vision of a stable, independent Afghanistan at peace with its neighbors and the rest of the world and on the road to a more prosperous future.

We recognize the links between illegal drug trafficking and terrorism and stress the importance of U.S.-Russia cooperation on counternarcotics. Both our countries are dedicated to continuing their support for regional initiatives, such as those of the "Six Plus Two" Working Group on Drugs, to encourage cooperation among member countries and to strengthen their counternarcotics capabilities. We both strongly support the Afghan Interim Authority's plan to implement its poppy ban.

Believing that the sovereignty, long-term stability, prosperity, and further democratic development of the states of Central Asia serve the strategic interests of the United States and Russia, we pledge transparency and cooperation in our relations with the states of Central Asia. An important step for ensuring their security is to eradicate terrorist activities in Afghanistan once and for all and to assist in the prevention of their reoccurrence.

We reaffirm our commitment to working with the Government of Georgia on counterterrorism issues, while upholding Georgian sovereignty, and hope that the presence of terrorists in this country will be eliminated. As members of the Friends of the UN Secretary-General on Georgia, the United States and Russia remain committed to advancing a peaceful, political resolution of the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. We pledge to work closely with all relevant parties to these conflicts to reduce military tensions, address civilians' security concerns, and foster a lasting political settlement that preserves Georgia's territorial integrity and protects the rights of all of those involved in the conflicts. We highly appreciate the contribution of the UN Security Council, concerned states, and international mechanisms which participate in peaceful efforts toward resolution of these conflicts.

We note with satisfaction the entry into force of the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters between the United States of America and the Russian Federation, which will facilitate joint efforts on criminal and terrorist cases.

We will work to strengthen the exchange of professional know-how and experience in such areas as transportation security, hostage takeover, and airplane hijacking, among others.

We will work to strengthen national, bilateral, and multilateral measures to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, related technologies, and delivery means as an essential element of the fight against international terrorism and all those who support it.

An important step in our joint cooperation will be a meeting of our scientists in June. We will seek to develop jointly new technology to detect nuclear material that can be used to manufacture weapons for purposes of terrorism.

The U.S.-Russia Working Group on Afghanistan has proven a successful vehicle for joint efforts between the United States and Russia to counter terrorism emanating from Afghanistan. Recognizing the increased threat of terrorism originating in other regions of the world, we have directed that the Working Group's agenda be broadened, and that it be renamed the U.S.-Russia Working Group on Counterterrorism. Among other issues, this Working Group will address the threats posed by nuclear, biological, and chemical terrorism. The next meeting of the Working Group will take place in the Washington area in July 2002.

The White House – Office of the Press Secretary

President Bush, Russian President Putin Sign Nuclear Arms Treaty

Remarks by President Bush and President Putin at Signing of Joint Declaration and Press Availability

The Kremlin - Moscow, Russia

24 May 2002

President Bush: [...] President Putin and I have signed a treaty that will substantially reduce our nuclear -- strategic nuclear warhead arsenals to the range of 1,700 to 2,200, the lowest level in decades. This treaty liquidates the Cold War legacy of nuclear hostility between our countries.

We've also signed a joint declaration of new strategic relationship that charts a course toward greater security, political and economic cooperation between Russia and the United States. Our nations will continue to cooperate closely in the war against global terror.

I understand full well that the people of Russia have suffered at the hands of terrorists. And so have we. And I want to thank President Putin for his understanding of the nature of the new war we face together, and his willingness to be determined and steadfast and patient as we pursue this war together.

President Putin and I agree also that the greatest danger in this war is the prospect of terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction. Our nations must spare no effort at preventing all forms of proliferation. And we discussed Iran in this context today. We'll work closely with each other on this very important issue.

Our nations also agree on the importance of a new NATO-Russia Council that will be launched in a few days in Rome. And, Mr. President, this council is also a tribute to your leadership and your vision. For decades, Russia and NATO were adversaries. Those days are gone, and that's good. And

that's good for the Russian people, it's good for the people of my country, it's good for the people of Europe and it's good for the people of the world.

Russia and the United States are also determined to work closely on important regional challenges. Together, we will work to rebuild Afghanistan. Together, we will work to improve security in Georgia. We will work to help end fighting and achieve a political settlement in Chechnya. [...]

President Putin: [...] It's the statement of our countries to reduce our nuclear arsenals and the joint work for nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It's the decision of two states which are particularly responsible for international security and strategic stability. We're on the level of adopting the declaration on new strategic relationship which determines the basic directions in the security and international policy.

It will have a positive impact for economic cooperation and development of our relations between the institutions of general public, and together with Mr. President, we discussed especially this aspect, the civil society between the people of our countries. The declaration formulates the principles of our dialogue, anti-missile dialogue. That is the transparency and openness and exclusion of potential threats. We confirmed the Genoa agreement on offensive and defensive systems in all their aspects.

A separate issue, the mechanism of NATO-Russia cooperation within the framework of 20, it presumes a new level of joint responsibility and confidence between all its participants. [...]

Question: I have a question for both Presidents, please. If we've truly entered a new era, why do you each need 1,700 nuclear weapons? And, President Putin, why does Russia need to continue producing nuclear warheads? And to, President Bush, why does the United States need to keep some 2,000 of these weapons in storage, ready for deployment?

President Bush: First of all, remember where we've come from. We've come from 6,000 to 1,700 in a very quick -- or to 1,700 to 2,200 in a very quick period of time. You know, friends really don't need weapons pointed at each other. We both understand that. But it's a realistic assessment of where we've been. And who knows what will happen 10 years from now. Who knows what future presidents will say and how they react.

If you have a nuclear arsenal, you want to make sure they work. It's -- one reason that you keep weapons in storage apart from launchers is for quality control. And the thing I think it's important for you to know, Ron, is that we've made tremendous progress from the past. And the treaty is setting a period of time in the rear-view mirror of both countries. And I am not only confident that this is good for world peace, I'm confident this sets the stage for incredible cooperation that we've never had before between our countries.

President Putin: I concur with the assessment given by my colleague, Mr. Bush. And naturally, our position is well-known, we are guided by the facts that it's more worthwhile perhaps to eliminate a certain part of nuclear potentials. At the same time, I'd like to point out another thing here. Any man who has at least once in his career dealt with arms, had arms in his hands, at least to hunt or a rifle or whatever, he knows that it's much better, much safer to have it in stock disarmed, disassembled perhaps, rather than to have it in your arms and charged with bullets in it and with your finger on the trigger at the same time. This is a different state of affairs, as it were.

And the fact that we agreed with President Bush regarding such detente, in such manner, this is a serious move ahead to ensure international security, which is a very good sign as regards the relationship between our two countries.

Now, as to why Russia should continue to produce nuclear arms, I'd like to say that this is not our priority. But in addition to Russia and U.S. out there, there are other states who possess nuclear arms. What is more concerning, there are countries who want to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Experts in the area of international security are aware of the fact, and they have been talking a lot about nuclear arms as deterrent.

Moreover, many of them assert -- and it is difficult to dispute this fact -- they say the existence of the nuclear arms was an impediment, an obstacle which contained the world from large-scale wars over

the past decades, let's say. And I think we should take that into consideration while building a new quality of relationship within the two main nuclear states of the world.

We also should pay attention to the whole set of relations currently in the world out there and we should take into account the prospects of development of the world in the realm of security, bearing in mind those potential threats I've mentioned here.

[...]

Question: To both Presidents, to what extent the treaty ensures real nuclear parity, and are there conditions that the treaty can be terminated by either side? And how true is the fact that Russia still remains as one of the nuclear targets for nuclear forces? And how does that relate to the announced new strategic relations between our two countries?

President Bush: -- is a treaty. This document is a treaty that will be confirmed by the United States Senate and the Duma, hopefully.

Secondly, treaties have always had outs; there's nothing new about that. There are conditions of which things may change and people get out of treaties. That's the way it's been. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty had an out; there's nothing new about that. And, thirdly, you know, we are going to work to end the -- forever end the Cold War. And that begins with the statement that Russia's our friend, not our enemy.

And you say targeting -- I mean, the idea of our weaponry, our military has no aims at Russia. There may be old vestiges in place, but Russia's not an enemy. You don't think about how to deal with Russia the way they used to. Russia is a friend. And that's the new thinking. That's part of what's being codified today.

President Putin: As regards the parity, the parity relationship of sorts, the weight of military potentials and nuclear potential, and so on, so forth, each state would have its own strategy of development of what you refer to as nuclear deterrent process. But I'd like to assure you that all the action undertaken by us in this area fully confirmed with the interests of the Russian Federation. The documents signed today are a result of joint effort of the Minister of Defense and Chiefs of staff and our Minister of Foreign Affairs, of course, jointly with our American colleagues. And we proceed from the assumption we have today, and we try to forecast the status of affairs in the world for a lengthy period of time -- I would like to point out, again, for a lengthy perspective.

Now, as regards the question of verification and control, perhaps, I'd like to point out that we're very much satisfied with the U.S. administration approach to this question. Our American partners have agreed that we need to retain START I, which is provided for by the system of verification. We agreed we will continue this work on the basis of the documents signed today, as well.

And what was the second part of the question, incidentally? The mike was off at this time. Regarding those targets, that was not to me. I will also make a remark here, regarding aiming targets. And Mr. Baluyevskiy, our military First Deputy Chief of Staff, is here with us. He and his American counterpart are full aware of those things, targeting aims and other things involved and what is the status today of those aimings and targeting. All in speculations in the press are nothing but expression of domestic political infight either here or in the U.S., just on the verge of the visit. [...]

Russian Observer

The Summit Oil Deal - Setting the Stage for even Bigger Oil Bargains

by Ira Straus
24 May 2002 MCK

Russia and the U.S have agreed to work together on energy strategy. Specifically, they will cooperate against instability in global oil markets; which in practice means that Russia should increase its oil supplies to make up for the shortfall in case of cuts in oil supplies to the West from the Middle East. Meanwhile, America is to help develop Russian oil sources and markets: this means investment.

Evidently there is to be cooperation on developing Central Asian oil markets. This is, at first glance, a modest step, but it is one that is pregnant with a change in the basic nature of Russia-West relations... A new element in the U.S.-Russia agenda has emerged at this Summit: energy deals. It is a subject where the two countries are basically on the same side; they can reach deals to greatly increase their success in realizing their mutual interests, if they first simply set up a framework to reconcile the secondary differences in interest.

Their initial agreement is meant to do this. They have agreed to work together on energy strategy, reconciling their national energy strategies: this means they both recognize it as a strategic matter in which they are on the same side. Specifically, they will cooperate against instability in global oil markets; which in practice means that Russia should increase its oil supplies to make up for the shortfall in case of cuts in oil supplies to the West from the Middle East. Meanwhile, America is to help develop Russian oil sources and markets: this means investment. Evidently there is to be cooperation on developing Central Asian oil markets.

This is, at first glance, a modest step, but it is one that is pregnant with a change in the basic nature of Russia-West relations. As Mikhail Khodorkovsky of *Yukos* wrote, "the opportunities would be almost limitless" if the U.S. and Russia started making bargains in this field (*Financial Times*, May 24). They have started. The effects should keep growing with time:

1. It makes Russia an ally of the West in a vital Western economic security interest.
2. It makes the West an ally of Russia in a vital Russian economic growth interest.
3. It places a new regular item on the agenda of U.S.-Russia relations. Nuclear weapons disagreements need not always have the spotlight at a summit; energy bargains might instead.
4. It creates an invigorating atmosphere. Energy bargains are win-win deals, not zero-sum deals (which is the depressing feeling that always accompanies nuclear arms talks). Everyone can feel in the wallet how their interests are being benefited.

This is not likely to be the last energy deal. It is just the opening wedge. Now that energy-dealing has gotten onto the agenda, people can start thinking about what the next deal could be. Pressure groups should soon come to see the benefits they have gained from the present bargain and mobilize in favor of further deals. This is the classic way for setting an integrative dynamic into motion.

This energy deal should be seen as Stage 1. It is already possible to envisage Stage 2 and Stage 3 deals that would multiply the benefits several times over.

A Stage 2 energy deal: Russia joins the International Energy Agency (IEA), a fair oil price is agreed upon for Russian oil, the West agrees to compensate Russia for financial losses when oil prices fall below this level, and Russia agrees to compete ruthlessly against OPEC to cut world oil prices as low as possible.

The benefits: the West gains literally 10 ten times in low oil prices as much as it transfers to cover Russian losses from the same. Russia recoups all its losses, then gains some from increased market share. Desert sheikdoms stop accumulating huge financial power, something that has destabilized global finances and put big money behind the spread of religious extremist seminaries and terrorism. The world economy benefits tremendously, Third World (India, China, etc.) as well as First World. China and other countries burn less coal.

A further, long-term benefit: The Russian economy starts to rise and fall together with the rest of the world economy, instead of the other way around. It gets onto the same cycle as the West and the world economy, rather than an opposite cycle. This fosters a new enterprising and productive spirit, in keeping with the tremendous capabilities and skills of the Russian people. It encourages a better, mutual-gain attitude toward the world at large - not the old spirit of monopoly and extortion. It helps Russia become a healthy society. And it lances the financial boil of Middle Eastern societies, which have become unhealthier, cartel-and-extortion societies through their oil wealth.

A Stage 3 energy deal. A Russia-West Oil and Gas Community is established, incorporating the deals in Stages 1 and 2. The harmonization of Western and Russian oil price interests, achieved in Stage 2, makes it possible to form a strong joint organization in this sphere. The IEA is upgraded institutionally to form the basis for the Oil and Gas Community.

Like the Coal and Steel Community that laid the foundations of the European Common Market and today's EU, a Russia-West Oil and Gas Community could lay the foundations for a Euro-Atlantic-Eurasian common market.

And then there would be still further prospects:

Stage 4: the end of OPEC. By this stage, OPEC has been greatly weakened; and IEA, representing all the countries of the global "North", greatly strengthened. IEA can set norms for energy policy, energy taxation, stabilization funds and reserves, investment and production among its members. And the UN can set global norms on these matters and dictate to OPEC. A First World-Third World alliance can easily prevail in the UN against OPEC. UN regulations can undermine what is left of OPEC, outlawing its role as a cartel -- an illegitimate form of inter-governmental organization. Eventually OPEC members would no longer find it worth the embarrassment of maintaining the organization.

Stage 5: the end of global oil injustice. The UN Security Council proclaims oil and gas to be a commodity of global economic and security interest and to be subject to global antitrust regulation, as well as regulation motivated by environmental and other concerns. In low-population high-oil states such as the Gulf states (or perhaps all states where oil and gas production and reserves exceed population by a certain specified ratio), it undoes their nationalization of oil, placing the oil and gas fields under global ownership and authority. A UN energy agency could work closely with IEA to set overall management guidelines; a fair rent could be paid to the host states for use of their land.

And there we would have it. No more sucking of the world economy by a few barely populated states. No more letting the hundreds of billions of dollars go to financial destabilization, religious extremism, and terrorism, among other things. Instead a healthier Russia, a healthier Russia-West relation, and a healthier Northern leadership of the world system.

The White House - Office of the Press Secretary

Press Briefing by Secretary of State Colin Powell on President's trip to Russia

The Grand Europa Hotel
St. Petersburg, Russia
May 25, 2002

SECRETARY POWELL: [...] I think I might say a word about the Treaty of Moscow, the strategic offensive reduction treaty. [...] after a period of intense discussion and negotiation, we came up with the treaty that was signed yesterday, which moves operationally deployed warheads down from their levels of roughly 5,000 to 6,000 now, down to 1,700 to 2,200. We believe, and I think I can speak for the Russian side, as well, because they said as much -- believe that this is an historic achievement.

There has been some commentary as to, well, it doesn't deal with the actual warheads once they're in storage, it deals with the warheads on their launchers. I might point out that all previous arms control treaties were of the same type -- they didn't deal with the stockpile elimination, they dealt with either launchers or systems. And so this is consistent with those previous treaties -- SALT I, SALT II, START I, START II and the INF treaty.

The important point is that warheads are coming off of launchers. And if you were interested in reducing the number of warheads in the world on both sides and destroying these warheads, you start with taking them off a launcher. And once you have them into your stockpile, then you can make judgments as to whether you retain some as operational spares, or whether you use some to modernize systems, or whether you destroy them.

I think both sides have it in their interests to destroy as many as possible. Both sides are also limited as to how many they can destroy in any given year because it is a very technical process. We are limited to how many we can do; so are they, just by the nature of our nuclear infrastructure. [...] Nothing in this treaty keeps anybody from destroying warheads that they no longer need which are in stockpiles.

[...]

Question: Mr. Secretary, can you tell us in the context of the nonproliferation efforts, give us your assessment of how concerned you are with level of danger presented by the tactical nuclear weapons that remain in Russia?

SECRETARY POWELL: Yes. This is an area we will have to pursue in the future. Secretary

Rumsfeld makes a particular point of it every time we're together. This agreement yesterday dealt with strategic weapons, but both sides have tactical nuclear weapons. We have much fewer than they do. We made a more deliberate effort to get rid of them back in 1991 when, frankly, I was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and we did it. And they have a larger inventory.

They are short- and medium-range weapons that don't present the same kind of threat to us as the strategic systems do. But nevertheless, they're nuclear weapons. And we believe that, as we move forward, we should discuss these weapons, discuss inventory levels. Have you met the unilateral commitments you made 10 years ago to get rid of these? Because at that time, President Gorbachev, I think it was, made the same commitment that President Bush 41 did to get rid of these kinds of systems or bring them down to a much, much lower level. We still have a few or some -- we still have some. They have many more.

And so we do want to explore with them theater nuclear weapons, as to how we can get a better handle on this kind of weapons system, and we'll be discussing that with them as we move forward. [...]

Los Angeles Times

Tactical Devices Still Present Major Threat

By Paul Richter, Times Staff Writer
May 25, 2002

Washington -- The U.S.-Russian strategic arms deal signed Friday in Moscow has won praise around the globe, yet the agreement says nothing about a class of atomic weapons that experts believe poses the greatest threat: the smaller devices called tactical nuclear weapons.

Thousands of these arms are scattered throughout Russia, in the form of missile warheads, artilleryshells, aircraft bombs and land mines. Because of the security weaknesses of Russia's decaying military infrastructure, these explosives are more likely to fall into the hands of terrorists or "rogue" states than those of any other country, say Western government officials and independent experts.

U.S. officials acknowledge that such tactical weapons pose a proliferation danger, and they discussed safeguards with Russian leaders in the talks that led to the treaty signed Friday. But analysts say the Americans were reluctant to push too hard, for fear of endangering the agreement to reduce by two-thirds the number of nuclear warheads deployed by the two nations. Critics maintain this was a mistake, considering that the Sept. 11 attacks drove home the message that terrorists and rogue regimes might pose a greater risk than a long-range strike by a former Cold War adversary.

"In the post-9/11 world, these are the [weapons] that pose the greatest threat," said Alistair Millar, of the Fourth Freedom Forum, an arms control group in Washington. "That's a pretty severe omission."

Some prominent centrist and conservative figures have joined liberal arms-control advocates in arguing that the United States should be pushing for greater controls on tactical weapons.

Former Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), former Clinton administration Defense Secretary William J. Perry and retired Air Force Gen. Eugene E. Habiger, former commander of U.S. strategic nuclear forces, argued this week that top priority should be given to an accurate accounting of both countries' tactical nuclear arsenals.

"These are the nuclear weapons most attractive to terrorists--even more attractive to them than [radioactive bomb-making] material, and much more portable than strategic warheads," the three wrote in an opinion page article in the Washington Post.

Tactical nuclear weapons are generally defined as those designed for use against military targets on the battlefield. Strategic nuclear weapons are larger long-range weapons that are designed for use against cities or strategic nuclear missile forces.

Alexei G. Arbatov, a ranking member of Russia's Duma, or lower house of parliament, has been quoted as saying that Russia has about 3,800 tactical nuclear weapons. But many Western estimates range as high as 18,000.

The U.S. has about 1,670 such devices, according to Millar, including 180 bombs stored in seven Western European countries.

Tactical weapons are generally compact enough to be carried by one or two persons, said Millar. They are usually relatively small in destructive power--equivalent to less than 100 tons of TNT--but they can also pack as much force as 1 million tons or more of TNT. Some are 60 times as powerful as the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima, Japan, in World War II.

Experts say these weapons pose more of a danger because they are designed to be set off by front-line troops and do not have the elaborate safeguards employed with strategic missiles and bombs. Also, they are deployed in front-line areas near cities, rather than on remote bases or missile fields.

Russian officials have insisted that their inventory is safe and in good hands. But some officials have acknowledged the risks. Col. Gen. Yevgeny P. Maslin, a Russian defense official in charge of nuclear munitions, told *Special Warfare* magazine in 1996 that theft of nuclear weapons from Russian facilities was "impossible." But he acknowledged that the weapons were at risk when being transported and that he was concerned that they could be stolen by fired nuclear-industry specialists, "social malcontents, embittered individuals."

So far, no weapons are publicly known to have been stolen. But there have been unconfirmed reports of Russian tactical weapons being offered for sale, Millar said.

The International Atomic Energy Agency reported the recent case of two Lithuanian arms brokers who offered to sell Russian tactical nuclear weapons to undercover U.S. agents, he said.

One of the greatest sources of Western concern about the tactical arsenal has been an unnerving absence of information on what has occurred since Russia began downsizing its arsenal and withdrawing tactical weapons from former Soviet republics.

After President George Bush, the current American leader's father, made unilateral cuts in the U.S. tactical force, Russian President Boris N. Yeltsin promised in 1992 to sharply slash the tactical force. But since then, there have been only vague statements about that downsizing.

One obstacle to any reduction in the Russian arsenal is the suggestion from Bush administration officials that the Pentagon might need to develop a new class of small "bunker-buster" nuclear weapons to destroy deeply buried enemy command posts and weapons storage facilities. U.S. officials have publicly denied that they have decided to build such new weapons, but several officials are known to privately favor such an effort.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization officials have openly expressed their concerns about Russia's tactical inventory. Yet the tactical force has become even more important to Russian defense in recent years. Russia no longer has enough money to maintain the robust conventional forces it would like. And many in the country feel threatened by the continuing expansion of NATO, which is expected this year to add seven members, including Baltic states and others on Russia's western flank. "They see this as their nuclear equalizer," said Thomas Z. Collina of the Union of Concerned Scientists.

The Clinton administration had hoped to make progress on the subject. In 1997 in Helsinki, Finland, President Clinton got Yeltsin to agree to further discussions. But the American leader made no further headway, and the Bush administration has so far made it a second-tier issue.

John R. Bolton, undersecretary of State for arms control, said in March that U.S. officials had raised the tactical weapons control issue "periodically over the last year, and I'm sure we'll continue to discuss it with them."

But he said the administration's first priority with the Russians was the ballistic missile treaty, the second was the offensive strategic arsenal and the third was other proliferation issues. "The issue of tactical nuclear weapons is still out there," he said in an interview with *Arms Control Today* magazine.

The Observer

Why Bush's deal with Putin doesn't make the world safer

The current American deal with Russia was on offer a decade ago. Meanwhile the Republican right continues to make the world a less safe place.

Dan Plesch
Sunday May 26, 2002

As President Bush travels around Europe this week, he faces many familiar criticisms of his aggressive stance in international affairs. He hopes to assuage these concerns by concluding new agreements with Russia. But a closer look at these deals shows that they have done little to change the wider Bush approach to international affairs. It is the Republican right's refusal to deal the world in any way beyond insisting that America must have everything it wants which guarantees not just continuing dissent in Europe and beyond, but also a less stable world for American interests.

Let's start with the nuclear arms reduction treaty. Bush has described it as finally ending the Cold War. Of course, the Cold War ended ten years ago with the collapse of the Soviet Union. I still recall the shock that went around the NATO press room as the NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner read out the fax he had just received from President Boris Yeltsin announcing the new Russian Federation.

Of course, George Bush must know this. What he appears to be claiming is that the nuclear confrontation is now also over. But this too is untrue. He has signed a treaty which is said to cut two-thirds of US and Russian nuclear missiles but still keeps thousands ready to fire at a few minutes notice. But this is also a decade-old news. His treaty is similar to the START 2 Treaty signed by his father in 1992. It was never implemented because of opposition in the US Senate from those Republicans than now make up Bush's administration. This latest agreement does not even require the missiles to be destroyed and can be cancelled at ninety days notice.

Bush junior's wing of the Republican Party came to office on a platform of outright rejection of any more nuclear arms treaties with Russia, condemning them as agreements of a bygone age. But after little more than a year they had to concede to Russian insistence that a treaty was essential. In the meantime a decade has been lost that could have been used to manage and eliminate nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. These weapons are forever being described as the greatest threat to peace by world leaders including Blair and Bush. But the problems of proliferation in the third world, of "loose nukes" in Russia and of the continuing US-Russian standoff all remain off the agenda of the Moscow Summit.

In the US, the details of the thousands of Russian weapons and enormous quantities of nuclear materials are publicised by many non-governmental groups anxious that they be brought under control. Unfortunately they did not even make enough headway when President Clinton was in office. Today their voices fall on deaf ears.

These "loose nukes" and radioactive materials in other nations, including Britain, remain the source for supply for terrorists and yet Bush is blocking global efforts to control them. The consensus amongst his supporters is that efforts at control are doomed to failure and should never be attempted. Their view is far more extreme even than Ronald Reagan who dealt with the Soviets according to the motto "Trust but Verify". Abandoning these efforts at control is reckless incompetence which his agreement with Putin does little to rectify.

The next order of business for Bush and Putin is a new NATO-Russia agreement. Again, it is certainly better to have some deal than none, but it offers little more than the existing NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. This fell into disuse after the Kosovo war. The new agreement calls for cooperation on counter-terrorism, missile proliferation and missile defence. One result of this new relationship has been that despite Bush's rhetoric on freedom, Russian abuses in Chechnya are no longer criticised by the White House. Even on the spread of missile technology the US has ignored a Russian plan that recommends much greater restrictions than anything NATO has contemplated.

Also on Bush's itinerary is a trip to the Normandy beaches where he will attempt to wrap himself in the aura of the many who died there liberating Europe. But Roosevelt and his generation of Americans sought to build the UN and other international institutions to prevent the renewal of war, Bush on the other hand is bent on belittling the UN and dispensing with international security agreements wherever possible. According to US government officials this refusal to play ball except when they can be guaranteed victory has reached new heights. There is now a formal State Department edict that the US should not even begin a negotiation if it thinks it might have to make

concessions. This shows an astonishing lack of confidence in the US's ability to make constructive agreements even when it wields such immense power.

At first sight this strong-minded approach may suit the lone superpower. But any considered view shows that this lack of flexibility and imagination in the application of power has not produced security. Israel is out of control, the Indo-Pakistan conflict has occurred after sanctions caused by the nuclear weapons programmes had been lifted by Washington (in order to bring both South Asian states on board for the war on terrorism); in Afghanistan military victory seems far off and US soldiers keep telling reporters, "It is just like Vietnam". The US military is now advising Bush that despite a near \$300 billion budget they cannot attack Iraq for another six months to a year.

The militarist culture has yet to face up to the real requirements of intelligence and secrecy. On a recent trip to Washington, talking to experienced writers on American intelligence, I was shown two graphic examples of the failure of the national security culture. On one occasion I was shown pictures of secret Al-Qaeda bases which US soldiers were sending around the internet. On another, pictures of the supposedly secret faces of US commandos taken by a US General on tour and handed out to the public at a special forces museum event back home.

These are not simply isolated lapses but are indicative of a far broader lack of understanding of the real requirements of meeting the threat that certainly does exist from Al Qaeda and its imitators. For the Bush team a military solution is the only solution they are interested in. Nation-building and other "social work" is suitable only for the Europeans. In the real world the military have a role to play but not the only role and on many occasions not even the most important.

The Bush approach can be compared to trying to keep law and order just using a riot squad. If the riot squad is all one has, then it will be used more and more. Debate will turn to the need for more and better tear-gas, riot shields and the like. In reality social programs, cops on the beat, economic development and a legal system are essential to our security. Denying that these are essential tools of global governance plays into the hands of the wreckers.

• *Dan Plesch is Senior Research Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute and author of *Sheriff and Outlaws in the Global Village*.*

Commentaar

Wie een nadere blik werpt op de kleine letters van het Moskou verdrag en die bovendien vergelijkt met de ontwikkelingen die elders hebben plaats gevonden, kan alleen bijzonder verbaasd zijn over de positieve ‘spin’ die in de media aan de afspraken tussen Rusland en de VS is gegeven. Zoals William Hartung in een hier afgedrukt artikel het zo mooi beschrijft: de facto wordt de wereld veilig gemaakt voor het voortbestaan van kernwapens. Dat is heel wat anders dan de afspraak die in de evaluatieconferentie van het Non-proliferatieverdrag in 2000 nogmaals werd bevestigd in het slotdocument, om “ondubbelzinnig” (unequivocally) tot nucleaire ontwapening te komen. Dat verdrag wordt onderschreven door alle landen ter wereld, behalve Cuba, India, Pakistan en Israël. Dat is ook de reden dat er in het Moskou verdrag expliciet naar artikel VI van het verdrag wordt verwezen, waar deze ontwapeningsbelofte in 1970 werd vastgelegd.

De kern van de afspraken van het in Moskou ondertekende verdrag is dat beide kernwapenmogendheden genoeg nucleaire middelen houden om de wereld een aantal malen te verwoesten, en bovendien de flexibiliteit wordt ingebouwd om zelfs dat absurd hoge aantal wapens weer snel uit te breiden als een van de ondertekenaars dat nodig acht. Daarmee wordt in feite het terreur evenwicht in stand gehouden. De beoogde reductie duurt zo lang dat volgende regeringen er makkelijk op kunnen terugkomen: het verdrag kan met een waarschuwingsperiode van drie maanden worden opgezegd.

Voor Rusland was ondertekening een mogelijkheid om hun onmacht tegenover de reeks unilaterale stappen van de VS te verbergen. De voormalige supermacht heeft immers geen financiële mogelijkheden om een omvangrijk leger, laat staan een grote kernwapenstrijdmacht, in stand te houden. De tegelijkertijd onderhandelde overeenkomst tussen de NAVO en Rusland wijst ook in dezelfde richting: een sterk verzwakt Rusland dat zich moet neerleggen bij de dictaten van de enige supermacht, en blij moet zijn om te mogen deelnemen aan de vergaderingen van de werkelijke machthebbers. Russische commentatoren zijn zich hier wel van bewust: Pavel Felgenhauer schrijft in de Moscow Times botweg dat het verdrag een waardeloos stuk papier is: er zijn geen procedres voor verificatie van het nakomen van de afspraken.

Ruim voor het verdrag werd getekend, had de publicatie van delen van het ‘Nuclear Posture Review’ in januari al helder gemaakt dat de ombouw van de Amerikaanse nucleaire strijdkrachten geenszins bedoeld was om kernwapens af te schaffen. Het in dat aan het Congres gestuurd document beschreef de contouren van de nieuwe kernwapenstrijdkrachten: flexibeler, ingebouwd in een systeem waar de bevels- en communicatielijnen zouden worden verbeterd, zodat mogelijke doelwitten zo snel mogelijk konden worden bestookt met kernwapens of conventionele middelen. Het te bouwen raketschild zou de flexibiliteit nog verder verhogen: het thuisland, de bondgenoten en expeditielegers van de VS zouden afgeschermd worden. Daardoor zou het mogelijk worden om flexibeler op te treden in het buitenland. Die flexibiliteit hield ook in dat kernwapens onder nog meer omstandigheden konden worden ingezet: niet alleen als reactie op een aanval met massavernietigingswapens, maar ook tegen de vermeende dreiging van zo een aanval, tegen diep ingegraven installaties gerelateerd aan massavernietigingswapens en zelfs in niet nader gedefinieerde omstandigheden waarin Amerikaanse troepen in gevaar zouden komen.

Bovendien werd aangekondigd dat ook de nucleaire doctrine van de NAVO zou moeten worden herzien in het licht van de nieuwe dreigingen. Dat laatste zou consequenties hebben voor de kernwapens die in het kader van de NAVO door de Nederlandse luchtmacht worden gebruikt. Om het raketschild verdragsmatig mogelijk te maken, stapte de VS in juni 2002 uit het anti-ballisties raketverdrag.

Deze aanslag op de stappen die in de negentiger jaren naar nucleaire ontwapening zijn genomen, valt wellicht alleen te verklaren in het kader van de oorlogen tegen het terrorisme die de Amerikaanse regering heeft uitgeroepen als reactie op de aanslagen op de WTC en het Pentagon. De diplomaten van de westerse landen die in het verleden het multilateralisme en het belang van verdragen toejuichten, zijn nu vervallen in een merkwaardige stilte. Daarmee wordt het Amerikaanse unilateralisme en de afspraak van Rusland en de VS om niet nucleair te ontwapenen, stilzwijgend goedgekeurd.

FACTS AND REPORTS

Eerder verschenen in de reeks PENN – NL Facts and Reports:

1. US unilateralism – official foreign comments
Citaten van internationale politici en diplomaten over het Amerikaans unilateralisme.
2. Veiligheidsvraagstukken en de verkiezingen – standpunten van de politieke partijen
Relevante delen van de partijprogramma's van de Nederlandse politieke partijen, plus citaten van politici op het terrein van oorlog en vrede.
3. Transatlantic relations – recent developments
Overzicht van recente ontwikkelingen in de transatlantische betrekkingen, met name binnen de NAVO, mede naar aanleiding van uitspraken in de State of the Union.
4. Ontwikkelingen betreffende kernwapens en de Nederlandse politiek – briefing paper
Periodiek overzicht van ontwikkelingen rond kernwapens in de internationale en nationale politiek, met uitgebreide hoeveelheid bijlagen.
5. Nucleaire vraagstukken – standpunten van de Nederlandse regering en de Tweede Kamer
Overzicht april 2001 – april 2002
6. Crisis in de OPCW – de verwijdering van directeur-generaal Bustani
Documenten en artikelen over het ontslag van directeur-generaal Bustani van het OPCW
7. Prepcom van het NPV – nucleaire ontwapening stopt
Verklaringen en rapporten van staten en ngo's tijdens de Prepcom van het NPV

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